AIC_2008

ANNALES

INTERNATIONALES DE CRIMINOLOGIE

INTERNATIONAL ANNALS OF CRIMINOLOGY

ANALES

INTERNACIONALES DE CRIMINOLOGIA

ANNEE 2008 (volume 46-1/2)

SOCIÉTÉ INTERNATIONALE DE CRIMINOLOGIE

Ministère de la Justice

12, rue Charles Fourier

75013 — Paris

phone

33.(0)1.45.88.00.23

fax : 33.(0)1.45.88.96.40

e-mail

crim.sic@wanadoo.fr

web site

http://perso.wanadoo.fr/societe.internationale.de.criminologie

ANNALES INTERNATIONALES

DE CRIMINOLOGIE

Organe officiel de la Société Internationale de Criminologie

Président de la Société : Tony PETERS (Belgique)

Secrétaire général de la Société : George PICCA (France)

COMITÉ DE RÉDACTION DES ANNALES

Rédacteur en chef

Prof. Georges KELLENS (Belgique)

adj. Prof. Michaël DANTINNE (Belgique)

Rédacteurs Associés

Prof. Edmundo Oliveira (Brésil)

Prof. Louise Shelley (USA)

Prof. Setsuo Miyazawa (Japon)

La redacciôn agradece a la Dra. Maria Jesûüs Guardiola Lago (Uni-

versidad de Lleida) su colaboraciôn en la traducciôn de los textos en

castellano.

The editors want to thank Dr. Maria Jesûs Guardiola Lago (Univer-

sity of Lleida) for her assistance in Castilian.

Merci à Dra. Maria Jesûüs Guardiola Lago (Université de Lleida)

pour sa précieuse aide en castillan.

Table de matières

Table of contents

Indice

Souvenir de Giacomo Canepa

Tullio Bandini et Uberto Gatti

« . —. e « » + » © » » e » e »s »s » » e e . e « . = +

XV Congrès mondial de criminologie (Barcelone — Espagne

20/25 juillet 2008)

. e . e e « » »% + + » + » » + + » » » » » » + e + » « © e e e » + » » » e » » © à

Georges Picca

Allocution du Président de la Société Internationale de Crimi-

nologie

Tony Peters

e « . « . + + » + < + + »s » » © + < e + » + » » e © » e e » e s. e « « » » » + + » + +

]1

Presentaciôn del XV Congreso Mundial de la Sociedad Inter-

nacional de Criminologia Barcelona 20-25 julio 2008

Esther Giménez-Salinas 1 Colomer

e e e e « e e © e + « » « © » + e » + © — + +

15

Disciplining Criminology?

David Garland

19

Organized Crime : New Label, New Phenomenon or Policy

Expedient?

Letizia Paoli

« . *. + —. e + « + + e « =s e + + + + + +s « + * + » e » » + » e + © » —s © « » » e « » —

39

Delincuencia urbana y victimizaciôn de las victimas

E. Rauûl Zaffaroni

63

Globalization and Transnational Crime : New Links, New

Perspectives

Emilio C. Viano

81

iQuién necesita a un criminôlogo’: Investigaciôn, acciôn y

politica criminal

Vicente Garrido Genovés

. . e » »s + + » e … »s » » e » « » » e » e e + e e — « e » e

107

10.The Draft UN Convention on Justice and Support for Vic-

tims of Crime, with special reference to its provisions on Res-

torative Justice

Marc Groenhuijsen

. « « * » + © » e 6 * » + » » à . » « e s. « e + =s + » » e + e « +e « + À

121

11

The Future of Criminology as a Social Science And Acade-

mic

Discipline :

Reflections

on Criminology's

Unholy

Alliance with Criminal Policy & on Current Misguided

Attempts to Divorce Victimology from Criminology

Ezzat À. Fattah

. . ». e — » … e » e © … e e » s e + e — « © » + » e » e < » e < » » . e + e —

137

Attribution des Prix de la Société Internationale

de Criminologie

12

Premio Herman Mannheim : Prof. Esther Gimenez-Salinas 1

Colomer

Tony Peters

. s. » * » © — + » 6 e » + » … » e « « » e . » » . e « © « * e » »s © © + « © » e =s + e

171

13

Prix Durkheim : Professeur Hans-Jürgen Kerner

Denis Szabo

. ». © « e < » e — e + * + » * s » e » e e e » e » » . % . + + + « + e < + » = + » +

173

14

Prix Etienne De Greeff : Luis Rodriguez Manzanera

Uberto Gatti

. » e e « <s e © + » » » » e + » e e » « e e e — — e + — « + « + + » < e + + » » »

177

15

Premio especial del presidente de la SIC : Prof. M. Luisa C.

Corcoy Bidasolo

Tony Peters

181

- 6—

SOUVENIR DE GIACOMO CANEPA

Tullio Bandini

Uberto Gatti

Le 18 février 2008 Giacomo Canepa, 1illustre Professeur de Crimino-

logie et de Médecine légale, nous a quittés.

Né à Gènes (Italie) en 1922, 1l fut reçu docteur en Médecine juste

après la guerre et entreprit sa carrière académique à l’Institut de Méde-

cine Légale de Gênes où une activité scientifique originale se développait

déjà dans le domaine de la psychologie et de la criminologie, activité liée

aux travaux d'’éminents spécialistes tels que Amadeo Dalla Volta,

Domenico Macagg1 et Aldo Franchini.

Devenu Docteur en Médecine, le Professeur Canepa ressentit vite

l’exigence d'approfondir ses connaissances avec des études humanistes,

obtenant une maîtrise en philosophie et se spécialisant en Psychologie à

la prestigieuse Ecole milanaise fondée et dirigée par le Révérend Père

Agostino Gemelli.

Ses multiples intérêts culturels embrassaient de nombreux champs,

allant de la littérature au cinéma, à la musique classique avec une dis-

position particulière pour l’étude du violon où 1l avait atteint d’excel-

lents résultats.

Sa vie fut enrichie par une épouse présente et pleine de sagesse et par

trois filles merveilleuses qui l’aidèrent à surmonter toutes les difficultés.

Professeur titulaire d'Anthropologie Criminelle et de Médecine

Légale, 1l fut le fondateur de l’Institut de Criminologie, de l’Ecole de

Spécialisation en Criminologie Clinique, du Centre International de Cri-

minologie Clinique Comparée, de la Revue italienne de Criminologie,

créant à l'Université de Gênes un centre de recherche et d’enseignement

criminologique connu et apprécié dans le monde entier.

L'activité internationale du Professeur Canepa fut particulièrement

intense : il collabora pendant de nombreuses années avec l’Ecole de Cri-

minologie de l'Université de Montréal (Canada); il fut un membre actif

et enthousiaste du Conseil Scientifique de Criminologie du Conseil

d'Europe; il présida la Société Internationale de Criminologie, avec tou-

jours le même engagement et la même énergie.

Les criminologues du monde entier gardent le souvenir du style et de

l’atmosphère cordiale qui régnaient au cours des Journées Internationa-

les de Criminologie Clinique Comparée de Santa Margherita Ligure, qui

ont accueilli, pendant de nombreuses années, les criminologues, juristes

7 —

et médecins légistes les plus prestigieux. En Italie, 1l se dédia particuliè-

rement au développement de la Société Italienne de Criminologie, dont

il fut le président pendant de nombreuses années, organisant activement

congrès et séminaires d’étude et où 1l fut l’initiateur et le coordinateur

de nombreuses activités de publication.

Organisateur infatigable, homme de médiation et de contact, inspira-

teur et Maître de nombreux disciples qu’il savait écouter, conseiller et

soutenir, le Professeur Canepa posait la recherche et l’activité scientifi-

que au centre de ses intérêts. Profondément engagé dans la recherche cli-

nique, 1l était un spécialiste attentif et connaisseur de toutes les perspec-

tives possibles d’étude de la Criminologie qu’il intégrait dans une

approche pluridisciplinaire et qui trouvait sa synthèse dans le concept de

personnalité. C’est autour de cette dimension qu’il développa de nom-

breuses recherches, dans une vision ouverte sur l’étude des facteurs bio-

logiques, psychologiques et sociaux qui sous-tendent le comportement

de l’homme.

Travailleur infatigable,il publia des centaines d’articles et de livres

scientifiques, des rapports de recherche, des documents d’analyse de

politique criminelle.

Honoré et aimé dans le monde entier pour ses qualités personnelles

et pour sa valeur scientifique, il reçut d'innombrables louanges, prix

nationaux et internationaux ainsi que le titre prestigieux de Docteur

honoris causa de l’Université de Lyon.

Ses nombreux disciples se souviennent de lui avec beaucoup d’estime

et une grande affection, et n'oublieront jamais son exemple et ses ensei-

gnements moraux, humains et scientifiques.

— 8

XVe CONGRES MONDIAL

DE CRIMINOLOGIE

(Barcelone — Espagne —

20/25 juillet 2008)

Georges Picca ‘!)

Le XV° Congrès mondial de Criminologie organisé par la Société

Internationale de Criminologie, s’est déroulé à Barcelone (Espagne) du

20 au 25 juillet 2008. Il avait pour thème «Crime et criminologie :

recherche et action». Le Congrès s'inscrivait ainsi dans la perspective, à

la fois scientifique et pratique de ceux qui l’ont immédiatement pré-

cédé . Tl a réuni un nombre important de participants, venus de diffé-

rentes régions du monde : universitaires et chercheurs, responsables des

polices et, de la justice pénale et de nombreux étudiants.

L'évolution actuelle des différentes manifestations de la criminalité

dans un contexte de globalisation a contribué à mettre, notamment dans

ce Congrès, l’accent sur le caractère transnational de certaines tendances

de la criminalité (crime organisé, criminalité financière, trafic de stupé-

fiants et terrorisme). Mais d’autres thèmes majeurs ont également con-

tribué à animer le débat. Il en a été ainsi de la persistance d’une crimi-

nalité urbaine

importante,

consécutive à des

concentrations

de

populations, qui existent désormais dans diverses régions du monde.

Dans un tel contexte social la nécessité d'une adaptation des politi-

ques criminelles, ainsi que de l’action des services de police et de justice

devait être complétée par un intérêt, désormais croissant, pour des

mesures adaptées à l'amélioration du sort des victimes de la criminalité,

ainsi que de procédures nouvelles telles que la médiation et la justice dite

«restaurative».

Ce nouveau numéro des Annales Internationales de Criminologie est

consacré aux principales contributions présentées au cours des séances

plénières du Congrès , par les meilleurs experts dans différents domai-

nes de la criminologie.

() Secrétaire général.

( Les trois précédents Congrès ont eu lieu à Séoul (Corée) en 1998, Rio de Janeiro (Bré-

sil) en 2003, et Philadelphie (USA) en 2005.

G11 à été rendu compte des précédents Congrès déjà cités dans les numéros 37, 41 et 43

des Annales Internationales de Criminologie.

9 _—

Le thème du Congrès a permis de faire le point sur nombre de pro-

blèmes actuels que posent à la fois les nouveaux développements de la

criminalité et, l’évolution des procédures de prévention sociale, ainsi que

des diverses politiques nationales ou régionales, anticriminelles.

Ce thème central a été, en effet, développé, à la fois en plusieurs

séances plénières, animées par d’éminents conférenciers, ainsi que dans

l’organisation d’une centaine d’ateliers (workshops) destinés à favoriser

les échanges entre praticiens, experts, chercheurs et responsables de la

justice pénale et de la criminologie.

Il importe, en effet, de souligner que les travaux de nos Congrès

visent à une évaluation périodique des tendances de la criminalité, dans

les différentes parties du monde, ainsi que des problèmes nouveaux qui

en résultent pour les responsables de la justice pénale et de la prévention

sociale. S’agissant plus particulièrement de la contribution que peut

apporter la recherche en criminologie, cette exigence doit également être

prise en compte dans les priorités à retenir. Il est, en effet, légitime

d'attendre de la recherche, sur un plan plus général, une contribution

utile à l’efficacité des politiques sociales.

En ce qui concerne l’organisation de ce Congrès, 1l importe de rendre

hommage à la contribution essentielle des Universités de Barcelone et

Ramon Llull, concernant à la fois l’accueil et le séjour des participants

mais également le développement des aspects scientifiques de cette

grande manifestation. La Société Internationale de Criminologie, par

suite, exprime ses vifs remerciements aux différentes hautes autorités qui

ont permis le succès de ce XV° Congrès mondial de criminologie.

Ce Congrès a été, également l’occasion, comme il est de tradition, de

décerner un certain nombre de Prix destinés à récompenser des contri-

butions scientifiques particulièrement remarquées aux progrès de la cri-

minologie dans différents domaines. Il s’agissait principalement du Prix

Émile Durkheim, dans le domaine de la sociologie criminelle, du Prix

De Greeff dans le domaine de la criminologie clinique et, du Prix Man-

nheim. On trouvera, par suite, dans ce numéro des Annales, le texte des

hommages adressés aux personnalités ayant reçu les Prix précités.

Ces textes sont également accompagnés par les allocutions d'ouver-

ture du Congrès du Prof. Tony Peters, Président de la Société Interna-

tionale de Criminologie et de Madame Esther Giménez-Salinas 1 Colo-

mer, Rectrice de l’Université Ramon Llull de Barcelone.

[l est, enfin, particulièrement agréable de vous annoncer que le XVI®

Congrès Mondial de Criminologie, aura lieu en 2011 à Kobe (Japon).

C’est une nouvelle étape dans le développement au niveau mondial de

notre Société qui est ainsi soulignée. C'est également l’opportunité de

remercier la contribution de l’ensemble des abonnés et des lecteurs des

Annales Internationales de Criminologie.

— 10 —

ALLOCUTION DU PRÉSIDENT

DE LA SOCIÉTÉ INTERNATIONALE

DE CRIMINOLOGIE

Tony Peters ‘!)

Estimadas autoridades civiles, judiciales y policiales

Estimada Señora Esther Jiménez Salinas, Rectora magnifica de la

Universidad Ramon Llull.

Estimados colegas crimindôlogos

Es para mi un motivo de gran satisfacciôn poder inaugurar el Deci-

moquinto Congreso Mundial de Criminologia aqui, en Barcelona.

Casi 38 años después del V Congreso Mundial, que se organizô en

Madrid a finales de septiembre de 1970, la SIC, ha vuelto a España, esta

vez a Barcelona, a Cataluña.

Durante la ültima década ya nos hemos encontrado

— en Asia, (Corea, Seül en 1998)

— En América Latina, (Brasil, Rio de Janeiro en 2003)

— Y la ûltima en América del Norte, (EEUU, Filadelfia en 2005)

En nombre de la SIC me gustaria agradecer y al mismo tiempo feli-

citar, de todo corazôn, a todas las personas (y son muchas) que desde

hace dos años han realizado un enorme trabajo de preparaciôn y de

organizaciôn de este Congreso Mundial.

La Universidad Ramon Llull y la Universidad de Barcelona han

reunido a sus mejores expertos para colaborar con la SIC con el obje-

tivo de hacer de este evento criminolôgico un éxito, tanto a nivel orga-

nizacional como cientifico.

Querria en particular y personalmente agradecer y felicitar a las dos

colegas que representan esas dos Universidades y a sus dos equipos de

colaboradores.

Gracias Señora Rectora Esther Giménez Salinas 1 Colomer (gracias

Andreu, Ana y Pamen)

Gracias Colega Mirenxtu Corcoy (y gracias Gabriela y Fernando)

Aprovecho la ocasiôn para agradecer también a todo el equipo de

organizaciôn ALOHA Congreso, Tecnic Viajes que se ha preocupado de

toda la parte técnica y de organizaciôn material de las inscripciones,

reservas etc....

(D Presidente de la Sociedad Internacional de Criminologia.

— 11 —

Agradezco en nombre de la SIC, a las autoridades e instituciones que

han apoyado y subvencionado el XV Congreso Mundial :

— El Ayuntamiento de Barcelona

— El Departamento del Interior, el Departamento de Justicia y el Cen-

tre d'Estudis de la Generalitat de Catalunya.

— El Departamento de Interior del Gobierno Vasco

— El Ministerio de Interior del Gobierno de España

Agradezco especialmente las dos organizaciones :

— La SEIC (Sociedad Española de Investigaciôn criminolôgica)

— La FACE (Federaciôn de Asociaciones de Criminélogos de España)

que han decidido asociar sus actividades anuales este año con el Con-

greso mundial de la SIC

Muy bienvenidos a Barcelona.

Les deseo mucho éxito con sus mültiples iniciativas dentro del pro-

grama de nuestras actividades en talleres y mesas redondas.

Barcelona (España) 20 de Julio de 2008

*

*

*

I also welcome the presence of three Honorary Presidents of the ISC,

Prof. Denis Szabo, Prof. Hans Juergen Kerner and Prof. Larry Sher-

man

Their active participation in various meetings, plenaries and work-

shops, shnows how much they remain involved in the International Soci-

ety

When I was elected president of the ISC I had two priorities in mind.

À first priority was related to the subject matter of the next Con-

gress.

The general theme we have chosen for the XVth World Congress 1s :

“Crime and Criminology : Research and Action”

Within this broad approach we will use three actual and main areas

of interest : transnational crime, urban crime and victims and restorative

justice, for presentations and discussions in plenary sessions, workshops

and round tables.

But first of all, l have proposed to pay attention to a fundamental

reflection on the state of affairs and the future position we aim at, for

academic criminology in teaching and research. Challenging socio-eco-

nomic and political developments urge criminologists to step forward as

creative independent and critical scientists who contribute to a fast

growing body of theoretical knowledge and socio-empirical academic

research.

_— 1n -

These two dimensions teaching and research will be addressed this

morning by two outstanding, internationally recognized scholars in

criminology.

À second priority, 1 have in mind is to try to develop within the ISC

a general role of a basic information service about “the academic status

of criminology”.

We arrived at a turning point where important decisions about the

academic position of criminology, as an interdisciplinary approach in its

own right have been made recently or will be made in the near future

by Universities in different countries.

This worldwide debate, receives particular interest in Europe.

With the Sorbonne, Bologna declaration, the European Union stim-

ulates and facilitates a far reaching remodeling of the Furopean Aca-

demic World. In some countries it confirms in other countries it opens

new perspectives for the academic position of criminology.

More especially in Spain, this debate is ongoing and is taking a

promising orientation. | hope that the XV" World Congress will be a

strong support for our

Spanish colleagues, who are finalizing the debate and who are taking

important decisions about the introduction of independent academic

criminology programs at different levels and different Universities.

My proposal is to discuss, during this Congress, within appropriate

workshops and meetings, the service role the ISC, could play in bringing

together basic information about existing and planned academic crimi-

nology programs.

The aim is to put the collected information together, following a for-

mat we have to agree on, and to make this information available to all

interested academic centres to facilitate discussions and to promote

exchanges.

This could become an important info service role for the ISC, and

could become a recurrent activity of the Scientific Commission.

On behalf of the organizing committee and on behalf of the ISC we

wish you all exceptional rich experiences of satisfying scientific

exchanges and debates.

It is our honest hope that the XV* Word Congress becomes a long

lasting source of intellectual, academic and professional inspiration for

the world community of criminologists meeting here in Barcelona.

*

*

*

A mes paroles de remerciements je veux ajouter ma gratitude et ma

reconnaissance au secrétariat de la Société Internationale de Criminolo-

— 13 —

gie. Avec notre secrétaire général, Georges Picca, J'ai une large expé-

rience de communication et de collaboration. Sa préoccupation cons-

tante est la continuité et la qualité de nos activités scientifiques. Sa

présence est une fidèle garantie, pour l’avenir de notre Société.

À côté de lui, Rachida Touahria, qui a un rôle décisif. Elle se trouve

au centre des activités, au point névralgique, où, passent les appels, les

demandes, les plaintes, les exigences etc. Heureusement, elle sait com-

ment gérer tous ces mouvements.J’ai toujours apprécié sa collaboration

efficace.

Finalement, «last but not least», je remercie, de tout mon cœur,

notre Président de la Commission scientifique, notre collègue Serge Bro-

chu de l’Université de Montréal.

Avec l’aide de son équipe, Valérie et Mylène, 1l a fait, presque

l’impossible, pour organiser un programme d’ateliers et tables rondes, à

la fois diversifié et équilibré. Mon expérience du Congrès de Rio de

Janeiro m'autorise à dire que je sais de quoi je parle.

Je ne voudrais pas oublier de souligner que quelques membres de la

Commission Scientifique ont joué un rôle décisif pour la mise en œuvre

du programme des ateliers.

_— 14 —

PRESENTACION

DEL XV CONGRESO MUNDIAL

DE LA SOCIEDAD INTERNACIONAL

DE CRIMINOLOGIA

Barcelona 20-25 julio 2008

Esther Giménez-Salinas i Colomer “)

Es un honor para la Universidad Ramon Llull y la Universidad de

Barcelona acoger a los participantes del XV Congreso Mundial de la

Sociedad Internacional de Criminologia.

Como Rectora de la Universitat Ramon Llull me gustaria empezar

diciendo que la organizaciôn conjunta de este congreso con la Univer-

sitat de Barcelona ha sido una experiencia enriquecedora que espero que

se repita en muchas otras ocasiones. La estrecha colaboraciôn en la que

hemos trabajado, el desarrollo conjunto de las actividades y la definitiva

organizaciôon del congreso, solo ha sido posible gracias a las personas

que han participado y de manera muy particular gracias a la Profesora

Dra. Mirentxu Corcoy, Directora del Departamento de Derecho Penal

de la Universidad de Barcelona.

También quiero agradecer efusivamente a la Sociedad Española de

Investigacion Criminolégica y a la Federaciôn de Asociaciones de Cri-

minologia Española que no hayan celebrado sus congresos internos con

la intenciôn que este Congreso Mundial pudiera tener un mayor éxito

de puüblico. Gestos tan generosos como estos contribuyen a la consoli-

daciôn 1 internacionalizaciôn de nuestra disciplina.

Finalmente quiero agradecer la colaboraciôn de todas las personas e

Instituciones que han hecho posible la realizaciôon de este Congreso y de

una manera particular al Departamento de Justicia y al Centro de Estu-

dios Juridicos de la Generalitat de Catalunya, Al Departamento de

Relaciones Institucionales y de Participaciôn y al Instituto de seguridad

Püblica de la Generalitat de Catalunya. Al Ministerio del Interior del

Gobierno de España y a la Consejeria de Interior del gobierno Vasco.

También a Aloha congress por su profesionalidad y dedicaciôn.

Pero si hay alguien que merece un agradecimiento muy particular

Ileno de respeto pero también de cariño, es el Profesor Dr. Tony Peters,

profesor emérito de la facultad de Criminologia de la Universidad de

Leuven y actualmente Presidente de la Sociedad Internacional de Crimi-

() Prof. Dra. Rectora de la Universitat Ramon Llull.

— 15 —

nologia, que en circunstancies harto dificiles ha trabajado no solo con

extrema dedicaciôn y entusiasmo, sino poniendo en prâctica su gran

especialidad ‘“la mediaciôn”. De principio a fin y durante estos cinco

años Tony Peters ha dirigido y ha mediado en este dificil mundo de la

Academia, con sabiduria, paciencia y bondad algo que muy pocos hom-

bres poseen y que el administra con creces.

Para nuestro pais la celebraciôn de este Congreso en estos momentos

es muy importante. La adaptaciôn de los nuevos planes de estudio al

Espacio Europeo de Educaciôn Superior- también conocido como Bolo-

nia- significa una gran oportunidad para la Criminologia. En efecto la

nueva regulaciôn en España va a permitir que las Universidades que asi

lo deseen, puedan implantar a partir del curso 2008/2009 un grado en

Criminologia. Asi mismo son varias las Universidades que han recon-

vertido sus Masters en Criminologia en Masters oficiales de Bolonia.

Ello significa que definitivamente los estudios de Criminologia en

España constaran de los tres ciclos es decir Grado, Master y Doctorado.

Ello sitüa a la Criminologia en 1gualdad de condiciones que el resto de

los estudios que se pueden cursar en las Universidades españolas. Todo

ello significa que, finalmente la Criminologia tendrä una estructura cla-

ramente diferenciada del resto de las disciplinas,con su respectivo Pro-

fesorado y la posibilidad de cursar los tres grados. Mâs allà de la impor-

tancia en el la docencia, representa también la posibilidad de potenciar

la investigaciôn criminolôgica como disciplina autônoma.

Durante estos dias reflexionaremos también sobre estos temas y sus

consecuencias y hasta que punto al establecerse la criminologia como

una disciplina autônoma se separa sustancialmente de los planteamien-

tos psicolôgicos, juridicos o sociolôgicos que hasta el momento habian

representado la base de su conocimiento.

Ya mâs en concreto se abordaran algunos de los retos esenciales a

los que la criminologia ha de hacer frente en la actualidad : asi y como

grandes ejes se trataràä la criminalidad transnacional como un fenômeno

propio de la globalizaciôn y de imparables consecuencias, la criminali-

dad urbana con sus diferentes manifestaciones y caracteristicas segûn el

tipo de ciudad y la apariciôn de nuevos modelos de control de la segu-

ridad y finalmente un tema que no podia faltar y es el derecho de las

victimas y su desarrollo progresivo en el proceso judicial, asi como los

avances dede el nuevo paradigma de la Justicia restaurativa.

Es un gran honor que la Sociedad Internacional de Criminologia eli-

giera Barcelona como la Sede de este Congreso y para nuestras Univer-

sidades un espléndida ocasiôn para dar un nuevo empuje a esta disci-

plina.

Al igual que en el Ambito del control, el control informal se desarro-

lla con igual o mas importancia que el control formal, asi pues en el

ambito de un congreso de estas caracteristicas, las relaciones, los con-

tactos y la informaciôn con el resto de los participantes son tan o mas

provechosas que las actividades programadas. Por ello no tengo la

menor duda que con una participaciôn de 1.000 personas y mültiples

posibilidades de encuentros, los vinculos de los diferentes profesionales

y las posibilidades de intercambio se estrecharan en profundidad.

Tan solo me resta desearles que durante su estancia en Barcelona dis-

fruten de nuestra ciudad de nuestro pais y de nuestra cultura.

Como Ustedes conocen, en Catalunya nuestra lengua es el catalän,

por ello me permito darles nuevamente la mas cordial bienvenida, no

solo en nuestra lengua sino también con las palabras de uno de nuestros

mas admirados cantautores, me refiero a Jaume Sisa quien en uno de

sus textos dice asi :

Oh, benvinguts, passeu passeu

fa una nit clara i tranquilla,

hi ha la Îluna que fa Ium,

els convidats van arribant

i van omplint tota la casa

de colors i de perfums

Oh, benvinguts, passeu passeu,

de les tristors en farem fum.

ÀÂ casa meva és casa vostra

si que hi ha cases d'algu.

Esperando que estos versos sean una auténtica realidad reciban nue-

vamente la mas cordial bienvenida.

_— 17 —

DISCIPLINING CRIMINOLOGY?

David Garland @

INTRODUCTION

Criminology in 2008 is a remarkable success story, and this can be

attested by a number of important measures.

It has certainly come a long way fast. The idea of a science of crime

and criminals is a very recent one, having been around for no more than

130 years. The word itself —“criminology” — did not exist prior to 1890

when it was first used (in its French language version) as a non-partisan

alternative to some other strange new names that had recently appeared

> (

»> 66

— “criminal anthropology

>

criminal psychology

,

criminal sociology”,

etc. — each of which claimed the subject for a different discipline. When

the earliest training courses appeared in the 1930s, many of them were

taught by prison medical officers or psychiatrists. The subject entered

the universities only after the Second World War, when the first Insti-

tutes and departments began to take shape. When I enrolled in my first

criminology class in Edinburgh University>s Law Faculty in 1974, crim-

inology was still very much a newcomer in the academic world (Garland

1985; Garland 2002). Today, in stark contrast, criminology is a stand-

ard part of the undergraduate curriculum in universities all over the

world. More and more universities offer postgraduate degrees and doc-

torates. Particularly in the USA, the UK and Australia, increasing num-

bers of universities have departments and even whole colleges dedicated

to criminology and criminal justice studies (Baars-Schuyt (2001) Bisi

(1999) Kerner (1998)).

Criminology's professional organizations have also grown. The Inter-

national Society of Criminology’s World Congress attracts 1,000 dele-

gates. The new European Society of Criminology, begun only a few

years ago, boasts members from 46 different countries (Aebi and Kro-

nicz 2008). Dozens of countries have national criminological associa-

tions, with membership ranging from 35 in the Slovak Criminological

( This is a revised version of an address presented to the Wor'd Congress of the Inter-

national Society of Criminology in Barcelona in July 2008. The author is grateful to Erin

Braatz for research assistance and also to the Filomen D'Agostino and Max Greenberg

Research Fund of the NYU Law School. Joachim Savelsberg is also to be thanked for some

very helpful comments as the speech was being revised for publication.

( Arthur T. Vanderbilt Professor of Law and Professor of Sociology, New York Uni-

versity.

— 19 —

Society, to 900 in the British Society, to 3,500 in the American Society

of Criminology.

Quantitative change produces qualitative change and growth of this

scale and rapidity brings consequences. As criminology has expanded,

attracting more students, more scholars and more research funds, it has

changed its character and its position in the academy. Today, it increas-

ingly takes the form of a free-standing, autonomous subject, with crim-

inology degrees, criminology departments and criminal justice colleges

operating independently of other academic disciplines.

In an article published in 2006, ISC President Tony Peters noted this

tendency and commented as follows :

“An undeniable change in the historical position of ...criminology has

taken place.… Instead of being a servant or auxiliary discipline in legal,

social or even medical sciences, criminology [has become] an autonomous,

often independent, entity” (Peters 2006).

Professor Peters welcomed these developments for the most part. But

he also raised questions, asking “what 1s the added value of this auton-

omous profile?” In this, the opening talk of the World Congress, I want

to offer a response to Professor Peters’ question. I want to begin a proc-

ess of reflection and debate on the nature of criminology today and on

the question of its “independence”. I will argue that, as criminology

becomes more autonomous, the dilemmas and difficulties that affect the

subject become more pronounced and harder to manage. I will also

argue that much of criminology's intellectual and institutional strength

stems from its integration with, and its rootedness in, a number of

other, more fundamental disciplines.

I will further suggest that as criminology grows more autonomous,

institutionally and intellectually; as it begins to train its recruits in its

own literature; focus on its own research agenda; and publish in its own

journals, it tends to become more inward-looking and lose its vital con-

nection to the more basic disciplines (c/f Savelsberg and Sampson 2002).

And I will argue that a criminology which reproduces itself internally

will inevitably come to narrow itself intellectually.

The resulting loss of connection with the basic disciplines, I will

argue, 1s liable to produce negative consequences - not just in intellec-

tual terms (important as these are) but also in respect of the subject’s

relation to government and its position in the university.

1 will suggest therefore that we should see criminological independ-

ence as a temptation to be resisted rather than a goal to be embraced.

Instead of aspiring to an autonomous discipline, we should work for an

intellectually and institutionally integrated criminology - one that oper-

ates as a bridging subject, linking together a practical social field with

20 —

a range of academic disciplines, one that poses policy-oriented, social-

problem questions using theoretically-oriented, social science concepts in

a way that enriches both.

SOME TROUBLING SIGNS

I began by pointing to the signs of criminology’s success — above all,

its rapid expansion and newfound ability to attract students, scholars

and research funds. These developments are impressive and significant.

But let me also point to some troubling aspects of the present. And

instead of focusing on quantitative expansion, let me raise some quali-

tative questions : about the kinds of knowledge we produce, about our

relation to power, and about our position in the academy.

I present these points baldly and without nuance, so I should make

it clear that my information is largely based on my experience in the

USA and the UK. I realize, of course, that criminology’s position varies

enormously from place to place (Johnson 1983) and I will be happy to

be told that the concerns I raise here do not apply to the same extent

in other countries.

Let me begin by 1identifying five troubling issues :

(1) Criminology may have expanded its place in the university but its

position in the academic field is an ambiguous one. In some countries,

the subject is located in elite research universities and graduate pro-

grammes but elsewhere it is situated in lower-tier institutions where

vocational teaching takes precedence over academic research. As for the

research undertaken, in many places it appears increasingly to be

responsive to the short-term needs of government departments rather

than to basic questions of theoretical inquiry or scientific replication

(Ericson 2003; Austin 2003; Chan 2000; Laub 2004).

(i1) Criminology has more students than ever, but in some countries

— Including the USA, where criminology’s independence is most exten-

sively developed — its students appear less well-qualified than students

who enter other disciplines (Nieswiadomy, M. (1998)).

(ii1) Criminology 1s establishing more and more undergraduate

degrees but the proper goals and content of an undergraduate crimino-

logical training remain uncertain and the orientation is increasingly

vocational rather than academic.

(iv) Criminology has become increasingly independent, but as it

becomes more autonomous it becomes less deeply rooted in what were

once its constitutive disciplines (Savelsberg and Sampson (2002); Sav-

elsberg, Cleveland and King (2004)).

_— 21 —

(v) Criminology has grown in size but it has not grown in theoretical

range or intellectual ambition. We criminologists have been slow to

respond to the challenges of our times (Garland and Sparks 2000) : slow

to engage, for example, with the emerging world of international crim-

inal law, with crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against human-

ity, all of which entail complex problems of etiology, prevention, pun-

ishment and control (Hagan, Rymond-Richmond and Parker (2005);

Brannigan (1998); Yacoubian (2000); Day and Vandiver (2000); Rob-

erts and McMillan (2003)). And we have been surprisingly slow to intro-

duce criminological theory and research findings into debates about ter-

rorism and the so-called “war on terror” with the result that today'’s

most pressing security issues are usually discussed in the public sphere

in ways that are innocent of all criminological theory (Rosenfeld (2002);

Savelsberg (2006);: Hogg (2007); Hamm (2005); Mythen and Walklate

(2006)).

So an expanded criminology is not an unproblematic one. And crim-

inology's relation to itself and to the wider academy raise important

questions that we ought to consider. In order to think clearly about the

institutional and intellectual issues that these developments entail, we

might begin by considering some of the fundamental features of our

subject, in particular criminology'’s character as disciplined, eclectic, con-

tested and governmental.

1. — FIRST OF ALL,

CRIMINOLOGY IS

DISCIPLINED

Like any academic subject, criminology has intellectual and organi-

Zational dimensions.

Intellectually, it consists of a body of accredited and systematically

transmitted knowledge:;

approved procedures

and

techniques

of

investigation; and various clusters of questions that make up the sub-

ject’s research agendas. These intellectual materials and activities are

loosely organized by means of a “discipline” — the standard organiza-

tional form of the modern academy (Garland 2002).

The discipline establishes and enforces norms of evidence and

argument; evaluates contributions to knowledge; fixes and revises the

canon of exemplary theory and research; oversees the training of

students; and distributes status and authority among accredited practi-

tioners.

These disciplinary functions are carried out by various institutions -

peer-reviewed journals, professional associations, conferences, funding

__ 22 _—

agencies, and so on — which make up the material infrastructure of the

enterprise.

There is nothing especially unusual or interesting about this — in all

these organizational and institutional respects, criminology is no differ-

ent from any other academic discipline. The interesting question is a

prior intellectual one: how and why did this rather inchoate, eclectic,

practical subject come to form the basis of an academic discipline in the

first place? This question is even more puzzling when one considers that,

unlike most other academic disciplines, criminology has no distinct the-

oretical object and no distinct method of inquiry of its own (Garland

1985; Savelsberg and Sampson (2002)) ®. Which leads to my next obser-

vation…

2. — CRIMINOLOGY IS ECLECTIC

Criminologists address themselves to topics that bear upon crime and

its control. The list of topics is long and diverse, as a glance at the

World Congress programme will show. We investigate these topics by

means of quantitative and qualitative methods, using data sets of every

description, drawing upon a whole gamut of theoretical perspectives,

and with a variety of ideological and political slants. In our teaching

and research, we criminologists draw on other disciplines, most notably

sociology, psychology and law but also history, anthropology, public

health, biology, economics, political science, operations research, and so

on

One of the constitutive dynamics of criminology is the incessant raid-

ing of other disciplines for new ideas with which to pursue and renew

the criminological project. As a discipline, criminology is shaped only to

a small extent by its own theoretical logic and logic of inquiry. Its epis-

temological threshold is a low one, making it open to radical innovation

but also prone to the intellectual disorganization of eclecticism (Garland

2002).

(3 SAVELSBERG and SAMPSON (2002) use the term “discipline” to refer to an academic field

with a distinctive, self-generated intellectual core of problems and concepts - and they argue,

correctly in my view, that criminology is not, in that sense, a discipline. My own usage is

rather different, referring to the organizational practices that constitute and regulate crimi-

nology as a demarcated academic field. Many academic subjects are, of course, disciplines

in both senses of the term. Criminology is not. As I argue here, the field of criminology lacks

a coherent, self-generated, scientific object because its objects of study (crime, criminals, con-

trol) are given to it by extra-scientific processes.

_— 23 —

3. — CRIMINOLOGY IS CONTESTED

Given this diversity, there will always be competing visions of what

criminology ought to be — criminology as experimental science; crimi-

nology as social science; criminology as policy prescription; criminology

as security management; criminology as criminal justice training; crim-

inology as public discourse, and so on (Sherman (1998; 2005); Petersilia

(1991); Balvig, Christie and Tham (2008); Sarat and Silbey (1988);

Uggen and Inderbitzin (2006)).

Relatedly, there are also competing conceptions of criminology'’s

proper position in the academic field. Among the most important of

these visions are the following: (1) criminology as an independent,

stand-alone discipline (Radzinowicz 1962; Wolfgang 1963); (11) criminol-

ogy as a sub-field within other more fundamental disciplines (Savelsberg

and Sampson 2002); and (ili) criminology as a dissolving pathway into

larger studies of regulation (Braithwaite 2000; 2003), or peace-making

(Pepinsky and Quinney 1991) or human rights violations (McEvoy

2003), and so on. In the course of this talk, [ want to outline an alter-

native vision of a dialogic criminology — a conception that builds upon

criminology's past and preserves its most vital intellectual features. This

conception would constitute criminology as an interactive, integrative

enterprise, a bridging subject connecting the practical world of crime

control with the academic disciplines of social science and law, a dia-

logic enterprise that undertakes the work of criminological inquiry in

on-going conversation with the diverse academic disciplines that bear

upon its subject-matter.

4. — FINALLY, CRIMINOLOGY IS GOVERNMENTAL

Let me return to the puzzle ! mentioned a moment ago. Criminol-

ogy's eclecticism, and the absence of any theoretical problem or object

of analysis that it can call its own, make its emergence as a “discipline”

seem puzzling. How did this disparate bundle of policy-related inquiries

come to acquire the status of a distinct academic subject? How did crim-

inology achieve its current position in the academic field and in the insti-

tutions of higher education?

The solution to this puzzle has to do with criminology's perceived

ability to further governmental interests by bringing its knowledge to

bear on crime policy and the practice of criminal justice (Foucault 1977:

Garland 1992). Criminology's basic organizing principle is the empirical

study of crime and its control - which is to say, the study of a legally-

defined entity and a state-directed practice. Unlike other sciences and

__ 24 —

well-constituted academic disciplines, criminology's object is not a self-

generated theoretical entity or a naturally-occurring phenomenon but

instead a state-defined social problem and the means by which that

problem is managed. As a consequence, criminology 1s intimately (at the

epistemological level) and directly (at the social level) tied into govern-

ment (Garland 2002).

This governmental dimension was especially obvious in the early

years when the subject flourished in the prisons, the courtroom, and the

juvenile justice hall — a flourishing that was directly encouraged by gov-

ernment support and sponsorship (Garland 1988; 2002). Criminology's

subsequent location in the university has, to some extent, obscured this

knowledge-power link and alleviated some of the problems that stem

from being too identified with government, but the linkage and the

problems remain nonetheless (Garland 1992). Criminology's social sta-

tus continues to rest in large part upon its practical utility and its value

for government. Even within the academy, the subject 1s valued as much

for its ability to attract research funds and student numbers as for its

distinguished academic achievements.

This dual commitment to government and to the academy, to policy

and to science, sets up a series of recurring problems and tensions for

criminology and its practitioners.

Tension No. I :

Criminology's relations with government

The central difficulty that stems from criminology's dual commit-

ment is one that 1s familiar to all criminological researchers and consists

in the struggle to maintain academic integrity while seeking government

access and research funding. But this problem also has a more funda-

mental aspect that is less often noted and less easily dealt with — and it

has to do with criminology's epistemological relation to government.

Is it acceptable for an academic subject to derive its concepts, its cat-

egories, its questions, and its objects of study from state institutions?

Should criminology's objects of study be legal categories, governmental

problems, and institutional products that are given to it by state prac-

tices and political processes?

Is criminology obliged to understand the categories of “crime”,

“offender”, and ‘“victim” in accordance with the meanings given to them

in the legal process? Must it accept the theories of action and responsi-

bility implicit in legal discourse and court decisions? Or can it reconsti-

tute these categories and theories in its own terms?

25 -

In all of these issues, practical considerations (of relevance, of influ-

ence, of funding, of communication) may press in a different direction

than scientific considerations. How should we manage that tension?

The solution lies, I think, in the company that criminology keeps, or

to be more precise, in the intellectual diversity of the academic field it

inhabits and of the intellectual exchanges in which it 1s routinely

involved. It lies in criminology’s capacity to establish dialogue with con-

tiguous academic subjects, to bridge the gap between its practical

domain and the academic subjects that can provide resources for con-

ceptualizing it.

Let me offer a concrete illustration. À criminology that investigates

state-defined criminal offences and state-identified offenders ought to be

in constant dialogue with a sociology of deviance that refuses to take

these terms as unproblematic givens. Such conversations can take place

in lots of ways — in departmental meetings, at conferences, in undergrad-

uate lectures, in the evaluation of manuscripts submitted to journals, or

in the understanding that sociology graduates bring to postgraduate

criminology programs. Where this kind of dialogue routinely takes

place, it acts as a healthy reminder that the law'’s categories are social

constructions that can be questioned, and that the state’s conceptions of

“normal” and “deviant” are the outcome of political processes that are

historically contingent, subject to change and open to challenge. Such

conversations also bring into focus the extent to which criminalizing and

penological practices are bound up with wider social processes, remind-

ing criminologists of the links between crime and social issues such as

stratification; labour markets; urban ecology; class, race and gender;

family relations and the life course; and political economy ‘*

Criminology'’s institutional location vis a vis other disciplines, and vis

a vis disciplinary journals, conferences, graduate students, etc are liable

to produce intellectual consequences for the subject. Wherever routine

contact occurs between criminology and the other disciplines, criminol-

ogy can retain its practical focus and yet benefit intellectually from con-

tiguous disciplines. These intellectual benefits are much less likely wher-

CVeTr

criminology

asserts

1ts

autonomy

and

sets

itself apart

institutionally.

In proposing this bridging, dialogic solution, ! am refusing a more

radical suggestion that criminology should reject state definitions, aban-

don its focus on “crime”, and reconstitute itself on a different basis (e.g.

H. and J. Schwendinger 1975). Why? Because the state’s legal categories

9 [ illustrate my point here by referring to criminology’s links with sociology, but one

could make the same point by reference to the other disciplines with which criminology car-

ries on conversations - psychology, law, history, political science and so on.

__ 26 —

and institutional definitions are real and powerful. They shape our

world, they organize our lives, they determine the fates of millions of

people. To reject these categories, to give them no place in our analyses,

is to opt out of an engagement with the real world — an engagement that

has always been one of criminology's chief virtues.

But we need always to view these state-defined categories for what

they are : a specific regime of truth, made possible by specific institu-

tions, specific social relations and definite balances of power. Because a

policy-oriented governmental criminology is prone to forget that, a rou-

tine, on-going association with critical theory and comparative sociology

is a crucial corrective and we should seek institutional arrangements that

make this possible.

Tension No. 2 :

Criminology’s role as policy adviser

Criminology’s role as a policy adviser brings definite benefits. It

brings research funding and access; an opportunity to shape policy and

serve the public good; training and employment opportunities for our

students; and an insider knowledge that enhances our credibility and

public authority (Radzinowicz (1962); Ericson (2003)).

The danger, however, is that criminology will become a wholly-

owned subsidiary of the criminal justice state, with the criminal law dic-

tating our object of study, government agencies dictating our research

questions, and politicians and the press dictating our frames of rele-

Vance.

This Foucauldian image of criminology as power-knowledge in the

service of the state is an ever-present danger, given the subject's basic

disposition and orientation. If we have escaped that fate, and have suc-

ceeded in creating a critical distance and a measure of scholarly integ-

rity, it is due to our position in the academic field and our connections

with other academic disciplines (Foucault 1980; Garland 1992).

To the extent that we change that position, to the extent that we

loosen these connections, to the extent that we establish an independent

criminology that stands on its own, we thereby make ourselves more

vulnerable to being co-opted by government ©)

(°) See SAVELSBERG and SAMPSON (2002) who argue that “crimnology’s isolation from

sociology comes at great cost.” “As criminology closes itself off from other academic disci-

plines, it opens itself up to extra-scholarly interests, especially those of the state.” It thereby

risks losing its academic integrity. They conclude that this process ought to be resisted. and

that “concern with disciplinary credentials [and autonomy] should be replaced by a renewed

focus on intellectual ideas.” See also SAVELSBERG, KING and CLEVELAND (2002) for empirical

evidence supporting these claims.

_ 27 —

Am I suggesting that criminology ought to disengage from all gov-

ernment involvement? That criminologists should cease giving policy

advice? Am I adopting the view of Stanley Cohen (1985: 238) who

declared : “It is simply not our professional job to advise, consult, rec-

ommend or make decisions”? Or that of John Hagan (1989 : 257-8),

who would subsume criminology into an explanatory sociology, com-

pletely unconcerned with policy matters‘’? Or of Nils Christie, who

insists that criminology should be “problem-raising” rather than a

“problem-solving” ?

No, [ am not. Nor 1s there any need to do so, since the issue can be

viewed as a matter of “also/and” rather than “either/or”. Criminology

would quickly cease to exist 1f it gave up its ambition to improve penal

policy and offer crime control advice. But a policy-oriented criminology

has its best chance of remaining detached and critical and intellectually

alive 1f it 1s taught alongside, and in dialogue with, the kinds of crimi-

nology that Cohen and Hagan and Christie have in mind : criminologies

that are critical, explanatory, or downright trouble-making.

The “policy-oriented criminologist”, the “academic sociologist of

crime”, the “critical criminologist” - these are three different job

descriptions and working personalities and they each imply a different

vision of what criminology should be. But there is no reason why our

subject has to commit itself exclusively to one or other of these visions.

The field of criminology can fruitfully contain all three kinds of schol-

arship and facilitate the cross-fertilization of each by the others. Theo-

retical and critical work stand to gain from an engagement with the

details of institutional practice and the messy complexities of policy-

making. Policy advice can benefit from an understanding of the theo-

retical frames and critical perspectives that bear on the subject. À broad

field composed of different ways of doing and conceiving criminology,

and drawing on a range of different disciplines and perspectives - that’s

the arrangement that has worked best for criminology in the past and

that's the working arrangement we should seek to foster in the future.

If an expanded, independent criminology risks leaving that behind, then

I, for one, am against independence.

( In his more recent work, Hagan appears to have revised his view. His new book about

Darfur (HAGAN 2008) argues that criminology ought to come to terms with genocide and the

causal processes underlying it. In the course of his argument, he makes it clear that he envis-

ages a policy role for criminologists, providing international courts and organizations with

evidence and expertise that can help justify and direct humanitarian intervention.

() Quoted in ZEDNER and ASHWORTH (2003 : 16).

28

Tension No. $ :

Criminology'’s position in the academic field

Criminology's secure location in the academic world and its status as

a respected field of scholarly inquiry are, it seems to me, of paramount

importance for the intellectual and institutional health of our subject.

Criminology's academic integrity and status as a university-based sub-

ject are also, as [ have suggested, crucial in managing the subject’s rela-

tions with government.

It is therefore worrying that criminology's position in the academic

hierarchy has often been an ambiguous one, and that stand-alone crim-

inology (or criminal justice) degrees are — at least in the USA — most

often associated with low-ranking colleges where teaching and voca-

tional training take precedence over research and scholarship.

This status problem is linked to some of criminology's essential char-

acteristics. Às we have seen, criminology 1s organized around a policy

problem and largely consists of empirical studies that produce local

knowledge. In the academic hierarchy, “problem-oriented fields” of this

kind are typically less prestigious than fundamental disciplines (Abbott

2001) *.

The explanation for this status differential has to do with the differ-

ence in the kinds of knowledge produced by the different kinds of sub-

ject. The basic academic disciplines produce “portable knowledge” and

transferable analytical skills that are more competitive, more enduring,

and more valuable over time, compared to the localized “problem-based

knowledge” of subjects like criminology.

Why? Because “portable knowledge” has the power of abstraction,

enabling it to address new situations and new problems by means of

principles learned in other settings — in contrast to “problem-based

knowledge” which tends to be more local and more limited in its appli-

cation. The two forms of knowledge are also intellectually distinct, the

former aspiring to theoretical depth and analytical understanding, the

latter more focused on surface description and practical know-how.

Of course, policy-specific research has intrinsic value, as does voca-

tional training. And criminology would not exist in the university system

today were it not for its capacity to provide these. But a university-

based subject will ultimately be evaluated in terms of the university's

own values, and these are fundamentally to do with the quality and

depth of scholarship and the extent of theoretical understanding. We

$ As Andrew Abbott points out, “status differences… keep the disciplines in superior

power. Criminology departments hire from sociology departments, but seldom vice versa.”

Abbott quoted in FERICSON (2003).

29

ought therefore to take care that the expansion of the subject and its

increasing independence do not develop at the cost of its research capac-

ity and academic standing.

This, to me, provides another powerful reason why criminology

needs to remain close to its constitutive disciplines. Only by drawing on

the fundamental disciplines, and contributing to them in turn, can we

hope to sustain the scholarly erudition, intellectual depth, and theoreti-

cal insight that bring prestige and status in the academic world and

which have always marked the very best criminological writings.

Tension No. 4 :

The training of criminologists

To make academic contributions of the highest kind, it helps if crim-

inologists are properly trained in the basic disciplines prior to specializ-

ing in crime and punishment. It is not always enough to be introduced

to these disciplines in passing, as part of a criminology degree : all too

often such courses are a diluted form of disciplinary training, offering

light-weight versions of the real thing, trimmed and tailored to fit into

a criminology curriculum. And this problem will likely get worse over

time. At present, most criminology graduate programmes are staffed by

faculty trained in the basic disciplines. But as the subject’s institutional

independence grows, criminology graduate programmes will increasingly

be staffed by faculty with criminology graduate degrees with the result

that the institutional relation of these programmes to the basic disci-

plines will become ever more distant, their intellectual connections ever

more attenuated.

To thrive as an academic discipline, criminologists have to compete

on equal terms with other social scientists and lawyers. If we write about

our research and present our findings in a sociological, psychological,

historical or legal mode, we mustn’t always be the amateurs, the self-

trained outsiders. When we recruit our students and our faculty, we

want the best and the brightest of these other disciplines coming into

criminology, and we want to export criminological ideas and findings

back into these disciplines. It ssems to me that the more independence

criminology acquires, the more it moves away from the fundamental dis-

ciplines, the more difficult it is to achieve real academic distinction.

There are several sources of status and power in the university system

— student numbers, research income, policy impact, media presence

and criminology does relatively well in all of these terms. But the key

measure of academic achievement 1s quality and distinction in scholar-

ship. On this measure, criminology has a more mixed record. If we want

to thrive in academic settings, we have to aspire to the highest scholar-

— 30 —

ship and reconnect with the fundamental concerns of social science and

social theory. Creating an independent criminology that disengages insti-

tutionally from these larger disciplines risks disengaging on intellectual

terms too, and that’s a risk we ought not to take .

SPECIALIZATION

AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THEORY

I have described some of the risks entailed in criminology becoming

an independent specialism — the risk that it will be cut off from the basic

disciplines, the risk that government will extend its dominance, and the

risk that the subject will lose academic prestige. There is a final risk :

namely that an independent criminology will tend to fragment into dis-

tinct specialisms unconnected by any overarching theory.

Specialization is an intrinsic dynamic in the field of criminology

proper, given its focus on specific institutions, problems and policies.

Prison studies; police studies; probation studies; sentencing studies;

treatment studies; victim studies; juvenile studies; violence studies;

crime prevention studies; fear of crime studies… the list goes on, each

one a growing subfield poised to spin off from the larger discipline.

There are obvious benefits of specialization, but the most salient

drawback of this process is its negative effect on communication. Wher-

ever specialisms proliferate, the tendency is for conversation across the

field to decline. Criminologists end up as so many specialists with little

to say to each other, with negative consequences for collective learning.

In most academic fields there are two centripetal forces that work to

unify research and generate conversation between researchers. One 1s

topic and the other is theory‘

10)

. Topics bring scholars together but the

# ] say this with some confidence because something of the sort has already occurred

in the USA. During the first half of the 20" century, crime and its control were central topics

of research in America’s leading sociology departments. (Think of the Chicago School. for

example, or of Edwin Sutherland’s department at Indiana.) In the 1960s, however, the US

government decided to professionalize criminal justice and funded a massive expansion of

criminological training, much of it based in new criminal justice colleges. The subsequent

expansion of criminology and the rise of these self-standing criminal justice programs led to

the gradual abandonment of the specialism by the sociology departments of all the leading

research universities. Until very recently, there was hardly a sociologist of crime and punish-

ment to be found in any of them _ with major consequences for the kind and quality of work

done on criminological topics. See SAVELSBERG, CLEVELAND and RyAN (2004) for empirical

evidence about the way that institutional location (criminal justice program or sociology

department) shapes research and theory choices. Recently, this process has been reversed,

largely because America’s penal system has grown to the point where it has become a major

engine of social organization and stratification.

(19) Methodological discussion can also have this effect, but l'm going to ignore that for

the moment.

——

-— 31

inherent disposition of topic is a drive towards concreteness and specif-

icity. Scholarship that is organized around a topic tends to become ever

more specific, ever more specialized. The more scholars there are in the

field, the more the field can support numerous specialisms. The more

specialisms there are, the more fragmented the field becomes. In the end,

there 1s little to talk about outside the rooms where small specialist

groups discuss the arcane details of their speciality.

The tendency of theory, in contrast, is towards abstraction and gen-

eralization. Its aim 1s to include ever more data, ever more processes,

and ever more situations, ever more fopics in its scope. It strives to link

causal arguments and to build unified explanations. Different topics

cease to be unconnected specialisms and become, instead, multiple

opportunities for theoretical reflection and analysis. Theory gives rise to

conversation and community — or else to focused conflict and disputa-

tion. It operates to unify the field in collective projects that transcend

particular research and esoteric specialisms !

Theory can, of course, divide an academic field just as it can unify

it. But whether it unifies or divides, theory organizes, it generates col-

lective conversations, it pulls researchers into a dialogue with one

another, moving them beyond their concrete specialism to engage with

larger questions. All of which enhances individual scholarship and serves

the collective good of the subject. It is theory that provides the intellec-

tual resources to take on new challenges and new problems - to extend

our explanatory range and engage with new issues as they emerge. The-

ory is what enlivens and energizes an academic subject. And since theory

is generated by the fundamental disciplines, the vitality of our field

depends on criminology’s continued connection with them.

Let me be clear. I am not objecting to the existence of criminology

institutes or criminology departments. Some of the most profoundly

important scholarship on crime, control and punishment has come from

such places. Nor am I saying that criminology undergraduate degrees

cannot be academically first rate. But [ am saying that criminology must

never cut itself loose from the disciplines that supply its intellectual

energy and inspiration — and the move towards institutional autonomy

threatens to bring this about

(12)

( Here we ought to take our lead from the field of anthropology

a discipline in which

each individual scholar engages in specialist field research, focused on a particular place and

particular people. and which might easily have become utterly fragmented but for the disci-

pline's strong commitment to theory

a commitment that is institutionalized in textbooks,

university curricula, graduate training, journals, and the overall status system of the discipline.

(2) As the work of SAVELSBERG et al shows (2002; 2004), the capacity to sustain serious

connections between academic subjects is determined by institutional arrangements, organi-

Zational routines, and the structurally-conditioned habits and oritentations of individual aca-

demics. Ît cannot be left to good intentions.

32

IN CONCLUSION

My argument has been that although criminology has an institu-

tional core, its most important intellectual sources are eccentric, off-cen-

tre, originating from outside the subject itself. My own experience 1s tes-

tament to this. If I were to list the texts that have been most important

to me in my work, they would not be the “classics” of mainstream crim-

inology — though I have engaged with these classics and learned a great

deal from them. My most useful exemplars have been works that

loomed on the horizon of criminology, on its margins, most of them

coming at crime and punishment from well beyond the criminological

domain. In addition to the central thinkers of the sociological tradition

(Marx, Weber, above all, Durkheim) I think of the work of figures like

Paul Q. Hirst, Stuart Hall, Gareth Stedman Jones, Michel Foucault,

Jacques Donzelot, Nikolas Rose, Norbert Elias, Chifford Geertz, Pierre

Bourdieu, Ian Hacking, and Mary Douglas. These authors were not

“criminologists” in any recognizable sense. And none of their inspira-

tional works was generated out of criminology's core concerns. But

every one of them advanced criminological understanding and helped

redefine what criminology might be. Every one of them altered the ways

in which criminologists could frame their questions, opening up new

theoretical understandings in ways that were ultimately productive for

the field as a whole.

If criminology is to continue to realize its potential as an academic

subject and not just a governmental one, if it is to continue producing

scholarship of the highest quality, it needs to remain dialogic rather

than detached, and eccentric rather than self-enclosed. It is not an

autonomous criminology we need, it is an expansive criminology able to

embrace and engage an intellectual world that sometimes begins where

an independent criminology would likely leave off.

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ABSTRACT

This essay discusses the current state of criminology and raises some

questions about the subject’s nature, its relationship to government, and

its location in the academic field. The author argues that criminology 1s

best conceived not as an independent subject but as a bridging subject

that addresses a practical field using the intellectual resources of more

basic disciplines such as sociology, psychology and law. He warns

against recent institutional developments that threaten to distance crim-

inological research and training from those disciplines that provide its

intellectual energy and distinction. Against these tendencies, the author

argues for a dialogic conception of criminology and for the institutional

conditions that make that conception possible.

REÉSUMÉ

L’objet de cet essai est de discuter de l’état actuel de la criminologie

et de soulever certaines questions sur la nature de son objet, sur sa rela-

tion avec le gouvernement, et sur sa position dans le champ académique.

L’auteur soutient que la meilleure manière de concevoir la criminologie

n’est pas d’en faire un objet indépendant, mais plutôt un objet fédéra-

teur qui mobilise les ressources intellectuelles d’une série de disciplines

de base telles que la sociologie, la psychologie et le droit. Il met en garde

contre des développements institutionnels récents qui tendent à éloigner

la recherche et la formation criminologiques des disciplines qui assurent

son énergie et sa distinction. À l’encontre de ces tendances, l'auteur

plaide en faveur d’une conception dialogique de la criminologie et de

conditions institutionnelles qui rendent cette conception possible.

RESUMEN

El objeto de este articulo es discutir el estado actual de la crimino-

logia y plantear ciertas cuestiones sobre la naturaleza de su objeto, sobre

su relaciôon con el gobierno y sobre su posiciôn en el campo académico.

— 36

El autor sostiene que la mejor manera de concebir la criminologia no

es hacer de ella un objeto independiente sino mâs bien un objeto aso-

ciativo, que movilice los recursos intelectuales de una serie de disciplinas

de base, tales como la sociologia, la psicologia y el derecho. Advierte

sobre los recientes desarrollos institucionales que tienden a alejar a la

investigacion y la formaciôn criminolôgicas de las disciplinas que asegu-

ran su energia y su distinciôn. Frente a estas tendencias, el autor

defiende una concepciôn dialôgica de la criminologia y de las condicio-

nes institucionales que hacen posible esta concepciôn.

37 -—

ORGANIZED CRIME :

NEW LABEL, NEW PHENOMENON

OR POLICY EXPEDIENT?

Letizia Paoli @

Up until the mid-1980s organized crime was considered a problem

that concerned only a limited number of countries — primarily the

United States and Italy, with the eventual addition of Japan, China and

Colombia. Until then the scientific communities, the political leadership

and the general public in virtually all European countries aside from

Italy regarded themselves as largely unaffected by organized crime.

Twenty years later, the picture has changed dramatically, particularly in

Europe. Now virtually all European national law enforcement agencies

claim that each of their nations has a serious organized crime problem,

the fight against organized crime represents a priority of Europol and

most domestic law enforcement agencies, and there is much concern

about the threats posed by organized crime in the media and in public

opinion, not just in Europe but worldwide (Paoli and Fijnaut, 2004b).

Despite some delays and persisting deficiencies, academic research on

organized crime has also expanded rapidly, particularly in Europe, since

the 1980s.

The growing concern about organized crime has fed and justified pol-

icy reform. To control this form of crime, all European states and sev-

eral non-European ones as well, have passed far-reaching legal and insti-

tutional reforms, and all major international organizations, ranging

from the European Union (EU) to the United Nations (UN), have

adopted new international treaties and an even larger amount of soft

law. The UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, which

was opened for signature in 2000 and came into force in 2003, represents

the apotheosis of such international efforts.

À pertinent question is then to ask : ‘Why and how has this radical

change of perception and policies taken place?’ This 1s the main ques-

tion that this articie 1s supposed to answer. Another way to frame this

(D This article is an extended version of the keynote lecture delivered at the XV World

Congress of Criminology on July 22, 2008, in Barcelona. I would like to thank warmly Tony

Peters for inviting me to give that lecture and Cyrille Fijnaut for allowing me to draw exten-

sively upon the chapters we originally wrote jointly for Organized Crime in Europe (Fijnaut

and Paoli, 2004).

C Prof. Dr. Leuven Institute of Criminology. K.U. Leuven Faculty of Law, Belgium.

question is to consider the extent to which organized crime can be best

defined in terms of one of the three following definitions :

— À new label attached to pre-existing illegal activities and actors that

have remained substantially unchanged

— À new phenomenon : that is, the growing use of the expression

‘organized crime’ effectively points to the rise of fundamentally new

actors or new ways of conducting 1llegal activities

— An expedient to promote and legitimize encompassing policy and

institutional reforms and enhance international police and judicial

cooperation.

To briefly anticipate my conclusion, there is evidence to support all

three definitions; however, there 1s no doubt that the first and third ones

fit more closely than the second one.

The article is organized in six parts. In the first section, I briefly

sketch and try to explain the above-mentioned perception change. In the

three central ones, I consider the contemporary patterns of organized

crime in Europe and elsewhere. The fifth section reviews the policy

changes introduced since the 1990s to tackle organized crime. In the

final section, I come back to the title question and provide an extensive

answer to it. In my conclusions, I also briefly consider the past and

future contributions of criminology to this research and policy area.

À few words on my sources : For Europe, I have relied to a large

extent on the findings of a project on organized crime in Europe that I

coordinated a few years ago with Cyrille Fijnaut and which involved

over 30 other experts covering 13 EU and non-EU countries (Fijnaut

and Paoli, 2004). For the rest of the world, I have used a variety of

sources. Among them, I also refer to a project on the world heroin mar-

ket, which I have just concluded with Victoria Greenfield and Peter

Reuter (Paoli, Greenfield and Reuter, 2009).

1. — PERCEPTION CHANGES

Several long-term processes and a variety of both far-reaching and

localized historical events have contributed to the changing perception

of organized crime. Some of these processes and occurrences directly

impinge on the activities and perpetrators typically associated with

organized crime; others are related to them only indirectly. Among the

former set of processes, the rise of the 1llegal drug industry (since the

late 1960s) and the phenomenal expansion of the human smuggling and

trafficking industries (from the late 1980s onwards) are the most prom-

inent (see infra). À variety of local crime-related events also contributed

to the changing perception of organized crime. Among them, the mur-

— 40 —

ders of Judges Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino in 1992 and the

bombs attacks in Continental Italy in 1993 organized by the Sicilian

Cosa Nostra were certainly the most dramatic and received worldwide

COVCTAgE.

The changes affecting organized crime actors and activities cannot be

properly understood unless we consider wider social processes and

events. These have profoundly affected not only the organization and

flow of 1illegal markets but also the general perception of organized

crime. The worldwide processes of globalization have accelerated the

interconnection between previously separate domestic 1illegal markets

and increased the mobility of criminals across national borders. At the

same time, economic liberalization has reduced the ability of govern-

ments to withstand and regulate market forces and has unintentionally

facilitated the sectors of the global economy that remain criminalized

(Andreas, 2002).

Illegal exchanges were also further facilitated by the fall of the Iron

Curtain in 1989. The opening of the Eastern borders, once strictly

patrolled by Warsaw Pact troops, triggered a veritable boom of 1llegal

markets all over the former Soviet Union and its satellite countries and

objectively enhanced the movement of people, goods and capital

across - and between — the two formerly segregated portions of Europe :

criminals as well as non-criminals, drugs as well as regular commodities,

dirty as well as hot and legitimate money could all circulate more freely

than before. The fall of the Iron Curtain also had a tremendous impact

on the perception of the organized crime problem. Particularly in its

transnational variant, organized crime became one of the most frequent

and successful labels to express the rising sense of insecurity caused by

the sudden collapse of the bipolar world and the obscure menaces com-

ing from the East (Woodiwiss, 2001).

Within the countries of the European Community/Union, the wide-

spread feeling of insecurity was further increased by the completion of

the internal market and the abolition of internal border controls. Since

the late 1980s ordinary people and politicians alike realized that in the

new united Europe, free movement, increased economic interdependency

and the facilitation of cross-border financial activities rendered internal

borders increasingly ineffective, both as instruments of control and as

obstacles to the movement of criminals and their activities.

Wider social changes have also radically affected the perception of

organized crime : together with several other, at least partially overlap-

ping, concepts (the drugs and arms trafficker, the white slaver and, after

September 2001, the terrorist), organized crime has become a convenient

tool to express the anxieties of the general population about living in the

ever more uncertain and insecure world of the late- or post-modern age.

— 41 —

These anxieties tend to manifest themselves as perceptions of threats to

one’s own personal and material safety (Bauman, 2000) and have con-

tributed to make organized crime a veritable ‘folk devil’ (Cohen, 1972).

The radical change in perception has been made possible by three

connotations of the very concept of organized crime. The first one 1s the

idea of organized crime as a threat that comes from the outside (an

‘alien conspiracy’, as its critics would say; e.g., Smith, 1975 : 138-41), an

idea that is underpinning much of the public debate on organized crime

since its origins in the U.S. in the 1950s. The prototypical image 1s that

of the Sicilian mafia organization invading and corrupting the U.S. first

and later the rest of Europe (e.g., U.S. Senate, 1951 and 1963). In David

Garland’s (2001) words, organized crime is clearly a case of ‘criminology

of the other’.

The extreme vagueness and elasticity of the concept constitutes the

second connotation. Às Mike Levi puts it, organized crime 1s like the

psychiatrist’s Rorschach blot, whose ‘attraction as well as

weakness

is that one can read almost anything into it’ (2002 : 887). Even within

the scientific discourse 1t is still unclear whether organized crime consists

of a set of criminalized activities, primarily the provision of prohibited

goods and services, or a set of actors engaging in crime and, specifically,

criminal organizations with a well-defined collective identity and subdi-

vision of work among its members (Paoli, 2002).

The third trait is the transnational dimension of organized crime,

which has been increasingly emphasized since the early 1990s, primarily

but not exclusively by the United Nations and other international

organizations to point to the growing cross-border criminal activities

(e.g., Fijnaut and Paoli, 2009).

The mix of these three traits has allowed, and indeed fostered, the

development of a very serious gap between the rhetoric of much discus-

sion on organized crime and the definitions officially adopted. In official

statements and reports, organized crime 1s presented as a most worrying

threat with a strong emphasis on its transnational dimension. At the end

of the UN World Ministerial Conference on Organized Transnational

Crime, which took place in Naples in 1994, for example, its participants

declared themselves ‘deeply concerned about the dramatic growth of

organized crime over the past decade and about its global reach, which

constitute a threat to the internal security and stability of sovereign

States’ (United Nations General Assembly, 1994 : 2).

On the other hand, the definitions of organized crime officially

adopted are very loose and vague. The UN Convention against Tran-

snational Organized Crime of 2000, for example, has clearly adopted a

‘lowest common denominator definition’ with no strict criteria in terms

of number of members and group structure. Article 2, paragraph (a) of

__ 42 —

the Convention states : ‘“Organized criminal group” shall mean a struc-

tured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and

acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes

or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to

obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit’

(United Nations General Assembly, 2000 : 25). Serious crime is defined

by paragraph (b) of the same article as any offence punishable by a

maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years (ibid.). This means

that the incisive investigative methods and other legislative and institu-

tional changes recommended by the World Ministerial Conference of

1994 and now to a large extent included in the Convention can be also

applied to cliques, gangs and networks that are very far removed from

the stereotypes of organized crime dominating the media and political

discourse.

An analogous ‘double-track’ approach has been pursued by the

European Union executive bodies. To justify its intervention, the EU

Council presents organized crime as a new threat, whose novelty lies in

the increasing involvement of criminal organizations in the supply of

criminal goods and services. Such a view is clearly stated in the first pro-

grammatic document dealing with organized crime, the ‘Action Plan to

Combat Organised Crime’, which was adopted by the Council of the

European Union on 28 April 1997. Its opening statement maintains :

Organized crime is increasingly becoming a threat to society as we know

it and want to preserve it. Criminal behaviour no longer is the domain

of individuals only, but also of organizations that pervade the various

structures of civil society and indeed society as a whole (European

Union Council, 1997).

When 1t comes to defining what a criminal organization 1s, the Euro-

pean Union also proposes a very loose interpretation, setting low

numerical standards. In the Joint Action adopted by the European

Council on May 1998, a criminal organization is defined as ‘a structured

association, established over a period of time, of more than two persons,

acting in concert with a view to committing offences which are punish-

able by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at

least four years or a more serious penalty. . ° (European Union Council,

1998). ° If three people only are sufficient to form a criminal organiza-

tion, one might justifiably ask if the (alleged) increasing presence of

these entities in the illegal arena really represents a major innovation in

( This approach is confirmed by the proposed EU Framework Decision on the Fight

against Organized Crime, which the European Council approved in April 2006 but has not

yet entered into force because parliamentary reservations in some countries (Calderoni.

2008).

__ 43 _

regard to the past and the threatening menace that the Plan assumes 1t

to be.

2. — QORGANIZED CRIME ACTORS AND

Despite the lack of regular and reliable data on organized crime and

the poor cooperation between law enforcement agencies and independ-

ent researchers in many countries, the available empirical research

allows us to sketch a rough outline of organized crime in Europe.

Though much of the concern about organized crime since the 1980s

has been dictated by the fear of the expansion of the Italian mafia to

the whole of Europe and to its becoming a model for others involved

in organized crime, these pessimistic scenarios have not been realized. In

no Western European country except Italy — nor in northern or central

Italy itself — do Italian mafia groups control a significant portion of

local 1llegal economies or exercise a systematic influence over the legal

economy or the political system. Contrary to the exaggerated predic-

tions of the early 1990s, other organized crime groups have not shown

any interest in imitating the culture and structure of the Italian mafia.

Nor are the average perpetrators in the EU interested in, or capable of,

exercising a quasi-political power similar to that of the largest and most

stable mafia organizations in southern Italy (Paoli and Fijnaut, 2004a).

Europol itself has recognized the poor level of organization of organ-

ized crime actors within the European Union : Às it wrote in its 2003

European Union Organised Crime Report : ‘the traditional perception of

hierarchically structured organised crime groups is being challenged.

There is now a development suggesting that a greater percentage of

powerful organised crime groups are far more cellular in structure, with

loose affiliations made and broken on a regular basis and less obvious

chains of command’ (Europol, 2003 : 8). Whereas it is disputable that

non-ltalian mafia groups have ever complied with the ‘traditional per-

ception of hierarchically structured organised crime groups’, Europol’s

departure from the Italia mafia model can only be welcomed.

A growing body of literature‘*) shows that the great majority of ille-

gal exchanges in Western European countries are carried out by numer-

ous, relatively small and often ephemeral enterprises. This 1s because all

illegal market actors are subject to constraints deriving from the

($ This literature includes both the reports on organized crime in ten EU countries and

Switzerland produced for Organised Crime in Europe (e.g.. Besozzi. 2004; Hobbs, 2004, Kin-

zig, 2004, Kleemans, 2004) as well as studies conducted by various authors in different coun-

tries (e.g.…. Van Duyne and Levi, 2005; von Lampe, 2005; Swedish National Council for

Crime Prevention, 2007; Spapens, 2008; Spapens and Fijnaut, 2005).

__ 44 —

enforcement of prohibition. These constraints have to do with the fact

that illegal market entrepreneurs are obliged to operate both without

and against the state.

First, since the goods and services they provide are prohibited, illegal

market suppliers cannot resort to state institutions to enforce contracts

and have violations of contracts prosecuted. Nor does the illegal arena

host an alternative sovereign power to which a party may appeal for

redress of injury. Às a result, property rights are poorly protected,

employment contracts cannot be formalized, and the development of

large, formally organized, long-lasting companies is strongly discour-

aged (Reuter, 1983).

Second, all suppliers of 1llegal commodities are forced to operate

under the constant threat of arrest and confiscation of their assets by

law enforcement institutions. Participants in criminal trades will thus try

to organize their activities in such a way as to assure that the risk of

police detection is minimized. Incorporating drug transactions into kin-

ship and friendship networks and reducing the number of customers and

employees are two of the most frequent strategies illegal entrepreneurs

employ to reduce their vulnerability to law enforcement moves. Due to

the threat of police intervention, either in terms of seizing assets or

imprisoning participants, the planning time horizons of illegal entrepre-

neurs are likely to be much shorter than those in legal markets. Since

an illegal enterprise can hardly be sold as the entrepreneur ages, he is

likely to divert an increasing share of his profits to legal assets which

can be passed on to his heirs.

Finally, since they are operating against the state, illegal firms are

prevented from marketing their products. They cannot create their own

brand image and try to bind customers to it. Strong economies of scale,

however, are associated with advertising and the advantages linked to

the nationwide marketing of one’s own products have long been recog-

nized as a very important factor in the rise of modern large-scale cor-

porations. According to most economists, for example, advertising rep-

resents the single most important basis of large-firm advantages (Scherer

and Ross, 1990: 130-38). Illegal firms, however, are by definition

excluded from the possibility of exploiting these advantages because, by

doing so, they would obviously attract law enforcement attention and

damage their own businesses.

For all the above reasons, it is rather unlikely that large, hierarchi-

cally organized firms will emerge to mediate economic transactions in

the illegal marketplace. The factors promoting the development of

bureaucracies in the legal portion of the economy - namely taking

advantage of economies of scale of operations and specialization of roles

— are outbalanced in the illegal arena by the very consequences of prod-

— 45 —

uct illegality. Listing these constraints thus leads to the conclusion that,

within the illegal economy of countries with efficient governments, there

is no immanent tendency towards the consolidation of large-scale, mod-

ern illegal bureaucracies (Paoli, Reuter and Greenfield, 2009). Even

southern Italian mafia families are subjected to the constraints deriving

from the 1llegal status of products and, when they deal in drugs or other

illegal commodities, they do not operate as monolithic productive and

commercial units. On the contrary, their members frequently set up

short-term partnerships with other mafia affiliates, or even non-mem-

bers, to carry out 1llegal transactions (Paoli, 2003). In other words, in

the 1illegal markets of most industrialized countries ruled by relatively

strong and efficient state apparatuses, the dominant model is not organ-

ized crime, but — following the title of a famous book by Peter Reuter

— “disorganized crime’ (1983).

3

AND ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE

Recognising the relatively ‘disorganized’ nature of organized crime in

Europe does not imply an optimistic assessment of its nature, scale and

danger. Forming flexible and changeable networks, the small and

ephemeral enterprises comprising the bulk of European organized crime

since the mid-1970s have sustained a phenomenal expansion of 1llegal

markets in Western and, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, in Eastern

Europe as well.

Since the early 1970s, in particular, a rising demand for a variety of

illegal drugs — first cannabis and heroin and then since the early 1990s

cocaine, ecstasy and other amphetamine products - has fostered the

development of an international drug trade from producing to consumer

countries and the emergence of nationwide drug distribution systems in

all European states. To meet expanding popular demand, pre-existing

criminal organizations — such as Italian mafia groups — and thousands

of individuals, cliques and groups with or without previous criminal

expertise have entered the drug trafficking business, attracted by the

anticipation of large profits. The expansion of the drugs market has

resulted in the progressive re-conversion of professional crime to the

drug business, with a progressive decline of the ‘traditional’ underworld.

Today the drug market is most probably — despite the absence of relia-

ble estimates for other illegal activities — the largest illegal market world-

wide, with an annual turnover of over 320 billion dollars according to

the UNODC (2005 : 123-143).

It is important to stress that European countries are not just con-

sumers and thus — so to say — victims of drug trafficking. In the last two

decades of the twentieth century, several European countries acquired a

__ 46 —

pivotal role in the world illegal drug trade. Due to their geographic posi-

tion, Turkey and Spain have constituted for at least two decades the

main gateway for Afghan heroin as well as Moroccan hashish and

Colombian cocaine, respectively. Since the 1970s Turkey has been the

main gate for Afghan heroin on its way to Western European markets.

Likewise, due to its geographic position, Spain has since the 1980s

become the main entry point for Moroccan hashish, as shown by the

fact that it accounts for about 75 percent of all hashish seizures in

Europe. For smuggling cocaine into Europe, Colombian traffickers also

seem to prefer Spain (together with the Netherlands), as they are aided

by a mutual language and by the presence of a consistent community

of co-nationals (Gômez-Céspedez and Stangeland, 2004). In some coun-

tries, most notably the Netherlands and Belgium but also more recently

Poland and Albania, we find not only illegal drug traffickers and dis-

tributors but drug producers as well. Cannabis is cultivated nowadays,

at least indoors, in most European countries (e.g., Spapens, van de Bunt

and Rastovac, 2007). From the early 1990s onwards the Netherlands

and Belgium have become the major European and, possibly, world pro-

ducers of ecstasy (Spapens, 2006). Polish chemists have specialized in the

production of amphetamines for both Western and Eastern markets,

and Albanians have taken up the cultivation and sale of marijuana, re-

launching a product that had for almost twenty years disappeared from

many Western European markets (Paoli and Fijnaut, 2004a).

Despite the re-conversion of many professional criminals to drug

trafficking and dealing, several — traditional and non-traditional -

profit-making criminal activities have continued to proliferate. Some,

such as the illegal trade in weapons, are instrumental to a life ‘on the

other side of the law’. Other activities — ranging from car thefts, to rob-

beries and the exploitation of prostitution — experienced an unexpected

revival in the years immediately following the fall of the Iron Curtain,

when Eastern European criminals primarily resorted to violence and

ruthlessness to earn a ‘fast buck' in Western Europe.

As a few scholars and particularly Mike Levi (1999) and Tom Naylor

(2004) have shown, a third group of entrepreneurial crime activities also

flourished in the 1980s and 1990s and continue to do so today, though

they are hardly the prerogative of traditional underworld members.

These activities range from fraud and other financial crimes to bid-rig-

ging in public works tenders and the 1llegal wholesale trade in toxic

waste, weapons, diamonds and gold. They undoubtedly form a part of

organized crime, if one accepts the loose definitions of organized crime

that dominate the political and scientific discourse on organized crime

in Europe today. As Dick Hobbs (2004 : 422) puts it, ‘by acknowledging

[these activities] as organised crime, both the curricula vitae of contem-

__ 47 —

porary felons and the range of 1ideological and material support struc-

tures for their activities are considerably expanded’. Though difficult to

estimate precisely, their financial turnover and the harm they cause to

society may also be considerably higher than those of most types of

crime traditionally considered to be an exemplification of organized

crime.

Whereas the more white-collar forms of organized crime usually

attract public attention only in the immediate aftermath of a big scan-

dal, a second wave of expansion of European illegal markets, which

started to develop fifteen years after the first, drug-related wave, has

raised much concern in government institutions and from the general

public. This expansion was largely triggered by the enactment of increas-

ingly restrictive immigration policies in most Western European coun-

tries during the 1980s and 1990s, which created a large demand for

human smuggling services. The number of potential customers as well

as victims of veritable human trafficking suddenly multiplied, as the lib-

eration of Eastern Europe in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union

in 1991 finally abolished restrictions on the mobility of almost four hun-

dred million Eastern EFuropean and former Soviet citizens. Crises in

other parts of the world, ranging from several African countries to Iraq,

Afghanistan and East Timor, also engorged the flow of prospective

migrants, at the same time as growth and improvement of transporta-

tion facilitated their movements, by drastically reducing logistical con-

straints.

To meet this demand, human smuggling ‘companies’ popped up at

all the crucial borders of ‘Fortress Europe’. Though many smugglers

merely sell services desperately wanted by their customers, not only are

their prices in most cases extortionate, but conditions are often inhu-

man, as proven by the many accidents all over Europe that cost the lives

of undocumented migrants. Moreover, this flourishing black market has

opened up space for all kinds of exploitation that sometimes end up as

real trafficking in human beings. According to U.S. Department of State

(2008), 600-800,000 persons are trafficked across borders each year,

though the scientific bases of this figure remain unclear.

Organized crime’s infiltration of the legitimate economy, civil society

and politics has been investigated and studied much less than its 1llegal

market activities, and even in many EU countries it is impossible to go

beyond guesswork and speculation. Despite the serious shortcomings of

information sources, it can safely be stated that in all ‘old’ EU countries

— With the exception of Italy — traditional organized crime groups’ abil-

ity to infiltrate the legitimate economy and corrupt civil and political

institutions was grossly overstated when organized crime began to

_— 48 —

attract media and political attention in the late 1980s (Paoli and Fijnaut,

2004a).

In many European countries, however, perpetrators of organized

crime invest in several legitimate industries — above all in the transport,

finance, real estate, hotel and night-life sectors — to facilitate their 1llegal

activities and reinvest their illicit proceeds. Organized crime’s investment

in hotels, night-clubs and pubs in several Dutch cities (especially in

Amsterdam) and in real estate in the south of Spain as well as extensive

mafia infiltration in the southern Italian legitimate economy are most

worrying (Kleemans, 2004 and Gômez-Céspedez and Stangeland, 2004).

The picture becomes even less clear-cut if one considers the perpetrators

of non-traditional organized crime activities, such as fraud, the manip-

ulation of public tenders and the illegal trade in toxic waste, weapons

and gold. These white-collar criminals have no need to ‘infiltrate’ into

the legitimate economy as they are already an established part of it, and

the revenues of their ‘dirty’ activities are barely distinguishable from the

flows of ‘clean’ and ‘hot’ money that are traded incessantly around the

world.

4. — BROADENING THE VIFVW :

ORGANIZED CRIME MANIFESTATIONS

IN THE REST OF THE WORLD

Some distinctions to the picture I have sketched so far need to be

made for Eastern Europe. Before pointing to the differences, however,

let me first stress the similarities between organized crime activities and

actors in Western and Eastern Europe. Long curtailed by socialist dic-

tatorships, illegal markets have boomed in all Eastern European coun-

tries since the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989. In particular, illegal drug

consumption and trade have expanded phenomenally in Russia and

most other former Warsaw Pact countries. Today, Russia probably con-

stitutes the second largest market in the world for opiates and the larg-

est one if only heroin is considered — and this although heroin was vir-

tually unknown to Russian and Eastern European until the mid-1990s

(Paoli, Greenfield and Reuter, 2009). AlIl illegal markets in Eastern

Europe and Russia have integrated into the world ones and rapidly

internationalized.

During the early phases of the transition, large criminal groups

formed in numerous former Warsaw Pact countries, as the former Com-

munist government agencies did not have the necessary resources to

effectively counter their activities, and many civil servants with misera-

ble or no regular pay were happy to accept bribes from criminals or

_— 49 —

even to enter themselves into illegal profit-making and protection busi-

nesses, as for example, the work of Federico Varese (2001) and Vadim

Volkov (2002) on the Russian mafia have masterly shown. Almost

twenty years after 1989, most Eastern European countries are well

advanced in closing the legal and institutional gap separating them from

Western standards and as a result, organized crime has also tended to

assume the more disorganized and network-like patterns typical of

Western Europe. Large and violence-prone criminal groups remain,

however, active in countries where the government is unable or not

interested in enforcing criminal law prohibitions strictly (e.g., Arsovska,

2007).

The distinction between organized crime, business crime and the

legitimate economy also became blurred after 1989 in countries where

up until few years earlier all forms of private entrepreneurship had been

considered criminal and where it was long virtually impossible to con-

duct a business without violating some laws. Again, paths have diversi-

fied across former Warsaw Pact countries. In some of them, particularly

those that have entered the EU, the local governments have set up a via-

ble legal framework to regulate the legitimate economy and to separate

the latter from the underground and tout court criminal economies. In

other contexts, however, a clear-cut distinction still does not exist, and

organized crime groups are still heavily involved in key legitimate eco-

nomic sectors, are able to influence the political decision making and

thus threaten economic and political stability (e.g., Shelley, 2004).

The organized crime picture becomes less clear-cut once we leave

Europe, all the more so as research on organized crime has been scarce

except for a few countries, such as the United States, ° Canada (Beare,

1996), Colombia (Thoumi, 2003) and Japan (Hill, 2003). There 1s no

time here for a full-fledged review. With some caveats, I hypothesize

that the model of varying 1llegality I have recently developed with Vic-

toria Greenfield and Peter Reuter (2009) for the world heroin market

can be extended to other 1llegal activities as well. Namely, in countries

with effective governments the organized crime picture by and large

resembles that in the EU, with the main exception being Japan, where

the government long preferred accommodation with the Yakuza (Hill,

2003). Such countries tend to host 1illegal enterprises that are relatively

small and ephemeral, use violence sparingly because it is counterproduc-

tive for their own businesses and are unable to corrupt systematically

) In the United States, research on organized crime has a long tradition, as it began

already in the 1920s with the seminal work of John Landesco ([1929], 1968). However, since

the 1980s the topic of organized crime as such has stimulated limited empirical research (e.g..

Reuter, 1983; Chin, 1996; Jacobs, 1999; Finckenauer and Waring, 2001), although there 1s

a large body of scientific literature on activities considered typical of organized crime, such

as drug trafficking and human smuggling.

—— 50 —

the public administration or extensively infiltrate the legitimate econ-

omy

Where governments are weak, corrupt or do not control parts of

their own territory, such as in Colombia, Afghanistan, Tajikistan or

some African countries (e.g., Thoumi, 2003; Paoli et al., 2007; Gastrow,

2003), large organized crime enterprises may consolidate, and these have

no restraints in using extensive violence and corruption or in infiltrating

the legitimate economy and influencing politics. Indeed, these enterprises

are often no longer mere economic entities but frequently fuse with

guerrilla, insurgency or paramilitary groups.

5. — QORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL POLICIES

To a much higher degree than in other contexts, the fight against

organized crime has been a major theme in justice and home affairs pol-

icy-making in Europe since the 1990s. At least up until 9/11, the need

to tackle organized crime had become one of European politicians’ and

government agencies’ most effective arguments to enact criminal and

criminal procedural law reforms, introduce new offences and special

investigative powers for law enforcement agencies and propel the tran-

snationalization of crime control and criminal justice (Fijnaut and Paoli,

2004a).

It is by no means excessive to say that under the aegis of the Euro-

pean Union, policy on organized crime in Europe has increasingly tran-

scended national boundaries and since the late 1990s become a matter

of international politics and hence also of the foreign policy of individ-

ual countries. This internationalization of organized crime control policy

explains why the changes that have taken place on several fronts in indi-

vidual countries in Europe are so similar, whether they involve the cen-

tralization of the police, the judiciary and the customs authorities, or the

creation of special units within these institutions, or the introduction of

intrusive methods of investigation, such as the use of phone tapping,

anonymous witnesses and undercover agents. The reports on organized

crime control policies in 13 European states‘°’ and their comparison in

Organized Crime in Europe (Fijnaut and Paoli, 2004) document these

similarities and also the pressure EU Member States and particularly the

old ‘Candidate States’ were put under to accept a common approach to

organized crime.

The first EU policy initiative on organized crime was the already-

mentioned ‘Action Plan to Combat Organised Crime of April 1997’.

(°) The reports were produced by scholars such as Levi (2004), van de Bunt (2004), Kilch-

ling (2004), Cornils and Greve (2004), Scheinost (2004) and Plywaczeski and Filipowski (2004).

This comprehensive plan consisted of a raft of measures to forcefully

promote cooperation between the Member States in criminal matters, as

intended in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union : expansion of

the system of legal assistance, greater involvement of Europol in coop-

eration between the Member States, mutual evaluation of the legal and

organizational measures that the Member States implement in this area

in their own country, etc. The plan also included a few proposals to

devote more attention to preventing organized crime : transparency in

public administration, screening of individuals and companies in public

tender procedures and social and economic measures for cities to pre-

vent them becoming ‘breeding grounds for organised crime’.

In the same year, the fight against organized crime was elevated to

the rank of an EU treaty issue in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997),

becoming central to the Third Pillar, whose main aim is to create an

‘area of freedom, security and justice’ within the countries of the EU.

In the reformulated Title VI (‘Provisions in the Field of Justice and

Home Affairs’) strengthening police and judicial cooperation was sup-

posed to serve just one purpose : to combat organized crime. Ât a spe-

cial summit in Tampere, Finland, in October 1999 the European Coun-

cil expressed itself ‘deeply committed to reinforcing the fight against

serious organized and transnational crime’ and launched a ‘Unionwide

Fight against Crime’, meaning primarily organized crime (European

Union Council, 1999).

In the following years many initiatives were introduced by the Euro-

pean Council and Commission to implement the agreements reached.

For instance, Eurojust (a sort of European prosecutor’s office with the

task of facilitating the proper coordination of national prosecuting

authorities), the Police Chiefs Operational Task Force and joint inves-

tigation teams were set up, and in 2005 an EU Convention on Mutual

Assistance in Criminal Matters entered into force.

The latest culmination of this internationalization process is repre-

sented by the Lisbon Treaty. If it ever comes into force, this could rep-

resent a ‘Copernican Revolution,’ as Cyrille Fijnaut (personal commu-

nication) puts it, for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. In

particular, police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters should de

facto become matters of old ‘First Pillar’ and as such be decided with

qualified majority voting. In such a legislative framework, however, the

fight against organized crime may lose some of its policy relevance :

once maintaining domestic security becomes a joint task of the Euro-

pean Union and the Member States together, it might no longer be nec-

essary to stress so much the transnational dimension of organized crime

to legitimize the EU intervention.

__ 52 —

Organized crime control has also acquired a growing relevance in EU

foreign policy. In 1998 the applicant countries that joined the EU in

May 2004 were made sign a ‘Pre-Accession Pact on Organised Crime’

and put under considerable pressure to adopt Western European policy

in this area : the famous acquis communautaire. At the same time, a vari-

ety of programs were initiated by the European Commission and the

Council of Europe to help all former communist European countries

strengthen their political and judicial capacities in the fight against

organized crime and corruption.

This important development - the interweaving of the domestic and

foreign policies of the European Union, particularly in the field of com-

bating organized crime — culminated in the European Security Strategy,

which was adopted in December 2003. In this document, organized

crime is considered one of the key threats to Europe, alongside terrorism

and regional conflicts. Its control is thus singled out as one of the most

relevant EU'’s strategic objectives and ‘better coordination between

external action and Justice and Home Affairs policies 1s’ stated as being

‘crucial in the fight against both terrorism and organised crime’. This

perspective is obviously influenced by the philosophy that underlies the

U.S. policy in this area, namely that ‘the first line of defence is often

abroad’ (e.g., Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006). This development means

that in the EU, too, the question of internal security has become inex-

tricably linked with that of external security. The fight against organized

crime is no longer an internal European matter for the Member States,

but has become a global priority of the EU as such.

An interesting paradox here is that the United States, the country

that first introduced most of the new investigative methods as well as

the ‘first line of defence’ philosophy, has resorted much less frequently

than its European partners to the umbrella concept of organized crime

to back policy changes. Even before launching the ‘War on Terror’, the

United States has exploited other causes, such as the ‘War on Drugs

and the fight against money laundering, as the main justifications for

introducing the new investigative methods, marketing them among allied

and satellite countries and intensifying international police cooperation

(Nadelmann, 1993; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006). Not surprisingly,

this lower political relevance has also resulted in much less academic

interest in the topic.

Despite these differences, the United States was, along with the EU

countries, an outspoken supporter of the 2000 UN Convention against

Transnational Organized Crime, which propagates many of the new

( The Council of Europe also takes initiatives of its own accord to combat organized

crime. For a brief review, see Fijnaut and Paoli (2004).

_ 53 —

investigative methods and enhances police and judicial cooperation

among its 143 parties (Gastrow, 2002). The Convention criminalizes the

participation in an organized criminal group, defined according to the

loose criteria discussed earlier, as well as money laundering and corrup-

tion and foresees tough measures to combat these phenomena, prosecute

offenders and confiscate proceeds. Important procedural issues are dealt

with in detail in the second part of the convention : extradition and

mutual assistance, special investigative techniques and joint investiga-

tions, exchange of information, protection of witnesses and law enforce-

ment cooperation. All these measures clearly demonstrate the influence

of the United States and the EU on the Convention.

This explains why the Convention was and still is regarded with a

certain amount of suspicion in other parts of the world. Does it not

serve the interests of the West too much? Is it not a direct application

of the ‘first line of defence’ doctrine? The fact that Article 30 creates the

possibility of assisting ‘developing countries and countries with econo-

mies in transition’ in the implementation of the Convention can, of

course, easily fuel this suspicion (Fijnaut and Paoli, 2009).

6. — CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS

ON CRIMINOLOGICAL RESEARCH ON ORGANIZED CRIME

It is now time to give a full answer to the title question : ‘Does

organized crime constitute primarily a new label, new phenomenon or

policy expedient ?

Let us first acknowledge the changes that have

occurred and thus the extent to which organized crime represents a new

phenomenon. Criminals and criminalized commodities travel today

much faster than ever before, and previously separate domestic illegal

markets have become much more tightly interconnected. Areas of the

globe that were previously isolated — either for political reasons, such as

the former Warsaw Pact bloc, or because of their underdevelopment,

such as many African countries —- have now become integrated in the

world illegal markets. These developments should not be a source of

surprise, though, as they mirror analogous changes in the broader soci-

ety and economy.

Moreover, this picture needs to be nuanced and sharpened with some

facts contradicting the thesis of organized crime as a new phenomenon.

First, despite the growing emphasis placed on the transnational dimen-

sion of organized crime since the early 1990s, many organized crime

activities — and their impact — remain local. For example, consider the

illicit drug trade, which is often considered a prototypical transnational

activity : drugs are produced, distributed and consumed in specific

__ 54 —

places. What 1s transnational in their trade, as in most forms of criminal

activities, are the transportation, communication and money flows.

From a policy perspective, an important corollary of this more balanced

understanding of organized crime is that its containment 1s first and

foremost the responsibility of local authorities. To operate effectively,

however, these authorities often need to cooperate with each other, and

so they need the support of international institutions such as Interpol

or, in a European context, Europol and Eurojust to bridge the gaps

between them.

Second, the powerful large-scale and hierarchical criminal organiza-

tions that have long been considered exemplary of organized crime have

by and large not materialized in any country with a government effec-

tively enforcing its criminal law. In these contexts, a myriad of small

and ephemeral enterprises continue to constitute the bulk even of those

illegal industries that expanded significantly in the late twentieth cen-

tury. From such a perspective, organized crime appears to be more a

new label than a new phenomenon.

Despite its lack of an empirical basis, the spectre of transnational

mafia-type criminal organizations has served a key policy function — and

it is for this reason that organized crime must also be considered a pol-

icy expedient. With varying degrees of good faith, in fact, such a spectre

has been propagated by the media, politicians, law enforcement agencies

of many countries and, more recently, by international organizations to

pass reforms that would otherwise meet resistance from lower-level

agencies seeing their competencies reduced and provoke the opposition

of civil rights organizations.

At the same time, however, the legal definitions of organized crime

adopted by most states and international organizations hardly reflect the

mafia fixation of much political and media discourse. Às mentioned ear-

lier, most of these definitions are very broad, if not vague, so much so

that they — and the special powers granted to organized crime investiga-

tors and prosecutors — can be applied to a wide range of criminal phe-

nomena and people involved. Indeed, by reading most official definitions,

one can barely grasp the specificity of organized crime vis-à-vis other

types of crime and understand the novel dangers of this phenomenon,

which are cited to justify the introduction of incisive investigative powers

and the restriction of defendants’ and common people's rights. It 1s in

this gap between the dramatic images presented by political and media

rhetoric and the wide-ranging and petty behaviours included in most offi-

clal definitions that a serious deception of the general public lies.

I would like to conclude this article with a few considerations on the

past and future contributions of criminology to this area of research and

policy. Especially in Europe and North America, criminologists have

played a key role in improving our understanding of organized crime

activities and actors through a series of empirical studies at the local,

national and, less frequently, at the regional level. The overall picture of

organized crime in these contexts is fairly clear, though additional stud-

les, especially ethnographic research projects, could certainly improve

our understanding of the details and new trends.

Criminologists have also been most vocal in showing the political

uses of much concern about organized crime and, in my opinion, some

have gone even too far in completely denying the underlying changes in

international 1illegal markets. Together with criminal laywers and other

social scientists, criminologists — again especially in Europe and North

America — have also critically reviewed the legislation adopted, sharply

criticizing it when these measures appeared not commensurate or went

too far in restricting suspects’ and citizens’ rights.

As for the potential of future research, I see three main gaps that

should be filled in the coming years. First, not much is yet known about

organized crime activities and actors in large parts of Africa, Asia and

Latin America. Research in these contexts should be intensified : Article

28 of the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime calls par-

ties to promote scientific research on organized crime, but this article

has so far remained a dead letter in most countries. Comparative

research across different parts of the world should also be encouraged.

Second, most policy reforms on organized crime are justified with the

reasoning that organized crime represents a major threat to society. In

the last few years many European police agencies, including Europol

(2008) have begun Organized Crime Threat Assessments to set their pri-

orities (see also SOCA, 2008). In my opinion, these assessments should

not be left to government agencies alone, which often use poor and

opaque methodologies. Criminologists should at the very least exercise

a critical review of the official Threat Assessments or, even better,

develop independent scientific methods to establish what kind of threat

(and to whom or what) the different organized crime activities and

actors really represent. Consider, for example, the case of smuggling

migrants. This activity is often lumped together with human trafficking,

which is a most heinous activity. In the case of smuggling of migrants,

however, the harm 1s certainly much lower and seems to be more the

result of criminalization than of the criminalized activity itself. ‘*

Finally, the flurry of initiatives adopted in the past fifteen years to

fight against organized crime has been subject only sporadically to eval-

($) Tom Vander Beken from the University of Gent and myself, together with two junior

colleagues from our universities, have just started a project in this area in collaboration with

the Belgian Federal Police, and at the next World Congress of Criminology we should have

some findings to report.

_— 56 —

uation. Some of my former colleagues at the Max Planck Institute for

Criminal Law in Freiburg have done some pioneering work in this

respect for Germany (Albrecht, Dorsch and Krüpe, 2003; Kinzig, 2004)

and, as far as confiscation is concerned, also Europe-wide (Kilchling,

2001). But except for these and a few other studies in other countries

(e.g, Levi, 2004), we basically do not know how, how often and against

whom most organized crime provisions are applied. We neither know 1f

these provisions have had the desired impact on organized crime activ-

itles and actors nor what their unintended consequences have been.

Given the wide-ranging definitions of organized crime adopted, it is

fairly reasonable to assume that there has been a significant net-widen-

ing effect. An independent evaluation of organized crime control policies

seems to me crucial for enhancing the long-term legitimacy of the over-

all crime control system.

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ABSTRACT

The perception of and the policies against organized crime have dras-

tically changed since the mid-1980s in Europe and the rest of the world.

Whereas organized crime was long considered a problem that affected

only a few countries, in the past three decades there has been a growing

concern worldwide about this form of crime, which has fed and justified

policy reform.

Given this huge and sudden shift, the article considers the extent to

Wwhich organized crime can be best defined in terms of one of the three

following definitions : (1) a new label attached to pre-existing illegal

activities and actors that have remained substantially unchanged; (2) a

new phenomenon : that is, the growing use of the expression ‘organized

crime’ effectively points to the rise of fundamentally new actors or new

ways of conducting illegal activities; (3) an expedient to promote and

legitimize encompassing policy and institutional reforms and enhance

international police and judicial cooperation.

After reviewing organized crime manifestations and policies in

Europe and elsewhere, the article concludes that there is evidence to

support all three definitions; however, there is no doubt that the first

and third ones (organized crime as a new label and policy expedient,

respectively) fit more closely than the second one (organized crime as a

new phenomenon).

RÉSUMÉ

La perception du crime organisé et les politiques qui sont dévelop-

pées à son encontre ont changé radicalement depuis le milieu des années

1980 tant en Europe que dans le reste du monde. Alors que le crime

organisé a longtemps été considéré comme un problème propre à certai-

nes contrées, les trois dernières décennies ont vu croître dans le monde

entier la préoccupation de cette forme de crime, alimentant et justifiant

la volonté de changer la politique à son égard.

Face à ce changement important et soudain, l’auteur examine dans

quelle mesure le crime organisé trouve le mieux sa définition dans les

trois formules suivantes : (1) un nouveau label pour des activités illégales

— 61 —

préexistantes et des acteurs qui n’ont pas substantiellement changé; (2)

un phénomène nouveau : l’usage accru de l’expression “crime organisé”

répondrait à l’augmentation d’acteurs fondamentalement nouveaux ou

de nouvelles manières de mener des activités 1illégales; (3) un expédient

pour promouvoir et légitimer des politiques et des réformes institution-

nelles et favoriser la coopération internationale en matière policière et

judiciaire.

Après avoir passé en revue les manifestations du crime organisé et les

politiques développées en Europe et ailleurs, l’auteur de l’article conclut

qu’aucune preuve n’étaye aucune des trois définitions, mais qu'il n’y a

pas de doute que la première et la troisième (nouvelle étiquette, ou jus-

tification de politiques) rendent mieux compte de la réalité que la

deuxième (phénomène nouveau).

RESUMEN

La percepciôn del crimen organizado y de las politicas en contra del

mismo han experimentado un cambio drâstico desde mediados de los

años ochenta tanto en Europa como en el resto del mundo. Durante

mucho tiempo se considerô que el crimen organizado era un problema

que solo afectaba a unos pocos paises, pero en las tres ültimas décadas

el interés por este tipo de crimen ha ido creciendo en todo el mundo,

alimentando y justificando asi una reforma de esta politica.

Dado este enorme y repentino cambio, el articulo considera cual de

las tres definiciones que siguen a continuaciôn, es la mejor para referirse

al crimen organizado: (l) dar una nueva etiqueta a actividades 1legales

ya existentes y a actores, aunque no hayan cambiado sustancialmente;

(2) un nuevo fenômeno: el creciente uso de la expresiôn «crimen

organizado» señala fundamentalmente el aumento de nuevos actores 0

nuevos modos de realizar actividades 1legales; (3) un recurso para pro-

mocionar y legitimizar reformas politicas e institucionales y promover la

policia internacional y la cooperaciôn judicial.

Después de revisar muestras y politicas de crimen organizado en

Europa y otros lugares, el articulo concluye que hay evidencia para apo-

yar las tres definiciones. Sin embargo, no hay duda de que la primera

y la tercera (crimen organizado como una nueva etiqueta, y un recurso

politico, respectivamente) se ajustan mejor que la segunda (crimen orga-

nizado como un nuevo fenômeno).

— 62 —

DELINCUENCIA URBANA

Y VICTIMIZACION DE LAS VICTIMAS

E. Raûl Zaffaroni ()

1. — LA POLITICA ACTUAL

\!

LA DELINCUENCIA

URBANA

(( A alguien le interesa prevenir la delincuencia urbana?) Existe un

preocupante fenômeno de delincuencia urbana en todo el mundo. La

vida se ha vuelto urbana, la poblaciôn mundial tiende a concentrarse en

ciudades y, por ende, la criminalidad también. Pero el hecho de la delin-

cuencia urbana es proyectado a la poblaciôn a través de la comunica-

ciôn masiva, que construye la realidad de la delincuencia urbana (pro-

yeccion mediâtica del hecho). Por ùûltimo hay una respuesta politica al

hecho y a su proyecciôn. Teôricamente puede distinguirse la respuesta

politica al hecho (medidas preventivas y represivas, servicio de seguridad,

etc.) de la respuesta politica a la proyecciôn (discurso politico de seguri-

dad) pero en la prâctica no son independientes e incluso se confunden

de modo inextricable : los legisladores, las agencias ejecutivas y los res-

ponsables politicos de éstas e incluso los poderes ejecutivos, responden

a hecho en la forma en que éste es proyectado por la comunicaciôn, por-

que ésta es la exigencia de la llamada opiniôn publica.

Es América Latina — y quizà en todo el mundo — es cada vez mas

claro que /a respuesta politica es a la proyecciôn mediâtica y no al hecho

mismo de la delincuencia urbana. Urgidos los politicos por la proyeccion

mediâtica, responden discursivamente y condicionan a ella la respuesta al

hecho mismo, al punto de desentenderse de éste. No existen observato-

rios, estadisticas serias y orientadas a la prevenciôn, nadie se ocupa por

investigar con miras preventivas el hecho mismo de la delincuencia

urbana, mientras los comunicadores sociales y los politicos sôlo se cen-

tran en la proyecciôn mediâtica del hecho y manejan alguna estadistica

poco confiable y bastante inûtil para efectos preventivos. Se enfrenta la

construcciôn de la realidad y no la realidad, a la que nadie intenta

aproximarse.

Esta afirmaciôn se verifica compulsando

los presupuestos de

seguridad : no se destina dinero alguno a la investigaciôon técnica del

() Profesor Emérito y Director del Departamento de Derecho Penal y Criminologia.

Facultad de Derecho. Universidad de Buenos Aires.

— 63 —

fenômeno de la delincuencia urbana : frecuencia, dinämica, modalida-

des, barrios, situaciones de riesgo, poblacion de riesgo, etc.

No se puede prevenir lo que no se conoce, pero a nadie le interesa

conocer; luego, parece que a nadie le interesa prevenir.

(Una preocupaciôn creciente; la reparaciôn del daño psiquico) Entre

las medidas con que ûltimamente se trata de paliar la confiscaciôon de la

victima‘?), en algunos paises centrales el estado ha intentado ocuparse de

los daños psiquicos que éstas sufren, en especial en caso de hechos masi-

vos (catästrofes, crimenes de destrucciôn masiva indiscriminada vulgar-

mente llamado ferrorismo), extendiendo el concepto de victima a fami-

liares y deudos.

Los psicôlogos se han preocupado por distinguir el mero estrés del

verdadero trauma que sufre la victima en delitos violentos : en tanto que

el estrés es pasajero, el trauma irrumpe en la conciencia de la victima y

la perturba. Pero los resultados positivos de la asistencia psicolôgica

inmediata se discuten 9). Todas las indicaciones para la atenciôn de las

victimas tienen por objeto la prevenciôn o el restablecimiento de su

salud psiquica, prestando especial atenciôn a la elaboraciôn del duelo.

Es sabido que la elaboraciôon del duelo es precedida por pasos de

estupefacciôn, de autoinculpaciôn y de posterior proyecciôn de la culpa

(identificaciôn de algûn culpable), hasta lograr la etapa final de elabo-

raciôn. Se trata de facilitar el trabajo del aparato psiquico para evitar

que la acumulaciôn de excitaciones termine siendo patôgeno ‘*

Cuando la elaboraciôn se interrumpe aumenta el riesgo de acumula-

ciôn de tensiones que desemboca en patologia psiquica mäs o menos

grave, dependiendo en alguna medida de la personalidad de la victima

y del estado de su salud mental con anterioridad al hecho.

? Es sabido que el poder punitivo se caracteriza por la confiscaciôn de la victima (que

algunos Ilaman expropiacion), cuyo lugar usurpa desde hace casi un milenio el soberano, en

cualquiera de sus formas politicas. La victima dejô de tener trato de persona, para pasar a

ser un dato procesal, razôn por la cual el modelo punitivo no es un modelo de soluciôn de

conflictos, sino de ejercicio vertical de poder del soberano. En tiempo reciente se ha tratado

por diversos medios de atenuar la posicion subordinada de la victima con paliativos a la

paradoja de su despersonalizaciôn (o cosificacion). Por otra parte, una importante corriente

resucita las formas tradicionales de soluciôn de conflictos, tratando de adaptarlas a la civi-

lizaciôn actual, bajo la forma de justicia restaurativa y de mediaciôn penal. En tanto que los

primeros intentos no abandonan el modelo punitivo, los segundos se van alejando lentamente

de él.

G) Cfr. Carolina ELIACHEFF - Daniel SOULEZ LARIVIÈRE, Il tempo delle vittime, Milano,

2008.

(4 Corresponde al concepto freudiano de Durcharbeiten (cfr. LAPLANCHE-PONTALIS, Dic-

cionario de Psicoanalisis, Barcelona, 1981, pâg. 106).

_— 64 —

2. — LA CREACION DE LA VICTIMA/HÉROE

(Selectividad en la proyecciôn publica de la victimizaciôn) Abundan

las investigaciones que verifican que los indices de victimizaciôn se

reparten con tan escasa equidad como los de criminalizaciôn. La comu-

nicaciôn masiva sôlo proyecta como victimas a algunas de ellas, en

tanto que otras carecen de imagen y de voz, directamente se ignoran y

no son consideradas como tales por la opiniôn corriente. Esta discrimi-

naciôn se acentûa en las sociedades muy estratificadas, como las de

nuestra América.

(Procedimiento de construccion de la victimalhéroe) En ocasiones,

entre las victimas mostradas, la comunicaciôn masiva selecciona a alguna

que es elevada a la categoria de héroe. Para eso los comunicadores lo

incitan a que se exprese como criminôlogo, penalista y criminalista

experto y omnisapiente. Dado que nadie se atreve a contradecir en voz

alta a un ser doliente y digno de compasiôn, necesitado de solidaridad,

asistencia y consuelo, cualquier respuesta pûblica es proyectada y perci-

bida como marcadamente insensible al dolor ajeno, de modo que los

desatinos que la victima en esa triste circunstancia puede expresar son

tomados como verdades cientificas y son difundidos como tales por los

comunicadores âvidos de rating, quienes les incitan a que expresen sus

peores prejuicios.

En esa coyuntura, los politicos —oficialistas y opositores- ensayan una

respuesta a la realidad mediâticamente construida en base al discurso de

la victima/héroe y que, por supuesto, nada tiene que ver con el hecho de

la criminalidad urbana, que es mâs ignorado que nunca.

(Condiciones de la victimalhéroe) Las victimas que se elevan a la con-

diciôn de héroes deben reunir ciertas caracteristicas que permitan la

identificaciôon por parte del püblico al que se dirige la construcciôn, pero

también debe poseer cierto grado de capacidad histriônica que le per-

mita asumir adecuadamente el papel de victima/héroe. Esta ültima con-

diciôn puede obedecer incluso a cierto grado de patologia o trastorno

de personalidad previo.

(Factores politicos que favorecen la construcciôn) Tampoco se cons-

truye una victima/héroe en cualquier momento, sino cuando su manipu-

laciôon es funcional a ciertos sectores politicos o econômicos. En este

sentido es necesario destacar que el actual momento de poder del

mundo es particularmente favorable a estas construcuiones. À ello con-

tribuyen los siguientes factores :

(a) El desequilibrio entre paises ricos y pobres y la concentraciôn de

riqueza generan mültiples conflictos entre nacionales en situaciôn limite

- 65 —

en los paises pobres e inmigrantes que huyen de esa situaciôn en los

ricos .

(b) En el centro y en la periferia del poder mundial las clases medias

se empobrecen como resultado de creciente polarizaciôn de riqueza,

cayendo en anomia como resultado de un profundo sentimiento de inse-

guridad.

(c) La comunicaciôn masiva destina el mayor espacio informativo de

la delincuencia urbana, si puede la magnifica y no la presenta como

resultado sino como principal fuente de todos los males.

(d) La pérdida de poder de los estados nacionales impide a los poli-

ticos emprender reformas estructurales que resuelvan los mâäs graves

problemas sociales.

(e) El estallido de la revolucion tecnolôgica (que es bâsicamente una

revoluciôn comunicacional), determina que la politica y el propio, estado

asuman cada dia mâs la forma de un espectäculo ‘

(f) Tiene creciente éxito imputar a los politicos incapacidad para

resolver los problemas, reduciendo éstos a la criminalidad urbana y a la

corrupciôn, omitiendo toda menciôn a los otros riesgos sociales, aunque

se trate de la destrucciôn de la vida planetaria.

(g) Los medios de comunicaciôn tienden a monopolizarse por empre-

sas y cuando los intereses de éstas coinciden con el oficialismo politico,

basta reducir el espacio dedicado a la criminalidad urbana para que la

proyecciôn püûblica de ésta desaparezca, tal como sucede en las dictadu-

ras

3. — LA VICTIMA/HÉROE

ES UN FENOMENO NUEVO

(Tiene dos notas diferenciales : resultados politicos antes desconocidos

y una enorme crueldad revictimizante) La construcciôn de la victima/

héroe es marcadamente diferente de la tradicional manipulaciôn de la

imagen de la criminalidad urbana con fines politicos. Es nuevo tanto (a)

por su efecto politico inmediato, que importa siempre una regresiôn

grave en cuanto a respeto a la dignidad de la persona, como por (b) la

crueldad a que somete a la propia victima/héroe, a la que interrumpe el

proceso de elaboraciôn del duelo, con grave daño psiquico, sin contar

con que en ocasiones se vale de la patologia previa de ésta sin mira-

miento alguno.

5) V. Alessandro DEL LAGO, Non-persone. L'esclusione dei migranti in una società globale,

Milano. 1999.

(6) Lo observaba proféticamente hace décadas Roger-Gérard SCHWARTZANBERG, O

Estado espetaäculo, Sao Paulo, 1978.

— 66 —

(Efecto politico inmediato sobre la represiôn) La construcciôn de la

victima/héroe estä provocando el desbaratamiento de la legislaciôn penal

en toda América Latina, donde en algunos paises (como la Argentina y

en buena medida Brasil) puede afirmarse que ya no existe côdigo penal,

sino un conjunto de retazos de normas incoherentes y contradictorias,

con desequilibrio de pena, algunas violatorias de normas internacionales

de derechos humanos, sin contar con la legitimaciôn pûblica de abusos

represivos (incluyendo la tortura) y de un mayor control sobre toda la

poblaciôon (que conforme a la experiencia universal se concentra sobre

los sectores subalternos y los disidentes ideolôgicos). Por esta via se

estän poniendo en peligro los mejores logros de nuestra civilizaciôn.

(Peligro para la democracia pluralista) La culpabilizaciôn de los poli-

ticos estäà destinada a tener gran acogida püblica en momentos en que

la

representaciôn

institucional

està mundialmente cuestionada y

jaqueada por organizaciones que se arrogan la verdadera representaciôn

de la sociedad, que por cierto nadie les ha conferido (lo que se ha dado

en llamar la contrademocracia)‘”), sin contar con que abren el camino a

la aventura politica de outsiders oportunistas. No puede olvidarse que el

descrédito del parlamentarismo y del consiguiente pluralismo politico

fue el principal blanco de ataque del totalitarismo en ascenso para

demoler la Repüblica de Weimar y la Repüblica Española en los años

treinta.

(La interrupcion de la elaboraciôn del duelo) Pero no se detiene alli

la novedad de la creaciôn de la victima/héroe. Los medios masivos la

captan en su momento de mayor desequilibrio emocional, cuando pro-

cura liberarse de la autoinculpaciôn (poner la culpa fuera) expresando

desmesuras neutralizantes que los comunicadores ratifican con singular

éxito. El efecto que esto tiene en la victima es fijarla en una etapa previa

a la elaboraciôn del duelo sin lograr concretarla, en especial cuando sus

caracteristicas psicolôgicas son negativas o problematicas para la elabo-

raciôn y el restablecimiento de su salud mental.

El éxito comunicacional de esos comentarios se explica (entre otras

razones) porque el destinatario del mensaje también rechaza toda co-

culpabilidad y de este modo, si la victima reûne las caracteristicas nece-

sarias (de clase, lenguaje, educaciôn, cultura, etc.) se identifica con ella

y con sus manifestaciones. Ademâs, la extracciôon social de la victima/

héroe permite también una identificaciôn ideolôgica y la participacion

en los mismos prejuicios, que son reforzados °

( Cfr. Pierre ROSANVALLON, La contrademocracia. La politica en la era de la descon-

fianza, Buenos Aires, Manantial, 2007.

( El reforzamiento de los prejuicios es la principal caracteristica de toda politica vôlkisch

porque es indispensable para la construcciôn de un enemigo.

— 67 —

La victima traumatizada pone la culpa en cabeza de las autoridades

estatales — politicas, judiciales, policiales — y de su ineficacia preventiva

y represiva, lo que siempre es posible porque la prevenciôn tiene limites

y, en los paises periféricos del poder mundial, el servicio de seguridad

no sôlo reconoce enormes fallas, sino incluso altos grados de corrupcion

y complicidad.

(La ocasion del oportunismo politico) La insistencia y apoyo al dis-

curso de la victima traumatizada y elevada a héroe, con caracteres idô-

neos para generar una amplia identificaciôn de la audiencia, sin duda

que constituye, al mismo tiempo, una formidable amenaza para la poli-

tica, pero también una enorme tentaciôn.

La identificaciôon de la audiencia con la victima puede ser muy nega-

tiva para el politico inculpado, pero también le resulta muy ûtil si logra

poner distancia de cualquier inculpaciôn y colocarse junto a la victima,

lo que intentarä radicalizando el discurso traumâtico de ésta hasta

sobreactuar para ratificar su identificaciôn con ella.

(Verificacion de la originalidad de!l fenômeno de la victimalhéroe) Si

bien la originalidad del fenômeno de la victima/héroe necesita ser inves-

tigada mâs profundamente comparando las distintas experiencias nacio-

nales al respecto, la verificaciôn empirica de las notas diferenciales

puede obtenerse en cada pais y contexto de la comparaciôn con ante-

riores manipulaciones de la victimizaciôn Ilevadas a cabo con objetivo

politico. En la medida de lo posible seria deseable que la investigacion

de la victima/héroe se realice comparando los casos mâs anälogos dis-

tantes en el tiempo. Esto es lo que, brevemente, pasamos a hacer res-

pecto de la Argentina, comparando dos casos anälogos en cuanto a

caracteristicas del crimen y a difusiôn y manipulaciôn mediâtica, pero

separados por setenta años de distancia y en contextos politicos muy

diferentes.

(Los casos analizados) Se trata de dos secuestros extorsivos con resul-

tado de muerte que provocaron iniciativas legislativas represoras : el pri-

mero (caso Ayerza) es de 1932/1933 y el segundo fue el mäs explotado

por los medios masivos en 2004 y años siguientes.

Las similitudes entre ambos son las siguientes :

(a) la victima fatal fue un joven universitario,

(b) hijo de familia de alta posiciôn social,

(c) ideolôgicamente de derecha,

(d) con amplia repercusiôon mediâtica sostenida en el tiempo,

(e) con reclamo de mayor represiôn a las autoridades,

(f) con proyectos de considerables reformas penales,

(g) en ambos casos de individualizô y se penô a los autores,

- 68

(h) y coincidieron con momentos de crisis econômica.

4. — EL CASO AYERZA (1932/1933)

(El contexto politico) En el caso Ayerza se produjo el secuestro el 25

de octubre de 1932 y apareciô el cadâver el 21 de febrero de 1933. Los

titulares de los periôdicos de la época y la radiotelefonia se ocuparon del

caso todo el verano. El pais se hallaba en una profunda crisis econômica

y en manos de un gobierno surgido de elecciones fraudulentas (con el

partido mayoritario proscrito) impuestas por una dictadura militar esta-

blecida en 1930. La derecha neoliberal — por asi llamarla — se habia

encumbrado al gobierno, desplazando a la derecha filo-fascista encar-

nada en la dictadura de 1930-1932, que después de que su mentor mili-

tar perdiese el poder se concentraba en organizaciones disciplinadas de

jôvenes de clase alta y media alta.

(Clara identidad politica de la victima) La victima era un joven estu-

diante, perteneciente a una familia de clase alta y militante de una de

las organizaciones afines al fascismo (Legiôn Civica)). Dada la publi-

cidad alcanzada por el secuestro y que la prensa habia ocupado todo el

verano con el caso, el sepelio de la victima fue un acto masivo en el que

se acusô de complicidad al gobierno conservador producto del fraude

electoral, pero enfrentado a la derecha a que pertenecia la victima.

En el sepelio multitudinario de la victima se exigieron penas severas,

montaron guardia los camaradas politicos de la victima, se prometiô

venganza y se reclamô el restablecimiento de la pena de muerte, dero-

gada por el côdigo penal de 1921 y que no se aplicaba desde 1916.

Dos meses mâs tarde, en abril de 1933, se detuvo a los responsables,

pertenecientes a una banda de secuestradores italianos (la banda de

10)

Galiffi), o sea, de lo que fue conocido como la mafia argentina ‘

(EI muerto era la unica victima; su madre sufria en silencio) En el

“caso Ayerza” (1932/1933) si alguna victima/héroe existia era soôlo el ver-

dadero muerto en el crimen. La comunicaciôn mostraba a la madre,

pero como sufriente, dolorosa, en ninguna actitud mesiänica, reivindica-

toria ni vengativa. Puede decirse que el joven Ayerza era una pâlida

imagen de Jesucristo y su madre de Maria Dolorosa.

( David RocK y otros. La derecha argentina. Nacionalistas, neoliberales, militares y cle-

ricales. Javier Vergara Editor. Buenos Aires, 2001.

(10) Sobre este fenômeno y el caso Ayerza : Eduardo AGUIRRE, Historias de la mafia en

la Argentina, Buenos Aires, 2000: Lila CAIMARI, Apenas un delincuente. Crimen, castigo y cul-

tura en la Argentina, 1880-1955, Buenos Aires, 2004; Lila CAIMARI, “Suceso de cinematogra-

ficos aspectos”. Secuestro y espectaâculo en el Buenos Aires de los años treinta, en Lila Car-

MARI (compiladora). *La ley de los profanos. Delito, justicia y cultura en Buenos Aires (1870-

1940)". Buenos Aires, 2007, pags. 209 y sgts.

69

—

—

(Proclamaciôon del compromiso politico de la victima) La 1identidad

ideolôgica de la victima no se ocultaba ni disimulaba, sino todo lo

contrario : era asumida pûblicamente y la organizaciôn a la que perte-

necia mostraba su presencia e indignaciôn. Era esta organizaciôn la que

a través de la empatia con el joven cuya vida se habia truncado procu-

raba canalizarla contra el gobierno fraudulento. Ningûün miembro de la

familia Ayerza fue elevado a héroe ni por este medio ambicioné funciôn

politica alguna.

El objetivo politico estaba muy claro : se imputaba debilidad punitiva

a un gobierno conservador y minoritario (producto de fraude electoral)

por un sector mâs conservador, cercano a la derecha fascista.

(Discurso xenôfobo) La crisis econômica “!) estaba en su punto mâs

alto y se señalaba como factor perturbador a la criminalidad organizada

de corte mafioso, importada del sur italiano. Se exaltaba el naciona-

lismo frente a una criminalidad extranjera, con discurso de corte discri-

minatorio (el mal no era argentino, sino que provenia del extranjero).

La clase media emergente — identificada con el partido derrocado en

1930 — estaba en su mayoria compuesta por la primera generaciôn de

inmigrantes.

(Reacciôn del gobierno) El Poder Ejecutivo reacciono frente a la pro-

yecciôn del hecho desempolvando viejos proyectos de estado peligroso

sin delito y proponiendo reformas represivas al côdigo penal de 1921,

remitiendo el proyecto al Senado, caâmara de corte claramente conserva-

dor, aunque integrada también por un senador socialista de la Ciudad

de Buenos Aires.

El proyecto del Ejecutivo dio lugar a un amplio debate en el Senado,

muy difundido y con protagonismo critico del senador socialista

(Alfredo Palacios). El Senado redoblô la propuesta del Ejecutivo dando

media sanciôn a un proyecto absurdamente represivo, que incluia la

pena de muerte por electrocuciôn “?).

(Resistencia de las estructuras politicas) Dentro del partido oficialista

(conservador) se manifestô un claro rechazo al proyecto con media san-

ciôon del Senado. El propio autor del côdigo penal e importante politico

conservador, Rodolfo Moreno (h), que fue gobernador de la Provincia

de Buenos Aires, embajador en el Japôn y luego precandidato a la pre-

( Producto de la recesion mundial de 1929 y que habia repercutido en la Argentina,

siendo aprovechada por las Fuerzas Armadas para quebrar la constitucionalidad, dando un

golpe de estado el 6 de setiembre de 1930, que derrocéô al presidente constitucional - Hipôlito

Irigoyen , perteneciente a una fuerza popular, habia desembocado en una dictadura de tinte

corporativista, encabezada por José Felix Uriburu, quien mediante intriga interna del ejér-

cito, fue reemplazado - fraude mediante - por el Gral. Agustin P. Justo.

(2) Sobre este debate : José PEco, La reforma penal en el Senado de 1933, Instituto de

Criminologia, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, Facultad de Ciencias Juridicas y Sociales,

Buenos Aires, 1936.

—- 70 —

sidencia de la Repüblica, se opuso a la reforma y defendiô su côdigo de

19213 La Cämara de Diputados recibiô el proyecto con media san-

ciôn del Senado y no le dio tratamiento. Por ende, el Côdigo Penal —

en esa ocasiôn — saliô intacto del primer embate masivo y estructural

que sufriera.

5. — EL CASO DE 2004

(Coyuntura politica diferente) El panorama, contexto y consecuencias

fueron muy diferentes setenta años mâs tarde, justamente por efecto del

fenômeno de la victima/héroe. Fue otro secuestro extorsivo en que el

cadâver del joven victima fue hallado el 23 de marzo de 2004“%. No

hubo conmociôn pûblica anterior y la victima del delito no tenia mili-

tancia politica : se tratô de un secuestro extorsivo que culmind en hom:-

cidio, al parecer porque la victima intentô fugarse, cometido por crimi-

nales de baja condiciôn social y sin una organizaciôn sofisticada, que

operaban en la provincia de Buenos Aires con medios mâs bien preca-

rios.

La coyuntura politica era completamente diferente a la del caso

Ayerza : el gobierno era producto de elecciones libres (sin proscripcio-

nes). No se planteaban cuestiones de xenofobia ni de nacionalismo. El

gobierno — que apenas comenzaba su gestion — enfrentaba a dos secto-

res, ambos minoritarios aunque con considerable poder mediâtico : los

responsables de los crimenes de la dictadura de 1976-1983, que se veian

amenazados por la posible reapertura de los proceso penales por un

lado; y, por el otro, a quienes se habian beneficiado con la politica eco-

nômica de los años 1989-1999 y con la posterior crisis de 2001, que

veian amenazados sus intereses. La situaciôn econômica era grave pero

se observaba una innegable tendencia a la recuperaciôn acelerada, lo

que deslegitimaba cualquier otro reclamo pûblico contra un gobierno

que llevaba pocos meses de gestiôn. La inseguridad era sin duda el ünico

camino por el que podia introducirse la critica, omitiendo —obviamente-

toda posible referencia a la responsabilidad de los propios sectores cri-

ticos en la producciôn de las causas.

(Estallido mediâtico a partir de la victimalhéroe) La proyecciôn

mediâtica no estallô con el secuestro, sino que, a diferencia del caso

Ayerza, tuvo lugar a partir del hallazgo del cadäver del joven vic-

(13) V. Rodolfo MORENO (h). El problema penal ( Segunda edicion con un apéndice), Bue-

nos Aires, 1933.

(14) Los detalles en Lucas GUAGNINI, Blumberg, en el nombre del hijo, Buenos Aires, 2005.

_— 71 —

tima (°). Todo parece indicar que fueron las especiales caracteristicas del

padre de la victima las que decidieron su elecciôon como victima/héroe.

(( Patriarcalismo?) Es interesante observar que el joven victima prâac-

ticamente desapareciô de la proyecciôn mediâtica, se lo mencionaba tan-

gencialmente, pero el papel preponderante se proyectaba con el padre.

La madre nunca tuvo intervenciôn pûblica, salvo una muy esporädica en

el proceso penal. Fl desplazamiento total de la madre no deja de ser

significativo : parece dominar un patriarcado que desplaza a la figura

femenina, reemplazändola por la de un empresario dinämico y agresivo,

cargado de autoridad. Jesucristo y la Dolorosa desaparecen en beneficio

de algo asi como el padre terrible cercano al Urvater freudiano.

(ç Tendencia autoritaria de las clases medias”) Dada la tendencia a

identificarse con la clase superior — que a lo largo de la historia carac-

teriza a la clase media argentina —, los sectores mäs bajos de ésta pare-

cieron identificarse mâs con un patriarca que con el dolor de madre, o

sea que buscaban un padre, lo que no deja de expresar una peligrosa

tendencia autoritaria que debiera ser materia de mayor anâlisis.

(El rechazo de la politica) Una diferencia importante es la no mili-

tancia politica de la victima (apoliticidad). À diferencia del caso Ayerza,

en que la militancia era clara y proclamada, en el 2004 la militancia

politica aparece como contaminante, de modo que la inocencia de la vic-

tima y de su padre como victima/héroe pasô por la no contaminacion

politica.

Fue la pretendida asepsia politica del padre lo que facilitô la identi-

ficaciôon mediâtica en momentos en que la politica pasaba por un transe

dificil : dos años antes era comün el slogan que se vayan todos, como

condena a toda la politica por efecto de la crisis del año 2001 que, entre

otras cosas, habia retenido los ahorros de la clase media argentina.

El padre tratô de ocultar sus valores politicos y en un primer

momento confundiô a la opiniôn bajo la apariencia del padre dolorido

por la pérdida que reaccionaba por auténtica indignaciôn, sin otra moti-

vaciôn ni objetivo. No obstante, râäpidamente se roded de algunos con-

sultores que habian estado vinculados a la dictadura de 1976-1983 o a

la gestion politica de 1989-1999, que estaba püblicamente descalificada

y señalada como corrupta y responsable de la crisis del año 2001.

La victima/héroe tratô en algûün momento de poner distancia de los

mentores que lo comprometian ideolôgicamente, atribuyendo esos con-

tactos a su inexperiencia politica, pero sin mucho éxito, con lo cual se

gano la antipatia de los sectores mäs progresistas - que en principio lo

(15) Sobre consideraciones y detalles acerca del fenômeno mediâätico y sus consecuencias

penales : Carlos Alberto ELBERT (Director), Inseguridad, victimas y victimarios. Argentina

2001/2007, Julio César Faira Editor, Montevideo-Buenos Aires, 2007.

72 —

habian apoyado —, lo que pasô a ser franco distanciamiento y luego

abierto rechazo a medida que aumentaban sus criticas a las organiza-

ciones de derechos humanos.

(La capacidad de convocatoria de la victimalhéroe) La victima/héroe

— con amplisimo apoyo mediâtico — convocô concentraciones de miles

de personas, aunque en cada una de ellas con menos concurrencia, a

medida que los empresarios mediâticos le restaban apoyo e incurria en

errores politicos, como emitir juicios que no eran politicamente correc-

tos. En esas concentraciones denostaba a autoridades y funcionarios en

la medida en que no era recibido o acogido por éstos.

(Autoridades y derechos humanos como blanco) En el discurso de la

victima/héroe se señalaba como responsables a las autoridades y a los

defensores de derechos humanos y de las garantias penales y procesales;

hubo claros acentos discriminatorios clasistas, pero sin el tono xenofô-

bico de la derecha del ‘“caso Ayerza”; no habia inmigraciôn 1taliana que

discriminar, contaminaciôn nacional que rechazar y los nuevos inmigran-

tes (procedentes de paises limitrofes) eran por completo ajenos al episo-

dio. Ademäs, la prédica antidiscriminatoria en la Argentina habia dado

algunos frutos y el viejo discurso de extrema derecha de los años treinta

no era admisible pûblicamente.

Si bien todos los discursos montados sobre la manipulaciôn de las

victimas suelen ser discriminatorios, clasistas y en alguna medida tam-

bién racistas, la tendencia actual muestra una inclinaciôn a asumir mâs

embozadamente estas caracteristicas, dejando de lado las pretensiones

supuestamente nacionalistas y xenofôbicas, pero atacando a las organi-

zaciones de derechos humanos. Las expresiones püblicas del tipo /as

garantias son para los delincuentes, nadie se ocupa de los derechos huma-

nos de las victimas y anälogas fueron los s/ogans preferidos de la cam-

paña de la victima/héroe.

(Silencio del Ejecutivo : proyectos de la victimalhéroe) El Poder Eje-

cutivo no enviô ningûn proyecto de reforma penal al Congreso, pues se

encontraba trabajando una comisiôn que elaboraba un anteproyecto de

côdigo penal en el ârea del Ministerio de Justicia, que - como veremos —

también fue neutralizado por la victima/héroe.

El padre de la victima fue quien Ilevô los proyectos al Congreso de

la Naciôn, elaborados por sus colaboradores espontäneos renacidos a su

amparo al protagonismo politico. Se encargô personalmente de intimi-

dar a los legisladores en el propio recinto del Congreso de la Naciôn,

ante el silencio temeroso de éstos. Sin duda que contribuyô a esto una

personalidad dotada de rasgos marcadamente agresivos, pero también la

carencia de personalidad y de conocimiento del tema por parte de los

legisladores, que no disponian de un discurso adecuado.

73 —

Era claro que el dolor de victima neutralizaba cualquier resistencia o

expresion de descortesia, lo que le permitia invadir todos los ambitos

oficiales, aunque su comportamiento denotaba una contradicciôn que a

la postre le fue fatal : no era compatible el rol de victima dolorida con

la agresividad puesta de manifiesto en varias ocasiones y, menos aûn,

con los crecientes rumores de posible protagonismo politico.

(Sumision de los funcionarios y legisladores) Casi ningûn politico y

pocos funcionarios se animaron a confrontar con sus pretensiones de

reformas legislativas o a recibirlo en sus despachos. Prâcticamente no

hubo debate legislativo, los legisladores se sometieron a las exigencias de

la victima/héroe, aunque algunas estaban confusamente redactadas por

personas vinculadas a la dictadura de 1976-1983, mientras el mismo

Congreso votaba una ley que anulaba las amnistias a los crimenes con-

tra la humanidad.

Dentro del partido oficialista no hubo capacidad de resistencia, pero

tampoco por parte de la oposiciôn. À diferencia del proceso de 1933, no

hubo un Rodolfo Moreno (h) deslegitimando las pretensiones reformis-

tas ni tampoco muchas voces sensatas que enfrentasen las disparatadas

reformas que acabaron por descalabrar el côdigo penal de 1921, hasta

el punto de producir una hecatombe como jamäs habia experimentado

la legislaciôon penal argentina en tiempos de gobiernos constitucionales

(y, sinceramente, tampoco en algunos de facto).

(Indiferencia del Ejecutivo) El Poder Ejecutivo dejô que las reformas

que destruyeron el côdigo penal se promulgaran automâticamente. À

diferencia del “caso Ayerza”, en que el Poder Ejecutivo tomô la inicia-

tiva de adelantarse a proponer reformas represivas, éstas surgieron todas

del Congreso de la Naciôn, por obra de legisladores atemorizados por

la presencia de la victima/héroe, que se limitaban a votar disciplinada-

mente los proyectos que ésta llevaba, redactados por sus colaboradores

que resucitaban del ostracismo politico a que los habia condenado su

desprestigio püblico.

(El ejecutivo detiene una reforma integral del côdigo penal) Por

ültimo, cabe señalar que en el “caso Ayerza” no estaba en marcha nin-

guna reforma penal, en tanto que en 2004 una comisiôn integrada por

los mâs prestigiosas profesores de derecho penal elaborô un antepro-

yecto de buena calidad técnica, que la victima/héroe atacô frontalmente,

imponiendo temor al poder ejecutivo, que se apresurô a declarar que no

estaba dispuesto a enviarlo al Congreso Nacional.

(Fragilidad de las estructuras politicas) Las estructuras politicas del

estado mostraron mayor fragilidad. Si bien el Poder Ejecutivo no se

involucrô directamente en la reforma legislativa, tampoco se sintiô capaz

de hacerle frente e incluso, en algün momento, tratô de captar a la vic-

tima/héroe apoyando una fundaciôn que ésta habia creado. Pero la

__ 74 —

debilidad extrema se puso de manifiesto en el Poder Legislativo, donde

el Congreso se dejô intimidar y humillar por la victima-héroe que, en el

mismo recinto de la Cäâmara se tomaba la libertad de pretender contro-

lar la presencia de legisladores en las sesiones.

Todo esto pone de manifiesto que la construcciôn de la victima/

héroe, ante el descrédito y la desconfianza a la representaciôn, se pre-

senta como un medio eficaz de desestabilizaciôon de instituciones demo-

crâticas por minorias, invitando a la consagracion de héroes paternalis-

tas supuestamente ajenos a la politica democrâätica y en especial a los

partidos politicos e introduciendo subrepticiamente valores contrarios a

la solidaridad, a la igualdad y a la libertad y, en definitiva, a la misma

democracia pluripartidista. Las instituciones democräticas han perdido

buena parte de su capacidad de reacciôn y defensa, rindiéndose fäcil-

mente ante las amenazas de la victima-héroe.

(La incursiôn politica de la victimalhéroe) Después de las concentra-

ciones multitudinarias que con enorme aparato mediâtico convocaba la

victima/héroe, y pese a que la asistencia disminuia a medida que se rei-

teraban las convocatorias, ésta recibiô ofertas oportunistas de varios

politicos para lanzar su candidatura y estuvo dudando hasta que por fin

-algo tardiamente- se decidiô a hacerlo. Cabe observar que en un

momento las encuestas arrojaron un alto porcentaje de votos a su favor

como candidato a gobernador de la provincia de Buenos Aires, cargo

que importa la segunda funciôn politica del pais.

(E] deterioro de la imagen publica de la victimalhéroe) La figura del

patriarca aséptico se desgastaba a medida que se introducia en la poli-

tica y que en sus declaraciones iba transparentando una clara ideologia

elitista. No obstante, conservaba una fuerte corriente de opiniôn que se

desbaratô por completo cuando se descubriô que el titulo de ingeniero

que ostentaba no existia, lo que deslegitimô la prédica de la victima/

héroe ante los sectores de clase media que le seguian.

Cabe observar que sus seguidores no lo abandonan por explotar poli-

ticamente su condiciôn de victima, sino por faltar a un valor elemental

en los sectores medios, como es la prohibiciôn de usurpar titulos.

(La contradicciôn señalaba el inevitable final) De cualquier manera,

la propia contradicciôon del discurso hubiese provocado este resultado

mâs o menos inevitable : el desprestigio de la politica en la clase media

con sus ahorros retenidos en los bancos no era soôlo con un sector de

ésta, sino que habia llegado al grado de considerar contaminante cual-

quier contacto o compromiso politico.

(La inhabilidad politica) Ademäs, la victima/héroe no era suficiente-

mente häbil en el terreno politico activo. No podia serlo debido a su

inexperiencia y también a la clara identificacion ideolôgica de sus men-

tores que, ademâäs, tampoco estaban en condiciones de aconsejarlo al

__ 75 —

respecto, dado que provenian de posiciones de poder a las que habian

llegado sin necesidad de tales habilidades o que las habian manejado tan

mal que se les habia diluido todo su caudal electoral. Por ello, la vic-

tima/héroe incurria con frecuencia en declaraciones que ponian al des-

cubierto su ideologia o que eran politicamente inconvenientes y alta-

mente

incorrectas.

Aunque con frecuencia intentô rectificarse, no

lograba neutralizar su relativa torpeza en ese terreno. Fue particular-

mente clara su precaria disculpa del homicidio policial de un adolescente

esquizofrénico.

Su aventura politica terminô cuando habiendo lanzado su candida-

tura en una fuerza minoritaria insignificante no alcanzô ni siquiera una

banca de diputado. À partir de ese momento es absolutamente ignorado

por la comunicaciôn masiva.

6. — ALGUNAS REFLEXIONES INQUIETANTES

(La originalidad del fenômeno) Las diferencias entre los dos casos —

separados por setenta años — creemos que demuestra acabadamente la

originalidad del fenômeno, que dista mucho de las usuales campañas de

ley y orden y de las anteriores manipulaciones en la proyecciôn pûblica

de victimas.

(Fragilidad institucional) La actual fragilidad de las instituciones poli-

ticas no es puramente latinoamericana, sino que la etapa de poder pla-

netario que se ha dado en llamar g/obalizaciôn ha debilitado a los esta-

dos nacionales en todo el mundo. Esta fragilidad se agudiza cuando mâs

fuerte deberia hallarse — o sea, en los momentos de crisis - y alcanza

limites muy peligrosos en los paises periféricos.

(Sintesis de efectos politicos) La construcciôn de una victima/héroe

que refuerza el patriarcado, descalifica toda la politica y el sistema plu-

ralista mismo, impone sumisiôn a los poderes legitimos de los estados,

emite juicios infundados sin espacio de respuesta racional, fuerza la san-

ciôn de leyes represivas, inconstitucionales y contrarias a los tratados

internacionales de derechos humanos, refuerza los prejuicios sociales

negativos, se hace eco de conceptos elitistas, no es comparable con la

manipulaciôn que de una victima (muerta) hacia una fuerza o corriente

politica hace setenta años para desacreditar a un gobierno y forzarlo a

defenderse proponiendo medidas que, en definitiva, no se concretaron

en leyes.

(La crueldad con la victima es nueva) Por otra parte, manipular la

imagen de un muerto no puede lesionarlo, pero la manipulaciôn de un

deudo, en forma que claramente interrumpe su proceso de elaboraciôn

del duelo, para dejarlo luego librado a su suerte cuando su condiciôn de

— 76

victima/héroe se esfuma ante la indiferencia total de los mismos medios

masivos que lo erigieron, es muestra de una crueldad e inhumanidad

desconocida en los fenômenos anâlogos del siglo pasado.

Queda claro que se trata de un fenômeno nuevo y alarmante, que no

sôlo provoca caos en la legislaciôn penal y hace naufragar cualquier

politica criminal racional y democrätica , sino que también sacrifica la

salud mental de la victima que elige para erigirla en héroe.

(La criminologia no puede desentenderse) Entendemos que nuestra

ciencia no puede pasar por alto el significado de este fenômeno nove-

doso. La criminologia se ha olvidado de los genocidios, ha omitido lar-

gamente su investigaciôn, quizà por considerarlos demasiado cercanos a

la politica. De ese modo, ha estado ausente ante el mâs grave de los cri-

menes, pese a los millones de victimas que cobrô en el curso del siglo

pasado ”. Seria terrible — y fatal para nuestro destino como cientificos-

que por estar imbricado en la politica coyuntural ahora callàsemos un

fenômeno que amenaza a las instituciones democrâticas, a la vigencia de

los derechos humanos y que, ademäs, importa un increible grado de

crueldad psiquica para las victimas. Seria muy penoso que también los

criminôlogos se sintiesen atemorizados antes los desplantes de las victi-

mas/héroes, olvidando que nuestra tarea no està condicionada por los

medios de comunicaciôn masiva ni por la aprobaciôn de ninguna mayo-

ria electoral.

(El descuartizamiento psiquico de las victimas) Hace siglos — no

muchos, por cierto — se descuartizaba a los asesinos en las plazas pübli-

cas, lo que constituia un acto de evidente crueldad, que no hacia mâs

que reafirmar el poder del soberano absoluto y la pretensiôn de atemo-

rizar a los disidentes y a los marginales. Ahora esta nueva forma de

manipulaciôn descuartiza psiquicamente a las victimas cuando ya no le

sirven como héroes e impone temor al soberano.

Hasta el presente parece que se estä pasando por alto que la actual

sociedad mediâtica y la propia lucha politica, mientras declama su soli-

daridad con las victimas y su dolor, se empeña en demasiados casos en

enfermarlas, fomentando todo lo necesario para interrumpir el proceso

de reequilibrio psiquico de esas personas.

(16) Aunque no se ha investigado adecuadamente, en el caso de 2004 es muy probable que

la extrema publicidad dada a secuestros anteriores y luego a la victiina/héroe haya proyec-

tado la imagen de este delito como un crimen muy rentable y de fäcil ejecucion. Por cierto

hubo una serie de secuestros y algunos con resultado letal. Es sabido que el secuestro es un

crimen que requiere una organizaciôn criminal y que el practicado con medios precarios pone

en mâs serio peligro de muerte a la victima. No sabemos cuäntos secuestros precarios se

habrän decidido como resultado de esta publicidad ni cuäntas victimas fatales habrän

cobrado.

( V. Wayne MORRISON, Criminology, Civilisation and the New World Order, Routledge-

Cavendish. 2006, pag. 93.

__ 77 —

(Se contradice con los mejores esfuerzos contemporäneos) La preocu-

paciôn de la victimologia por resaltar la injusta distribuciôn de los ries-

gos de victimizaciôn, el empeño de quienes procuran caminos alternati-

vos a la soluciôn punitiva de los conflictos, las investigaciones y

experiencias acerca de la atenciôn de la salud mental de las victimas,

queda empañado por este fenômeno que amenaza la vida democrâtica

de nuestros paises.

En sintesis :

(a) Estä creciendo peligrosamente una marcada tendencia a manipu-

lar a algunas victimas, explotando y profundizando su patologia

mediante su elevacion a la condicion heroica.

(b) La manipulaciôn tiene resultados politicos que ponen en peligro

al estado de derecho, contando con que en la actualidad las estructuras

politicas son crecientemente débiles y la comunicaciôn inversamente

fuerte.

(c) Estas manipulaciones provocan un alivio pasajero a la victima,

pero en realidad constituyen una revictimizaciôn, bajo la forma de un

verdadero cinismo victimizante.

Julio de 2008.

SUMMARY

The victim as hero is a new phenomenon. The mass media are build-

ing an image by choosing and promoting a victim who wants irrational

penal statutes. The suffering of the selected victim does not permit a

rational answer. The lawgivers are prisoners of this publicity promotion

and end in destroying penal law. The media and politics phenomenon

has nothing to do with campaigns in favour of law and order, nor with

other manipulations of criminal facts. It presents indeed quite original

characteristics one can verify by making the comparison with manipu-

lations which took place in similar cicumstances in every country.

RESUMÉ

La victime-héros est un phénomène nouveau. Les médias de masse

construisent une image en choisissant et en promouvant une victime, qui

réclame des lois pénales irrationnelles. La douleur de la victime sélec-

tionnée empêche que lui soit donnée une réponse rationnelle. Les légis-

lateurs sont prisonniers de cette promotion publicitaire et finissent par

détruire la législation pénale. Le phénomène médiatico-politique n'a rien

à voir avec les campagnes en faveur de la loi et de l’ordre, ni avec

__ 78 —

d'autres manipulations de faits criminels. Il présente en effet des carac-

téristiques tout à fait originales, que l’on peut vérifier en faisant la com-

paraison avec les manipulations que l’on a pu observer dans des circons-

tances analogues dans chaque pays.

RESUMEN

La victima-héroe es un fenômeno nuevo. Los medios masivos cons-

truyen una imagen seleccionando a una victima y promoviéndola, mien-

tras ésta reclama leyes penales irracionales. El dolor de la victima selec-

cionada impide responderle racionalmente. Los legisladores quedan

presos de esta promociôn publicitaria y acaban destruyendo la legisla-

ciôon penal. El fenômeno mediâtico/politico no tiene nada que ver con

las campañas de ley y orden ni con otras manipulaciones de hechos cri-

minales, pues presenta caracteres completamente originales, lo que se

verifica comparändolo con manipulaciones que tuvieron lugar en cir-

cunstancias semejantes en cada pais.

_— 79 —

GLOBALIZATION

AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME :

NEW LINKS, NEW PERSPECTIVES

Emilio C. Viano ()

A. — GLOBALIZATION :

A PROCESS

AFFECTING EVERYONE

The lives of everyone today, and particularly our consuming habits,

have becoming more and more globalized. Globalization has become an

everyday world but is a phenomenon of considerable relevance, of great

significance ? and touches upon several larger issues and problems like

inequality between countries, between North and South, inequalities of

social class and genders, democratization and international relations. Ît

also generates strong negative reactions and even criminal acts of oppo-

sition to it.’ Globalization also touches on crime, crime policy and

their effects on society. It. has been aptly described as “compressing” (*

and making the world “smaller,” typified by the substantial and quick-

ening progress in the transportation, communication, and information

sharing areas. Seen in a historical perspective, globalization is the natu-

ral outcome of a process that began centuries ago and that advanced

through several major technological innovations, some of which, like the

telegraph, have already become obsolete while others, like the internet,

(D American University and Washington College of Law. Washington DC.

C) See Jeffrey D. SAcHs, Globalization and the Rule of Law (Yale Law School Occasional

Papers, Second Series, Number 4, 1998); see also Charles FRANÇOIS, El Camino de la

Globalizacion : Una Vision Sistemica S (1999); Willlam TWINING, Globalisation and Legal

Theory 7 (2000).

G An example of a target of anti-globalization efforts is the controversial and popular

institution of McDonald’s in France, which is loved and hated to the point of occasionally

provoking a national crisis as well as a number of social conflicts and criminal prosecutions

in recent years. McDonald’s has expanded rapidly in France with over 1,100 outlets in the

country. making it the most profitable subsidiary in Europe. McDonald’s has aroused both

political opposition and opposition in the workplace, which takes the form of a struggle

against working conditions, the conception of McWork and McManagement. The opposition

is often justified or explained in terms of resistance to “Americanization” and globalization.

Jose Bove, the Farmers’ Confederation firebrand, led a strong anti-McDonald'’s campaign in

the south of France a few years ago and partially destroyed a “McDo” in Millau with a trac-

tor. Brittany separatists bombed a McDonald’s in 2000, killing a young French woman

employee. In bitter backlash, thousands rallied outside the Breton regional parliament to

protest the death. See also Marianne Debouzy (2006). Working for McDonald's, France :

Resistance to the Americanization of Work. International Labor and Working-Class History,

70. pp. 126-142.

(4 Roland ROBERTSON, Globalization : Social Theory and Global Culture 8-32 (1992).

— 81 —

are constantly growing and morphing into new forms and applica-

tions. ©) In the economic sphere, there have also been major changes like

the rapid expansion of commercial and financial instruments and mar-

kets and the speed, ease and privacy with which these transactions are

now being conducted. There is not question that a borderless global

economy has been created and is expanding. ‘ Thus, globalization can

be described as “the closer integration of countries and peoples of the

world which has been brought about by the enormous reduction of costs

of transportation and communication, and the breaking down of artifi-

cial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and (to

a lesser extent) people across borders.”‘) Cheaper transportation and

communication play a big role in making globalization possible and suc-

cessful. Globalization increases the velocity of interactions. Thus, tran-

snational activity takes place faster, more easily, and more often than in

the past. Vast numbers of people can now do very often and quickly

what few people were able to do only occasionally and slowly in the

past. (ê)

Among other important consequences of globalization and of the

world becoming “smaller”, there has also been a growing awareness of

the earth as a community, of the existence of a “common good or pat-

rimony of humanity” as an important value to be protected and fos-

tered, °’ and of our duty to be careful stewards of the earth for future

generations. (% This has given impetus and value to fostering human

rights, protecting the environment ‘" and improving the overall eco-

nomic, social and living conditions of fellow humans.‘? Issues like

human rights, especially those of women and children, environmental

protection, global warming, and of the threat of new and infectious dis-

6) Edgardo ROTMAN, “The globalization of criminal violence”, Fall, 2000, 10 Cornell J.

L. & Pub. Pol'y 4.

(6) See generally Michael HARDT & Antonio NEGRI, “Globalization as Empire”, in The

Global Transformations Reader 116, 117 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2000):

Anthony McGRrew, “Models of Transnational Democracy”, in The Global Transformations

Reader, 500, 500-05 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2000).

( Joseph E. STIGLITZ, Globalization and Its Discontents 9 (2002).

(®) Patrick J. KEENAN, “The New Deterrence : Crime and Policy in the Age of Globaliza-

tion”, January, 2006, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 505.

( See ROTMAN, supra, note 5

(0) Symposium : The Multinational Enterprise as Global Corporate Citizen, Sydney M.

Cone, III - Moderator, Jose E. Alvarez, James L. Gunmderson, John R. MacArthur, Steven

R. Ratner, 2001, 21 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int'! & Comp. L. 1. See also ROTMAN, supra, note 3.

(D Alberto BERNABE-RIEFKOHL, ““To Dream the Impossible Dream': Globalization and

Harmonization of Environmental Laws”, 20 N.C. J. Int'1l L. & Com. Reg. 205, 206 (1995)

(stating that the increase in economic globalization is not accompanied by a globalization of

environmental protection).

(12) Mixed Reception : “Culture, International Norms, and Legal Change in East Asia”

David NELKEN, “Comment : Signaling Conformity : Changing Norms in Japan and Chaine”

Spring, 2006. 27 Mich. J. Int’I L. 933.

__ 82 _—

eases like HIV, AIDS, Ebola, the flu pandemic and others are now rec-

ognized as important and operational at the worldwide level.“* Glo-

balization and intermediate, serious steps towards 1t like regionalization,

are recognized as supporting the establishment of a global order

founded on democracy and peaceful relations between countries. (* For

example, countries aspiring to belong to the European Union (EU)

often acquire first membership in the Council of Europe which pro-

motes democracy, human rights and the rule of law as a pre-condition

to EU membership. (°) Our planet is "shrinking" because problems such

as the environment, nuclear weapons, disease, and terrorism are now of

global concern, and are thus measured by international law stand-

ards. ‘16) That the world is becoming “smaller” every day strengthens the

awareness of interdependence, of the advantages of cooperation and

coordination, of the importance of instituting strategic, economic and

political alliances while also stressing the importance, value and unique-

ness of regional and local culture, music, food and drink, faiths, and

mores. Ît is one of the ironies of today that the more the world 1s

becoming unified and free of various barriers, the more 1t is also becom-

ing local and protective of tradition, language, customs, local products

and their areas of origin. ‘ The European Union is a prime example

of a successful effort to create an economic and political union while

also valuing, protecting and fostering regional differences, products, and

cultures. Even more importantly, globalization or at least regionaliza-

tion are also seen as guaranteeing peace among nations united and inter-

dependent through trade, commerce, various exchanges, and an increas-

ing web of interpersonal relations made possible, as in the EU, by the

free movement of people, goods, capital and services. 18

(3) Symposium : Global Justice : Poverty, Human Rights, and Responsibilities : Panel 1 :

Richard W. Miller, Human Rights and Global Responsibilities : Global Institutional Reform

and Global Social Movements : From False Promise to Realistic Hope, 2002, 39 Cornell Int'I

L.J. 501.

(4) Jim CHEN, “Pax Mercatoria : Globalization as a second chance at ‘peace in our

time’.” November/December, 2000, 24 Fordham Int'! L.J. 217. See also ROTMAN, supra,

note 3.

49 Jost DELBRCK, “Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets-Implications for Domes-

tic Law - À European Perspective”. 1 Ind. J. of Global Legal Stud. 9, 14-19 (1993).

(16) See John Alan COHAN, “Sovereignty in a Post-sovereign World”, 18 Fla. J. Int'1 L

907. 910 (2006).

(7) Stefan A. RIESENFELD, “Symposium 2003 : International Money Laundering : From

Latin America to Asia : Who Pays?”; Lan Cao, “The Transnational and Sub-National in

Global Crimes”, 2004, 22 Berkeley J. Int'! L. 59. See also ROTMAN, supra, note 5.

(18) See lan CLARK, Globalization and Fragmentation : International Relations in the

Twentieth Century !7 (1997) (“There is pervasive resort to the twin themes of globalization

and fragmentation in a wide variety of literature.”); BOUTROs-BOUTROS Ghali [sic], SOth

Anniversary of the United Nations. Vital Speeches, Nov. 15, 1995, at 66 (stating that glo-

balization and fragmentation are the two great forces that will shape the world in the 21st

century).

__ 83 —

Globalization and the growth of international commerce, the export-

ing of jobs from more developed regions of the world to underdeveloped

ones, thus creating employment and revenue, the remittances of emi-

grants that sustain their families, relatives, and at times literally their

countries back home, the advances in farming, production of crops and

food, medicine and surgery, the growing investment in developing coun-

tries, the dizzying speed of today's communications, information and

economic transactions and many other phenomena affecting our daily

lives and made possible by globalization have vastly improved the way

in which most of us live our lives, even though major inequalities still

exist between different parts of the world.“°) Poverty is, after all, a rel-

ative concept. For example, in less than 50 years, countries that were net

exporters of people through emigration are now the coveted destination

of legal and undocumented immigrants from other parts of the world,

just as countries that were until recently welcoming jobs outsourced by

richer countries where labor was more expensive, are now themselves

already beginning to export jobs to still poorer parts of the world and

even back to richer ones.

B. — THE NEGATIVES IN GLOBALIZATION

But unfortunately not all consequences of globalization are positive.

Globalization can be seen in the advancement of technology, as well as

in the global expansion of trade. But these developments that are

expected to help us achieve prosperity, freedom, and peace, can also

produce social fragmentation, economic dislocations and exacerbate

critical vulnerabilities, opening the door to violence and conflict. The

more negative aspects of globalization are often attributed to capitalism

and labeled as “McDonaldization” and “Americanization.” 29 Threats

have become global in scope ironically in great part because of the

achievements of increased and more diffused knowledge, powerful and

readily available technologies, and the apparently uncontrollable mass

movements of people. Ironically, the advances and the improvements in

the conditions of daily life for millions of people, especially the increas-

ing wealth across the world (relatively speaking), also have the potential

(19) For more information on this related to health, see generally, George J. ANNas,

“Human Rights and Health . The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at 50”, 339 New

England J. Med., 1778, 1780-81 (1998). On globalization in general and its effect on the law,

see generally Richard FALK, Predatory Globalization: A Critique (1999); Peter J. SPIRO,

“Globalization, International Law, and the Academy”, 32 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 567

(2000); Brigitte STERN, “How to Regulate Globalization?”, in The Role of Law in Interna-

tional Politics 247 (Michael Byers ed., 2000).

(20) George RITZER, The Globalization of Nothing 2, Thousand Oaks CA : Pine Forge

Press, 2007, 21-30.

__ 84 _

of creating and fostering negative consequences favorable to the flour-

ishing of transnational crime. Globalization has been connected to a

range of social problems like poverty, economic and health care inequal-

ities, global crime and corruption, international sex commerce, terror-

ism ‘ and negative consequences for agriculture and the environment.

International criminal networks have been quick to take advantage of

the opportunities resulting from the revolutionary changes in world pol-

itics, business, technology, and communications‘*”) that have by-and-

large strengthened democracy and free markets, brought the world’s

nations closer together, and given especially to the European Union and

the United States, and also growingly to China, India, Brazil and others,

unprecedented security and prosperity. Crime cannot be understood out-

side of its social context. Consequently, this article is at the same time

an attempt at and a plea for comparative contextual analysis.

C. — KEY FACTORS FAVORING TRANSNATIONAL CRIME

Some of the more important developments and influential factors in

the last twenty years or so are :

1. — The changed post-Cold War landscape

The end of the Cold War resulted in the breakdown of political and

economic barriers not only in Europe but also around the world. This

change opened the way for substantially increased trade, movement of

people, and capital flows between democracies and free market countries

and the formerly closed societies and markets that had been hampered

by Soviet power. The end of the Cold War also brought with it an end

to superpower jockeying for power in other regions of the world. This

relative peace has allowed international criminals to expand their net-

works and increase their cooperation in illicit activities and financial

transactions. Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet Union, just as the

overthrow of Saddam Hussein did in Iraq, threw thousands of less than

model state employees onto the labor market. AIl sorts of operatives

were now unemployed : secret police, counterintelligence officers, spe-

cial-forces commandos and border guards, along with homicide detec-

tives and traffic cops. They were trained in skills that are quite valuable

CD Symposium : Corporate Governance, Stakeholder Accountability, and Sustainable

Peace : Keynote Address. Linda LIM, “Terrorism and Globalization : An International Per-

spective”, March, 2002, 35 Vand. J. Transnat'! L. 703.

C Ilya GARGER, “Merchants of Mayhem Why the biggest beneficiaries of globalization

may be pimps, drug runners and other crooks,” Time International (Asia ed.), New York,

Nov 7. 2005. Vol. 166, Iss. 19; pg. 74.

_— 85 —-

to organized crime including surveillance, forging documents, smug-

gling, eliminating people, knowing how to access and extort from key

people in banking, finance, transport and security, creating networks

and blackmail. The demise of the Soviet Union also ensured a steady

supply of women for Western Europe and other markets and gave crim-

inal gangs profitable areas for their activities like the sex trade, smug-

gling of cigarettes and other goods, drug trafficking and more. @*

2. — EÉconomic and trade liberalization

Increasing economic interdependence has both promoted and bene-

fited from reforms in many countries opening or liberalizing state-con-

trolled economies with the intention of boosting trade and becoming

more competitive in the global marketplace. Criminals have taken

advantage of transitioning and more open economies to establish front

companies and quasi-legitimate businesses that facilitate smuggling,

money laundering, financial frauds, piracy of intellectual property, iden-

tity theft and other illicit ventures. Bilateral or multilateral economic

agreements reducing trade barriers in North America, Europe, Asia, and

other regions of the world have substantially increased the volume of

international trade. Criminal and terrorist groups “ have taken advan-

tage of the high and growing volume of legitimate trade to smuggle

along drugs, arms, people and other contraband across national bound-

aries. At the same time liberalized financial and commodities markets

have offered lucrative new opportunities for criminal syndicates, facili-

tated by the wide-open possibilities offered by the use of computers and

of the internet.

3. — Technological advances

The last decade has presented revolutionary advances in information

and communications technologies that have brought the world closer

together. Modern telecommunications and information systems that

underpin legitimate commercial activity in today'’s fast-paced global

market are as easily used by criminal networks as they are by legal busi-

nesses. Commercially available and constantly improving state-of-the-art

communications equipment greatly facilitates international criminal

transactions — including making deals and coordinating the large volume

@53) Misha GLENNY, McMafia: A Journey through the Global Criminal Underworld.

London : Knopf. 2008

(24) Alan LAMBERT, “Underground Banking and Financing of Terrorism”, 15 Fla. J. Int'l

L. 9, 12 (2002)

— 86 —

of illicit trade. ° In addition to the reliability and swiftness of commu-

nications, constantly evolving and improving technology, like for exam-

ple disposable phones, also affords criminals considerable security and

being shielded from law enforcement detection.

(26)

4. — Use of the World Wide Web

and of related technology

Through the use of the World Wide Web and of related technology

(computers, Blackberry, cell phones etc.), international criminals have

an unprecedented capability to obtain, process, and protect information

and sidestep law enforcement investigations. They can use the interac-

tive capabilities of advanced computers and telecommunications systems

to plot marketing strategies for drugs and other 1llicit commodities, to

map the fastest and most efficient routes and methods for smuggling

and moving money in the financial system, and to create false trails to

mislead law enforcement or banking security. International criminals

also take advantage of the speed and magnitude of financial transac-

tions and the fact that there are few safeguards to prevent abuse of the

system to move large amounts of money without scrutiny. Some crimi-

nal organizations also appear to be adept at using technology for coun-

terintelligence purposes and for tracking law enforcement activities.

Identity theft and cybercrime in general are certainly on the increase

today and represent a serious threat to individuals, companies and entire

countries.

S. — Globalization of business ‘’”

The revolution in modern telecommunications and information sys-

tems and the lowering of political and economic barriers that have so

greatly quickened the pace, volume, and scope of international com-

merce are being exploited on a daily basis by criminal networks world-

wide. International criminals are attracted to major “ global commer-

cial and banking centers where they take advantage of gateway seaports

and airports, the high volume of international trade, the concentration

(C5) See, for example. Donna M. HucHEs, Council of Europe, Final Report: Group of

Specialists on the Impact of the Use of New Information Technologies on Trafficking in

Human Beings for the Purpose of Sexual Exploitation 18 (2003), available at http://

www.uri.edu/artsci/wms/hughes/eg-s-nt_final_report.

(26) Fletcher N. BALDWIN, Jr.…. “Organized Crime, Terrorism and Money Laundering in

the Americas”, 15 Fla. J Int'! L. 3, 17-18 (2002).

(27) Peter F. DRUCKER, The Global Economy and the Nation-State, Foreign Aff.. Sept/

Oct. 1997, at 159, 163. See also Grahame THOMPsON, “Economic Globalization?”, in David

HELD (ed.), ÀA Globalization World? Culture, Economics, Politics 85, 108 (2000).

C8 www.academicmind.com/unpublishedpapers/business/..…/2005-04-000aaf-just-in-time-

inventory-management.html; www.ashland.edu/-rjacobs/m503jit.html.

__ 87 —

of modern telecommunications and information systems, and the pres-

ence of major financial institutions. They count on avoiding close scru-

tiny of their activities because of the importance that businesses and

governments give to facilitating commercial and financial transactions

and the rapid transshipment of products, especially for export. Thus,

ironically, the shipping speed made possible by computer software, and

best symbolized, for example, by the “just on time” inventories which

make sizeable savings and expedited service possible, also helped tran-

snational crime ship its products quickly and undetected, taking advan-

tage of the elimination of thorough inspections in the interest of boost-

ing commerce and the speed of delivery.

6. — Explosion in international travel

With the breaking down of international political and economic bar-

riers, the globalization of business, and the lowering of the cost of inter-

national travel (this may be changing now with the skyrocketing cost of

fuel), there is more freedom of movement. International transportation

of goods and services 1s also easier and cheaper. The proliferation of air

transportation connections and the easing of immigration and visa

restrictions in many countries to promote international commerce and

lucrative tourism, especially within regional trade blocs, have also facil-

itated criminal activity. In the past, more limited travel options between

countries and more stringent border checks made crossing national

boundaries difficult for international criminals. Now, criminals have

great many choices of travel routes and can arrange itineraries so as to

minimize risk. Border controls within many regional economic blocs -

such as the European Union — have for the most part and normally, dis-

appeared. Even where there 1s still an international border, like between

Mexico and the U.S.À., traffic in both directions through the border 1s

quite heavy as well. About 700,000 persons cross that Mexico-U.S. bor-

der every day along with 150 million vehicles a year and over 5 million

shipping containers. This great volume of traffic and trade into the

United States provides international criminals tremendous opportunities

to smuggle contraband — including drugs and counterfeit products - into

the country, as well as to illegally export firearms, stolen vehicles, and

other contraband overseas. But these classical developments that attract

organized crime and its ability to adapt and exploit new situations and

opportunities also impact society at large and in turn give reason to and

revenues for transnational crime to flourish. International political econ-

omy scholarship has posited a criminal underside of globalization facil-

itated by technological change, broad patterns of state liberalization of

trade and capital flows, and the rise of global markets. There are also

liberal arguments conceptualizing transnational organized crime as the

88 —

epitome of capitalism within this illicit global economy — embracing laws

of supply and demand in the global marketplace and challenging the

very integrity of the territorial state, basically mirroring on the 1llegal

side the role and function played worldwide by multinational corpora-

29)

tions on the legal side.‘

D. — POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS

WITH

NEGATIVE REPERCUSSIONS

The most important general trends that favor transnational crime

are

Increasing prosperity and improvements in the financial, housing, com-

munications, information, travel, educational, and power of acquisition

circumstances of vast numbers of people across the world and especially

in areas previously under-developed

When people have more money to spend, are better informed on

what 1s available, are aware of fashion trends worldwide, buy into the

hedonistic,

glamorous,

self-affirming,

self-rewarding,

and

sexually

charged values and lifestyle of today, then the demand for all sorts of

goods and services skyrockets. The problem is that not all goods and

services desired are available legally. At times they are forbidden for

morality, accessibility or protectionist reasons.‘*°” Moreover not every-

one can afford the legally sanctioned version of those goods and serv-

ices, be it a Prada bag, a Piaget watch or an original CD/DVD. Ît is

at this point that organized transnational crime can provide the goods

and services that millions clamor for. Thus, ironically, the overall

steady improvement of the human condition coupled with the ease of

shipping, travel, communications, information, transfer of funds, and

abolition of many borders create some of the best conditions for tran-

snational crime to be established and flourish. The same goes for pros-

titution °" human trafficking, traffic in organs, antiquities, exotic ani-

mals and their organs etc. The growing relative affluence of people in

many parts of the world make it so that local people find certain forms

of employment not attractive any more nor paid well enough to main-

tain the lifestyle they feel they are entitled to. This promptly creates an

unstoppable demand for labor to be imported from pnorer parts of the

C9) M. FINDLAY. The Globalisation of Crime : Understanding Transitional Relationships in

Context. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1999.

50 inks.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-2234(194905)47%3A7%3C1032%3ASPSAJF3E2:

WWW.answers.com/topic/scarcity-l.

G See for example. High Priced Prostitutes Sharing in India's New Prosperity:

www.lht.com/articles/2008/09/14/business/escort.php.

89 -

world, at times neighboring countries, most often illegally. The 1llegality

is also a function of the slowness of the law to update itself and adapt

to rapidly changing conditions on the terrain. It is also a function of

powerful vested interests that control levels of employment in order, for

example, to sustain high wage and compensation levels for the locals.

At the same time, when advanced economies, like the EU and the USA,

succeed through various trade agreements and the backing of the World

Trade Organization (WTO) to open world markets to their goods but

at the same time continue to provide large protectionist subsidies to

their own agricultural sectors, they fatally undermine, even destroy,

food production in developing countries unable to compete on world

markets because their food 1s too expensive when compared to that sold

by the European Union and the United States. This in turn creates a

vast army of the dispossessed and the desperate and, consequently, a

lucrative market in illegal immigration and prostitution. 67 Thus,

almost perversely, progress in some areas of life for millions of people

that creates the financial ability to improve one’s dwelling, lifestyle,

education, travel, and station in life generally; that allows more leisure

time and recreational choices; that stresses the importance and dignity

of each individual to the detriment of the obligations to the group; that

eliminates certain religious and cultural barriers, thus making possible

a freer and less constrained lifestyle and contact between the genders,

can also unleash an enormous and almost insatiable demand for goods,

services, capital and labor that can be satisfied only through illegal or

criminal means by transnational crime because of its scarcity, high price

or illegality. ° Transnational crime is taking full advantage of all the

most recent technological, travel, communications, shipping and finan-

cial advances to satisfy those needs. But it is not always necessarily

crime. Ît can be legitimate or at least “semi-legitimate.” For example,

globalization in general and the rapid development of some countries

like China and India, that then become formidable competitors, and the

ensuing need to cut costs in other countries to compete internationally,

has justified moving manufacturing plants to areas where labor laws

protecting workers may be weaker or unenforced and where wages are

(°) M. LEHTI and K. AROMAA, “Trafficking for sexual exploitation”. Pp. 133-227 in

M. TONRY, Crime and Justice : À review of research. Chicago, 2006.

G3) An indication of the powerful and insatiable demand for goods and services, even if

unaffordable, is the dramatic financial crisis that affected especially the United States in late

2008 caused in great part by the so-called “toxic loans” that 1s real estate loans by financial

institutions to people who did not have the money to pay them back. Thus the crisis was

fueled by both the insatiable demand for goods beyond their reach by consumers eager to

live the “good life” even if they could not afford it and the greed and irresponsibility of

banks and Wall Street institutions offering credit without verifying the borrower’s ability to

repay the loan, wanting to derive maximum financial gains without in the end taking respon-

sibility for it. The U.S. taxpayer is now saddled with an enormous debt, calculated at the

end of September 2008 as the cost of two Iraq wars at least.

—- 90 —

quite low. 3% Manpower for these factories, located at times in remote

areas of the world or hidden in the very heart of American or European

metropolises, is often provided through criminal enterprises but also

through legal labor suppliers, both engaging in unsavory practices like

the buying and selling of human beings, indentured servitude, human

trafficking, smuggling, or sending people to work under appalling con-

ditions. *°) The line between legal and illegal, legitimate and criminal is

often quite difficult to discern in situations like this when vast amounts

of money are at stake, when the “national good” 1s in play and can be

used as a justification, and a whole human chain of decision makers

and bureaucrats are vulnerable to bribery °® and corruption $”) and are

known to actually engage in corrupt practices. 38 There are those who

argue that global economic and legal conditions foreshadow an increase

in corporate human rights abuses because corporate actors can avoid

liability under most existing legal theories while they simultaneously

increase their operations across the globe. °°) In the absence of congres-

sional action on the issue of corporate human rights abuses, the United

States could become the world's largest underwriter of private torturers

and the largest consumer market for abusive producers. ‘* This regret-

table conclusion would occur, despite its obvious repugnance to Amer-

ican and global values, because international and domestic law as cur-

rently interpreted offer little in the way of deterrence for non-state

actors who are abusive of human rights. ‘$!

(34) Anecdotal evidence and case law corroborate the belief that most corporate human

rights abuses occur in the developing world. See, e.g.…. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932,

937-39 (9th Cir. 2002): Evan CLARK, “Advocacy Group Finds Violations at Bangladesh

Apparel Factory”. Women's Wear Daily, Oct. 26, 2006, at 14.

G5 Commission on Human Rights. Interim Report of the Special Representative of the

Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other

Business Enterprises, 62d Sess., <pmark> 27, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006)

(prepared by John Ruggie). available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/papers/JGR 20

Interim% 20Report%20to%20the%20UN.pdf.

G6) See Karl M. M£ESsEN, “Fighting Corruption Across the Border”, 18 Fordham Int'I

L.J. 1647, 1647 (1995) (“Times of transition are times of corruption.”)

G7 Philip M. NicHoLs, “Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalization and

Fragmentation”. Winter, 1999, 24 Yale J. Int'I L. 257.

38 Jenia lontcheva TURNER. “Transnational Networks and International Criminal Jus-

tice”, 2007, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 985.

59 John McKENZIE, “The Limits of Offshoring - Why the United States Should Keep

Enforcement of Human Rights Standards ‘In-House’,” 2008, 83 Ind. L.J. 1121

(40) Sukanya PiLLAY, “And justice for all? Globalization, Multinational Corporations,

and the Need for Legally Enforceable Human Rights Protections”, Summer, 2004, 81 U. Det.

Mercy L. Rev. 489.

(4 Jd. at 1130.

91 —-

E. — VULNERABILITY OF COUNTRIES

TO GLOBALIZED CRIME

Globalization under its various forms can also impact the behavior

of countries and ensnare them in the wide network of globalized crime.

Several major vulnerable areas come readily to mind. ‘*

The first is indeed labor. While countries may sign and ratify all sorts

of treaties, including human rights and labor conventions (the Interna-

tional Labor Office (ILO) has introduced about 200 different treaties

and conventions), they may turn a blind eye and even favor the 1llegal

smuggling and trafficking in human beings taking place in or out of

their territory. Why? When it comes to smuggling people out in very

populated countries, with high levels of poverty in rural areas and of

unemployment of unskilled workers in urban areas, this relieves the

pressure on the government to create jobs, to develop the needed infra-

structure in non-urban regions and to reduce poverty and unemploy-

ment. Second, some countries tolerate or even approve of illegal emigra-

tion because those workers going abroad will eventually begin to send

back money earned there to support their family of origin. This can

amount to billions of dollars. ‘*°) There are countries in Central America

that would not be able to survive economically without the ‘“remesas”

(remittances) sent back home by their citizens working legally or 1lle-

gally abroad. Every major player gains : the government of the export-

ing country because it relieves unemployment and, with the remittances,

it fuels their economy. Employers (and they are not any more just West-

ern employers) appreciate the cut-rate labor provided and the submis-

sive position of undocumented workers that can be dismissed at will and

actually turned over to the authorities for repatriation, 1f they make too

many demands. The family or villages that pooled their money to send

a worker abroad also like it, because the investment 1s returning divi-

dends.

(42) Edgardo ROTMAN, “The globalization of criminal violence”. 2000, 10 Cornell J. L. &

Pub. Pol'y 1.

(43) Alternative remittance systems (ARSs) are also linked to transnational crime. Money

associated with the drug trade is laundered through ARSs in Hong Kong, China, India,

Indonesia. Nepal, Pakistan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of the Philippines.

Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, and Vietnam. Remittance systems in India, Sri Lanka, and

Turkey encounter profits from smuggling. The Indian system also launders funds from smug-

gled gold and precious stones, terrorism, and corruption. The ethnic banking systems of

Hong Kong. China, Indonesia, Japan, and the Republic of the Philippines are used to laun-

der illegal gambling profits, and the proceeds of human traffic, including alien smuggling and

ransom, are washed through alternative remittances in India, Japan, the People's Republic

of China, the Republic of the Philippines, Vietnam. Lisa C. CARROLL, “Alternative Remit-

tance Systems : Distinguishing Sub-Systems of Ethnice Money Laundering in Interpol Mem-

ber Countries of the Asian Continent (Jan. 31, 2003)”, available at http://www.interpol.com/

public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/EthnicMoney/default.asp.

92

This financial link may at times influence a government to turn a

blind eye or to not enforce the law against human trafficking too zeal-

ously because of the obvious financial benefit to be derived.‘** Some

countries are suspected of funding NGOs supposedly working in the

problem area — trafficking of women, children, people in general — with

the actual mandate of projecting a positive image of the government as

if it is making major strides to resolve the problem. At times, if espe-

cially needed, powerful and professional lobbyists are hired to stave off

criticism and sanctions. But we are not talking here necessarily of overt

corruption or of open approval. The support can be quiet and even tacit

but it thwarts any serious effort to stop the trafficking of human beings,

especially women and children, for sexual exploitation, and of laborers

for factories and for the agricultural, tourism, and unskilled services sec-

tors of the economy of the receiving country. ‘* The agricultural, farm-

ing, tourism, restaurants, and hotels sectors are often those most

strongly opposed to a meaningful reform of immigration laws, ‘*6) espe-

cially amnesties and regularizing undocumented immigrants. These sec-

tors of the economy earn more money and exercise much more control

when dealing with a vast pool of undocumented, unskilled, eager, if not

desperate, compliant, competing, highly disposable and cheap workers

than with legal immigrants who have a better chance of possibly enforc-

ing their rights, earn at least minimum wage, maybe belong to a union,

and have some standing when expecting the protection of the law and

of the authorities.‘*) At times these situations are also created through

the illogical aspects of globalization. For example, the European Union

has a labor shortage and an aging population that is not being replen-

ished because of low birthrates. At the same time, restrictive immigra-

tion policies remain in force and are actually just now being tight-

ened.‘*°) The result? Another wide opportunity, almost an open

invitation, for transnational criminal enterprises to earn more profits

(44 Abigail SCHWARTZ, “Sex Trafficking in Cambodia”. spring, 2004, 17 Colum. J. Asian

L. 371; Grace CHANG, “The Global Trade in Filipina Workers”. in Dragon Ladies : Asian

American Feminists Breathe Fire 132, 135 (Sonia Shah ed., 1997).

(4°) Barbara CROSSETTE, “UN Warns that Trafficking in Human Beings is Growing”. N.Y.

Times, June 25, 2000, at A10. Trafficking in children has also increased. The Center for Pro-

tection of Children's Rights estimates that as many as 800.000 children worldwide are in

prostitution. In India alone, UNICEF estimates that there are approximately 400.000 to

500.000 child prostitutes. Manuel CASTELLS, End of Millennium 155 (1998).

(46) 18" Annual Corporate Law Symposium : David WEISSBRODT, “Corporate social

responsibility in the international context : Business and Human Rights”. Fall. 2005. 74 U.

Cin. L. Rev. 55

(4 Larry Cata BACKER. “Multinational Corporations, transnational law: The United

Nations’ norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations as a harbinger of cor-

porate social responsibility in international law”. Winter, 2006, 37 Colum. Human Rights L.

Rev. 287.

(38) Henk OVERBEEK, “Neoliberalism and the Regulation of Global Labor Mobility”.

May, 2002, 581 Annals Am. Academy Pol. Social Science T4.

_ 93 —

smuggling undocumented workers into the EU. Thus, clearly, not all the

consequences of globalization are positive.

F. — GLOBALIZATION

AND ““VIOLENT COMMODITIES”

Globalization facilitates demand and supply of certain types of com-

modities that can elicit considerable violence as they are traded. ‘* This

violence ranges on a continuum of acts and areas that includes murder

and serious wounding, psychological harm, and damage to other living

creatures and to the environment. ° One of the best examples are the

so-called ‘“blood diamonds” from West Africa. The diamond, we all

know, is a stone artfully marketed as an essential symbol of love, caring,

fidelity and engagement to millions of women involved in a relationship

they hope will lead to marriage. The engagement ring 1s one of the most

coveted trophies many women dream to finally display to friends, family

and co-workers. It is not uncommon today for a woman in the U.S. to

expect a diamond engagement ring in the range of $20,000 to $50,000.

And the DeBeers of the world are astutely investing in promoting what

they call “the diamond experience” and in exporting this “requirement”

to countries where it is still not a widespread custom. We all know of

the 1000s of people who were killed, cruelly mutilated, their limbs often

cut off with a machete, displaced, raped, abandoned, especially the eld-

erly and children now without parents or a family, in the name of those

who controlled diamond mines and their traffic in West and Central

Africa. Yet, calls to boycott diamonds as gift in rings, watches, neck-

laces, pendants etc. have mostly fallen over deaf ears. The blood dia-

mond trade prospers because demand not only continues unabated but

1s actually expanding. There are other major examples of criminal activ-

ities substantially increasing because of more widespread prosperity and

therefore growing affordability and demand. One is the commerce in

rhinoceros’ horns. Prohibited under the Convention on International

Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), a thriving 1llegal market operates

in China, Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, Macau and Yemen.

Rhino horns are smuggled overland through Nepal, Tibet and Burma to

China, by international crime syndicates. This trade has been 1llegal in

China since 1993. Reportedly a horn can earn $20,000 per kilogram on

the black market. À horn can weigh between 500 grams and 3 kilo-

grams, depending on the age of the animal. Poachers who actually kill

(49) See Edgardo ROTMAN, supra, note 5

G50) Alex Y. SEITA, “The Role of Market Forces in Transnational Violence”, 60 Alhb. L.

Rev. 635, 637 (1997).

__ 94 —

the rhino may earn only $1,000 per horn which 1s still a large sum in

their economy. The quest for these horns, sought after because in tra-

ditional Chinese medicine they are believed to increase sexual vigor and

endurance, !" has transformed the areas where the rhinoceros live into

killing fields. Poaching has exploded especially with increased wealth

spreading in China. Only 2,400 rhinos remain in the world. Tiger penises

are thought to have aphrodisiacal powers as well, especially in Korea,

Vietnam and Indonesia. Endangered Sumatran tigers are especially

killed for this item that can fetch $5,000 in the case of a white tiger.

Bear gallbladders and elephants’ feet are also poached. It is estimated

that 23,000 elephants were 1llegally killed last year and 20 tons of ivory

smuggled. À foot can fetch $675 and more, depending on its size. The

same is true of shark fins used to make gourmet soup reportedly sold

for $150 a bowl and fashionable at wedding banquets in China and

Japan. The tailfin of a whale shark can cost $10,000. Once prohibitively

expensive but for the very rich, now 1t is affordable by many and thus

the demand and the slaughter have increased exponentially. It 1s esti-

mated that thirty-eight million sharks are killed every year for this rea-

son alone, the rest of the carcass left to rot unused, even though the tak-

ing of fins 1s prohibited in 60 countries.

G. — DRUGS AND VIOLENCE

IN A GLOBALIZED CONTEXT

Users may perpetrate crimes of violence to raise the money to buy

drugs. Traffickers and suppliers use violence for a variety of reasons : to

obtain and defend their control and possession of the commodity, to

protect their shipments, to guarantee themselves a market free of com-

petitors, to distribute the goods, and to protect their earnings. Other

areas where there is a strong violent component are human trafficking,

prostitution, arms sales, illegal deforestation and the seizing of land.

This 1s of course nothing new. The so-called “discovery of America” by

the Europeans started one of the bloodiest land grabs in recent history

in the Americas. In Asia, in the 1800s the Opium Wars represented the

climax of a trade dispute between China under the Qing Dynasty and

the United Kingdom. British smuggling of opium from British India

into China and the Chinese government’s efforts to enforce its drug laws

erupted in conflict. China’s defeat in both wars forced the government

to have to tolerate the opium trade that benefitted the British and their

(D There is no scientific basis for this belief. The rhino horn is mostly composed of ker-

atin also common in nails, hair. skin and teeth. This fact however does not curb the increas-

ing demand for it.

95 —

balance of trade with China. Colonial wars and other conflicts, includ-

ing the current ones in the Middle Fast, have also been defined in terms

of guaranteeing more powerful or technologically advanced countries

the control and monopoly over free labor, raw and precious materials,

and energy sources, to ensure the continuation of their high level of liv-

ing at the expense of the people and resources of the occupied lands.

H. — THE GLOBALIZATION OF PROBLEMS

There is no doubt that today most problems impacting a country or

a group of countries become global almost instantly. Economic prob-

lems and downturns spread from country to country. An economic crisis

in the United States or the European Union (EU) quickly impacts the

rest of the world. ? The same is true with health epidemics (at one

point recently there was world mass fear of a chicken flu pandemic),

cross border environmental problems and pollution, atomic energy, the

depletion of the ozone layer, global warming, tsunamis, hurricanes,

typhoons, tornadoes, earthquakes, computer viruses and piracy of intel-

lectual property. None of these problems stop at national borders; all

can potentially impact wide regions of the world.°’ No doubt the

instant and live coverage of news from all over the world for 24 hours/

Tdays a week has played a crucial role in making the world a small vil-

lage indeed and in magnifying crises and problems at times many times

over. We can see this at work now even during U.S. presidential election

campaigns with candidates trying to garner international support : John

McCain traveling to South America; Barack Obama to Iraq, Afghani-

stan and Europe; candidates for the presidency of Mexico and of

Argentina traveling to the U.S. and more.

I. — CRIME :

FROM A LOCAL TO A GLOBAL

EVENT

One of the major changes brought about by globalization has espe-

cially been about crime. °® Until now, crime has always been mostly a

local even

t (55S

) The majority of murder victims know their killers; most

abused children know their abusers; theft victims generally only have to

(52) »

‘Is Financial Globalization Beneficial” In : ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/11891.html.

(53) Paul Schiff BERMAN, “From International Law to Law and Globalization”. 2005, 43

Colum. J. Transnat'! L. 485.

54 M. Cherif BASSIOUNI, “Introduction : The Future of International Criminal Justice”

Fall. 1999, 11 Pace Int'I L. Rev. 309.

(5) Patrick J. KEENAN. “The New Deterrence : Crime and Policy in the Age of Globali-

zation”, January. 2006. 91 Zowa L. Rev. 505.

- 96

look in their own neighborhoods to find the thieves. ‘“The poor prey on

9

the poor,

it is often said, to stress that criminal most often victimize

their neighbors. And intimate crimes, like sexual assault, are described

as mostly occurring between acquaintances, often in the victim's own

apartment, and intra-racially, that is again impacting mostly people

close to the victimizer. Crime is local also in the way 1it is controlled. In

federal countries, like the United States, it 1s the states, not the federal

government, that prosecute the largest number of criminal cases. Law

enforcement budgets may depend at least in part on monies from the

central federal government, but enforcement priorities are decided

locally.°6 Although, for example, there are varying degrees of coordi-

nation among different law enforcement agencies from various states in

the United States and also between agencies from different countries,

57)

crime remains mostly a local problem. ‘

Globalization is changing this in ways that have not yet been fully

explored. While crime as an event will always possess a substantial local

component with officials and victims normally reacting to it in the place

where it occurs, it 1s rapidly becoming more and more of a transnational

phenomenon. Increasingly, an activity that 1s regulated or proscribed in

one country because it is deemed dangerous or unwanted can become

more common in other, neighboring countries. ‘* The difference is that

in the latter countries, while the activity 1s just as unwanted, it may how-

ever be less effectively regulated or vigorously forbidden. What happens

then when an activity that is unwanted in two places is however more

effectively regulated in one place than in the other? Does the unwanted

activity just move from the first state to the second? How much of it

migrates, and what factors impact how much 1s displaced? How should

scholars and policymakers consider regulation in this situation — as a

local response to a local problem or as part of a broader effort to dimin-

ish the overall incidence of the unwanted activity?°°) These questions

are basic to determining what globalization will mean in the near

B6) Stefan A. Riesenfeld Symposium 2003 : International Money Laundering From Latin

America to Asia. Who Pays?; Mariano-Florentino CUELLAR, “The Mismatch Between State

Power and State Capacity in Transnational Law Enforcement”, By 2004, 22 Berkeley J. Int'I

L. 15.

ÉN Stefan A. Riesenfeld Symposium 2003 : International Money Laundering from Latin

American to Asia. Who pays?; Lan Cao, “The Transnational and Sub-National in Global

Crimes”, 2004, 22 Berkeley J. Int'! L. S9.

(8) This can take place at the local level too like when vigorous police action against

prostitution or drug trafficking in one section of a city simply displaces those activities to

another part of the city. without truly solving the problem.

(9) There is commonsensical and empirical evidence that this happens at the neighbor-

hood level as well. For example, if the police crack down on drug use in one neighborhood.

drug dealers move to a nearby neighborhood where various circumstances may make it pos-

sible for them to establish themselves and operate successfully.

__ 97 —

future. ‘ Until now, they have not been fully explored. The existing

scholarship on deterrence is of limited use in a globalized context. 6"

There is no question that progress in transportation, communica-

tions, the provision of information increasingly with “live images, ” the

practical abolition of borders in certain parts of the world, the constant

increase of internet users and networks which makes borders less and

less relevant, the gradual decrease in state authority either by design, as

in the context of the EU, or because of a weakening of the state, ‘°?) the

ability to efficiently and instantly conduct financial operations cross-

borders, the existence of offshore banking and tax heavens, the speed,

secrecy and anonymity of today's communications have all allowed

transnational crime to firmly establish itself and successfully avoid

detection, regulation and investigation.‘° Transnational crime, after

creating a market for violence, today subcontracts its execution to be

carried out by locals. The ever growing chasm between the wealthy and

the poor, generated as it is by differential access to capitals markets,

also stirs up considerable interest in criminal options to “catch up,” so

to speak.

J. — POSITIVE ASPECTS OF GLOBALIZATION

On the other hand, one should not think of globalization as only a

negative and destructive force. Many of the positive trends in today's

world are the fruit of the many aspects of globalization already men-

tioned. Increased longevity, higher survival rates for infants, children

and women giving birth, better nutrition, more education, more and

higher quality information, great entertainment and the increasing

awareness of a smaller world, whose problems impact all of us and

whose solutions benefit all of us, represent distinct advantages of glo-

balization. This can also be transferred to crime control through more

cooperation, coordination, and mutual assistance. Globalizing crime

control is considered by some one of the more positive responses to the

(60) Andreas HERBERG-ROTHE, “New Containment Policy: A Grand Strategy for the

Twenty-first Century?”, RUSI Journal, London : Apr 2008, Vol. 153, Iss. 2; pg. 50.

(61) Jost DELBRCK, “Structural Changes in the International System and its Legal Order :

International Law in the Era of Globalization”, Swiss Rev. Int'!l & Eur. L., 1, 4 (2001).

(62) Oscar SCHACHTER, “The Decline of the Nation State and Îts Implications for Inter-

national Law”, 36 Colum. J. Transnat'! L. 7, 15 (1997).

(63) “Book Review : Introduction to International Criminal Law, Mark A. Drumbl.

Washington & Lee University, School of Law and edited by Richard B. Bilder”, January,

2005, 99 A.J.I.L. 287.

—— 98 —

challenge of transnational crime in a world that is more and more inter-

dependent.

(64)

K. — WHAT DOES THE GLOBALIZATION

OF CRIME MEAN TO CRIMINOLOGISTS?

So, what does all of this in the end mean to criminologists?

First of all, criminology as a profession must take globalization and

its consequences much more seriously into account in our studies and

(65)

analyses of crime.

Just as crime 1s mostly local, so the work of criminologists 1s likewise

mostly localized to the community where the crimes occur or to the

region or country. Most criminology studies within a wider area are

effectively mostly national in scope, at the most. International or tran-

snational studies generally are limited to comparing two or a few coun-

tries. The American approach to the study of crime favors empirical

studies which however normally respect national boundaries. The Euro-

pean approach emphasizes mostly case studies which can be highly indi-

vidualistic and narrow. Comparative studies also utilize mostly national

survey data. But the world is indeed rapidly changing in the direction

of globalization that transcends national boundaries. ‘°) To understand

today’s crime, a wide variety of crimes, we must become adept at taking

a holistic approach that understands, operationalizes, stresses and

underlines the various points of connection, potentially worldwide, that

characterize crime today.‘6’) Limiting ourselves geographically, cultur-

ally, legally to a particular place, even if it is a whole country or even

a region, and to a predominantly sociological approach is no longer suf-

ficient to fully grasp what is happening in reality, to analyze it correctly,

and to develop sensible deterrence countermeasures that have a chance

of succeeding.‘°°) It offers only a compartmentalized and chopped

(64) Hannah L. BUXBAUM, “Conflict of Economic Laws: From Sovereignty to Sub-

stance”. 42 VA. J. Int'I L. 931, 942-54 (2002) (discussing ways in which “regulatory power

traditionally enjoyed by sovereign states has shifted” to supranational level, to private actors,

and to “informal networks constituted among sub state-level agencies in different countries”).

(69) Flerida Ruth P. ROMERO, Lecture : Legal challenges of globalization, delivered as part

of the Indiana Supreme Court Lecture Series at Indiana University Law School, Indianap-

olis, 2005, 15 Ind. Int 1 & Comp. L. Rev. 501.

(66) Gnther TEUBNER, “Global Private Regimes : Neo Spontaneous Law and Dual Con-

stitution of Autonomous Sectors”, in Public Governance in the age of Globalization 74

(Gnther Teubner ed.… 1997).

(6) Symposium : International Company and Securities Law. Paul Redmond. Transna-

tional Enterprise and Human Rights : Options for Standard Setting and Compliance, The

International Lawyer, Spring, 2003, 37 Int'! Law. 69.

(68 Dan M. KAHAN, “Between Economics and Sociology : The New Path of Deterrence”

95 Mich. L. Rev. 2477, 2477 (1997).

__ 99 _

vision, formalistically correct, but realistically handicapped. À quick

example of this could be sex tourism that originates as a plan in one

continent but is executed in another one.

Secondly, criminologists need to be aware and mindful of the very

high level of links between political, strategic, economic and trade var-

iables and the topics that they are researching and studying. The tradi-

tional focus on the perpetrator(s), the victim(s) and their communities

is no longer sufficient. Understanding crime cannot any more be linked

only to explanations that focus on the perpetrators, the victims, and the

immediate circeumstances. There are powerful variables that play a much

deeper, wider role in setting the stage for criminal activity and that must

be taken into consideration if we want to develop effective preventive

measures. For example, populations today are very transient, mobile, in

flux. Massive immigration is changing the composition, dynamics, cul-

ture, language and food of the communities of destination. While race

is a variable examined in numerous studies, especially in the U.S., it 1s

static. It reflects recognized groups as if they were totally Americanized

or Îtalianized or British instead of building into the research ways that

allow one to detect, examine and account for a continuum of variations

that reflects events, experiences, links and influences at times 1000 miles

away. There are those who strongly believe that ‘shared citizenship’

requires the official recognition of different identities and allegiances.

Thus, for example, in February 2008 the Archbishop of Canterbury in

a controversial speech proposed that in the limited areas of marriage,

divorce, inheritance and custody, Muslim communal judgments, volun-

tarily agreed to, might be recognized within what would remain a com-

mon framework of law — much as Talmudic provisions are for Orthodox

Jews. This is an example of the impact of massive immigration and of

the complexity of the reality that we as criminologists now face.

Another powerful example 1s the growth of Islamic banking which oper-

ates according to the law of the Sharia, the body of Islamic religious

law. In the United States 1t 1s estimated that the American Muslim com-

munity has a purchasing power of $170 billion. The financial industry

in the U.S. and elsewhere 1s racing to develop products that are tailored

to meet the needs of the Muslim community. ‘°) The world in front of

us has become much more nuanced and complex. Most of all criminol-

ogists must take more into account forces, phenomena, changes in soci-

ety that have nothing necessarily to do with free will, psychiatric disor-

ders, bad associations but rather reflect powerful forces that at times

are per se positive. One can think about the impact of the increase in

relative wealth across the world on all sorts of positive and negative

(69) Shahzad Q. QADRI, “Islamic Banking”. Business Law Today, vol. 17, no. 6. American

Bar Association, 59.

- 100 —

behaviors, including skyrocketing demand for drugs, recreational sex

and therefore sexual services and therefore prostitution and therefore

trafficking in people. More disposable income also leads to a desire to

escape the ordinary, to seek the unusual, the risqué, a high level of

entertainment and excitement. Thus, the surprisingly and worrisome

growing demand for children and minors, even very young ones, for sex-

ual activities®’ and the widespread use of drugs to alter conscious-

ness.(/!) And these are just some examples.

Third, we must realize that the state often has or takes a stake in

the transnational criminal activity. While it may give lip service to com-

bating criminality, it may not be ready to intervene and break the bal-

ance of power, financial gain, and relative social peace that are gener-

ated by

silent

or

open agreements

with

transnational

crime

organizations and their members. For example, some states gain from

illegal immigration that provides cheap labor in the fields, restaurants,

hotels, factories and other services. This helps keep prices down, which

in turn makes exports more attractive and competitive, and earnings up:

allows the citizens to have more of a disposable income to fuel the econ-

omy through consumption and discretionary spending; ensures that crit-

ical but low-prestige jobs and chores are done for the benefit of the

community, especially the upper classes; and allows the citizens to con-

tinue to enjoy a higher standard of living that otherwise they could not

afford. The country exporting people gains as well since emigration

reduces unemployment and the pressure to provide training and educa-

tional services to prepare those citizens for employment and to create

jobs, and eventually generates millions or even billions of dollars annu-

ally in remittances which quickly become essential to the financial well

being and prosperity of the country of origin. This symbiosis creates

ambiguous situations when the legal posture of a state or number of

states does not coincide with their actual practices.

(72)

Trafficking in

arms is a prime example of this ambiguity in the role of the state pros-

ecuting “illegal” arms trafficking while taking active part and competing

fiercely for arms sales. As another example, a state may ratify treaties

and enact laws that prohibit and sanction human trafficking and forced

sex work but at the same time derive substantial financial benefits, being

a major destination country for sex tourism. The contribution of sex

70 M. MELROSE and D. BARRETT. “The flesh trade in Europe and the trafficking in

women and children from commercial exploitation ”. Police Practice and Research. vol. 7.

2006. no. 2. pp. 113-123.

C Chantal THOMAs, “Disciplining globalization : International law. illegal trade. and the

case of narcotics”. 2003. 24 Mich. J. Int'1 L. 549.

( Nancie CARAWAY, “Human Rights and Existing Contradictions in Asia-Pacific

Human Trafficking Politics and Discourse”. Spring. 2006. 14 Tul. J. Int1 & Comp. L. 295.

101

work to the GDP of some Southeast Asian countries /* is so visible and

impressive that a few years ago the ILO called for them to openly rec-

ognize it and take more responsibility for it. The ILO report /* stresses

that the growth of prostitution is probably linked, albeit inadvertently,

to the macro-economic policies of governments which have a tendency

to spawn rapid urbanization at the expense of rural development, to

promote cheap labor for industrialization, to facilitate the export of

female labor for overseas employment and to promote tourism as a for-

eign exchange earner. /° AIl these features of modern, export-oriented

economies, combined with the pervasive lack of social safety nets and

deep-rooted gender discrimination against females, probably contribute

to the growth of the sex sector. Moreover, sex work is often better paid

than most of the options available to young, uneducated women

excluded from access to the education and training leading to better

paying jobs. (6)

It is not and will not be easy to operationalize the state’s participa-

tion and connivance in the establishment, continuation and even flour-

ishing of a transnational crime activity but we cannot even begin to

study it and/or to propose remedies, solutions and avenues for change

if we do not take into account the double role that governments can and

do play in these types of murky situations. ”

Fourthly, this perspective obviously impacts the response to transna-

tional crime that criminologists may propose. Typically, studies and

papers on transnational crime call for more cooperation between coun-

tries, more resources for policing and tracking of transnational crime,

more treaties and conventions, more money for INTERPOL, the expan-

sion of EUROPOL, the establishment of more and similar “POLs” in

other continents etc. But how can we expect these measures to succeed

when most countries derive tangible benefits as well from transnational

crime? In attempting to study, analyze, remedy, prevent and maybe even

solve the puzzle of transnational crime, we must factor into the equation

the variable of the ambiguous role of the state and not just accept at

face value laws, treaties and agreements and assume that more state and

(3) Robyn EMERTON, “Translating international and regional trafficking norms into

domestic reality: À Hong Kong case study”, 2004, 10 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 215.

(4 Lin Lean LIM (editor), The Sex Sector : The economic and social bases of prostitution

in Southeast Asia, International Labor Office, Geneva, 1998.

(°) Mohamed Y. MATTAR, “Trafficking in Persons : An Annotated Legal Bibliography”,

Fall. 2004. 96 Law Libr. J. 669.

(76) Symposium : Globalization and the Erosion of Sovereignty in honor of Professor

Lichtenstein : Dinah SHELTON, “Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World”, Spring.

2002, 25 B.C. Int1 & Comp. L. Rev. 273.

( Edi C.M. KINNEY. “Appropriations for the Abolitionists : Undermining Effects of the

U.S. Mandatory Anti-Prostitution Pledge in the Fight against Human Trafficking and HIV/

AIDS”, 2006, 21 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 158.

— 102 —

interstate resources are going to seriously impact a sensitive area that

especially affects the economy of a country or entire region. An example

maybe some European Union countries decrying 1llegal immigration

from Eastern Europe or South America while at the same time tens of

thousand of their elderly depend on Romanian or Ecuadorian undocu-

mented women for their daily care.

In analyzing transnational crimes, especially money laundering and

other financial transactions, criminologists need again to show their abil-

ity to see through the apparent contradictory and competitive role of the

established authorities. The fundamental question could be : “Is the state

and/or the international organism’s prohibition of certain financial oper-

ations and modalities, like for example bank secrecy, genuinely moti-

vated by a well articulated desire to stamp out transnational money

laundering or does it represent a power grab against the private sector

by the state or against a smaller state by more powerful ones in order

to guarantee themselves the maximum financial benefits possible ?” 79 In

other words, is the state’s intervention motivated by a true desire to

combat crime or simply to maximize revenues? We have seen controver-

sial measures taken by some governments supposedly to stamp out cor-

ruption and money laundering that have instead raised an articulated

suspicion that they were actually moves to eliminate political rivals and

consolidate the power of the central government in controlling national

assets (Russia under Putin comes to mind as a prime example of this).

This is actually nothing new. The abolition of the order of the Knights

Templar in the 14 century was not truly motivated by a desire to

stamp out the debauchery of their alleged homosexual practices con-

fessed to by its leaders under harsh torture but rather a calculated move

by Philip IV of France to eliminate a potential parallel state threatening

his power and most of all to cancel the heavy debt he owed the Knights.

The establishment of the Church of England, one could argue, was not

so much motivated by a sincere and austere desire for religious reform

and to recover the purity of the faith but rather by coveting the sub-

stantial wealth of the Catholic Church and monasteries in England at

that time when the monarchy was heavily indebted to the nobility and

needed money to assert its power. Confiscating and appropriating the

riches of the religious orders and of the church in both cases provided

an irresistible motivation while the publicly stated motives sounded

much more pure and noble. Closer to us in time, there are those who

have said that banks in Florida, for example, would aot have prospered

and survived were it not for the massive laundering of drug money. And

there are indications that the continuing remarkable boom in real estate

(8) [van SIMoNovIC, “State Sovereignty and Globalization : Are Some States More

Equal?””, Summer, 2000, 28 Ga. J. Int1 & Comp Law 381.

— 103 —

development in some countries, for example in the eastern Arabian

Peninsula, is fueled not just by an ample supply of petrodollars but also

by large money laundering activities.

(79)

Thus, while criminologists may applaud the efforts of the Organiza-

tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United

Nations, the U.S., the EU and others in combating corruption and

money laundering, they must critically ask 1f this 1s truly to stamp out

transnational crime or instead to ensure the monopoly of the state on

the proceed of legal and illegal activities alike, thus incorporating tran-

snational crime into the financial “books” of a country with the poten-

tial of making the state a less than impartial party. À more skeptical

look at international efforts to take out corruption and taking the state

more vigorously to task relative to its true intentions, objectives and

methodology may give our profession more relevance, more bite, and

truly help the difficult process of finding reasonable solutions to a very

complex problem. ‘8°)

L. — CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we now fully live in the post September 11, 2001

attack on the twin towers in New York; the post March 11, 2004 train

bombings in Madrid, and the post July 7, 2005 tube bombings in Lon-

don. The world has just begun to fully comprehend, digest and react to

large scale, war-like terrorist attacks. #" At the same time, massive shifts

in wealth, manufacturing, trade and in the balance of world power are

taking place and center stage in our vision of the world and its dynam-

ics. The ascendancy in the last few years especially of China and India

economically, politically and also militarily, are changing the balance of

wealth and power in the world. They also herald a time of sustained and

increased relative prosperity there and elsewhere, hopefully and eventu-

ally for billions of people. China’s wholesale purchasing of soybeans

everywhere possible has, for example, allowed many farmers in other

hemispheres, especially in South America, to renovate their homes, buy

(79) Stefan A. Riesenfeld Symposium 2003 : International Money Laundering from Latin

America to Asia : Who Pays?: Bruce ZAGARIS, “The Merging Of The Anti-Money Launder-

ing And Counter-Terrorism Financial Enforcement Regimes After September !1. 2001”,

2004, 22 Berkeley J. Int'I L. 123.

(80) Many theorize that a future real danger is a general weakening of state laws and pro-

tections in favor of making conditions more accommodating to corporations. See Karl-Heinz

LADEUR, “Globalization and the Conversion of Democracy to Polycentric Networks: Can

Democracy Survive the End of the Nation State?”, in Public Governance in the Age of Glo-

balization 89, 90 (Karl-Heinz Ladeur ed., 2004).

(D Maryann Cusimano Love, “Globalization, ethics and the war on terrorism”, 2002, 16

ND J. L. Ethics & Pub Pol'y 65.

— 104 —

the latest farm machinery, and purchase expensive goods and cars. The

monopoly on wealth, information, communications, power and influ-

ence enjoyed until recently by the U.S. and the EU is now being increas-

ingly shared with other countries in the world, until recently “underde-

veloped.”

Many countries

previously dependent on

international

institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund

(IMF) and others do not need them any more. For example, energy

resources in Bolivia and Venezuela; copper in Peru and Chile; and bio-

fuels in Brazil are generating their financial independence. ? This is in

turn creating a massive demand in all sectors of the economy imaginable

offering untold opportunities for legal and illegal commerce and trade.

The geographical and mental frontiers of our research, theorizing, and

policy-recommending must change accordingly. Contextual analysis 1s

required. This will be neither easy nor error free but it 1s unavoidable

and necessary. Best of all, this challenge offers us unparalleled opportu-

nities to truly think, research and act globally and really make the work

of criminologists relevant at a worldwide level.‘*) It is a challenge that

we Will and must meet skillfully and successfully in order to alleviate

and, if possible, eliminate the widespread transnational criminality

engendered by the massive changes taking place in the world today and

that are impacting our daily lives both positively and negatively.

ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on globalization as it relates to transnational

crime. It attempts to show how the very patterns and dynamics that

make globalization possible and effective as a positive force in the world

also give rise to “collateral” negative, that is criminal, consequences and

facilitate the spawning and rapid growth of transnational crimes. More-

over, there are also crimes committed opposing globalization. And glo-

balization also makes it easier to fight crime since 1t facilitates cooper-

ation and coordination of anti-crime efforts. Thus it has a complex

relationship with crime : positive, negative and preventative. The paper

also addresses how criminology should review and revise their research

and intervention models to take into account how globalization has

changed the way we can and should approach crime. New and bold

ways of thinking and modeling are needed. Examples are provided.

(82

}In the fall of 2008, for example. the IMF only has one country as a client, Turkey,

instead of several as in the recent past.

$3 Milena STERIO, “The evolution of international law”, Spring, 2008. 31 B.C. Int'1 &

Comp. L. Rev. 213.

— 105 —

RESUMEN

Este articulo se centra en la globalizaciôn en tanto en cuanto estä

relacionada con el crimen transnacional. Intenta demostrar cômo los

mismos modelos y dinämicas que hacen que la globalizaciôn sea posible

y eficaz conducen también a consecuencias colaterales negativas, es

decir, criminales, y facilitan la introducciôn y el râpido crecimiento de

los crimenes transnacionales. Ademâs, existen también delitos cometidos

contra la globalizaciôn. Por su parte, la globalizaciôn facilita la lucha

contra el crimen porque la cooperaciôn y la coordinaciôn de los esfuer-

Zzos contra el crimen son mâs fâciles. Por consiguiente, la globalizaciôn

posee una relaciôn muy compleja con el crimen : positiva, negativa y de

prevenciôn. Este articulo examina también cômo la criminologia deberia

reconsiderar y revisar sus modelos de investigaciôn y de intervenciôn

para tener bien en cuenta cômo la globalizaciôn ha cambiado la manera

en la cual podemos y deberiamos plantear el estudio del crimen. Se nece-

sitan nuevas y audaces maneras de pensar y de preparar modelos. El

articulo aporta ejemplos.

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article se concentre sur la globalisation dans sa relation avec la

criminalité transnationale. Il tente de montrer comment les mêmes

modèles et dynamiques qui rendent la globalisation possible et efficace

amènent aussi des conséquences collatérales négatives, c’est-à-dire crimi-

nelles, et facilitent l’introduction et la croissance rapide des crimes trans-

nationaux. Du reste, il y a aussi des crimes commis contre la globalisa-

tion. Et la globalisation, pour sa part, facilite la lutte contre le crime

parce que la coopération et la coordination des efforts contre le crime

sont plus faciles. En conséquence, la globalisation a un rapport très

complexe avec le crime : positif, négatif, et préventif. Cet article traite

aussi de la manière dont la criminologie devrait réexaminer et réviser ses

modèles de recherche et d’intervention pour prendre en compte ce que

la globalisation a changé dans la manière dont on peut et dont on

devrait aborder le crime. On a besoin de nouvelles et audacieuses façons

de penser et de modéliser. Des exemples sont fournis.

— 106 —

:QUIEN NECESITA A UN CRIMINOLOGO? :

INVESTIGACION, ACCION Y POLITICA

CRIMINAL

Vicente Garrido Genovés “!)

En un reciente articulo encabezado por Marianne Junger junto con

investigadores pertenecientes a siete paises (Estados Unidos, Gran Bre-

taña, Holanda, España, Australia, Canadà y Alemania) publicado en la

revista European Journal on Criminological Policy Research, los autores

se preguntaban si los gobiernos de esos paises apoyaban de modo habi-

tual las medidas para prevenir la delincuencia que contaban con la

mejor evidencia cientifica disponible en cuanto a su efectividad. Los

hallazgos fueron sorprendentemente semejantes en todos los casos : si

bien en esas naciones se observaban claros esfuerzos por desplazarse

hacia una politica criminal basada en la evidencia (Farrington y Petro-

sino, 2001), existian muchos obstäculos en el camino. Junto a las pro-

pias limitaciones del conocimiento cientifico — en forma de escasos estu-

dios sôlidamente establecidos que permitieran conclusiones especificas—

se puso de relieve en este anâlisis de criminologia comparada la fuerte

dependencia que tiene la politica criminal de los sucesos alarmantes que

generan una crisis de confianza en el püblico para con el sistema. Tam-

bién se comprobé la dificultad que los cientificos tenian para ser escu-

chados por la sociedad y los politicos, fuera de los circulos de la Aca-

demia.

En este texto intento poner de relieve la importancia que podria tener

la criminologia en lo que se refiere a la prevenciôn del delito en la socie-

dad actual, con tal de que fuéramos capaces de lograr determinados

objetivos insertos en el ambito de la investigaciôn, por una parte, y de

la acciôn o puesta en prâäctica de las iniciativas, por otra. Posteriormente

me ocupo de las razones por las que la criminologia tiene muchas difi-

cultades para influir sobre la politica criminal de los paises, y los modos

en que podria obtenerse un mayor acceso a la toma de decisiones rele-

vantes en la prevenciôn de la delincuencia. À continuaciôn analizo cuâa-

les son las funciones que ahora desempeñamos los criminôlogos, sin

duda bastante marginales tanto en el funcionamiento de la justicia como

en el sistema decisorio de las politicas criminales, y de qué modo

podrian ser aumentados en su influencia sus roles en un futuro prôximo.

(D Facultad de Filosofia y Educaciôn. Avda. Blasco Ibañez, 30. 46010 Valencia.

vicente.garrido@uv.es.

— 107 —

LA INVESTIGACION

No cabe duda de que uno de los grandes paradigmas en la investi-

gaciôn actual es lo que se conoce como la perspectiva basada en la evi-

dencia (evidence-based approach), esto es, el esfuerzo desarrollado en los

ültimos años para generar conocimientos a través de la investigaciôn

mediante revisiones sistemâticas promovidas por la Colaboraciôn Cam-

pbell (Campbell Group in Crime & Justice) en la bûüsqueda de progra-

mas efectivos. Mediante un estudio exhaustivo de la metodologia dispo-

nible acerca de un tôpico cualquiera de la prevenciôn del delito, se llega

a derivar una serie de conclusiones cuyo alcance depende de la calidad

de las investigaciones originales que componen la revisiôn final. Como

convenciôn, se llega a decidir si un método de intervenciôn determinado

ha alcanzado un estatus de “efectivo”, “prometedor” o “no efectivo” en

la consecuciôn de sus objetivos de prevenciôn, de acuerdo a los datos

disponibles en el momento de la revisiôn (ver Sherman, Farrington,

Walsh & MacKenzie, 2002).

Bajo el planteamiento de la evidencia, se considera que la prevenciôn

del delito podria ubicarse dentro del modelo de salud püblica, en el que

para cada dolencia existe un tratamiento recomendable o, al menos, uno

preferible en comparaciôn con los otros. Las intervenciones tienen que

ajustarse a los factores de riesgo y de protecciôn que presentan las per-

sonas o los escenarios que van a ser objeto de las mismas.

Ahora bien, otros criminélogos en la actualidad abogan por un

Modelo Reflexivo (Knepper, 2005) o Cultural, västago de la orientaciôn

critica en Criminologia, cuyo fin no es tanto buscar referentes cuantita-

tivos de ‘lo que funciona’ (what works), sino, en palabras de Stephanie

Kane, “documentar, descifrar y desplegar las estructuras interpretativas,

las imâgenes y los sentidos a través de los cuales el delito es aprehendido

y realizado” (2004 : 303).

En esta ponencia mantengo, en este punto, que ambos planteamien-

tos investigativos son necesarios, como lo demuestra en la actualidad el

estudio del fenômeno conocido como ‘desistencia’ (desistance), y sus

obvias relaciones con la denominada justicia de la restauraciôn (Res-

torative Justice). En efecto, mientras que el tratamiento de los delin-

cuentes tiene que enfrentarse a un ambiente politico inhôspito y a los

problemas derivados de la implementaciôn (ver mâs adelante), la aten-

ciôn reciente a los temas de discusion que plantea el concepto de desis-

tencia de la carrera delictiva ha promovido un interés renovado en los

modelos de intervenciôn de prestaciôn de servicios en la comunidad y

en los ingredientes de los programas efectivos. Un desarrollo importante

es la idea de que la desistencia es un proceso que mueve a alguien desde

la conducta delictiva hasta la abstinencia en el delito, y que tal conducta

— 108 —

de ausencia del delito (0, en otras palabras, el hecho de “desistir”’) nunca

termina. Asi en lugar de esta cesaciôn abrupta se produce un cambio

tanto en la tasa como en la frecuencia de la conducta delictiva, y de este

modo podemos decir que el cambio gradual constituye el proceso de

desistencia. En su libro Crime in the Making, Sampson y Laub (1993)

desarrollan la teoria del control social informal para explicar la con-

ducta delictiva como parte de un trayecto vital (life course). En esta

obra seminal los autores mostraron cômo transiciones tan relevantes en

el desarrollo vital como obtener un empleo, entrar en el ejército o con-

traer matrimonio afectaron para bien el curso del delito, incluso en el

caso de los delincuentes juveniles. Otros trabajos posteriores contribu-

yeron al conocimiento del proceso de desistencia como un fenômeno

gradual, y reafirmaron la importancia de los vinculos sociales. Este énfa-

sis en los controles sociales informales por parte de esta corriente de la

investigacion — es decir, sobre las instituciones sociales que unen al indi-

viduo a la conducta prosocial- ha contrastado con muchas de las poli-

ticas contemporäneas focalizadas en la potenciaciôn del control formal

y la linea dura de la “ley y orden”.

Es aqui donde entra en relaciôn el estudio de la desistencia con los

principios de la justicia de la restauraciôn. Como han sugerido autores

como Bazemore y Erbe (2004), la intervenciôn basada en ella pretende,

por encima de todo, acelerar el proceso natural de la desistencia

mediante la creaciôn de nuevas conexiones que construyen el capital

humano en los delincuentes y el capital social en las comunidades donde

éstos hayan de reintegrarse. El resultado final es el cambio del individuo

mediante la asunciôon de una nueva identidad, pasando de verse de un

‘delincuente” a alguien prosocial (Maruna, Immarigeon & Lebel, 2004).

Mi punto de vista es que el planteamiento de los factores de riesgo

y la büsqueda del programa eficaz de acuerdo con la evidencia puede

beneficiarse de la investigaciôn cualitativa (o si se quiere menos orto-

doxa) que ilustra el anâlisis de la desistencia y el conocimiento de los

efectos en las victimas, delincuentes y comunidades de los modelos de

trabajo de la justicia de la restauraciôn. Otro ejemplo relevante de esta

integraciôn es la propuesta de Robert Agnew (2005) de estudiar las ‘his-

torias’ o ‘argumentos’ (storylines) en la trayectoria vital de los delincuen-

tes como causas del delito.

La conclusiôn de este apartado, no obstante, es que no podemos

renunciar a hacer efectiva la aspiraciôn de la consiliencia (consilience) o

armonia de los hallazgos a partir de la pluralidad de metodologias de

investigacion, tal y como fue formulada por E.O. Wilson hace unos

años (Wilson, 1999).

— 109 —

LA ACCION

Mi discurso aqui no es original, y abogo porque empleemos en la

prevencion del delito aquellos programas o metologias que pueben ser

efectivos, o al menos que muestren conseguir objetivos intermedios que

sean considerados valiosos para la comunidad (como es el caso de los

logros de la justicia de la restauraciôn, y su énfasis en construir el capi-

tal social en beneficio de todas las personas implicadas en un escenario

de intervenciôn). Podremos someter a anâlisis critico la oportunidad de

determinados programas, pero si aceptamos llevarlos a cabo, no pode-

mos malgastar el tiempo, el dinero y las esperanzas de los contribuyen-

tes

En este punto asumo las reflexiones y propuestas señaladas por Paul

Ebklom (2005 : 57). (Cuâl es el propésito del conocimiento en la pre-

venciôn del delito? Tal y como señala Paul Ekblom, éste ha de dirigirse

a mejorar, extender y mantener los esfuerzos en la prevenciôn del delito,

ya sean realizados por la comunidad en su vida diaria (mediante el con-

trol social informal), por los servicios de seguridad privada, por los dise-

nadores de objetos y lugares mâs seguros, o por las instituciones del

control formal del Estado.

Este autor establece los siguientes tipos de contenidos del conoci-

miento necesario para la prevenciôn del delito (tabla 1))

TABLA 1 : LOS CONTENIDOS DEL CONOCIMIENTO

PARA LA PREVENCION (EKBLOM, 2005)

Acerca del tipo de delito a | Sus costos y consecuencias para la victima y la

prevenir

sociedad; modus operandi de los delincuentes,

definiciones legales; patrones y tendencias en su

manifestaciôn; factores de riesgo y protecciôn ;

teorias explicativas.

Acerca de los métodos de

En qué contexto; sus efectos colaterales; anâlisis

prevenciôn que son efica-

de costos y beneficios.

CEs

Cômo poner en prâctica

Conocimiento y habilidades

necesarios

para

esos métodos

implementarlos; metodologias de investigaciôn y

anâlisis

À quiénes hay que implicar

Contactos para buscar consultores, entidades

€n €sos programas

asociadas;

colaboradores

para

ponerlo

en

otras

instituciones de

prâctica ;

financiacion:

apoyo.

Cuâändo actuar

Elegir el momento adecuado; coordinaciôn con

otras instituciones.

— 110 —

TABLA 1: LOS CONTENIDOS DEL CONOCIMIENTO

PARA LA PREVENCION (EKBLOM, 2005)

Dônde establecer los recur-

Acciones y momentos del programa que han de

sos necesarios

contar con los recursos necesarios

Tener en cuenta las impli-

Estudiar el modo en que el programa se adecua

caciones simbôlicas, emo-

al sentido de justicia y valores de la comunidad

cionales y culturales del

en la que se va a implementar.

programa

La importancia de reunir ese conocimiento se pone de relieve en el

hecho de que una y otra vez observamos cuân frecuente es que un pro-

grama fracase en su implementaciôn en el mundo real (‘mainstream pro-

jects’), a pesar de que en su demostraciôn diseñada previamente diera

buenos resultados. ; Cuâl es la razôn? Con demasiada frecuencia se trata

de una falta de conocimiento sobre los mecanismos causales que hacen

funcionar el método o programa puesto en prâctica, asi como un igual-

mente deficiente conocimiento sobre las causas del tipo de delito que se

quiere prevenir. Otra causa habitual es no tomar en consideraciôn el

contexto en el que dicho programa va a ser puesto a prueba. Como dice

Ekblom (2005 : 60): “Los métodos de prevenciôn del delito no son

como los pesticidas que pueden ser extendidos uniformemente sobre los

mismos campos con la certeza de que van a tener en todos ellos los mis-

mos efectos”. Estas deficiencias aumentan si, por otra parte, las estregias

diseñadas para la evaluacion de proceso de los programas y de sus resul-

tados son tan pobres que nos dejan con mäs incôgnitas que respuestas.

Es por ello que nos unimos a esta recomendaciôn que realiza de

nuevo Ekblom (2005 : 60) :

Bajo estas circunstancias, hariamos bien en dotar a nuestros profesionales

con un conjunto de principios genéricos de prevenciôn y de conocimiento

del proceso antes que ofrecerles meramente un gran nûmero de soluciones

prefijadas (...) En un sentido mâäs amplio, tenemos que ayudarles a que

piensen menos como técnicos que han de seleccionar un remedio prefabri-

cado de una lista o menû (...) y mâs como consultores expertos que

emplean esos principios para adaptar el programa al contexto, para inno-

var y reconfigurar sus diagnôsticos y soluciones a medida que lo necesiten.

Asi pues, saber “lo que funciona” (what-works) es esencial, pero nece-

sitamos saberlo de una forma detallada si vamos a ser capaces de com-

partir y replicar los programas preventivos, de modo tal que sepamos

exactamente cuâles son sus fortalezas y debilidades. Nuestro conoci-

miento debe intentar describir el proceso de modo tal que posibilite la

reconstrucciôn inteligente de las acciones preventivas mediante la des-

cripciôn de cada etapa en su desarrollo y puesta en prâctica (Ekblom,

2005).

— 111 —

Este punto puede ser el paso siguiente a la tarea que estä realizando

el Grupo Cambell en Crimen y Justicia. Como sabemos, mediante revi-

siones sistemâticas la Colaboraciôn Campbell estä ofreciendo una infor-

maciôn muy valiosa sobre la evidencia en la prevenciôn del delito de

mültiples métodos, desde las cämaras de circuito cerrado hasta los cam-

pos de entrenamiento militares (boot camps) o los programas para delin-

cuentes sexuales. Esto, sin embargo, no es del todo suficiente para per-

mitir una replicaciôn exitosa en diferentes lugares. Las revisiones

sistemâticas deberian moverse en el futuro hacia la creacion de un cono-

cimiento de base que permitiera la replicaciôn mâs exitosa de los pro-

gramas, de acuerdo con determinados parämetros bien detallados que la

instituciôn que los va a poner en prâäctica tendria que considerar. Qué

duda cabe que tal informaciôn tendria un valor igualmente inapreciable

para los responsables politicos de tomar decisiones sobre los programas

que tendrian que ser implementados en sus respectivas comunidades.

De este modo, sobre la base del conocimiento ya presentado en la

tabla 1, Ekblom (2005) propone una estructura para los profesionales

con objeto de establecer una serie de pasos que aseguren la “mejor prâc-

tica” posible en la reducciôn del delito, a la que él llama el “modelo de

las cinco ies” (tabla 2).

TABLA 2 : EL MODELO DE LAS CINCO IES DE EKBLOM

DE BUENAS PRACTICAS PARA LA IMPLEMENTACION

DE ESTRATEGIAS DE PREVENCION

Inteligencia

Reunir y analizar la informaciôn sobre el delito a

prevenir, sus causas y consecuencias

Intervencion

Emprender la acciôn con objeto de evitar, alterar

o debilitar las causas y factores de riesgo,

empleando métodos basados en la evidencia y

que sean apropiados al problema delictivo que se

quiere prevenir y al contexto de implementaciôn.

Implementaciôn

Lograr que las präcticas seleccionadas “funcio-

nen”, de acuerdo con las necesidades locales

Implicaciôn

Mobilizar a instituciones, empresas y personas

para que hagan su trabajo en la implementaciôn

de la intervenciôn

Impacto

Evaluar los resultados del programa, asi como su

rentabilidad en términos de su costo-efectividad.

Asi pues, parece que estamos en un momento de la Criminologia

Aplicada en el cual se hace necesario desarrollar programas de preven-

ciôn del delito basados en la evidencia que puedan replicarse respetando

— 112 —

la integridad de sus componentes mediante un conjunto detallado de

buenas prâcticas que sean sensibles a las exigencias del contexto.

Estariamos, entonces, ante la tarea de construir una pirämide de

métodos basados en la evidencia que diseminaran el conocimiento con-

siderado efectivo de acuerdo con diferentes niveles jerärquicos, donde

cada programa o método tendria que especificar sus metas, poblaciones

diana y ciertos parâmetros del contexto que permitieran una replicacion

cada vez mâs plena de conocimiento acerca de ‘“lo que funciona” y “por

qué”‘(grâfico 1).

INT

“ Nacional

Regional

| Implementaciôn Local

Un programa podria ser diseminado en un nivel regional si se cono-

cen bien los resultados efectivos en las aplicaciones locales. Posterior-

mente, podria ser adoptado en un contexto nacional por el pais concer-

nido, y ello podria dar lugar a un examen comparativo derivado de su

aplicaciôn en otros paises. Por consiguiente, en la medida en que las

prâcticas derivadas de las cinco ies quedaran bien especificadas, tal

método podria ser adoptado en otros paises y contextos, de cuyos resul-

tados todos los profesionales y responsables politicos podrian aprender.

LA DISEMINACION DE LOS CONOCIMIENTOS

DE LA CRIMINOLOGIA EN LA POLÎTICA CRIMINAL

En la tercera parte de la ponencia me dirijo a examinar el siempre

complicado tema de por qué los criminolôgos tenemns tantas dificulta-

des en ser escuchados en la escena pûblica de la politica social de la pre-

vencion del delito, lo cual incluye también la relaciôn de la Academia

con los medios de comunicaciôn.

— 113 —

En un interesante articulo de 2007 titulado Against Marginality :

Arguments for a public criminology, Elliot Currie ha intentado explicar

las razones por las que la Criminologia todavia se halla en los mârgenes

de influencia en la toma de decisiones politicas, a pesar de los notables

avances acaecidos en los ûültimos años en forma de teorias y conocimien-

tos empiricos. Por ejemplo, como nos recuerda el trabajo de revision de

la evidencia cientifica acumulada por el Grupo Campbell en Crimen y

Justicia, hoy en dia sabemos que programas tan populares como Scared

Straight o Boot Camps resultan poco convincentes como estrategias de

prevenciôn del delito o que, como Sherman se ha cansado de explicar,

las tendencias a incrementar el castigo en los delincuentes como estra-

tegia esencial de prevenciôn especial arroja, como minimo, pobres divi-

dendos. Sin embargo, la paradoja es que, como criminôlogos, tenemos

muchas cosas que decir acerca de cômo prevenir la delincuencia

mediante programas de intervenciôn temprana en escuelas y familias, 0

cômo mejorar las opciones de que un programa de tratamiento en la

cärcel o en la comunidad disminuya la tasa de reincidencia entre los

delincuentes juveniles y adultos (ver, por ejemplo, el influyente libro edi-

tado por Sherman et al., 2002, Evidence-Based Crime Prevention). Currie

retrata con pesimismo la falta de interés de la politica americana por

apoyarse en la investigaciôn criminolégica, pero a mi juicio de modo

certero extiende esa preocupaciôn a otros muchos paises :

En demasiadas naciones alrededor del mundo persiste un patrôn en la

politica criminal basado en aumentar el poder de un sistema de justicia

cada vez mâs punitivo, asi como en el crecimiento de la encarcelaciôn

como formas de hacer frente a las consecuencias de una destrucciôn global

de las comunidades y sus formas de vida, tomando el ejemplo a partir del

modelo de Estados Unidos, como si éste fuera recomendable.

Dada esta situaciôn, la presencia püblica de una criminologia influyente

nunca ha sido tan critica. Sin embargo, cuando mâs se precisa del cono-

cimiento de la criminologia, ésta como disciplina ha Ilegado a convertirse

en algo marginal en la discusiôn general acerca del delito y del sistema de

justicia, cada vez menos capaz de influir sobre la politica criminal.

Por qué se ha Ilegado a esa situaciôn? ;Por qué no tenemos voz en

la plaza püblica de la politica cuando tenemos tantas cosas que decir?

Para Currie el problema central se halla en que “tenemos que ganar

mentes y corazones”(p. 179), es decir, tenemos que educar a la gente, al

püblico, sobre los auténticos conocimientos que estän deträs de los deli-

tos y sus soluciones, y de este modo poder ofrecer a los politicos reco-

mendaciones que sean mâs realistas de implementar sin provocar el

rechazo de los votantes.

Esa educaciôn del püblico requiere ganar el terreno a los que hablan

en los medios sin conocimiento, ocupar espacios donde podamos formar

a la opiniôn pûblica. Ahora bien, (estamos bien preparados para hacer

— 114 —

esto? Su respuesta es que no, y pone la carga de la culpa en el modo

en que las universidades desincentivan esa labor divulgadora : “Con

demasiada frecuencia priorizamos aquello que pensamos que es una

investigacion ‘original’ — especialmente aquella que pensamos que puede

ser publicada en las revistas de mayor impacto — a expensas de dos otras

cosas que creo que son partes esenciales de cualquier empresa intelec-

tual, a saber, intentar comprender la masa de investigaciôn que genera-

mos, a través del trabajo analitico y sintético, y diseminar todo ese

ingente trabajo en una audencia mâäs amplia que la nuestra y potencial-

mente mâs resolutiva. En otras palabras, gastamos mucho tiempo en

generar ‘hallazgos’, pero muy poco en hablar entre nosotros y con

audiencias mâs numerosas acerca de lo que significan esos hallazgos”

(p. 180).

No se trata de ‘popularizar’ la ciencia, caricaturizando sus resulta-

dos, sino de ofrecer un trabajo riguroso — y agotador — de anâlisis y sin-

tesis, que permita la comprensiôn y utilidad de nuestros esfuerzos por

parte de la gente y de los politicos. Eso significa trabajar en esa zona

‘intermedia’ que existe entre el conocimiento teôrico y técnico, por una

parte, y la aplicaciôon de una politica criminal desinformada o — peor

aûn — interesada en que la balanza caiga en una determinada direccion.

Ese es el riesgo que corremos si obviamos esa comunicacion inteligente

con la sociedad de lo que investigamos y podemos concluir de nuestros

hallazgos : que sean otros quienes se comuniquen con los que toman las

decisiones, otros que no disponen de esos conocimientos, o que tienen

una agenda oculta.

En España podemos ver la violencia doméstica como una muestra de

lo que señala Currie. Planteado desde la ideologia dominante como un

mero problema de la ‘estructura del patriarcado’, se niega la multicau-

salidad del fenômeno y se fia toda la respuesta a endurecer y agilizar la

respuesta penal, asi como a una dudosa campaña social de sensibiliza-

ciôn en los medios. Sin embargo, las mujeres muertas constituyen, año

tras año, un nûmero elevado que produce una clara alarma social, sin

que hasta ahora se haya podido explicar el por qué de esa anomalia. La

tesis politicamente correcta consiste en afirmar que la razôn profunda se

halla en el ‘machismo’ todavia imperante. Y se cierra la explicaciôn —

lo que claramente se constituye en una hipôtesis dificilmente falsable —

obviando factores relevantes como el grave problema de fracaso social

que tenemos entre los jôvenes en España, la situaciôn de anomia en que

un nûmero importante de inmigrantes (que llegan a constituir un tercio

de las muertes) viven entre nosotros, y el grave riesgo en que ponemos

a las victimas cuando invitamos a denunciar a sus agresores y luego

somos incapaces de darles una protecciôon adecuada. Quizàs un ejemplo

contrario también en España se refiere a los delincuentes sexuales,

— 115 —

donde un comité de expertos en Cataluña fue capaz de ofrecer en el año

2008 unas sugerencias valiosas en medio de diferentes casos de violencia

sexual que conmocionaron al püblico. Por desgracia, desconocemos en

estos momentos si esas recomendaciones hallarän eco en la prâctica. Sin

embargo, al menos se dejaron oir.

Esa renuncia al espacio pûblico de la toma de decisiones ha tenido

otra consecuencia indeseada, de acuerdo a Currie : mantenernos alejados

de los temas candentes y relevantes en la sociedad, mientras nos ocupa-

mos con frecuencia de asuntos de dudosa trascendencia por su pequeñez

o reiteraciôn. Asuntos como el terrorismo, el träfico de personas, las

bandas organizadas, la prevenciôn de la violencia en los barrios o la

atenciôn a los jôvenes que presentan una carrera delictiva intensa pue-

den necesitar nuestro esfuerzo mucho mâs del que ahora parece que

estamos dispuestos a dedicarles.

Por otra parte, Francis Cullen, en su conferencia presidencial ante la

ASC en 2004, habia aludido precisamente al problema de ‘por qué

importa poco la Criminologia en la politica social’, explicando el ejem-

plo triunfante de, à su juicio, la salvaciôn del ideal de la rehabilitacion

a cargo de doce cientificos que fueron capaces de ofrecer una resistencia

tenaz ante la doctrina del ‘nada funciona’ (Cullen, 2005). Las sugeren-

cias que ofrece Cullen incluye la labor de diseminaciôn que aconseja

Currie, no sôlo entre el pûblico, sino también entre los profesionales de

la prevenciôn, asi como la necesidad de hacer una ‘ciencia mejor’, esto

es, mâs rigurosa y capaz de dar soluciones mâs eficaces ante los proble-

mas. No obstante, deja un interrogante en el aire que merece toda nues-

tra consideraciôn : ;Es posible que la criminologia importe sôlo en cir-

cunstancias histôricas ünicas que los cientificos no puedan elegir? O

bien, alternativamente, ;quizäs sea posible producir esas condiciones

para la diseminaciôn exitosa de sus conocimientos? Es evidente que

Currie cree firmemente en esa segunda opciôn.

Finalmente, es importante estudiar el modo en que las corrientes de

acciôn de los criminôlogos encuentran un amplio eco, en los escasos

momentos en que tal cosa ocurre, demostrando este hecho que si resulta

posible influir sobre la politica criminal. En este punto, tal y como hacen

Newburn y Jones (2007) con el modelo criminolôgico de mayor acepta-

ciôn en el ûltimo cuarto de siglo, denominado ‘tolerancia cero’, se hace

perentorio acudir a la criminologia cultural para comprender su valor

simbôlico y descubrir los mecanismos de transmisiôn que hicieron alta-

mente aceptable entre los politicos y el püblico en general la idea de

nula permisividad con cualquier tipo de acciôn delictiva. El éxito de este

modelo nos deja la siguiente pregunta por contestar : ;Cômo puede una

politica criminal justa y eficaz luchar contra la preferencia del pûblico

por las medidas ‘sencillas’ y ‘râpidas’? Mi reflexiôn es que tendriamos

— 116 —

que tener en cuenta el valor simbôlico de las propuestas en las socieda-

des donde éstas aspiren a integrarse, al tiempo que utilizamos mecanis-

mos de difusiôn y de representaciôn que puedan ofrecer elementos de

reflexion compartidos por esa audiencia y que, a la postre, faciliten su

aceptaciôn.

(PARA QUÉ SIRVE UN CRIMINOLOGO?

Una de las principales conclusiones que podemos extraer de la disu-

sion precedente es que la criminologia como profesiôn es mâs necesaria

que nunca, ya que en los comienzos de la andadura de este siglo la com-

plejidad de la vida social no ha hecho sino aumentar al tiempo que las

mutaciones de la tecnologia y las fuerzas socio-econômicas, lo que exige

respuestas mâs razonadas y complejas, algo que no se adapta bien a los

mensajes sencillos y lineales que tanto se valoran en la politica. En par-

ticular, destaco la importancia de atender al consejo de Popper en el

sentido de ‘aprender de los errores” como fôrmula para el avance social

(Knepper, 2005), y la extrema importancia de comprender muy bien el

contexto y las necesidades de sus moradores antes de erigir programa

alguno.

Por desgracia, en el mejor de los casos, los criminôlogos somos con-

sultados como una ‘gracia’ o favor que nos conceden los politicos

cuando se trata de temas que no son lo suficientemente polémicos como

para tomar decisiones al compäs de lo que espera escuchar la opiniôn

püblica. En el mundo profesional, la labor estä fuertemente constreñida

por los requisitos legales que regulan los procedimientos del sistema de

justicia, y toda innovaciôn supone un esfuerzo titänico que debe vencer

inercias y suspicacias, aunque aduzca en beneficio de su proyecto los

resultados de la evidencia empirica. Probablemente la razôn se halla en

que las instituciones estän pensadas para reproducir patrones, y a duras

penas son capaces de asumir riesgos ante los responsables politicos, por

temor a disfunciones que puedan poner en entredicho su labor ante la

opiniôn pûblica.

Frente a este statu quo, los criminôlogos han de protagonizar una

parcela esencial en el debate de los principios, metas y modelos de pre-

venciôn en lo concerniente al delito. Huir del debate y sus consecuencias

puede tener como resultado que temas tan cruciales como el papel de

las agencias de la seguridad privada en la sociedad no lleguen a un

punto de anâlisis profundo (Zedner, 2007). Para ello, deberiamos exigir

nuestra participaciôn, como academia o como centros asociados a los

gobiernos, en el debate sobre metas y los esfuerzos para la investigaciôn

y la acciôn, y apuntar soluciones si se poseen, o al menos desaconsejar

iniciativas que sabemos que son contraproducentes. Una justicia de

— 117 —

nuevo ‘ilustrada’ — en palabras de Sherman, 2003 —, que quizàs haya de

dar cambios sustanciales para huir de una inercia que la sofoca, no

puede estar al margen de los conocimientos, y éstos han de ganar la

arena pûblica. Por otra parte, creo que una funciôn esencial del crimi-

nôlogo seria la de diseñador de programas de intervenciôn, algo para lo

que se requiere un conocimiento especializado debido a la complejidad

que ello requiere en el mundo real, asi como de coordinador en la ges-

tion de los servicios que los integran. Y finalmente, el criminôlogo debe-

ria ocuparse igualmente de la evaluaciôon de proceso y de resultados de

tales intervenciones.

En conclusiôn, creo que la labor del criminôlogo deberia situarse en

estos tres niveles :

a) Tecnolégico : orientar de forma decidida y sensible al contexto en

problemas y programas ya conocidos.

b) Reflexivo/Critica social : iluminar las peculiaridades del problema

presente, orientando sobre los peligros, inconvenientes y posibles

beneficios de los diferentes escenarios posibles vinculados con präcti-

cas o politicas determinadas.

c) Investigativo : Establecer una agenda de anâlisis para hacer frente a

los problemas o temas que ahora no tienen una respuesta definida.

REFERENCIAS

AGNEW, R. (2006). “Storylines as a neglected cause of crime”

Journal of

Research in Crime and Delinquency, 43, 119-147.

BAZEMORE, G. & ERBE, C. (2004). “Reintegration and restorative justice : towards

a theory and practice of informal social control and support.” In S. MARUNNA

& R. IMMARIGEON (Eds), After crime and punishment (pp. 27-56). Portland,

Or : William.

CULLEN, F.T. (2005). “The twelve people who saved rehabilitation : How the

science of criminology made a difference”. Criminology, 43, 1-42.

CURRIE, E. (2007). “Against marginality : Arguments for a public criminology”.

Theoretical Criminology, 11, 175-190.

EKBLOM, P. (2005). “The SIs framework : Sharing good practice in crime preven-

tion”. In E. MARKS, À. MEYER & R. LINSSEN (Eds.), Quality in crime preven-

tion (pp. 55-84). Hanover : Books on Demand.

FARRINGTON, D.P. & PETROSINO, À. (2001). “The Campbell Collaboration Crime

and Justice Group”. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social

Sciences, 578, 35-49.

JUNGER, M., FEDER, L., CLAY, J., CÔTÉ, S., FARRINGTON, D.P., FREIBERG, K.

GARRIDO, V., HOMEL, R., LôSEL, F., MANNING, M., MAZEROLLE, P., SANTOS,

R., SCHUMUKER, M., SULLIVAN C., SUTTON, C., YPEREN, T. & TREMBLAY, R.

(2007). “Preventing violence in seven countries : Global convergence in poli-

cies”. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 13, 327-356.

— 118 —

KANE, S. (2004). “The unconventional methods of cultural criminology”. Theore-

tical Criminology, 8, 303-321.

KNEPPER, P. (2005). “Crime prevention in a multinational open society”. Interna-

tional Criminal Justice Review, 15, 58-74.

MARUNA, S., IMMARIGEON, R. & LEBEL, T.P. (2004). “Ex offender reintegration :

Theory and practice”’. In S. MARUNNA & R. IMMARIGEON (Eds), After crime

and punishment (pp. 3-26). Portland, Or : William.

NEWBURN, T., & Jones, T. (2007). “Symbolizing crime control : Reflections on

Zero Tolerance”. Theoretical Criminology 11, 221-243.

SAMPSON, R.J., & LauB, J. (1993). Crime in the making : Pathways and turning

points through life. Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press.

SHERMAN, L. (2003). “Reason and emotion : Reiventing justice with theories,

innovations, and research”. Criminology, 41, 1-37.

SHERMAN, L., FARRINGTON, D., WELSH, B. & MACKIENZIE, D. (Eds.) (2002). Evi-

dence-based crime prevention. N.Y.: Routledge.

WiLsoNn, E.O. (1999). Consilience.

La unidad del conocimiento. Barcelona :

Galaxia Gutemberg.

ZEDNER, L. (2007). “Pre-crime and post-criminology?” Theoretical Criminology,

11, 261-281.

RESUMEN

Este articulo pretende poner de relieve la importancia de la crimino-

logia en la sociedad actual, dado que la complejidad y celeridad de las

transformaciones sociales requiere de una ciencia mejor, y no de solu-

ciones basadas en lo que el püblico “parece que quiere” o en aquello que

“parece mejor”. Con ese fin divido mi trabajo en tres apartados : los dos

primeros señalan los caminos que, a mi juicio, deberia seguir la crimi-

nologia para progresar como ciencia capaz de dar respuestas välidas a

los problemas del crimen (la investigaciôn y la acciôn). En un tercer

apartado analizo las razones por las que la criminologia tiene muchas

dificultades para influir sobre la politica criminal de los paises, y los

modos en que podria obtenerse un mayor acceso a la toma de decisiones

relevantes en la prevenciôn de la delincuencia. Concluyo señalando las

principales funciones que hoy en dia puede desempeñar un criminôlogo

en el servicio que presta a la sociedad.

SUMMARY

The purpose of this paper 1s to stress the importante of criminology

in today’s society, where complex and fast social change requires better

science and no solutions grounded on what the public “seem to want”

or what ‘‘seems better”. With this end in view, the autor divides his

paper in three parts : the first ones indicate ways that can be followed

— 119 —

by criminology in order to propose valid crime problem solving

(research and action). In the last one, the author analises why criminol-

ogy meets high difficulties in influencing state crime policies, and the

ways that could lead to a better access to relevant decision taking in

crime prevention. In conclusion, the autor states the main functions a

criminologist can fulfil in his service to society.

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article entend souligner l’importance de la criminologie dans la

société actuelle, sachant que la complexité et la rapidité des transforma-

tions sociales requièrent une meilleure science et non point des solutions

fondées sur ce que le public “semble vouloir” ou sur ce qui “semble

meilleur”. Pour atteindre cet objectif, l’auteur divise l’article en trois

parties : les deux premières mettent en avant les chemins que doivent

suivre la criminologie pour progresser comme science capable de donner

des réponses valides aux problèmes du crime (la recherche et l’action).

Dans une troisième partie, l’auteur analyse les raisons pour lesquelles la

criminologie rencontre des difficultés à influencer la politique criminelle

des pays, et les moyens qui permettraient un meilleur accès à la prise de

décisions importantes dans la prévention de la délinquance. L'auteur

conclut en indiquant les principales fonctions qu'un criminologue peut

remplir aujourd’hui dans le service qu’il rend à la société.

— 120 —

THE DRAFT UN CONVENTION

ON JUSTICE AND SUPPORT FOR VICTIMS

OF CRIME, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE

TO ITS PROVISIONS

ON RESTORATIVE JUSTICE

Marc Groenhuijsen ‘!)

1. — INTRODUCTION

At the time of the previous World Congress of the International

Society for Criminology, in 2003 in Rio de Janeiro, the idea of propos-

ing a United Nations Convention on Victims’ Rights had not yet been

seriously proposed or considered. Today, only five years onward, many

things have changed. The pro's and con’s of such a move have been

debated in academic discourse, several drafts of a possible Convention

have been written and translated into various languages, and a cam-

paign has been started to persuade the member States of the UN to

work in the direction of adopting a document like that. This paper aims

to explain the background of these recent developments and to connect

them with another major trend in the way many societies deal with the

phenomenon of crime : the rise of restorative justice practices.

The present contribution consists of four parts. First, an overview

will be given of the 1985 UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice

for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power and the subsequent efforts to

have the Declaration properly implemented. Secondly, the idea of

replacing the Declaration with a Convention will be explained. The

main arguments in favour of such a shift will be outlined and the con-

tent of the currently available draft Convention will be schetched.

Thirdly, a closer look will be given to the relationship between the draft

UN Convention on the one hand and emerging restorative justice prac-

tices on the other. And finally some essential information will be pro-

vided on the next steps to be taken. How realistic 1s the expectation that

the UN will actually move in the direction of adopting a Convention on

victims’ rights?

() Prof. dr.

— 121 —

2. — THE 1985 UN DECLARATION

AND SUBSEQUENT EFFORTS TO GET IT IMPLEMENTED

The UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of

Crime and Abuse of Power has frequently been hailed as the Magna

Charta for victims of crime (Vetere & David 2005). The reason for this

is that the document was visionary. It contains a bill of rights which

inspired and continues to inspire many subsequent international and

domestic protocols on victims’ rights (Van Dijk 2005). Ever since it was

adopted, it has served as a benchmark to assess progress in this area.

In

short, the Declaration awards victims the right to :

—

be treated with compassion and respect for their dignity

——

receive information

— allow the views of the victim to be presented and considered

——

proper assistance throughout the legal process

— protection of privacy and physical safety

— informal dispute resolution (including mediation)

—

social assistance

State compensation

building partnerships between government agencies, NGO”s and civil

society.

In many areas of international law (be it ‘hard law’ or ‘soft law”-

instruments) there is a conspicuous lack of follow-up activities after

solemny adopting standards of this kind. In the case of the UN Decla-

ration, however, a range of efforts can be identified aimed at effectively

implementing its provisions. ‘ In 1989 the General Assembly adopted a

detailed set of measures to promote compliance (a ‘plan of action’). In

1994 the Secretary-General circulated a questionnaire among the mem-

bership. ° In 1997 a “Manual on the Use and Application of the Dec-

99

laration…

as well as a “Guide for policymakers” was published. *

Despite these attempts at promoting the transposal of the Declaration

into domestic criminal justice systems, some 20 years after its adoption

the conclusion 1s inescapable that the implementation of the Declaration

( United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Compendium of United Nations standards

and norms in crime prevention and criminal justice, New York 2006. And Groenhuijsen 1999.

It has to be observed, though, that the questionnaire had an all time record low

response rate. To complicate things even further, experts felt that the information provided

in response to the questionnaire was not always reliable, because those officials responsible

for providing the answers were frequently the same individuals who had shaped and executed

victim oriented policies in their respective countries.

(4 Laudable as these efforts may be, again it has to be observed that very few national

governments and very few victim support organisations have actually used these sources in

order to improve their performance.

— 122 —

is still unsatisfactory. The overall assessment is that victims’ rights are

not a priority in administering criminal justice. This holds for developing

countries ‘“) as well as for the more affluent societies. ‘“)

3. — FROM A UN DECLARATION

TO A UN CONVENTION?

Against this background, we need to address the question of how to

improve this state of affairs. What 1s the best way to transform victims’

rights into a living reality? Which mechanisms should be used in order

to make the ‘law in action’ look more like the ‘law in the books’?

3.1. — Best practice on achieving reform

on behalf of crime victims

First, we need to build on the available evidence. During the past

decades, several empirical studies have been published providing insights

into the conditions which have to be met in order to effectively achieve

reforms. Some of the well tested conditions to make progress are the

following

— a network of stakeholders should be created (officials from law

enforcement, victim support, probation, social work, etc.)

— the attitude of the responsible officials and agencies should be sup-

portive of change ‘*

-— a favourable attitude should be backed up by knowledge on victims

issues; hence the need for mandatory training of every official who

comes into contact with victims (including the judiciary) °

— adequate resources should be provided in order to enable the agen-

cies to execute new and additional responsibilities

(10)

C) For obvious reasons : they quite often lack the financial resources to prioritise this pol-

Icy area.

(6) This can be inferred from an assessment by the European Commission of the trans-

posal of the relevant EU Framework Decision on Victims’ Rights : Report from the Com-

mission of the European Communities on the Basis of Article 18 of the Council Framework

Decision of 15 March 2001 on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings, Brussels,

3 March 2004, COM (2004) 54 final.

() Extensive references in GROENHUISEN 2005.

(3) An example is the police organisation. It has been demonstrated in several countries

that reform on behalf of crime victims will be sabotaged if either the leadership of the police

force or the officers who actually have face to face contact with victims, do not have solid

convictions that change is worthwile.

In many countries lots of progress has been made in setting up mandatory training

programs for the police and for prosecutors. It has been much harder to persuade the judi-

ciary to accept mandatory training modules.

( Obviously, these resources should be ‘earmarked budgets’ in order to avoid funding

of old responsibilities with additional money.

— 123 —

— senior officials in relevant ministries should be charged with specific

responsibility to shape and execute victims oriented policies (Phare

project 2002) .

3.2. — Could a UN Convention

make a real difference?

This set of conditions appears to represent state of the art knowledge

of how to effect change on behalf of crime victims. À completely new

question that only came up during recent years is: maybe the idea of

introducing a UN Convention on victims’ rights could also contribute

to a better implementation of the basic principles of justice as expressed

by the Declaration.

Why would 1t be realistic to expect that the adoption of a Conven-

tion might have such effect? In academic discourse, several arguments

of a criminological nature have been presented favouring such a move

or warning against 1t.

The most prominent arguments promoting a Convention can be sum-

marised as follows (Garkawe, 2005) :

—

(12)

it would increase the visibility of victims’ issues

‘hard law’ will put more pressure on governments than the Declara-

tion (‘soft law’)‘

13)

Courts will take a Convention more seriously than the Declara-

tion ‘

14)

a Convention provides a framework for analyses of domestic law ‘!*)

the ratification process would urge non-complying States to motivate

publicly why they do not support victims’ rights to the extent cov-

ered by the Convention ‘

16)

(D An example of best practice in this respect is the OVC (Office for Victims of Crime)

in the US Justice Department.

(12

) Without any doubt this 1s a valid argument. If one only takes into account the effort

it would take to negotiate the preferred wording of a Convention, it is obvious that this

would attract a lot of attention.

(3 It might be argued that this is a doctrinal assumption rather than a claim which has

been empirically tested. European experience with hard law instruments (like the EU Frame-

work Decision of 2001 and the Council of Europe Convention on State Compensation (1983)

does not directly support this assumption.

(14) Again : an interesting prediction, but essentially speculative.

(S Undoubtedly true : a new benchmark.

(6) This can hardly be disputed. On the other hand, it appears to be an argument with

little weight. since governments can easily provide a statement which sounds reassuring.

124

— now that the UN has adopted a series of Conventions in the area of

criminal law(1), the status of a mere Declaration has been dimin-

ished. (!8)

Conversely, two main arguments can be invoked to urge caution in

advocating a UN Convention in this area (Van Genugten cum suis,

2006) :

-— The process of negotiating, drafting and adopting a Convention will

take a long time. It 1s likely that the various stages will last a sub-

stantial number of years. During this period of time nothing else will

happen at the UN level in order to improve observance of victims’

rights standards. This leads to a substantial risk of effectively organ-

Ising a standstill.

À Convention is only possible 1f a large number of countries — in the

most diverse regions of the world — agree on substance. It is likely

that the need for consensus will lead to watered down provisions.

UN experience in other policy areas offers ample examples of this.

3.3. — The content of the first drafts

of a possible Convention

It is very hard to assess the validity and the relative weight of these

arguments without having any kind of idea of what a UN Convention

on victims’ rights might look like. For this reason, experts from the

World Society of Victimology and from INTERVICT (Tilburg Univer-

sity, The Netherlands) met in December 2005 and produced a first

cogent draft of what might become a “UN Convention on Justice and

Support for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power

» (19)

Compared to the 1985 Declaration, the draft Convention can be con-

sidered to reflect state of the art in victimological knowledge. “ This

will be demonstrated by listing and explaining seven of the most striking

differences in content between the two documents.

( Some examples are :

UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000:

Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women

and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organ-

ized Crime. GA resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000.

(S In my view, this is a particularly interesting argument. It shows that a supranational

legal order has an intrinsic dynamic of its own.

9 The draft was put on the internet (http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/intervict/undecla-

ration: http://www.worldsocietyofvictimology.org/index.html); comments by interested par-

ties were sollicited:; the draft was amended several times and translated into various lan-

guages. Naturally, all of this serves as a starting point for debate rather than as a starting

point for real negotiations at the UN level.

C0 It has to be noted that many of the innovations in the draft Convention were inspired

by the Recommendation (2006)8 on Assistance to Crime Victims, adopted by the Council of

Europe on 14 June 2006.

125 —

a) Since 1985, awareness has increased that victims do not constitute a

homogeneous category of people sharing the exact same interests

and needs.‘?!) This is not just stating the obvious. It has become

abundantly clear that some may be affected more seriously or in a

different way because of personal circumstances (including character

traits) or because of the specific kind of crime involved. In the Dec-

laration, this 1s only acknowledged in a very limited way. In #17,

under the heading of ‘assistance’, it is stipulated that ‘attention

should be given to those who have special needs’. Article 3, section

3 of the draft Convention is more explicit on this. It requires all pro-

visions to be applied without discrimination of any kind, and then

goes on : “This will be without prejudice to providing special justice

and support best suited to victims who are particularly vulnerable

because of age, gender, disability or other characteristics”. It must be

noted here that many jurisdictions have specialised centres for victim

support and/or have introduced specific legislative measures for dif-

ferent categories of crime victims.

b)

The Declaration is completely silent on the topic of crime prevention.

The draft Convention, on the other hand, in article 4 provides for a

commitment on the part of States Parties to reduce victimization. To

this end, it lists no less than seven distinct strategies and policies.

Perhaps even more importantly, the draft Convention calls for pro-

tection from repeat victimization (article B, section 6, sub e) ”. Back

in 1985, the concept of ‘repeat victimization’ was virtually unknown.

Since then, empirical research has made it clear that recidivism not

only applies to offenders, but 1s also rampant on the side of victims

(G. Farrell, 1995; H.J. Schneider 2001). The numbers are spectacular

(a small number of victims suffer from a large part of crime) * and

cover a wide range of types of crime (property crime * , violent

crime 2°), sexual crime).

)

Another novelty is article 5 of the draft Convention, on ‘access to

justice and fair treatment’. In section 2 it is provided that States shall

ensure that the judicial, administrative and informal processes are

responsive to the needs of victims. This should be facilitated by, inter

(?D Various typologies of victims have been described by Fattah, 1991.

(2°) The relevant provision reads : “protection from repeat victimization should be pro-

vided through the development of safety and security plans. This may include information

on police surveillance, relocation, emergency communication and the like. It may also involve

assistance with obtaining protection orders through the judicial system.”

(23) Farrel, 1992, reports that 14% of adults experience about 70% of all self reported

cases of victimization.

(24) The event of a household burglary increases the probabillity of another burglary in

the same place by a factor of four (Osborn cum suis, 1996).

C5)17% of victims suffer from 45% of violent crime (Mayhew cum suis, 1993).

— 126 —

alia, “providing to victims, where appropriate, the right of appeal

against decisions of the prosecutorial authority not to prosecute in

cases where they were victimized”. In many jurisdictions the tradi-

tional remedy against prosecutorial inactivity is the instrument of

private prosecution. However, empirical findings suggest that this

remedy is ineffective at best and quite often even counterproductive

and a source of secondary victimization (Brienen & Hoegen, 2000).

Hence, the solution of judicial review appears to be a major

improvement.

d)

The Declaration was fairly advanced on the topic of ‘restitution’.

Offenders or third parties responsible for their behaviour should

make fair restitution to victims, their families or dependants. On top

of that, governments were encouraged to consider restitution as an

available sentencing option in criminal cases, in addition to other

criminal sanctions (#8 and #9 respectively). The draft Convention

takes this issue yet another giant step further by obliging the State

to “ensuring the enforcement of any order or decree granting awards

to victims” (article 5, section 2, sub ]; even more robustly stated in

article 10, section 1, sub d: “When there is a court order for resti-

tution, the State Party shall be responsible for enforcing the order”).

This innovation is based on empirical findings (van Dijk & Groen-

huijsen, 1993). Research has documented that 1f the execution of a

court order 1s left to the victim, only a minority (usually approxi-

mately 25%) of the benificiaries will ever receive the money awarded

to them (de Liège, 1988). Conversely, when the government 1s

responsible for enforcing the order, a large majority (at least 75-

80%) of the victims will actually get what they are entitled to

(Moxon cum suis, 1992). 26

e)

The huge gap between 1985 and 2008 is also clearly visible in the

provisions on the right to receive information. The Declaration

merely holds that victims should be informed of their rights and of

their role and the scope, timing and progress of the proceedings and

of the disposition of their cases. The draft Convention is more elab-

orate on this. Article 7 details the specifics of a long list of items a

victim shall be given information on, ‘from their first contact with

law enforcement or other agencies’.‘?’) It is worth mentioning that,

C6 That would still leave a substantial number of victims with enipty hands. In order to

remedy this situation, the final step was taken by the Dutch parliament in 2007 by adopting

a Statute which obliges the State to pay an awarded compensation order up front to the vic-

tim and then recover the money from the offender.

C In order to demonstrate the sophistication of the informational rights, it is necessary

to quote art. 7 in its full length: “*1. States Parties shall ensure that victims have a right to

information, and must be informed of this, from their first contact with law enforcement or

other agencies. States Parties shall ensure that victims receive general information in the most

— 127 —

at least in cases where there might be danger to the victims, they

shall be notified when the person prosecuted or sentenced for an

offence 1s released. Another important novelty is the introduction of

an opt-out-procedure : victims shall have the right not to receive

information (unless communication thereof is compulsory under the

terms of the relevant criminal proceedings).

Possibly the most farreaching difference between the two documents

under discussion concerns implementation and monitoring. The Dec-

laration itself is — understandably — completely silent on this. On the

other end of the spectrum, the draft Convention contains numerous

and extensive provisions to ensure that States shall monitor the effi-

ciency and effectiveness of policies and measures designed for the

implementation of the Convention (articles 12-16). For the purpose

of examining the progress made in the various jurisdictions 1t envis-

ages the establishment of a ‘Committee on Justice and Support for

Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power’. States Parties shall submit

progress reports to this committee and the committee in its turn shall

report to the General Assembly. This comprehensive mechanism for

supervision is replicated from other UN Conventions already in

force.

expeditious and efficient method appropriate to the culture such as through oral or written

communication with concern for literacy and literary traditions. Specific information should

be given person to person. Such information should facilitate an informed understanding for

victims and shall be at least as follows :

a) the type of services or organizations to which they can turn for support:

b) the type of support which they can obtain, including the availability of health and

social services and other relevant assistance ;

c)

where and how they report an offence;

d)

procedures following such a report and their role in connection with such procedures;

e)

their role and the scope, timing and progress of the proceedings and of the disposition

of their cases, especially where serious crimes are involved and where they have

requested such information;

f)

how and under what cireumstances they can obtain protection:

g)

to what extent and on what terms they have access to legal advice or legal aid;

h)

requirements for them to be be entitled to compensation:

1)

if they are resident in another State, any special arrangements available to them in

order to protect their interests:

))

where and how victims could obtain more information.

2. States Parties shall ensure that victims who have expressed a wish to this effect are

kept informed of :

«

the outcome of their complaint:

b

relevant factors enabling them. in the event of prosecution, to know the conduct of

the proceedings regarding the person prosecuted for offences concerning them, except

in exceptional cases where the proper handling of the case may be adversely affected :

C

the court’s sentence.

3

States Parties shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the victim is notified,

at least in cases where there might be danger to the victims, when the person prosecuted or

sentenced for an offence is released.

4. In so far as States Parties take forward on their own initiative the information referred

to in paragraphs 2 and 3, they shall ensure that victims have the right not to receive it, unless

communication thereof is compulsory under the terms of the relevant criminal proceedings. ”

— 128 —

3.4. — The draft Convention

and restorative justice

Finally, there is the issue of mediation and restorative justice. The

draft Convention offers an interesting novel approach in this area.

The 1985 UN Declaration was brief and outspoken in its support of

non punitive responses to crime. #7 simply reads : “Informal mecha-

nisms for the resolution of disputes, including mediation, arbitration

and customary justice or indigenous practices, should be utilized where

appropriate to facilitate conciliation and redress for victims”

Here again, the draft Convention is more sophisticated and elabo-

rate. It is useful to quote the relevant article 9 in full :

“1. States Parties shall endeavor, where appropriate, to establish or

enhance systems of restorative justice, that seek to represent victims”

interests as a priority. States shall emphasize the need for acceptance by

the offender of his or her responsibility for the offence and the acknowl-

edgement of the adverse consequences of the offence for the victim.

2. States Parties shall ensure that victims shall have the opportunity

to choose or not to choose restorative justice forums under domestic

laws, and if they do decide to choose such forums, these mechanisms

must accord with victims’ dignity, compassion and similar rights and

services to those described in this Convention.”

What is particularly striking in this article, is that it is no longer

taken for granted that restorative practices are by definition serving the

best interests of crime victims. Rather, these provisions reflect the view

previously articulated by the European Forum for Victim Services. ‘

28)

The core essence of this view is the conviction that mediation and other

forms of restorative justice are very powerful interventions. Powerful

interventions, with the potential to deliver great benefits to all parties

concerned, but they also have the potential to do harm. It is remarkable

that the pre-existing international protocols for restorative justice do not

take the latter factor adequately into account. These instruments fail to

recognise that no programme should be described as restorative 1f 1t

does not, as a priority, seek to restore the victim.

Mediation in criminal cases 1s different from similar processes in

other areas of life (like labour law, family law). The position of victim

and offender in restorative justice practices is less symmetrical than in

(28) EFVS, Statement on the Position of the Victim within the Process of Mediation, Lon-

don 2005: similarly : article 13 of the Council of Europe Recommendation (2006)8 on Assist-

ance to Crime Victims.

— 129 —

other domains.This vital element is seriously underestimated in the cur-

rent international standards governing restorative practices. ‘*?)

So the real challenge in this area is how the potential benefits of

mediation can be maximised while minimizing the potential risks. This

can be elucidated with three examples (Groenhuijsen, 2004).

One of the mantra’»s of mediation is that victim and offender shall

participate on a voluntary basis. The obtaining international standards

refer to the “free and voluntary consent of the victim and the

offender”.*°) The question needs to be raised, however, how the concept

of free consent is to be defined. In actual practice, there is a tendency

to narrow this concept to just offering the opportunity to refuse to take

part in a mediation process. According to the available evidence, how-

ever, this view would jeopardise some vital interests of the victim. What

is needed is “a full policy of free consent”.3!" A policy like that consists

of numerous and various component parts. One is that the offer of

mediation should be made by a person who has been fully trained to

recognise the variable impact of the offer on each crime victim. Next, it

requires that the victim be given sufficient time to consider the offer and

to have access to independent advice. Furthermore, consent can not be

considered to be free of pressure if the alternative consequences for the

offender are substantially graver 1f the victim feels unable to take part

in the mediation. 62 This means that if participation in mediation would

have benefits for the offender — for example a reduced sentence — then

those benefits should, as far as possible, also be applicable 1f the medi-

ation does not go ahead due to a refusal by the victim

The second example concerns a rather controversial topic. It is about

accepting limits (i.e. creating exeptions) of the confidential nature of a

mediation session. The relevant Council of Europe Recommendation

states as a general principle : “Discussions in mediation are confidential

and may not be used subsequently, except with the agreement of the

parties.” As a consequence, it is generally assumed that :

(29) Council of Europe Recommendation (1999)19 concerning Mediation in Penal Mat-

ters, adopted on 15 September 1999; UN ECOSOC Resolution 2002/12 Basic Principles on

the Use of Restorative Justice Programmes in Criminal Matters.

(30) Article 7 of ECOSOC res. 2002/12. 24 July 2002. Likewise, article ! of the Council

of Europe Recommendation R(99)19 concerning Mediation in Penal Matters (15 September

1999) reads : “Mediation in penal matters should only take place if the parties freely con-

sent”.

GN The concept is borrowed from the EFVS-statement referred to before.

G2 The EFVS-statement explains : “Where the diversion of the offender from the crimi-

nal justice process 1s being considered, an alternative diversionary remedy should be available

for example, community service. Where a case has been referred for mediation by a court,

there should be an understanding that any sentence discount which would be available fol-

lowing a succesful mediation will also be available 1f the offender had been motivated but

the offer was declined.”

— 130 —

a. participation in mediation should not be used as evidence of

admission of guilt in subsequent legal proceedings °* (this looks fair

enough to me);

and b. that confessions of guilt by the offender during the mediation

session cannot be used as evidence in a subsequent trial before a crim-

inal court. Here I see a major problem. This implication can violate

legitimate interests of the victim. In order to justify an exception to the

principle of confidentiality in this respect, l would like to appeal to one

of the essential features of the mediation procedure. All definitions of

mediation emphasise the fact that this is a process in which the victim

is given an opportunity to express his feelings and wishes, and the

offender is offered the chance to accept responsibility and act accord-

ingly. The key point here 1s communication between two parties, with the

help of an independent third party. It is important that this communi-

cation is not symmetrical in every respect. It must be clear to all those

involved that the basic principle 1s that the offender is at fault and 1s

willing to admit it honestly and accept responsibility on that basis. That

is why everyone refers to mediation as a form of ‘“restorative justice”.

That is why this process 1s labelled as victim-offender-mediation : it has

nothing to do with victim-suspect-mediation or victim-accused-media-

tion. If there is nothing to restore, for example when there is no agree-

ment on the question of whether the offender has done anything wrong,

then right from the outset there is no basis for a successful mediation

session. The principle is therefore that the offender has violated the

rights of the victim, 1s willing to admit this, and 1s also prepared to

make reasonable restitution for it (in a way to be determined through

consultation). If this 1s the purpose of the mediation procedure, then 1t

is not logical, if it does fail, to consider the offender's confession or

other statements inadmissable as evidence in subsequent criminal pro-

ceedings. From a legal point of view, in many jurisdictions the victim

can never be prevented from bringing this fact to the attention of the

court as a de auditu declaration. The Public Prosecutor might summon

the victim — or even the mediator “* — to give evidence in court and

might request a report of what occurred during mediation. In most

countries there is, after all, no statutory provision fundamentally pro-

tecting the confidentiality of such a procedure. In short, in my view the

offender's willingness to take part in a mediation procedure presupposes

a certain conciliatory attitude towards the victim. If the offender 1s not

prepared to do this, he should not take part. If he aucepts this role vol-

untarily, he cannot do so without any obligation. If mediation subse-

G9 This is explicitly provided in article 14 of R(99)19 of the Council of Europe and in

article 8 of ECOSOC res. 2002/12.

(4) Under current legislation, mediators have no right to refuse to give evidence.

— 131 —

quently fails he cannot simply fall back on his position in the proceed-

ings as a suspect who denies the offence and who has nothing to do with

the expressions of regret that he has made during mediation. What 1s

important here is that the victim must not be made a laughing stock or

made to suffer as a result of his willingness to enter into a conversation

with the offender.

The third and final example builds on the same principle to maximize

potential benefits and to minimize potential risks of mediation. When

mediation is about accepting responsibility and acting accordingly, the

outcome of a process like that will frequently include an apology. 6°

Research has confirmed that an apology is a good way to achieve for-

giveness. ° However, insincere apologies by the offender have the

opposite effect. Victims react with more rather than less indignation to

this kind of apology. Receiving an insincere apology therefore, is not a

neutral but a negative experience for victims, and could be said to

amount to secondary victimization (Opdebeeck cum suis, 2002). Against

this empirical background the logical inference would be the proposal to

shape mediation sessions in such a way as to avoid the occurrence of

insincere apologies as much as possible, and — equally important — to

avoid even the semblance of an insincere apology. However, a proposal

like that would be somewhat meaningless, since there is a knowledge

gap in this area. We just do not yet have adequate research findings on

how to avoid insincere apologies and about the relevant factors impact-

ing on victims’ perceptions of the sincerity of apologies. This gap needs

to be filled urgently.

4. — THE NEXT STEPS.

IS IT LIKELY THAT THE UN WILL SOON ADOPT

A CONVENTION ON VICTIMS’ RIGHTS?

Is it likely that the UN will soon adopt a Convention on victims’

rights? My answer to this question 1s : I just do not know. There are two

recurrent events where the United Nations deliberates policy in the area

of administering criminal justice. One 1s the annual meeting of the UN

Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, in Vienna. The

other is the UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice,

held every 5'” year in a different host country. The next (the twelfth)

Congress will be in 2010 in Brazil.

G5) STRANG, 2002, reports 72% of participating offenders in the RISE-experiments apol-

ogizing for what they had done.

G6) EXLINE & BAUMEISTER, 2000: an overview (with more references) is provided by Pem-

berton & Winkel & Groenhuijsen, 2007.

— 132 —

At the 15" Session of the Commission in 2006 (i.e. after a first draft

of a Convention had been written and circulated) it was decided to

request the Secretary-General to convene an intergovernmental expert

group meeting, charged with a twofold mandate :

a. designing an information gathering instrument;

and b. analysing ways and means to promote the use and application

of UN standards and norms related primarily to victim issues.

The IEGM took place, which led to a report in which a question-

naire (‘an information gathering instrument’) was presented. The second

part of the report (‘ways and means to promote.…’) includes a reference

to the draft Convention on justice and support for victims of crime and

abuse of power. So this was very encouraging for those favouring a

Convention.

During the 16'" Session of the Commission in 2007 attention was

largely focused on finalising the questionnaire. Other means and ways

to improve implementation of existing UN standards were hardly con-

sidered. Any reference to a potential convention in this area was omitted

in the official records.

The 17" Session of the Commission took place in April 2008. One

item of discussion concerned preparations for the Twelfth Congress. À

decision was made on the overall theme of the Congress $”), its agenda

items and the workshop topics. Neither of these includes a direct refer-

ence to victims rights. All of this looks very discouraging to those 1n

favour of having a Convention. At a plenary session of the meeting the

president of the World Society of Victimology argued at length for a

UN Convention on victims’ rights. Informal consultations revealed that

several country delegations contemplate taking up this lead and might

start a campaign to do further work in this direction.

It is too early to predict whether a Convention — or a Framework

Convention, as suggested by some scholars (van Genugten cum suis,

2006) — will eventually be negotiated. Regardless of the outcome of this

process, the mere existence of a draft UN Convention has opened the

way for new debates on the best possible range of victims’ rights on a

global level. That in itself can be regarded as a sign of progress.

REFERENCES

M.F.1. BRIENEN & E.H. HOEGEN, Victims of Crime in 22 European Criminal Jus-

tice Systems, Nijmegen : Wolf Legal Productions 2000.

GI “Comprehensive strategies for global challenges : crime prevention and criminal jus-

tice systems and their development in a changing world”.

— 133 —

J.J.M.

VAN

en

Dik & M.S. GROENHUIJSEN,

‘Schadevergoedingsmaatregel

voeging : de civielrechtelijke invalshoek’, Nederlands Juristenblad 1993, p. 163-

167.

Jan J. M. VAN Duxk, ‘Benchmarking Legislation on Crime Victims : the UN Vic-

tims Declaration of 1985’, in : VETERE & DavID 2005, p. 202-208.

J.J. EXLINE & R.F. BAUMEISTER, ‘Expressing forgiveness and repentance : benefits

and barriers’, in: M.E. McCuULLOUGH & C.E. THORESEN (eds.), Forgiveness

theory : research and practice, London : Guildford Press 2000.

Graham FARRELL, ‘Multiple Victimisation, its Extent and Significance', Interna-

tional Review of Victimology 1992, 2, p. 85-102.

Graham FARRELL, ‘Preventing Repeat Victimization’, in: Michael TONRY &

David FARRINGTON (eds.), Building a Safer Society, Crime and Justice, Vol-

ume 19, Chicago 1995, p. 469-534.

Ezzat À. FATTAH, Understanding Criminal Victimization. An Introduction to The-

oretical Victimology, Scarborough, Ontario : Prentice-Hall Canada 1991.

Sam GARKAWE, “The Need for a Victims’ Convention’, The Victimologist 2005,

p. 4-5.

Willem VAN GENUGTEN, Rob VAN GESTEL, Marc GROENHUIJSEN, Rianne LET-

SCHERT, ‘Loopholes, Risks and Ambivalences in International Lawmaking:;

the Case of a Framework Convention on Victims’ Rights’, Netherlands Year-

book of International Law, Volume XXXVII, 2006, p. 109-154.

Marc GROENHUIJSEN, ‘Victims’ Rights in the Criminal Justice System : À Call for

more Comprehensive Implementation Theory', in: Jan J.M. VAN DuIK, Ron

G.H. VAN KAAM, Jo-Anne WEMMERS (eds.), Caring for Crime Victims :

Selected Proceedings of the Ninth International Symposium on Victimology,

New York 1999, p. 85-114.

M.S. GROENHUIJSEN, ‘Nieuw beleidsdocument van het “European Forum for Vic-

tim Services” omtrent de positie van het slachtoffer in de context van medi-

ation in strafzaken, Tijdschrift voor Herstelrecht 2004, no. 4, p. 39-47.

Marc GROENHUIJSEN, ‘International Protocols on Victims’ Rights and some

Reflections on Significant Recent Developments in Victimology', in : R. SNY-

MAN & L. Davis (eds.), Victimology in South Africa, Pretoria : van Schaik

Publishers 2005, p. 333-351.

Marie-Pierre DE LIÈGE, Concrete achievements toward the implementation of the

fundamental principles of justice for victims in France, Paris : Ministry of Jus-

tice 1988.

Pat MAYHEW, Natalie AYE MAUNG, Catriona MIRLEES-BLACK, The 1992 British

Crime Survey, London 1993.

D

Moxon, J.M. CORKERY, C. HEDDERMAN, Developments in the use of compen-

sation orders in magistrates’ courts since October 1988, Home Office Research

Study 126, London : HSMO 1992.

OPDEBEECK, G. VERVAEKE, F.W. WINKEL, ‘Bemiddeling in het strafrecht’, in

P.J. van Koppen a.o. (eds.), Het recht van binnen : psychologie van het recht,

Deventer : Kluwer 2002.

Denise OsBORN, Dan ELLINGWORTH, Tim HopE, Alan TRICKETT, ‘Are Repeatedly

Victimized Households Different?, Journal of Quantitative Criminology 1996,

12, p. 223-245.

A. PEMBERTON, F.W. WINKEL, M.S. GROENHUIJSEN, ‘Evaluating Victims Exper1-

ences in Restorative Justice, Contemporary Justice Review 2007.

— 134 —

Phare project, Reinforcement of the Rule of Law. Final report on the first part

of the project, Nijmegen : Wolf Legal Productions 2002.

Hans Joachim SCHNEIDER, ‘Victimological Developments in the World during the

last Three Decades: À Study of Comparative Victimology', in: Arlène

GOUDREAULT & Irvin WALLER (eds.), Beyond Boundaries. Selected Symposium

Proceedings, Montreal 2001. p. 19-68.

H. STRANG, Repair or revenge : Victims and restorative justice, Oxford : Oxford

University Press 2002.

Eduardo VETERE & Pedro DaviD (eds.), Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power :

Festschrift in honour of Irene Mellup, Bangkok 2005.

SUMMARY

At the time of the previous World Congress of the International

Society for Criminology, in 2003 in Rio de Janeiro, the idea of propos-

ing a United Nations Convention on Victims’ Rights had not yet been

seriously proposed or considered. Today, only five years onward, many

things have changed. The pro's and con’s of such a move have been

debated in academic discourse, several drafts of a possible Convention

have been written and translated into various languages, and a cam-

paign has been started to persuade the member States of the UN to

work in the direction of adopting a document like that. This paper aims

to explain the background of these recent developments and to connect

them with another major trend in the way many societies deal with the

phenomenon of crime : the rise of restorative justice practices.

RESUMÉ

À l’époque du précédent congrès mondial de la Société internationale

de criminologie, à 2003 à Rio de Janeiro, l’idée de proposer une con-

vention des Nations Unies sur les droits des victimes n'avait pas encore

été sérieusement avancée ou prise en considération.Aujourd'hui, à peine

cinq ans plus tard, beaucoup de choses ont changé. Les avantages et les

inconvénients d’un tel dispositif ont fait l’objet de débats dans le dis-

cours académique, plusieurs avant-projets de convention ont été élabo-

rés et traduits dans de multiples langues, et une campagne a été lancée

pour persuader les Etats membres des Nations Unies d'oeuvrer dans la

direction de l'adoption d’un tel document. L'auteur se propose dans le

présent article, d'expliquer l’arrière-plan de ces développements récents

et de les mettre en rapport avec un autre trait majeur de la manière dont

nombre de sociétés traitent le phénomène criminel : la progression des

pratiques de justice restaurative.

— 135 —

RESUMEN

En el momento del precedente congreso mundial de la Sociedad

Internacional de Criminologia de 2003 en Rio de Janeiro, la idea de pro-

poner una Convenciôn de Naciones Unidas sobre los derechos de las

victimas todavia no se habia considerado seriamente. Hoy, apenas cinco

años mâs tarde, muchas cosas han cambiado. Las ventajas e inconve-

nientes de tal dispositivo han sido objeto de debates en el discurso aca-

démico, se han elaborado varios ante-proyectos de Convenciôn, tradu-

cidos a mültiples lenguas, y se ha lanzado una campaña para persuadir

a los Estados miembros de Naciones Unidas de actuar con el objetivo

de adoptar tal documento. En el presente articulo, el autor se propone

explicar el trasfondo de estos recientes desarrollos y ponerlos en relaciôn

con la justicia restaurativa, otra caracteristica importante de la manera

en la que un gran nûmero de sociedades tratan el fenômeno criminal.

— 136 —

THE FUTURE OF CRIMINOLOGY

AS A SOCIAL SCIENCE

AND ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE :

Reflections on Criminology’s Unholy Alliance

with Criminal Policy & on Current Misguided

Attempts to Divorce Victimology from Criminology

Ezzat A. Fattah ()

PROLOGUE

It is truly a great pleasure to be asked to contribute to the 15* Inter-

national Congress of Criminology which is being held for the first time

in the beautiful and culturally-rich Catalonian city of Barcelona. And it

Is a great honor, but also a heavy responsibility, to be scheduled as the

last plenary speaker. After three intensive days of lectures, workshops,

discussions and exchanges, does anything remain to be added? Could

anything be said at this stage that would not be anticlimactic?

Well, it was the brilliant idea of our President, Professor Tony Peters,

to end the plenary sessions of the Congress, devoted as it 1s to the theme

of “Research and Action”, with a futuristic look at criminology. He

wanted me to examine what could lie ahead for criminology as a social

science and as an academic discipline. So here I am, without a crystal

ball of any kind, trying to gaze into the future in an attempt to figure

out where criminology is heading and to speculate on what the future

holds for t.

Those of you who are expecting a synthesis report, in the great Euro-

pean tradition, will undoubtedly be disappointed because this is not the

task that was assigned to me, What I was asked to do 1s to use the expe-

rience of half a century, studying and teaching criminology, to reflect on

what 1s likely to happen to it in the next decade or two.

Is criminology heading to oblivion? Is it destined to become 1rrele-

vant in the security-obsessed society of the 21* century? Could anything

be done to prevent its stagnation and eventual decline? Or will crimi-

nology be able to develop, flourish and take its rightful place along side

(> Ph.D.. D.h.c. (Liege). F.R.S.C. Professor Emeritus. School of Criminology. Simon

Fraser University. Vancouver, Canada.

— 137 —

other firmly established social sciences? What sound and useful advice

could be made at this conjuncture in its evolution?

Since what I am presenting to you are simply personal views and

thoughtful reflections, I do not expect you to accept my predictions for

the future or to agree with my suggestions for change. However, 1f Î suc-

ceed in offering you some food for thought and in forcing you to think

about and to debate the issues that I will be raising, then I will consider

my mission fulfilled and my goal achieved.

Those of you who know me well will probably agree that I have

proven over the years to be a free and independent thinker who 1s not

overwhelmed by the force of tradition, who 1s not swayed by ideological

or political swings and 1s not influenced by fads or fashions. In fact, I

often swam against the sweeping tide. As a result I have earned, rightly

or wrongly, a reputation of being “l’enfant terrible” of criminology and

victimology meetings, of being the speaker who says what participants

do not want or do not like to hear. I therefore applaud the courage and

the integrity of the organizing committee that decided to invite me to be

one of the plenary speakers and to heartily thank them for the invita-

tion.

So what 1s it that qualifies me to be a plenary speaker at this distin-

guished congress? Well, it is more than half a century of experience in

criminal justice and criminology, and to be more precise, a career that

included 12 years of practical experience as a prosecutor, chief prosecu-

tor and “juge d'instruction” in my country of birth (Egypt) plus 47 years

of study, research and teaching criminology in Europe and Canada.

Those of you who have known me personally and those who have

followed my career path would know that I always had a vision for

criminology and have ferociously defended it against its detractors and

they were never in short supply. They would also know that I have

missed no opportunity to criticize criminology though it was always a

constructive and well-meant criticism. And what could be more telling

than the subtitle I chose for my treatise “Criminology, Past, Present and

Future - ÀA Critical Overview”( Fattah, 1997).

Those of you who have read the book or who are familiar with my

other criminological writings will notice major differences between what

I said then and what I will be saying today. This is because my thoughts

and my views have markedly evolved since the book was written more

than 10 years ago and particularly after the tragic events of 9/11 and the

disturbing developments that followed. Another development that

deeply influenced my thoughts and my views about criminology in

recent years was the unfortunate transformation of victimology, natu-

rally and logically a sub-field of criminology, from a fledging scientific

discipline into a political/ideological movement, into a partisan lobby

— 138 —

and an advocacy enterprise. So you should not be surprised, for exam-

ple, when I share with you my deep conviction that criminology curric-

ula, like the one I single-handedly designed and developed at Simon

Fraser University in Vancouver 34 years ago, are in dire need not only

of substantial changes but a total overhaul. And believe me; if I were

to do it all over again, it would be significantly different from what t

was then and what 1t is now.

Back in 1974 when I was invited to set up the criminology Depart-

ment at SFU, criminology was a newcomer to the university scene.

There were very few precedents to draw upon and very few models to

be inspired by or to be able to assess and to follow. I was asked to do

it because I offered a credible vision of what the study of criminology

is all about and of what a university criminology program should be

like. It was a new experiment and by all accounts a successful one. But

like society itself, social sciences are dynamic sciences. And as things

move on and as societies evolve, visions change. It 1s true that academia

is not particularly prone to change. But academics are good at learning

from experience. After more than three decades I have personally learnt

a lot from the SFU experiment and from others that have followed.

As Spain and many other European countries are in the process of

deciding how to go about the teaching of criminology, I thought it

might be beneficial to share with you my new vision for the future of

criminology in the hope that it may provide you with some 1ideas to

think about because the decisions you make now will shape the future

of criminology for many years to come. You are about to make vital

decisions about the subject-matter of criminology, the level at which 1t

is to be taught, about the most appropriate academic and administrative

setting where it should be housed, about its relationship and interactions

with other academic disciplines, and so forth.

À few of you may agree with what I have to say. Most, being used

to the status quo or having been trained in the present context, will

undoubtedly disagree. Be that as it may, I certainly hope that my talk

will not leave you indifferent and that it will force you to reexamine

your views and to rethink, and hopefully revise, your firmly held posi-

tions on the issues. Whether you agree or disagree, I hope you will judge

the ideas, the views and the suggestions I am presenting today, not on

how popular, or even how practical, they are but on how sound and

how logical they are.

I also hope to have an opportunity later on to explain those views

as well as their practical implications, in more detail and to answer

whatever questions you may have about them, to hear your comments

and feedback and to be able to defend my position. In other words,

what I am asking you is to hear the message without shooting the mes-

-— 139 —

senger. And the message is rather simple : criminology 1s a relatively

young science, and is not as firmly established as several other social or

natural sciences. Ît 1s still evolving. Past experience and recent history

have revealed some fundamental weaknesses and pointed the way to

some badly needed changes. Some soul-searching 1s in order. And what

better forum to sound the alarm and to offer suggestions for change

than the International Congress of Criminology?

Âs criminologists we would be wise to learn from and to follow the

example of what took place in other domains. Some years ago, environ-

mentalists sounded the alarm about pollution, ozone depletion, energy

consumption, climate change and so on. Âs a result drastic actions are

being taken both at the national and international levels. Yet when 1t

came to problems and threats related to our field, criminologists were

conspicuous by their silence! One has to wonder : where were the crim-

inologists, who maintained all along that criminal policy was an integral

part of criminology, when a wave of repression, human rights violations

and invasion of privacy swept the United States, the United Kingdom

and many other countries in the Western world in the aftermath of 9/

11?

My main argument, therefore, will be that if criminology is to survive

and thrive it will need to divorce itself from the criminal law and to

detach itself from criminal policy. Hopefully, I will be able to prove to

you that teaching criminology and law under the same roof and within

the same administrative structure 1s detrimental to its progress, scientific

development and future evolution. Hopefully I will manage to convince

you that such practice, as common as it is, defies logic and rationality.

Still I am sure most of you will not agree with this view dismissing 1t

outright as unconventional, radical or even revolutionary. This, how-

ever, is not an issue that will be settled easily or soon. Only time and

future developments will tell whether this view is right or wrong.

THE NEED FOR A REVISED DEFINITION

OF CRIMINOLOGY

What is criminology and what is its subject-matter? Those may

sound inappropriate or frivolous questions to ask close to the end of the

15'" International Congress of Criminology, but you can take my word

for it, they are vital and timeless questions for which we need a correct

answer. Unlike many other disciplines, criminology has proven to be

hard to define and there are many divergent views of what its subject-

matter is or ought to be. And yet a sound definition 1s absolutely indis-

pensable for reflecting on, and predicting its future as a social science

— 140 —

and as an academic discipline. Reflecting upon the definition of crimi-

nology Î was inspired by what our Secretary General, Monsieur Georges

Picca, wrote in the most recent issue of the “International Annals of

Criminology” (2007 : 7). Describing the role of the International Society

he wrote :

“La Société Internationale de Criminologie, Organisation non-governmen-

tale (ONG), a ainsi pour vocation, depuis reconnue, d'assurer le dévolop-

pement des sciences dans leur application au phénomène criminel, dans les

différentes sociétés humaines”

Criminology, therefore, is a science and the role of the International

Society is to ensure its scientific development. According to Korn &

McCorkle (1959 : V), the two essential functions of any science are the

gathering of empirical evidence and the logical ordering of this evidence

in relation to explanatory conceptions. May I then propose a simple,

concise, non-polemical, unambiguous, though unconventional, defini-

tion of criminology? According to this definition :

“Criminology is the search for, and the application of, multidisciplinary sci-

entific concepts, methods and theories to the study of the social phenomenon

of crime, its perpetrators and its victims.’

This definition affirms criminology's scientific character and its status

as an empirical, non-normative, non-speculative social/behavioral sci-

ence. Ît is meant, above all, to differentiate the science of criminology

from the discipline of criminal policy. To further confirm the distinction

between the two I propose the following definition of criminal policy :

“Criminal policy is the application in practice of religious and ideological

beliefs, criminological and other types of knowledge, to achieve desirable

goals in the areas of crime control and prevention, for managing offenders

and helping victims”

Âs this definition makes it clear, criminal policy is an applied disci-

pline with a much broader scope and much wider field of application

than criminology. Those include the processes of making, unmaking and

reforming the laws related to crime, as well as the processes of enforcing

and applying those laws, assessing social reaction to crime, and deciding

on the ways and means of controlling and preventing crime, and of

helping offenders and victims.

THE NEED TO CIRCUMSCRIBE

THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF CRIMINOLOGY

It 1s truly amazing how infrequently we stop to reexamine what has

been taken for granted for many years or decades to assess its accuracy

or its adequacy. If we do so we might realize that what has been

accepted as unchallengeable truth in the past is not at all as sound and

— 141 —

as unassailable today as it appeared some time ago. Let us, for example,

examine the relationship between criminology and some other disci-

plines or professions.

Despite fundamental differences that I will dwell upon later on, his-

torically, criminology has been tied up with the criminal law. And as a

result of misguided attempts to expand the subject-matter of criminol-

ogy and to extend its territory or its applications, various fields such as

criminal policy, criminal justice, law enforcement (or policing, as it 1s

now called), sociology of punishment which used to be called “penol-

ogy”, and even a legal function such as sentencing, were treated as part

or branches of criminology and were subsumed under what was mistak-

enly used as an “umbrella” term.

One may ask what logic or rationale renders sentencing a part of

criminology? What logic or rationale dictated that the parallel disci-

plines of penology and criminology be amalgamated? As early as the

19'® century a clear distinction was made between the science of crime

and social reaction to crime. The first was called criminology and the

latter was called penology. For example both John Gillin's book pub-

lished in 1926 as well as Korn and McCorkle’s book published in 1959

are entitled “Criminology and Penology” indicating that they were two

separate and distinct disciplines. So why 1s it that “sociology of punish-

ment”, the new name for penology, is now considered a branch or a

part of criminology?

Âre criminalistics, police science, forensic science branches or sub-

fields of criminology? If they are, why 1s it that they are not a standard

component of criminology curricula and are not taught in criminology

departments but in police colleges? If they are not, we may ask what

makes certain criminal justice practices part and parcel of criminology

while others are not.

THE NEFED TO SEPARATE

THE TEACHING OF CRIMINOLOGY

FROM THE TEACHING OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Education at all levels is changing to meet the growing need for spe-

cialization and to adjust to the complex realities of the 21* century.

When I suffered from an eye ailment some months ago I needed to see

and consult five different specialists. I saw an ophthalmologist who

diagnosed the problem, a technician who conducted the various tests

(field test, OCT test, etc.), a retina specialist who examined the retina,

an eye surgeon who did the operation, and an optometrist who fitted me

with new glasses!

— 142 —

The need for a change in criminology education is even more press-

ing than it is for several other disciplines. Why? Because criminology 1s

a relatively young discipline and a newcomer to the university scene.

There are no long established traditions about the teaching of criminol-

ogy in academia as an autonomous, independent discipline. The few

programs that currently exist are, for the most part, pioneering experi-

ments that need to be thoroughly analyzed and assessed to find out their

strengths and their weaknesses, their positives and their negatives, their

successes and their failures, their achievements and their shortcomings.

Such an analysis would shed light on what changes need to be made

and why. To examine the future of criminology as a social science and

as an academic discipline necessitates a differentiation between “sci-

ence”,

5 c6

art” and “profession” which are three distinct types of endeavor.

To use the three terms or designations interchangeably is confusing, mis-

leading and unwarranted because it blurs the fundamental differences

between them. It is true that artists and professionals do use scientific

knowledge and occasionally science methods, but this does not make

them scientists.

Detecting and investigating crime is an art, not science, even when

scientific knowledge or scientific methods are used in the process. Inter-

rogation of suspects, assessing the credibility of informers or witnesses,

etc. is an art, not a science, even when criminological and psychological

knowledge is used in the process. Practices such as sentencing, arbitra-

tion, mediation, etc. are generally considered arts not science.

While the difference between art and science may be rather obvious,

let me examine a little more closely the distinction between sciences and

professional disciplines. Criminology, I maintain, is a social/behavioral

science. Criminal justice, policing, corrections, probation and parole

supervision, after care, are not sciences, they are professions. The fact

that criminal justice practitioners may use criminological knowledge in

their daily activities neither makes them criminologists nor makes crim-

inal justice an integral part of criminology. Criminal justice profession-

als, whether lawyers, prosecutors, judges, police officers or correctional

officers, are not criminologists. They do not claim to be criminologists

and do not identify themselves as criminologists.

Criminal justice is concerned with the “HOW” questions. Criminol-

ogy ‘s main preoccupation is with the “WHY” questions. The relation-

ship of criminal justice to criminology is not dissimilar to that between

nursing and medicine. Though related in some ways, they are distinct.

Nursing, like social work, 1s a profession. Nurses and social workers are

not scientists. They are professionals.

The logical distinction and separation between criminology and crim-

inal justice is being followed in practice. There are societies of criminol-

— 143 —

ogy as there are bar associations, criminal justice associations, police

brotherhoods, correctional associations, etc. They have different mis-

sions and goals, different aspirations, different philosophies and so

forth. To ignore their distinctiveness and to try to amalgamate them

under the umbrella of criminology is to no one’s benefit. To recognize

their differences is not to deny that they can have, or may share, certain

common interests, or that they can, and should work together and coop-

erate to achieve common ends.

The same separation and differentiation is also happening at the

international level. The appropriateness of those distinctions and of the

need for separation is confirmed by the existence, for so many decades,

of four major international organizations : The International Society of

criminology; The International Association of Penal Law,; The Interna-

tional Society of Social Defense (which more appropriately could call

itself “The International Society of Criminal Policy”); and The Interna-

tional Penal and Penitentiary Foundation. Ît goes without saying that

despite their distinctiveness they do have common interests, they share

some common goals, and their concerns may overlap. They continue to

exist as four different and distinct entities and I have never heard any

call or witnessed any attempt for their amalgamation. The distinction

and separation between criminology and criminal justice does exist

within our own society. The International Society of Criminology has a

“scientific commission” but does not have a professional or criminal jus-

tice commission. The logic and the rationale for this separation should

serve as a guide when reflecting on the future of criminology as a social

science and as an academic discipline.

The distinction between criminology as a social/behavioral science

and criminal justice as a profession and the need to teach them in sep-

arate settings, with different curricula, has long been recognized and 1s

the dominant model in North America. There are university depart-

ments of criminology that have a theoretical and research focus and

there are schools (or programs) of criminal justice as well as police col-

leges that have applied, practical, vocational and technological orienta-

tions.

In Vancouver, to give just one example, we have the Justice Institute

which is a vocational institute completely separate from Simon Fraser

University's School of Criminology.

While having those criminology and criminal justice programs as dis-

tinct and separate units within different universities has many advan-

tages, combining them serves no useful purpose. Again this does not

mean that there are no areas of overlap (chevauchement). Criminologists

need a good understanding of the law, particularly criminal law, and of

the workings of the criminal justice system. Criminal Justice profession-

— 144 -

als need not only a good understanding of the law but also a good grasp

of basic knowledge in criminology and other social sciences.

But the logic of the separation is indisputable. Criminology is about

substance not techniques, about knowledge not skills. It is about what

is and the “why”, not about the “know how”. À professional program

(or vocational as Professor David Garland described it) is geared toward

teaching the skills required for performing various types of jobs, about

helping students learn how to develop those skills and to effectively and

efficiently perform specific functions.

An academic program helps students amass knowledge in their cho-

sen field and teaches them how to use this knowledge for critical and

innovative purposes. Îts focus is research, discussion, exploration and

the exchange of ideas. [ am sure you all agree that planning and design

are different functions from execution. It is the same difference between

the architect who plans and designs the building and the contractor who

constructs it.

THE NEED TO SEPARATE THE TEACHING OF CRIMINOLOGY

FROM THE TEACHING OF CRIMINAL LAW

Having explained what I believe is a most logical rationale for sepa-

rating the teaching of criminal justice from the teaching of criminology,

let me now turn to what I believe is even a more compelling rationale

for separating the teaching of criminology from the teaching of criminal

law

Let me stress at the outset, in no uncertain terms, that criminology

is neither an addendum nor an appendage to the criminal law. They are

two distinct and separate disciplines. Criminal law is normative, crimi-

nology is not. Criminology neither defines nor proscribes norms of con-

duct or rules of behavior. It does not pass value judgments on the

behaviors it studies. Criminology 1s empirical; criminal law 1s theoretical

and dogmatic. Criminology uses inductive reasoning. Criminal law uses

deductive reasoning. Criminal law is speculative, criminology 1s positiv-

ist. Criminal law studies legal texts and jurisprudence. Criminology stud-

1es behavior. Criminal law 1s preoccupied with qualification (is the act

a felony, a misdemeanor, etc.) and with application (which section, par-

agraph, or sub-paragraph applies to the act in question?). Criminal law

1s interested in interpretation, consulting the spirit of the law, trying to

guess the intent of the makers of the law or the mind set of the legislator

a century or two ago. Criminal law tries to split hairs : was the crime

an act of malevolence, an act of recklessness, callousness, negligence or

imprudence? Is it an act of criminal responsibility or civil liability?

— 145 —

Criminology 1s different. Criminology attempts to seek explanations.

It is not interested in legal fiction but in social reality. It studies actual

not ideal behavior and tries to understand and explain why people

behave the way they do.

I have always, therefore, been baffled by the contempt in which crim-

inology is held by many of the older criminal law professors and legal

scholars whom I encountered throughout my career!

Having given the matter a great deal of reflection, I think I do under-

stand now why the high priests of the criminal law want to keep crim-

inology in a state of subordination under the control and domination of

their own discipline. And I think I have an explanation for why they

fear the empirical science of criminology and other social, behavioral

and life sciences. To paraphrase Thomas Jefferson they ‘“dread the

advance of science as witches do the approach of light”. They are scared

that the discoveries of science will lead the metaphysical and theological

foundations on which criminal law is constructed to crumble (see Fat-

tah, 1992; 1993b). Yes, this is the reason why an empirical science of

criminology is much too menacing for criminal law.

Criminal law and criminal policy are based on arbitrary religious and

moral beliefs that have no scientific basis, on faulty assumptions about

the universality, the immutability or the absolute nature of certain moral

standards and rules. The fact is, there are no universal, transcendental

or immutable moral standards, rules or values. Morality is relative in

time and space and varies considerably from culture to culture, as I have

often and repeatedly argued (Fattah, 1993a; 1997). Such relativity

explains the continuous and ongoing processes of criminalization and

decriminalization. To illustrate the evolution of morality one can give a

couple of examples: Until recently, gay marriages were considered

immoral, now they are perfectly legal. Certain sexual practices between

consenting adults in private were deemed as highly immoral. Now they

are considered to be perfectly normal and are shielded from criminali-

Zzation.

The arbitrariness of the criminal law is quite evident in the distinc-

tions it makes between what 1s criminal and what 1s civil (Fattah, 1997),

between what is a felony and what 1s a misdemeanor; in criminalizing

certain drugs but not others. It is evident when one looks at the age set

to determine criminal responsibility, the age at which juveniles are

treated as adults, the age set for recognizing valid consent to heterosex-

ual and homosexual relations. And one can go on and on citing the

speed limits, the blood alcohol levels used to establish impaired driving,

etc., etc.

Rather than being constrained by the metaphysical notions, the base-

less theological beliefs and the arbitrary moral values that guide and

— 146 —

dominate criminal law, one of the critical missions of criminology 1s to

challenge and denounce the arbitrary, non-scientific, and even non-sen-

sical nature of such notions and distinctions as I did in my paper pre-

sented at the Colloquium celebrating the centenary of the Finnish Penal

Code (Fattah, 1992). In the paper I pointed out the irrationality of

many accepted truths in criminal law.

In contrast to the static and dogmatic criminal law, criminology 1s a

dynamic science undergoing constant evolution. Criminology advances

by discarding disproven and discredited theories, notions, and beliefs

and by taking stock of the new discoveries of modern science. Criminol-

ogy is the search for factual and scientifically acquired knowledge. To

do criminology is to seek truthful, objective, unbiased information

about crime, its perpetrators and its victims, information that 1s free

from prejudice and uninfluenced by preconceived ideas and preset posi-

tions. And while criminal law finds its inspiration in theology and moral

philosophy, criminology derives its knowledge from objective observa-

tion and scientific experimentation. Criminology is not an armchair sei-

ence and there is no place in criminology for philosophizing or specu-

lation. Criminal law may claim that it appeals to reason. Criminology

seeks and relies on scientific evidence.

Back in the 20" century, many prominent criminalists went on to

claim that criminology is a member of the family of criminal sciences!

One has to wonder what criminal sciences they were talking about! No

science worthy of the appellation could remain virtually unchanged for

hundreds of years. Criminal law remains frozen in the era of vengeance

and vindictiveness and continues to be both centered and fixated on

punishment. Its basic principles, concepts and notions such as free will,

moral guilt, malicious intent, malice aforethought, premeditation (let

alone the ridiculous notion of dolus eventualis or so-called indirect inten-

tion), to mention but a few, are antiquated, outdated and most of them

are in flagrant conflict with the findings of the behavioral and social sci-

ences. And it does not cease to amaze me that none of the scientific dis-

coveries of the 20" century was able to change or even to shake the the-

ological, philosophical and metaphysical foundations of an archaic

criminal law. Is it not surprising that we continue to have a criminal law

that is in disharmony with the current Zeitgeist and is centered on the

scientifically disproven metaphysical/philosophical notion of free will??

— 147 —

THE POPULAR YET FALLACIOUS ARGUMENT

AGAINST THE AUTONOMY OF CRIMINOLOGY

One of the most often made arguments challenging the autonomy

and independence of criminology 1s that its subject-matter is determined

and circumscribed by the criminal law. The faulty assumption underly-

ing this argument is easy to refute. It assumes that concepts such as

99 c6

“crime

>

criminal” and “victim” could only be defined according to the

criminal law. The argument ignores the indisputable fact that crime 1s a

social, not a legal phenomenon. It occurs in societies and communities

that have no formal or written criminal legislation. In my book

“Criminology : Past, Present and Future” (Fattah, 1997) I devoted a

whole chapter to the issue of defining crime. I quoted Hermanus Bianchi

(1956) who correctly maintained that the objective semantic function of

the term “crime” is, as much as the phenomenon itself, independent of

any legislative operation, that both the term and the phenomenon are

evidently pre-legislative, that they exist independently of, and in spite of,

any legislative use of the terms (see also Hermann Mannheim, 1965 :31).

To this I added that the origin of crime can be traced to the origin

of society, not to the origin of the criminal law. Criminal law originated

as a way of dealing with crime. Crime is not created by criminal laws;

it is simply recognized by them, and it can (and should) therefore, be

defined independently of those criminal laws. Rules making certain

behaviors punishable succeed not precede the existence of those behav-

lors. The criminal code designates certain acts as criminal because they

generate a specific social reaction. The criminal law simply recognizes

and formalizes such reaction. It would, therefore, be incorrect to claim

that those acts evoke this social reaction because they are made criminal

by the law. In Durkheim's words “We must not say that an action

shocks the common conscience because it 1s criminal, but rather that it

is criminal because it shocks the common conscience. We do not reprove

it because it is a crime, but it 1S a crime because we reprove it”

(1965 : 81).

THE OPTIMAL SETTING

FOR THE TEACHING OF CRIMINOLOGY

Affirming the scientific nature of criminology, its autonomous and

independent status, its non-speculative, non-normative, and non-ideo-

logical

character and acknowledging the fundamental

differences

between criminology and the criminal law will logically lead to the

determination of the optimal academic setting where it should be taught

and the most appropriate administrative structure it should be housed

— 148 —

in. Ît is to question and to challenge the anomalous situation that still

exists in most European, Asian and South American countries, where

criminology continues to be held in a state of dependency to the crimi-

nal law. Actually it does not cease to surprise me that the highest status

that criminology has achieved in those countries is that of a research

centre or institute that may or may not offer some courses in criminol-

ogy on the side. Despite its obvious nature as a social, empirical, non-

dogmatic and non-speculative science, criminology continues to be

taught in those countries, within the law faculties as an auxiliary branch

of criminal law, as a peripheral, non-essential and quite often elective

subject. There are a couple of notable exceptions, for example, Belgium

and the United Kingdom. However, in most other European countries,

freeing criminology from the shackles and the tentacles of the criminal

law has been an endless and unwinnable battle for those enlightened

academics who aspired to create autonomous departments or schools of

criminology. One of the things that attracted me personally to Simon

Fraser University when I was invited to set up the criminology program

was the fact that the university did not, and still does not, have a law

school.

But why be surprised? Not infrequently history and tradition tri-

umph over logic and rationality. And I fully understand that changing

the present practice poses a formidable challenge to all of us. But I

firmly believe that it is the key to the advancement and the radiance

(rayonnement) of criminology in the coming decades. We should keep

in mind that criminology is a synthesis science (science de synthèse).

This begs the question : how could a synthesis science advance, develop

and flourish in a unidisciplinary setting??

The fundamental differences outlined above between criminology and

the criminal law will help you understand why criminology education in

North America is quite different. It may partly explain why the subject

of criminology is conspicuous by its absence from the curriculum of the

vast majority of our law schools/faculties. As a matter of fact I know

of no criminology program in the USA that is attached to, or is housed

in, a law school/faculty. Prior to the creation of Schools of Criminology,

like the one that was at the University of Berkeley, California, criminol-

ogy, in line with its nature as an empirical social discipline, was a stand-

ard and popular subject in many sociology departments. While it is

more logical to have criminology taught in sociology departments than

in law schools, the absence of criminology, and for that matter other

social sciences, from the curricula of law schools in North America does

have alarming consequences. Excluding the social and behavioral sci-

ences and restricting the curriculum to legal training mean that future

lawyers, prosecutors and judges are seriously handicapped when per-

149 —

forming their everyday duties. It means that legislators and policy-mak-

ers, most of whom are lawyers, have very little knowledge of criminol-

ogy and the other social and behavioral sciences. The fact that the vast

majority of law schools in the United States and Canada require appli-

cants to have an undergraduate degree, offers a partial remedy to this

unfortunate situation. It incites many of those who aspire to study law

to choose the social sciences as their undergraduate field.

THE NEED TO DIVORCE CRIMINOLOGY

FROM CRIMINAL POLICY

Past attempts to broaden the scope and the subject-matter of crimi-

nology and the misguided efforts to place criminal policy under its wing

have been detrimental to its scientific evolution. It has led to all kinds

of justified and unjustified criticisms and is largely responsible for the

stagnation and the fragmentation of criminology.

While the differences, highlighted above, between criminology and

the criminal law may be rather evident and well-known, the differences

between criminology and criminal policy need some explanation as they

are much less understood. Once those differences are exposed it becomes

clear that any alliance between the two is doomed because 1t is based

on faulty logic and defective reasoning. You may wonder : if criminal

policy 1s that different from, even incompatible with, criminology, how

did it end up being considered by many as a sub-discipline of

criminology?

Âs repeatedly mentioned, criminology is a non-normative, non-ideo-

logical scientific discipline. It is interested in facts not ideals. It studies

actual behavior and analyzes things as they are not as they ought to be.

Criminology is a secular science. In contrast, criminal policy has little to

do with science and everything to do with religion, politics and ideology.

Its ideological bias is evident in the adjectives used to describe it : liberal

criminal policy, conservative criminal policy; as well as in the value

judgments passed on its contents : mild criminal policy, harsh criminal

policy, permissive, progressive, regressive criminal policy, etc., etc.

Criminal policy, which uses the criminal law as its main tool, cannot

avoid being a normative field. It is judgmental and can never be neutral

or value-free. By its nature it is a partisan policy that takes sides. His-

torically and traditionally, criminal policy has protected the interests of

the rich against the poor, the haves against the have-nots, the interests

of the powerful against the interests of the powerless, the interests of the

incumbents against the insurgents who threaten their hold on power.

More recently the policy is being geared to promoting the interests of

— 150 —

crime victims at the expense of the rights of offenders. But science and

partisanship are incompatible. They do not go hand in hand. Once

researchers take sides or become advocates they lose their neutrality,

their objectivity and their credibility. This 1s a fundamental principle

that should be seriously considered by those criminologists and victimol-

ogists who have adopted the cause of crime victims and who claim to

speak on their behalf. It flies in the face of those victim advocates who,

under the guise of helping victims, are trying incessantly to separate vic-

timology from criminology and to create a political and ideological

enterprise that has nothing to do with science.

Criminal policy has always been designed, formulated and legislated

by lawyers and politicians, not by criminologists. It is a policy shaped

and molded by conservative ideology, religious punitiveness, and more

recently, by the politics of fear. Criminal policy tries to reflect the moral

outrage generated by the crime and to canalize the vindictive reactions

that follow. Criminal policy is sysnonymous with punishment and con-

trol and both are the main instruments of repression. Criminal policy 1s

a political exercise and there is no need for criminology to be seen as,

or to become, the tool of repression. This would be a 360 degree depar-

ture from its historical roots and its original noble mission of defending

the individual against the tyranny of power.

It is not surprising therefore, that some of the most 1illustrious crim-

inologists of the 20!'" century, on both sides of the Atlantic, did make a

plea for separating criminology from criminal policy. So my call for

such separation is by no means new, radical or revolutionary. Às early

as 1938, Prof. Thorsten Sellin, the first American President of our soci-

ety, suggested that the term “criminology” be used to designate only the

body of scientific knowledge and the deliberate pursuit of such knowl-

edge. He then proposed that the technical use of knowledge in the treat-

ment and prevention of crime be separate. As he could not find a suit-

able term to designate this field, he hinted that it may be called

“crimino-technology”.

Three decades later, another 1llustrious criminologist, Prof. Hermann

Mannheim (1965 : 13), with whose prize I was honored at the last con-

gress, suggested that criminal policy be treated as a discipline apart,

rather than as an integral part of criminology. Affirming the non-nor-

mative character of criminology, Mannheim believed 1t 1s preferable that

questions of what ought to be done to reform the criminal law and the

penal system be treated as a separate discipline based upon the factual

findings of the criminologist and the penologist. Criminology, he

insisted, should remain a non-policy-making discipline which regards the

“ends” as beyond its province. Mannheim hastened to add that this does

not prevent the criminologist from advocating a certain measure of legal

-— 151 —

and administrative penal reform, but he or she has to do so as a poli-

tician or an ordinary citizen and voter rather than in the capacity of

criminologist.

À fact that has been largely 1gnored or overlooked in criminology 1s

that the pursuit of knowledge and the practical application or imple-

mentation of that knowledge are two different, distinct and separate

endeavors. The pursuit of knowledge for knowledge’s sake, as in anthro-

pology, archeology or history, is a laudable and worthwhile exercise,

whether the knowledge has or does not have any practical applications.

It is a disinterested pursuit because it is neutral and does not carry with

it the danger that the acquired knowledge may be misused or deformed

when applied.

CRIMINOLOGY’S NEGLIGIBLE IMPACT

ON CRIMINAL AND SOCIAL POLICY

The popular claim that criminal policy is an integral part of crimi-

nology would lose any validity and credibility were we able to show that

criminology has had no, or only a minimal, impact on that policy. To

do so we need only to critically examine the impact that criminology has

had on criminal policy over the decades. Unfortunately, the inevitable

conclusion of such an analysis would be to admit that the balance sheet

is definitely negative.

Just ask yourselves a simple question : “In what way does what we

do with criminals today, in the 21* century, differ from what was done

to them in the 19" or even the 18 century?” Isn’t it rather surprising

that despite enormous social evolution and despite huge advances in sci-

ence and technology for over a century the social reaction to crime has

not changed one 1ota?? Those who break the law are dealt with in the

same manner as centuries ago! They are sent to prison, they are fined,

and if they are unable to pay the fine they will do time. The late Anto-

nio Lamer who served as the chairman of the now defunct “Law Reform

Commission” and who was, for ten years, the Chief Justice of the

Supreme Court of Canada said 1t best :

Among all the areas of public concern for which governments establish

departments and ministries, law is unique in one very significant way : legit-

imacy is measured by how closely what we do today corresponds to what

we did in the past. If such thinking dominated other areas of public policy,

we would still be training our soldiers to dig trenches, we would still be

debating whether smallpox vaccinations are an appropriate public health

measure and the tractor would be viewed as a novel and probably dangerous

innovation. Modern behavioral science, to say nothing of the eighty percent

recidivism rate in our penitentiaries, has made it absolutely clear that the

broad consensus and naïve optimism of the nineteenth century has been a

— 152 —

disastrous foundation of our approach to the problems of criminality today

(1978 :129).

The claim that what is being done in practice with law breakers 1s

inspired by criminology or merits the designation of “applied criminol-

ogy” 1s both inaccurate and misleading. It erroneously implies that the

mistreatment of offenders, the harm and indignities daily inflicted upon

them are based on criminological knowledge and advice. And nothing

could be further from the truth. Because the fact 1is, criminal policy, as

a political and 1ideological exercise, is determined by considerations that

are foreign to, and are often at odds with, criminology. The reason 1s

rather simple : for those who hold the strings of power, the views of

criminologists and penologists do not count 1f they are at odds with the

wishes and demands of the voting public. As a result, criminologists and

penologists have been unable to persuade the politicians to follow their

advice, to accept their recipes for reform or to implement their sugges-

tions for change. More important still is the fact that criminologists do

not have, and should not claim to have, the solutions to the problem of

crime. They would be wise to stick to the role assigned to them, decades

earlier, by Nils Christie (1971) who maintained that they are “problem-

raisers” not “problem-solvers”

Criminologists’ impotence to influence criminal policy 1s as clear as

it is depressing. À look at the USA, the richest and most powerful coun-

try in the world, would bear this out. American criminologists were una-

ble to have an archaic and medieval practice, the death penalty, abol-

ished. And sadly, the current debate has shifted from the cause of

abolition to the method of execution with the US Supreme Court

recently ruling, to the consternation of many, that lethal injection is not

a cruel or inhumane practice! American criminologists were unable to

stop a wave of crazy laws such as “Three strikes and you are out”. They

were powerless and helpless in their attempts to prevent the explosion

of the prison population which in recent years reached unprecedented

record numbers. Their pleas for the decriminalization (or depenaliza-

tion) of soft drugs were unsuccessful and fell on deaf ears. They could

not stop the wave of repression, the flagrant abuses and human rights

violations that followed 9/11 or to have practices such as water-boarding

recognized as torture and banned. Nor were they able to prevent the

atrocities in Guantanamo Bay, not to mention those in Abu-Gharib

prison in Baghdad. While many strongly denounced such atrocities,

some decided that appeasement 1s the best way of keeping research

funds flowing and had no hesitation jumping on the security band-

wagon. Ît was distressing to see how some became apologists for the

government defending the draconian measures, the invasion of privacy,

the violations of human rights and civil liberties as justified means of

— 153 —

combating terrorism! Surely criminologists were not as successful in

their endeavors as was the victim lobby which managed to exploit the

vindictive instincts of a punitive public to bring about punitive changes

in the criminal law and in criminal justice practices.

The lesson to be learnt is rather simple. To assign to criminology the

unrealistic task of reforming current criminal policy or formulating

future policy is to condemn it to oblivion. Some realism is in order.

Criminologists have stood by and saw security concerns, real, imagined

or invented, trump human rights and civil liberties, including the funda-

mental democratic right to privacy. Were they able to prevent or to stop

this invasion and this intrusion by the State? Were they able to protect

our fundamental liberties and our basic freedoms? If criminologists were

utterly helpless and powerless to change or to influence criminal policy,

what hope 1s there that they can have more impact when it comes to

social and economic policies? Criminologists have known for the longest

of time that crime thrives in social environments characterized by huge

disparities in wealth and power, so what have they done or can do to

reduce such disparities?

HOw DOES SCIENTIFIC CRIMINOLOGY

DIFFER FROM PRESENT-DAY CRIMINOLOGY?

It is worth repeating that a scientific, non-normative, research-

focused criminology is an objective, neutral and non-partisan criminol-

ogy. It is a non-ideological discipline that does not pass value judgments

and does not take sides. It is a criminology that pays equal attention to

crimes of the powerful as to crimes of the powerless, crime in the streets

as crime in the suites, crimes of corporations as crimes of individuals.

It is a criminology that devotes equal time and effort to the study of

crimes by the oppressed as crimes by the oppressors, crimes from below

as crimes from above, incumbent “terrorism” and insurgent “terrorism”

It is a criminology that gives equal importance to crimes by the State

as to crimes against the State, acts of protest against power as to acts

of abuse of power. It is a criminology that is equally interested in tran-

snational and international crimes as it 1s in national crimes; in crimes

of war as in crimes of peace.

À scientific, objective and ideology-free criminology is a classless

criminology. It is a gender —- and race — neutral criminology. It is an

egalitarian criminology that makes no distinction between rich and

poor, between “common” criminals and white collar criminals. It makes

no distinction between males and females, between blacks and whites,

between members of the majority and members of minorities.

— 154 —

It is a secular and agnostic criminology. It avoids religious, racial

and political labels. For it, Islamist violence is no different from IRA

violence, Basque violence, Tamil violence, Ku Klux Klan violence, neo-

Nazi violence, etc. It treats them as equally worthy of study and

research.

It is a value-free criminology that does not create normative hierar-

chies of offenders or victims.

RECAPITULATION

From what is said above, the “Leitmotiv” of my thesis should by

now be clear. Specialization 1s a key concept and practice in the modern

world. It is the need for, and the concern about, specialization that do

explain and are responsible for the emergence of new fields and sub-

fields of knowledge, and the creation of new disciplines and sub-disci-

plines in order to recognize and to accommodate those new branches of

knowledge.

When it comes to crime, offenders and victims, specialization calls

for a net separation between three functions : research, policy and

action. It goes without saying that the three are interrelated. Ideally,

research, rather than politics or ideology, should guide policy. And

action is the implementation of policy in the designated practical fields.

AlI this requires a well defined specialization of three groups and a clear

differentiation of their roles : 1) those whose principal preoccupation is

to study and research, to analyze and evaluate, to design and innovate:

2) those whose main occupation is professional practice; and 3) those

whose positions in Parliament or government call upon them to formu-

late and legislate policy.

What used to be a common saying in the past, that a criminologist

is a “Jack of all trades” is no longer true or feasible in the 21°“ Century.

So what exactly does this mean? It means that the appropriate setting

for teaching criminal policy and its related field, penology, are primarily

law schools and political science departments. The two disciplines

should be part and parcel of the training of those lawyers and politicians

whose future tasks will involve the formulation of criminal policy, as

well as the judges who are entrusted with the task of deciding what

would be the best possible sentence in a given case.

Âs for professional criminal justice programs, their logical setting are

the undergraduate curricula developed by the Schools of criminal justice

available at many universities, at community colleges such as the famous

John Jay College in the State of new York; and at police colleges such

as The Canadian Police College (Ottawa), L'Ecole Nationale de Police

— 155 —

du Quebec à Nicolet, The International Police College of Canada

(Winnipeg); The Royal New Zealand Police College; or at Justice Insti-

tutes like the one we have in Vancouver.

The logical, and by far the, optimal setting for a science of criminol-

ogy program, where the emphasis 1s on theory and research, 1s at the

graduate level enabling the students to obtain master’s and doctoral

degrees in criminology. Naturally, there will be constant movement

between the three types of programs. In the near future, the need for a

solid social science component for lawyers and other criminal justice

practitioners will become even more evident than it is now or has ever

been. This will force law schools, which have ignored those sciences for

decades, to open their doors wide open to criminology graduates who

will be sought after to teach in those schools in the same way they are

now teaching in professional justice programs. And there will be many

more teaching opportunities for criminologists in the future. Sooner or

later, it will become clear that criminology needs to be taught in sec-

ondary and high schools. Why? We all know that crime and delin-

quency are predominantly a youth problem. Don't you find it perplex-

ing that those young people who are taught courses in welding, in home

economics, in car mechanics, etc. are not being educated about one of

the greatest challenges they will face while growing up? And it is almost

certain that in the not too distant future every reasonably sized police

force will have a research department of its own that will need qualified

researchers to do in-house research and who are called upon to convince

their members of the important role of research, and the indispensability

of analysis and evaluation to the effectiveness and efficiency of their

operations.

And where will the clientele for those graduate programs in criminol-

ogy come from?

First, there are those graduates with a bachelor degree in one of the

social sciences such as sociology, psychology, political science, etc. who

have a desire to specialize in criminology.

Second, there are Law school graduates with a bachelor degree

(LL.B.) or a LL.L. (Licence en Droit) who are interested in complement-

ing their legal training with grounding in the social sciences. Third, there

are those graduates from professional criminal justice programs and

police colleges who want to pursue a career in research or teaching.

Those are but some of the potential candidates who would enroll in

graduate criminology programs and work towards a Master's or a

Ph.D.

Insisting that the social/behavioral science of criminology is more

appropriately taught at the graduate level is not to advocate an ivory

tower role for the criminologist. Far from it. Criminologists can, if they

p

_

156 —

so wish, get involved in the practice. They can become criminal justice

practitioners and be immersed in the field to gain first hand knowledge

about crime, offenders and victims. In fact, with their graduate degrees,

they would be ideal candidates for high level positions in all sectors of

the administration of justice. They will be highly and singularly qualified

to be entrusted with the tasks of research, planning, design, analysis,

evaluation and other scientific functions.

But the primary role of the true criminologist in the future will be

that of a critic of social, economic and criminal policies, one who crit-

Icizes not on ideological grounds but on sound scientific grounds. It will

be the role of a researcher, an educator, an innovator upon whom falls

the responsibility of disseminating their research findings about the

crime phenomenon, the social, economic and family conditions that

breed or promote crime, about the sociological, psychological and soci-

ocultural factors that predispose to criminal behavior, about the social/

psychological make-up of offenders and victims, about victim/target

selection, the dynamics of criminal behavior, the relationships/interac-

tions between offenders and victims, about the impact of victimization

and the consequences of becoming victim, etc., etc.

CONCLUSION

Criminology's stagnation, lack of innovation and its slow adaptation

to the realities of the 21* century is threatening its very existence as it

riskxs becoming irrelevant to the threats facing post 9/11 society, namely

the flagrant abuses of power and the serious violations of human rights

and civil liberties.

The politics of expansion have not been beneficial to criminology.

Retrenchment 1s the order of the day. Rather than holding firm to fields

and areas that do not belong to, or are only at the distant periphery of

the discipline, criminology should take a bold step and make a number

of territorial concessions that would ensure its safe return to its natural

and logical subject-matter.

If criminology is to gain in stature and prestige it has to shed its

undeserved European reputation as an auxiliary branch of the criminal

law and its American reputation as a sub-field of sociology. It has to

fight and correct the misperception that it is a peripheral discipline at

the bottom heap of the social sciences. It has co affirm its scientific

nature, its own identity, its originality, and its autonomy. It has to

affirm its specificity, its objectivity and its neutrality. It has to dissociate

itself from the criminal law and to divorce itself from criminal policy.

And finally the time seems to have come to separate the teaching of

——

157

criminology from the teaching of other professional fields such as law,

law enforcement, criminal justice, etc. in the same way that medicine 1s

taught separately from nursing and the science of economics is taught

separately from the professional discipline of accounting.

EPILOGUE

! certainly hope I did not sound too critical or too pessimistic! If I

did then let me end on a positive and optimistic note by highlighting what

I believe is a very positive and promising trend. Forty years ago !

expressed my hope (or call it a dream if you wish) that I will live to

see the end of the punitive society. Well, although I have lived long

enough this has not yet happened. And yet there is no doubt in my mind

that despite recent setbacks, modern societies will continue their inevitable

march towards a punishment-free society. Decades, may be centuries from

now, future generations will look back upon our current punitive prac-

tices, like imprisonment, with the same horror that we feel when we

examine medieval practices that have disappeared from the arsenal of

penal sanctions in modern society. Historians will have a hard time

explaining how a civilized society, for example, the United States, con-

tinued to execute people well in the 21* century, or how drug addicts and

sexual predators, to give only a couple of examples, were left to languish

in prison rather than being placed in proper treatment facilities. With the

advent of the non-punitive society disciplines like penology or the sociol-

ogy of punishment will become obsolete and will be turned into historical

studies. In recent years we have witnessed the emergence of peaceful, non-

violent, and non punitive methods of dispute settlement and conflict res-

olution. The practice of what has become to be known as “Restorative

Justice” is spreading like wildfire. It is perhaps the most encouraging

trend I have witnessed in my lifetime. And the trend will continue not

only because it is the natural way of solving human and social conflicts

but also because the institution of punishment is based on faulty premises

and suffers from inherent and insoluble ethical and equity problems ( Fat-

tah 1982; 1995; 2002; 2003). And more important still is that it is an

archaic and anachronistie practice. The secularization of society, the rec-

ognition of human diversity, the liberalization of attitudes towards devi-

ance and human misbehavior, the pursuit of cost-effective social policies

and practices, have rendered the metaphysical notion of retribution and

the theological concepts of expiation and atonement anachronistic and

anathematic to contemporary thinking (Fattah, 2008). ÀA non-punitive

society is possible and feasible and Greenland Criminal Code is a good

example. But restorative justice will end up imposing itself because it is

a constructive mode of dealing with human conflicts and is a better sys-

— 158 —

tem for victims, offenders and society. It ensures that the harm done is

repaired, that the chances of future victimization are minimized, and is

an excellent tool for closure and healing. But in order to succeed in

replacing current punitive practices it needs your endorsement and your

support and I urge all of you to stand behind it and to give it that much

needed support.

TABLEAU 1 : PROPOSED MODEL FOR THE TEACHING

OF CRIMINOLOGY AND RELATED DISCIPLINES (ABBREVIATED)

Graduate Level

Law

v

Law Schools/

Prerequisite :

Undergraduate degree preferably in the

Faculties

Social Sciences (Sociology, psychology,

v

political Science, economics); or the

human sciences; Bachelor degree in

Criminal Justice; etc.

LL.B.: LL.L.:

Training : stand-

Standard Legal training + basic courses

M.L.; J.D.

ard law curricu-

in Criminology, Penology, Criminal

lum

Policy, Victimology; Restorative Jus-

tice, Forensic Sciences, etc.

Criminology

v

Departments of

Prerequisite :

Undergraduate Degree in one of the

Criminology

Social Sciences (Sociology, Psychology,

Political Science, Economics); a Law

Degree; a Bachelor Degree in Criminal

Justice; etc.

M.A.: Ph.D.

Training :

Advanced courses/seminars in Crimi-

Research & the-

nology &Victimology. Focus on quali-

ory oriented

tative & quantitative research methods,

hypothesis-testing, theory formulation,

assessment & evaluation, design and

innovation; etc.

Thesis/Dissertation

Undergraduate

Level

Criminal Justice

Prerequisite :

High School Diploma or the equivalent

v

Schools of Crim-

Training :

Mainly professional with three possible

inal Justice

orientations :

— 159 —

TABLEAU 1 : PROPOSED MODEL FOR THE TEACHING

OF CRIMINOLOGY AND RELATED DISCIPLINES (ABBREVIATED)

v

Bachelor of C.J.

Focus on correctional practice (empha-

Grounding in

v

criminology

sis on skill development, interpersonal

M.C.J. & D.C.J

&other social

communication, etc.)

sciences. Exten-

b) Focus on Restorative Justice Prac-

sive knowledge

tices.

& analysis of the

Focus on Administration & Planning

CIS

(emphasis on Management and

Administration; human resources;

information systems, budgeting; etc.,

etc.)

Policingl Law

Prerequisite :

High School Diploma or the equivalent

Enforcement

v

Police Colleges

Training :

Mainly vocational : Standard Police

Justice Institutes

curriculum + Introductory Criminology

& Social Science courses. Victimology ;

Crime prevention; Courses related to

security issues; Courses on Human

Rights & Civil Liberties. Criminalistics ;

Forensic Science; Criminal

Investigation:; interrogation ; etc.

Diplomas

(For a detailed

Certificates

curriculum see

Fattah 1998 &

1999).

REFERENCES

BIANCHI, H. (1956) Position and Subject-Matter of Criminology : Inquiry Con-

cerning Theoretical Criminology. Amsterdam : North Holland Publishing.

CHRISTIE, N. (1971) “Criminologist : Technician or Poet?” Scandinavian Studies

in Criminology. Vol. 3, pp. 140-45. Oslo : Universitetsforlaget.

DURKHEIM, E. (1956) Reprint. The Division of Labor in Society. New York : The

Free Press.

FATTAH, E.A. (1982) “Making the Punishment fit the Crime : The Case of Impris-

onment. Problems Inherent in the use of Imprisonment as a Retributive Sanc-

tion”. Canadian Journal of Criminology. 24 :1, pp.1-12.

FATTAH, E.A. (1992) “Beyond Metaphysics : The Need for a New Paradigm. On

Actual and Potential Contributions of Criminology and the Social Sciences to

the Reform of the Criminal Law”. In R. LAHTI and K. NUoTIo (eds.) Criminal

Law Theory in Transition, Helsinki : Finnish Lawyers Publishing Company.

— 160 —

FATTAH. E.A. (1993a) “La Relativité Culturelle de la Victimisation”, Criminolo-

gie, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, pp.121-36.

FATTAH, E.AÀ. (1993b) “From a Guilt Orientation to a Consequence Orientation”.

In F. DENKER et. al. (eds.). Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft. Heidelberg. C.F.

Muller.

FATTAH, E.A. (1995) “Restorative and Retributive Justice Models : À Compari-

son”. In H-H. KÜHNE (ed.) Festschrift für Koichi Miyazawa. Baden-Baden :

Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, pp. 305-15.

FATTAH, E.À. (1997) Criminology : Past, Present and Future. London : Macmil-

lan. N.Y. St. Martin's Press Inc.

FATTAH, E.À. (1998) “Some Reflections on Police Education and Training in the

Developing Countries in the 21* Century”. Proceedings of the Internatiional

Conference on Police Science. UAR : Sharjah Police.-

FATTAH, E.À. (1999) “Algunas Reflexiones Sobre Educaciôn y Entrenamiento de

la Policia en los Paises en Desarrollo en el Siglo XXI”. Cuadernos de Crimi-

nologia (Santiago), No. 9, pp. 25-44.

FATTAH, E.A. (2002) “From Philosophical Abstraction to Restorative Action -

From Senseless Retribution to Meaningful Restitution. Just Desert and

Restorative Justice revisited”. In H.J. KERNER and E. WEITEKANP (eds.),

Restorative Justice,

Theoretical Foundations, Willan Publishing, Culmcott

House, Devon, U.K.. pp. 308-21.

FATTAH, E.A. (2003) “Gearing Justice Action to Victim Satisfaction. Contrasting

Two Justice Philosophies : Retribution and Redress”. In Hendrik KAPTEIN &

Marijke MALSCH (eds.) Crime, Victims and Justice - Essays on Principles and

Practice. Burlington, VT : Ashgate Publishing Company.

FATTAH, E.À. (2007) “Is punishment the appropriate response to gross human

rights violations? Is a non-punitive justice system feasible?” In Restorative

Justice : Politics, Policies and Prospects. Eds.: E. VAN DER SPUY, S. PARMEN-

TIER, À. DissEL. Published under the auspices of the Faculty of Law, Univer-

sity of Cape Town. (JUTA and Co).

GILLIN, J.L. (1926) Criminology and Penology. New York : Century Co.

KORN, R.R. & MCCORKLE, L.W. (1959) Criminology and Penology. N.Y.: Holt,

Reinhart and Wilson.

LAMER, À. (1978) “Criminal Justice

A Total Look”. Canadian Journal of Crim-

inology. 20 : 2, pp. 126-41.

MANNHEIM, H. (1965) Comparative Criminology. London : Routledge and Kegan

Paul.

PiccA, G. (2007) XV Congrès Mondial de Criminologie : entre passé et avenir.

Annales Internationales de Criminologie. Vol. 45, nos. 1/2, pp. 7-10.

SELLIN, T. (1938) Culture Conflict and Crime. N.Y.: Social Science Research

Council.

— 161 —

ADDENDUM

IN DEFENSE OF CRIMINOLOGY

ÀA RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR DAVID GARLAND°’S

ORAL PRESENTATION AT THE OPENING

SESSION

OF THE XV" INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF CRIMINOLOGY

IN BARCELONA, SPAIN, JULY 2008

Following professor Garland’s inaugural speech at the opening ses-

sion of the Congress no time and no opportunity was allowed for ques-

tions, comments or discussion. I had no chance to intervene or to

express my disagreement with the views he offered about criminology.

When I was given the podium as the last plenary speaker I felt obliged,

before presenting my own views about criminology, to respond to Pro-

fessor Garland’s opinions. Unfortunately, Professor Garland was not

present at the last session as he had to leave the day before. Otherwise

it would have been really interesting to engage in a fruitful debate about

criminology and its future and to get valuable feedback from the audi-

ence. Às time was at a premium throughout the Congress my response

to Professor Garland could only be very brief and here is what I said :

By a stroke of genius, Professor Garland was scheduled as the first

plenary speaker and I was scheduled to be the last. This ensured that

congress participants whose patience and perseverance brought them to

this last plenary session will be given a chance to assess and to choose

between two very different visions of what criminology 1s all about,

where it is heading, what it ought to become, and where its future lies.

What professor Garland’s presentation and mine have in common 1s

that they are both critical of the current state of criminology and both

have the best interests of criminology at heart. But as much as I enjoyed

listening to his brilliant presentation I must confess that my views differ

markedly from his.

To react and to respond to his views let me refresh your memory by

reiterating some of the points he made based on the notes I took (and

I do hope they are an accurate reflection of what he said) so that you

may be able to see to what extent our positions diverge.

Professor Garland does not seem to believe in the autonomy of crim-

inology and suggests that criminology has nothing to gain by being

taught in a separate administrative structure. He eloquently outlined

what he sees as the dangers inherent in such a model. With all due

respect for Professor Garland’s view, it does in my opinion overlook the

compelling reasons that led to such development from the 1960’s on.

Independent, autonomous departments and schools of criminology

emerged precisely because the traditional way of having 1t taught in law

schools, in sociology or psychology departments, was proven to be a

— 162 —

hindrance rather than an asset. It was a major hurdle in the way of the

development and progress of an interdisciplinary science of criminology.

This is because it was the negation of the multidisciplinarity of crimi-

nology. It ensured that instead of coming of age and flourishing on its

own, it remained in a state of dependency on the older discipline, be it

law, sociology, psychology or else.

Criminology is a science of synthesis (science de synthèse). How

would it be possible for a synthesis science to develop, advance and

flourish in a unidiscipliary setting? And how logical is it to teach a syn-

thesis science in a unidisciplinary setting??

The movement towards autonomous Departments and Schools of

Criminology was simply a successful attempt to affirm its maturity and

to liberate it from remaining an auxiliary branch of criminal law or a

subfield of sociology and to allow it to advance, develop and thrive on

its own. Professor Garland’s argument that instead of becoming a dis-

tinct, autonomous academic subject, criminology should remain close to

its constitutive disciplines is an anti-evolutionary argument. The natural

historical evolution shows that new and fledging branches of knowledge

develop, advance, mature and become disciplines in their own right. In

the same way that sociology and psychology, for example, matured and

detached themselves from philosophy to become autonomous social sci-

ences, criminology has, since its origins late in the 19 century, devel-

oped its own distinct subject-matter and has sufficiently matured to

detach itself from criminal law, from sociology, psychology, psychiatry,

medicine, etc.

But there are many other points of disagreement between me and

professor Garland. He seems to favor a policy-oriented governmental

criminology and to advocate what in the 1970’s and the 1980’s used to

be called “administrative criminology” . He sees criminology’s main

role as policy advisor, as a discipline that serves and furthers govern-

ment interests. This, for him, is the “raison d’être” of criminology. He

unequivocally stated, and I am quoting, that “criminology would cease

to exist were it not for its capacity to deliver the goods to the govern-

ment”. He is critical of the position of Stan Cohen, John Hagan, Nils

Christie and others who called for a detached, disengaged criminology.

My position is exactly the opposite of his as you will sse when I present

to you my personal views and my arguments for divorcing scientific

criminology from criminal policy, citing illustrious criminologists of the

20' century like T. Sellin and H. Mannheim.

C) Administrative criminology is à term used to describe an uncritical criminology whose

main focus is to study crime-related issues that politicians and administrators deem worthy

of research; a criminology whose main role 1s to provide information and may be advice to

governmental authorities.

— 163 —

If I remember correctly, Professor Garland called criminology an

esoteric subject and he seems to think that criminology, being a prob-

lem-centered discipline, does not have the potential of reaching a high

rank or a high status among the social sciences. I respectfully disagree.

The fact that medicine is multidisciplinary and is also centered on a

problem, namely sickness and disease, did not stop it from reaching a

high rank among other sciences.

Another difference between us has to do with the future of criminol-

ogy. Professor Garland seems to favor an expansionist criminology. In

contrast, I take a purist position that calls for a sharp retrenchment of

the subject-matter of criminology.

Unfortunately, because of severe time constraints I am unable to

continue citing my disagreements with professor Garland, for example

my disagreement with his claim that criminology is a contested subject

with a low epistemological threshold. But to conclude these very brief

comments on his paper let me just mention our divergent views on the

training of criminologists. If I understood him correctly, he is not in

favor of specialization. Actually he calls it “specialism” and feels it can

have a negative effect on general communication. I could not disagree

more because as you will see, specialization 1s actually the “Leitmotiv”

of my paper.

SUMMARY

The paper stresses the need for a concise, non-polemical definition of

criminology and offers one that emphasizes its empirical, non-specula-

tive and non-normative nature and that restricts its subject-matter. The

paper asserts that attempts to broaden the scope of criminology and to

stretch its subject-matter have been detrimental to the discipline. They

have led criminology astray. It argues therefore for a retrenchment and

calls on criminology to make territorial concessions and to restrict its

field of research to the pursuit of scientific knowledge about crime,

offenders and victims. In line with this, the paper calls for separating

criminology from the normative/dogmatic discipline of criminal law,

from the political/ideological field of criminal policy and from the pro-

fessional areas of criminal justice that are simply users of criminological

knowledge.

The paper argues that there is no logic, rationale or compelling rea-

son dictating that the study of social reaction to crime, the study of

making, unmaking and remaking the laws, be part and parcel of the

empirical, non-normative science of criminology. Ît argues that there 1s

no sound rationale for considering distinct disciplines such as penology

— 164 —

or the sociology of punishment as branches of criminology. One of the

questions it asks is “why should a practical, legal exercise like sentencing

be part of a science of crime?”

The call for criminology to detach itself from criminal policy and to

devote itself to the scientific pursuit of knowledge about crime, offend-

ers and victims logically leads to questioning current attempts to divorce

victimology from criminology and to claim it to be an autonomous dis-

cipline it its own right. The paper laments the fact that in their mission-

ary zeal victim advocates have killed any hope for victimology to

develop into a truly scientific, objective, non-partisan discipline. They

navigated it towards becoming a branch of social work. Since social

work is not a science but a profession, the only hope for victimology to

reclaim the status of a scientific discipline 1s to detach itself from victim

policy and to revert to its original position as an integral branch of

criminology.

Following this, the paper calls attention to the basic differences

between “sciences” and “‘professional disciplines”. Criminology, it main-

tains, is a social/behavioral science. Criminal justice, policing, correc-

tions, probation and parole supervision, after-care are not sciences.

They are professions. The relationship of criminal justice to criminology

is not dissimilar to that between nursing and medicine. Though related

in some ways, they are distinct. Criminal justice is concerned with the

“HOW” questions. Criminology's main preoccupation is with the

“WHY” questions. The distinction between criminology as a social/

behavioral science and criminal justice as a profession and the need to

teach them in separate settings, with different curricula, has long been

recognized and is the dominant model in North America. There are uni-

versity departments of criminology that have a theoretical and research

focus and there are schools (or programs) of criminal justice as well as

police colleges that have applied, practical, vocational and technological

orientations.

The paper then examines at length the fundamental differences

between the social/behavioral science of criminology and the normative/

dogmatic discipline of criminal law. It stresses the autonomy of crimi-

nology and refutes the popular, yet fallacious argument that criminol-

ogy’s subject-matter is determined and circumscribed by the criminal

law. It goes on to show why teaching criminology and criminal law

under the same roof and within the same administrative structure 1s det-

rimental to the development and advancement of criminology. Stressing

criminology’s nature as a multidisciplinary, synthesis science it asks how

could a synthesis science advance, develop and flourish in a unidiscipli-

nary setting? This leads to the argument that the optimal setting for

teaching criminology is autonomous multidisciplinary departments at

— 165 —

the graduate level. And the paper follows this up by proposing an

abbreviated model for the teaching of criminology and related disci-

plines.

To conclude the paper affirms that Criminology’s stagnation, lack of

innovation and its slow adaptation to the realities of the 21* century is

threatening its very existence as it risks becoming irrelevant to the

threats facing post 9/11 society, namely the flagrant abuses of power and

the serious violations of human rights and civil liberties. To avoid such

distressing scenario, the paper suggests that if criminology is to gain in

stature and prestige it has to shed its undeserved European reputation

as an auxiliary branch of the criminal law and its American reputation

as a sub-field of sociology. It has to fight and correct the misperception

that it is a peripheral discipline at the bottom heap of the social sciences.

It has to affirm its scientific nature, its own identity, its originality, and

its autonomy. It has to affirm its specificity, its objectivity and its neu-

trality. It has to dissociate itself from the criminal law and to divorce

itself from criminal policy. And finally the time seems to have come to

separate the teaching of criminology from the teaching of other profes-

sional fields such as law, law enforcement, criminal justice, etc. in the

same way that medicine is taught separately from nursing and the sci-

ence of economics is taught separately from the professional discipline

of accounting.

RÉSUMÉ

L’auteur insiste dans cet article sur la nécessité d’offrir une définition

de la criminologie qui soit concise et non polémique, et en propose une

qui met en évidence sa nature empirique, non spéculative et non norma-

tive et qui restreint son objet. L'’article fait valoir que les tentatives

d’élargir le champ de la criminologie et d’étirer son objet ont porté pré-

judice à la discipline. Elles l’ont amené à s’égarer. Il plaide dès lors en

faveur d’une réduction et invite la criminologie à faire des concessions

territoriales et à restreindre son champ de recherche à la poursuite d’une

connaissance scientifique à propos du crime, des auteurs et des victimes.

Dans cette ligne, le texte invite à séparer la criminologie de la discipline

normativo-dogmatique du droit criminel, du domaine politico-idéologi-

que de la politique criminelle, et des zones professionnelles de la justice

criminelle qui ne font que faire usage des connaissances criminologiques.

Le texte argumente qu'il n’y a aucune raison logique, rationnelle ou

contraignante que l’étude de la réaction sociale au crime, l’étude de l’éla-

boration, de l’abrogation ou de la transformation du droit, fasse partie

intégrante de la science non normative, empirique, de la criminologie.

L’auteur argue qu’il n’y a guère de saine rationalité à considérer des dis-

— 166 —

ciplines distinctes comme la pénologie ou la sociologie de la peine,

comme des branches de la criminologie. L'une des questions qu’il pose

est : “Pourquoi un exercice juridique comme le sentencing devrait-il faire

partie d'une science du crime?”

L'invitation à la criminologie de se détacher de la politique criminelle

et de se consacrer à la recherche de la connaissance sur le crime, les cri-

minels et les victimes conduit logiquement à mettre en question les ten-

tatives de faire divorcer la victimologie de la criminologie et de réclamer

pour elle le statut de discipline autonome et indépendante. Le texte

déplore le fait que dans leur zèle missionnaire les avocats de la victime

ont tué tout espoir pour la victimologie de se développer en une disci-

pline véritablement scientifique, objective, non partisane. Ils l’ont fait

naviguer vers les rives d’une branche du travail social. Comme le travail

social n'est pas une science mais une profession, le seul espoir pour la

victimologie de réclamer le statut de discipline scientifique est de se déta-

cher de la politique criminelle et d’en revenir à sa position originale de

branche intégrale de la criminologie.

Suivant cela, le texte appelle l’attention sur les différences de base

entre “sciences” et “disciplines professionnelles”. La criminologie, sou-

tient-il, est une science de la société et du comportement. La justice cri-

minelle, la police, l’enfermement, la probation, la libération condition-

nelle et la post-cure ne sont pas des sciences. Ce sont des professions.

La relation entre justice criminelle et criminologie n’est pas différente de

celle qui distingue les soins infirmiers de la médecine. Bien que reliés de

certaines façons, 1ls sont distincts. La justice criminelle se pose des ques-

tions de l’ordre du “comment”. La criminologie, pour l’essentiel, de

l’ordre du “pourquoi’. La distinction entre la criminologie comme

science du social et du comportemental et la justice criminelle comme

profession, et la nécessité de les enseigner dans des infrastructures sépa-

rées, avec des curriculums différents, est depuis longtemps reconnue et

représente en Amérique du nord le modèle dominant. Il existe des

départements universitaires de criminologie, qui ont un objectif de théo-

risation et de recherche, et il y a des écoles (ou programmes) de justice

criminelle et des colleges de police qui ont des orientations appliquées,

pratiques, professionnelles et technologiques.

Le texte se poursuit par l’'examen approfondi des différences fonda-

mentales entre la science socio-comportementale qu'’est la criminologie,

et la discipline normativo-dogmatique qu'’est le droit criminel. Il souli-

gne l'autonomie de la criminologie et réfute l’argument populaire, mais

fallacieux suivant lequel l’objet de la criminologie est circonscrit par le

droit pénal. Il poursuit en montrant que l’enseignement de la crimino-

logie et du droit criminel sous le même toit et au sein de la même struc-

ture administrative se fait au détriment du développement et de l’avan-

— 167 —

cement de la criminologie. Soulignant la nature de la criminologie

comme science multidisciplinaire, de synthèse, 1l demande comment une

science de synthèse pourrait avancer, se développer et fleurir dans un

environnement unidisciplinaire. Ceci mène à l’argument que le meilleur

environnement pour l’enseignement de la criminologie est apporté par

des départements autonomes multidisciplinaires au niveau de la maîtrise.

Et le texte poursuit l’idée en proposant un modèle abrégé pour l’ensei-

gnement de la criminologie et des disciplines qui y sont liées.

En conclusion, l’auteur pose que la stagnation de la criminologie, le

manque d’innovation et la lenteur de son adaptation aux réalités du

XXIe siècle menace son existence même, dans la mesure où elle risque

de ne plus correspondre aux menaces qui guettent la société de l'après

11 septembre, c’est-à-dire les flagrants abus de pouvoir et les violations

sérieuses des droits humains et des libertés civiles. Pour éviter ce scéna-

rio désolant, il est suggéré dans le texte que, si la criminologie entend

gagner en stature et en prestige, elle doit se dépouiller tant de sa répu-

tation européenne imméritée de branche auxiliaire du droit criminel, que

de sa réputation américaine de sous-champ de la sociologie. Elle doit

combattre et corriger sa perception erronée de discipline périphérique au

croupion des sciences sociales. Elle doit affirmer sa nature scientifique,

son identité propre, son originalité, et son autonomie. Elle doit affirmer

sa spécificité, son objectivité, et sa neutralité. Elle doit se dissocier du

droit criminel et divorcer de la politique criminelle. Et enfin, le temps

semble venu de séparer l’enseignement de la criminologie d'autres

champs professionnels comme le droit, l’application du droit, la justice

criminelle, etc., de la même façon que la médecine est enseignée séparé-

ment du nursing, et la science économique séparément de la comptabi-

lité.

RESUMEN

En este articulo, el autor insiste en la necesidad de ofrecer una defi-

nicion de la criminologia que sea concisa y no polémica y propone otra

que evidencia su naturaleza empirica, no especulativa y no normativa y

que restringe su objeto. El articulo destaca que los intentos de ampliar

el campo de la criminologia y de extender su objeto han perjudicado a

la disciplina. La han conducido a difuminarse. Por lo tanto, defiende

una reducciôn e invita a la criminologia a hacer concesiones territoriales

y a restringir su campo de investigaciôn a la büsqueda de un conoci-

miento cientifico sobre el crimen, los autores y las victimas. En esta

linea, el texto invita a separar la criminolgia de la disciplina normativo-

dogmâtica del derecho penal, del campo politico-ideolôgico de la poli-

— 168 —

tica criminal y de las zonas profesionales de la justicia penal que ünica-

mente utilizan los conocimientos criminolégicos.

El texto argumenta que no existe ninguna razôn lôgica, racional u

obligatoria para que el estudio de la reacciôn social al delito y el estudio

de la elaboraciôn, de la derogaciôn o de la transformaciôn del derecho

formen parte integrante de la ciencia no normativa y empirica de la cri-

minologia. El autor arguye que no hay mucho de sana racionalidad en

considerar como ramas de la criminologia a la penologia o la sociologia

de la pena. Una de las cuestiones que plantea es la siguiente : “; Por qué

un ejercicio juridico como el sentencing deberia formar parte de una

ciencia del crimen?”

La invitacion a la criminologia de separarse de la politica criminal y

de consagrarse a la investigaciôn sobre el conocimiento del crimen, los

delincuentes y las victimas conduce lôgicamente a cuestionar las tenta-

tivas de divorciar la victimologia de la criminologia y de reclamar para

ella el estatus de disciplina autônoma e independiente. El texto lamenta

el hecho de que el celo de los abogados de la victima haya hecho des-

aparecer toda esperanza para la victimologia de desarrollarse como una

disciplina verdaderamente cientifica, objetiva y no partidista. Ellos la

han conducido hacia una rama del trabajo social. Como el trabajo

social no es una ciencia sino una profesiôn, la ünica esperanza para la

victimologia de reclamar el estatus de disciplina cientifica es separarse de

la politica criminal y de volver a su posiciôn original de rama integral

de la criminologia.

En consecuencia, el texto llama la atenciôn sobre las diferencias de

base entre “ciencias” y “disciplinas profesionales”. La criminologia —sos-

tiene el autor — es una ciencia de la sociedad y del comportamiento. La

justicia penal, la policia, el encarcelamiento, la probation, la libertad

condicional y la curaciôn posterior no son ciencias. Son profesiones. La

relaciôn entre la justicia penal y la criminologia no es diferente de aque-

lla que distingue la atenciôn médica de la medicina. Aunque relaciona-

dos en cierta forma, son distintos. La justicia penal se plantea cuestiones

relativas al “como”. La criminologia, esencialmente, relativas al “por

qué”. La distinciôn entre la criminologia como ciencia de lo social y de

lo comportamental y la justicia penal como profesiôn y la necesidad de

enseñarlas en infraestructuras separadas, con curriculos diferentes, se

reconoce desde hace tiempo y representa el modelo dominante en Amé-

rica del norte. Existen departamentos universitarics de criminologia, que

tienen un objetivo de teorizaciôn y de investigaciôn y existen escuelas (0

programas) de justicia penal y colegas de la policia que tienen orienta-

ciones aplicadas, prâäcticas, profesionales y tecnolôgicas.

Prosigue el texto con el examen profundo de las diferencias funda-

mentales entre la ciencia socio-comportamental que es la criminologia y

— 169 —

la disciplina normativo-dogmâtica que es el derecho penal. Subraya la

autonomia de la criminologia y rechaza el argumento popular, pero

falaz, segûn el cual el objeto de la criminologia se circunscribe por el

derecho penal. Continua mostrando que la enseñanza de la criminologia

y del derecho penal bajo el mismo techo y en el seno de la misma estruc-

tura administrativa se realiza en detrimento del desarrollo y del avance

de la criminologia. Subrayando la naturaleza de la criminologia como

ciencia multidisciplinar, de sintesis, se pregunta cômo una ciencia de sin-

tesis podria avanzar, desarrollarse y florecer en un entorno unidiscipli-

nar. Ello conduce al argumento de que el mejor entorno para la ense-

fnanza de la criminologia se aporta por departamentos autônomos

multidisciplinares en el nivel del ültimo curso. Y el texto prosigue la idea

proponiendo un modelo abreviado para la enseñanza de la criminologia

y de las disciplinas que estän relacionadas con ella.

En conclusiôn, el autor sostiene que el estancamiento de la crimino-

logia, la falta de innovaciôn y la lentitud de su adaptaciôn a las reali-

dades del siglo XXI amenaza su propia existencia, en la medida en la

que corre el riesgo de no corresponder ya a las amenazas que acechan

a la sociedad de después del 11 de septiembre, es decir, a los flagrantes

abusos de poder y a las serias violaciones de los derechos humanos y

libertades civiles. Para evitar este escenario desolador, se sugiere en el

texto que, si la criminologia pretende ganar en estatura y en prestigio,

debe despojarse tanto de su desmerecida reputaciôn europea de rama

auxiliar del derecho penal como de su reputaciôn americana de sub-

campo de la sociologia. Debe combatir y corregir su errônea percepciôn

de disciplina periférica como ültimo eslabôn de las ciencias sociales.

Debe afirmar su naturaleza cientifica, su propia identidad, su originali-

dad y su autonomia. Debe afirmar su especificidad, su objetividad y su

neutralidad. Debe disociarse del derecho penal y divorciarse de la poli-

tica criminal. Finalmente, parece que ya ha llegado el momento de sepa-

rar la enseñanza de la criminologia de otros campos profesionales como

el derecho, la aplicaciôon del derecho, la justicia penal, etc., de la misma

manera que la medicina se enseña separadamente del rursing y la ciencia

econômica separadamente de la contabilidad.

— 170 —

PREMIO HERMAN MANNHEIM :

PROF. ESTHER GIMENEZ-SALINAS

I COLOMER

Tony Peters !)

En nombre de la Sociedad International de Criminologia, tengo el

gran honor de otorgar el Premio Herman Mannheim, del “Centre Inter-

national de Criminologie comparée” de l'Université de Montreal, a la

exelentisima Rectora y Profesora Esther Gimenez-Salinas 1 Colomer.

Ese premio se otorga a una persona por la totalidad de una carera

prestigiosa y excepcional en servicio del desarrollo de la criminologia

como ciencia interdisciplinaria, teôrica y socio-empirica.

Esther Gimenez-Salinas 1 Colomer, ha estudiado el derecho y la psi-

cologia aplicada. Ha obtenido el diploma de licenciatura en derecho de

la Universidad de Barcelona en 1971, de psicologia aplicada en 1976 y

de Doctor en Derecho Penal en 1978, ambos de la misma Universidad

de Barcelona.

Muy tipico para Esther ha sido siempre y desde muchos anos su

carera mixta, combinando puestos de profesor y catedrâtica de Derecho

penal, de derecho penitenciaro y criminologia con muy altas cargas

administrativos como Directora General del Centre d’Estudis Juridics 1

Formaciô Especialitzada del Departamento de Justicia de la Generalitat

de Catalunya y cargas judiciales como Vocal del Consejo General del

Poder Judicial.

Desde 2002 Esther es Rectora de la Universidad Ramon Llull. Esa

mayor responsabilidad académica implica en este momento su partici-

pacion profunda en el proyecto Europea de la reforma fundamental de

los programas académicos de estudios en casi todas las disciplinas

incluido los programas académicos de criminologia.

La larga experiencia de Esther con los estudios de Derecho y Crimi-

nologia, sus reconocidas capacidades de liderazgo en sus contactos

humanos con los colegas y la gran profesionalidad con que ella siempre

la podido movilizar y aplicar “los conocimientos académicos” en los

terenos sociales los mâs dificiles como “la justicia para menores” “la jus-

ticia penal” y la “ejecuciôn de las penas privativas de libertad”, le ase-

guran una fuerza intelectual y una plataforma socio-institucional de

apoyo para realizar con éxito reformas fundamentales.

( Prof. Dr.

— 171 —

Con ella y con un gran numero de sus colegas muy motivados esta-

mos convencidos de que en España como en algunos otros paises de

Europa, la criminologia esta desarollandose

plenamente y va establecerse con un perfil académico adulto.

El existo de eso proceso recibirâ los respaldos decisivos de la gran

personalidad cientifica de la lauréate del premio Mannheim.

Esther Gimenez tiene una lista impresionante de publicaciones mono-

grâficas y aportaciones certificas en libros y revistas.

Los titulos nos ensenan sus diferentes especialidades en materias

como la justicia para menores, el derecho penitenciario, la penologia, la

prevenciôn y ya desde mäs de una década su interés para la justicia

reparadora. Esther tiene una larga experiencia de investigacion cientifica

en que ella reûne el anâlisis y el desarrollo de la aproximaciôn norma-

tiva con la del socio-empirica.

En sus textos se muestra ademâs un constante interés para el anâlisis

internacional comparativo.

Su dominaciôn de cuatro lenguas y sus estancias de larga duracion

en centros académicos, en Alemania, Francia y los EEUU, se han con-

vertido en aportaciones cientificas importantes.

El premio Herman Mannheim del CICC de la Universidad de Mon-

treal, otorgado hoy se une a une larga lista de premios que Esther ya

ha recibido.

Refiero solamente a la medalla de oro, premio “Cesare Beccaria” en

reconocimiento de sus meritos por fundar una criminologia cientifica

para una politica criminal en España, y Europa, otorgada por la Nue

Kriminologishe Gesellschaft con sede en Frankfurt Alemania.

Desde mäs de 20 anos conozco personalmente a Esther, y he podido

colaborar con ella en muy diferentes termas y iniciativas. Siempre le he

admirado por combinacar y integrar perfectamente los mâs altos valores

humanos y cientificos.

La concesiôn del premio Herman Mannheim, a esa gran Señora y

personalidad en nuestra disciplina, marcarâ el inicio de una nueva etapa

en la manifestaciôn de la criminologia en España.

— 172 —

PRIX DURKHEIM :

PROFESSEUR HANS-JÜRGEN KERNER

Denis Szabo “!)

HANS-JÜRGEN KERNER ET LA CRIMINOLOGIE

DE LA SECONDE MOITIÉ DU XXF SIECLE

Le professeur Hans Jürgen Kerner est né en 1943, dans le village de

Herxheim, l’État de Rhineland-Palatina, dans la République Fédérale

d’Allemagne. Il n’a pas connu les affres des Européens, et en particulier

celles des Allemands d’'après-guerre, dont l’adolescence fut marquée par

la deuxième guerre mondiale et la dictature nazie.

Période de formation

Sa formation secondaire était solide. Le Gymnasium a dispensé

l’enseignement du grec classique, du latin et des langues étrangêères :

français et anglais. Voici, au départ, de fermes fondations dans la cul-

ture européenne!

Carrière académique

De 1963 à 1967, ses études universitaires furent achevées dans les spé-

cialités juridiques et criminologiques, en médecine et en psychiatrie

légale, aux universités de Munich, Berlin et de Tübingen. Employé à

titre de travailleur social à temps partiel en 1967, au service de nuit

auprès des personnes sans domicile fixe, le jeune étudiant découvre le

côté sombre de l’existence humaine.

Son doctorat en droit (Dr.iur) lui fut octroyé en 1973. Thème : Eva-

luation de la validité des statistiques criminelles. Finalement, sa spéciali-

sation couvrait, en plus de la criminologie, la justice pénale des mineurs,

la procédure pénale et la resocialisation des délinquants. Sa titularisa-

tion, intervenue en 1986, couvrait ce vaste domaine. La direction de

l’Institut était attachée à la chaire. Cependant, avant de se fixer à Tübin-

gen, son Alma-Mater, 1l a assumé les fonctions de conseiller (Rat) à

l’université de Bielefeld de 1975 à 1979, d’enseignant aux universités de

Hambourg (77-80) et de Heidelberg (80-86). Professeur titulaire, doyen

de faculté de Droit, 1l s’établit au sommet de la hiérarchie académique

de la République Fédérale aux cours des années 1977 et 1986.

(P Professeur émérite, Université de Montréal. Président honoraire de la SIC.

— 173 —

Rôle international

Appelé très tôt à enseigner aux universités étrangères, au Royaume-

Uni, aux États-Unis, en Asie, en particulier en Chine et au Japon, 1l se

fait connaître à travers le monde.

Dans sa patrie, 1l a consolidé la criminologie universitaire par la créa-

tion, en 1988, d’une nouvelle société scientifique, la Neue kriminologis-

che Gesellschaft. Il préside, dès ses origines, les grandes assises nationa-

les panallemandes de la prévention du crime. Répondant aux besoins

des criminologues européens, 1l les réunit en association et crée la

Société européenne de criminologie. Il en est le premier président. On le

voit présent partout où se développe la criminologie, 1l assume partout

les fonctions de direction et de coordination. Rappelons simplement

que, depuis 1985, 1l est membre des organes directeurs de notre Société,

la Société internationale de criminologie. Il y co-organise des congrès

mondiaux à Hambourg, Budapest, Vienne et Séoul. Il est notre prési-

dent de 1995 à 1999. Il a sûrement bien mérité de la criminologie et de

la Société internationale de criminologie!

Publications

Parmi ses publications scientifiques, on relève 33 livres, manuels et

monographies, 34 livres publiés sous sa direction et quelques 215 con-

tributions à des ouvrages collectifs. Plusieurs sont traduits en français,

en italien, en espagnol et en chinois. Entre 1973 et 2008, les grandes pro-

blématiques stratégiques fondamentales de la deuxième moitié du XX°

siècle ont été abordées. D’'abord le problème du langage scientifique,

capital pour une discipline à la lisière des sciences de la vie, des sciences

humaines, des sciences sociales et politiques, ainsi que du droit pénal! Il

est auteur et coauteur de plusieurs dictionnaires.

La réforme de la justice des mineurs était la cause célèbre de sa géné-

ration. Tout le monde a souhaité le développement des programmes de

prévention, d’éducation, de resocialisation, corrigeant les effets souvent

néfastes de l’enfermement et de la répression. De nombreux ouvrages

individuels et collectifs ont été consacrés à ce grand sujet. L’interpréta-

tion des statistiques criminelles fut une autre cause célèbre des années

d'après-guerre. La validité des statistiques criminelles, émanant des ser-

vices publics, se posait. Il fallait préciser de quoi on parle : grand sujet

de débat dans les milieux criminologiques de l’après-guerre. Les rela-

tions entre victimes et auteurs d’agressions ont été approfondies et dif-

férentes méthodes ont été proposées pour introduire la victime dans le

processus de resocialisation des criminels. Plusieurs de ses ouvrages ont

été consacrés à la justice restauratrice. Sur le plan théorique et métho-

dologique, les études de cohortes ont connu des innovations importantes

— 174 —

et connurent une grande popularité à la suite des travaux-pionniers de

Sellin et de Wolfgang. Notre lauréat y a apporté des contributions

remarquées. À l’horizon des décennies du XXI* siècle, les gangs des jeu-

nes violents ainsi que les problèmes de la sécurité interne et externe de

l’Etat, retiennent l'attention de la communauté internationale. Il s’y

engage résolument.

Plusieurs dizaines d’ouvrages et plus de 200 contributions à des

ouvrages collectifs embrassent tous les grands défis auxquels est con-

frontée la jeune criminologie d’après-guerre. C’est pour cela qu’on peut

dire, en toute confiance, que l’œuvre du professeur Hans Jürgen Kerner

embrasse les grandes questions scientifiques, stratégiques et politiques de

la criminalité et de la justice pénale de l’après-guerre; en d’autres termes,

de la seconde moitié du XX* siècle. On ne peut qu’être impressionné par

la qualité et la quantité de cet immense labeur qui fut cependant large-

ment reconnu par la communauté scientifique internationale et natio-

nale. Ainsi, notre lauréat reçut de nombreux prix et distinctions qui doi-

vent bien remplir une grande vitrine dans la maison familiale de

Keltengrab, près de Tübingen.

Famille

Une telle carrière ne se conçoit point sans une famille assurant la

paix de l’âme et le bonheur domestique. L'amour et le soutien d’Anna,

son épouse, le confortent dans son rôle de père auprès de Mathias,

d'Eva-Maria et Anna Lena, ses enfants. Ils ont leur part dans le succès

et la carrière exceptionnelle et brillante de Hans!

À-t-il trop travaillé?

Une anecdote éclairera peut être le rayonnement exceptionnel de

notre lauréat. Lors d’une réception à Berlin, avant la première guerre

mondiale, le chancelier Bethman-Hollweg interpella l’ambassadeur de

France, l’illustre François Ponçet, un verre de champagne à la main :

« Dites moi, Monsieur l'ambassadeur, pourquoi sommes-nous si peu popu-

laires, nous autres Allemands, en Europe” Pourquoi ne nous aime-t-on

pas?».

La réponse tient en trois mots, réplique l’ambassadeur en

souriant : « Vous travaillez trop …». Prosit!

Et bien, sans conteste, Hans Jürgen Kerner a aussi travaillé trop. On

lui connait sans doute des adversaires, mais point d’ennemis. Il est

même l’Allemand que tout le monde aime .…aimer!

Souvenirs de Alte Hans

Pour terminer, jJ'aimerais évoquer un souvenir qui me touche au

cœur, celui lié à la personnalité exceptionnelle de Hans Gôppinger, mai-

— 175 —

tre de la criminologie allemande d’après-guerre. C’est lui qui a appris la

rigueur et la discipline du travail scientifique, à travers ses recherches

aux confins de la psychiatrie légale, du droit pénal et de la criminologie,

aux jeunes de la génération qui ont grandi dans l’après-guerre. Le

«junge Hans» y fut apprenti-marmiton auprès de Alte Hans, en compa-

gnie, entre autres, de Gunther Kaiser et de Hans Joachim Schneider.

*

*

*

Nous honorons aujourd’hui le junge Hans qui est devenu, au fil des

ans, le Alte Hans, en lui souhaitant encore de nombreux lauriers cou-

ronnant ses contributions à la criminologie et à la coopération interna-

tionale.

VIVAT!

— 176 —

PRIX ETIENNE DE GREEFF :

LUIS RODRIGUEZ MANZANERA

Uberto Gatti

Desde muy joven Luis Rodriguez nunca dudô en su afân de ser cri-

minoôlogo, fue a ver a su profesor Alfonso Quiroz Cuarôn y le dijo :

Doônde puedo estudiar Criminologia?, porque voy a ser el mejor crimi-

nôlogo de México. Eso sorprendiô a su maestro quien era entonces el

mejor.

Mexicano, obtuvo la Licenciatura en Derecho en la Facultad de

Derecho de la Universidad Nacional Autônoma de México, y la Licen-

ciatura en Psicologia en el Colegio de Psicologia de la Facultad de Filo-

sofia y Letras de la misma Universidad.

Realizo el Curso de Perito en Criminalistica en la Procuraduria

General de Justicia del Distrito Federal y el Curso de Interrogatorio

Criminal y Poligrafo en el Banco de México. Todos estos conocimientos

le dieron el alcance interdisciplinario necesario para emprender su for-

maciôn como criminôlogo en Roma, Îtalia.

Obtuvo el Doctorado en Derecho Penal en la Universitä degli Studi

di Roma, y el Diploma de Criminologia Clinica en la Scuola di Specia-

lizzazione di Rebibbia, en Roma, Italia, formändose con Benigno Di

Tullio.

Podemos hablar del Dr. Rodriguez desde tres aspectos bâsicos :

Como docente investigador y académico, y como servidor püblico

En la Universidad Nacional Autônoma de México fue Director

General de Asuntos Juridicos; y, en la Facultad de Derecho de la misma

Universidad : Secretario del Doctorado de la Divisiôn de Estudios Supe-

riores, Consejero Técnico y Director General del Seminario de Derecho

Penal.

Es Profesor titular de Criminologia en la Universidad Nacional

Autônoma de México, desde 1969, y en la Universidad La Salle desde

1973; ha impartido cursos en varias Universidades de la Repüblica, en

el Instituto de Formacion Profesional de la Procuraduria del Distrito

Federal y en el Instituto Nacional de Ciencias Penales. Fue Director de

la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad La Salle de México, durante

nueve anños.

Ministros, gobernadores, magistrados, procuradores, jueces, lo reco-

nocen como su maestro.

— 177 —

En su actividad internacional, ha dictado cursos y pronunciado con-

ferencias en 30 Universidades del extranjero; se ha desempeñado como

Experto de Naciones Unidas en prevenciôn del delito y tratamiento del

delincuente.

Tuvo una intervenciôn decisiva en la redacciôn de las Reglas mini-

mas de las Naciones Unidas para la administraciôn de la justicia de

menores ("Reglas de Beijing"), asi como en las directrices de Riat, lle-

vando su influencia criminolôgica a la prâctica en los contenidos técni-

cos de varios los articulos. Normas que mâs tarde impulsô para que fue-

ran contenidas en las leyes de menores de México, donde formô parte

de diversas comisiones legislativas.

Cuenta en su haber 115 articulos publicados en revistas especializa-

das y 19 libros, entre los que destacan : “Criminologia”, “Victimologia”,

“Penologia”, “Criminalidad de Menores”, “Clâsicos de la Criminolo-

gia”, “Criminologia Clinica”, “La Crisis Penitenciaria y los Substitutivos

de la Prisiôn”, “ Cômo elige un delincuente a sus victimas?”.

Entre las Sociedades Cientificas Nacionales a las que pertenece se

pueden mencionar : Académico de Nümero de la Academia Mexicana

de Ciencias Penales y de la Academia Mexicana de Criminalistica; y la

Sociedad Mexicana de Criminologia, de la que es Presidente.

En lo internacional, es miembro de la Sociedad Mundial de Victimo-

logia, Delegado Nacional y Miembro de Comité Cientifico de la Socie-

dad Internacional de Criminologia y Secretario General Adjunto de la

Sociedad Internacional de Defensa Social.

Ha recibido diversas distinciones, entre ellas queremos destacar entre

las mâs relevantes : En 1997 el reconocimiento Hans von Hentig de la

Sociedad Mundial de Victimologia en Amsterdam, Holanda; el Instituto

Nacional de Ciencias Penales le otorgô el grado de Doctor Honoris

Causa; la Fundaciôn Victimologia de España le otorgô el Premio Inter-

nacional de Victimologia y Defensa de las Victimas.

Como servidor püblico tuvo la oportunidad de ser director técnico de

Reclusorios de la Ciudad de México, con un equipo técnico de mâäs de

300 profesionales, donde puso en prâctica sus conocimientos clinico-cri-

minolôgicos, en su afän de entrenar a los consejos y equipos técnicos cri-

minolôgicos con instrumentos, particularmente en las âreas biomédicas,

psicolôgicas, sociales y criminolôgicas, para la comprensiôn integral del

fenômeno criminal.

Realizô prognosis y se adentrô en integraciôn de modelos de trata-

mientos para la readaptaciôn social y resocializaciôn de los menores

infractores y adultos internos. Incluso en una ocasiôn le correspondid

ser mediador en un motin en una de las cârceles mâs dificiles de esa ciu-

dad

— 178 —

Dirigiô la Academia Nacional de Seguridad Pûüblica, del Sistema

Nacional de Seguridad Püblica de la Repüblica Mexicana, apasionado

en unificar a todas las academias de policia del pais, labor que fue alta-

mente relevante, donde aplicaron examenes de selecciôn a miles de ele-

mentos, capacitaron a mandos policiales, y elaboraron perfiles. Esa

misma academia conjuntô el esfuerzo de todos las escuelas del poder

judicial y la Suprema Corte, para formar a estos profesionales en mate-

rias claves, aportändoles conocimientos ademäs de legales, periciales,

criminolégicos y victimolôgicos.

Dificil combinar la vida profesional con la familiar, pero queremos

decir que Luis Rodriguez se casô con la Dra. Maria de la Luz Lima

aqui presente, quien fue una de sus destacadas alumnas, y tiene tres exi-

tosos hijos profesionales a quienes adora.

Luis es uno de esos criminôlogos afortunados que ha podido influir de

manera directa en las politicas püblicas de México e indirectamente a

través de destacados alumnos que formo.

Enhorabuena Doctor por este merecido premio que hoy recibes.

— 179 —

PREMIO ESPECIAL

DEL PRESIDENTE DE LA SIC ® :

PROF. M. LUISA C. CORCOY BIDASOLO

Tony Peters

Querida Mirentxu :

Me ha dado muchisimo contento haberte conocido, descubriendo asi

a una colega prôxima y con tantas y tan excepcionales cualidades, tal

cosa con ocasiôn de este Decimoquinto Congreso Mundial de Crimino-

logia.

Me honra y, al mismo tiempo, me alegra profundamente poder galar-

donarte con el Premio Especial del Presidente de la Sociedad Internacio-

nal de Criminologia.

Querido Mirentxu, con la señora Rectora y colega Esther, aceptaste

la enorme tarea de organizar este Congreso Mundial en Barcelona.

Vuestras Universidades han aceptado acoger a la comunidad mun-

dial de los criminôlogos durante una semana y la han brindado un

entorno académico de muy alto nivel, poniendo a su disposiciôn una

infraestructura que le ha permitido desarrollar todos los tipos de activi-

dades que requiere un Congreso con unos mil participantes.

Hemos recibido de parte de la señora Rectora, Esther Giménez Sali-

nas | Colomer, todo el apoyo para que este Congreso pudiera organi-

zarse en la mejores condiciones, ademäs de que Esther nos ha abierto

muchas puertas que han permitido vincular al Congreso con las mâs

importantes y relevantes instituciones de la Sociedad catalana y espa-

nola.

Mirentxu, con tu equipo has seguido, orientado, desarrollado y

supervisado muy de cerca el proyecto del Congreso Mundial.

Contigo he podido colaborar literalmente cada dia durante mâs de

dos anños.

Tuvimos, aunque trabajando en lugares distantes, la misma preocu-

paciôn, desarrollando los temas, el contenido y las cosas prâcticas del

Congreso.

Con tu pequeño equipo has funcionado como un centro de intercam-

bio permanente de informaciôn entre las diferentes estucaras de la SIC

() XV Congreso Mundial de la Sociedad Internacional de Criminéloga, Barcelona Julio

del ano 2008

C Presidente de la Sociedad Internacional de Criminologia.

— 181 —

y la organizaciôn local en Barcelona, todos responsables de manera con-

junta por la puesta en marcha del Congreso.

Mi experiencia personal en ese trabajo largo y, de vez en cuando,

duro ha sido siempre positiva, pues se dio en contacto directo con una

persona muy inteligente, calma, razonable, optimista y siempre dis-

puesta a buscar una soluciôn creativa también en situaciones tensas y

complicadas.

No fue un trabajo simple.

Siempre he podido contar con tus virtudes personales y con tus con-

vicciones y experiencia académicas para solucionar los problemas, por

lo que en ese proceso de colaboraciôn interpersonal, he aprendido a esti-

marlas y apreciarlas.

Tengo el convencimiento, la certeza de que compartimos plenamente,

cada uno en su posiciôn, los valores del proyecto criminolôgico que

estamos promoviendo juntos de todo corazôn.

Por tu trabajo y compromiso total y sin reserva en este proyecto, te

agradezco y te galardono con ese premio especial.

En Barcelona (España) el 25 de Julio 2008.

182 —