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 Annales internationales de criminologie, 46 ANNALES INTERNATIONALES DE CRIMINOLOGIE INTERNATIONAL ANNALS OF CRIMINOLOGY ANALES INTERNACIONALES DE CRIMINOLOGIA ANNEE 2008 (volume 46-1/2) SOCIÉTÉ INTERNATIONALE DE CRIMINOLOGIE Ministère de la Justice 12, rue Charles Fourier 75013 — Paris phone 33.(0)1.45.88.00.23 fax : 33.(0)1.45.88.96.40 e-mail crim.sic@wanadoo.fr web site http://perso.wanadoo.fr/societe.internationale.de.criminologie ANNALES INTERNATIONALES DE CRIMINOLOGIE Organe officiel de la Société Internationale de Criminologie Président de la Société : Tony PETERS (Belgique) Secrétaire général de la Société : George PICCA (France) COMITÉ DE RÉDACTION DES ANNALES Rédacteur en chef Prof. Georges KELLENS (Belgique) adj. Prof. Michaël DANTINNE (Belgique) Rédacteurs Associés Prof. Edmundo Oliveira (Brésil) Prof. Louise Shelley (USA) Prof. Setsuo Miyazawa (Japon) La redacciôn agradece a la Dra. Maria Jesûüs Guardiola Lago (Uni- versidad de Lleida) su colaboraciôn en la traducciôn de los textos en castellano. The editors want to thank Dr. Maria Jesûs Guardiola Lago (Univer- sity of Lleida) for her assistance in Castilian. Merci à Dra. Maria Jesûüs Guardiola Lago (Université de Lleida) pour sa précieuse aide en castillan. Table de matières Table of contents Indice Souvenir de Giacomo Canepa Tullio Bandini et Uberto Gatti « . —. e « » + » © » » e » e »s »s » » e e . e « . = + XV Congrès mondial de criminologie (Barcelone — Espagne 20/25 juillet 2008) . e . e e « » »% + + » + » » + + » » » » » » + e + » « © e e e » + » » » e » » © à Georges Picca Allocution du Président de la Société Internationale de Crimi- nologie Tony Peters e « . « . + + » + < + + »s » » © + < e + » + » » e © » e e » e s. e « « » » » + + » + + ]1 Presentaciôn del XV Congreso Mundial de la Sociedad Inter- nacional de Criminologia Barcelona 20-25 julio 2008 Esther Giménez-Salinas 1 Colomer e e e e « e e © e + « » « © » + e » + © — + + 15 Disciplining Criminology? David Garland 19 Organized Crime : New Label, New Phenomenon or Policy Expedient? Letizia Paoli « . *. + —. e + « + + e « =s e + + + + + +s « + * + » e » » + » e + © » —s © « » » e « » — 39 Delincuencia urbana y victimizaciôn de las victimas E. Rauûl Zaffaroni 63 Globalization and Transnational Crime : New Links, New Perspectives Emilio C. Viano 81 iQuién necesita a un criminôlogo’: Investigaciôn, acciôn y politica criminal Vicente Garrido Genovés . . e » »s + + » e … »s » » e » « » » e » e e + e e — « e » e 107 10.The Draft UN Convention on Justice and Support for Vic- tims of Crime, with special reference to its provisions on Res- torative Justice Marc Groenhuijsen . « « * » + © » e 6 * » + » » à . » « e s. « e + =s + » » e + e « +e « + À 121 11 The Future of Criminology as a Social Science And Acade- mic Discipline : Reflections on Criminology's Unholy Alliance with Criminal Policy & on Current Misguided Attempts to Divorce Victimology from Criminology Ezzat À. Fattah . . ». e — » … e » e © … e e » s e + e — « © » + » e » e < » e < » » . e + e — 137 Attribution des Prix de la Société Internationale de Criminologie 12 Premio Herman Mannheim : Prof. Esther Gimenez-Salinas 1 Colomer Tony Peters . s. » * » © — + » 6 e » + » … » e « « » e . » » . e « © « * e » »s © © + « © » e =s + e 171 13 Prix Durkheim : Professeur Hans-Jürgen Kerner Denis Szabo . ». © « e < » e — e + * + » * s » e » e e e » e » » . % . + + + « + e < + » = + » + 173 14 Prix Etienne De Greeff : Luis Rodriguez Manzanera Uberto Gatti . » e e « <s e © + » » » » e + » e e » « e e e — — e + — « + « + + » < e + + » » » 177 15 Premio especial del presidente de la SIC : Prof. M. Luisa C. Corcoy Bidasolo Tony Peters 181 - 6— SOUVENIR DE GIACOMO CANEPA Tullio Bandini Uberto Gatti Le 18 février 2008 Giacomo Canepa, 1illustre Professeur de Crimino- logie et de Médecine légale, nous a quittés. Né à Gènes (Italie) en 1922, 1l fut reçu docteur en Médecine juste après la guerre et entreprit sa carrière académique à l’Institut de Méde- cine Légale de Gênes où une activité scientifique originale se développait déjà dans le domaine de la psychologie et de la criminologie, activité liée aux travaux d'’éminents spécialistes tels que Amadeo Dalla Volta, Domenico Macagg1 et Aldo Franchini. Devenu Docteur en Médecine, le Professeur Canepa ressentit vite l’exigence d'approfondir ses connaissances avec des études humanistes, obtenant une maîtrise en philosophie et se spécialisant en Psychologie à la prestigieuse Ecole milanaise fondée et dirigée par le Révérend Père Agostino Gemelli. Ses multiples intérêts culturels embrassaient de nombreux champs, allant de la littérature au cinéma, à la musique classique avec une dis- position particulière pour l’étude du violon où 1l avait atteint d’excel- lents résultats. Sa vie fut enrichie par une épouse présente et pleine de sagesse et par trois filles merveilleuses qui l’aidèrent à surmonter toutes les difficultés. Professeur titulaire d'Anthropologie Criminelle et de Médecine Légale, 1l fut le fondateur de l’Institut de Criminologie, de l’Ecole de Spécialisation en Criminologie Clinique, du Centre International de Cri- minologie Clinique Comparée, de la Revue italienne de Criminologie, créant à l'Université de Gênes un centre de recherche et d’enseignement criminologique connu et apprécié dans le monde entier. L'activité internationale du Professeur Canepa fut particulièrement intense : il collabora pendant de nombreuses années avec l’Ecole de Cri- minologie de l'Université de Montréal (Canada); il fut un membre actif et enthousiaste du Conseil Scientifique de Criminologie du Conseil d'Europe; il présida la Société Internationale de Criminologie, avec tou- jours le même engagement et la même énergie. Les criminologues du monde entier gardent le souvenir du style et de l’atmosphère cordiale qui régnaient au cours des Journées Internationa- les de Criminologie Clinique Comparée de Santa Margherita Ligure, qui ont accueilli, pendant de nombreuses années, les criminologues, juristes 7 — et médecins légistes les plus prestigieux. En Italie, 1l se dédia particuliè- rement au développement de la Société Italienne de Criminologie, dont il fut le président pendant de nombreuses années, organisant activement congrès et séminaires d’étude et où 1l fut l’initiateur et le coordinateur de nombreuses activités de publication. Organisateur infatigable, homme de médiation et de contact, inspira- teur et Maître de nombreux disciples qu’il savait écouter, conseiller et soutenir, le Professeur Canepa posait la recherche et l’activité scientifi- que au centre de ses intérêts. Profondément engagé dans la recherche cli- nique, 1l était un spécialiste attentif et connaisseur de toutes les perspec- tives possibles d’étude de la Criminologie qu’il intégrait dans une approche pluridisciplinaire et qui trouvait sa synthèse dans le concept de personnalité. C’est autour de cette dimension qu’il développa de nom- breuses recherches, dans une vision ouverte sur l’étude des facteurs bio- logiques, psychologiques et sociaux qui sous-tendent le comportement de l’homme. Travailleur infatigable,il publia des centaines d’articles et de livres scientifiques, des rapports de recherche, des documents d’analyse de politique criminelle. Honoré et aimé dans le monde entier pour ses qualités personnelles et pour sa valeur scientifique, il reçut d'innombrables louanges, prix nationaux et internationaux ainsi que le titre prestigieux de Docteur honoris causa de l’Université de Lyon. Ses nombreux disciples se souviennent de lui avec beaucoup d’estime et une grande affection, et n'oublieront jamais son exemple et ses ensei- gnements moraux, humains et scientifiques. — 8 XVe CONGRES MONDIAL DE CRIMINOLOGIE (Barcelone — Espagne — 20/25 juillet 2008) Georges Picca ‘!) Le XV° Congrès mondial de Criminologie organisé par la Société Internationale de Criminologie, s’est déroulé à Barcelone (Espagne) du 20 au 25 juillet 2008. Il avait pour thème «Crime et criminologie : recherche et action». Le Congrès s'inscrivait ainsi dans la perspective, à la fois scientifique et pratique de ceux qui l’ont immédiatement pré- cédé . Tl a réuni un nombre important de participants, venus de diffé- rentes régions du monde : universitaires et chercheurs, responsables des polices et, de la justice pénale et de nombreux étudiants. L'évolution actuelle des différentes manifestations de la criminalité dans un contexte de globalisation a contribué à mettre, notamment dans ce Congrès, l’accent sur le caractère transnational de certaines tendances de la criminalité (crime organisé, criminalité financière, trafic de stupé- fiants et terrorisme). Mais d’autres thèmes majeurs ont également con- tribué à animer le débat. Il en a été ainsi de la persistance d’une crimi- nalité urbaine importante, consécutive à des concentrations de populations, qui existent désormais dans diverses régions du monde. Dans un tel contexte social la nécessité d'une adaptation des politi- ques criminelles, ainsi que de l’action des services de police et de justice devait être complétée par un intérêt, désormais croissant, pour des mesures adaptées à l'amélioration du sort des victimes de la criminalité, ainsi que de procédures nouvelles telles que la médiation et la justice dite «restaurative». Ce nouveau numéro des Annales Internationales de Criminologie est consacré aux principales contributions présentées au cours des séances plénières du Congrès , par les meilleurs experts dans différents domai- nes de la criminologie. () Secrétaire général. ( Les trois précédents Congrès ont eu lieu à Séoul (Corée) en 1998, Rio de Janeiro (Bré- sil) en 2003, et Philadelphie (USA) en 2005. G11 à été rendu compte des précédents Congrès déjà cités dans les numéros 37, 41 et 43 des Annales Internationales de Criminologie. 9 _— Le thème du Congrès a permis de faire le point sur nombre de pro- blèmes actuels que posent à la fois les nouveaux développements de la criminalité et, l’évolution des procédures de prévention sociale, ainsi que des diverses politiques nationales ou régionales, anticriminelles. Ce thème central a été, en effet, développé, à la fois en plusieurs séances plénières, animées par d’éminents conférenciers, ainsi que dans l’organisation d’une centaine d’ateliers (workshops) destinés à favoriser les échanges entre praticiens, experts, chercheurs et responsables de la justice pénale et de la criminologie. Il importe, en effet, de souligner que les travaux de nos Congrès visent à une évaluation périodique des tendances de la criminalité, dans les différentes parties du monde, ainsi que des problèmes nouveaux qui en résultent pour les responsables de la justice pénale et de la prévention sociale. S’agissant plus particulièrement de la contribution que peut apporter la recherche en criminologie, cette exigence doit également être prise en compte dans les priorités à retenir. Il est, en effet, légitime d'attendre de la recherche, sur un plan plus général, une contribution utile à l’efficacité des politiques sociales. En ce qui concerne l’organisation de ce Congrès, 1l importe de rendre hommage à la contribution essentielle des Universités de Barcelone et Ramon Llull, concernant à la fois l’accueil et le séjour des participants mais également le développement des aspects scientifiques de cette grande manifestation. La Société Internationale de Criminologie, par suite, exprime ses vifs remerciements aux différentes hautes autorités qui ont permis le succès de ce XV° Congrès mondial de criminologie. Ce Congrès a été, également l’occasion, comme il est de tradition, de décerner un certain nombre de Prix destinés à récompenser des contri- butions scientifiques particulièrement remarquées aux progrès de la cri- minologie dans différents domaines. Il s’agissait principalement du Prix Émile Durkheim, dans le domaine de la sociologie criminelle, du Prix De Greeff dans le domaine de la criminologie clinique et, du Prix Man- nheim. On trouvera, par suite, dans ce numéro des Annales, le texte des hommages adressés aux personnalités ayant reçu les Prix précités. Ces textes sont également accompagnés par les allocutions d'ouver- ture du Congrès du Prof. Tony Peters, Président de la Société Interna- tionale de Criminologie et de Madame Esther Giménez-Salinas 1 Colo- mer, Rectrice de l’Université Ramon Llull de Barcelone. [l est, enfin, particulièrement agréable de vous annoncer que le XVI® Congrès Mondial de Criminologie, aura lieu en 2011 à Kobe (Japon). C’est une nouvelle étape dans le développement au niveau mondial de notre Société qui est ainsi soulignée. C'est également l’opportunité de remercier la contribution de l’ensemble des abonnés et des lecteurs des Annales Internationales de Criminologie. — 10 — ALLOCUTION DU PRÉSIDENT DE LA SOCIÉTÉ INTERNATIONALE DE CRIMINOLOGIE Tony Peters ‘!) Estimadas autoridades civiles, judiciales y policiales Estimada Señora Esther Jiménez Salinas, Rectora magnifica de la Universidad Ramon Llull. Estimados colegas crimindôlogos Es para mi un motivo de gran satisfacciôn poder inaugurar el Deci- moquinto Congreso Mundial de Criminologia aqui, en Barcelona. Casi 38 años después del V Congreso Mundial, que se organizô en Madrid a finales de septiembre de 1970, la SIC, ha vuelto a España, esta vez a Barcelona, a Cataluña. Durante la ültima década ya nos hemos encontrado — en Asia, (Corea, Seül en 1998) — En América Latina, (Brasil, Rio de Janeiro en 2003) — Y la ûltima en América del Norte, (EEUU, Filadelfia en 2005) En nombre de la SIC me gustaria agradecer y al mismo tiempo feli- citar, de todo corazôn, a todas las personas (y son muchas) que desde hace dos años han realizado un enorme trabajo de preparaciôn y de organizaciôn de este Congreso Mundial. La Universidad Ramon Llull y la Universidad de Barcelona han reunido a sus mejores expertos para colaborar con la SIC con el obje- tivo de hacer de este evento criminolôgico un éxito, tanto a nivel orga- nizacional como cientifico. Querria en particular y personalmente agradecer y felicitar a las dos colegas que representan esas dos Universidades y a sus dos equipos de colaboradores. Gracias Señora Rectora Esther Giménez Salinas 1 Colomer (gracias Andreu, Ana y Pamen) Gracias Colega Mirenxtu Corcoy (y gracias Gabriela y Fernando) Aprovecho la ocasiôn para agradecer también a todo el equipo de organizaciôn ALOHA Congreso, Tecnic Viajes que se ha preocupado de toda la parte técnica y de organizaciôn material de las inscripciones, reservas etc.... (D Presidente de la Sociedad Internacional de Criminologia. — 11 — Agradezco en nombre de la SIC, a las autoridades e instituciones que han apoyado y subvencionado el XV Congreso Mundial : — El Ayuntamiento de Barcelona — El Departamento del Interior, el Departamento de Justicia y el Cen- tre d'Estudis de la Generalitat de Catalunya. — El Departamento de Interior del Gobierno Vasco — El Ministerio de Interior del Gobierno de España Agradezco especialmente las dos organizaciones : — La SEIC (Sociedad Española de Investigaciôn criminolôgica) — La FACE (Federaciôn de Asociaciones de Criminélogos de España) que han decidido asociar sus actividades anuales este año con el Con- greso mundial de la SIC Muy bienvenidos a Barcelona. Les deseo mucho éxito con sus mültiples iniciativas dentro del pro- grama de nuestras actividades en talleres y mesas redondas. Barcelona (España) 20 de Julio de 2008 * * * I also welcome the presence of three Honorary Presidents of the ISC, Prof. Denis Szabo, Prof. Hans Juergen Kerner and Prof. Larry Sher- man Their active participation in various meetings, plenaries and work- shops, shnows how much they remain involved in the International Soci- ety When I was elected president of the ISC I had two priorities in mind. À first priority was related to the subject matter of the next Con- gress. The general theme we have chosen for the XVth World Congress 1s : “Crime and Criminology : Research and Action” Within this broad approach we will use three actual and main areas of interest : transnational crime, urban crime and victims and restorative justice, for presentations and discussions in plenary sessions, workshops and round tables. But first of all, l have proposed to pay attention to a fundamental reflection on the state of affairs and the future position we aim at, for academic criminology in teaching and research. Challenging socio-eco- nomic and political developments urge criminologists to step forward as creative independent and critical scientists who contribute to a fast growing body of theoretical knowledge and socio-empirical academic research. _— 1n - These two dimensions teaching and research will be addressed this morning by two outstanding, internationally recognized scholars in criminology. À second priority, 1 have in mind is to try to develop within the ISC a general role of a basic information service about “the academic status of criminology”. We arrived at a turning point where important decisions about the academic position of criminology, as an interdisciplinary approach in its own right have been made recently or will be made in the near future by Universities in different countries. This worldwide debate, receives particular interest in Europe. With the Sorbonne, Bologna declaration, the European Union stim- ulates and facilitates a far reaching remodeling of the Furopean Aca- demic World. In some countries it confirms in other countries it opens new perspectives for the academic position of criminology. More especially in Spain, this debate is ongoing and is taking a promising orientation. | hope that the XV" World Congress will be a strong support for our Spanish colleagues, who are finalizing the debate and who are taking important decisions about the introduction of independent academic criminology programs at different levels and different Universities. My proposal is to discuss, during this Congress, within appropriate workshops and meetings, the service role the ISC, could play in bringing together basic information about existing and planned academic crimi- nology programs. The aim is to put the collected information together, following a for- mat we have to agree on, and to make this information available to all interested academic centres to facilitate discussions and to promote exchanges. This could become an important info service role for the ISC, and could become a recurrent activity of the Scientific Commission. On behalf of the organizing committee and on behalf of the ISC we wish you all exceptional rich experiences of satisfying scientific exchanges and debates. It is our honest hope that the XV* Word Congress becomes a long lasting source of intellectual, academic and professional inspiration for the world community of criminologists meeting here in Barcelona. * * * A mes paroles de remerciements je veux ajouter ma gratitude et ma reconnaissance au secrétariat de la Société Internationale de Criminolo- — 13 — gie. Avec notre secrétaire général, Georges Picca, J'ai une large expé- rience de communication et de collaboration. Sa préoccupation cons- tante est la continuité et la qualité de nos activités scientifiques. Sa présence est une fidèle garantie, pour l’avenir de notre Société. À côté de lui, Rachida Touahria, qui a un rôle décisif. Elle se trouve au centre des activités, au point névralgique, où, passent les appels, les demandes, les plaintes, les exigences etc. Heureusement, elle sait com- ment gérer tous ces mouvements.J’ai toujours apprécié sa collaboration efficace. Finalement, «last but not least», je remercie, de tout mon cœur, notre Président de la Commission scientifique, notre collègue Serge Bro- chu de l’Université de Montréal. Avec l’aide de son équipe, Valérie et Mylène, 1l a fait, presque l’impossible, pour organiser un programme d’ateliers et tables rondes, à la fois diversifié et équilibré. Mon expérience du Congrès de Rio de Janeiro m'autorise à dire que je sais de quoi je parle. Je ne voudrais pas oublier de souligner que quelques membres de la Commission Scientifique ont joué un rôle décisif pour la mise en œuvre du programme des ateliers. _— 14 — PRESENTACION DEL XV CONGRESO MUNDIAL DE LA SOCIEDAD INTERNACIONAL DE CRIMINOLOGIA Barcelona 20-25 julio 2008 Esther Giménez-Salinas i Colomer “) Es un honor para la Universidad Ramon Llull y la Universidad de Barcelona acoger a los participantes del XV Congreso Mundial de la Sociedad Internacional de Criminologia. Como Rectora de la Universitat Ramon Llull me gustaria empezar diciendo que la organizaciôn conjunta de este congreso con la Univer- sitat de Barcelona ha sido una experiencia enriquecedora que espero que se repita en muchas otras ocasiones. La estrecha colaboraciôn en la que hemos trabajado, el desarrollo conjunto de las actividades y la definitiva organizaciôon del congreso, solo ha sido posible gracias a las personas que han participado y de manera muy particular gracias a la Profesora Dra. Mirentxu Corcoy, Directora del Departamento de Derecho Penal de la Universidad de Barcelona. También quiero agradecer efusivamente a la Sociedad Española de Investigacion Criminolégica y a la Federaciôn de Asociaciones de Cri- minologia Española que no hayan celebrado sus congresos internos con la intenciôn que este Congreso Mundial pudiera tener un mayor éxito de puüblico. Gestos tan generosos como estos contribuyen a la consoli- daciôn 1 internacionalizaciôn de nuestra disciplina. Finalmente quiero agradecer la colaboraciôn de todas las personas e Instituciones que han hecho posible la realizaciôon de este Congreso y de una manera particular al Departamento de Justicia y al Centro de Estu- dios Juridicos de la Generalitat de Catalunya, Al Departamento de Relaciones Institucionales y de Participaciôn y al Instituto de seguridad Püblica de la Generalitat de Catalunya. Al Ministerio del Interior del Gobierno de España y a la Consejeria de Interior del gobierno Vasco. También a Aloha congress por su profesionalidad y dedicaciôn. Pero si hay alguien que merece un agradecimiento muy particular Ileno de respeto pero también de cariño, es el Profesor Dr. Tony Peters, profesor emérito de la facultad de Criminologia de la Universidad de Leuven y actualmente Presidente de la Sociedad Internacional de Crimi- () Prof. Dra. Rectora de la Universitat Ramon Llull. — 15 — nologia, que en circunstancies harto dificiles ha trabajado no solo con extrema dedicaciôn y entusiasmo, sino poniendo en prâctica su gran especialidad ‘“la mediaciôn”. De principio a fin y durante estos cinco años Tony Peters ha dirigido y ha mediado en este dificil mundo de la Academia, con sabiduria, paciencia y bondad algo que muy pocos hom- bres poseen y que el administra con creces. Para nuestro pais la celebraciôn de este Congreso en estos momentos es muy importante. La adaptaciôn de los nuevos planes de estudio al Espacio Europeo de Educaciôn Superior- también conocido como Bolo- nia- significa una gran oportunidad para la Criminologia. En efecto la nueva regulaciôn en España va a permitir que las Universidades que asi lo deseen, puedan implantar a partir del curso 2008/2009 un grado en Criminologia. Asi mismo son varias las Universidades que han recon- vertido sus Masters en Criminologia en Masters oficiales de Bolonia. Ello significa que definitivamente los estudios de Criminologia en España constaran de los tres ciclos es decir Grado, Master y Doctorado. Ello sitüa a la Criminologia en 1gualdad de condiciones que el resto de los estudios que se pueden cursar en las Universidades españolas. Todo ello significa que, finalmente la Criminologia tendrä una estructura cla- ramente diferenciada del resto de las disciplinas,con su respectivo Pro- fesorado y la posibilidad de cursar los tres grados. Mâs allà de la impor- tancia en el la docencia, representa también la posibilidad de potenciar la investigaciôn criminolôgica como disciplina autônoma. Durante estos dias reflexionaremos también sobre estos temas y sus consecuencias y hasta que punto al establecerse la criminologia como una disciplina autônoma se separa sustancialmente de los planteamien- tos psicolôgicos, juridicos o sociolôgicos que hasta el momento habian representado la base de su conocimiento. Ya mâs en concreto se abordaran algunos de los retos esenciales a los que la criminologia ha de hacer frente en la actualidad : asi y como grandes ejes se trataràä la criminalidad transnacional como un fenômeno propio de la globalizaciôn y de imparables consecuencias, la criminali- dad urbana con sus diferentes manifestaciones y caracteristicas segûn el tipo de ciudad y la apariciôn de nuevos modelos de control de la segu- ridad y finalmente un tema que no podia faltar y es el derecho de las victimas y su desarrollo progresivo en el proceso judicial, asi como los avances dede el nuevo paradigma de la Justicia restaurativa. Es un gran honor que la Sociedad Internacional de Criminologia eli- giera Barcelona como la Sede de este Congreso y para nuestras Univer- sidades un espléndida ocasiôn para dar un nuevo empuje a esta disci- plina. Al igual que en el Ambito del control, el control informal se desarro- lla con igual o mas importancia que el control formal, asi pues en el ambito de un congreso de estas caracteristicas, las relaciones, los con- tactos y la informaciôn con el resto de los participantes son tan o mas provechosas que las actividades programadas. Por ello no tengo la menor duda que con una participaciôn de 1.000 personas y mültiples posibilidades de encuentros, los vinculos de los diferentes profesionales y las posibilidades de intercambio se estrecharan en profundidad. Tan solo me resta desearles que durante su estancia en Barcelona dis- fruten de nuestra ciudad de nuestro pais y de nuestra cultura. Como Ustedes conocen, en Catalunya nuestra lengua es el catalän, por ello me permito darles nuevamente la mas cordial bienvenida, no solo en nuestra lengua sino también con las palabras de uno de nuestros mas admirados cantautores, me refiero a Jaume Sisa quien en uno de sus textos dice asi : Oh, benvinguts, passeu passeu fa una nit clara i tranquilla, hi ha la Îluna que fa Ium, els convidats van arribant i van omplint tota la casa de colors i de perfums Oh, benvinguts, passeu passeu, de les tristors en farem fum. À casa meva és casa vostra si que hi ha cases d'algu. Esperando que estos versos sean una auténtica realidad reciban nue- vamente la mas cordial bienvenida. _— 17 — DISCIPLINING CRIMINOLOGY? David Garland @ INTRODUCTION Criminology in 2008 is a remarkable success story, and this can be attested by a number of important measures. It has certainly come a long way fast. The idea of a science of crime and criminals is a very recent one, having been around for no more than 130 years. The word itself —“criminology” — did not exist prior to 1890 when it was first used (in its French language version) as a non-partisan alternative to some other strange new names that had recently appeared > ( »> 66 — “criminal anthropology > criminal psychology , criminal sociology”, etc. — each of which claimed the subject for a different discipline. When the earliest training courses appeared in the 1930s, many of them were taught by prison medical officers or psychiatrists. The subject entered the universities only after the Second World War, when the first Insti- tutes and departments began to take shape. When I enrolled in my first criminology class in Edinburgh University>s Law Faculty in 1974, crim- inology was still very much a newcomer in the academic world (Garland 1985; Garland 2002). Today, in stark contrast, criminology is a stand- ard part of the undergraduate curriculum in universities all over the world. More and more universities offer postgraduate degrees and doc- torates. Particularly in the USA, the UK and Australia, increasing num- bers of universities have departments and even whole colleges dedicated to criminology and criminal justice studies (Baars-Schuyt (2001) Bisi (1999) Kerner (1998)). Criminology's professional organizations have also grown. The Inter- national Society of Criminology’s World Congress attracts 1,000 dele- gates. The new European Society of Criminology, begun only a few years ago, boasts members from 46 different countries (Aebi and Kro- nicz 2008). Dozens of countries have national criminological associa- tions, with membership ranging from 35 in the Slovak Criminological ( This is a revised version of an address presented to the Wor'd Congress of the Inter- national Society of Criminology in Barcelona in July 2008. The author is grateful to Erin Braatz for research assistance and also to the Filomen D'Agostino and Max Greenberg Research Fund of the NYU Law School. Joachim Savelsberg is also to be thanked for some very helpful comments as the speech was being revised for publication. ( Arthur T. Vanderbilt Professor of Law and Professor of Sociology, New York Uni- versity. — 19 — Society, to 900 in the British Society, to 3,500 in the American Society of Criminology. Quantitative change produces qualitative change and growth of this scale and rapidity brings consequences. As criminology has expanded, attracting more students, more scholars and more research funds, it has changed its character and its position in the academy. Today, it increas- ingly takes the form of a free-standing, autonomous subject, with crim- inology degrees, criminology departments and criminal justice colleges operating independently of other academic disciplines. In an article published in 2006, ISC President Tony Peters noted this tendency and commented as follows : “An undeniable change in the historical position of ...criminology has taken place.… Instead of being a servant or auxiliary discipline in legal, social or even medical sciences, criminology [has become] an autonomous, often independent, entity” (Peters 2006). Professor Peters welcomed these developments for the most part. But he also raised questions, asking “what 1s the added value of this auton- omous profile?” In this, the opening talk of the World Congress, I want to offer a response to Professor Peters’ question. I want to begin a proc- ess of reflection and debate on the nature of criminology today and on the question of its “independence”. I will argue that, as criminology becomes more autonomous, the dilemmas and difficulties that affect the subject become more pronounced and harder to manage. I will also argue that much of criminology's intellectual and institutional strength stems from its integration with, and its rootedness in, a number of other, more fundamental disciplines. I will further suggest that as criminology grows more autonomous, institutionally and intellectually; as it begins to train its recruits in its own literature; focus on its own research agenda; and publish in its own journals, it tends to become more inward-looking and lose its vital con- nection to the more basic disciplines (c/f Savelsberg and Sampson 2002). And I will argue that a criminology which reproduces itself internally will inevitably come to narrow itself intellectually. The resulting loss of connection with the basic disciplines, I will argue, 1s liable to produce negative consequences - not just in intellec- tual terms (important as these are) but also in respect of the subject’s relation to government and its position in the university. 1 will suggest therefore that we should see criminological independ- ence as a temptation to be resisted rather than a goal to be embraced. Instead of aspiring to an autonomous discipline, we should work for an intellectually and institutionally integrated criminology - one that oper- ates as a bridging subject, linking together a practical social field with 20 — a range of academic disciplines, one that poses policy-oriented, social- problem questions using theoretically-oriented, social science concepts in a way that enriches both. SOME TROUBLING SIGNS I began by pointing to the signs of criminology’s success — above all, its rapid expansion and newfound ability to attract students, scholars and research funds. These developments are impressive and significant. But let me also point to some troubling aspects of the present. And instead of focusing on quantitative expansion, let me raise some quali- tative questions : about the kinds of knowledge we produce, about our relation to power, and about our position in the academy. I present these points baldly and without nuance, so I should make it clear that my information is largely based on my experience in the USA and the UK. I realize, of course, that criminology’s position varies enormously from place to place (Johnson 1983) and I will be happy to be told that the concerns I raise here do not apply to the same extent in other countries. Let me begin by 1identifying five troubling issues : (1) Criminology may have expanded its place in the university but its position in the academic field is an ambiguous one. In some countries, the subject is located in elite research universities and graduate pro- grammes but elsewhere it is situated in lower-tier institutions where vocational teaching takes precedence over academic research. As for the research undertaken, in many places it appears increasingly to be responsive to the short-term needs of government departments rather than to basic questions of theoretical inquiry or scientific replication (Ericson 2003; Austin 2003; Chan 2000; Laub 2004). (i1) Criminology has more students than ever, but in some countries — Including the USA, where criminology’s independence is most exten- sively developed — its students appear less well-qualified than students who enter other disciplines (Nieswiadomy, M. (1998)). (ii1) Criminology 1s establishing more and more undergraduate degrees but the proper goals and content of an undergraduate crimino- logical training remain uncertain and the orientation is increasingly vocational rather than academic. (iv) Criminology has become increasingly independent, but as it becomes more autonomous it becomes less deeply rooted in what were once its constitutive disciplines (Savelsberg and Sampson (2002); Sav- elsberg, Cleveland and King (2004)). _— 21 — (v) Criminology has grown in size but it has not grown in theoretical range or intellectual ambition. We criminologists have been slow to respond to the challenges of our times (Garland and Sparks 2000) : slow to engage, for example, with the emerging world of international crim- inal law, with crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against human- ity, all of which entail complex problems of etiology, prevention, pun- ishment and control (Hagan, Rymond-Richmond and Parker (2005); Brannigan (1998); Yacoubian (2000); Day and Vandiver (2000); Rob- erts and McMillan (2003)). And we have been surprisingly slow to intro- duce criminological theory and research findings into debates about ter- rorism and the so-called “war on terror” with the result that today'’s most pressing security issues are usually discussed in the public sphere in ways that are innocent of all criminological theory (Rosenfeld (2002); Savelsberg (2006);: Hogg (2007); Hamm (2005); Mythen and Walklate (2006)). So an expanded criminology is not an unproblematic one. And crim- inology's relation to itself and to the wider academy raise important questions that we ought to consider. In order to think clearly about the institutional and intellectual issues that these developments entail, we might begin by considering some of the fundamental features of our subject, in particular criminology'’s character as disciplined, eclectic, con- tested and governmental. 1. — FIRST OF ALL, CRIMINOLOGY IS DISCIPLINED Like any academic subject, criminology has intellectual and organi- Zational dimensions. Intellectually, it consists of a body of accredited and systematically transmitted knowledge:; approved procedures and techniques of investigation; and various clusters of questions that make up the sub- ject’s research agendas. These intellectual materials and activities are loosely organized by means of a “discipline” — the standard organiza- tional form of the modern academy (Garland 2002). The discipline establishes and enforces norms of evidence and argument; evaluates contributions to knowledge; fixes and revises the canon of exemplary theory and research; oversees the training of students; and distributes status and authority among accredited practi- tioners. These disciplinary functions are carried out by various institutions - peer-reviewed journals, professional associations, conferences, funding __ 22 _— agencies, and so on — which make up the material infrastructure of the enterprise. There is nothing especially unusual or interesting about this — in all these organizational and institutional respects, criminology is no differ- ent from any other academic discipline. The interesting question is a prior intellectual one: how and why did this rather inchoate, eclectic, practical subject come to form the basis of an academic discipline in the first place? This question is even more puzzling when one considers that, unlike most other academic disciplines, criminology has no distinct the- oretical object and no distinct method of inquiry of its own (Garland 1985; Savelsberg and Sampson (2002)) ®. Which leads to my next obser- vation… 2. — CRIMINOLOGY IS ECLECTIC Criminologists address themselves to topics that bear upon crime and its control. The list of topics is long and diverse, as a glance at the World Congress programme will show. We investigate these topics by means of quantitative and qualitative methods, using data sets of every description, drawing upon a whole gamut of theoretical perspectives, and with a variety of ideological and political slants. In our teaching and research, we criminologists draw on other disciplines, most notably sociology, psychology and law but also history, anthropology, public health, biology, economics, political science, operations research, and so on One of the constitutive dynamics of criminology is the incessant raid- ing of other disciplines for new ideas with which to pursue and renew the criminological project. As a discipline, criminology is shaped only to a small extent by its own theoretical logic and logic of inquiry. Its epis- temological threshold is a low one, making it open to radical innovation but also prone to the intellectual disorganization of eclecticism (Garland 2002). (3 SAVELSBERG and SAMPSON (2002) use the term “discipline” to refer to an academic field with a distinctive, self-generated intellectual core of problems and concepts - and they argue, correctly in my view, that criminology is not, in that sense, a discipline. My own usage is rather different, referring to the organizational practices that constitute and regulate crimi- nology as a demarcated academic field. Many academic subjects are, of course, disciplines in both senses of the term. Criminology is not. As I argue here, the field of criminology lacks a coherent, self-generated, scientific object because its objects of study (crime, criminals, con- trol) are given to it by extra-scientific processes. _— 23 — 3. — CRIMINOLOGY IS CONTESTED Given this diversity, there will always be competing visions of what criminology ought to be — criminology as experimental science; crimi- nology as social science; criminology as policy prescription; criminology as security management; criminology as criminal justice training; crim- inology as public discourse, and so on (Sherman (1998; 2005); Petersilia (1991); Balvig, Christie and Tham (2008); Sarat and Silbey (1988); Uggen and Inderbitzin (2006)). Relatedly, there are also competing conceptions of criminology'’s proper position in the academic field. Among the most important of these visions are the following: (1) criminology as an independent, stand-alone discipline (Radzinowicz 1962; Wolfgang 1963); (11) criminol- ogy as a sub-field within other more fundamental disciplines (Savelsberg and Sampson 2002); and (ili) criminology as a dissolving pathway into larger studies of regulation (Braithwaite 2000; 2003), or peace-making (Pepinsky and Quinney 1991) or human rights violations (McEvoy 2003), and so on. In the course of this talk, [ want to outline an alter- native vision of a dialogic criminology — a conception that builds upon criminology's past and preserves its most vital intellectual features. This conception would constitute criminology as an interactive, integrative enterprise, a bridging subject connecting the practical world of crime control with the academic disciplines of social science and law, a dia- logic enterprise that undertakes the work of criminological inquiry in on-going conversation with the diverse academic disciplines that bear upon its subject-matter. 4. — FINALLY, CRIMINOLOGY IS GOVERNMENTAL Let me return to the puzzle ! mentioned a moment ago. Criminol- ogy's eclecticism, and the absence of any theoretical problem or object of analysis that it can call its own, make its emergence as a “discipline” seem puzzling. How did this disparate bundle of policy-related inquiries come to acquire the status of a distinct academic subject? How did crim- inology achieve its current position in the academic field and in the insti- tutions of higher education? The solution to this puzzle has to do with criminology's perceived ability to further governmental interests by bringing its knowledge to bear on crime policy and the practice of criminal justice (Foucault 1977: Garland 1992). Criminology's basic organizing principle is the empirical study of crime and its control - which is to say, the study of a legally- defined entity and a state-directed practice. Unlike other sciences and __ 24 — well-constituted academic disciplines, criminology's object is not a self- generated theoretical entity or a naturally-occurring phenomenon but instead a state-defined social problem and the means by which that problem is managed. As a consequence, criminology 1s intimately (at the epistemological level) and directly (at the social level) tied into govern- ment (Garland 2002). This governmental dimension was especially obvious in the early years when the subject flourished in the prisons, the courtroom, and the juvenile justice hall — a flourishing that was directly encouraged by gov- ernment support and sponsorship (Garland 1988; 2002). Criminology's subsequent location in the university has, to some extent, obscured this knowledge-power link and alleviated some of the problems that stem from being too identified with government, but the linkage and the problems remain nonetheless (Garland 1992). Criminology's social sta- tus continues to rest in large part upon its practical utility and its value for government. Even within the academy, the subject 1s valued as much for its ability to attract research funds and student numbers as for its distinguished academic achievements. This dual commitment to government and to the academy, to policy and to science, sets up a series of recurring problems and tensions for criminology and its practitioners. Tension No. I : Criminology's relations with government The central difficulty that stems from criminology's dual commit- ment is one that 1s familiar to all criminological researchers and consists in the struggle to maintain academic integrity while seeking government access and research funding. But this problem also has a more funda- mental aspect that is less often noted and less easily dealt with — and it has to do with criminology's epistemological relation to government. Is it acceptable for an academic subject to derive its concepts, its cat- egories, its questions, and its objects of study from state institutions? Should criminology's objects of study be legal categories, governmental problems, and institutional products that are given to it by state prac- tices and political processes? Is criminology obliged to understand the categories of “crime”, “offender”, and ‘“victim” in accordance with the meanings given to them in the legal process? Must it accept the theories of action and responsi- bility implicit in legal discourse and court decisions? Or can it reconsti- tute these categories and theories in its own terms? 25 - In all of these issues, practical considerations (of relevance, of influ- ence, of funding, of communication) may press in a different direction than scientific considerations. How should we manage that tension? The solution lies, I think, in the company that criminology keeps, or to be more precise, in the intellectual diversity of the academic field it inhabits and of the intellectual exchanges in which it 1s routinely involved. It lies in criminology’s capacity to establish dialogue with con- tiguous academic subjects, to bridge the gap between its practical domain and the academic subjects that can provide resources for con- ceptualizing it. Let me offer a concrete illustration. À criminology that investigates state-defined criminal offences and state-identified offenders ought to be in constant dialogue with a sociology of deviance that refuses to take these terms as unproblematic givens. Such conversations can take place in lots of ways — in departmental meetings, at conferences, in undergrad- uate lectures, in the evaluation of manuscripts submitted to journals, or in the understanding that sociology graduates bring to postgraduate criminology programs. Where this kind of dialogue routinely takes place, it acts as a healthy reminder that the law'’s categories are social constructions that can be questioned, and that the state’s conceptions of “normal” and “deviant” are the outcome of political processes that are historically contingent, subject to change and open to challenge. Such conversations also bring into focus the extent to which criminalizing and penological practices are bound up with wider social processes, remind- ing criminologists of the links between crime and social issues such as stratification; labour markets; urban ecology; class, race and gender; family relations and the life course; and political economy ‘* Criminology'’s institutional location vis a vis other disciplines, and vis a vis disciplinary journals, conferences, graduate students, etc are liable to produce intellectual consequences for the subject. Wherever routine contact occurs between criminology and the other disciplines, criminol- ogy can retain its practical focus and yet benefit intellectually from con- tiguous disciplines. These intellectual benefits are much less likely wher- CVeTr criminology asserts 1ts autonomy and sets itself apart institutionally. In proposing this bridging, dialogic solution, ! am refusing a more radical suggestion that criminology should reject state definitions, aban- don its focus on “crime”, and reconstitute itself on a different basis (e.g. H. and J. Schwendinger 1975). Why? Because the state’s legal categories 9 [ illustrate my point here by referring to criminology’s links with sociology, but one could make the same point by reference to the other disciplines with which criminology car- ries on conversations - psychology, law, history, political science and so on. __ 26 — and institutional definitions are real and powerful. They shape our world, they organize our lives, they determine the fates of millions of people. To reject these categories, to give them no place in our analyses, is to opt out of an engagement with the real world — an engagement that has always been one of criminology's chief virtues. But we need always to view these state-defined categories for what they are : a specific regime of truth, made possible by specific institu- tions, specific social relations and definite balances of power. Because a policy-oriented governmental criminology is prone to forget that, a rou- tine, on-going association with critical theory and comparative sociology is a crucial corrective and we should seek institutional arrangements that make this possible. Tension No. 2 : Criminology’s role as policy adviser Criminology’s role as a policy adviser brings definite benefits. It brings research funding and access; an opportunity to shape policy and serve the public good; training and employment opportunities for our students; and an insider knowledge that enhances our credibility and public authority (Radzinowicz (1962); Ericson (2003)). The danger, however, is that criminology will become a wholly- owned subsidiary of the criminal justice state, with the criminal law dic- tating our object of study, government agencies dictating our research questions, and politicians and the press dictating our frames of rele- Vance. This Foucauldian image of criminology as power-knowledge in the service of the state is an ever-present danger, given the subject's basic disposition and orientation. If we have escaped that fate, and have suc- ceeded in creating a critical distance and a measure of scholarly integ- rity, it is due to our position in the academic field and our connections with other academic disciplines (Foucault 1980; Garland 1992). To the extent that we change that position, to the extent that we loosen these connections, to the extent that we establish an independent criminology that stands on its own, we thereby make ourselves more vulnerable to being co-opted by government ©) (°) See SAVELSBERG and SAMPSON (2002) who argue that “crimnology’s isolation from sociology comes at great cost.” “As criminology closes itself off from other academic disci- plines, it opens itself up to extra-scholarly interests, especially those of the state.” It thereby risks losing its academic integrity. They conclude that this process ought to be resisted. and that “concern with disciplinary credentials [and autonomy] should be replaced by a renewed focus on intellectual ideas.” See also SAVELSBERG, KING and CLEVELAND (2002) for empirical evidence supporting these claims. _ 27 — Am I suggesting that criminology ought to disengage from all gov- ernment involvement? That criminologists should cease giving policy advice? Am I adopting the view of Stanley Cohen (1985: 238) who declared : “It is simply not our professional job to advise, consult, rec- ommend or make decisions”? Or that of John Hagan (1989 : 257-8), who would subsume criminology into an explanatory sociology, com- pletely unconcerned with policy matters‘’? Or of Nils Christie, who insists that criminology should be “problem-raising” rather than a “problem-solving” ? No, [ am not. Nor 1s there any need to do so, since the issue can be viewed as a matter of “also/and” rather than “either/or”. Criminology would quickly cease to exist 1f it gave up its ambition to improve penal policy and offer crime control advice. But a policy-oriented criminology has its best chance of remaining detached and critical and intellectually alive 1f it 1s taught alongside, and in dialogue with, the kinds of crimi- nology that Cohen and Hagan and Christie have in mind : criminologies that are critical, explanatory, or downright trouble-making. The “policy-oriented criminologist”, the “academic sociologist of crime”, the “critical criminologist” - these are three different job descriptions and working personalities and they each imply a different vision of what criminology should be. But there is no reason why our subject has to commit itself exclusively to one or other of these visions. The field of criminology can fruitfully contain all three kinds of schol- arship and facilitate the cross-fertilization of each by the others. Theo- retical and critical work stand to gain from an engagement with the details of institutional practice and the messy complexities of policy- making. Policy advice can benefit from an understanding of the theo- retical frames and critical perspectives that bear on the subject. À broad field composed of different ways of doing and conceiving criminology, and drawing on a range of different disciplines and perspectives - that’s the arrangement that has worked best for criminology in the past and that's the working arrangement we should seek to foster in the future. If an expanded, independent criminology risks leaving that behind, then I, for one, am against independence. ( In his more recent work, Hagan appears to have revised his view. His new book about Darfur (HAGAN 2008) argues that criminology ought to come to terms with genocide and the causal processes underlying it. In the course of his argument, he makes it clear that he envis- ages a policy role for criminologists, providing international courts and organizations with evidence and expertise that can help justify and direct humanitarian intervention. () Quoted in ZEDNER and ASHWORTH (2003 : 16). 28 Tension No. $ : Criminology'’s position in the academic field Criminology's secure location in the academic world and its status as a respected field of scholarly inquiry are, it seems to me, of paramount importance for the intellectual and institutional health of our subject. Criminology's academic integrity and status as a university-based sub- ject are also, as [ have suggested, crucial in managing the subject’s rela- tions with government. It is therefore worrying that criminology's position in the academic hierarchy has often been an ambiguous one, and that stand-alone crim- inology (or criminal justice) degrees are — at least in the USA — most often associated with low-ranking colleges where teaching and voca- tional training take precedence over research and scholarship. This status problem is linked to some of criminology's essential char- acteristics. Às we have seen, criminology 1s organized around a policy problem and largely consists of empirical studies that produce local knowledge. In the academic hierarchy, “problem-oriented fields” of this kind are typically less prestigious than fundamental disciplines (Abbott 2001) *. The explanation for this status differential has to do with the differ- ence in the kinds of knowledge produced by the different kinds of sub- ject. The basic academic disciplines produce “portable knowledge” and transferable analytical skills that are more competitive, more enduring, and more valuable over time, compared to the localized “problem-based knowledge” of subjects like criminology. Why? Because “portable knowledge” has the power of abstraction, enabling it to address new situations and new problems by means of principles learned in other settings — in contrast to “problem-based knowledge” which tends to be more local and more limited in its appli- cation. The two forms of knowledge are also intellectually distinct, the former aspiring to theoretical depth and analytical understanding, the latter more focused on surface description and practical know-how. Of course, policy-specific research has intrinsic value, as does voca- tional training. And criminology would not exist in the university system today were it not for its capacity to provide these. But a university- based subject will ultimately be evaluated in terms of the university's own values, and these are fundamentally to do with the quality and depth of scholarship and the extent of theoretical understanding. We $ As Andrew Abbott points out, “status differences… keep the disciplines in superior power. Criminology departments hire from sociology departments, but seldom vice versa.” Abbott quoted in FERICSON (2003). 29 ought therefore to take care that the expansion of the subject and its increasing independence do not develop at the cost of its research capac- ity and academic standing. This, to me, provides another powerful reason why criminology needs to remain close to its constitutive disciplines. Only by drawing on the fundamental disciplines, and contributing to them in turn, can we hope to sustain the scholarly erudition, intellectual depth, and theoreti- cal insight that bring prestige and status in the academic world and which have always marked the very best criminological writings. Tension No. 4 : The training of criminologists To make academic contributions of the highest kind, it helps if crim- inologists are properly trained in the basic disciplines prior to specializ- ing in crime and punishment. It is not always enough to be introduced to these disciplines in passing, as part of a criminology degree : all too often such courses are a diluted form of disciplinary training, offering light-weight versions of the real thing, trimmed and tailored to fit into a criminology curriculum. And this problem will likely get worse over time. At present, most criminology graduate programmes are staffed by faculty trained in the basic disciplines. But as the subject’s institutional independence grows, criminology graduate programmes will increasingly be staffed by faculty with criminology graduate degrees with the result that the institutional relation of these programmes to the basic disci- plines will become ever more distant, their intellectual connections ever more attenuated. To thrive as an academic discipline, criminologists have to compete on equal terms with other social scientists and lawyers. If we write about our research and present our findings in a sociological, psychological, historical or legal mode, we mustn’t always be the amateurs, the self- trained outsiders. When we recruit our students and our faculty, we want the best and the brightest of these other disciplines coming into criminology, and we want to export criminological ideas and findings back into these disciplines. It ssems to me that the more independence criminology acquires, the more it moves away from the fundamental dis- ciplines, the more difficult it is to achieve real academic distinction. There are several sources of status and power in the university system — student numbers, research income, policy impact, media presence and criminology does relatively well in all of these terms. But the key measure of academic achievement 1s quality and distinction in scholar- ship. On this measure, criminology has a more mixed record. If we want to thrive in academic settings, we have to aspire to the highest scholar- — 30 — ship and reconnect with the fundamental concerns of social science and social theory. Creating an independent criminology that disengages insti- tutionally from these larger disciplines risks disengaging on intellectual terms too, and that’s a risk we ought not to take . SPECIALIZATION AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THEORY I have described some of the risks entailed in criminology becoming an independent specialism — the risk that it will be cut off from the basic disciplines, the risk that government will extend its dominance, and the risk that the subject will lose academic prestige. There is a final risk : namely that an independent criminology will tend to fragment into dis- tinct specialisms unconnected by any overarching theory. Specialization is an intrinsic dynamic in the field of criminology proper, given its focus on specific institutions, problems and policies. Prison studies; police studies; probation studies; sentencing studies; treatment studies; victim studies; juvenile studies; violence studies; crime prevention studies; fear of crime studies… the list goes on, each one a growing subfield poised to spin off from the larger discipline. There are obvious benefits of specialization, but the most salient drawback of this process is its negative effect on communication. Wher- ever specialisms proliferate, the tendency is for conversation across the field to decline. Criminologists end up as so many specialists with little to say to each other, with negative consequences for collective learning. In most academic fields there are two centripetal forces that work to unify research and generate conversation between researchers. One 1s topic and the other is theory‘ 10) . Topics bring scholars together but the # ] say this with some confidence because something of the sort has already occurred in the USA. During the first half of the 20" century, crime and its control were central topics of research in America’s leading sociology departments. (Think of the Chicago School. for example, or of Edwin Sutherland’s department at Indiana.) In the 1960s, however, the US government decided to professionalize criminal justice and funded a massive expansion of criminological training, much of it based in new criminal justice colleges. The subsequent expansion of criminology and the rise of these self-standing criminal justice programs led to the gradual abandonment of the specialism by the sociology departments of all the leading research universities. Until very recently, there was hardly a sociologist of crime and punish- ment to be found in any of them _ with major consequences for the kind and quality of work done on criminological topics. See SAVELSBERG, CLEVELAND and RyAN (2004) for empirical evidence about the way that institutional location (criminal justice program or sociology department) shapes research and theory choices. Recently, this process has been reversed, largely because America’s penal system has grown to the point where it has become a major engine of social organization and stratification. (19) Methodological discussion can also have this effect, but l'm going to ignore that for the moment. —— -— 31 inherent disposition of topic is a drive towards concreteness and specif- icity. Scholarship that is organized around a topic tends to become ever more specific, ever more specialized. The more scholars there are in the field, the more the field can support numerous specialisms. The more specialisms there are, the more fragmented the field becomes. In the end, there 1s little to talk about outside the rooms where small specialist groups discuss the arcane details of their speciality. The tendency of theory, in contrast, is towards abstraction and gen- eralization. Its aim 1s to include ever more data, ever more processes, and ever more situations, ever more fopics in its scope. It strives to link causal arguments and to build unified explanations. Different topics cease to be unconnected specialisms and become, instead, multiple opportunities for theoretical reflection and analysis. Theory gives rise to conversation and community — or else to focused conflict and disputa- tion. It operates to unify the field in collective projects that transcend particular research and esoteric specialisms ! Theory can, of course, divide an academic field just as it can unify it. But whether it unifies or divides, theory organizes, it generates col- lective conversations, it pulls researchers into a dialogue with one another, moving them beyond their concrete specialism to engage with larger questions. All of which enhances individual scholarship and serves the collective good of the subject. It is theory that provides the intellec- tual resources to take on new challenges and new problems - to extend our explanatory range and engage with new issues as they emerge. The- ory is what enlivens and energizes an academic subject. And since theory is generated by the fundamental disciplines, the vitality of our field depends on criminology’s continued connection with them. Let me be clear. I am not objecting to the existence of criminology institutes or criminology departments. Some of the most profoundly important scholarship on crime, control and punishment has come from such places. Nor am I saying that criminology undergraduate degrees cannot be academically first rate. But [ am saying that criminology must never cut itself loose from the disciplines that supply its intellectual energy and inspiration — and the move towards institutional autonomy threatens to bring this about (12) ( Here we ought to take our lead from the field of anthropology a discipline in which each individual scholar engages in specialist field research, focused on a particular place and particular people. and which might easily have become utterly fragmented but for the disci- pline's strong commitment to theory a commitment that is institutionalized in textbooks, university curricula, graduate training, journals, and the overall status system of the discipline. (2) As the work of SAVELSBERG et al shows (2002; 2004), the capacity to sustain serious connections between academic subjects is determined by institutional arrangements, organi- Zational routines, and the structurally-conditioned habits and oritentations of individual aca- demics. Ît cannot be left to good intentions. 32 IN CONCLUSION My argument has been that although criminology has an institu- tional core, its most important intellectual sources are eccentric, off-cen- tre, originating from outside the subject itself. My own experience 1s tes- tament to this. If I were to list the texts that have been most important to me in my work, they would not be the “classics” of mainstream crim- inology — though I have engaged with these classics and learned a great deal from them. My most useful exemplars have been works that loomed on the horizon of criminology, on its margins, most of them coming at crime and punishment from well beyond the criminological domain. In addition to the central thinkers of the sociological tradition (Marx, Weber, above all, Durkheim) I think of the work of figures like Paul Q. Hirst, Stuart Hall, Gareth Stedman Jones, Michel Foucault, Jacques Donzelot, Nikolas Rose, Norbert Elias, Chifford Geertz, Pierre Bourdieu, Ian Hacking, and Mary Douglas. These authors were not “criminologists” in any recognizable sense. And none of their inspira- tional works was generated out of criminology's core concerns. But every one of them advanced criminological understanding and helped redefine what criminology might be. Every one of them altered the ways in which criminologists could frame their questions, opening up new theoretical understandings in ways that were ultimately productive for the field as a whole. If criminology is to continue to realize its potential as an academic subject and not just a governmental one, if it is to continue producing scholarship of the highest quality, it needs to remain dialogic rather than detached, and eccentric rather than self-enclosed. 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(1985), “The Criminal and his Science”, in British Journal of Crim- inology, 25/2, pp. 109-137. GARLAND, D. (1988), “British Criminology Before 1935”, in P. Rock (ed), A His- tory of British Criminology, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 1-17. GARLAND, D. (1992), “Criminological Knowledge and its Relation to Power : Foucault’s Genealogy and Criminology Today”, in British Journal of Crimi- nology, 32/4, pp. 403-422. GARLAND, D. (2002), “Of Crimes and Criminals : The Development of Criminol- ogy in Britain”’, in M. MAGUIRE, R. MORGAN and R. REINER (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Criminology, 3'* edition, OUP, Oxford, pp. 7-50. GARLAND, D. and SPARKS, R. (2000), “Criminology, Social Theory and the Chal- lenge of Our Times”, in British Journal of Criminology, 40, pp. 189-204. HAGAN, J., RYMOND-RICHMOND, W. and PARKER, P. (2005), “The Criminology of Genocide : The Death and Rape of Darfur”, Criminology, 43/3, pp. 525-561. HAGAN, J. and RYMOND-RICHMOND, W. 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(2006), “Public Criminologies”, paper presented at the 2006 annual meetings of the ASA, Montreal. __ 35 — WOLFGANG, M. (1963), “Criminology and the Criminologist”, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 54, pp. 155-162. YACOUBIAN, G. (2000), “The (In)significance of Genocidal Behavior to the Dis- cipline of Criminology”, Crime, Law & Social Change, 34, pp. 7-19. ZEDNER, L. and ASHWORTH. À. (2003), “Introduction’” to ZEDNER and ASHWORTH (eds), The Criminological Foundations of Penal Policy, OUP, Oxford, pp. |- 30. ABSTRACT This essay discusses the current state of criminology and raises some questions about the subject’s nature, its relationship to government, and its location in the academic field. The author argues that criminology 1s best conceived not as an independent subject but as a bridging subject that addresses a practical field using the intellectual resources of more basic disciplines such as sociology, psychology and law. He warns against recent institutional developments that threaten to distance crim- inological research and training from those disciplines that provide its intellectual energy and distinction. Against these tendencies, the author argues for a dialogic conception of criminology and for the institutional conditions that make that conception possible. REÉSUMÉ L’objet de cet essai est de discuter de l’état actuel de la criminologie et de soulever certaines questions sur la nature de son objet, sur sa rela- tion avec le gouvernement, et sur sa position dans le champ académique. L’auteur soutient que la meilleure manière de concevoir la criminologie n’est pas d’en faire un objet indépendant, mais plutôt un objet fédéra- teur qui mobilise les ressources intellectuelles d’une série de disciplines de base telles que la sociologie, la psychologie et le droit. Il met en garde contre des développements institutionnels récents qui tendent à éloigner la recherche et la formation criminologiques des disciplines qui assurent son énergie et sa distinction. À l’encontre de ces tendances, l'auteur plaide en faveur d’une conception dialogique de la criminologie et de conditions institutionnelles qui rendent cette conception possible. RESUMEN El objeto de este articulo es discutir el estado actual de la crimino- logia y plantear ciertas cuestiones sobre la naturaleza de su objeto, sobre su relaciôon con el gobierno y sobre su posiciôn en el campo académico. — 36 El autor sostiene que la mejor manera de concebir la criminologia no es hacer de ella un objeto independiente sino mâs bien un objeto aso- ciativo, que movilice los recursos intelectuales de una serie de disciplinas de base, tales como la sociologia, la psicologia y el derecho. Advierte sobre los recientes desarrollos institucionales que tienden a alejar a la investigacion y la formaciôn criminolôgicas de las disciplinas que asegu- ran su energia y su distinciôn. Frente a estas tendencias, el autor defiende una concepciôn dialôgica de la criminologia y de las condicio- nes institucionales que hacen posible esta concepciôn. 37 -— ORGANIZED CRIME : NEW LABEL, NEW PHENOMENON OR POLICY EXPEDIENT? Letizia Paoli @ Up until the mid-1980s organized crime was considered a problem that concerned only a limited number of countries — primarily the United States and Italy, with the eventual addition of Japan, China and Colombia. Until then the scientific communities, the political leadership and the general public in virtually all European countries aside from Italy regarded themselves as largely unaffected by organized crime. Twenty years later, the picture has changed dramatically, particularly in Europe. Now virtually all European national law enforcement agencies claim that each of their nations has a serious organized crime problem, the fight against organized crime represents a priority of Europol and most domestic law enforcement agencies, and there is much concern about the threats posed by organized crime in the media and in public opinion, not just in Europe but worldwide (Paoli and Fijnaut, 2004b). Despite some delays and persisting deficiencies, academic research on organized crime has also expanded rapidly, particularly in Europe, since the 1980s. The growing concern about organized crime has fed and justified pol- icy reform. To control this form of crime, all European states and sev- eral non-European ones as well, have passed far-reaching legal and insti- tutional reforms, and all major international organizations, ranging from the European Union (EU) to the United Nations (UN), have adopted new international treaties and an even larger amount of soft law. The UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, which was opened for signature in 2000 and came into force in 2003, represents the apotheosis of such international efforts. À pertinent question is then to ask : ‘Why and how has this radical change of perception and policies taken place?’ This 1s the main ques- tion that this articie 1s supposed to answer. Another way to frame this (D This article is an extended version of the keynote lecture delivered at the XV World Congress of Criminology on July 22, 2008, in Barcelona. I would like to thank warmly Tony Peters for inviting me to give that lecture and Cyrille Fijnaut for allowing me to draw exten- sively upon the chapters we originally wrote jointly for Organized Crime in Europe (Fijnaut and Paoli, 2004). C Prof. Dr. Leuven Institute of Criminology. K.U. Leuven Faculty of Law, Belgium. question is to consider the extent to which organized crime can be best defined in terms of one of the three following definitions : — À new label attached to pre-existing illegal activities and actors that have remained substantially unchanged — À new phenomenon : that is, the growing use of the expression ‘organized crime’ effectively points to the rise of fundamentally new actors or new ways of conducting 1llegal activities — An expedient to promote and legitimize encompassing policy and institutional reforms and enhance international police and judicial cooperation. To briefly anticipate my conclusion, there is evidence to support all three definitions; however, there 1s no doubt that the first and third ones fit more closely than the second one. The article is organized in six parts. In the first section, I briefly sketch and try to explain the above-mentioned perception change. In the three central ones, I consider the contemporary patterns of organized crime in Europe and elsewhere. The fifth section reviews the policy changes introduced since the 1990s to tackle organized crime. In the final section, I come back to the title question and provide an extensive answer to it. In my conclusions, I also briefly consider the past and future contributions of criminology to this research and policy area. À few words on my sources : For Europe, I have relied to a large extent on the findings of a project on organized crime in Europe that I coordinated a few years ago with Cyrille Fijnaut and which involved over 30 other experts covering 13 EU and non-EU countries (Fijnaut and Paoli, 2004). For the rest of the world, I have used a variety of sources. Among them, I also refer to a project on the world heroin mar- ket, which I have just concluded with Victoria Greenfield and Peter Reuter (Paoli, Greenfield and Reuter, 2009). 1. — PERCEPTION CHANGES Several long-term processes and a variety of both far-reaching and localized historical events have contributed to the changing perception of organized crime. Some of these processes and occurrences directly impinge on the activities and perpetrators typically associated with organized crime; others are related to them only indirectly. Among the former set of processes, the rise of the 1llegal drug industry (since the late 1960s) and the phenomenal expansion of the human smuggling and trafficking industries (from the late 1980s onwards) are the most prom- inent (see infra). À variety of local crime-related events also contributed to the changing perception of organized crime. Among them, the mur- — 40 — ders of Judges Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino in 1992 and the bombs attacks in Continental Italy in 1993 organized by the Sicilian Cosa Nostra were certainly the most dramatic and received worldwide COVCTAgE. The changes affecting organized crime actors and activities cannot be properly understood unless we consider wider social processes and events. These have profoundly affected not only the organization and flow of 1illegal markets but also the general perception of organized crime. The worldwide processes of globalization have accelerated the interconnection between previously separate domestic 1illegal markets and increased the mobility of criminals across national borders. At the same time, economic liberalization has reduced the ability of govern- ments to withstand and regulate market forces and has unintentionally facilitated the sectors of the global economy that remain criminalized (Andreas, 2002). Illegal exchanges were also further facilitated by the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989. The opening of the Eastern borders, once strictly patrolled by Warsaw Pact troops, triggered a veritable boom of 1llegal markets all over the former Soviet Union and its satellite countries and objectively enhanced the movement of people, goods and capital across - and between — the two formerly segregated portions of Europe : criminals as well as non-criminals, drugs as well as regular commodities, dirty as well as hot and legitimate money could all circulate more freely than before. The fall of the Iron Curtain also had a tremendous impact on the perception of the organized crime problem. Particularly in its transnational variant, organized crime became one of the most frequent and successful labels to express the rising sense of insecurity caused by the sudden collapse of the bipolar world and the obscure menaces com- ing from the East (Woodiwiss, 2001). Within the countries of the European Community/Union, the wide- spread feeling of insecurity was further increased by the completion of the internal market and the abolition of internal border controls. Since the late 1980s ordinary people and politicians alike realized that in the new united Europe, free movement, increased economic interdependency and the facilitation of cross-border financial activities rendered internal borders increasingly ineffective, both as instruments of control and as obstacles to the movement of criminals and their activities. Wider social changes have also radically affected the perception of organized crime : together with several other, at least partially overlap- ping, concepts (the drugs and arms trafficker, the white slaver and, after September 2001, the terrorist), organized crime has become a convenient tool to express the anxieties of the general population about living in the ever more uncertain and insecure world of the late- or post-modern age. — 41 — These anxieties tend to manifest themselves as perceptions of threats to one’s own personal and material safety (Bauman, 2000) and have con- tributed to make organized crime a veritable ‘folk devil’ (Cohen, 1972). The radical change in perception has been made possible by three connotations of the very concept of organized crime. The first one 1s the idea of organized crime as a threat that comes from the outside (an ‘alien conspiracy’, as its critics would say; e.g., Smith, 1975 : 138-41), an idea that is underpinning much of the public debate on organized crime since its origins in the U.S. in the 1950s. The prototypical image 1s that of the Sicilian mafia organization invading and corrupting the U.S. first and later the rest of Europe (e.g., U.S. Senate, 1951 and 1963). In David Garland’s (2001) words, organized crime is clearly a case of ‘criminology of the other’. The extreme vagueness and elasticity of the concept constitutes the second connotation. Às Mike Levi puts it, organized crime 1s like the psychiatrist’s Rorschach blot, whose ‘attraction as well as weakness is that one can read almost anything into it’ (2002 : 887). Even within the scientific discourse 1t is still unclear whether organized crime consists of a set of criminalized activities, primarily the provision of prohibited goods and services, or a set of actors engaging in crime and, specifically, criminal organizations with a well-defined collective identity and subdi- vision of work among its members (Paoli, 2002). The third trait is the transnational dimension of organized crime, which has been increasingly emphasized since the early 1990s, primarily but not exclusively by the United Nations and other international organizations to point to the growing cross-border criminal activities (e.g., Fijnaut and Paoli, 2009). The mix of these three traits has allowed, and indeed fostered, the development of a very serious gap between the rhetoric of much discus- sion on organized crime and the definitions officially adopted. In official statements and reports, organized crime 1s presented as a most worrying threat with a strong emphasis on its transnational dimension. At the end of the UN World Ministerial Conference on Organized Transnational Crime, which took place in Naples in 1994, for example, its participants declared themselves ‘deeply concerned about the dramatic growth of organized crime over the past decade and about its global reach, which constitute a threat to the internal security and stability of sovereign States’ (United Nations General Assembly, 1994 : 2). On the other hand, the definitions of organized crime officially adopted are very loose and vague. The UN Convention against Tran- snational Organized Crime of 2000, for example, has clearly adopted a ‘lowest common denominator definition’ with no strict criteria in terms of number of members and group structure. Article 2, paragraph (a) of __ 42 — the Convention states : ‘“Organized criminal group” shall mean a struc- tured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit’ (United Nations General Assembly, 2000 : 25). Serious crime is defined by paragraph (b) of the same article as any offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years (ibid.). This means that the incisive investigative methods and other legislative and institu- tional changes recommended by the World Ministerial Conference of 1994 and now to a large extent included in the Convention can be also applied to cliques, gangs and networks that are very far removed from the stereotypes of organized crime dominating the media and political discourse. An analogous ‘double-track’ approach has been pursued by the European Union executive bodies. To justify its intervention, the EU Council presents organized crime as a new threat, whose novelty lies in the increasing involvement of criminal organizations in the supply of criminal goods and services. Such a view is clearly stated in the first pro- grammatic document dealing with organized crime, the ‘Action Plan to Combat Organised Crime’, which was adopted by the Council of the European Union on 28 April 1997. Its opening statement maintains : Organized crime is increasingly becoming a threat to society as we know it and want to preserve it. Criminal behaviour no longer is the domain of individuals only, but also of organizations that pervade the various structures of civil society and indeed society as a whole (European Union Council, 1997). When 1t comes to defining what a criminal organization 1s, the Euro- pean Union also proposes a very loose interpretation, setting low numerical standards. In the Joint Action adopted by the European Council on May 1998, a criminal organization is defined as ‘a structured association, established over a period of time, of more than two persons, acting in concert with a view to committing offences which are punish- able by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at least four years or a more serious penalty. . ° (European Union Council, 1998). ° If three people only are sufficient to form a criminal organiza- tion, one might justifiably ask if the (alleged) increasing presence of these entities in the illegal arena really represents a major innovation in ( This approach is confirmed by the proposed EU Framework Decision on the Fight against Organized Crime, which the European Council approved in April 2006 but has not yet entered into force because parliamentary reservations in some countries (Calderoni. 2008). __ 43 _ regard to the past and the threatening menace that the Plan assumes 1t to be. 2. — QORGANIZED CRIME ACTORS AND Despite the lack of regular and reliable data on organized crime and the poor cooperation between law enforcement agencies and independ- ent researchers in many countries, the available empirical research allows us to sketch a rough outline of organized crime in Europe. Though much of the concern about organized crime since the 1980s has been dictated by the fear of the expansion of the Italian mafia to the whole of Europe and to its becoming a model for others involved in organized crime, these pessimistic scenarios have not been realized. In no Western European country except Italy — nor in northern or central Italy itself — do Italian mafia groups control a significant portion of local 1llegal economies or exercise a systematic influence over the legal economy or the political system. Contrary to the exaggerated predic- tions of the early 1990s, other organized crime groups have not shown any interest in imitating the culture and structure of the Italian mafia. Nor are the average perpetrators in the EU interested in, or capable of, exercising a quasi-political power similar to that of the largest and most stable mafia organizations in southern Italy (Paoli and Fijnaut, 2004a). Europol itself has recognized the poor level of organization of organ- ized crime actors within the European Union : Às it wrote in its 2003 European Union Organised Crime Report : ‘the traditional perception of hierarchically structured organised crime groups is being challenged. There is now a development suggesting that a greater percentage of powerful organised crime groups are far more cellular in structure, with loose affiliations made and broken on a regular basis and less obvious chains of command’ (Europol, 2003 : 8). Whereas it is disputable that non-ltalian mafia groups have ever complied with the ‘traditional per- ception of hierarchically structured organised crime groups’, Europol’s departure from the Italia mafia model can only be welcomed. A growing body of literature‘*) shows that the great majority of ille- gal exchanges in Western European countries are carried out by numer- ous, relatively small and often ephemeral enterprises. This 1s because all illegal market actors are subject to constraints deriving from the ($ This literature includes both the reports on organized crime in ten EU countries and Switzerland produced for Organised Crime in Europe (e.g.. Besozzi. 2004; Hobbs, 2004, Kin- zig, 2004, Kleemans, 2004) as well as studies conducted by various authors in different coun- tries (e.g.…. Van Duyne and Levi, 2005; von Lampe, 2005; Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention, 2007; Spapens, 2008; Spapens and Fijnaut, 2005). __ 44 — enforcement of prohibition. These constraints have to do with the fact that illegal market entrepreneurs are obliged to operate both without and against the state. First, since the goods and services they provide are prohibited, illegal market suppliers cannot resort to state institutions to enforce contracts and have violations of contracts prosecuted. Nor does the illegal arena host an alternative sovereign power to which a party may appeal for redress of injury. Às a result, property rights are poorly protected, employment contracts cannot be formalized, and the development of large, formally organized, long-lasting companies is strongly discour- aged (Reuter, 1983). Second, all suppliers of 1llegal commodities are forced to operate under the constant threat of arrest and confiscation of their assets by law enforcement institutions. Participants in criminal trades will thus try to organize their activities in such a way as to assure that the risk of police detection is minimized. Incorporating drug transactions into kin- ship and friendship networks and reducing the number of customers and employees are two of the most frequent strategies illegal entrepreneurs employ to reduce their vulnerability to law enforcement moves. Due to the threat of police intervention, either in terms of seizing assets or imprisoning participants, the planning time horizons of illegal entrepre- neurs are likely to be much shorter than those in legal markets. Since an illegal enterprise can hardly be sold as the entrepreneur ages, he is likely to divert an increasing share of his profits to legal assets which can be passed on to his heirs. Finally, since they are operating against the state, illegal firms are prevented from marketing their products. They cannot create their own brand image and try to bind customers to it. Strong economies of scale, however, are associated with advertising and the advantages linked to the nationwide marketing of one’s own products have long been recog- nized as a very important factor in the rise of modern large-scale cor- porations. According to most economists, for example, advertising rep- resents the single most important basis of large-firm advantages (Scherer and Ross, 1990: 130-38). Illegal firms, however, are by definition excluded from the possibility of exploiting these advantages because, by doing so, they would obviously attract law enforcement attention and damage their own businesses. For all the above reasons, it is rather unlikely that large, hierarchi- cally organized firms will emerge to mediate economic transactions in the illegal marketplace. The factors promoting the development of bureaucracies in the legal portion of the economy - namely taking advantage of economies of scale of operations and specialization of roles — are outbalanced in the illegal arena by the very consequences of prod- — 45 — uct illegality. Listing these constraints thus leads to the conclusion that, within the illegal economy of countries with efficient governments, there is no immanent tendency towards the consolidation of large-scale, mod- ern illegal bureaucracies (Paoli, Reuter and Greenfield, 2009). Even southern Italian mafia families are subjected to the constraints deriving from the 1llegal status of products and, when they deal in drugs or other illegal commodities, they do not operate as monolithic productive and commercial units. On the contrary, their members frequently set up short-term partnerships with other mafia affiliates, or even non-mem- bers, to carry out 1llegal transactions (Paoli, 2003). In other words, in the 1illegal markets of most industrialized countries ruled by relatively strong and efficient state apparatuses, the dominant model is not organ- ized crime, but — following the title of a famous book by Peter Reuter — “disorganized crime’ (1983). 3 AND ACTIVITIES IN EUROPE Recognising the relatively ‘disorganized’ nature of organized crime in Europe does not imply an optimistic assessment of its nature, scale and danger. Forming flexible and changeable networks, the small and ephemeral enterprises comprising the bulk of European organized crime since the mid-1970s have sustained a phenomenal expansion of 1llegal markets in Western and, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, in Eastern Europe as well. Since the early 1970s, in particular, a rising demand for a variety of illegal drugs — first cannabis and heroin and then since the early 1990s cocaine, ecstasy and other amphetamine products - has fostered the development of an international drug trade from producing to consumer countries and the emergence of nationwide drug distribution systems in all European states. To meet expanding popular demand, pre-existing criminal organizations — such as Italian mafia groups — and thousands of individuals, cliques and groups with or without previous criminal expertise have entered the drug trafficking business, attracted by the anticipation of large profits. The expansion of the drugs market has resulted in the progressive re-conversion of professional crime to the drug business, with a progressive decline of the ‘traditional’ underworld. Today the drug market is most probably — despite the absence of relia- ble estimates for other illegal activities — the largest illegal market world- wide, with an annual turnover of over 320 billion dollars according to the UNODC (2005 : 123-143). It is important to stress that European countries are not just con- sumers and thus — so to say — victims of drug trafficking. In the last two decades of the twentieth century, several European countries acquired a __ 46 — pivotal role in the world illegal drug trade. Due to their geographic posi- tion, Turkey and Spain have constituted for at least two decades the main gateway for Afghan heroin as well as Moroccan hashish and Colombian cocaine, respectively. Since the 1970s Turkey has been the main gate for Afghan heroin on its way to Western European markets. Likewise, due to its geographic position, Spain has since the 1980s become the main entry point for Moroccan hashish, as shown by the fact that it accounts for about 75 percent of all hashish seizures in Europe. For smuggling cocaine into Europe, Colombian traffickers also seem to prefer Spain (together with the Netherlands), as they are aided by a mutual language and by the presence of a consistent community of co-nationals (Gômez-Céspedez and Stangeland, 2004). In some coun- tries, most notably the Netherlands and Belgium but also more recently Poland and Albania, we find not only illegal drug traffickers and dis- tributors but drug producers as well. Cannabis is cultivated nowadays, at least indoors, in most European countries (e.g., Spapens, van de Bunt and Rastovac, 2007). From the early 1990s onwards the Netherlands and Belgium have become the major European and, possibly, world pro- ducers of ecstasy (Spapens, 2006). Polish chemists have specialized in the production of amphetamines for both Western and Eastern markets, and Albanians have taken up the cultivation and sale of marijuana, re- launching a product that had for almost twenty years disappeared from many Western European markets (Paoli and Fijnaut, 2004a). Despite the re-conversion of many professional criminals to drug trafficking and dealing, several — traditional and non-traditional - profit-making criminal activities have continued to proliferate. Some, such as the illegal trade in weapons, are instrumental to a life ‘on the other side of the law’. Other activities — ranging from car thefts, to rob- beries and the exploitation of prostitution — experienced an unexpected revival in the years immediately following the fall of the Iron Curtain, when Eastern European criminals primarily resorted to violence and ruthlessness to earn a ‘fast buck' in Western Europe. As a few scholars and particularly Mike Levi (1999) and Tom Naylor (2004) have shown, a third group of entrepreneurial crime activities also flourished in the 1980s and 1990s and continue to do so today, though they are hardly the prerogative of traditional underworld members. These activities range from fraud and other financial crimes to bid-rig- ging in public works tenders and the 1llegal wholesale trade in toxic waste, weapons, diamonds and gold. They undoubtedly form a part of organized crime, if one accepts the loose definitions of organized crime that dominate the political and scientific discourse on organized crime in Europe today. As Dick Hobbs (2004 : 422) puts it, ‘by acknowledging [these activities] as organised crime, both the curricula vitae of contem- __ 47 — porary felons and the range of 1ideological and material support struc- tures for their activities are considerably expanded’. Though difficult to estimate precisely, their financial turnover and the harm they cause to society may also be considerably higher than those of most types of crime traditionally considered to be an exemplification of organized crime. Whereas the more white-collar forms of organized crime usually attract public attention only in the immediate aftermath of a big scan- dal, a second wave of expansion of European illegal markets, which started to develop fifteen years after the first, drug-related wave, has raised much concern in government institutions and from the general public. This expansion was largely triggered by the enactment of increas- ingly restrictive immigration policies in most Western European coun- tries during the 1980s and 1990s, which created a large demand for human smuggling services. The number of potential customers as well as victims of veritable human trafficking suddenly multiplied, as the lib- eration of Eastern Europe in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 finally abolished restrictions on the mobility of almost four hun- dred million Eastern EFuropean and former Soviet citizens. Crises in other parts of the world, ranging from several African countries to Iraq, Afghanistan and East Timor, also engorged the flow of prospective migrants, at the same time as growth and improvement of transporta- tion facilitated their movements, by drastically reducing logistical con- straints. To meet this demand, human smuggling ‘companies’ popped up at all the crucial borders of ‘Fortress Europe’. Though many smugglers merely sell services desperately wanted by their customers, not only are their prices in most cases extortionate, but conditions are often inhu- man, as proven by the many accidents all over Europe that cost the lives of undocumented migrants. Moreover, this flourishing black market has opened up space for all kinds of exploitation that sometimes end up as real trafficking in human beings. According to U.S. Department of State (2008), 600-800,000 persons are trafficked across borders each year, though the scientific bases of this figure remain unclear. Organized crime’s infiltration of the legitimate economy, civil society and politics has been investigated and studied much less than its 1llegal market activities, and even in many EU countries it is impossible to go beyond guesswork and speculation. Despite the serious shortcomings of information sources, it can safely be stated that in all ‘old’ EU countries — With the exception of Italy — traditional organized crime groups’ abil- ity to infiltrate the legitimate economy and corrupt civil and political institutions was grossly overstated when organized crime began to _— 48 — attract media and political attention in the late 1980s (Paoli and Fijnaut, 2004a). In many European countries, however, perpetrators of organized crime invest in several legitimate industries — above all in the transport, finance, real estate, hotel and night-life sectors — to facilitate their 1llegal activities and reinvest their illicit proceeds. Organized crime’s investment in hotels, night-clubs and pubs in several Dutch cities (especially in Amsterdam) and in real estate in the south of Spain as well as extensive mafia infiltration in the southern Italian legitimate economy are most worrying (Kleemans, 2004 and Gômez-Céspedez and Stangeland, 2004). The picture becomes even less clear-cut if one considers the perpetrators of non-traditional organized crime activities, such as fraud, the manip- ulation of public tenders and the illegal trade in toxic waste, weapons and gold. These white-collar criminals have no need to ‘infiltrate’ into the legitimate economy as they are already an established part of it, and the revenues of their ‘dirty’ activities are barely distinguishable from the flows of ‘clean’ and ‘hot’ money that are traded incessantly around the world. 4. — BROADENING THE VIFVW : ORGANIZED CRIME MANIFESTATIONS IN THE REST OF THE WORLD Some distinctions to the picture I have sketched so far need to be made for Eastern Europe. Before pointing to the differences, however, let me first stress the similarities between organized crime activities and actors in Western and Eastern Europe. Long curtailed by socialist dic- tatorships, illegal markets have boomed in all Eastern European coun- tries since the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989. In particular, illegal drug consumption and trade have expanded phenomenally in Russia and most other former Warsaw Pact countries. Today, Russia probably con- stitutes the second largest market in the world for opiates and the larg- est one if only heroin is considered — and this although heroin was vir- tually unknown to Russian and Eastern European until the mid-1990s (Paoli, Greenfield and Reuter, 2009). AlIl illegal markets in Eastern Europe and Russia have integrated into the world ones and rapidly internationalized. During the early phases of the transition, large criminal groups formed in numerous former Warsaw Pact countries, as the former Com- munist government agencies did not have the necessary resources to effectively counter their activities, and many civil servants with misera- ble or no regular pay were happy to accept bribes from criminals or _— 49 — even to enter themselves into illegal profit-making and protection busi- nesses, as for example, the work of Federico Varese (2001) and Vadim Volkov (2002) on the Russian mafia have masterly shown. Almost twenty years after 1989, most Eastern European countries are well advanced in closing the legal and institutional gap separating them from Western standards and as a result, organized crime has also tended to assume the more disorganized and network-like patterns typical of Western Europe. Large and violence-prone criminal groups remain, however, active in countries where the government is unable or not interested in enforcing criminal law prohibitions strictly (e.g., Arsovska, 2007). The distinction between organized crime, business crime and the legitimate economy also became blurred after 1989 in countries where up until few years earlier all forms of private entrepreneurship had been considered criminal and where it was long virtually impossible to con- duct a business without violating some laws. Again, paths have diversi- fied across former Warsaw Pact countries. In some of them, particularly those that have entered the EU, the local governments have set up a via- ble legal framework to regulate the legitimate economy and to separate the latter from the underground and tout court criminal economies. In other contexts, however, a clear-cut distinction still does not exist, and organized crime groups are still heavily involved in key legitimate eco- nomic sectors, are able to influence the political decision making and thus threaten economic and political stability (e.g., Shelley, 2004). The organized crime picture becomes less clear-cut once we leave Europe, all the more so as research on organized crime has been scarce except for a few countries, such as the United States, ° Canada (Beare, 1996), Colombia (Thoumi, 2003) and Japan (Hill, 2003). There 1s no time here for a full-fledged review. With some caveats, I hypothesize that the model of varying 1llegality I have recently developed with Vic- toria Greenfield and Peter Reuter (2009) for the world heroin market can be extended to other 1llegal activities as well. Namely, in countries with effective governments the organized crime picture by and large resembles that in the EU, with the main exception being Japan, where the government long preferred accommodation with the Yakuza (Hill, 2003). Such countries tend to host 1illegal enterprises that are relatively small and ephemeral, use violence sparingly because it is counterproduc- tive for their own businesses and are unable to corrupt systematically ) In the United States, research on organized crime has a long tradition, as it began already in the 1920s with the seminal work of John Landesco ([1929], 1968). However, since the 1980s the topic of organized crime as such has stimulated limited empirical research (e.g.. Reuter, 1983; Chin, 1996; Jacobs, 1999; Finckenauer and Waring, 2001), although there 1s a large body of scientific literature on activities considered typical of organized crime, such as drug trafficking and human smuggling. —— 50 — the public administration or extensively infiltrate the legitimate econ- omy Where governments are weak, corrupt or do not control parts of their own territory, such as in Colombia, Afghanistan, Tajikistan or some African countries (e.g., Thoumi, 2003; Paoli et al., 2007; Gastrow, 2003), large organized crime enterprises may consolidate, and these have no restraints in using extensive violence and corruption or in infiltrating the legitimate economy and influencing politics. Indeed, these enterprises are often no longer mere economic entities but frequently fuse with guerrilla, insurgency or paramilitary groups. 5. — QORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL POLICIES To a much higher degree than in other contexts, the fight against organized crime has been a major theme in justice and home affairs pol- icy-making in Europe since the 1990s. At least up until 9/11, the need to tackle organized crime had become one of European politicians’ and government agencies’ most effective arguments to enact criminal and criminal procedural law reforms, introduce new offences and special investigative powers for law enforcement agencies and propel the tran- snationalization of crime control and criminal justice (Fijnaut and Paoli, 2004a). It is by no means excessive to say that under the aegis of the Euro- pean Union, policy on organized crime in Europe has increasingly tran- scended national boundaries and since the late 1990s become a matter of international politics and hence also of the foreign policy of individ- ual countries. This internationalization of organized crime control policy explains why the changes that have taken place on several fronts in indi- vidual countries in Europe are so similar, whether they involve the cen- tralization of the police, the judiciary and the customs authorities, or the creation of special units within these institutions, or the introduction of intrusive methods of investigation, such as the use of phone tapping, anonymous witnesses and undercover agents. The reports on organized crime control policies in 13 European states‘°’ and their comparison in Organized Crime in Europe (Fijnaut and Paoli, 2004) document these similarities and also the pressure EU Member States and particularly the old ‘Candidate States’ were put under to accept a common approach to organized crime. The first EU policy initiative on organized crime was the already- mentioned ‘Action Plan to Combat Organised Crime of April 1997’. (°) The reports were produced by scholars such as Levi (2004), van de Bunt (2004), Kilch- ling (2004), Cornils and Greve (2004), Scheinost (2004) and Plywaczeski and Filipowski (2004). This comprehensive plan consisted of a raft of measures to forcefully promote cooperation between the Member States in criminal matters, as intended in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union : expansion of the system of legal assistance, greater involvement of Europol in coop- eration between the Member States, mutual evaluation of the legal and organizational measures that the Member States implement in this area in their own country, etc. The plan also included a few proposals to devote more attention to preventing organized crime : transparency in public administration, screening of individuals and companies in public tender procedures and social and economic measures for cities to pre- vent them becoming ‘breeding grounds for organised crime’. In the same year, the fight against organized crime was elevated to the rank of an EU treaty issue in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), becoming central to the Third Pillar, whose main aim is to create an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ within the countries of the EU. In the reformulated Title VI (‘Provisions in the Field of Justice and Home Affairs’) strengthening police and judicial cooperation was sup- posed to serve just one purpose : to combat organized crime. Ât a spe- cial summit in Tampere, Finland, in October 1999 the European Coun- cil expressed itself ‘deeply committed to reinforcing the fight against serious organized and transnational crime’ and launched a ‘Unionwide Fight against Crime’, meaning primarily organized crime (European Union Council, 1999). In the following years many initiatives were introduced by the Euro- pean Council and Commission to implement the agreements reached. For instance, Eurojust (a sort of European prosecutor’s office with the task of facilitating the proper coordination of national prosecuting authorities), the Police Chiefs Operational Task Force and joint inves- tigation teams were set up, and in 2005 an EU Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters entered into force. The latest culmination of this internationalization process is repre- sented by the Lisbon Treaty. If it ever comes into force, this could rep- resent a ‘Copernican Revolution,’ as Cyrille Fijnaut (personal commu- nication) puts it, for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. In particular, police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters should de facto become matters of old ‘First Pillar’ and as such be decided with qualified majority voting. In such a legislative framework, however, the fight against organized crime may lose some of its policy relevance : once maintaining domestic security becomes a joint task of the Euro- pean Union and the Member States together, it might no longer be nec- essary to stress so much the transnational dimension of organized crime to legitimize the EU intervention. __ 52 — Organized crime control has also acquired a growing relevance in EU foreign policy. In 1998 the applicant countries that joined the EU in May 2004 were made sign a ‘Pre-Accession Pact on Organised Crime’ and put under considerable pressure to adopt Western European policy in this area : the famous acquis communautaire. At the same time, a vari- ety of programs were initiated by the European Commission and the Council of Europe to help all former communist European countries strengthen their political and judicial capacities in the fight against organized crime and corruption. This important development - the interweaving of the domestic and foreign policies of the European Union, particularly in the field of com- bating organized crime — culminated in the European Security Strategy, which was adopted in December 2003. In this document, organized crime is considered one of the key threats to Europe, alongside terrorism and regional conflicts. Its control is thus singled out as one of the most relevant EU'’s strategic objectives and ‘better coordination between external action and Justice and Home Affairs policies 1s’ stated as being ‘crucial in the fight against both terrorism and organised crime’. This perspective is obviously influenced by the philosophy that underlies the U.S. policy in this area, namely that ‘the first line of defence is often abroad’ (e.g., Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006). This development means that in the EU, too, the question of internal security has become inex- tricably linked with that of external security. The fight against organized crime is no longer an internal European matter for the Member States, but has become a global priority of the EU as such. An interesting paradox here is that the United States, the country that first introduced most of the new investigative methods as well as the ‘first line of defence’ philosophy, has resorted much less frequently than its European partners to the umbrella concept of organized crime to back policy changes. Even before launching the ‘War on Terror’, the United States has exploited other causes, such as the ‘War on Drugs and the fight against money laundering, as the main justifications for introducing the new investigative methods, marketing them among allied and satellite countries and intensifying international police cooperation (Nadelmann, 1993; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006). Not surprisingly, this lower political relevance has also resulted in much less academic interest in the topic. Despite these differences, the United States was, along with the EU countries, an outspoken supporter of the 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, which propagates many of the new ( The Council of Europe also takes initiatives of its own accord to combat organized crime. For a brief review, see Fijnaut and Paoli (2004). _ 53 — investigative methods and enhances police and judicial cooperation among its 143 parties (Gastrow, 2002). The Convention criminalizes the participation in an organized criminal group, defined according to the loose criteria discussed earlier, as well as money laundering and corrup- tion and foresees tough measures to combat these phenomena, prosecute offenders and confiscate proceeds. Important procedural issues are dealt with in detail in the second part of the convention : extradition and mutual assistance, special investigative techniques and joint investiga- tions, exchange of information, protection of witnesses and law enforce- ment cooperation. All these measures clearly demonstrate the influence of the United States and the EU on the Convention. This explains why the Convention was and still is regarded with a certain amount of suspicion in other parts of the world. Does it not serve the interests of the West too much? Is it not a direct application of the ‘first line of defence’ doctrine? The fact that Article 30 creates the possibility of assisting ‘developing countries and countries with econo- mies in transition’ in the implementation of the Convention can, of course, easily fuel this suspicion (Fijnaut and Paoli, 2009). 6. — CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS ON CRIMINOLOGICAL RESEARCH ON ORGANIZED CRIME It is now time to give a full answer to the title question : ‘Does organized crime constitute primarily a new label, new phenomenon or policy expedient ? Let us first acknowledge the changes that have occurred and thus the extent to which organized crime represents a new phenomenon. Criminals and criminalized commodities travel today much faster than ever before, and previously separate domestic illegal markets have become much more tightly interconnected. Areas of the globe that were previously isolated — either for political reasons, such as the former Warsaw Pact bloc, or because of their underdevelopment, such as many African countries —- have now become integrated in the world illegal markets. These developments should not be a source of surprise, though, as they mirror analogous changes in the broader soci- ety and economy. Moreover, this picture needs to be nuanced and sharpened with some facts contradicting the thesis of organized crime as a new phenomenon. First, despite the growing emphasis placed on the transnational dimen- sion of organized crime since the early 1990s, many organized crime activities — and their impact — remain local. For example, consider the illicit drug trade, which is often considered a prototypical transnational activity : drugs are produced, distributed and consumed in specific __ 54 — places. What 1s transnational in their trade, as in most forms of criminal activities, are the transportation, communication and money flows. From a policy perspective, an important corollary of this more balanced understanding of organized crime is that its containment 1s first and foremost the responsibility of local authorities. To operate effectively, however, these authorities often need to cooperate with each other, and so they need the support of international institutions such as Interpol or, in a European context, Europol and Eurojust to bridge the gaps between them. Second, the powerful large-scale and hierarchical criminal organiza- tions that have long been considered exemplary of organized crime have by and large not materialized in any country with a government effec- tively enforcing its criminal law. In these contexts, a myriad of small and ephemeral enterprises continue to constitute the bulk even of those illegal industries that expanded significantly in the late twentieth cen- tury. From such a perspective, organized crime appears to be more a new label than a new phenomenon. Despite its lack of an empirical basis, the spectre of transnational mafia-type criminal organizations has served a key policy function — and it is for this reason that organized crime must also be considered a pol- icy expedient. With varying degrees of good faith, in fact, such a spectre has been propagated by the media, politicians, law enforcement agencies of many countries and, more recently, by international organizations to pass reforms that would otherwise meet resistance from lower-level agencies seeing their competencies reduced and provoke the opposition of civil rights organizations. At the same time, however, the legal definitions of organized crime adopted by most states and international organizations hardly reflect the mafia fixation of much political and media discourse. Às mentioned ear- lier, most of these definitions are very broad, if not vague, so much so that they — and the special powers granted to organized crime investiga- tors and prosecutors — can be applied to a wide range of criminal phe- nomena and people involved. Indeed, by reading most official definitions, one can barely grasp the specificity of organized crime vis-à-vis other types of crime and understand the novel dangers of this phenomenon, which are cited to justify the introduction of incisive investigative powers and the restriction of defendants’ and common people's rights. It 1s in this gap between the dramatic images presented by political and media rhetoric and the wide-ranging and petty behaviours included in most offi- clal definitions that a serious deception of the general public lies. I would like to conclude this article with a few considerations on the past and future contributions of criminology to this area of research and policy. Especially in Europe and North America, criminologists have played a key role in improving our understanding of organized crime activities and actors through a series of empirical studies at the local, national and, less frequently, at the regional level. The overall picture of organized crime in these contexts is fairly clear, though additional stud- les, especially ethnographic research projects, could certainly improve our understanding of the details and new trends. Criminologists have also been most vocal in showing the political uses of much concern about organized crime and, in my opinion, some have gone even too far in completely denying the underlying changes in international 1illegal markets. Together with criminal laywers and other social scientists, criminologists — again especially in Europe and North America — have also critically reviewed the legislation adopted, sharply criticizing it when these measures appeared not commensurate or went too far in restricting suspects’ and citizens’ rights. As for the potential of future research, I see three main gaps that should be filled in the coming years. First, not much is yet known about organized crime activities and actors in large parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Research in these contexts should be intensified : Article 28 of the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime calls par- ties to promote scientific research on organized crime, but this article has so far remained a dead letter in most countries. Comparative research across different parts of the world should also be encouraged. Second, most policy reforms on organized crime are justified with the reasoning that organized crime represents a major threat to society. In the last few years many European police agencies, including Europol (2008) have begun Organized Crime Threat Assessments to set their pri- orities (see also SOCA, 2008). In my opinion, these assessments should not be left to government agencies alone, which often use poor and opaque methodologies. Criminologists should at the very least exercise a critical review of the official Threat Assessments or, even better, develop independent scientific methods to establish what kind of threat (and to whom or what) the different organized crime activities and actors really represent. Consider, for example, the case of smuggling migrants. This activity is often lumped together with human trafficking, which is a most heinous activity. In the case of smuggling of migrants, however, the harm 1s certainly much lower and seems to be more the result of criminalization than of the criminalized activity itself. ‘* Finally, the flurry of initiatives adopted in the past fifteen years to fight against organized crime has been subject only sporadically to eval- ($) Tom Vander Beken from the University of Gent and myself, together with two junior colleagues from our universities, have just started a project in this area in collaboration with the Belgian Federal Police, and at the next World Congress of Criminology we should have some findings to report. _— 56 — uation. Some of my former colleagues at the Max Planck Institute for Criminal Law in Freiburg have done some pioneering work in this respect for Germany (Albrecht, Dorsch and Krüpe, 2003; Kinzig, 2004) and, as far as confiscation is concerned, also Europe-wide (Kilchling, 2001). 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Given this huge and sudden shift, the article considers the extent to Wwhich organized crime can be best defined in terms of one of the three following definitions : (1) a new label attached to pre-existing illegal activities and actors that have remained substantially unchanged; (2) a new phenomenon : that is, the growing use of the expression ‘organized crime’ effectively points to the rise of fundamentally new actors or new ways of conducting illegal activities; (3) an expedient to promote and legitimize encompassing policy and institutional reforms and enhance international police and judicial cooperation. After reviewing organized crime manifestations and policies in Europe and elsewhere, the article concludes that there is evidence to support all three definitions; however, there is no doubt that the first and third ones (organized crime as a new label and policy expedient, respectively) fit more closely than the second one (organized crime as a new phenomenon). RÉSUMÉ La perception du crime organisé et les politiques qui sont dévelop- pées à son encontre ont changé radicalement depuis le milieu des années 1980 tant en Europe que dans le reste du monde. Alors que le crime organisé a longtemps été considéré comme un problème propre à certai- nes contrées, les trois dernières décennies ont vu croître dans le monde entier la préoccupation de cette forme de crime, alimentant et justifiant la volonté de changer la politique à son égard. Face à ce changement important et soudain, l’auteur examine dans quelle mesure le crime organisé trouve le mieux sa définition dans les trois formules suivantes : (1) un nouveau label pour des activités illégales — 61 — préexistantes et des acteurs qui n’ont pas substantiellement changé; (2) un phénomène nouveau : l’usage accru de l’expression “crime organisé” répondrait à l’augmentation d’acteurs fondamentalement nouveaux ou de nouvelles manières de mener des activités 1illégales; (3) un expédient pour promouvoir et légitimer des politiques et des réformes institution- nelles et favoriser la coopération internationale en matière policière et judiciaire. Après avoir passé en revue les manifestations du crime organisé et les politiques développées en Europe et ailleurs, l’auteur de l’article conclut qu’aucune preuve n’étaye aucune des trois définitions, mais qu'il n’y a pas de doute que la première et la troisième (nouvelle étiquette, ou jus- tification de politiques) rendent mieux compte de la réalité que la deuxième (phénomène nouveau). RESUMEN La percepciôn del crimen organizado y de las politicas en contra del mismo han experimentado un cambio drâstico desde mediados de los años ochenta tanto en Europa como en el resto del mundo. Durante mucho tiempo se considerô que el crimen organizado era un problema que solo afectaba a unos pocos paises, pero en las tres ültimas décadas el interés por este tipo de crimen ha ido creciendo en todo el mundo, alimentando y justificando asi una reforma de esta politica. Dado este enorme y repentino cambio, el articulo considera cual de las tres definiciones que siguen a continuaciôn, es la mejor para referirse al crimen organizado: (l) dar una nueva etiqueta a actividades 1legales ya existentes y a actores, aunque no hayan cambiado sustancialmente; (2) un nuevo fenômeno: el creciente uso de la expresiôn «crimen organizado» señala fundamentalmente el aumento de nuevos actores 0 nuevos modos de realizar actividades 1legales; (3) un recurso para pro- mocionar y legitimizar reformas politicas e institucionales y promover la policia internacional y la cooperaciôn judicial. Después de revisar muestras y politicas de crimen organizado en Europa y otros lugares, el articulo concluye que hay evidencia para apo- yar las tres definiciones. Sin embargo, no hay duda de que la primera y la tercera (crimen organizado como una nueva etiqueta, y un recurso politico, respectivamente) se ajustan mejor que la segunda (crimen orga- nizado como un nuevo fenômeno). — 62 — DELINCUENCIA URBANA Y VICTIMIZACION DE LAS VICTIMAS E. Raûl Zaffaroni () 1. — LA POLITICA ACTUAL \! LA DELINCUENCIA URBANA (( A alguien le interesa prevenir la delincuencia urbana?) Existe un preocupante fenômeno de delincuencia urbana en todo el mundo. La vida se ha vuelto urbana, la poblaciôn mundial tiende a concentrarse en ciudades y, por ende, la criminalidad también. Pero el hecho de la delin- cuencia urbana es proyectado a la poblaciôn a través de la comunica- ciôn masiva, que construye la realidad de la delincuencia urbana (pro- yeccion mediâtica del hecho). Por ùûltimo hay una respuesta politica al hecho y a su proyecciôn. Teôricamente puede distinguirse la respuesta politica al hecho (medidas preventivas y represivas, servicio de seguridad, etc.) de la respuesta politica a la proyecciôn (discurso politico de seguri- dad) pero en la prâctica no son independientes e incluso se confunden de modo inextricable : los legisladores, las agencias ejecutivas y los res- ponsables politicos de éstas e incluso los poderes ejecutivos, responden a hecho en la forma en que éste es proyectado por la comunicaciôn, por- que ésta es la exigencia de la llamada opiniôn publica. Es América Latina — y quizà en todo el mundo — es cada vez mas claro que /a respuesta politica es a la proyecciôn mediâtica y no al hecho mismo de la delincuencia urbana. Urgidos los politicos por la proyeccion mediâtica, responden discursivamente y condicionan a ella la respuesta al hecho mismo, al punto de desentenderse de éste. No existen observato- rios, estadisticas serias y orientadas a la prevenciôn, nadie se ocupa por investigar con miras preventivas el hecho mismo de la delincuencia urbana, mientras los comunicadores sociales y los politicos sôlo se cen- tran en la proyecciôn mediâtica del hecho y manejan alguna estadistica poco confiable y bastante inûtil para efectos preventivos. Se enfrenta la construcciôn de la realidad y no la realidad, a la que nadie intenta aproximarse. Esta afirmaciôn se verifica compulsando los presupuestos de seguridad : no se destina dinero alguno a la investigaciôon técnica del () Profesor Emérito y Director del Departamento de Derecho Penal y Criminologia. Facultad de Derecho. Universidad de Buenos Aires. — 63 — fenômeno de la delincuencia urbana : frecuencia, dinämica, modalida- des, barrios, situaciones de riesgo, poblacion de riesgo, etc. No se puede prevenir lo que no se conoce, pero a nadie le interesa conocer; luego, parece que a nadie le interesa prevenir. (Una preocupaciôn creciente; la reparaciôn del daño psiquico) Entre las medidas con que ûltimamente se trata de paliar la confiscaciôon de la victima‘?), en algunos paises centrales el estado ha intentado ocuparse de los daños psiquicos que éstas sufren, en especial en caso de hechos masi- vos (catästrofes, crimenes de destrucciôn masiva indiscriminada vulgar- mente llamado ferrorismo), extendiendo el concepto de victima a fami- liares y deudos. Los psicôlogos se han preocupado por distinguir el mero estrés del verdadero trauma que sufre la victima en delitos violentos : en tanto que el estrés es pasajero, el trauma irrumpe en la conciencia de la victima y la perturba. Pero los resultados positivos de la asistencia psicolôgica inmediata se discuten 9). Todas las indicaciones para la atenciôn de las victimas tienen por objeto la prevenciôn o el restablecimiento de su salud psiquica, prestando especial atenciôn a la elaboraciôn del duelo. Es sabido que la elaboraciôon del duelo es precedida por pasos de estupefacciôn, de autoinculpaciôn y de posterior proyecciôn de la culpa (identificaciôn de algûn culpable), hasta lograr la etapa final de elabo- raciôn. Se trata de facilitar el trabajo del aparato psiquico para evitar que la acumulaciôn de excitaciones termine siendo patôgeno ‘* Cuando la elaboraciôn se interrumpe aumenta el riesgo de acumula- ciôn de tensiones que desemboca en patologia psiquica mäs o menos grave, dependiendo en alguna medida de la personalidad de la victima y del estado de su salud mental con anterioridad al hecho. ? Es sabido que el poder punitivo se caracteriza por la confiscaciôn de la victima (que algunos Ilaman expropiacion), cuyo lugar usurpa desde hace casi un milenio el soberano, en cualquiera de sus formas politicas. La victima dejô de tener trato de persona, para pasar a ser un dato procesal, razôn por la cual el modelo punitivo no es un modelo de soluciôn de conflictos, sino de ejercicio vertical de poder del soberano. En tiempo reciente se ha tratado por diversos medios de atenuar la posicion subordinada de la victima con paliativos a la paradoja de su despersonalizaciôn (o cosificacion). Por otra parte, una importante corriente resucita las formas tradicionales de soluciôn de conflictos, tratando de adaptarlas a la civi- lizaciôn actual, bajo la forma de justicia restaurativa y de mediaciôn penal. En tanto que los primeros intentos no abandonan el modelo punitivo, los segundos se van alejando lentamente de él. G) Cfr. Carolina ELIACHEFF - Daniel SOULEZ LARIVIÈRE, Il tempo delle vittime, Milano, 2008. (4 Corresponde al concepto freudiano de Durcharbeiten (cfr. LAPLANCHE-PONTALIS, Dic- cionario de Psicoanalisis, Barcelona, 1981, pâg. 106). _— 64 — 2. — LA CREACION DE LA VICTIMA/HÉROE (Selectividad en la proyecciôn publica de la victimizaciôn) Abundan las investigaciones que verifican que los indices de victimizaciôn se reparten con tan escasa equidad como los de criminalizaciôn. La comu- nicaciôn masiva sôlo proyecta como victimas a algunas de ellas, en tanto que otras carecen de imagen y de voz, directamente se ignoran y no son consideradas como tales por la opiniôn corriente. Esta discrimi- naciôn se acentûa en las sociedades muy estratificadas, como las de nuestra América. (Procedimiento de construccion de la victimalhéroe) En ocasiones, entre las victimas mostradas, la comunicaciôn masiva selecciona a alguna que es elevada a la categoria de héroe. Para eso los comunicadores lo incitan a que se exprese como criminôlogo, penalista y criminalista experto y omnisapiente. Dado que nadie se atreve a contradecir en voz alta a un ser doliente y digno de compasiôn, necesitado de solidaridad, asistencia y consuelo, cualquier respuesta pûblica es proyectada y perci- bida como marcadamente insensible al dolor ajeno, de modo que los desatinos que la victima en esa triste circunstancia puede expresar son tomados como verdades cientificas y son difundidos como tales por los comunicadores âvidos de rating, quienes les incitan a que expresen sus peores prejuicios. En esa coyuntura, los politicos —oficialistas y opositores- ensayan una respuesta a la realidad mediâticamente construida en base al discurso de la victima/héroe y que, por supuesto, nada tiene que ver con el hecho de la criminalidad urbana, que es mâs ignorado que nunca. (Condiciones de la victimalhéroe) Las victimas que se elevan a la con- diciôn de héroes deben reunir ciertas caracteristicas que permitan la identificaciôon por parte del püblico al que se dirige la construcciôn, pero también debe poseer cierto grado de capacidad histriônica que le per- mita asumir adecuadamente el papel de victima/héroe. Esta ültima con- diciôn puede obedecer incluso a cierto grado de patologia o trastorno de personalidad previo. (Factores politicos que favorecen la construcciôn) Tampoco se cons- truye una victima/héroe en cualquier momento, sino cuando su manipu- laciôon es funcional a ciertos sectores politicos o econômicos. En este sentido es necesario destacar que el actual momento de poder del mundo es particularmente favorable a estas construcuiones. À ello con- tribuyen los siguientes factores : (a) El desequilibrio entre paises ricos y pobres y la concentraciôn de riqueza generan mültiples conflictos entre nacionales en situaciôn limite - 65 — en los paises pobres e inmigrantes que huyen de esa situaciôn en los ricos . (b) En el centro y en la periferia del poder mundial las clases medias se empobrecen como resultado de creciente polarizaciôn de riqueza, cayendo en anomia como resultado de un profundo sentimiento de inse- guridad. (c) La comunicaciôn masiva destina el mayor espacio informativo de la delincuencia urbana, si puede la magnifica y no la presenta como resultado sino como principal fuente de todos los males. (d) La pérdida de poder de los estados nacionales impide a los poli- ticos emprender reformas estructurales que resuelvan los mâäs graves problemas sociales. (e) El estallido de la revolucion tecnolôgica (que es bâsicamente una revoluciôn comunicacional), determina que la politica y el propio, estado asuman cada dia mâs la forma de un espectäculo ‘ (f) Tiene creciente éxito imputar a los politicos incapacidad para resolver los problemas, reduciendo éstos a la criminalidad urbana y a la corrupciôn, omitiendo toda menciôn a los otros riesgos sociales, aunque se trate de la destrucciôn de la vida planetaria. (g) Los medios de comunicaciôn tienden a monopolizarse por empre- sas y cuando los intereses de éstas coinciden con el oficialismo politico, basta reducir el espacio dedicado a la criminalidad urbana para que la proyecciôn püûblica de ésta desaparezca, tal como sucede en las dictadu- ras 3. — LA VICTIMA/HÉROE ES UN FENOMENO NUEVO (Tiene dos notas diferenciales : resultados politicos antes desconocidos y una enorme crueldad revictimizante) La construcciôn de la victima/ héroe es marcadamente diferente de la tradicional manipulaciôn de la imagen de la criminalidad urbana con fines politicos. Es nuevo tanto (a) por su efecto politico inmediato, que importa siempre una regresiôn grave en cuanto a respeto a la dignidad de la persona, como por (b) la crueldad a que somete a la propia victima/héroe, a la que interrumpe el proceso de elaboraciôn del duelo, con grave daño psiquico, sin contar con que en ocasiones se vale de la patologia previa de ésta sin mira- miento alguno. 5) V. Alessandro DEL LAGO, Non-persone. L'esclusione dei migranti in una società globale, Milano. 1999. (6) Lo observaba proféticamente hace décadas Roger-Gérard SCHWARTZANBERG, O Estado espetaäculo, Sao Paulo, 1978. — 66 — (Efecto politico inmediato sobre la represiôn) La construcciôn de la victima/héroe estä provocando el desbaratamiento de la legislaciôn penal en toda América Latina, donde en algunos paises (como la Argentina y en buena medida Brasil) puede afirmarse que ya no existe côdigo penal, sino un conjunto de retazos de normas incoherentes y contradictorias, con desequilibrio de pena, algunas violatorias de normas internacionales de derechos humanos, sin contar con la legitimaciôn pûblica de abusos represivos (incluyendo la tortura) y de un mayor control sobre toda la poblaciôon (que conforme a la experiencia universal se concentra sobre los sectores subalternos y los disidentes ideolôgicos). Por esta via se estän poniendo en peligro los mejores logros de nuestra civilizaciôn. (Peligro para la democracia pluralista) La culpabilizaciôn de los poli- ticos estäà destinada a tener gran acogida püblica en momentos en que la representaciôn institucional està mundialmente cuestionada y jaqueada por organizaciones que se arrogan la verdadera representaciôn de la sociedad, que por cierto nadie les ha conferido (lo que se ha dado en llamar la contrademocracia)‘”), sin contar con que abren el camino a la aventura politica de outsiders oportunistas. No puede olvidarse que el descrédito del parlamentarismo y del consiguiente pluralismo politico fue el principal blanco de ataque del totalitarismo en ascenso para demoler la Repüblica de Weimar y la Repüblica Española en los años treinta. (La interrupcion de la elaboraciôn del duelo) Pero no se detiene alli la novedad de la creaciôn de la victima/héroe. Los medios masivos la captan en su momento de mayor desequilibrio emocional, cuando pro- cura liberarse de la autoinculpaciôn (poner la culpa fuera) expresando desmesuras neutralizantes que los comunicadores ratifican con singular éxito. El efecto que esto tiene en la victima es fijarla en una etapa previa a la elaboraciôn del duelo sin lograr concretarla, en especial cuando sus caracteristicas psicolôgicas son negativas o problematicas para la elabo- raciôn y el restablecimiento de su salud mental. El éxito comunicacional de esos comentarios se explica (entre otras razones) porque el destinatario del mensaje también rechaza toda co- culpabilidad y de este modo, si la victima reûne las caracteristicas nece- sarias (de clase, lenguaje, educaciôn, cultura, etc.) se identifica con ella y con sus manifestaciones. Ademâs, la extracciôon social de la victima/ héroe permite también una identificaciôn ideolôgica y la participacion en los mismos prejuicios, que son reforzados ° ( Cfr. Pierre ROSANVALLON, La contrademocracia. La politica en la era de la descon- fianza, Buenos Aires, Manantial, 2007. ( El reforzamiento de los prejuicios es la principal caracteristica de toda politica vôlkisch porque es indispensable para la construcciôn de un enemigo. — 67 — La victima traumatizada pone la culpa en cabeza de las autoridades estatales — politicas, judiciales, policiales — y de su ineficacia preventiva y represiva, lo que siempre es posible porque la prevenciôn tiene limites y, en los paises periféricos del poder mundial, el servicio de seguridad no sôlo reconoce enormes fallas, sino incluso altos grados de corrupcion y complicidad. (La ocasion del oportunismo politico) La insistencia y apoyo al dis- curso de la victima traumatizada y elevada a héroe, con caracteres idô- neos para generar una amplia identificaciôn de la audiencia, sin duda que constituye, al mismo tiempo, una formidable amenaza para la poli- tica, pero también una enorme tentaciôn. La identificaciôon de la audiencia con la victima puede ser muy nega- tiva para el politico inculpado, pero también le resulta muy ûtil si logra poner distancia de cualquier inculpaciôn y colocarse junto a la victima, lo que intentarä radicalizando el discurso traumâtico de ésta hasta sobreactuar para ratificar su identificaciôn con ella. (Verificacion de la originalidad de!l fenômeno de la victimalhéroe) Si bien la originalidad del fenômeno de la victima/héroe necesita ser inves- tigada mâs profundamente comparando las distintas experiencias nacio- nales al respecto, la verificaciôn empirica de las notas diferenciales puede obtenerse en cada pais y contexto de la comparaciôn con ante- riores manipulaciones de la victimizaciôn Ilevadas a cabo con objetivo politico. En la medida de lo posible seria deseable que la investigacion de la victima/héroe se realice comparando los casos mâs anälogos dis- tantes en el tiempo. Esto es lo que, brevemente, pasamos a hacer res- pecto de la Argentina, comparando dos casos anälogos en cuanto a caracteristicas del crimen y a difusiôn y manipulaciôn mediâtica, pero separados por setenta años de distancia y en contextos politicos muy diferentes. (Los casos analizados) Se trata de dos secuestros extorsivos con resul- tado de muerte que provocaron iniciativas legislativas represoras : el pri- mero (caso Ayerza) es de 1932/1933 y el segundo fue el mäs explotado por los medios masivos en 2004 y años siguientes. Las similitudes entre ambos son las siguientes : (a) la victima fatal fue un joven universitario, (b) hijo de familia de alta posiciôn social, (c) ideolôgicamente de derecha, (d) con amplia repercusiôon mediâtica sostenida en el tiempo, (e) con reclamo de mayor represiôn a las autoridades, (f) con proyectos de considerables reformas penales, (g) en ambos casos de individualizô y se penô a los autores, - 68 (h) y coincidieron con momentos de crisis econômica. 4. — EL CASO AYERZA (1932/1933) (El contexto politico) En el caso Ayerza se produjo el secuestro el 25 de octubre de 1932 y apareciô el cadâver el 21 de febrero de 1933. Los titulares de los periôdicos de la época y la radiotelefonia se ocuparon del caso todo el verano. El pais se hallaba en una profunda crisis econômica y en manos de un gobierno surgido de elecciones fraudulentas (con el partido mayoritario proscrito) impuestas por una dictadura militar esta- blecida en 1930. La derecha neoliberal — por asi llamarla — se habia encumbrado al gobierno, desplazando a la derecha filo-fascista encar- nada en la dictadura de 1930-1932, que después de que su mentor mili- tar perdiese el poder se concentraba en organizaciones disciplinadas de jôvenes de clase alta y media alta. (Clara identidad politica de la victima) La victima era un joven estu- diante, perteneciente a una familia de clase alta y militante de una de las organizaciones afines al fascismo (Legiôn Civica)). Dada la publi- cidad alcanzada por el secuestro y que la prensa habia ocupado todo el verano con el caso, el sepelio de la victima fue un acto masivo en el que se acusô de complicidad al gobierno conservador producto del fraude electoral, pero enfrentado a la derecha a que pertenecia la victima. En el sepelio multitudinario de la victima se exigieron penas severas, montaron guardia los camaradas politicos de la victima, se prometiô venganza y se reclamô el restablecimiento de la pena de muerte, dero- gada por el côdigo penal de 1921 y que no se aplicaba desde 1916. Dos meses mâs tarde, en abril de 1933, se detuvo a los responsables, pertenecientes a una banda de secuestradores italianos (la banda de 10) Galiffi), o sea, de lo que fue conocido como la mafia argentina ‘ (EI muerto era la unica victima; su madre sufria en silencio) En el “caso Ayerza” (1932/1933) si alguna victima/héroe existia era soôlo el ver- dadero muerto en el crimen. La comunicaciôn mostraba a la madre, pero como sufriente, dolorosa, en ninguna actitud mesiänica, reivindica- toria ni vengativa. Puede decirse que el joven Ayerza era una pâlida imagen de Jesucristo y su madre de Maria Dolorosa. ( David RocK y otros. La derecha argentina. Nacionalistas, neoliberales, militares y cle- ricales. Javier Vergara Editor. Buenos Aires, 2001. (10) Sobre este fenômeno y el caso Ayerza : Eduardo AGUIRRE, Historias de la mafia en la Argentina, Buenos Aires, 2000: Lila CAIMARI, Apenas un delincuente. Crimen, castigo y cul- tura en la Argentina, 1880-1955, Buenos Aires, 2004; Lila CAIMARI, “Suceso de cinematogra- ficos aspectos”. Secuestro y espectaâculo en el Buenos Aires de los años treinta, en Lila Car- MARI (compiladora). *La ley de los profanos. Delito, justicia y cultura en Buenos Aires (1870- 1940)". Buenos Aires, 2007, pags. 209 y sgts. 69 — — (Proclamaciôon del compromiso politico de la victima) La 1identidad ideolôgica de la victima no se ocultaba ni disimulaba, sino todo lo contrario : era asumida pûblicamente y la organizaciôn a la que perte- necia mostraba su presencia e indignaciôn. Era esta organizaciôn la que a través de la empatia con el joven cuya vida se habia truncado procu- raba canalizarla contra el gobierno fraudulento. Ningûün miembro de la familia Ayerza fue elevado a héroe ni por este medio ambicioné funciôn politica alguna. El objetivo politico estaba muy claro : se imputaba debilidad punitiva a un gobierno conservador y minoritario (producto de fraude electoral) por un sector mâs conservador, cercano a la derecha fascista. (Discurso xenôfobo) La crisis econômica “!) estaba en su punto mâs alto y se señalaba como factor perturbador a la criminalidad organizada de corte mafioso, importada del sur italiano. Se exaltaba el naciona- lismo frente a una criminalidad extranjera, con discurso de corte discri- minatorio (el mal no era argentino, sino que provenia del extranjero). La clase media emergente — identificada con el partido derrocado en 1930 — estaba en su mayoria compuesta por la primera generaciôn de inmigrantes. (Reacciôn del gobierno) El Poder Ejecutivo reacciono frente a la pro- yecciôn del hecho desempolvando viejos proyectos de estado peligroso sin delito y proponiendo reformas represivas al côdigo penal de 1921, remitiendo el proyecto al Senado, caâmara de corte claramente conserva- dor, aunque integrada también por un senador socialista de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires. El proyecto del Ejecutivo dio lugar a un amplio debate en el Senado, muy difundido y con protagonismo critico del senador socialista (Alfredo Palacios). El Senado redoblô la propuesta del Ejecutivo dando media sanciôn a un proyecto absurdamente represivo, que incluia la pena de muerte por electrocuciôn “?). (Resistencia de las estructuras politicas) Dentro del partido oficialista (conservador) se manifestô un claro rechazo al proyecto con media san- ciôon del Senado. El propio autor del côdigo penal e importante politico conservador, Rodolfo Moreno (h), que fue gobernador de la Provincia de Buenos Aires, embajador en el Japôn y luego precandidato a la pre- ( Producto de la recesion mundial de 1929 y que habia repercutido en la Argentina, siendo aprovechada por las Fuerzas Armadas para quebrar la constitucionalidad, dando un golpe de estado el 6 de setiembre de 1930, que derrocéô al presidente constitucional - Hipôlito Irigoyen , perteneciente a una fuerza popular, habia desembocado en una dictadura de tinte corporativista, encabezada por José Felix Uriburu, quien mediante intriga interna del ejér- cito, fue reemplazado - fraude mediante - por el Gral. Agustin P. Justo. (2) Sobre este debate : José PEco, La reforma penal en el Senado de 1933, Instituto de Criminologia, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, Facultad de Ciencias Juridicas y Sociales, Buenos Aires, 1936. —- 70 — sidencia de la Repüblica, se opuso a la reforma y defendiô su côdigo de 19213 La Cämara de Diputados recibiô el proyecto con media san- ciôn del Senado y no le dio tratamiento. Por ende, el Côdigo Penal — en esa ocasiôn — saliô intacto del primer embate masivo y estructural que sufriera. 5. — EL CASO DE 2004 (Coyuntura politica diferente) El panorama, contexto y consecuencias fueron muy diferentes setenta años mâs tarde, justamente por efecto del fenômeno de la victima/héroe. Fue otro secuestro extorsivo en que el cadâver del joven victima fue hallado el 23 de marzo de 2004“%. No hubo conmociôn pûblica anterior y la victima del delito no tenia mili- tancia politica : se tratô de un secuestro extorsivo que culmind en hom:- cidio, al parecer porque la victima intentô fugarse, cometido por crimi- nales de baja condiciôn social y sin una organizaciôn sofisticada, que operaban en la provincia de Buenos Aires con medios mâs bien preca- rios. La coyuntura politica era completamente diferente a la del caso Ayerza : el gobierno era producto de elecciones libres (sin proscripcio- nes). No se planteaban cuestiones de xenofobia ni de nacionalismo. El gobierno — que apenas comenzaba su gestion — enfrentaba a dos secto- res, ambos minoritarios aunque con considerable poder mediâtico : los responsables de los crimenes de la dictadura de 1976-1983, que se veian amenazados por la posible reapertura de los proceso penales por un lado; y, por el otro, a quienes se habian beneficiado con la politica eco- nômica de los años 1989-1999 y con la posterior crisis de 2001, que veian amenazados sus intereses. La situaciôn econômica era grave pero se observaba una innegable tendencia a la recuperaciôn acelerada, lo que deslegitimaba cualquier otro reclamo pûblico contra un gobierno que llevaba pocos meses de gestiôn. La inseguridad era sin duda el ünico camino por el que podia introducirse la critica, omitiendo —obviamente- toda posible referencia a la responsabilidad de los propios sectores cri- ticos en la producciôn de las causas. (Estallido mediâtico a partir de la victimalhéroe) La proyecciôn mediâtica no estallô con el secuestro, sino que, a diferencia del caso Ayerza, tuvo lugar a partir del hallazgo del cadäver del joven vic- (13) V. Rodolfo MORENO (h). El problema penal ( Segunda edicion con un apéndice), Bue- nos Aires, 1933. (14) Los detalles en Lucas GUAGNINI, Blumberg, en el nombre del hijo, Buenos Aires, 2005. _— 71 — tima (°). Todo parece indicar que fueron las especiales caracteristicas del padre de la victima las que decidieron su elecciôon como victima/héroe. (( Patriarcalismo?) Es interesante observar que el joven victima prâac- ticamente desapareciô de la proyecciôn mediâtica, se lo mencionaba tan- gencialmente, pero el papel preponderante se proyectaba con el padre. La madre nunca tuvo intervenciôn pûblica, salvo una muy esporädica en el proceso penal. Fl desplazamiento total de la madre no deja de ser significativo : parece dominar un patriarcado que desplaza a la figura femenina, reemplazändola por la de un empresario dinämico y agresivo, cargado de autoridad. Jesucristo y la Dolorosa desaparecen en beneficio de algo asi como el padre terrible cercano al Urvater freudiano. (ç Tendencia autoritaria de las clases medias”) Dada la tendencia a identificarse con la clase superior — que a lo largo de la historia carac- teriza a la clase media argentina —, los sectores mäs bajos de ésta pare- cieron identificarse mâs con un patriarca que con el dolor de madre, o sea que buscaban un padre, lo que no deja de expresar una peligrosa tendencia autoritaria que debiera ser materia de mayor anâlisis. (El rechazo de la politica) Una diferencia importante es la no mili- tancia politica de la victima (apoliticidad). À diferencia del caso Ayerza, en que la militancia era clara y proclamada, en el 2004 la militancia politica aparece como contaminante, de modo que la inocencia de la vic- tima y de su padre como victima/héroe pasô por la no contaminacion politica. Fue la pretendida asepsia politica del padre lo que facilitô la identi- ficaciôon mediâtica en momentos en que la politica pasaba por un transe dificil : dos años antes era comün el slogan que se vayan todos, como condena a toda la politica por efecto de la crisis del año 2001 que, entre otras cosas, habia retenido los ahorros de la clase media argentina. El padre tratô de ocultar sus valores politicos y en un primer momento confundiô a la opiniôn bajo la apariencia del padre dolorido por la pérdida que reaccionaba por auténtica indignaciôn, sin otra moti- vaciôn ni objetivo. No obstante, râäpidamente se roded de algunos con- sultores que habian estado vinculados a la dictadura de 1976-1983 o a la gestion politica de 1989-1999, que estaba püblicamente descalificada y señalada como corrupta y responsable de la crisis del año 2001. La victima/héroe tratô en algûün momento de poner distancia de los mentores que lo comprometian ideolôgicamente, atribuyendo esos con- tactos a su inexperiencia politica, pero sin mucho éxito, con lo cual se gano la antipatia de los sectores mäs progresistas - que en principio lo (15) Sobre consideraciones y detalles acerca del fenômeno mediâätico y sus consecuencias penales : Carlos Alberto ELBERT (Director), Inseguridad, victimas y victimarios. Argentina 2001/2007, Julio César Faira Editor, Montevideo-Buenos Aires, 2007. 72 — habian apoyado —, lo que pasô a ser franco distanciamiento y luego abierto rechazo a medida que aumentaban sus criticas a las organiza- ciones de derechos humanos. (La capacidad de convocatoria de la victimalhéroe) La victima/héroe — con amplisimo apoyo mediâtico — convocô concentraciones de miles de personas, aunque en cada una de ellas con menos concurrencia, a medida que los empresarios mediâticos le restaban apoyo e incurria en errores politicos, como emitir juicios que no eran politicamente correc- tos. En esas concentraciones denostaba a autoridades y funcionarios en la medida en que no era recibido o acogido por éstos. (Autoridades y derechos humanos como blanco) En el discurso de la victima/héroe se señalaba como responsables a las autoridades y a los defensores de derechos humanos y de las garantias penales y procesales; hubo claros acentos discriminatorios clasistas, pero sin el tono xenofô- bico de la derecha del ‘“caso Ayerza”; no habia inmigraciôn 1taliana que discriminar, contaminaciôn nacional que rechazar y los nuevos inmigran- tes (procedentes de paises limitrofes) eran por completo ajenos al episo- dio. Ademäs, la prédica antidiscriminatoria en la Argentina habia dado algunos frutos y el viejo discurso de extrema derecha de los años treinta no era admisible pûblicamente. Si bien todos los discursos montados sobre la manipulaciôn de las victimas suelen ser discriminatorios, clasistas y en alguna medida tam- bién racistas, la tendencia actual muestra una inclinaciôn a asumir mâs embozadamente estas caracteristicas, dejando de lado las pretensiones supuestamente nacionalistas y xenofôbicas, pero atacando a las organi- zaciones de derechos humanos. Las expresiones püblicas del tipo /as garantias son para los delincuentes, nadie se ocupa de los derechos huma- nos de las victimas y anälogas fueron los s/ogans preferidos de la cam- paña de la victima/héroe. (Silencio del Ejecutivo : proyectos de la victimalhéroe) El Poder Eje- cutivo no enviô ningûn proyecto de reforma penal al Congreso, pues se encontraba trabajando una comisiôn que elaboraba un anteproyecto de côdigo penal en el ârea del Ministerio de Justicia, que - como veremos — también fue neutralizado por la victima/héroe. El padre de la victima fue quien Ilevô los proyectos al Congreso de la Naciôn, elaborados por sus colaboradores espontäneos renacidos a su amparo al protagonismo politico. Se encargô personalmente de intimi- dar a los legisladores en el propio recinto del Congreso de la Naciôn, ante el silencio temeroso de éstos. Sin duda que contribuyô a esto una personalidad dotada de rasgos marcadamente agresivos, pero también la carencia de personalidad y de conocimiento del tema por parte de los legisladores, que no disponian de un discurso adecuado. 73 — Era claro que el dolor de victima neutralizaba cualquier resistencia o expresion de descortesia, lo que le permitia invadir todos los ambitos oficiales, aunque su comportamiento denotaba una contradicciôn que a la postre le fue fatal : no era compatible el rol de victima dolorida con la agresividad puesta de manifiesto en varias ocasiones y, menos aûn, con los crecientes rumores de posible protagonismo politico. (Sumision de los funcionarios y legisladores) Casi ningûn politico y pocos funcionarios se animaron a confrontar con sus pretensiones de reformas legislativas o a recibirlo en sus despachos. Prâcticamente no hubo debate legislativo, los legisladores se sometieron a las exigencias de la victima/héroe, aunque algunas estaban confusamente redactadas por personas vinculadas a la dictadura de 1976-1983, mientras el mismo Congreso votaba una ley que anulaba las amnistias a los crimenes con- tra la humanidad. Dentro del partido oficialista no hubo capacidad de resistencia, pero tampoco por parte de la oposiciôn. À diferencia del proceso de 1933, no hubo un Rodolfo Moreno (h) deslegitimando las pretensiones reformis- tas ni tampoco muchas voces sensatas que enfrentasen las disparatadas reformas que acabaron por descalabrar el côdigo penal de 1921, hasta el punto de producir una hecatombe como jamäs habia experimentado la legislaciôon penal argentina en tiempos de gobiernos constitucionales (y, sinceramente, tampoco en algunos de facto). (Indiferencia del Ejecutivo) El Poder Ejecutivo dejô que las reformas que destruyeron el côdigo penal se promulgaran automâticamente. À diferencia del “caso Ayerza”, en que el Poder Ejecutivo tomô la inicia- tiva de adelantarse a proponer reformas represivas, éstas surgieron todas del Congreso de la Naciôn, por obra de legisladores atemorizados por la presencia de la victima/héroe, que se limitaban a votar disciplinada- mente los proyectos que ésta llevaba, redactados por sus colaboradores que resucitaban del ostracismo politico a que los habia condenado su desprestigio püblico. (El ejecutivo detiene una reforma integral del côdigo penal) Por ültimo, cabe señalar que en el “caso Ayerza” no estaba en marcha nin- guna reforma penal, en tanto que en 2004 una comisiôn integrada por los mâs prestigiosas profesores de derecho penal elaborô un antepro- yecto de buena calidad técnica, que la victima/héroe atacô frontalmente, imponiendo temor al poder ejecutivo, que se apresurô a declarar que no estaba dispuesto a enviarlo al Congreso Nacional. (Fragilidad de las estructuras politicas) Las estructuras politicas del estado mostraron mayor fragilidad. Si bien el Poder Ejecutivo no se involucrô directamente en la reforma legislativa, tampoco se sintiô capaz de hacerle frente e incluso, en algün momento, tratô de captar a la vic- tima/héroe apoyando una fundaciôn que ésta habia creado. Pero la __ 74 — debilidad extrema se puso de manifiesto en el Poder Legislativo, donde el Congreso se dejô intimidar y humillar por la victima-héroe que, en el mismo recinto de la Cäâmara se tomaba la libertad de pretender contro- lar la presencia de legisladores en las sesiones. Todo esto pone de manifiesto que la construcciôn de la victima/ héroe, ante el descrédito y la desconfianza a la representaciôn, se pre- senta como un medio eficaz de desestabilizaciôon de instituciones demo- crâticas por minorias, invitando a la consagracion de héroes paternalis- tas supuestamente ajenos a la politica democrâätica y en especial a los partidos politicos e introduciendo subrepticiamente valores contrarios a la solidaridad, a la igualdad y a la libertad y, en definitiva, a la misma democracia pluripartidista. Las instituciones democräticas han perdido buena parte de su capacidad de reacciôn y defensa, rindiéndose fäcil- mente ante las amenazas de la victima-héroe. (La incursiôn politica de la victimalhéroe) Después de las concentra- ciones multitudinarias que con enorme aparato mediâtico convocaba la victima/héroe, y pese a que la asistencia disminuia a medida que se rei- teraban las convocatorias, ésta recibiô ofertas oportunistas de varios politicos para lanzar su candidatura y estuvo dudando hasta que por fin -algo tardiamente- se decidiô a hacerlo. Cabe observar que en un momento las encuestas arrojaron un alto porcentaje de votos a su favor como candidato a gobernador de la provincia de Buenos Aires, cargo que importa la segunda funciôn politica del pais. (E] deterioro de la imagen publica de la victimalhéroe) La figura del patriarca aséptico se desgastaba a medida que se introducia en la poli- tica y que en sus declaraciones iba transparentando una clara ideologia elitista. No obstante, conservaba una fuerte corriente de opiniôn que se desbaratô por completo cuando se descubriô que el titulo de ingeniero que ostentaba no existia, lo que deslegitimô la prédica de la victima/ héroe ante los sectores de clase media que le seguian. Cabe observar que sus seguidores no lo abandonan por explotar poli- ticamente su condiciôn de victima, sino por faltar a un valor elemental en los sectores medios, como es la prohibiciôn de usurpar titulos. (La contradicciôn señalaba el inevitable final) De cualquier manera, la propia contradicciôon del discurso hubiese provocado este resultado mâs o menos inevitable : el desprestigio de la politica en la clase media con sus ahorros retenidos en los bancos no era soôlo con un sector de ésta, sino que habia llegado al grado de considerar contaminante cual- quier contacto o compromiso politico. (La inhabilidad politica) Ademäs, la victima/héroe no era suficiente- mente häbil en el terreno politico activo. No podia serlo debido a su inexperiencia y también a la clara identificacion ideolôgica de sus men- tores que, ademâäs, tampoco estaban en condiciones de aconsejarlo al __ 75 — respecto, dado que provenian de posiciones de poder a las que habian llegado sin necesidad de tales habilidades o que las habian manejado tan mal que se les habia diluido todo su caudal electoral. Por ello, la vic- tima/héroe incurria con frecuencia en declaraciones que ponian al des- cubierto su ideologia o que eran politicamente inconvenientes y alta- mente incorrectas. Aunque con frecuencia intentô rectificarse, no lograba neutralizar su relativa torpeza en ese terreno. Fue particular- mente clara su precaria disculpa del homicidio policial de un adolescente esquizofrénico. Su aventura politica terminô cuando habiendo lanzado su candida- tura en una fuerza minoritaria insignificante no alcanzô ni siquiera una banca de diputado. À partir de ese momento es absolutamente ignorado por la comunicaciôn masiva. 6. — ALGUNAS REFLEXIONES INQUIETANTES (La originalidad del fenômeno) Las diferencias entre los dos casos — separados por setenta años — creemos que demuestra acabadamente la originalidad del fenômeno, que dista mucho de las usuales campañas de ley y orden y de las anteriores manipulaciones en la proyecciôn pûblica de victimas. (Fragilidad institucional) La actual fragilidad de las instituciones poli- ticas no es puramente latinoamericana, sino que la etapa de poder pla- netario que se ha dado en llamar g/obalizaciôn ha debilitado a los esta- dos nacionales en todo el mundo. Esta fragilidad se agudiza cuando mâs fuerte deberia hallarse — o sea, en los momentos de crisis - y alcanza limites muy peligrosos en los paises periféricos. (Sintesis de efectos politicos) La construcciôn de una victima/héroe que refuerza el patriarcado, descalifica toda la politica y el sistema plu- ralista mismo, impone sumisiôn a los poderes legitimos de los estados, emite juicios infundados sin espacio de respuesta racional, fuerza la san- ciôn de leyes represivas, inconstitucionales y contrarias a los tratados internacionales de derechos humanos, refuerza los prejuicios sociales negativos, se hace eco de conceptos elitistas, no es comparable con la manipulaciôn que de una victima (muerta) hacia una fuerza o corriente politica hace setenta años para desacreditar a un gobierno y forzarlo a defenderse proponiendo medidas que, en definitiva, no se concretaron en leyes. (La crueldad con la victima es nueva) Por otra parte, manipular la imagen de un muerto no puede lesionarlo, pero la manipulaciôn de un deudo, en forma que claramente interrumpe su proceso de elaboraciôn del duelo, para dejarlo luego librado a su suerte cuando su condiciôn de — 76 victima/héroe se esfuma ante la indiferencia total de los mismos medios masivos que lo erigieron, es muestra de una crueldad e inhumanidad desconocida en los fenômenos anâlogos del siglo pasado. Queda claro que se trata de un fenômeno nuevo y alarmante, que no sôlo provoca caos en la legislaciôn penal y hace naufragar cualquier politica criminal racional y democrätica , sino que también sacrifica la salud mental de la victima que elige para erigirla en héroe. (La criminologia no puede desentenderse) Entendemos que nuestra ciencia no puede pasar por alto el significado de este fenômeno nove- doso. La criminologia se ha olvidado de los genocidios, ha omitido lar- gamente su investigaciôn, quizà por considerarlos demasiado cercanos a la politica. De ese modo, ha estado ausente ante el mâs grave de los cri- menes, pese a los millones de victimas que cobrô en el curso del siglo pasado ”. Seria terrible — y fatal para nuestro destino como cientificos- que por estar imbricado en la politica coyuntural ahora callàsemos un fenômeno que amenaza a las instituciones democrâticas, a la vigencia de los derechos humanos y que, ademäs, importa un increible grado de crueldad psiquica para las victimas. Seria muy penoso que también los criminôlogos se sintiesen atemorizados antes los desplantes de las victi- mas/héroes, olvidando que nuestra tarea no està condicionada por los medios de comunicaciôn masiva ni por la aprobaciôn de ninguna mayo- ria electoral. (El descuartizamiento psiquico de las victimas) Hace siglos — no muchos, por cierto — se descuartizaba a los asesinos en las plazas pübli- cas, lo que constituia un acto de evidente crueldad, que no hacia mâs que reafirmar el poder del soberano absoluto y la pretensiôn de atemo- rizar a los disidentes y a los marginales. Ahora esta nueva forma de manipulaciôn descuartiza psiquicamente a las victimas cuando ya no le sirven como héroes e impone temor al soberano. Hasta el presente parece que se estä pasando por alto que la actual sociedad mediâtica y la propia lucha politica, mientras declama su soli- daridad con las victimas y su dolor, se empeña en demasiados casos en enfermarlas, fomentando todo lo necesario para interrumpir el proceso de reequilibrio psiquico de esas personas. (16) Aunque no se ha investigado adecuadamente, en el caso de 2004 es muy probable que la extrema publicidad dada a secuestros anteriores y luego a la victiina/héroe haya proyec- tado la imagen de este delito como un crimen muy rentable y de fäcil ejecucion. Por cierto hubo una serie de secuestros y algunos con resultado letal. Es sabido que el secuestro es un crimen que requiere una organizaciôn criminal y que el practicado con medios precarios pone en mâs serio peligro de muerte a la victima. No sabemos cuäntos secuestros precarios se habrän decidido como resultado de esta publicidad ni cuäntas victimas fatales habrän cobrado. ( V. Wayne MORRISON, Criminology, Civilisation and the New World Order, Routledge- Cavendish. 2006, pag. 93. __ 77 — (Se contradice con los mejores esfuerzos contemporäneos) La preocu- paciôn de la victimologia por resaltar la injusta distribuciôn de los ries- gos de victimizaciôn, el empeño de quienes procuran caminos alternati- vos a la soluciôn punitiva de los conflictos, las investigaciones y experiencias acerca de la atenciôn de la salud mental de las victimas, queda empañado por este fenômeno que amenaza la vida democrâtica de nuestros paises. En sintesis : (a) Estä creciendo peligrosamente una marcada tendencia a manipu- lar a algunas victimas, explotando y profundizando su patologia mediante su elevacion a la condicion heroica. (b) La manipulaciôn tiene resultados politicos que ponen en peligro al estado de derecho, contando con que en la actualidad las estructuras politicas son crecientemente débiles y la comunicaciôn inversamente fuerte. (c) Estas manipulaciones provocan un alivio pasajero a la victima, pero en realidad constituyen una revictimizaciôn, bajo la forma de un verdadero cinismo victimizante. Julio de 2008. SUMMARY The victim as hero is a new phenomenon. The mass media are build- ing an image by choosing and promoting a victim who wants irrational penal statutes. The suffering of the selected victim does not permit a rational answer. The lawgivers are prisoners of this publicity promotion and end in destroying penal law. The media and politics phenomenon has nothing to do with campaigns in favour of law and order, nor with other manipulations of criminal facts. It presents indeed quite original characteristics one can verify by making the comparison with manipu- lations which took place in similar cicumstances in every country. RESUMÉ La victime-héros est un phénomène nouveau. Les médias de masse construisent une image en choisissant et en promouvant une victime, qui réclame des lois pénales irrationnelles. La douleur de la victime sélec- tionnée empêche que lui soit donnée une réponse rationnelle. Les légis- lateurs sont prisonniers de cette promotion publicitaire et finissent par détruire la législation pénale. Le phénomène médiatico-politique n'a rien à voir avec les campagnes en faveur de la loi et de l’ordre, ni avec __ 78 — d'autres manipulations de faits criminels. Il présente en effet des carac- téristiques tout à fait originales, que l’on peut vérifier en faisant la com- paraison avec les manipulations que l’on a pu observer dans des circons- tances analogues dans chaque pays. RESUMEN La victima-héroe es un fenômeno nuevo. Los medios masivos cons- truyen una imagen seleccionando a una victima y promoviéndola, mien- tras ésta reclama leyes penales irracionales. El dolor de la victima selec- cionada impide responderle racionalmente. Los legisladores quedan presos de esta promociôn publicitaria y acaban destruyendo la legisla- ciôon penal. El fenômeno mediâtico/politico no tiene nada que ver con las campañas de ley y orden ni con otras manipulaciones de hechos cri- minales, pues presenta caracteres completamente originales, lo que se verifica comparändolo con manipulaciones que tuvieron lugar en cir- cunstancias semejantes en cada pais. _— 79 — GLOBALIZATION AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME : NEW LINKS, NEW PERSPECTIVES Emilio C. Viano () A. — GLOBALIZATION : A PROCESS AFFECTING EVERYONE The lives of everyone today, and particularly our consuming habits, have becoming more and more globalized. Globalization has become an everyday world but is a phenomenon of considerable relevance, of great significance ? and touches upon several larger issues and problems like inequality between countries, between North and South, inequalities of social class and genders, democratization and international relations. Ît also generates strong negative reactions and even criminal acts of oppo- sition to it.’ Globalization also touches on crime, crime policy and their effects on society. It. has been aptly described as “compressing” (* and making the world “smaller,” typified by the substantial and quick- ening progress in the transportation, communication, and information sharing areas. Seen in a historical perspective, globalization is the natu- ral outcome of a process that began centuries ago and that advanced through several major technological innovations, some of which, like the telegraph, have already become obsolete while others, like the internet, (D American University and Washington College of Law. Washington DC. C) See Jeffrey D. SAcHs, Globalization and the Rule of Law (Yale Law School Occasional Papers, Second Series, Number 4, 1998); see also Charles FRANÇOIS, El Camino de la Globalizacion : Una Vision Sistemica S (1999); Willlam TWINING, Globalisation and Legal Theory 7 (2000). G An example of a target of anti-globalization efforts is the controversial and popular institution of McDonald’s in France, which is loved and hated to the point of occasionally provoking a national crisis as well as a number of social conflicts and criminal prosecutions in recent years. McDonald’s has expanded rapidly in France with over 1,100 outlets in the country. making it the most profitable subsidiary in Europe. McDonald’s has aroused both political opposition and opposition in the workplace, which takes the form of a struggle against working conditions, the conception of McWork and McManagement. The opposition is often justified or explained in terms of resistance to “Americanization” and globalization. Jose Bove, the Farmers’ Confederation firebrand, led a strong anti-McDonald'’s campaign in the south of France a few years ago and partially destroyed a “McDo” in Millau with a trac- tor. Brittany separatists bombed a McDonald’s in 2000, killing a young French woman employee. In bitter backlash, thousands rallied outside the Breton regional parliament to protest the death. See also Marianne Debouzy (2006). Working for McDonald's, France : Resistance to the Americanization of Work. International Labor and Working-Class History, 70. pp. 126-142. (4 Roland ROBERTSON, Globalization : Social Theory and Global Culture 8-32 (1992). — 81 — are constantly growing and morphing into new forms and applica- tions. ©) In the economic sphere, there have also been major changes like the rapid expansion of commercial and financial instruments and mar- kets and the speed, ease and privacy with which these transactions are now being conducted. There is not question that a borderless global economy has been created and is expanding. ‘ Thus, globalization can be described as “the closer integration of countries and peoples of the world which has been brought about by the enormous reduction of costs of transportation and communication, and the breaking down of artifi- cial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people across borders.”‘) Cheaper transportation and communication play a big role in making globalization possible and suc- cessful. Globalization increases the velocity of interactions. Thus, tran- snational activity takes place faster, more easily, and more often than in the past. Vast numbers of people can now do very often and quickly what few people were able to do only occasionally and slowly in the past. (ê) Among other important consequences of globalization and of the world becoming “smaller”, there has also been a growing awareness of the earth as a community, of the existence of a “common good or pat- rimony of humanity” as an important value to be protected and fos- tered, °’ and of our duty to be careful stewards of the earth for future generations. (% This has given impetus and value to fostering human rights, protecting the environment ‘" and improving the overall eco- nomic, social and living conditions of fellow humans.‘? Issues like human rights, especially those of women and children, environmental protection, global warming, and of the threat of new and infectious dis- 6) Edgardo ROTMAN, “The globalization of criminal violence”, Fall, 2000, 10 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 4. (6) See generally Michael HARDT & Antonio NEGRI, “Globalization as Empire”, in The Global Transformations Reader 116, 117 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2000): Anthony McGRrew, “Models of Transnational Democracy”, in The Global Transformations Reader, 500, 500-05 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2000). ( Joseph E. STIGLITZ, Globalization and Its Discontents 9 (2002). (®) Patrick J. KEENAN, “The New Deterrence : Crime and Policy in the Age of Globaliza- tion”, January, 2006, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 505. ( See ROTMAN, supra, note 5 (0) Symposium : The Multinational Enterprise as Global Corporate Citizen, Sydney M. Cone, III - Moderator, Jose E. Alvarez, James L. Gunmderson, John R. MacArthur, Steven R. Ratner, 2001, 21 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int'! & Comp. L. 1. See also ROTMAN, supra, note 3. (D Alberto BERNABE-RIEFKOHL, ““To Dream the Impossible Dream': Globalization and Harmonization of Environmental Laws”, 20 N.C. J. Int'1l L. & Com. Reg. 205, 206 (1995) (stating that the increase in economic globalization is not accompanied by a globalization of environmental protection). (12) Mixed Reception : “Culture, International Norms, and Legal Change in East Asia” David NELKEN, “Comment : Signaling Conformity : Changing Norms in Japan and Chaine” Spring, 2006. 27 Mich. J. Int’I L. 933. __ 82 _— eases like HIV, AIDS, Ebola, the flu pandemic and others are now rec- ognized as important and operational at the worldwide level.“* Glo- balization and intermediate, serious steps towards 1t like regionalization, are recognized as supporting the establishment of a global order founded on democracy and peaceful relations between countries. (* For example, countries aspiring to belong to the European Union (EU) often acquire first membership in the Council of Europe which pro- motes democracy, human rights and the rule of law as a pre-condition to EU membership. (°) Our planet is "shrinking" because problems such as the environment, nuclear weapons, disease, and terrorism are now of global concern, and are thus measured by international law stand- ards. ‘16) That the world is becoming “smaller” every day strengthens the awareness of interdependence, of the advantages of cooperation and coordination, of the importance of instituting strategic, economic and political alliances while also stressing the importance, value and unique- ness of regional and local culture, music, food and drink, faiths, and mores. Ît is one of the ironies of today that the more the world 1s becoming unified and free of various barriers, the more 1t is also becom- ing local and protective of tradition, language, customs, local products and their areas of origin. ‘ The European Union is a prime example of a successful effort to create an economic and political union while also valuing, protecting and fostering regional differences, products, and cultures. Even more importantly, globalization or at least regionaliza- tion are also seen as guaranteeing peace among nations united and inter- dependent through trade, commerce, various exchanges, and an increas- ing web of interpersonal relations made possible, as in the EU, by the free movement of people, goods, capital and services. 18 (3) Symposium : Global Justice : Poverty, Human Rights, and Responsibilities : Panel 1 : Richard W. Miller, Human Rights and Global Responsibilities : Global Institutional Reform and Global Social Movements : From False Promise to Realistic Hope, 2002, 39 Cornell Int'I L.J. 501. (4) Jim CHEN, “Pax Mercatoria : Globalization as a second chance at ‘peace in our time’.” November/December, 2000, 24 Fordham Int'! L.J. 217. See also ROTMAN, supra, note 3. 49 Jost DELBRCK, “Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets-Implications for Domes- tic Law - À European Perspective”. 1 Ind. J. of Global Legal Stud. 9, 14-19 (1993). (16) See John Alan COHAN, “Sovereignty in a Post-sovereign World”, 18 Fla. J. Int'1 L 907. 910 (2006). (7) Stefan A. RIESENFELD, “Symposium 2003 : International Money Laundering : From Latin America to Asia : Who Pays?”; Lan Cao, “The Transnational and Sub-National in Global Crimes”, 2004, 22 Berkeley J. Int'! L. 59. See also ROTMAN, supra, note 5. (18) See lan CLARK, Globalization and Fragmentation : International Relations in the Twentieth Century !7 (1997) (“There is pervasive resort to the twin themes of globalization and fragmentation in a wide variety of literature.”); BOUTROs-BOUTROS Ghali [sic], SOth Anniversary of the United Nations. Vital Speeches, Nov. 15, 1995, at 66 (stating that glo- balization and fragmentation are the two great forces that will shape the world in the 21st century). __ 83 — Globalization and the growth of international commerce, the export- ing of jobs from more developed regions of the world to underdeveloped ones, thus creating employment and revenue, the remittances of emi- grants that sustain their families, relatives, and at times literally their countries back home, the advances in farming, production of crops and food, medicine and surgery, the growing investment in developing coun- tries, the dizzying speed of today's communications, information and economic transactions and many other phenomena affecting our daily lives and made possible by globalization have vastly improved the way in which most of us live our lives, even though major inequalities still exist between different parts of the world.“°) Poverty is, after all, a rel- ative concept. For example, in less than 50 years, countries that were net exporters of people through emigration are now the coveted destination of legal and undocumented immigrants from other parts of the world, just as countries that were until recently welcoming jobs outsourced by richer countries where labor was more expensive, are now themselves already beginning to export jobs to still poorer parts of the world and even back to richer ones. B. — THE NEGATIVES IN GLOBALIZATION But unfortunately not all consequences of globalization are positive. Globalization can be seen in the advancement of technology, as well as in the global expansion of trade. But these developments that are expected to help us achieve prosperity, freedom, and peace, can also produce social fragmentation, economic dislocations and exacerbate critical vulnerabilities, opening the door to violence and conflict. The more negative aspects of globalization are often attributed to capitalism and labeled as “McDonaldization” and “Americanization.” 29 Threats have become global in scope ironically in great part because of the achievements of increased and more diffused knowledge, powerful and readily available technologies, and the apparently uncontrollable mass movements of people. Ironically, the advances and the improvements in the conditions of daily life for millions of people, especially the increas- ing wealth across the world (relatively speaking), also have the potential (19) For more information on this related to health, see generally, George J. ANNas, “Human Rights and Health . The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at 50”, 339 New England J. Med., 1778, 1780-81 (1998). On globalization in general and its effect on the law, see generally Richard FALK, Predatory Globalization: A Critique (1999); Peter J. SPIRO, “Globalization, International Law, and the Academy”, 32 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 567 (2000); Brigitte STERN, “How to Regulate Globalization?”, in The Role of Law in Interna- tional Politics 247 (Michael Byers ed., 2000). (20) George RITZER, The Globalization of Nothing 2, Thousand Oaks CA : Pine Forge Press, 2007, 21-30. __ 84 _ of creating and fostering negative consequences favorable to the flour- ishing of transnational crime. Globalization has been connected to a range of social problems like poverty, economic and health care inequal- ities, global crime and corruption, international sex commerce, terror- ism ‘ and negative consequences for agriculture and the environment. International criminal networks have been quick to take advantage of the opportunities resulting from the revolutionary changes in world pol- itics, business, technology, and communications‘*”) that have by-and- large strengthened democracy and free markets, brought the world’s nations closer together, and given especially to the European Union and the United States, and also growingly to China, India, Brazil and others, unprecedented security and prosperity. Crime cannot be understood out- side of its social context. Consequently, this article is at the same time an attempt at and a plea for comparative contextual analysis. C. — KEY FACTORS FAVORING TRANSNATIONAL CRIME Some of the more important developments and influential factors in the last twenty years or so are : 1. — The changed post-Cold War landscape The end of the Cold War resulted in the breakdown of political and economic barriers not only in Europe but also around the world. This change opened the way for substantially increased trade, movement of people, and capital flows between democracies and free market countries and the formerly closed societies and markets that had been hampered by Soviet power. The end of the Cold War also brought with it an end to superpower jockeying for power in other regions of the world. This relative peace has allowed international criminals to expand their net- works and increase their cooperation in illicit activities and financial transactions. Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet Union, just as the overthrow of Saddam Hussein did in Iraq, threw thousands of less than model state employees onto the labor market. AIl sorts of operatives were now unemployed : secret police, counterintelligence officers, spe- cial-forces commandos and border guards, along with homicide detec- tives and traffic cops. They were trained in skills that are quite valuable CD Symposium : Corporate Governance, Stakeholder Accountability, and Sustainable Peace : Keynote Address. Linda LIM, “Terrorism and Globalization : An International Per- spective”, March, 2002, 35 Vand. J. Transnat'! L. 703. C Ilya GARGER, “Merchants of Mayhem Why the biggest beneficiaries of globalization may be pimps, drug runners and other crooks,” Time International (Asia ed.), New York, Nov 7. 2005. Vol. 166, Iss. 19; pg. 74. _— 85 —- to organized crime including surveillance, forging documents, smug- gling, eliminating people, knowing how to access and extort from key people in banking, finance, transport and security, creating networks and blackmail. The demise of the Soviet Union also ensured a steady supply of women for Western Europe and other markets and gave crim- inal gangs profitable areas for their activities like the sex trade, smug- gling of cigarettes and other goods, drug trafficking and more. @* 2. — EÉconomic and trade liberalization Increasing economic interdependence has both promoted and bene- fited from reforms in many countries opening or liberalizing state-con- trolled economies with the intention of boosting trade and becoming more competitive in the global marketplace. Criminals have taken advantage of transitioning and more open economies to establish front companies and quasi-legitimate businesses that facilitate smuggling, money laundering, financial frauds, piracy of intellectual property, iden- tity theft and other illicit ventures. Bilateral or multilateral economic agreements reducing trade barriers in North America, Europe, Asia, and other regions of the world have substantially increased the volume of international trade. Criminal and terrorist groups “ have taken advan- tage of the high and growing volume of legitimate trade to smuggle along drugs, arms, people and other contraband across national bound- aries. At the same time liberalized financial and commodities markets have offered lucrative new opportunities for criminal syndicates, facili- tated by the wide-open possibilities offered by the use of computers and of the internet. 3. — Technological advances The last decade has presented revolutionary advances in information and communications technologies that have brought the world closer together. Modern telecommunications and information systems that underpin legitimate commercial activity in today'’s fast-paced global market are as easily used by criminal networks as they are by legal busi- nesses. Commercially available and constantly improving state-of-the-art communications equipment greatly facilitates international criminal transactions — including making deals and coordinating the large volume @53) Misha GLENNY, McMafia: A Journey through the Global Criminal Underworld. London : Knopf. 2008 (24) Alan LAMBERT, “Underground Banking and Financing of Terrorism”, 15 Fla. J. Int'l L. 9, 12 (2002) — 86 — of illicit trade. ° In addition to the reliability and swiftness of commu- nications, constantly evolving and improving technology, like for exam- ple disposable phones, also affords criminals considerable security and being shielded from law enforcement detection. (26) 4. — Use of the World Wide Web and of related technology Through the use of the World Wide Web and of related technology (computers, Blackberry, cell phones etc.), international criminals have an unprecedented capability to obtain, process, and protect information and sidestep law enforcement investigations. They can use the interac- tive capabilities of advanced computers and telecommunications systems to plot marketing strategies for drugs and other 1llicit commodities, to map the fastest and most efficient routes and methods for smuggling and moving money in the financial system, and to create false trails to mislead law enforcement or banking security. International criminals also take advantage of the speed and magnitude of financial transac- tions and the fact that there are few safeguards to prevent abuse of the system to move large amounts of money without scrutiny. Some crimi- nal organizations also appear to be adept at using technology for coun- terintelligence purposes and for tracking law enforcement activities. Identity theft and cybercrime in general are certainly on the increase today and represent a serious threat to individuals, companies and entire countries. S. — Globalization of business ‘’” The revolution in modern telecommunications and information sys- tems and the lowering of political and economic barriers that have so greatly quickened the pace, volume, and scope of international com- merce are being exploited on a daily basis by criminal networks world- wide. International criminals are attracted to major “ global commer- cial and banking centers where they take advantage of gateway seaports and airports, the high volume of international trade, the concentration (C5) See, for example. Donna M. HucHEs, Council of Europe, Final Report: Group of Specialists on the Impact of the Use of New Information Technologies on Trafficking in Human Beings for the Purpose of Sexual Exploitation 18 (2003), available at http:// www.uri.edu/artsci/wms/hughes/eg-s-nt_final_report. (26) Fletcher N. BALDWIN, Jr.…. “Organized Crime, Terrorism and Money Laundering in the Americas”, 15 Fla. J Int'! L. 3, 17-18 (2002). (27) Peter F. DRUCKER, The Global Economy and the Nation-State, Foreign Aff.. Sept/ Oct. 1997, at 159, 163. See also Grahame THOMPsON, “Economic Globalization?”, in David HELD (ed.), ÀA Globalization World? Culture, Economics, Politics 85, 108 (2000). C8 www.academicmind.com/unpublishedpapers/business/..…/2005-04-000aaf-just-in-time- inventory-management.html; www.ashland.edu/-rjacobs/m503jit.html. __ 87 — of modern telecommunications and information systems, and the pres- ence of major financial institutions. They count on avoiding close scru- tiny of their activities because of the importance that businesses and governments give to facilitating commercial and financial transactions and the rapid transshipment of products, especially for export. Thus, ironically, the shipping speed made possible by computer software, and best symbolized, for example, by the “just on time” inventories which make sizeable savings and expedited service possible, also helped tran- snational crime ship its products quickly and undetected, taking advan- tage of the elimination of thorough inspections in the interest of boost- ing commerce and the speed of delivery. 6. — Explosion in international travel With the breaking down of international political and economic bar- riers, the globalization of business, and the lowering of the cost of inter- national travel (this may be changing now with the skyrocketing cost of fuel), there is more freedom of movement. International transportation of goods and services 1s also easier and cheaper. The proliferation of air transportation connections and the easing of immigration and visa restrictions in many countries to promote international commerce and lucrative tourism, especially within regional trade blocs, have also facil- itated criminal activity. In the past, more limited travel options between countries and more stringent border checks made crossing national boundaries difficult for international criminals. Now, criminals have great many choices of travel routes and can arrange itineraries so as to minimize risk. Border controls within many regional economic blocs - such as the European Union — have for the most part and normally, dis- appeared. Even where there 1s still an international border, like between Mexico and the U.S.À., traffic in both directions through the border 1s quite heavy as well. About 700,000 persons cross that Mexico-U.S. bor- der every day along with 150 million vehicles a year and over 5 million shipping containers. This great volume of traffic and trade into the United States provides international criminals tremendous opportunities to smuggle contraband — including drugs and counterfeit products - into the country, as well as to illegally export firearms, stolen vehicles, and other contraband overseas. But these classical developments that attract organized crime and its ability to adapt and exploit new situations and opportunities also impact society at large and in turn give reason to and revenues for transnational crime to flourish. International political econ- omy scholarship has posited a criminal underside of globalization facil- itated by technological change, broad patterns of state liberalization of trade and capital flows, and the rise of global markets. There are also liberal arguments conceptualizing transnational organized crime as the 88 — epitome of capitalism within this illicit global economy — embracing laws of supply and demand in the global marketplace and challenging the very integrity of the territorial state, basically mirroring on the 1llegal side the role and function played worldwide by multinational corpora- 29) tions on the legal side.‘ D. — POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS WITH NEGATIVE REPERCUSSIONS The most important general trends that favor transnational crime are Increasing prosperity and improvements in the financial, housing, com- munications, information, travel, educational, and power of acquisition circumstances of vast numbers of people across the world and especially in areas previously under-developed When people have more money to spend, are better informed on what 1s available, are aware of fashion trends worldwide, buy into the hedonistic, glamorous, self-affirming, self-rewarding, and sexually charged values and lifestyle of today, then the demand for all sorts of goods and services skyrockets. The problem is that not all goods and services desired are available legally. At times they are forbidden for morality, accessibility or protectionist reasons.‘*°” Moreover not every- one can afford the legally sanctioned version of those goods and serv- ices, be it a Prada bag, a Piaget watch or an original CD/DVD. Ît is at this point that organized transnational crime can provide the goods and services that millions clamor for. Thus, ironically, the overall steady improvement of the human condition coupled with the ease of shipping, travel, communications, information, transfer of funds, and abolition of many borders create some of the best conditions for tran- snational crime to be established and flourish. The same goes for pros- titution °" human trafficking, traffic in organs, antiquities, exotic ani- mals and their organs etc. The growing relative affluence of people in many parts of the world make it so that local people find certain forms of employment not attractive any more nor paid well enough to main- tain the lifestyle they feel they are entitled to. This promptly creates an unstoppable demand for labor to be imported from pnorer parts of the C9) M. FINDLAY. The Globalisation of Crime : Understanding Transitional Relationships in Context. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1999. 50 inks.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-2234(194905)47%3A7%3C1032%3ASPSAJF3E2: WWW.answers.com/topic/scarcity-l. G See for example. High Priced Prostitutes Sharing in India's New Prosperity: www.lht.com/articles/2008/09/14/business/escort.php. 89 - world, at times neighboring countries, most often illegally. The 1llegality is also a function of the slowness of the law to update itself and adapt to rapidly changing conditions on the terrain. It is also a function of powerful vested interests that control levels of employment in order, for example, to sustain high wage and compensation levels for the locals. At the same time, when advanced economies, like the EU and the USA, succeed through various trade agreements and the backing of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to open world markets to their goods but at the same time continue to provide large protectionist subsidies to their own agricultural sectors, they fatally undermine, even destroy, food production in developing countries unable to compete on world markets because their food 1s too expensive when compared to that sold by the European Union and the United States. This in turn creates a vast army of the dispossessed and the desperate and, consequently, a lucrative market in illegal immigration and prostitution. 67 Thus, almost perversely, progress in some areas of life for millions of people that creates the financial ability to improve one’s dwelling, lifestyle, education, travel, and station in life generally; that allows more leisure time and recreational choices; that stresses the importance and dignity of each individual to the detriment of the obligations to the group; that eliminates certain religious and cultural barriers, thus making possible a freer and less constrained lifestyle and contact between the genders, can also unleash an enormous and almost insatiable demand for goods, services, capital and labor that can be satisfied only through illegal or criminal means by transnational crime because of its scarcity, high price or illegality. ° Transnational crime is taking full advantage of all the most recent technological, travel, communications, shipping and finan- cial advances to satisfy those needs. But it is not always necessarily crime. Ît can be legitimate or at least “semi-legitimate.” For example, globalization in general and the rapid development of some countries like China and India, that then become formidable competitors, and the ensuing need to cut costs in other countries to compete internationally, has justified moving manufacturing plants to areas where labor laws protecting workers may be weaker or unenforced and where wages are (°) M. LEHTI and K. AROMAA, “Trafficking for sexual exploitation”. Pp. 133-227 in M. TONRY, Crime and Justice : À review of research. Chicago, 2006. G3) An indication of the powerful and insatiable demand for goods and services, even if unaffordable, is the dramatic financial crisis that affected especially the United States in late 2008 caused in great part by the so-called “toxic loans” that 1s real estate loans by financial institutions to people who did not have the money to pay them back. Thus the crisis was fueled by both the insatiable demand for goods beyond their reach by consumers eager to live the “good life” even if they could not afford it and the greed and irresponsibility of banks and Wall Street institutions offering credit without verifying the borrower’s ability to repay the loan, wanting to derive maximum financial gains without in the end taking respon- sibility for it. The U.S. taxpayer is now saddled with an enormous debt, calculated at the end of September 2008 as the cost of two Iraq wars at least. —- 90 — quite low. 3% Manpower for these factories, located at times in remote areas of the world or hidden in the very heart of American or European metropolises, is often provided through criminal enterprises but also through legal labor suppliers, both engaging in unsavory practices like the buying and selling of human beings, indentured servitude, human trafficking, smuggling, or sending people to work under appalling con- ditions. *°) The line between legal and illegal, legitimate and criminal is often quite difficult to discern in situations like this when vast amounts of money are at stake, when the “national good” 1s in play and can be used as a justification, and a whole human chain of decision makers and bureaucrats are vulnerable to bribery °® and corruption $”) and are known to actually engage in corrupt practices. 38 There are those who argue that global economic and legal conditions foreshadow an increase in corporate human rights abuses because corporate actors can avoid liability under most existing legal theories while they simultaneously increase their operations across the globe. °°) In the absence of congres- sional action on the issue of corporate human rights abuses, the United States could become the world's largest underwriter of private torturers and the largest consumer market for abusive producers. ‘* This regret- table conclusion would occur, despite its obvious repugnance to Amer- ican and global values, because international and domestic law as cur- rently interpreted offer little in the way of deterrence for non-state actors who are abusive of human rights. ‘$! (34) Anecdotal evidence and case law corroborate the belief that most corporate human rights abuses occur in the developing world. See, e.g.…. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 937-39 (9th Cir. 2002): Evan CLARK, “Advocacy Group Finds Violations at Bangladesh Apparel Factory”. Women's Wear Daily, Oct. 26, 2006, at 14. G5 Commission on Human Rights. Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 62d Sess., <pmark> 27, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 22, 2006) (prepared by John Ruggie). available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/papers/JGR 20 Interim% 20Report%20to%20the%20UN.pdf. G6) See Karl M. M£ESsEN, “Fighting Corruption Across the Border”, 18 Fordham Int'I L.J. 1647, 1647 (1995) (“Times of transition are times of corruption.”) G7 Philip M. NicHoLs, “Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalization and Fragmentation”. Winter, 1999, 24 Yale J. Int'I L. 257. 38 Jenia lontcheva TURNER. “Transnational Networks and International Criminal Jus- tice”, 2007, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 985. 59 John McKENZIE, “The Limits of Offshoring - Why the United States Should Keep Enforcement of Human Rights Standards ‘In-House’,” 2008, 83 Ind. L.J. 1121 (40) Sukanya PiLLAY, “And justice for all? Globalization, Multinational Corporations, and the Need for Legally Enforceable Human Rights Protections”, Summer, 2004, 81 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 489. (4 Jd. at 1130. 91 —- E. — VULNERABILITY OF COUNTRIES TO GLOBALIZED CRIME Globalization under its various forms can also impact the behavior of countries and ensnare them in the wide network of globalized crime. Several major vulnerable areas come readily to mind. ‘* The first is indeed labor. While countries may sign and ratify all sorts of treaties, including human rights and labor conventions (the Interna- tional Labor Office (ILO) has introduced about 200 different treaties and conventions), they may turn a blind eye and even favor the 1llegal smuggling and trafficking in human beings taking place in or out of their territory. Why? When it comes to smuggling people out in very populated countries, with high levels of poverty in rural areas and of unemployment of unskilled workers in urban areas, this relieves the pressure on the government to create jobs, to develop the needed infra- structure in non-urban regions and to reduce poverty and unemploy- ment. Second, some countries tolerate or even approve of illegal emigra- tion because those workers going abroad will eventually begin to send back money earned there to support their family of origin. This can amount to billions of dollars. ‘*°) There are countries in Central America that would not be able to survive economically without the ‘“remesas” (remittances) sent back home by their citizens working legally or 1lle- gally abroad. Every major player gains : the government of the export- ing country because it relieves unemployment and, with the remittances, it fuels their economy. Employers (and they are not any more just West- ern employers) appreciate the cut-rate labor provided and the submis- sive position of undocumented workers that can be dismissed at will and actually turned over to the authorities for repatriation, 1f they make too many demands. The family or villages that pooled their money to send a worker abroad also like it, because the investment 1s returning divi- dends. (42) Edgardo ROTMAN, “The globalization of criminal violence”. 2000, 10 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 1. (43) Alternative remittance systems (ARSs) are also linked to transnational crime. Money associated with the drug trade is laundered through ARSs in Hong Kong, China, India, Indonesia. Nepal, Pakistan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of the Philippines. Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, and Vietnam. Remittance systems in India, Sri Lanka, and Turkey encounter profits from smuggling. The Indian system also launders funds from smug- gled gold and precious stones, terrorism, and corruption. The ethnic banking systems of Hong Kong. China, Indonesia, Japan, and the Republic of the Philippines are used to laun- der illegal gambling profits, and the proceeds of human traffic, including alien smuggling and ransom, are washed through alternative remittances in India, Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of the Philippines, Vietnam. Lisa C. CARROLL, “Alternative Remit- tance Systems : Distinguishing Sub-Systems of Ethnice Money Laundering in Interpol Mem- ber Countries of the Asian Continent (Jan. 31, 2003)”, available at http://www.interpol.com/ public/FinancialCrime/MoneyLaundering/EthnicMoney/default.asp. 92 This financial link may at times influence a government to turn a blind eye or to not enforce the law against human trafficking too zeal- ously because of the obvious financial benefit to be derived.‘** Some countries are suspected of funding NGOs supposedly working in the problem area — trafficking of women, children, people in general — with the actual mandate of projecting a positive image of the government as if it is making major strides to resolve the problem. At times, if espe- cially needed, powerful and professional lobbyists are hired to stave off criticism and sanctions. But we are not talking here necessarily of overt corruption or of open approval. The support can be quiet and even tacit but it thwarts any serious effort to stop the trafficking of human beings, especially women and children, for sexual exploitation, and of laborers for factories and for the agricultural, tourism, and unskilled services sec- tors of the economy of the receiving country. ‘* The agricultural, farm- ing, tourism, restaurants, and hotels sectors are often those most strongly opposed to a meaningful reform of immigration laws, ‘*6) espe- cially amnesties and regularizing undocumented immigrants. These sec- tors of the economy earn more money and exercise much more control when dealing with a vast pool of undocumented, unskilled, eager, if not desperate, compliant, competing, highly disposable and cheap workers than with legal immigrants who have a better chance of possibly enforc- ing their rights, earn at least minimum wage, maybe belong to a union, and have some standing when expecting the protection of the law and of the authorities.‘*) At times these situations are also created through the illogical aspects of globalization. For example, the European Union has a labor shortage and an aging population that is not being replen- ished because of low birthrates. At the same time, restrictive immigra- tion policies remain in force and are actually just now being tight- ened.‘*°) The result? Another wide opportunity, almost an open invitation, for transnational criminal enterprises to earn more profits (44 Abigail SCHWARTZ, “Sex Trafficking in Cambodia”. spring, 2004, 17 Colum. J. Asian L. 371; Grace CHANG, “The Global Trade in Filipina Workers”. in Dragon Ladies : Asian American Feminists Breathe Fire 132, 135 (Sonia Shah ed., 1997). (4°) Barbara CROSSETTE, “UN Warns that Trafficking in Human Beings is Growing”. N.Y. Times, June 25, 2000, at A10. Trafficking in children has also increased. The Center for Pro- tection of Children's Rights estimates that as many as 800.000 children worldwide are in prostitution. In India alone, UNICEF estimates that there are approximately 400.000 to 500.000 child prostitutes. Manuel CASTELLS, End of Millennium 155 (1998). (46) 18" Annual Corporate Law Symposium : David WEISSBRODT, “Corporate social responsibility in the international context : Business and Human Rights”. Fall. 2005. 74 U. Cin. L. Rev. 55 (4 Larry Cata BACKER. “Multinational Corporations, transnational law: The United Nations’ norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations as a harbinger of cor- porate social responsibility in international law”. Winter, 2006, 37 Colum. Human Rights L. Rev. 287. (38) Henk OVERBEEK, “Neoliberalism and the Regulation of Global Labor Mobility”. May, 2002, 581 Annals Am. Academy Pol. Social Science T4. _ 93 — smuggling undocumented workers into the EU. Thus, clearly, not all the consequences of globalization are positive. F. — GLOBALIZATION AND ““VIOLENT COMMODITIES” Globalization facilitates demand and supply of certain types of com- modities that can elicit considerable violence as they are traded. ‘* This violence ranges on a continuum of acts and areas that includes murder and serious wounding, psychological harm, and damage to other living creatures and to the environment. ° One of the best examples are the so-called ‘“blood diamonds” from West Africa. The diamond, we all know, is a stone artfully marketed as an essential symbol of love, caring, fidelity and engagement to millions of women involved in a relationship they hope will lead to marriage. The engagement ring 1s one of the most coveted trophies many women dream to finally display to friends, family and co-workers. It is not uncommon today for a woman in the U.S. to expect a diamond engagement ring in the range of $20,000 to $50,000. And the DeBeers of the world are astutely investing in promoting what they call “the diamond experience” and in exporting this “requirement” to countries where it is still not a widespread custom. We all know of the 1000s of people who were killed, cruelly mutilated, their limbs often cut off with a machete, displaced, raped, abandoned, especially the eld- erly and children now without parents or a family, in the name of those who controlled diamond mines and their traffic in West and Central Africa. Yet, calls to boycott diamonds as gift in rings, watches, neck- laces, pendants etc. have mostly fallen over deaf ears. The blood dia- mond trade prospers because demand not only continues unabated but 1s actually expanding. There are other major examples of criminal activ- ities substantially increasing because of more widespread prosperity and therefore growing affordability and demand. One is the commerce in rhinoceros’ horns. Prohibited under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), a thriving 1llegal market operates in China, Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, Macau and Yemen. Rhino horns are smuggled overland through Nepal, Tibet and Burma to China, by international crime syndicates. This trade has been 1llegal in China since 1993. Reportedly a horn can earn $20,000 per kilogram on the black market. À horn can weigh between 500 grams and 3 kilo- grams, depending on the age of the animal. Poachers who actually kill (49) See Edgardo ROTMAN, supra, note 5 G50) Alex Y. SEITA, “The Role of Market Forces in Transnational Violence”, 60 Alhb. L. Rev. 635, 637 (1997). __ 94 — the rhino may earn only $1,000 per horn which 1s still a large sum in their economy. The quest for these horns, sought after because in tra- ditional Chinese medicine they are believed to increase sexual vigor and endurance, !" has transformed the areas where the rhinoceros live into killing fields. Poaching has exploded especially with increased wealth spreading in China. Only 2,400 rhinos remain in the world. Tiger penises are thought to have aphrodisiacal powers as well, especially in Korea, Vietnam and Indonesia. Endangered Sumatran tigers are especially killed for this item that can fetch $5,000 in the case of a white tiger. Bear gallbladders and elephants’ feet are also poached. It is estimated that 23,000 elephants were 1llegally killed last year and 20 tons of ivory smuggled. À foot can fetch $675 and more, depending on its size. The same is true of shark fins used to make gourmet soup reportedly sold for $150 a bowl and fashionable at wedding banquets in China and Japan. The tailfin of a whale shark can cost $10,000. Once prohibitively expensive but for the very rich, now 1t is affordable by many and thus the demand and the slaughter have increased exponentially. It 1s esti- mated that thirty-eight million sharks are killed every year for this rea- son alone, the rest of the carcass left to rot unused, even though the tak- ing of fins 1s prohibited in 60 countries. G. — DRUGS AND VIOLENCE IN A GLOBALIZED CONTEXT Users may perpetrate crimes of violence to raise the money to buy drugs. Traffickers and suppliers use violence for a variety of reasons : to obtain and defend their control and possession of the commodity, to protect their shipments, to guarantee themselves a market free of com- petitors, to distribute the goods, and to protect their earnings. Other areas where there is a strong violent component are human trafficking, prostitution, arms sales, illegal deforestation and the seizing of land. This 1s of course nothing new. The so-called “discovery of America” by the Europeans started one of the bloodiest land grabs in recent history in the Americas. In Asia, in the 1800s the Opium Wars represented the climax of a trade dispute between China under the Qing Dynasty and the United Kingdom. British smuggling of opium from British India into China and the Chinese government’s efforts to enforce its drug laws erupted in conflict. China’s defeat in both wars forced the government to have to tolerate the opium trade that benefitted the British and their (D There is no scientific basis for this belief. The rhino horn is mostly composed of ker- atin also common in nails, hair. skin and teeth. This fact however does not curb the increas- ing demand for it. 95 — balance of trade with China. Colonial wars and other conflicts, includ- ing the current ones in the Middle Fast, have also been defined in terms of guaranteeing more powerful or technologically advanced countries the control and monopoly over free labor, raw and precious materials, and energy sources, to ensure the continuation of their high level of liv- ing at the expense of the people and resources of the occupied lands. H. — THE GLOBALIZATION OF PROBLEMS There is no doubt that today most problems impacting a country or a group of countries become global almost instantly. Economic prob- lems and downturns spread from country to country. An economic crisis in the United States or the European Union (EU) quickly impacts the rest of the world. ? The same is true with health epidemics (at one point recently there was world mass fear of a chicken flu pandemic), cross border environmental problems and pollution, atomic energy, the depletion of the ozone layer, global warming, tsunamis, hurricanes, typhoons, tornadoes, earthquakes, computer viruses and piracy of intel- lectual property. None of these problems stop at national borders; all can potentially impact wide regions of the world.°’ No doubt the instant and live coverage of news from all over the world for 24 hours/ Tdays a week has played a crucial role in making the world a small vil- lage indeed and in magnifying crises and problems at times many times over. We can see this at work now even during U.S. presidential election campaigns with candidates trying to garner international support : John McCain traveling to South America; Barack Obama to Iraq, Afghani- stan and Europe; candidates for the presidency of Mexico and of Argentina traveling to the U.S. and more. I. — CRIME : FROM A LOCAL TO A GLOBAL EVENT One of the major changes brought about by globalization has espe- cially been about crime. °® Until now, crime has always been mostly a local even t (55S ) The majority of murder victims know their killers; most abused children know their abusers; theft victims generally only have to (52) » ‘Is Financial Globalization Beneficial” In : ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/11891.html. (53) Paul Schiff BERMAN, “From International Law to Law and Globalization”. 2005, 43 Colum. J. Transnat'! L. 485. 54 M. Cherif BASSIOUNI, “Introduction : The Future of International Criminal Justice” Fall. 1999, 11 Pace Int'I L. Rev. 309. (5) Patrick J. KEENAN. “The New Deterrence : Crime and Policy in the Age of Globali- zation”, January. 2006. 91 Zowa L. Rev. 505. - 96 look in their own neighborhoods to find the thieves. ‘“The poor prey on 9 the poor, it is often said, to stress that criminal most often victimize their neighbors. And intimate crimes, like sexual assault, are described as mostly occurring between acquaintances, often in the victim's own apartment, and intra-racially, that is again impacting mostly people close to the victimizer. Crime is local also in the way 1it is controlled. In federal countries, like the United States, it 1s the states, not the federal government, that prosecute the largest number of criminal cases. Law enforcement budgets may depend at least in part on monies from the central federal government, but enforcement priorities are decided locally.°6 Although, for example, there are varying degrees of coordi- nation among different law enforcement agencies from various states in the United States and also between agencies from different countries, 57) crime remains mostly a local problem. ‘ Globalization is changing this in ways that have not yet been fully explored. While crime as an event will always possess a substantial local component with officials and victims normally reacting to it in the place where it occurs, it 1s rapidly becoming more and more of a transnational phenomenon. Increasingly, an activity that 1s regulated or proscribed in one country because it is deemed dangerous or unwanted can become more common in other, neighboring countries. ‘* The difference is that in the latter countries, while the activity 1s just as unwanted, it may how- ever be less effectively regulated or vigorously forbidden. What happens then when an activity that is unwanted in two places is however more effectively regulated in one place than in the other? Does the unwanted activity just move from the first state to the second? How much of it migrates, and what factors impact how much 1s displaced? How should scholars and policymakers consider regulation in this situation — as a local response to a local problem or as part of a broader effort to dimin- ish the overall incidence of the unwanted activity?°°) These questions are basic to determining what globalization will mean in the near B6) Stefan A. Riesenfeld Symposium 2003 : International Money Laundering From Latin America to Asia. Who Pays?; Mariano-Florentino CUELLAR, “The Mismatch Between State Power and State Capacity in Transnational Law Enforcement”, By 2004, 22 Berkeley J. Int'I L. 15. ÉN Stefan A. Riesenfeld Symposium 2003 : International Money Laundering from Latin American to Asia. Who pays?; Lan Cao, “The Transnational and Sub-National in Global Crimes”, 2004, 22 Berkeley J. Int'! L. S9. (8) This can take place at the local level too like when vigorous police action against prostitution or drug trafficking in one section of a city simply displaces those activities to another part of the city. without truly solving the problem. (9) There is commonsensical and empirical evidence that this happens at the neighbor- hood level as well. For example, if the police crack down on drug use in one neighborhood. drug dealers move to a nearby neighborhood where various circumstances may make it pos- sible for them to establish themselves and operate successfully. __ 97 — future. ‘ Until now, they have not been fully explored. The existing scholarship on deterrence is of limited use in a globalized context. 6" There is no question that progress in transportation, communica- tions, the provision of information increasingly with “live images, ” the practical abolition of borders in certain parts of the world, the constant increase of internet users and networks which makes borders less and less relevant, the gradual decrease in state authority either by design, as in the context of the EU, or because of a weakening of the state, ‘°?) the ability to efficiently and instantly conduct financial operations cross- borders, the existence of offshore banking and tax heavens, the speed, secrecy and anonymity of today's communications have all allowed transnational crime to firmly establish itself and successfully avoid detection, regulation and investigation.‘° Transnational crime, after creating a market for violence, today subcontracts its execution to be carried out by locals. The ever growing chasm between the wealthy and the poor, generated as it is by differential access to capitals markets, also stirs up considerable interest in criminal options to “catch up,” so to speak. J. — POSITIVE ASPECTS OF GLOBALIZATION On the other hand, one should not think of globalization as only a negative and destructive force. Many of the positive trends in today's world are the fruit of the many aspects of globalization already men- tioned. Increased longevity, higher survival rates for infants, children and women giving birth, better nutrition, more education, more and higher quality information, great entertainment and the increasing awareness of a smaller world, whose problems impact all of us and whose solutions benefit all of us, represent distinct advantages of glo- balization. This can also be transferred to crime control through more cooperation, coordination, and mutual assistance. Globalizing crime control is considered by some one of the more positive responses to the (60) Andreas HERBERG-ROTHE, “New Containment Policy: A Grand Strategy for the Twenty-first Century?”, RUSI Journal, London : Apr 2008, Vol. 153, Iss. 2; pg. 50. (61) Jost DELBRCK, “Structural Changes in the International System and its Legal Order : International Law in the Era of Globalization”, Swiss Rev. Int'!l & Eur. L., 1, 4 (2001). (62) Oscar SCHACHTER, “The Decline of the Nation State and Îts Implications for Inter- national Law”, 36 Colum. J. Transnat'! L. 7, 15 (1997). (63) “Book Review : Introduction to International Criminal Law, Mark A. Drumbl. Washington & Lee University, School of Law and edited by Richard B. Bilder”, January, 2005, 99 A.J.I.L. 287. —— 98 — challenge of transnational crime in a world that is more and more inter- dependent. (64) K. — WHAT DOES THE GLOBALIZATION OF CRIME MEAN TO CRIMINOLOGISTS? So, what does all of this in the end mean to criminologists? First of all, criminology as a profession must take globalization and its consequences much more seriously into account in our studies and (65) analyses of crime. Just as crime 1s mostly local, so the work of criminologists 1s likewise mostly localized to the community where the crimes occur or to the region or country. Most criminology studies within a wider area are effectively mostly national in scope, at the most. International or tran- snational studies generally are limited to comparing two or a few coun- tries. The American approach to the study of crime favors empirical studies which however normally respect national boundaries. The Euro- pean approach emphasizes mostly case studies which can be highly indi- vidualistic and narrow. Comparative studies also utilize mostly national survey data. But the world is indeed rapidly changing in the direction of globalization that transcends national boundaries. ‘°) To understand today’s crime, a wide variety of crimes, we must become adept at taking a holistic approach that understands, operationalizes, stresses and underlines the various points of connection, potentially worldwide, that characterize crime today.‘6’) Limiting ourselves geographically, cultur- ally, legally to a particular place, even if it is a whole country or even a region, and to a predominantly sociological approach is no longer suf- ficient to fully grasp what is happening in reality, to analyze it correctly, and to develop sensible deterrence countermeasures that have a chance of succeeding.‘°°) It offers only a compartmentalized and chopped (64) Hannah L. BUXBAUM, “Conflict of Economic Laws: From Sovereignty to Sub- stance”. 42 VA. J. Int'I L. 931, 942-54 (2002) (discussing ways in which “regulatory power traditionally enjoyed by sovereign states has shifted” to supranational level, to private actors, and to “informal networks constituted among sub state-level agencies in different countries”). (69) Flerida Ruth P. ROMERO, Lecture : Legal challenges of globalization, delivered as part of the Indiana Supreme Court Lecture Series at Indiana University Law School, Indianap- olis, 2005, 15 Ind. Int 1 & Comp. L. Rev. 501. (66) Gnther TEUBNER, “Global Private Regimes : Neo Spontaneous Law and Dual Con- stitution of Autonomous Sectors”, in Public Governance in the age of Globalization 74 (Gnther Teubner ed.… 1997). (6) Symposium : International Company and Securities Law. Paul Redmond. Transna- tional Enterprise and Human Rights : Options for Standard Setting and Compliance, The International Lawyer, Spring, 2003, 37 Int'! Law. 69. (68 Dan M. KAHAN, “Between Economics and Sociology : The New Path of Deterrence” 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2477, 2477 (1997). __ 99 _ vision, formalistically correct, but realistically handicapped. À quick example of this could be sex tourism that originates as a plan in one continent but is executed in another one. Secondly, criminologists need to be aware and mindful of the very high level of links between political, strategic, economic and trade var- iables and the topics that they are researching and studying. The tradi- tional focus on the perpetrator(s), the victim(s) and their communities is no longer sufficient. Understanding crime cannot any more be linked only to explanations that focus on the perpetrators, the victims, and the immediate circeumstances. There are powerful variables that play a much deeper, wider role in setting the stage for criminal activity and that must be taken into consideration if we want to develop effective preventive measures. For example, populations today are very transient, mobile, in flux. Massive immigration is changing the composition, dynamics, cul- ture, language and food of the communities of destination. While race is a variable examined in numerous studies, especially in the U.S., it 1s static. It reflects recognized groups as if they were totally Americanized or Îtalianized or British instead of building into the research ways that allow one to detect, examine and account for a continuum of variations that reflects events, experiences, links and influences at times 1000 miles away. There are those who strongly believe that ‘shared citizenship’ requires the official recognition of different identities and allegiances. Thus, for example, in February 2008 the Archbishop of Canterbury in a controversial speech proposed that in the limited areas of marriage, divorce, inheritance and custody, Muslim communal judgments, volun- tarily agreed to, might be recognized within what would remain a com- mon framework of law — much as Talmudic provisions are for Orthodox Jews. This is an example of the impact of massive immigration and of the complexity of the reality that we as criminologists now face. Another powerful example 1s the growth of Islamic banking which oper- ates according to the law of the Sharia, the body of Islamic religious law. In the United States 1t 1s estimated that the American Muslim com- munity has a purchasing power of $170 billion. The financial industry in the U.S. and elsewhere 1s racing to develop products that are tailored to meet the needs of the Muslim community. ‘°) The world in front of us has become much more nuanced and complex. Most of all criminol- ogists must take more into account forces, phenomena, changes in soci- ety that have nothing necessarily to do with free will, psychiatric disor- ders, bad associations but rather reflect powerful forces that at times are per se positive. One can think about the impact of the increase in relative wealth across the world on all sorts of positive and negative (69) Shahzad Q. QADRI, “Islamic Banking”. Business Law Today, vol. 17, no. 6. American Bar Association, 59. - 100 — behaviors, including skyrocketing demand for drugs, recreational sex and therefore sexual services and therefore prostitution and therefore trafficking in people. More disposable income also leads to a desire to escape the ordinary, to seek the unusual, the risqué, a high level of entertainment and excitement. Thus, the surprisingly and worrisome growing demand for children and minors, even very young ones, for sex- ual activities®’ and the widespread use of drugs to alter conscious- ness.(/!) And these are just some examples. Third, we must realize that the state often has or takes a stake in the transnational criminal activity. While it may give lip service to com- bating criminality, it may not be ready to intervene and break the bal- ance of power, financial gain, and relative social peace that are gener- ated by silent or open agreements with transnational crime organizations and their members. For example, some states gain from illegal immigration that provides cheap labor in the fields, restaurants, hotels, factories and other services. This helps keep prices down, which in turn makes exports more attractive and competitive, and earnings up: allows the citizens to have more of a disposable income to fuel the econ- omy through consumption and discretionary spending; ensures that crit- ical but low-prestige jobs and chores are done for the benefit of the community, especially the upper classes; and allows the citizens to con- tinue to enjoy a higher standard of living that otherwise they could not afford. The country exporting people gains as well since emigration reduces unemployment and the pressure to provide training and educa- tional services to prepare those citizens for employment and to create jobs, and eventually generates millions or even billions of dollars annu- ally in remittances which quickly become essential to the financial well being and prosperity of the country of origin. This symbiosis creates ambiguous situations when the legal posture of a state or number of states does not coincide with their actual practices. (72) Trafficking in arms is a prime example of this ambiguity in the role of the state pros- ecuting “illegal” arms trafficking while taking active part and competing fiercely for arms sales. As another example, a state may ratify treaties and enact laws that prohibit and sanction human trafficking and forced sex work but at the same time derive substantial financial benefits, being a major destination country for sex tourism. The contribution of sex 70 M. MELROSE and D. BARRETT. “The flesh trade in Europe and the trafficking in women and children from commercial exploitation ”. Police Practice and Research. vol. 7. 2006. no. 2. pp. 113-123. C Chantal THOMAs, “Disciplining globalization : International law. illegal trade. and the case of narcotics”. 2003. 24 Mich. J. Int'1 L. 549. ( Nancie CARAWAY, “Human Rights and Existing Contradictions in Asia-Pacific Human Trafficking Politics and Discourse”. Spring. 2006. 14 Tul. J. Int1 & Comp. L. 295. 101 work to the GDP of some Southeast Asian countries /* is so visible and impressive that a few years ago the ILO called for them to openly rec- ognize it and take more responsibility for it. The ILO report /* stresses that the growth of prostitution is probably linked, albeit inadvertently, to the macro-economic policies of governments which have a tendency to spawn rapid urbanization at the expense of rural development, to promote cheap labor for industrialization, to facilitate the export of female labor for overseas employment and to promote tourism as a for- eign exchange earner. /° AIl these features of modern, export-oriented economies, combined with the pervasive lack of social safety nets and deep-rooted gender discrimination against females, probably contribute to the growth of the sex sector. Moreover, sex work is often better paid than most of the options available to young, uneducated women excluded from access to the education and training leading to better paying jobs. (6) It is not and will not be easy to operationalize the state’s participa- tion and connivance in the establishment, continuation and even flour- ishing of a transnational crime activity but we cannot even begin to study it and/or to propose remedies, solutions and avenues for change if we do not take into account the double role that governments can and do play in these types of murky situations. ” Fourthly, this perspective obviously impacts the response to transna- tional crime that criminologists may propose. Typically, studies and papers on transnational crime call for more cooperation between coun- tries, more resources for policing and tracking of transnational crime, more treaties and conventions, more money for INTERPOL, the expan- sion of EUROPOL, the establishment of more and similar “POLs” in other continents etc. But how can we expect these measures to succeed when most countries derive tangible benefits as well from transnational crime? In attempting to study, analyze, remedy, prevent and maybe even solve the puzzle of transnational crime, we must factor into the equation the variable of the ambiguous role of the state and not just accept at face value laws, treaties and agreements and assume that more state and (3) Robyn EMERTON, “Translating international and regional trafficking norms into domestic reality: À Hong Kong case study”, 2004, 10 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 215. (4 Lin Lean LIM (editor), The Sex Sector : The economic and social bases of prostitution in Southeast Asia, International Labor Office, Geneva, 1998. (°) Mohamed Y. MATTAR, “Trafficking in Persons : An Annotated Legal Bibliography”, Fall. 2004. 96 Law Libr. J. 669. (76) Symposium : Globalization and the Erosion of Sovereignty in honor of Professor Lichtenstein : Dinah SHELTON, “Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World”, Spring. 2002, 25 B.C. Int1 & Comp. L. Rev. 273. ( Edi C.M. KINNEY. “Appropriations for the Abolitionists : Undermining Effects of the U.S. Mandatory Anti-Prostitution Pledge in the Fight against Human Trafficking and HIV/ AIDS”, 2006, 21 Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 158. — 102 — interstate resources are going to seriously impact a sensitive area that especially affects the economy of a country or entire region. An example maybe some European Union countries decrying 1llegal immigration from Eastern Europe or South America while at the same time tens of thousand of their elderly depend on Romanian or Ecuadorian undocu- mented women for their daily care. In analyzing transnational crimes, especially money laundering and other financial transactions, criminologists need again to show their abil- ity to see through the apparent contradictory and competitive role of the established authorities. The fundamental question could be : “Is the state and/or the international organism’s prohibition of certain financial oper- ations and modalities, like for example bank secrecy, genuinely moti- vated by a well articulated desire to stamp out transnational money laundering or does it represent a power grab against the private sector by the state or against a smaller state by more powerful ones in order to guarantee themselves the maximum financial benefits possible ?” 79 In other words, is the state’s intervention motivated by a true desire to combat crime or simply to maximize revenues? We have seen controver- sial measures taken by some governments supposedly to stamp out cor- ruption and money laundering that have instead raised an articulated suspicion that they were actually moves to eliminate political rivals and consolidate the power of the central government in controlling national assets (Russia under Putin comes to mind as a prime example of this). This is actually nothing new. The abolition of the order of the Knights Templar in the 14 century was not truly motivated by a desire to stamp out the debauchery of their alleged homosexual practices con- fessed to by its leaders under harsh torture but rather a calculated move by Philip IV of France to eliminate a potential parallel state threatening his power and most of all to cancel the heavy debt he owed the Knights. The establishment of the Church of England, one could argue, was not so much motivated by a sincere and austere desire for religious reform and to recover the purity of the faith but rather by coveting the sub- stantial wealth of the Catholic Church and monasteries in England at that time when the monarchy was heavily indebted to the nobility and needed money to assert its power. Confiscating and appropriating the riches of the religious orders and of the church in both cases provided an irresistible motivation while the publicly stated motives sounded much more pure and noble. Closer to us in time, there are those who have said that banks in Florida, for example, would aot have prospered and survived were it not for the massive laundering of drug money. And there are indications that the continuing remarkable boom in real estate (8) [van SIMoNovIC, “State Sovereignty and Globalization : Are Some States More Equal?””, Summer, 2000, 28 Ga. J. Int1 & Comp Law 381. — 103 — development in some countries, for example in the eastern Arabian Peninsula, is fueled not just by an ample supply of petrodollars but also by large money laundering activities. (79) Thus, while criminologists may applaud the efforts of the Organiza- tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United Nations, the U.S., the EU and others in combating corruption and money laundering, they must critically ask 1f this 1s truly to stamp out transnational crime or instead to ensure the monopoly of the state on the proceed of legal and illegal activities alike, thus incorporating tran- snational crime into the financial “books” of a country with the poten- tial of making the state a less than impartial party. À more skeptical look at international efforts to take out corruption and taking the state more vigorously to task relative to its true intentions, objectives and methodology may give our profession more relevance, more bite, and truly help the difficult process of finding reasonable solutions to a very complex problem. ‘8°) L. — CONCLUSION In conclusion, we now fully live in the post September 11, 2001 attack on the twin towers in New York; the post March 11, 2004 train bombings in Madrid, and the post July 7, 2005 tube bombings in Lon- don. The world has just begun to fully comprehend, digest and react to large scale, war-like terrorist attacks. #" At the same time, massive shifts in wealth, manufacturing, trade and in the balance of world power are taking place and center stage in our vision of the world and its dynam- ics. The ascendancy in the last few years especially of China and India economically, politically and also militarily, are changing the balance of wealth and power in the world. They also herald a time of sustained and increased relative prosperity there and elsewhere, hopefully and eventu- ally for billions of people. China’s wholesale purchasing of soybeans everywhere possible has, for example, allowed many farmers in other hemispheres, especially in South America, to renovate their homes, buy (79) Stefan A. Riesenfeld Symposium 2003 : International Money Laundering from Latin America to Asia : Who Pays?: Bruce ZAGARIS, “The Merging Of The Anti-Money Launder- ing And Counter-Terrorism Financial Enforcement Regimes After September !1. 2001”, 2004, 22 Berkeley J. Int'I L. 123. (80) Many theorize that a future real danger is a general weakening of state laws and pro- tections in favor of making conditions more accommodating to corporations. See Karl-Heinz LADEUR, “Globalization and the Conversion of Democracy to Polycentric Networks: Can Democracy Survive the End of the Nation State?”, in Public Governance in the Age of Glo- balization 89, 90 (Karl-Heinz Ladeur ed., 2004). (D Maryann Cusimano Love, “Globalization, ethics and the war on terrorism”, 2002, 16 ND J. L. Ethics & Pub Pol'y 65. — 104 — the latest farm machinery, and purchase expensive goods and cars. The monopoly on wealth, information, communications, power and influ- ence enjoyed until recently by the U.S. and the EU is now being increas- ingly shared with other countries in the world, until recently “underde- veloped.” Many countries previously dependent on international institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and others do not need them any more. For example, energy resources in Bolivia and Venezuela; copper in Peru and Chile; and bio- fuels in Brazil are generating their financial independence. ? This is in turn creating a massive demand in all sectors of the economy imaginable offering untold opportunities for legal and illegal commerce and trade. The geographical and mental frontiers of our research, theorizing, and policy-recommending must change accordingly. Contextual analysis 1s required. This will be neither easy nor error free but it 1s unavoidable and necessary. Best of all, this challenge offers us unparalleled opportu- nities to truly think, research and act globally and really make the work of criminologists relevant at a worldwide level.‘*) It is a challenge that we Will and must meet skillfully and successfully in order to alleviate and, if possible, eliminate the widespread transnational criminality engendered by the massive changes taking place in the world today and that are impacting our daily lives both positively and negatively. ABSTRACT This paper focuses on globalization as it relates to transnational crime. It attempts to show how the very patterns and dynamics that make globalization possible and effective as a positive force in the world also give rise to “collateral” negative, that is criminal, consequences and facilitate the spawning and rapid growth of transnational crimes. More- over, there are also crimes committed opposing globalization. And glo- balization also makes it easier to fight crime since 1t facilitates cooper- ation and coordination of anti-crime efforts. Thus it has a complex relationship with crime : positive, negative and preventative. The paper also addresses how criminology should review and revise their research and intervention models to take into account how globalization has changed the way we can and should approach crime. New and bold ways of thinking and modeling are needed. Examples are provided. (82 }In the fall of 2008, for example. the IMF only has one country as a client, Turkey, instead of several as in the recent past. $3 Milena STERIO, “The evolution of international law”, Spring, 2008. 31 B.C. Int'1 & Comp. L. Rev. 213. — 105 — RESUMEN Este articulo se centra en la globalizaciôn en tanto en cuanto estä relacionada con el crimen transnacional. Intenta demostrar cômo los mismos modelos y dinämicas que hacen que la globalizaciôn sea posible y eficaz conducen también a consecuencias colaterales negativas, es decir, criminales, y facilitan la introducciôn y el râpido crecimiento de los crimenes transnacionales. Ademâs, existen también delitos cometidos contra la globalizaciôn. Por su parte, la globalizaciôn facilita la lucha contra el crimen porque la cooperaciôn y la coordinaciôn de los esfuer- Zzos contra el crimen son mâs fâciles. Por consiguiente, la globalizaciôn posee una relaciôn muy compleja con el crimen : positiva, negativa y de prevenciôn. Este articulo examina también cômo la criminologia deberia reconsiderar y revisar sus modelos de investigaciôn y de intervenciôn para tener bien en cuenta cômo la globalizaciôn ha cambiado la manera en la cual podemos y deberiamos plantear el estudio del crimen. Se nece- sitan nuevas y audaces maneras de pensar y de preparar modelos. El articulo aporta ejemplos. RÉSUMÉ Cet article se concentre sur la globalisation dans sa relation avec la criminalité transnationale. Il tente de montrer comment les mêmes modèles et dynamiques qui rendent la globalisation possible et efficace amènent aussi des conséquences collatérales négatives, c’est-à-dire crimi- nelles, et facilitent l’introduction et la croissance rapide des crimes trans- nationaux. Du reste, il y a aussi des crimes commis contre la globalisa- tion. Et la globalisation, pour sa part, facilite la lutte contre le crime parce que la coopération et la coordination des efforts contre le crime sont plus faciles. En conséquence, la globalisation a un rapport très complexe avec le crime : positif, négatif, et préventif. Cet article traite aussi de la manière dont la criminologie devrait réexaminer et réviser ses modèles de recherche et d’intervention pour prendre en compte ce que la globalisation a changé dans la manière dont on peut et dont on devrait aborder le crime. On a besoin de nouvelles et audacieuses façons de penser et de modéliser. Des exemples sont fournis. — 106 — :QUIEN NECESITA A UN CRIMINOLOGO? : INVESTIGACION, ACCION Y POLITICA CRIMINAL Vicente Garrido Genovés “!) En un reciente articulo encabezado por Marianne Junger junto con investigadores pertenecientes a siete paises (Estados Unidos, Gran Bre- taña, Holanda, España, Australia, Canadà y Alemania) publicado en la revista European Journal on Criminological Policy Research, los autores se preguntaban si los gobiernos de esos paises apoyaban de modo habi- tual las medidas para prevenir la delincuencia que contaban con la mejor evidencia cientifica disponible en cuanto a su efectividad. Los hallazgos fueron sorprendentemente semejantes en todos los casos : si bien en esas naciones se observaban claros esfuerzos por desplazarse hacia una politica criminal basada en la evidencia (Farrington y Petro- sino, 2001), existian muchos obstäculos en el camino. Junto a las pro- pias limitaciones del conocimiento cientifico — en forma de escasos estu- dios sôlidamente establecidos que permitieran conclusiones especificas— se puso de relieve en este anâlisis de criminologia comparada la fuerte dependencia que tiene la politica criminal de los sucesos alarmantes que generan una crisis de confianza en el püblico para con el sistema. Tam- bién se comprobé la dificultad que los cientificos tenian para ser escu- chados por la sociedad y los politicos, fuera de los circulos de la Aca- demia. En este texto intento poner de relieve la importancia que podria tener la criminologia en lo que se refiere a la prevenciôn del delito en la socie- dad actual, con tal de que fuéramos capaces de lograr determinados objetivos insertos en el ambito de la investigaciôn, por una parte, y de la acciôn o puesta en prâäctica de las iniciativas, por otra. Posteriormente me ocupo de las razones por las que la criminologia tiene muchas difi- cultades para influir sobre la politica criminal de los paises, y los modos en que podria obtenerse un mayor acceso a la toma de decisiones rele- vantes en la prevenciôn de la delincuencia. À continuaciôn analizo cuâa- les son las funciones que ahora desempeñamos los criminôlogos, sin duda bastante marginales tanto en el funcionamiento de la justicia como en el sistema decisorio de las politicas criminales, y de qué modo podrian ser aumentados en su influencia sus roles en un futuro prôximo. (D Facultad de Filosofia y Educaciôn. Avda. Blasco Ibañez, 30. 46010 Valencia. vicente.garrido@uv.es. — 107 — LA INVESTIGACION No cabe duda de que uno de los grandes paradigmas en la investi- gaciôn actual es lo que se conoce como la perspectiva basada en la evi- dencia (evidence-based approach), esto es, el esfuerzo desarrollado en los ültimos años para generar conocimientos a través de la investigaciôn mediante revisiones sistemâticas promovidas por la Colaboraciôn Cam- pbell (Campbell Group in Crime & Justice) en la bûüsqueda de progra- mas efectivos. Mediante un estudio exhaustivo de la metodologia dispo- nible acerca de un tôpico cualquiera de la prevenciôn del delito, se llega a derivar una serie de conclusiones cuyo alcance depende de la calidad de las investigaciones originales que componen la revisiôn final. Como convenciôn, se llega a decidir si un método de intervenciôn determinado ha alcanzado un estatus de “efectivo”, “prometedor” o “no efectivo” en la consecuciôn de sus objetivos de prevenciôn, de acuerdo a los datos disponibles en el momento de la revisiôn (ver Sherman, Farrington, Walsh & MacKenzie, 2002). Bajo el planteamiento de la evidencia, se considera que la prevenciôn del delito podria ubicarse dentro del modelo de salud püblica, en el que para cada dolencia existe un tratamiento recomendable o, al menos, uno preferible en comparaciôn con los otros. Las intervenciones tienen que ajustarse a los factores de riesgo y de protecciôn que presentan las per- sonas o los escenarios que van a ser objeto de las mismas. Ahora bien, otros criminélogos en la actualidad abogan por un Modelo Reflexivo (Knepper, 2005) o Cultural, västago de la orientaciôn critica en Criminologia, cuyo fin no es tanto buscar referentes cuantita- tivos de ‘lo que funciona’ (what works), sino, en palabras de Stephanie Kane, “documentar, descifrar y desplegar las estructuras interpretativas, las imâgenes y los sentidos a través de los cuales el delito es aprehendido y realizado” (2004 : 303). En esta ponencia mantengo, en este punto, que ambos planteamien- tos investigativos son necesarios, como lo demuestra en la actualidad el estudio del fenômeno conocido como ‘desistencia’ (desistance), y sus obvias relaciones con la denominada justicia de la restauraciôn (Res- torative Justice). En efecto, mientras que el tratamiento de los delin- cuentes tiene que enfrentarse a un ambiente politico inhôspito y a los problemas derivados de la implementaciôn (ver mâs adelante), la aten- ciôn reciente a los temas de discusion que plantea el concepto de desis- tencia de la carrera delictiva ha promovido un interés renovado en los modelos de intervenciôn de prestaciôn de servicios en la comunidad y en los ingredientes de los programas efectivos. Un desarrollo importante es la idea de que la desistencia es un proceso que mueve a alguien desde la conducta delictiva hasta la abstinencia en el delito, y que tal conducta — 108 — de ausencia del delito (0, en otras palabras, el hecho de “desistir”’) nunca termina. Asi en lugar de esta cesaciôn abrupta se produce un cambio tanto en la tasa como en la frecuencia de la conducta delictiva, y de este modo podemos decir que el cambio gradual constituye el proceso de desistencia. En su libro Crime in the Making, Sampson y Laub (1993) desarrollan la teoria del control social informal para explicar la con- ducta delictiva como parte de un trayecto vital (life course). En esta obra seminal los autores mostraron cômo transiciones tan relevantes en el desarrollo vital como obtener un empleo, entrar en el ejército o con- traer matrimonio afectaron para bien el curso del delito, incluso en el caso de los delincuentes juveniles. Otros trabajos posteriores contribu- yeron al conocimiento del proceso de desistencia como un fenômeno gradual, y reafirmaron la importancia de los vinculos sociales. Este énfa- sis en los controles sociales informales por parte de esta corriente de la investigacion — es decir, sobre las instituciones sociales que unen al indi- viduo a la conducta prosocial- ha contrastado con muchas de las poli- ticas contemporäneas focalizadas en la potenciaciôn del control formal y la linea dura de la “ley y orden”. Es aqui donde entra en relaciôn el estudio de la desistencia con los principios de la justicia de la restauraciôn. Como han sugerido autores como Bazemore y Erbe (2004), la intervenciôn basada en ella pretende, por encima de todo, acelerar el proceso natural de la desistencia mediante la creaciôn de nuevas conexiones que construyen el capital humano en los delincuentes y el capital social en las comunidades donde éstos hayan de reintegrarse. El resultado final es el cambio del individuo mediante la asunciôon de una nueva identidad, pasando de verse de un ‘delincuente” a alguien prosocial (Maruna, Immarigeon & Lebel, 2004). Mi punto de vista es que el planteamiento de los factores de riesgo y la büsqueda del programa eficaz de acuerdo con la evidencia puede beneficiarse de la investigaciôn cualitativa (o si se quiere menos orto- doxa) que ilustra el anâlisis de la desistencia y el conocimiento de los efectos en las victimas, delincuentes y comunidades de los modelos de trabajo de la justicia de la restauraciôn. Otro ejemplo relevante de esta integraciôn es la propuesta de Robert Agnew (2005) de estudiar las ‘his- torias’ o ‘argumentos’ (storylines) en la trayectoria vital de los delincuen- tes como causas del delito. La conclusiôn de este apartado, no obstante, es que no podemos renunciar a hacer efectiva la aspiraciôn de la consiliencia (consilience) o armonia de los hallazgos a partir de la pluralidad de metodologias de investigacion, tal y como fue formulada por E.O. Wilson hace unos años (Wilson, 1999). — 109 — LA ACCION Mi discurso aqui no es original, y abogo porque empleemos en la prevencion del delito aquellos programas o metologias que pueben ser efectivos, o al menos que muestren conseguir objetivos intermedios que sean considerados valiosos para la comunidad (como es el caso de los logros de la justicia de la restauraciôn, y su énfasis en construir el capi- tal social en beneficio de todas las personas implicadas en un escenario de intervenciôn). Podremos someter a anâlisis critico la oportunidad de determinados programas, pero si aceptamos llevarlos a cabo, no pode- mos malgastar el tiempo, el dinero y las esperanzas de los contribuyen- tes En este punto asumo las reflexiones y propuestas señaladas por Paul Ebklom (2005 : 57). (Cuâl es el propésito del conocimiento en la pre- venciôn del delito? Tal y como señala Paul Ekblom, éste ha de dirigirse a mejorar, extender y mantener los esfuerzos en la prevenciôn del delito, ya sean realizados por la comunidad en su vida diaria (mediante el con- trol social informal), por los servicios de seguridad privada, por los dise- nadores de objetos y lugares mâs seguros, o por las instituciones del control formal del Estado. Este autor establece los siguientes tipos de contenidos del conoci- miento necesario para la prevenciôn del delito (tabla 1)) TABLA 1 : LOS CONTENIDOS DEL CONOCIMIENTO PARA LA PREVENCION (EKBLOM, 2005) Acerca del tipo de delito a | Sus costos y consecuencias para la victima y la prevenir sociedad; modus operandi de los delincuentes, definiciones legales; patrones y tendencias en su manifestaciôn; factores de riesgo y protecciôn ; teorias explicativas. Acerca de los métodos de En qué contexto; sus efectos colaterales; anâlisis prevenciôn que son efica- de costos y beneficios. CEs Cômo poner en prâctica Conocimiento y habilidades necesarios para esos métodos implementarlos; metodologias de investigaciôn y anâlisis À quiénes hay que implicar Contactos para buscar consultores, entidades €n €sos programas asociadas; colaboradores para ponerlo en otras instituciones de prâctica ; financiacion: apoyo. Cuâändo actuar Elegir el momento adecuado; coordinaciôn con otras instituciones. — 110 — TABLA 1: LOS CONTENIDOS DEL CONOCIMIENTO PARA LA PREVENCION (EKBLOM, 2005) Dônde establecer los recur- Acciones y momentos del programa que han de sos necesarios contar con los recursos necesarios Tener en cuenta las impli- Estudiar el modo en que el programa se adecua caciones simbôlicas, emo- al sentido de justicia y valores de la comunidad cionales y culturales del en la que se va a implementar. programa La importancia de reunir ese conocimiento se pone de relieve en el hecho de que una y otra vez observamos cuân frecuente es que un pro- grama fracase en su implementaciôn en el mundo real (‘mainstream pro- jects’), a pesar de que en su demostraciôn diseñada previamente diera buenos resultados. ; Cuâl es la razôn? Con demasiada frecuencia se trata de una falta de conocimiento sobre los mecanismos causales que hacen funcionar el método o programa puesto en prâctica, asi como un igual- mente deficiente conocimiento sobre las causas del tipo de delito que se quiere prevenir. Otra causa habitual es no tomar en consideraciôn el contexto en el que dicho programa va a ser puesto a prueba. Como dice Ekblom (2005 : 60): “Los métodos de prevenciôn del delito no son como los pesticidas que pueden ser extendidos uniformemente sobre los mismos campos con la certeza de que van a tener en todos ellos los mis- mos efectos”. Estas deficiencias aumentan si, por otra parte, las estregias diseñadas para la evaluacion de proceso de los programas y de sus resul- tados son tan pobres que nos dejan con mäs incôgnitas que respuestas. Es por ello que nos unimos a esta recomendaciôn que realiza de nuevo Ekblom (2005 : 60) : Bajo estas circunstancias, hariamos bien en dotar a nuestros profesionales con un conjunto de principios genéricos de prevenciôn y de conocimiento del proceso antes que ofrecerles meramente un gran nûmero de soluciones prefijadas (...) En un sentido mâäs amplio, tenemos que ayudarles a que piensen menos como técnicos que han de seleccionar un remedio prefabri- cado de una lista o menû (...) y mâs como consultores expertos que emplean esos principios para adaptar el programa al contexto, para inno- var y reconfigurar sus diagnôsticos y soluciones a medida que lo necesiten. Asi pues, saber “lo que funciona” (what-works) es esencial, pero nece- sitamos saberlo de una forma detallada si vamos a ser capaces de com- partir y replicar los programas preventivos, de modo tal que sepamos exactamente cuâles son sus fortalezas y debilidades. Nuestro conoci- miento debe intentar describir el proceso de modo tal que posibilite la reconstrucciôn inteligente de las acciones preventivas mediante la des- cripciôn de cada etapa en su desarrollo y puesta en prâctica (Ekblom, 2005). — 111 — Este punto puede ser el paso siguiente a la tarea que estä realizando el Grupo Cambell en Crimen y Justicia. Como sabemos, mediante revi- siones sistemâticas la Colaboraciôn Campbell estä ofreciendo una infor- maciôn muy valiosa sobre la evidencia en la prevenciôn del delito de mültiples métodos, desde las cämaras de circuito cerrado hasta los cam- pos de entrenamiento militares (boot camps) o los programas para delin- cuentes sexuales. Esto, sin embargo, no es del todo suficiente para per- mitir una replicaciôn exitosa en diferentes lugares. Las revisiones sistemâticas deberian moverse en el futuro hacia la creacion de un cono- cimiento de base que permitiera la replicaciôn mâs exitosa de los pro- gramas, de acuerdo con determinados parämetros bien detallados que la instituciôn que los va a poner en prâäctica tendria que considerar. Qué duda cabe que tal informaciôn tendria un valor igualmente inapreciable para los responsables politicos de tomar decisiones sobre los programas que tendrian que ser implementados en sus respectivas comunidades. De este modo, sobre la base del conocimiento ya presentado en la tabla 1, Ekblom (2005) propone una estructura para los profesionales con objeto de establecer una serie de pasos que aseguren la “mejor prâc- tica” posible en la reducciôn del delito, a la que él llama el “modelo de las cinco ies” (tabla 2). TABLA 2 : EL MODELO DE LAS CINCO IES DE EKBLOM DE BUENAS PRACTICAS PARA LA IMPLEMENTACION DE ESTRATEGIAS DE PREVENCION Inteligencia Reunir y analizar la informaciôn sobre el delito a prevenir, sus causas y consecuencias Intervencion Emprender la acciôn con objeto de evitar, alterar o debilitar las causas y factores de riesgo, empleando métodos basados en la evidencia y que sean apropiados al problema delictivo que se quiere prevenir y al contexto de implementaciôn. Implementaciôn Lograr que las präcticas seleccionadas “funcio- nen”, de acuerdo con las necesidades locales Implicaciôn Mobilizar a instituciones, empresas y personas para que hagan su trabajo en la implementaciôn de la intervenciôn Impacto Evaluar los resultados del programa, asi como su rentabilidad en términos de su costo-efectividad. Asi pues, parece que estamos en un momento de la Criminologia Aplicada en el cual se hace necesario desarrollar programas de preven- ciôn del delito basados en la evidencia que puedan replicarse respetando — 112 — la integridad de sus componentes mediante un conjunto detallado de buenas prâcticas que sean sensibles a las exigencias del contexto. Estariamos, entonces, ante la tarea de construir una pirämide de métodos basados en la evidencia que diseminaran el conocimiento con- siderado efectivo de acuerdo con diferentes niveles jerärquicos, donde cada programa o método tendria que especificar sus metas, poblaciones diana y ciertos parâmetros del contexto que permitieran una replicacion cada vez mâs plena de conocimiento acerca de ‘“lo que funciona” y “por qu锑(grâfico 1). INT “ Nacional Regional | Implementaciôn Local Un programa podria ser diseminado en un nivel regional si se cono- cen bien los resultados efectivos en las aplicaciones locales. Posterior- mente, podria ser adoptado en un contexto nacional por el pais concer- nido, y ello podria dar lugar a un examen comparativo derivado de su aplicaciôn en otros paises. Por consiguiente, en la medida en que las prâcticas derivadas de las cinco ies quedaran bien especificadas, tal método podria ser adoptado en otros paises y contextos, de cuyos resul- tados todos los profesionales y responsables politicos podrian aprender. LA DISEMINACION DE LOS CONOCIMIENTOS DE LA CRIMINOLOGIA EN LA POLÎTICA CRIMINAL En la tercera parte de la ponencia me dirijo a examinar el siempre complicado tema de por qué los criminolôgos tenemns tantas dificulta- des en ser escuchados en la escena pûblica de la politica social de la pre- vencion del delito, lo cual incluye también la relaciôn de la Academia con los medios de comunicaciôn. — 113 — En un interesante articulo de 2007 titulado Against Marginality : Arguments for a public criminology, Elliot Currie ha intentado explicar las razones por las que la Criminologia todavia se halla en los mârgenes de influencia en la toma de decisiones politicas, a pesar de los notables avances acaecidos en los ûültimos años en forma de teorias y conocimien- tos empiricos. Por ejemplo, como nos recuerda el trabajo de revision de la evidencia cientifica acumulada por el Grupo Campbell en Crimen y Justicia, hoy en dia sabemos que programas tan populares como Scared Straight o Boot Camps resultan poco convincentes como estrategias de prevenciôn del delito o que, como Sherman se ha cansado de explicar, las tendencias a incrementar el castigo en los delincuentes como estra- tegia esencial de prevenciôn especial arroja, como minimo, pobres divi- dendos. Sin embargo, la paradoja es que, como criminôlogos, tenemos muchas cosas que decir acerca de cômo prevenir la delincuencia mediante programas de intervenciôn temprana en escuelas y familias, 0 cômo mejorar las opciones de que un programa de tratamiento en la cärcel o en la comunidad disminuya la tasa de reincidencia entre los delincuentes juveniles y adultos (ver, por ejemplo, el influyente libro edi- tado por Sherman et al., 2002, Evidence-Based Crime Prevention). Currie retrata con pesimismo la falta de interés de la politica americana por apoyarse en la investigaciôn criminolégica, pero a mi juicio de modo certero extiende esa preocupaciôn a otros muchos paises : En demasiadas naciones alrededor del mundo persiste un patrôn en la politica criminal basado en aumentar el poder de un sistema de justicia cada vez mâs punitivo, asi como en el crecimiento de la encarcelaciôn como formas de hacer frente a las consecuencias de una destrucciôn global de las comunidades y sus formas de vida, tomando el ejemplo a partir del modelo de Estados Unidos, como si éste fuera recomendable. Dada esta situaciôn, la presencia püblica de una criminologia influyente nunca ha sido tan critica. Sin embargo, cuando mâs se precisa del cono- cimiento de la criminologia, ésta como disciplina ha Ilegado a convertirse en algo marginal en la discusiôn general acerca del delito y del sistema de justicia, cada vez menos capaz de influir sobre la politica criminal. Por qué se ha Ilegado a esa situaciôn? ;Por qué no tenemos voz en la plaza püblica de la politica cuando tenemos tantas cosas que decir? Para Currie el problema central se halla en que “tenemos que ganar mentes y corazones”(p. 179), es decir, tenemos que educar a la gente, al püblico, sobre los auténticos conocimientos que estän deträs de los deli- tos y sus soluciones, y de este modo poder ofrecer a los politicos reco- mendaciones que sean mâs realistas de implementar sin provocar el rechazo de los votantes. Esa educaciôn del püblico requiere ganar el terreno a los que hablan en los medios sin conocimiento, ocupar espacios donde podamos formar a la opiniôn pûblica. Ahora bien, (estamos bien preparados para hacer — 114 — esto? Su respuesta es que no, y pone la carga de la culpa en el modo en que las universidades desincentivan esa labor divulgadora : “Con demasiada frecuencia priorizamos aquello que pensamos que es una investigacion ‘original’ — especialmente aquella que pensamos que puede ser publicada en las revistas de mayor impacto — a expensas de dos otras cosas que creo que son partes esenciales de cualquier empresa intelec- tual, a saber, intentar comprender la masa de investigaciôn que genera- mos, a través del trabajo analitico y sintético, y diseminar todo ese ingente trabajo en una audencia mâäs amplia que la nuestra y potencial- mente mâs resolutiva. En otras palabras, gastamos mucho tiempo en generar ‘hallazgos’, pero muy poco en hablar entre nosotros y con audiencias mâs numerosas acerca de lo que significan esos hallazgos” (p. 180). No se trata de ‘popularizar’ la ciencia, caricaturizando sus resulta- dos, sino de ofrecer un trabajo riguroso — y agotador — de anâlisis y sin- tesis, que permita la comprensiôn y utilidad de nuestros esfuerzos por parte de la gente y de los politicos. Eso significa trabajar en esa zona ‘intermedia’ que existe entre el conocimiento teôrico y técnico, por una parte, y la aplicaciôon de una politica criminal desinformada o — peor aûn — interesada en que la balanza caiga en una determinada direccion. Ese es el riesgo que corremos si obviamos esa comunicacion inteligente con la sociedad de lo que investigamos y podemos concluir de nuestros hallazgos : que sean otros quienes se comuniquen con los que toman las decisiones, otros que no disponen de esos conocimientos, o que tienen una agenda oculta. En España podemos ver la violencia doméstica como una muestra de lo que señala Currie. Planteado desde la ideologia dominante como un mero problema de la ‘estructura del patriarcado’, se niega la multicau- salidad del fenômeno y se fia toda la respuesta a endurecer y agilizar la respuesta penal, asi como a una dudosa campaña social de sensibiliza- ciôn en los medios. Sin embargo, las mujeres muertas constituyen, año tras año, un nûmero elevado que produce una clara alarma social, sin que hasta ahora se haya podido explicar el por qué de esa anomalia. La tesis politicamente correcta consiste en afirmar que la razôn profunda se halla en el ‘machismo’ todavia imperante. Y se cierra la explicaciôn — lo que claramente se constituye en una hipôtesis dificilmente falsable — obviando factores relevantes como el grave problema de fracaso social que tenemos entre los jôvenes en España, la situaciôn de anomia en que un nûmero importante de inmigrantes (que llegan a constituir un tercio de las muertes) viven entre nosotros, y el grave riesgo en que ponemos a las victimas cuando invitamos a denunciar a sus agresores y luego somos incapaces de darles una protecciôon adecuada. Quizàs un ejemplo contrario también en España se refiere a los delincuentes sexuales, — 115 — donde un comité de expertos en Cataluña fue capaz de ofrecer en el año 2008 unas sugerencias valiosas en medio de diferentes casos de violencia sexual que conmocionaron al püblico. Por desgracia, desconocemos en estos momentos si esas recomendaciones hallarän eco en la prâctica. Sin embargo, al menos se dejaron oir. Esa renuncia al espacio pûblico de la toma de decisiones ha tenido otra consecuencia indeseada, de acuerdo a Currie : mantenernos alejados de los temas candentes y relevantes en la sociedad, mientras nos ocupa- mos con frecuencia de asuntos de dudosa trascendencia por su pequeñez o reiteraciôn. Asuntos como el terrorismo, el träfico de personas, las bandas organizadas, la prevenciôn de la violencia en los barrios o la atenciôn a los jôvenes que presentan una carrera delictiva intensa pue- den necesitar nuestro esfuerzo mucho mâs del que ahora parece que estamos dispuestos a dedicarles. Por otra parte, Francis Cullen, en su conferencia presidencial ante la ASC en 2004, habia aludido precisamente al problema de ‘por qué importa poco la Criminologia en la politica social’, explicando el ejem- plo triunfante de, à su juicio, la salvaciôn del ideal de la rehabilitacion a cargo de doce cientificos que fueron capaces de ofrecer una resistencia tenaz ante la doctrina del ‘nada funciona’ (Cullen, 2005). Las sugeren- cias que ofrece Cullen incluye la labor de diseminaciôn que aconseja Currie, no sôlo entre el pûblico, sino también entre los profesionales de la prevenciôn, asi como la necesidad de hacer una ‘ciencia mejor’, esto es, mâs rigurosa y capaz de dar soluciones mâs eficaces ante los proble- mas. No obstante, deja un interrogante en el aire que merece toda nues- tra consideraciôn : ;Es posible que la criminologia importe sôlo en cir- cunstancias histôricas ünicas que los cientificos no puedan elegir? O bien, alternativamente, ;quizäs sea posible producir esas condiciones para la diseminaciôn exitosa de sus conocimientos? Es evidente que Currie cree firmemente en esa segunda opciôn. Finalmente, es importante estudiar el modo en que las corrientes de acciôn de los criminôlogos encuentran un amplio eco, en los escasos momentos en que tal cosa ocurre, demostrando este hecho que si resulta posible influir sobre la politica criminal. En este punto, tal y como hacen Newburn y Jones (2007) con el modelo criminolôgico de mayor acepta- ciôn en el ûltimo cuarto de siglo, denominado ‘tolerancia cero’, se hace perentorio acudir a la criminologia cultural para comprender su valor simbôlico y descubrir los mecanismos de transmisiôn que hicieron alta- mente aceptable entre los politicos y el püblico en general la idea de nula permisividad con cualquier tipo de acciôn delictiva. El éxito de este modelo nos deja la siguiente pregunta por contestar : ;Cômo puede una politica criminal justa y eficaz luchar contra la preferencia del pûblico por las medidas ‘sencillas’ y ‘râpidas’? Mi reflexiôn es que tendriamos — 116 — que tener en cuenta el valor simbôlico de las propuestas en las socieda- des donde éstas aspiren a integrarse, al tiempo que utilizamos mecanis- mos de difusiôn y de representaciôn que puedan ofrecer elementos de reflexion compartidos por esa audiencia y que, a la postre, faciliten su aceptaciôn. (PARA QUÉ SIRVE UN CRIMINOLOGO? Una de las principales conclusiones que podemos extraer de la disu- sion precedente es que la criminologia como profesiôn es mâs necesaria que nunca, ya que en los comienzos de la andadura de este siglo la com- plejidad de la vida social no ha hecho sino aumentar al tiempo que las mutaciones de la tecnologia y las fuerzas socio-econômicas, lo que exige respuestas mâs razonadas y complejas, algo que no se adapta bien a los mensajes sencillos y lineales que tanto se valoran en la politica. En par- ticular, destaco la importancia de atender al consejo de Popper en el sentido de ‘aprender de los errores” como fôrmula para el avance social (Knepper, 2005), y la extrema importancia de comprender muy bien el contexto y las necesidades de sus moradores antes de erigir programa alguno. Por desgracia, en el mejor de los casos, los criminôlogos somos con- sultados como una ‘gracia’ o favor que nos conceden los politicos cuando se trata de temas que no son lo suficientemente polémicos como para tomar decisiones al compäs de lo que espera escuchar la opiniôn püblica. En el mundo profesional, la labor estä fuertemente constreñida por los requisitos legales que regulan los procedimientos del sistema de justicia, y toda innovaciôn supone un esfuerzo titänico que debe vencer inercias y suspicacias, aunque aduzca en beneficio de su proyecto los resultados de la evidencia empirica. Probablemente la razôn se halla en que las instituciones estän pensadas para reproducir patrones, y a duras penas son capaces de asumir riesgos ante los responsables politicos, por temor a disfunciones que puedan poner en entredicho su labor ante la opiniôn pûblica. Frente a este statu quo, los criminôlogos han de protagonizar una parcela esencial en el debate de los principios, metas y modelos de pre- venciôn en lo concerniente al delito. Huir del debate y sus consecuencias puede tener como resultado que temas tan cruciales como el papel de las agencias de la seguridad privada en la sociedad no lleguen a un punto de anâlisis profundo (Zedner, 2007). Para ello, deberiamos exigir nuestra participaciôn, como academia o como centros asociados a los gobiernos, en el debate sobre metas y los esfuerzos para la investigaciôn y la acciôn, y apuntar soluciones si se poseen, o al menos desaconsejar iniciativas que sabemos que son contraproducentes. Una justicia de — 117 — nuevo ‘ilustrada’ — en palabras de Sherman, 2003 —, que quizàs haya de dar cambios sustanciales para huir de una inercia que la sofoca, no puede estar al margen de los conocimientos, y éstos han de ganar la arena pûblica. Por otra parte, creo que una funciôn esencial del crimi- nôlogo seria la de diseñador de programas de intervenciôn, algo para lo que se requiere un conocimiento especializado debido a la complejidad que ello requiere en el mundo real, asi como de coordinador en la ges- tion de los servicios que los integran. Y finalmente, el criminôlogo debe- ria ocuparse igualmente de la evaluaciôon de proceso y de resultados de tales intervenciones. En conclusiôn, creo que la labor del criminôlogo deberia situarse en estos tres niveles : a) Tecnolégico : orientar de forma decidida y sensible al contexto en problemas y programas ya conocidos. b) Reflexivo/Critica social : iluminar las peculiaridades del problema presente, orientando sobre los peligros, inconvenientes y posibles beneficios de los diferentes escenarios posibles vinculados con präcti- cas o politicas determinadas. c) Investigativo : Establecer una agenda de anâlisis para hacer frente a los problemas o temas que ahora no tienen una respuesta definida. REFERENCIAS AGNEW, R. (2006). “Storylines as a neglected cause of crime” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 43, 119-147. BAZEMORE, G. & ERBE, C. (2004). “Reintegration and restorative justice : towards a theory and practice of informal social control and support.” In S. MARUNNA & R. IMMARIGEON (Eds), After crime and punishment (pp. 27-56). Portland, Or : William. CULLEN, F.T. (2005). “The twelve people who saved rehabilitation : How the science of criminology made a difference”. Criminology, 43, 1-42. CURRIE, E. (2007). “Against marginality : Arguments for a public criminology”. Theoretical Criminology, 11, 175-190. EKBLOM, P. (2005). “The SIs framework : Sharing good practice in crime preven- tion”. In E. MARKS, À. MEYER & R. LINSSEN (Eds.), Quality in crime preven- tion (pp. 55-84). Hanover : Books on Demand. FARRINGTON, D.P. & PETROSINO, À. (2001). “The Campbell Collaboration Crime and Justice Group”. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 578, 35-49. JUNGER, M., FEDER, L., CLAY, J., CÔTÉ, S., FARRINGTON, D.P., FREIBERG, K. GARRIDO, V., HOMEL, R., LôSEL, F., MANNING, M., MAZEROLLE, P., SANTOS, R., SCHUMUKER, M., SULLIVAN C., SUTTON, C., YPEREN, T. & TREMBLAY, R. (2007). “Preventing violence in seven countries : Global convergence in poli- cies”. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 13, 327-356. — 118 — KANE, S. (2004). “The unconventional methods of cultural criminology”. Theore- tical Criminology, 8, 303-321. KNEPPER, P. (2005). “Crime prevention in a multinational open society”. Interna- tional Criminal Justice Review, 15, 58-74. MARUNA, S., IMMARIGEON, R. & LEBEL, T.P. (2004). “Ex offender reintegration : Theory and practice”’. In S. MARUNNA & R. IMMARIGEON (Eds), After crime and punishment (pp. 3-26). Portland, Or : William. NEWBURN, T., & Jones, T. (2007). “Symbolizing crime control : Reflections on Zero Tolerance”. Theoretical Criminology 11, 221-243. SAMPSON, R.J., & LauB, J. (1993). Crime in the making : Pathways and turning points through life. Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press. SHERMAN, L. (2003). “Reason and emotion : Reiventing justice with theories, innovations, and research”. Criminology, 41, 1-37. SHERMAN, L., FARRINGTON, D., WELSH, B. & MACKIENZIE, D. (Eds.) (2002). Evi- dence-based crime prevention. N.Y.: Routledge. WiLsoNn, E.O. (1999). Consilience. La unidad del conocimiento. Barcelona : Galaxia Gutemberg. ZEDNER, L. (2007). “Pre-crime and post-criminology?” Theoretical Criminology, 11, 261-281. RESUMEN Este articulo pretende poner de relieve la importancia de la crimino- logia en la sociedad actual, dado que la complejidad y celeridad de las transformaciones sociales requiere de una ciencia mejor, y no de solu- ciones basadas en lo que el püblico “parece que quiere” o en aquello que “parece mejor”. Con ese fin divido mi trabajo en tres apartados : los dos primeros señalan los caminos que, a mi juicio, deberia seguir la crimi- nologia para progresar como ciencia capaz de dar respuestas välidas a los problemas del crimen (la investigaciôn y la acciôn). En un tercer apartado analizo las razones por las que la criminologia tiene muchas dificultades para influir sobre la politica criminal de los paises, y los modos en que podria obtenerse un mayor acceso a la toma de decisiones relevantes en la prevenciôn de la delincuencia. Concluyo señalando las principales funciones que hoy en dia puede desempeñar un criminôlogo en el servicio que presta a la sociedad. SUMMARY The purpose of this paper 1s to stress the importante of criminology in today’s society, where complex and fast social change requires better science and no solutions grounded on what the public “seem to want” or what ‘‘seems better”. With this end in view, the autor divides his paper in three parts : the first ones indicate ways that can be followed — 119 — by criminology in order to propose valid crime problem solving (research and action). In the last one, the author analises why criminol- ogy meets high difficulties in influencing state crime policies, and the ways that could lead to a better access to relevant decision taking in crime prevention. In conclusion, the autor states the main functions a criminologist can fulfil in his service to society. RÉSUMÉ Cet article entend souligner l’importance de la criminologie dans la société actuelle, sachant que la complexité et la rapidité des transforma- tions sociales requièrent une meilleure science et non point des solutions fondées sur ce que le public “semble vouloir” ou sur ce qui “semble meilleur”. Pour atteindre cet objectif, l’auteur divise l’article en trois parties : les deux premières mettent en avant les chemins que doivent suivre la criminologie pour progresser comme science capable de donner des réponses valides aux problèmes du crime (la recherche et l’action). Dans une troisième partie, l’auteur analyse les raisons pour lesquelles la criminologie rencontre des difficultés à influencer la politique criminelle des pays, et les moyens qui permettraient un meilleur accès à la prise de décisions importantes dans la prévention de la délinquance. L'auteur conclut en indiquant les principales fonctions qu'un criminologue peut remplir aujourd’hui dans le service qu’il rend à la société. — 120 — THE DRAFT UN CONVENTION ON JUSTICE AND SUPPORT FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ITS PROVISIONS ON RESTORATIVE JUSTICE Marc Groenhuijsen ‘!) 1. — INTRODUCTION At the time of the previous World Congress of the International Society for Criminology, in 2003 in Rio de Janeiro, the idea of propos- ing a United Nations Convention on Victims’ Rights had not yet been seriously proposed or considered. Today, only five years onward, many things have changed. The pro's and con’s of such a move have been debated in academic discourse, several drafts of a possible Convention have been written and translated into various languages, and a cam- paign has been started to persuade the member States of the UN to work in the direction of adopting a document like that. This paper aims to explain the background of these recent developments and to connect them with another major trend in the way many societies deal with the phenomenon of crime : the rise of restorative justice practices. The present contribution consists of four parts. First, an overview will be given of the 1985 UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power and the subsequent efforts to have the Declaration properly implemented. Secondly, the idea of replacing the Declaration with a Convention will be explained. The main arguments in favour of such a shift will be outlined and the con- tent of the currently available draft Convention will be schetched. Thirdly, a closer look will be given to the relationship between the draft UN Convention on the one hand and emerging restorative justice prac- tices on the other. And finally some essential information will be pro- vided on the next steps to be taken. How realistic 1s the expectation that the UN will actually move in the direction of adopting a Convention on victims’ rights? () Prof. dr. — 121 — 2. — THE 1985 UN DECLARATION AND SUBSEQUENT EFFORTS TO GET IT IMPLEMENTED The UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power has frequently been hailed as the Magna Charta for victims of crime (Vetere & David 2005). The reason for this is that the document was visionary. It contains a bill of rights which inspired and continues to inspire many subsequent international and domestic protocols on victims’ rights (Van Dijk 2005). Ever since it was adopted, it has served as a benchmark to assess progress in this area. In short, the Declaration awards victims the right to : — be treated with compassion and respect for their dignity —— receive information — allow the views of the victim to be presented and considered —— proper assistance throughout the legal process — protection of privacy and physical safety — informal dispute resolution (including mediation) — social assistance State compensation building partnerships between government agencies, NGO”s and civil society. In many areas of international law (be it ‘hard law’ or ‘soft law”- instruments) there is a conspicuous lack of follow-up activities after solemny adopting standards of this kind. In the case of the UN Decla- ration, however, a range of efforts can be identified aimed at effectively implementing its provisions. ‘ In 1989 the General Assembly adopted a detailed set of measures to promote compliance (a ‘plan of action’). In 1994 the Secretary-General circulated a questionnaire among the mem- bership. ° In 1997 a “Manual on the Use and Application of the Dec- 99 laration… as well as a “Guide for policymakers” was published. * Despite these attempts at promoting the transposal of the Declaration into domestic criminal justice systems, some 20 years after its adoption the conclusion 1s inescapable that the implementation of the Declaration ( United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Compendium of United Nations standards and norms in crime prevention and criminal justice, New York 2006. And Groenhuijsen 1999. It has to be observed, though, that the questionnaire had an all time record low response rate. To complicate things even further, experts felt that the information provided in response to the questionnaire was not always reliable, because those officials responsible for providing the answers were frequently the same individuals who had shaped and executed victim oriented policies in their respective countries. (4 Laudable as these efforts may be, again it has to be observed that very few national governments and very few victim support organisations have actually used these sources in order to improve their performance. — 122 — is still unsatisfactory. The overall assessment is that victims’ rights are not a priority in administering criminal justice. This holds for developing countries ‘“) as well as for the more affluent societies. ‘“) 3. — FROM A UN DECLARATION TO A UN CONVENTION? Against this background, we need to address the question of how to improve this state of affairs. What 1s the best way to transform victims’ rights into a living reality? Which mechanisms should be used in order to make the ‘law in action’ look more like the ‘law in the books’? 3.1. — Best practice on achieving reform on behalf of crime victims First, we need to build on the available evidence. During the past decades, several empirical studies have been published providing insights into the conditions which have to be met in order to effectively achieve reforms. Some of the well tested conditions to make progress are the following — a network of stakeholders should be created (officials from law enforcement, victim support, probation, social work, etc.) — the attitude of the responsible officials and agencies should be sup- portive of change ‘* -— a favourable attitude should be backed up by knowledge on victims issues; hence the need for mandatory training of every official who comes into contact with victims (including the judiciary) ° — adequate resources should be provided in order to enable the agen- cies to execute new and additional responsibilities (10) C) For obvious reasons : they quite often lack the financial resources to prioritise this pol- Icy area. (6) This can be inferred from an assessment by the European Commission of the trans- posal of the relevant EU Framework Decision on Victims’ Rights : Report from the Com- mission of the European Communities on the Basis of Article 18 of the Council Framework Decision of 15 March 2001 on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings, Brussels, 3 March 2004, COM (2004) 54 final. () Extensive references in GROENHUISEN 2005. (3) An example is the police organisation. It has been demonstrated in several countries that reform on behalf of crime victims will be sabotaged if either the leadership of the police force or the officers who actually have face to face contact with victims, do not have solid convictions that change is worthwile. In many countries lots of progress has been made in setting up mandatory training programs for the police and for prosecutors. It has been much harder to persuade the judi- ciary to accept mandatory training modules. ( Obviously, these resources should be ‘earmarked budgets’ in order to avoid funding of old responsibilities with additional money. — 123 — — senior officials in relevant ministries should be charged with specific responsibility to shape and execute victims oriented policies (Phare project 2002) . 3.2. — Could a UN Convention make a real difference? This set of conditions appears to represent state of the art knowledge of how to effect change on behalf of crime victims. À completely new question that only came up during recent years is: maybe the idea of introducing a UN Convention on victims’ rights could also contribute to a better implementation of the basic principles of justice as expressed by the Declaration. Why would 1t be realistic to expect that the adoption of a Conven- tion might have such effect? In academic discourse, several arguments of a criminological nature have been presented favouring such a move or warning against 1t. The most prominent arguments promoting a Convention can be sum- marised as follows (Garkawe, 2005) : — (12) it would increase the visibility of victims’ issues ‘hard law’ will put more pressure on governments than the Declara- tion (‘soft law’)‘ 13) Courts will take a Convention more seriously than the Declara- tion ‘ 14) a Convention provides a framework for analyses of domestic law ‘!*) the ratification process would urge non-complying States to motivate publicly why they do not support victims’ rights to the extent cov- ered by the Convention ‘ 16) (D An example of best practice in this respect is the OVC (Office for Victims of Crime) in the US Justice Department. (12 ) Without any doubt this 1s a valid argument. If one only takes into account the effort it would take to negotiate the preferred wording of a Convention, it is obvious that this would attract a lot of attention. (3 It might be argued that this is a doctrinal assumption rather than a claim which has been empirically tested. European experience with hard law instruments (like the EU Frame- work Decision of 2001 and the Council of Europe Convention on State Compensation (1983) does not directly support this assumption. (14) Again : an interesting prediction, but essentially speculative. (S Undoubtedly true : a new benchmark. (6) This can hardly be disputed. On the other hand, it appears to be an argument with little weight. since governments can easily provide a statement which sounds reassuring. 124 — now that the UN has adopted a series of Conventions in the area of criminal law(1), the status of a mere Declaration has been dimin- ished. (!8) Conversely, two main arguments can be invoked to urge caution in advocating a UN Convention in this area (Van Genugten cum suis, 2006) : -— The process of negotiating, drafting and adopting a Convention will take a long time. It 1s likely that the various stages will last a sub- stantial number of years. During this period of time nothing else will happen at the UN level in order to improve observance of victims’ rights standards. This leads to a substantial risk of effectively organ- Ising a standstill. À Convention is only possible 1f a large number of countries — in the most diverse regions of the world — agree on substance. It is likely that the need for consensus will lead to watered down provisions. UN experience in other policy areas offers ample examples of this. 3.3. — The content of the first drafts of a possible Convention It is very hard to assess the validity and the relative weight of these arguments without having any kind of idea of what a UN Convention on victims’ rights might look like. For this reason, experts from the World Society of Victimology and from INTERVICT (Tilburg Univer- sity, The Netherlands) met in December 2005 and produced a first cogent draft of what might become a “UN Convention on Justice and Support for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power » (19) Compared to the 1985 Declaration, the draft Convention can be con- sidered to reflect state of the art in victimological knowledge. “ This will be demonstrated by listing and explaining seven of the most striking differences in content between the two documents. ( Some examples are : UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000: Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organ- ized Crime. GA resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000. (S In my view, this is a particularly interesting argument. It shows that a supranational legal order has an intrinsic dynamic of its own. 9 The draft was put on the internet (http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/intervict/undecla- ration: http://www.worldsocietyofvictimology.org/index.html); comments by interested par- ties were sollicited:; the draft was amended several times and translated into various lan- guages. Naturally, all of this serves as a starting point for debate rather than as a starting point for real negotiations at the UN level. C0 It has to be noted that many of the innovations in the draft Convention were inspired by the Recommendation (2006)8 on Assistance to Crime Victims, adopted by the Council of Europe on 14 June 2006. 125 — a) Since 1985, awareness has increased that victims do not constitute a homogeneous category of people sharing the exact same interests and needs.‘?!) This is not just stating the obvious. It has become abundantly clear that some may be affected more seriously or in a different way because of personal circumstances (including character traits) or because of the specific kind of crime involved. In the Dec- laration, this 1s only acknowledged in a very limited way. In #17, under the heading of ‘assistance’, it is stipulated that ‘attention should be given to those who have special needs’. Article 3, section 3 of the draft Convention is more explicit on this. It requires all pro- visions to be applied without discrimination of any kind, and then goes on : “This will be without prejudice to providing special justice and support best suited to victims who are particularly vulnerable because of age, gender, disability or other characteristics”. It must be noted here that many jurisdictions have specialised centres for victim support and/or have introduced specific legislative measures for dif- ferent categories of crime victims. b) The Declaration is completely silent on the topic of crime prevention. The draft Convention, on the other hand, in article 4 provides for a commitment on the part of States Parties to reduce victimization. To this end, it lists no less than seven distinct strategies and policies. Perhaps even more importantly, the draft Convention calls for pro- tection from repeat victimization (article B, section 6, sub e) ”. Back in 1985, the concept of ‘repeat victimization’ was virtually unknown. Since then, empirical research has made it clear that recidivism not only applies to offenders, but 1s also rampant on the side of victims (G. Farrell, 1995; H.J. Schneider 2001). The numbers are spectacular (a small number of victims suffer from a large part of crime) * and cover a wide range of types of crime (property crime * , violent crime 2°), sexual crime). ) Another novelty is article 5 of the draft Convention, on ‘access to justice and fair treatment’. In section 2 it is provided that States shall ensure that the judicial, administrative and informal processes are responsive to the needs of victims. This should be facilitated by, inter (?D Various typologies of victims have been described by Fattah, 1991. (2°) The relevant provision reads : “protection from repeat victimization should be pro- vided through the development of safety and security plans. This may include information on police surveillance, relocation, emergency communication and the like. It may also involve assistance with obtaining protection orders through the judicial system.” (23) Farrel, 1992, reports that 14% of adults experience about 70% of all self reported cases of victimization. (24) The event of a household burglary increases the probabillity of another burglary in the same place by a factor of four (Osborn cum suis, 1996). C5)17% of victims suffer from 45% of violent crime (Mayhew cum suis, 1993). — 126 — alia, “providing to victims, where appropriate, the right of appeal against decisions of the prosecutorial authority not to prosecute in cases where they were victimized”. In many jurisdictions the tradi- tional remedy against prosecutorial inactivity is the instrument of private prosecution. However, empirical findings suggest that this remedy is ineffective at best and quite often even counterproductive and a source of secondary victimization (Brienen & Hoegen, 2000). Hence, the solution of judicial review appears to be a major improvement. d) The Declaration was fairly advanced on the topic of ‘restitution’. Offenders or third parties responsible for their behaviour should make fair restitution to victims, their families or dependants. On top of that, governments were encouraged to consider restitution as an available sentencing option in criminal cases, in addition to other criminal sanctions (#8 and #9 respectively). The draft Convention takes this issue yet another giant step further by obliging the State to “ensuring the enforcement of any order or decree granting awards to victims” (article 5, section 2, sub ]; even more robustly stated in article 10, section 1, sub d: “When there is a court order for resti- tution, the State Party shall be responsible for enforcing the order”). This innovation is based on empirical findings (van Dijk & Groen- huijsen, 1993). Research has documented that 1f the execution of a court order 1s left to the victim, only a minority (usually approxi- mately 25%) of the benificiaries will ever receive the money awarded to them (de Liège, 1988). Conversely, when the government 1s responsible for enforcing the order, a large majority (at least 75- 80%) of the victims will actually get what they are entitled to (Moxon cum suis, 1992). 26 e) The huge gap between 1985 and 2008 is also clearly visible in the provisions on the right to receive information. The Declaration merely holds that victims should be informed of their rights and of their role and the scope, timing and progress of the proceedings and of the disposition of their cases. The draft Convention is more elab- orate on this. Article 7 details the specifics of a long list of items a victim shall be given information on, ‘from their first contact with law enforcement or other agencies’.‘?’) It is worth mentioning that, C6 That would still leave a substantial number of victims with enipty hands. In order to remedy this situation, the final step was taken by the Dutch parliament in 2007 by adopting a Statute which obliges the State to pay an awarded compensation order up front to the vic- tim and then recover the money from the offender. C In order to demonstrate the sophistication of the informational rights, it is necessary to quote art. 7 in its full length: “*1. States Parties shall ensure that victims have a right to information, and must be informed of this, from their first contact with law enforcement or other agencies. States Parties shall ensure that victims receive general information in the most — 127 — at least in cases where there might be danger to the victims, they shall be notified when the person prosecuted or sentenced for an offence 1s released. Another important novelty is the introduction of an opt-out-procedure : victims shall have the right not to receive information (unless communication thereof is compulsory under the terms of the relevant criminal proceedings). Possibly the most farreaching difference between the two documents under discussion concerns implementation and monitoring. The Dec- laration itself is — understandably — completely silent on this. On the other end of the spectrum, the draft Convention contains numerous and extensive provisions to ensure that States shall monitor the effi- ciency and effectiveness of policies and measures designed for the implementation of the Convention (articles 12-16). For the purpose of examining the progress made in the various jurisdictions 1t envis- ages the establishment of a ‘Committee on Justice and Support for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power’. States Parties shall submit progress reports to this committee and the committee in its turn shall report to the General Assembly. This comprehensive mechanism for supervision is replicated from other UN Conventions already in force. expeditious and efficient method appropriate to the culture such as through oral or written communication with concern for literacy and literary traditions. Specific information should be given person to person. Such information should facilitate an informed understanding for victims and shall be at least as follows : a) the type of services or organizations to which they can turn for support: b) the type of support which they can obtain, including the availability of health and social services and other relevant assistance ; c) where and how they report an offence; d) procedures following such a report and their role in connection with such procedures; e) their role and the scope, timing and progress of the proceedings and of the disposition of their cases, especially where serious crimes are involved and where they have requested such information; f) how and under what cireumstances they can obtain protection: g) to what extent and on what terms they have access to legal advice or legal aid; h) requirements for them to be be entitled to compensation: 1) if they are resident in another State, any special arrangements available to them in order to protect their interests: )) where and how victims could obtain more information. 2. States Parties shall ensure that victims who have expressed a wish to this effect are kept informed of : « the outcome of their complaint: b relevant factors enabling them. in the event of prosecution, to know the conduct of the proceedings regarding the person prosecuted for offences concerning them, except in exceptional cases where the proper handling of the case may be adversely affected : C the court’s sentence. 3 States Parties shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the victim is notified, at least in cases where there might be danger to the victims, when the person prosecuted or sentenced for an offence is released. 4. In so far as States Parties take forward on their own initiative the information referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3, they shall ensure that victims have the right not to receive it, unless communication thereof is compulsory under the terms of the relevant criminal proceedings. ” — 128 — 3.4. — The draft Convention and restorative justice Finally, there is the issue of mediation and restorative justice. The draft Convention offers an interesting novel approach in this area. The 1985 UN Declaration was brief and outspoken in its support of non punitive responses to crime. #7 simply reads : “Informal mecha- nisms for the resolution of disputes, including mediation, arbitration and customary justice or indigenous practices, should be utilized where appropriate to facilitate conciliation and redress for victims” Here again, the draft Convention is more sophisticated and elabo- rate. It is useful to quote the relevant article 9 in full : “1. States Parties shall endeavor, where appropriate, to establish or enhance systems of restorative justice, that seek to represent victims” interests as a priority. States shall emphasize the need for acceptance by the offender of his or her responsibility for the offence and the acknowl- edgement of the adverse consequences of the offence for the victim. 2. States Parties shall ensure that victims shall have the opportunity to choose or not to choose restorative justice forums under domestic laws, and if they do decide to choose such forums, these mechanisms must accord with victims’ dignity, compassion and similar rights and services to those described in this Convention.” What is particularly striking in this article, is that it is no longer taken for granted that restorative practices are by definition serving the best interests of crime victims. Rather, these provisions reflect the view previously articulated by the European Forum for Victim Services. ‘ 28) The core essence of this view is the conviction that mediation and other forms of restorative justice are very powerful interventions. Powerful interventions, with the potential to deliver great benefits to all parties concerned, but they also have the potential to do harm. It is remarkable that the pre-existing international protocols for restorative justice do not take the latter factor adequately into account. These instruments fail to recognise that no programme should be described as restorative 1f 1t does not, as a priority, seek to restore the victim. Mediation in criminal cases 1s different from similar processes in other areas of life (like labour law, family law). The position of victim and offender in restorative justice practices is less symmetrical than in (28) EFVS, Statement on the Position of the Victim within the Process of Mediation, Lon- don 2005: similarly : article 13 of the Council of Europe Recommendation (2006)8 on Assist- ance to Crime Victims. — 129 — other domains.This vital element is seriously underestimated in the cur- rent international standards governing restorative practices. ‘*?) So the real challenge in this area is how the potential benefits of mediation can be maximised while minimizing the potential risks. This can be elucidated with three examples (Groenhuijsen, 2004). One of the mantra’»s of mediation is that victim and offender shall participate on a voluntary basis. The obtaining international standards refer to the “free and voluntary consent of the victim and the offender”.*°) The question needs to be raised, however, how the concept of free consent is to be defined. In actual practice, there is a tendency to narrow this concept to just offering the opportunity to refuse to take part in a mediation process. According to the available evidence, how- ever, this view would jeopardise some vital interests of the victim. What is needed is “a full policy of free consent”.3!" A policy like that consists of numerous and various component parts. One is that the offer of mediation should be made by a person who has been fully trained to recognise the variable impact of the offer on each crime victim. Next, it requires that the victim be given sufficient time to consider the offer and to have access to independent advice. Furthermore, consent can not be considered to be free of pressure if the alternative consequences for the offender are substantially graver 1f the victim feels unable to take part in the mediation. 62 This means that if participation in mediation would have benefits for the offender — for example a reduced sentence — then those benefits should, as far as possible, also be applicable 1f the medi- ation does not go ahead due to a refusal by the victim The second example concerns a rather controversial topic. It is about accepting limits (i.e. creating exeptions) of the confidential nature of a mediation session. The relevant Council of Europe Recommendation states as a general principle : “Discussions in mediation are confidential and may not be used subsequently, except with the agreement of the parties.” As a consequence, it is generally assumed that : (29) Council of Europe Recommendation (1999)19 concerning Mediation in Penal Mat- ters, adopted on 15 September 1999; UN ECOSOC Resolution 2002/12 Basic Principles on the Use of Restorative Justice Programmes in Criminal Matters. (30) Article 7 of ECOSOC res. 2002/12. 24 July 2002. Likewise, article ! of the Council of Europe Recommendation R(99)19 concerning Mediation in Penal Matters (15 September 1999) reads : “Mediation in penal matters should only take place if the parties freely con- sent”. GN The concept is borrowed from the EFVS-statement referred to before. G2 The EFVS-statement explains : “Where the diversion of the offender from the crimi- nal justice process 1s being considered, an alternative diversionary remedy should be available for example, community service. Where a case has been referred for mediation by a court, there should be an understanding that any sentence discount which would be available fol- lowing a succesful mediation will also be available 1f the offender had been motivated but the offer was declined.” — 130 — a. participation in mediation should not be used as evidence of admission of guilt in subsequent legal proceedings °* (this looks fair enough to me); and b. that confessions of guilt by the offender during the mediation session cannot be used as evidence in a subsequent trial before a crim- inal court. Here I see a major problem. This implication can violate legitimate interests of the victim. In order to justify an exception to the principle of confidentiality in this respect, l would like to appeal to one of the essential features of the mediation procedure. All definitions of mediation emphasise the fact that this is a process in which the victim is given an opportunity to express his feelings and wishes, and the offender is offered the chance to accept responsibility and act accord- ingly. The key point here 1s communication between two parties, with the help of an independent third party. It is important that this communi- cation is not symmetrical in every respect. It must be clear to all those involved that the basic principle 1s that the offender is at fault and 1s willing to admit it honestly and accept responsibility on that basis. That is why everyone refers to mediation as a form of ‘“restorative justice”. That is why this process 1s labelled as victim-offender-mediation : it has nothing to do with victim-suspect-mediation or victim-accused-media- tion. If there is nothing to restore, for example when there is no agree- ment on the question of whether the offender has done anything wrong, then right from the outset there is no basis for a successful mediation session. The principle is therefore that the offender has violated the rights of the victim, 1s willing to admit this, and 1s also prepared to make reasonable restitution for it (in a way to be determined through consultation). If this 1s the purpose of the mediation procedure, then 1t is not logical, if it does fail, to consider the offender's confession or other statements inadmissable as evidence in subsequent criminal pro- ceedings. From a legal point of view, in many jurisdictions the victim can never be prevented from bringing this fact to the attention of the court as a de auditu declaration. The Public Prosecutor might summon the victim — or even the mediator “* — to give evidence in court and might request a report of what occurred during mediation. In most countries there is, after all, no statutory provision fundamentally pro- tecting the confidentiality of such a procedure. In short, in my view the offender's willingness to take part in a mediation procedure presupposes a certain conciliatory attitude towards the victim. If the offender 1s not prepared to do this, he should not take part. If he aucepts this role vol- untarily, he cannot do so without any obligation. If mediation subse- G9 This is explicitly provided in article 14 of R(99)19 of the Council of Europe and in article 8 of ECOSOC res. 2002/12. (4) Under current legislation, mediators have no right to refuse to give evidence. — 131 — quently fails he cannot simply fall back on his position in the proceed- ings as a suspect who denies the offence and who has nothing to do with the expressions of regret that he has made during mediation. What 1s important here is that the victim must not be made a laughing stock or made to suffer as a result of his willingness to enter into a conversation with the offender. The third and final example builds on the same principle to maximize potential benefits and to minimize potential risks of mediation. When mediation is about accepting responsibility and acting accordingly, the outcome of a process like that will frequently include an apology. 6° Research has confirmed that an apology is a good way to achieve for- giveness. ° However, insincere apologies by the offender have the opposite effect. Victims react with more rather than less indignation to this kind of apology. Receiving an insincere apology therefore, is not a neutral but a negative experience for victims, and could be said to amount to secondary victimization (Opdebeeck cum suis, 2002). Against this empirical background the logical inference would be the proposal to shape mediation sessions in such a way as to avoid the occurrence of insincere apologies as much as possible, and — equally important — to avoid even the semblance of an insincere apology. However, a proposal like that would be somewhat meaningless, since there is a knowledge gap in this area. We just do not yet have adequate research findings on how to avoid insincere apologies and about the relevant factors impact- ing on victims’ perceptions of the sincerity of apologies. This gap needs to be filled urgently. 4. — THE NEXT STEPS. IS IT LIKELY THAT THE UN WILL SOON ADOPT A CONVENTION ON VICTIMS’ RIGHTS? Is it likely that the UN will soon adopt a Convention on victims’ rights? My answer to this question 1s : I just do not know. There are two recurrent events where the United Nations deliberates policy in the area of administering criminal justice. One 1s the annual meeting of the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, in Vienna. The other is the UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, held every 5'” year in a different host country. The next (the twelfth) Congress will be in 2010 in Brazil. G5) STRANG, 2002, reports 72% of participating offenders in the RISE-experiments apol- ogizing for what they had done. G6) EXLINE & BAUMEISTER, 2000: an overview (with more references) is provided by Pem- berton & Winkel & Groenhuijsen, 2007. — 132 — At the 15" Session of the Commission in 2006 (i.e. after a first draft of a Convention had been written and circulated) it was decided to request the Secretary-General to convene an intergovernmental expert group meeting, charged with a twofold mandate : a. designing an information gathering instrument; and b. analysing ways and means to promote the use and application of UN standards and norms related primarily to victim issues. The IEGM took place, which led to a report in which a question- naire (‘an information gathering instrument’) was presented. The second part of the report (‘ways and means to promote.…’) includes a reference to the draft Convention on justice and support for victims of crime and abuse of power. So this was very encouraging for those favouring a Convention. During the 16'" Session of the Commission in 2007 attention was largely focused on finalising the questionnaire. Other means and ways to improve implementation of existing UN standards were hardly con- sidered. Any reference to a potential convention in this area was omitted in the official records. The 17" Session of the Commission took place in April 2008. One item of discussion concerned preparations for the Twelfth Congress. À decision was made on the overall theme of the Congress $”), its agenda items and the workshop topics. Neither of these includes a direct refer- ence to victims rights. All of this looks very discouraging to those 1n favour of having a Convention. At a plenary session of the meeting the president of the World Society of Victimology argued at length for a UN Convention on victims’ rights. Informal consultations revealed that several country delegations contemplate taking up this lead and might start a campaign to do further work in this direction. It is too early to predict whether a Convention — or a Framework Convention, as suggested by some scholars (van Genugten cum suis, 2006) — will eventually be negotiated. Regardless of the outcome of this process, the mere existence of a draft UN Convention has opened the way for new debates on the best possible range of victims’ rights on a global level. That in itself can be regarded as a sign of progress. REFERENCES M.F.1. BRIENEN & E.H. HOEGEN, Victims of Crime in 22 European Criminal Jus- tice Systems, Nijmegen : Wolf Legal Productions 2000. GI “Comprehensive strategies for global challenges : crime prevention and criminal jus- tice systems and their development in a changing world”. — 133 — J.J.M. VAN en Dik & M.S. GROENHUIJSEN, ‘Schadevergoedingsmaatregel voeging : de civielrechtelijke invalshoek’, Nederlands Juristenblad 1993, p. 163- 167. Jan J. M. VAN Duxk, ‘Benchmarking Legislation on Crime Victims : the UN Vic- tims Declaration of 1985’, in : VETERE & DavID 2005, p. 202-208. J.J. EXLINE & R.F. BAUMEISTER, ‘Expressing forgiveness and repentance : benefits and barriers’, in: M.E. McCuULLOUGH & C.E. THORESEN (eds.), Forgiveness theory : research and practice, London : Guildford Press 2000. Graham FARRELL, ‘Multiple Victimisation, its Extent and Significance', Interna- tional Review of Victimology 1992, 2, p. 85-102. Graham FARRELL, ‘Preventing Repeat Victimization’, in: Michael TONRY & David FARRINGTON (eds.), Building a Safer Society, Crime and Justice, Vol- ume 19, Chicago 1995, p. 469-534. Ezzat À. FATTAH, Understanding Criminal Victimization. An Introduction to The- oretical Victimology, Scarborough, Ontario : Prentice-Hall Canada 1991. Sam GARKAWE, “The Need for a Victims’ Convention’, The Victimologist 2005, p. 4-5. Willem VAN GENUGTEN, Rob VAN GESTEL, Marc GROENHUIJSEN, Rianne LET- SCHERT, ‘Loopholes, Risks and Ambivalences in International Lawmaking:; the Case of a Framework Convention on Victims’ Rights’, Netherlands Year- book of International Law, Volume XXXVII, 2006, p. 109-154. Marc GROENHUIJSEN, ‘Victims’ Rights in the Criminal Justice System : À Call for more Comprehensive Implementation Theory', in: Jan J.M. VAN DuIK, Ron G.H. VAN KAAM, Jo-Anne WEMMERS (eds.), Caring for Crime Victims : Selected Proceedings of the Ninth International Symposium on Victimology, New York 1999, p. 85-114. M.S. GROENHUIJSEN, ‘Nieuw beleidsdocument van het “European Forum for Vic- tim Services” omtrent de positie van het slachtoffer in de context van medi- ation in strafzaken, Tijdschrift voor Herstelrecht 2004, no. 4, p. 39-47. Marc GROENHUIJSEN, ‘International Protocols on Victims’ Rights and some Reflections on Significant Recent Developments in Victimology', in : R. SNY- MAN & L. Davis (eds.), Victimology in South Africa, Pretoria : van Schaik Publishers 2005, p. 333-351. Marie-Pierre DE LIÈGE, Concrete achievements toward the implementation of the fundamental principles of justice for victims in France, Paris : Ministry of Jus- tice 1988. Pat MAYHEW, Natalie AYE MAUNG, Catriona MIRLEES-BLACK, The 1992 British Crime Survey, London 1993. D Moxon, J.M. CORKERY, C. HEDDERMAN, Developments in the use of compen- sation orders in magistrates’ courts since October 1988, Home Office Research Study 126, London : HSMO 1992. OPDEBEECK, G. VERVAEKE, F.W. WINKEL, ‘Bemiddeling in het strafrecht’, in P.J. van Koppen a.o. (eds.), Het recht van binnen : psychologie van het recht, Deventer : Kluwer 2002. Denise OsBORN, Dan ELLINGWORTH, Tim HopE, Alan TRICKETT, ‘Are Repeatedly Victimized Households Different?, Journal of Quantitative Criminology 1996, 12, p. 223-245. A. PEMBERTON, F.W. WINKEL, M.S. GROENHUIJSEN, ‘Evaluating Victims Exper1- ences in Restorative Justice, Contemporary Justice Review 2007. — 134 — Phare project, Reinforcement of the Rule of Law. Final report on the first part of the project, Nijmegen : Wolf Legal Productions 2002. Hans Joachim SCHNEIDER, ‘Victimological Developments in the World during the last Three Decades: À Study of Comparative Victimology', in: Arlène GOUDREAULT & Irvin WALLER (eds.), Beyond Boundaries. Selected Symposium Proceedings, Montreal 2001. p. 19-68. H. STRANG, Repair or revenge : Victims and restorative justice, Oxford : Oxford University Press 2002. Eduardo VETERE & Pedro DaviD (eds.), Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power : Festschrift in honour of Irene Mellup, Bangkok 2005. SUMMARY At the time of the previous World Congress of the International Society for Criminology, in 2003 in Rio de Janeiro, the idea of propos- ing a United Nations Convention on Victims’ Rights had not yet been seriously proposed or considered. Today, only five years onward, many things have changed. The pro's and con’s of such a move have been debated in academic discourse, several drafts of a possible Convention have been written and translated into various languages, and a cam- paign has been started to persuade the member States of the UN to work in the direction of adopting a document like that. This paper aims to explain the background of these recent developments and to connect them with another major trend in the way many societies deal with the phenomenon of crime : the rise of restorative justice practices. RESUMÉ À l’époque du précédent congrès mondial de la Société internationale de criminologie, à 2003 à Rio de Janeiro, l’idée de proposer une con- vention des Nations Unies sur les droits des victimes n'avait pas encore été sérieusement avancée ou prise en considération.Aujourd'hui, à peine cinq ans plus tard, beaucoup de choses ont changé. Les avantages et les inconvénients d’un tel dispositif ont fait l’objet de débats dans le dis- cours académique, plusieurs avant-projets de convention ont été élabo- rés et traduits dans de multiples langues, et une campagne a été lancée pour persuader les Etats membres des Nations Unies d'oeuvrer dans la direction de l'adoption d’un tel document. L'auteur se propose dans le présent article, d'expliquer l’arrière-plan de ces développements récents et de les mettre en rapport avec un autre trait majeur de la manière dont nombre de sociétés traitent le phénomène criminel : la progression des pratiques de justice restaurative. — 135 — RESUMEN En el momento del precedente congreso mundial de la Sociedad Internacional de Criminologia de 2003 en Rio de Janeiro, la idea de pro- poner una Convenciôn de Naciones Unidas sobre los derechos de las victimas todavia no se habia considerado seriamente. Hoy, apenas cinco años mâs tarde, muchas cosas han cambiado. Las ventajas e inconve- nientes de tal dispositivo han sido objeto de debates en el discurso aca- démico, se han elaborado varios ante-proyectos de Convenciôn, tradu- cidos a mültiples lenguas, y se ha lanzado una campaña para persuadir a los Estados miembros de Naciones Unidas de actuar con el objetivo de adoptar tal documento. En el presente articulo, el autor se propone explicar el trasfondo de estos recientes desarrollos y ponerlos en relaciôn con la justicia restaurativa, otra caracteristica importante de la manera en la que un gran nûmero de sociedades tratan el fenômeno criminal. — 136 — THE FUTURE OF CRIMINOLOGY AS A SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE : Reflections on Criminology’s Unholy Alliance with Criminal Policy & on Current Misguided Attempts to Divorce Victimology from Criminology Ezzat A. Fattah () PROLOGUE It is truly a great pleasure to be asked to contribute to the 15* Inter- national Congress of Criminology which is being held for the first time in the beautiful and culturally-rich Catalonian city of Barcelona. And it Is a great honor, but also a heavy responsibility, to be scheduled as the last plenary speaker. After three intensive days of lectures, workshops, discussions and exchanges, does anything remain to be added? Could anything be said at this stage that would not be anticlimactic? Well, it was the brilliant idea of our President, Professor Tony Peters, to end the plenary sessions of the Congress, devoted as it 1s to the theme of “Research and Action”, with a futuristic look at criminology. He wanted me to examine what could lie ahead for criminology as a social science and as an academic discipline. So here I am, without a crystal ball of any kind, trying to gaze into the future in an attempt to figure out where criminology is heading and to speculate on what the future holds for t. Those of you who are expecting a synthesis report, in the great Euro- pean tradition, will undoubtedly be disappointed because this is not the task that was assigned to me, What I was asked to do 1s to use the expe- rience of half a century, studying and teaching criminology, to reflect on what 1s likely to happen to it in the next decade or two. Is criminology heading to oblivion? Is it destined to become 1rrele- vant in the security-obsessed society of the 21* century? Could anything be done to prevent its stagnation and eventual decline? Or will crimi- nology be able to develop, flourish and take its rightful place along side (> Ph.D.. D.h.c. (Liege). F.R.S.C. Professor Emeritus. School of Criminology. Simon Fraser University. Vancouver, Canada. — 137 — other firmly established social sciences? What sound and useful advice could be made at this conjuncture in its evolution? Since what I am presenting to you are simply personal views and thoughtful reflections, I do not expect you to accept my predictions for the future or to agree with my suggestions for change. However, 1f Î suc- ceed in offering you some food for thought and in forcing you to think about and to debate the issues that I will be raising, then I will consider my mission fulfilled and my goal achieved. Those of you who know me well will probably agree that I have proven over the years to be a free and independent thinker who 1s not overwhelmed by the force of tradition, who 1s not swayed by ideological or political swings and 1s not influenced by fads or fashions. In fact, I often swam against the sweeping tide. As a result I have earned, rightly or wrongly, a reputation of being “l’enfant terrible” of criminology and victimology meetings, of being the speaker who says what participants do not want or do not like to hear. I therefore applaud the courage and the integrity of the organizing committee that decided to invite me to be one of the plenary speakers and to heartily thank them for the invita- tion. So what 1s it that qualifies me to be a plenary speaker at this distin- guished congress? Well, it is more than half a century of experience in criminal justice and criminology, and to be more precise, a career that included 12 years of practical experience as a prosecutor, chief prosecu- tor and “juge d'instruction” in my country of birth (Egypt) plus 47 years of study, research and teaching criminology in Europe and Canada. Those of you who have known me personally and those who have followed my career path would know that I always had a vision for criminology and have ferociously defended it against its detractors and they were never in short supply. They would also know that I have missed no opportunity to criticize criminology though it was always a constructive and well-meant criticism. And what could be more telling than the subtitle I chose for my treatise “Criminology, Past, Present and Future - ÀA Critical Overview”( Fattah, 1997). Those of you who have read the book or who are familiar with my other criminological writings will notice major differences between what I said then and what I will be saying today. This is because my thoughts and my views have markedly evolved since the book was written more than 10 years ago and particularly after the tragic events of 9/11 and the disturbing developments that followed. Another development that deeply influenced my thoughts and my views about criminology in recent years was the unfortunate transformation of victimology, natu- rally and logically a sub-field of criminology, from a fledging scientific discipline into a political/ideological movement, into a partisan lobby — 138 — and an advocacy enterprise. So you should not be surprised, for exam- ple, when I share with you my deep conviction that criminology curric- ula, like the one I single-handedly designed and developed at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver 34 years ago, are in dire need not only of substantial changes but a total overhaul. And believe me; if I were to do it all over again, it would be significantly different from what t was then and what 1t is now. Back in 1974 when I was invited to set up the criminology Depart- ment at SFU, criminology was a newcomer to the university scene. There were very few precedents to draw upon and very few models to be inspired by or to be able to assess and to follow. I was asked to do it because I offered a credible vision of what the study of criminology is all about and of what a university criminology program should be like. It was a new experiment and by all accounts a successful one. But like society itself, social sciences are dynamic sciences. And as things move on and as societies evolve, visions change. It 1s true that academia is not particularly prone to change. But academics are good at learning from experience. After more than three decades I have personally learnt a lot from the SFU experiment and from others that have followed. As Spain and many other European countries are in the process of deciding how to go about the teaching of criminology, I thought it might be beneficial to share with you my new vision for the future of criminology in the hope that it may provide you with some 1ideas to think about because the decisions you make now will shape the future of criminology for many years to come. You are about to make vital decisions about the subject-matter of criminology, the level at which 1t is to be taught, about the most appropriate academic and administrative setting where it should be housed, about its relationship and interactions with other academic disciplines, and so forth. À few of you may agree with what I have to say. Most, being used to the status quo or having been trained in the present context, will undoubtedly disagree. Be that as it may, I certainly hope that my talk will not leave you indifferent and that it will force you to reexamine your views and to rethink, and hopefully revise, your firmly held posi- tions on the issues. Whether you agree or disagree, I hope you will judge the ideas, the views and the suggestions I am presenting today, not on how popular, or even how practical, they are but on how sound and how logical they are. I also hope to have an opportunity later on to explain those views as well as their practical implications, in more detail and to answer whatever questions you may have about them, to hear your comments and feedback and to be able to defend my position. In other words, what I am asking you is to hear the message without shooting the mes- -— 139 — senger. And the message is rather simple : criminology 1s a relatively young science, and is not as firmly established as several other social or natural sciences. Ît 1s still evolving. Past experience and recent history have revealed some fundamental weaknesses and pointed the way to some badly needed changes. Some soul-searching 1s in order. And what better forum to sound the alarm and to offer suggestions for change than the International Congress of Criminology? Âs criminologists we would be wise to learn from and to follow the example of what took place in other domains. Some years ago, environ- mentalists sounded the alarm about pollution, ozone depletion, energy consumption, climate change and so on. Âs a result drastic actions are being taken both at the national and international levels. Yet when 1t came to problems and threats related to our field, criminologists were conspicuous by their silence! One has to wonder : where were the crim- inologists, who maintained all along that criminal policy was an integral part of criminology, when a wave of repression, human rights violations and invasion of privacy swept the United States, the United Kingdom and many other countries in the Western world in the aftermath of 9/ 11? My main argument, therefore, will be that if criminology is to survive and thrive it will need to divorce itself from the criminal law and to detach itself from criminal policy. Hopefully, I will be able to prove to you that teaching criminology and law under the same roof and within the same administrative structure 1s detrimental to its progress, scientific development and future evolution. Hopefully I will manage to convince you that such practice, as common as it is, defies logic and rationality. Still I am sure most of you will not agree with this view dismissing 1t outright as unconventional, radical or even revolutionary. This, how- ever, is not an issue that will be settled easily or soon. Only time and future developments will tell whether this view is right or wrong. THE NEED FOR A REVISED DEFINITION OF CRIMINOLOGY What is criminology and what is its subject-matter? Those may sound inappropriate or frivolous questions to ask close to the end of the 15'" International Congress of Criminology, but you can take my word for it, they are vital and timeless questions for which we need a correct answer. Unlike many other disciplines, criminology has proven to be hard to define and there are many divergent views of what its subject- matter is or ought to be. And yet a sound definition 1s absolutely indis- pensable for reflecting on, and predicting its future as a social science — 140 — and as an academic discipline. Reflecting upon the definition of crimi- nology Î was inspired by what our Secretary General, Monsieur Georges Picca, wrote in the most recent issue of the “International Annals of Criminology” (2007 : 7). Describing the role of the International Society he wrote : “La Société Internationale de Criminologie, Organisation non-governmen- tale (ONG), a ainsi pour vocation, depuis reconnue, d'assurer le dévolop- pement des sciences dans leur application au phénomène criminel, dans les différentes sociétés humaines” Criminology, therefore, is a science and the role of the International Society is to ensure its scientific development. According to Korn & McCorkle (1959 : V), the two essential functions of any science are the gathering of empirical evidence and the logical ordering of this evidence in relation to explanatory conceptions. May I then propose a simple, concise, non-polemical, unambiguous, though unconventional, defini- tion of criminology? According to this definition : “Criminology is the search for, and the application of, multidisciplinary sci- entific concepts, methods and theories to the study of the social phenomenon of crime, its perpetrators and its victims.’ This definition affirms criminology's scientific character and its status as an empirical, non-normative, non-speculative social/behavioral sci- ence. Ît is meant, above all, to differentiate the science of criminology from the discipline of criminal policy. To further confirm the distinction between the two I propose the following definition of criminal policy : “Criminal policy is the application in practice of religious and ideological beliefs, criminological and other types of knowledge, to achieve desirable goals in the areas of crime control and prevention, for managing offenders and helping victims” Âs this definition makes it clear, criminal policy is an applied disci- pline with a much broader scope and much wider field of application than criminology. Those include the processes of making, unmaking and reforming the laws related to crime, as well as the processes of enforcing and applying those laws, assessing social reaction to crime, and deciding on the ways and means of controlling and preventing crime, and of helping offenders and victims. THE NEED TO CIRCUMSCRIBE THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF CRIMINOLOGY It 1s truly amazing how infrequently we stop to reexamine what has been taken for granted for many years or decades to assess its accuracy or its adequacy. If we do so we might realize that what has been accepted as unchallengeable truth in the past is not at all as sound and — 141 — as unassailable today as it appeared some time ago. Let us, for example, examine the relationship between criminology and some other disci- plines or professions. Despite fundamental differences that I will dwell upon later on, his- torically, criminology has been tied up with the criminal law. And as a result of misguided attempts to expand the subject-matter of criminol- ogy and to extend its territory or its applications, various fields such as criminal policy, criminal justice, law enforcement (or policing, as it 1s now called), sociology of punishment which used to be called “penol- ogy”, and even a legal function such as sentencing, were treated as part or branches of criminology and were subsumed under what was mistak- enly used as an “umbrella” term. One may ask what logic or rationale renders sentencing a part of criminology? What logic or rationale dictated that the parallel disci- plines of penology and criminology be amalgamated? As early as the 19'® century a clear distinction was made between the science of crime and social reaction to crime. The first was called criminology and the latter was called penology. For example both John Gillin's book pub- lished in 1926 as well as Korn and McCorkle’s book published in 1959 are entitled “Criminology and Penology” indicating that they were two separate and distinct disciplines. So why 1s it that “sociology of punish- ment”, the new name for penology, is now considered a branch or a part of criminology? Âre criminalistics, police science, forensic science branches or sub- fields of criminology? If they are, why 1s it that they are not a standard component of criminology curricula and are not taught in criminology departments but in police colleges? If they are not, we may ask what makes certain criminal justice practices part and parcel of criminology while others are not. THE NEFED TO SEPARATE THE TEACHING OF CRIMINOLOGY FROM THE TEACHING OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE Education at all levels is changing to meet the growing need for spe- cialization and to adjust to the complex realities of the 21* century. When I suffered from an eye ailment some months ago I needed to see and consult five different specialists. I saw an ophthalmologist who diagnosed the problem, a technician who conducted the various tests (field test, OCT test, etc.), a retina specialist who examined the retina, an eye surgeon who did the operation, and an optometrist who fitted me with new glasses! — 142 — The need for a change in criminology education is even more press- ing than it is for several other disciplines. Why? Because criminology 1s a relatively young discipline and a newcomer to the university scene. There are no long established traditions about the teaching of criminol- ogy in academia as an autonomous, independent discipline. The few programs that currently exist are, for the most part, pioneering experi- ments that need to be thoroughly analyzed and assessed to find out their strengths and their weaknesses, their positives and their negatives, their successes and their failures, their achievements and their shortcomings. Such an analysis would shed light on what changes need to be made and why. To examine the future of criminology as a social science and as an academic discipline necessitates a differentiation between “sci- ence”, 5 c6 art” and “profession” which are three distinct types of endeavor. To use the three terms or designations interchangeably is confusing, mis- leading and unwarranted because it blurs the fundamental differences between them. It is true that artists and professionals do use scientific knowledge and occasionally science methods, but this does not make them scientists. Detecting and investigating crime is an art, not science, even when scientific knowledge or scientific methods are used in the process. Inter- rogation of suspects, assessing the credibility of informers or witnesses, etc. is an art, not a science, even when criminological and psychological knowledge is used in the process. Practices such as sentencing, arbitra- tion, mediation, etc. are generally considered arts not science. While the difference between art and science may be rather obvious, let me examine a little more closely the distinction between sciences and professional disciplines. Criminology, I maintain, is a social/behavioral science. Criminal justice, policing, corrections, probation and parole supervision, after care, are not sciences, they are professions. The fact that criminal justice practitioners may use criminological knowledge in their daily activities neither makes them criminologists nor makes crim- inal justice an integral part of criminology. Criminal justice profession- als, whether lawyers, prosecutors, judges, police officers or correctional officers, are not criminologists. They do not claim to be criminologists and do not identify themselves as criminologists. Criminal justice is concerned with the “HOW” questions. Criminol- ogy ‘s main preoccupation is with the “WHY” questions. The relation- ship of criminal justice to criminology is not dissimilar to that between nursing and medicine. Though related in some ways, they are distinct. Nursing, like social work, 1s a profession. Nurses and social workers are not scientists. They are professionals. The logical distinction and separation between criminology and crim- inal justice is being followed in practice. There are societies of criminol- — 143 — ogy as there are bar associations, criminal justice associations, police brotherhoods, correctional associations, etc. They have different mis- sions and goals, different aspirations, different philosophies and so forth. To ignore their distinctiveness and to try to amalgamate them under the umbrella of criminology is to no one’s benefit. To recognize their differences is not to deny that they can have, or may share, certain common interests, or that they can, and should work together and coop- erate to achieve common ends. The same separation and differentiation is also happening at the international level. The appropriateness of those distinctions and of the need for separation is confirmed by the existence, for so many decades, of four major international organizations : The International Society of criminology; The International Association of Penal Law,; The Interna- tional Society of Social Defense (which more appropriately could call itself “The International Society of Criminal Policy”); and The Interna- tional Penal and Penitentiary Foundation. Ît goes without saying that despite their distinctiveness they do have common interests, they share some common goals, and their concerns may overlap. They continue to exist as four different and distinct entities and I have never heard any call or witnessed any attempt for their amalgamation. The distinction and separation between criminology and criminal justice does exist within our own society. The International Society of Criminology has a “scientific commission” but does not have a professional or criminal jus- tice commission. The logic and the rationale for this separation should serve as a guide when reflecting on the future of criminology as a social science and as an academic discipline. The distinction between criminology as a social/behavioral science and criminal justice as a profession and the need to teach them in sep- arate settings, with different curricula, has long been recognized and 1s the dominant model in North America. There are university depart- ments of criminology that have a theoretical and research focus and there are schools (or programs) of criminal justice as well as police col- leges that have applied, practical, vocational and technological orienta- tions. In Vancouver, to give just one example, we have the Justice Institute which is a vocational institute completely separate from Simon Fraser University's School of Criminology. While having those criminology and criminal justice programs as dis- tinct and separate units within different universities has many advan- tages, combining them serves no useful purpose. Again this does not mean that there are no areas of overlap (chevauchement). Criminologists need a good understanding of the law, particularly criminal law, and of the workings of the criminal justice system. Criminal Justice profession- — 144 - als need not only a good understanding of the law but also a good grasp of basic knowledge in criminology and other social sciences. But the logic of the separation is indisputable. Criminology is about substance not techniques, about knowledge not skills. It is about what is and the “why”, not about the “know how”. À professional program (or vocational as Professor David Garland described it) is geared toward teaching the skills required for performing various types of jobs, about helping students learn how to develop those skills and to effectively and efficiently perform specific functions. An academic program helps students amass knowledge in their cho- sen field and teaches them how to use this knowledge for critical and innovative purposes. Îts focus is research, discussion, exploration and the exchange of ideas. [ am sure you all agree that planning and design are different functions from execution. It is the same difference between the architect who plans and designs the building and the contractor who constructs it. THE NEED TO SEPARATE THE TEACHING OF CRIMINOLOGY FROM THE TEACHING OF CRIMINAL LAW Having explained what I believe is a most logical rationale for sepa- rating the teaching of criminal justice from the teaching of criminology, let me now turn to what I believe is even a more compelling rationale for separating the teaching of criminology from the teaching of criminal law Let me stress at the outset, in no uncertain terms, that criminology is neither an addendum nor an appendage to the criminal law. They are two distinct and separate disciplines. Criminal law is normative, crimi- nology is not. Criminology neither defines nor proscribes norms of con- duct or rules of behavior. It does not pass value judgments on the behaviors it studies. Criminology 1s empirical; criminal law 1s theoretical and dogmatic. Criminology uses inductive reasoning. Criminal law uses deductive reasoning. Criminal law is speculative, criminology 1s positiv- ist. Criminal law studies legal texts and jurisprudence. Criminology stud- 1es behavior. Criminal law 1s preoccupied with qualification (is the act a felony, a misdemeanor, etc.) and with application (which section, par- agraph, or sub-paragraph applies to the act in question?). Criminal law 1s interested in interpretation, consulting the spirit of the law, trying to guess the intent of the makers of the law or the mind set of the legislator a century or two ago. Criminal law tries to split hairs : was the crime an act of malevolence, an act of recklessness, callousness, negligence or imprudence? Is it an act of criminal responsibility or civil liability? — 145 — Criminology 1s different. Criminology attempts to seek explanations. It is not interested in legal fiction but in social reality. It studies actual not ideal behavior and tries to understand and explain why people behave the way they do. I have always, therefore, been baffled by the contempt in which crim- inology is held by many of the older criminal law professors and legal scholars whom I encountered throughout my career! Having given the matter a great deal of reflection, I think I do under- stand now why the high priests of the criminal law want to keep crim- inology in a state of subordination under the control and domination of their own discipline. And I think I have an explanation for why they fear the empirical science of criminology and other social, behavioral and life sciences. To paraphrase Thomas Jefferson they ‘“dread the advance of science as witches do the approach of light”. They are scared that the discoveries of science will lead the metaphysical and theological foundations on which criminal law is constructed to crumble (see Fat- tah, 1992; 1993b). Yes, this is the reason why an empirical science of criminology is much too menacing for criminal law. Criminal law and criminal policy are based on arbitrary religious and moral beliefs that have no scientific basis, on faulty assumptions about the universality, the immutability or the absolute nature of certain moral standards and rules. The fact is, there are no universal, transcendental or immutable moral standards, rules or values. Morality is relative in time and space and varies considerably from culture to culture, as I have often and repeatedly argued (Fattah, 1993a; 1997). Such relativity explains the continuous and ongoing processes of criminalization and decriminalization. To illustrate the evolution of morality one can give a couple of examples: Until recently, gay marriages were considered immoral, now they are perfectly legal. Certain sexual practices between consenting adults in private were deemed as highly immoral. Now they are considered to be perfectly normal and are shielded from criminali- Zzation. The arbitrariness of the criminal law is quite evident in the distinc- tions it makes between what 1s criminal and what 1s civil (Fattah, 1997), between what is a felony and what 1s a misdemeanor; in criminalizing certain drugs but not others. It is evident when one looks at the age set to determine criminal responsibility, the age at which juveniles are treated as adults, the age set for recognizing valid consent to heterosex- ual and homosexual relations. And one can go on and on citing the speed limits, the blood alcohol levels used to establish impaired driving, etc., etc. Rather than being constrained by the metaphysical notions, the base- less theological beliefs and the arbitrary moral values that guide and — 146 — dominate criminal law, one of the critical missions of criminology 1s to challenge and denounce the arbitrary, non-scientific, and even non-sen- sical nature of such notions and distinctions as I did in my paper pre- sented at the Colloquium celebrating the centenary of the Finnish Penal Code (Fattah, 1992). In the paper I pointed out the irrationality of many accepted truths in criminal law. In contrast to the static and dogmatic criminal law, criminology 1s a dynamic science undergoing constant evolution. Criminology advances by discarding disproven and discredited theories, notions, and beliefs and by taking stock of the new discoveries of modern science. Criminol- ogy is the search for factual and scientifically acquired knowledge. To do criminology is to seek truthful, objective, unbiased information about crime, its perpetrators and its victims, information that 1s free from prejudice and uninfluenced by preconceived ideas and preset posi- tions. And while criminal law finds its inspiration in theology and moral philosophy, criminology derives its knowledge from objective observa- tion and scientific experimentation. Criminology is not an armchair sei- ence and there is no place in criminology for philosophizing or specu- lation. Criminal law may claim that it appeals to reason. Criminology seeks and relies on scientific evidence. Back in the 20" century, many prominent criminalists went on to claim that criminology is a member of the family of criminal sciences! One has to wonder what criminal sciences they were talking about! No science worthy of the appellation could remain virtually unchanged for hundreds of years. Criminal law remains frozen in the era of vengeance and vindictiveness and continues to be both centered and fixated on punishment. Its basic principles, concepts and notions such as free will, moral guilt, malicious intent, malice aforethought, premeditation (let alone the ridiculous notion of dolus eventualis or so-called indirect inten- tion), to mention but a few, are antiquated, outdated and most of them are in flagrant conflict with the findings of the behavioral and social sci- ences. And it does not cease to amaze me that none of the scientific dis- coveries of the 20" century was able to change or even to shake the the- ological, philosophical and metaphysical foundations of an archaic criminal law. Is it not surprising that we continue to have a criminal law that is in disharmony with the current Zeitgeist and is centered on the scientifically disproven metaphysical/philosophical notion of free will?? — 147 — THE POPULAR YET FALLACIOUS ARGUMENT AGAINST THE AUTONOMY OF CRIMINOLOGY One of the most often made arguments challenging the autonomy and independence of criminology 1s that its subject-matter is determined and circumscribed by the criminal law. The faulty assumption underly- ing this argument is easy to refute. It assumes that concepts such as 99 c6 “crime > criminal” and “victim” could only be defined according to the criminal law. The argument ignores the indisputable fact that crime 1s a social, not a legal phenomenon. It occurs in societies and communities that have no formal or written criminal legislation. In my book “Criminology : Past, Present and Future” (Fattah, 1997) I devoted a whole chapter to the issue of defining crime. I quoted Hermanus Bianchi (1956) who correctly maintained that the objective semantic function of the term “crime” is, as much as the phenomenon itself, independent of any legislative operation, that both the term and the phenomenon are evidently pre-legislative, that they exist independently of, and in spite of, any legislative use of the terms (see also Hermann Mannheim, 1965 :31). To this I added that the origin of crime can be traced to the origin of society, not to the origin of the criminal law. Criminal law originated as a way of dealing with crime. Crime is not created by criminal laws; it is simply recognized by them, and it can (and should) therefore, be defined independently of those criminal laws. Rules making certain behaviors punishable succeed not precede the existence of those behav- lors. The criminal code designates certain acts as criminal because they generate a specific social reaction. The criminal law simply recognizes and formalizes such reaction. It would, therefore, be incorrect to claim that those acts evoke this social reaction because they are made criminal by the law. In Durkheim's words “We must not say that an action shocks the common conscience because it 1s criminal, but rather that it is criminal because it shocks the common conscience. We do not reprove it because it is a crime, but it 1S a crime because we reprove it” (1965 : 81). THE OPTIMAL SETTING FOR THE TEACHING OF CRIMINOLOGY Affirming the scientific nature of criminology, its autonomous and independent status, its non-speculative, non-normative, and non-ideo- logical character and acknowledging the fundamental differences between criminology and the criminal law will logically lead to the determination of the optimal academic setting where it should be taught and the most appropriate administrative structure it should be housed — 148 — in. Ît is to question and to challenge the anomalous situation that still exists in most European, Asian and South American countries, where criminology continues to be held in a state of dependency to the crimi- nal law. Actually it does not cease to surprise me that the highest status that criminology has achieved in those countries is that of a research centre or institute that may or may not offer some courses in criminol- ogy on the side. Despite its obvious nature as a social, empirical, non- dogmatic and non-speculative science, criminology continues to be taught in those countries, within the law faculties as an auxiliary branch of criminal law, as a peripheral, non-essential and quite often elective subject. There are a couple of notable exceptions, for example, Belgium and the United Kingdom. However, in most other European countries, freeing criminology from the shackles and the tentacles of the criminal law has been an endless and unwinnable battle for those enlightened academics who aspired to create autonomous departments or schools of criminology. One of the things that attracted me personally to Simon Fraser University when I was invited to set up the criminology program was the fact that the university did not, and still does not, have a law school. But why be surprised? Not infrequently history and tradition tri- umph over logic and rationality. And I fully understand that changing the present practice poses a formidable challenge to all of us. But I firmly believe that it is the key to the advancement and the radiance (rayonnement) of criminology in the coming decades. We should keep in mind that criminology is a synthesis science (science de synthèse). This begs the question : how could a synthesis science advance, develop and flourish in a unidisciplinary setting?? The fundamental differences outlined above between criminology and the criminal law will help you understand why criminology education in North America is quite different. It may partly explain why the subject of criminology is conspicuous by its absence from the curriculum of the vast majority of our law schools/faculties. As a matter of fact I know of no criminology program in the USA that is attached to, or is housed in, a law school/faculty. Prior to the creation of Schools of Criminology, like the one that was at the University of Berkeley, California, criminol- ogy, in line with its nature as an empirical social discipline, was a stand- ard and popular subject in many sociology departments. While it is more logical to have criminology taught in sociology departments than in law schools, the absence of criminology, and for that matter other social sciences, from the curricula of law schools in North America does have alarming consequences. Excluding the social and behavioral sci- ences and restricting the curriculum to legal training mean that future lawyers, prosecutors and judges are seriously handicapped when per- 149 — forming their everyday duties. It means that legislators and policy-mak- ers, most of whom are lawyers, have very little knowledge of criminol- ogy and the other social and behavioral sciences. The fact that the vast majority of law schools in the United States and Canada require appli- cants to have an undergraduate degree, offers a partial remedy to this unfortunate situation. It incites many of those who aspire to study law to choose the social sciences as their undergraduate field. THE NEED TO DIVORCE CRIMINOLOGY FROM CRIMINAL POLICY Past attempts to broaden the scope and the subject-matter of crimi- nology and the misguided efforts to place criminal policy under its wing have been detrimental to its scientific evolution. It has led to all kinds of justified and unjustified criticisms and is largely responsible for the stagnation and the fragmentation of criminology. While the differences, highlighted above, between criminology and the criminal law may be rather evident and well-known, the differences between criminology and criminal policy need some explanation as they are much less understood. Once those differences are exposed it becomes clear that any alliance between the two is doomed because 1t is based on faulty logic and defective reasoning. You may wonder : if criminal policy 1s that different from, even incompatible with, criminology, how did it end up being considered by many as a sub-discipline of criminology? Âs repeatedly mentioned, criminology is a non-normative, non-ideo- logical scientific discipline. It is interested in facts not ideals. It studies actual behavior and analyzes things as they are not as they ought to be. Criminology is a secular science. In contrast, criminal policy has little to do with science and everything to do with religion, politics and ideology. Its ideological bias is evident in the adjectives used to describe it : liberal criminal policy, conservative criminal policy; as well as in the value judgments passed on its contents : mild criminal policy, harsh criminal policy, permissive, progressive, regressive criminal policy, etc., etc. Criminal policy, which uses the criminal law as its main tool, cannot avoid being a normative field. It is judgmental and can never be neutral or value-free. By its nature it is a partisan policy that takes sides. His- torically and traditionally, criminal policy has protected the interests of the rich against the poor, the haves against the have-nots, the interests of the powerful against the interests of the powerless, the interests of the incumbents against the insurgents who threaten their hold on power. More recently the policy is being geared to promoting the interests of — 150 — crime victims at the expense of the rights of offenders. But science and partisanship are incompatible. They do not go hand in hand. Once researchers take sides or become advocates they lose their neutrality, their objectivity and their credibility. This 1s a fundamental principle that should be seriously considered by those criminologists and victimol- ogists who have adopted the cause of crime victims and who claim to speak on their behalf. It flies in the face of those victim advocates who, under the guise of helping victims, are trying incessantly to separate vic- timology from criminology and to create a political and ideological enterprise that has nothing to do with science. Criminal policy has always been designed, formulated and legislated by lawyers and politicians, not by criminologists. It is a policy shaped and molded by conservative ideology, religious punitiveness, and more recently, by the politics of fear. Criminal policy tries to reflect the moral outrage generated by the crime and to canalize the vindictive reactions that follow. Criminal policy is sysnonymous with punishment and con- trol and both are the main instruments of repression. Criminal policy 1s a political exercise and there is no need for criminology to be seen as, or to become, the tool of repression. This would be a 360 degree depar- ture from its historical roots and its original noble mission of defending the individual against the tyranny of power. It is not surprising therefore, that some of the most 1illustrious crim- inologists of the 20!'" century, on both sides of the Atlantic, did make a plea for separating criminology from criminal policy. So my call for such separation is by no means new, radical or revolutionary. Às early as 1938, Prof. Thorsten Sellin, the first American President of our soci- ety, suggested that the term “criminology” be used to designate only the body of scientific knowledge and the deliberate pursuit of such knowl- edge. He then proposed that the technical use of knowledge in the treat- ment and prevention of crime be separate. As he could not find a suit- able term to designate this field, he hinted that it may be called “crimino-technology”. Three decades later, another 1llustrious criminologist, Prof. Hermann Mannheim (1965 : 13), with whose prize I was honored at the last con- gress, suggested that criminal policy be treated as a discipline apart, rather than as an integral part of criminology. Affirming the non-nor- mative character of criminology, Mannheim believed 1t 1s preferable that questions of what ought to be done to reform the criminal law and the penal system be treated as a separate discipline based upon the factual findings of the criminologist and the penologist. Criminology, he insisted, should remain a non-policy-making discipline which regards the “ends” as beyond its province. Mannheim hastened to add that this does not prevent the criminologist from advocating a certain measure of legal -— 151 — and administrative penal reform, but he or she has to do so as a poli- tician or an ordinary citizen and voter rather than in the capacity of criminologist. À fact that has been largely 1gnored or overlooked in criminology 1s that the pursuit of knowledge and the practical application or imple- mentation of that knowledge are two different, distinct and separate endeavors. The pursuit of knowledge for knowledge’s sake, as in anthro- pology, archeology or history, is a laudable and worthwhile exercise, whether the knowledge has or does not have any practical applications. It is a disinterested pursuit because it is neutral and does not carry with it the danger that the acquired knowledge may be misused or deformed when applied. CRIMINOLOGY’S NEGLIGIBLE IMPACT ON CRIMINAL AND SOCIAL POLICY The popular claim that criminal policy is an integral part of crimi- nology would lose any validity and credibility were we able to show that criminology has had no, or only a minimal, impact on that policy. To do so we need only to critically examine the impact that criminology has had on criminal policy over the decades. Unfortunately, the inevitable conclusion of such an analysis would be to admit that the balance sheet is definitely negative. Just ask yourselves a simple question : “In what way does what we do with criminals today, in the 21* century, differ from what was done to them in the 19" or even the 18 century?” Isn’t it rather surprising that despite enormous social evolution and despite huge advances in sci- ence and technology for over a century the social reaction to crime has not changed one 1ota?? Those who break the law are dealt with in the same manner as centuries ago! They are sent to prison, they are fined, and if they are unable to pay the fine they will do time. The late Anto- nio Lamer who served as the chairman of the now defunct “Law Reform Commission” and who was, for ten years, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada said 1t best : Among all the areas of public concern for which governments establish departments and ministries, law is unique in one very significant way : legit- imacy is measured by how closely what we do today corresponds to what we did in the past. If such thinking dominated other areas of public policy, we would still be training our soldiers to dig trenches, we would still be debating whether smallpox vaccinations are an appropriate public health measure and the tractor would be viewed as a novel and probably dangerous innovation. Modern behavioral science, to say nothing of the eighty percent recidivism rate in our penitentiaries, has made it absolutely clear that the broad consensus and naïve optimism of the nineteenth century has been a — 152 — disastrous foundation of our approach to the problems of criminality today (1978 :129). The claim that what is being done in practice with law breakers 1s inspired by criminology or merits the designation of “applied criminol- ogy” 1s both inaccurate and misleading. It erroneously implies that the mistreatment of offenders, the harm and indignities daily inflicted upon them are based on criminological knowledge and advice. And nothing could be further from the truth. Because the fact 1is, criminal policy, as a political and 1ideological exercise, is determined by considerations that are foreign to, and are often at odds with, criminology. The reason 1s rather simple : for those who hold the strings of power, the views of criminologists and penologists do not count 1f they are at odds with the wishes and demands of the voting public. As a result, criminologists and penologists have been unable to persuade the politicians to follow their advice, to accept their recipes for reform or to implement their sugges- tions for change. More important still is the fact that criminologists do not have, and should not claim to have, the solutions to the problem of crime. They would be wise to stick to the role assigned to them, decades earlier, by Nils Christie (1971) who maintained that they are “problem- raisers” not “problem-solvers” Criminologists’ impotence to influence criminal policy 1s as clear as it is depressing. À look at the USA, the richest and most powerful coun- try in the world, would bear this out. American criminologists were una- ble to have an archaic and medieval practice, the death penalty, abol- ished. And sadly, the current debate has shifted from the cause of abolition to the method of execution with the US Supreme Court recently ruling, to the consternation of many, that lethal injection is not a cruel or inhumane practice! American criminologists were unable to stop a wave of crazy laws such as “Three strikes and you are out”. They were powerless and helpless in their attempts to prevent the explosion of the prison population which in recent years reached unprecedented record numbers. Their pleas for the decriminalization (or depenaliza- tion) of soft drugs were unsuccessful and fell on deaf ears. They could not stop the wave of repression, the flagrant abuses and human rights violations that followed 9/11 or to have practices such as water-boarding recognized as torture and banned. Nor were they able to prevent the atrocities in Guantanamo Bay, not to mention those in Abu-Gharib prison in Baghdad. While many strongly denounced such atrocities, some decided that appeasement 1s the best way of keeping research funds flowing and had no hesitation jumping on the security band- wagon. Ît was distressing to see how some became apologists for the government defending the draconian measures, the invasion of privacy, the violations of human rights and civil liberties as justified means of — 153 — combating terrorism! Surely criminologists were not as successful in their endeavors as was the victim lobby which managed to exploit the vindictive instincts of a punitive public to bring about punitive changes in the criminal law and in criminal justice practices. The lesson to be learnt is rather simple. To assign to criminology the unrealistic task of reforming current criminal policy or formulating future policy is to condemn it to oblivion. Some realism is in order. Criminologists have stood by and saw security concerns, real, imagined or invented, trump human rights and civil liberties, including the funda- mental democratic right to privacy. Were they able to prevent or to stop this invasion and this intrusion by the State? Were they able to protect our fundamental liberties and our basic freedoms? If criminologists were utterly helpless and powerless to change or to influence criminal policy, what hope 1s there that they can have more impact when it comes to social and economic policies? Criminologists have known for the longest of time that crime thrives in social environments characterized by huge disparities in wealth and power, so what have they done or can do to reduce such disparities? HOw DOES SCIENTIFIC CRIMINOLOGY DIFFER FROM PRESENT-DAY CRIMINOLOGY? It is worth repeating that a scientific, non-normative, research- focused criminology is an objective, neutral and non-partisan criminol- ogy. It is a non-ideological discipline that does not pass value judgments and does not take sides. It is a criminology that pays equal attention to crimes of the powerful as to crimes of the powerless, crime in the streets as crime in the suites, crimes of corporations as crimes of individuals. It is a criminology that devotes equal time and effort to the study of crimes by the oppressed as crimes by the oppressors, crimes from below as crimes from above, incumbent “terrorism” and insurgent “terrorism” It is a criminology that gives equal importance to crimes by the State as to crimes against the State, acts of protest against power as to acts of abuse of power. It is a criminology that is equally interested in tran- snational and international crimes as it 1s in national crimes; in crimes of war as in crimes of peace. À scientific, objective and ideology-free criminology is a classless criminology. It is a gender —- and race — neutral criminology. It is an egalitarian criminology that makes no distinction between rich and poor, between “common” criminals and white collar criminals. It makes no distinction between males and females, between blacks and whites, between members of the majority and members of minorities. — 154 — It is a secular and agnostic criminology. It avoids religious, racial and political labels. For it, Islamist violence is no different from IRA violence, Basque violence, Tamil violence, Ku Klux Klan violence, neo- Nazi violence, etc. It treats them as equally worthy of study and research. It is a value-free criminology that does not create normative hierar- chies of offenders or victims. RECAPITULATION From what is said above, the “Leitmotiv” of my thesis should by now be clear. Specialization 1s a key concept and practice in the modern world. It is the need for, and the concern about, specialization that do explain and are responsible for the emergence of new fields and sub- fields of knowledge, and the creation of new disciplines and sub-disci- plines in order to recognize and to accommodate those new branches of knowledge. When it comes to crime, offenders and victims, specialization calls for a net separation between three functions : research, policy and action. It goes without saying that the three are interrelated. Ideally, research, rather than politics or ideology, should guide policy. And action is the implementation of policy in the designated practical fields. AlI this requires a well defined specialization of three groups and a clear differentiation of their roles : 1) those whose principal preoccupation is to study and research, to analyze and evaluate, to design and innovate: 2) those whose main occupation is professional practice; and 3) those whose positions in Parliament or government call upon them to formu- late and legislate policy. What used to be a common saying in the past, that a criminologist is a “Jack of all trades” is no longer true or feasible in the 21°“ Century. So what exactly does this mean? It means that the appropriate setting for teaching criminal policy and its related field, penology, are primarily law schools and political science departments. The two disciplines should be part and parcel of the training of those lawyers and politicians whose future tasks will involve the formulation of criminal policy, as well as the judges who are entrusted with the task of deciding what would be the best possible sentence in a given case. Âs for professional criminal justice programs, their logical setting are the undergraduate curricula developed by the Schools of criminal justice available at many universities, at community colleges such as the famous John Jay College in the State of new York; and at police colleges such as The Canadian Police College (Ottawa), L'Ecole Nationale de Police — 155 — du Quebec à Nicolet, The International Police College of Canada (Winnipeg); The Royal New Zealand Police College; or at Justice Insti- tutes like the one we have in Vancouver. The logical, and by far the, optimal setting for a science of criminol- ogy program, where the emphasis 1s on theory and research, 1s at the graduate level enabling the students to obtain master’s and doctoral degrees in criminology. Naturally, there will be constant movement between the three types of programs. In the near future, the need for a solid social science component for lawyers and other criminal justice practitioners will become even more evident than it is now or has ever been. This will force law schools, which have ignored those sciences for decades, to open their doors wide open to criminology graduates who will be sought after to teach in those schools in the same way they are now teaching in professional justice programs. And there will be many more teaching opportunities for criminologists in the future. Sooner or later, it will become clear that criminology needs to be taught in sec- ondary and high schools. Why? We all know that crime and delin- quency are predominantly a youth problem. Don't you find it perplex- ing that those young people who are taught courses in welding, in home economics, in car mechanics, etc. are not being educated about one of the greatest challenges they will face while growing up? And it is almost certain that in the not too distant future every reasonably sized police force will have a research department of its own that will need qualified researchers to do in-house research and who are called upon to convince their members of the important role of research, and the indispensability of analysis and evaluation to the effectiveness and efficiency of their operations. And where will the clientele for those graduate programs in criminol- ogy come from? First, there are those graduates with a bachelor degree in one of the social sciences such as sociology, psychology, political science, etc. who have a desire to specialize in criminology. Second, there are Law school graduates with a bachelor degree (LL.B.) or a LL.L. (Licence en Droit) who are interested in complement- ing their legal training with grounding in the social sciences. Third, there are those graduates from professional criminal justice programs and police colleges who want to pursue a career in research or teaching. Those are but some of the potential candidates who would enroll in graduate criminology programs and work towards a Master's or a Ph.D. Insisting that the social/behavioral science of criminology is more appropriately taught at the graduate level is not to advocate an ivory tower role for the criminologist. Far from it. Criminologists can, if they p _ 156 — so wish, get involved in the practice. They can become criminal justice practitioners and be immersed in the field to gain first hand knowledge about crime, offenders and victims. In fact, with their graduate degrees, they would be ideal candidates for high level positions in all sectors of the administration of justice. They will be highly and singularly qualified to be entrusted with the tasks of research, planning, design, analysis, evaluation and other scientific functions. But the primary role of the true criminologist in the future will be that of a critic of social, economic and criminal policies, one who crit- Icizes not on ideological grounds but on sound scientific grounds. It will be the role of a researcher, an educator, an innovator upon whom falls the responsibility of disseminating their research findings about the crime phenomenon, the social, economic and family conditions that breed or promote crime, about the sociological, psychological and soci- ocultural factors that predispose to criminal behavior, about the social/ psychological make-up of offenders and victims, about victim/target selection, the dynamics of criminal behavior, the relationships/interac- tions between offenders and victims, about the impact of victimization and the consequences of becoming victim, etc., etc. CONCLUSION Criminology's stagnation, lack of innovation and its slow adaptation to the realities of the 21* century is threatening its very existence as it riskxs becoming irrelevant to the threats facing post 9/11 society, namely the flagrant abuses of power and the serious violations of human rights and civil liberties. The politics of expansion have not been beneficial to criminology. Retrenchment 1s the order of the day. Rather than holding firm to fields and areas that do not belong to, or are only at the distant periphery of the discipline, criminology should take a bold step and make a number of territorial concessions that would ensure its safe return to its natural and logical subject-matter. If criminology is to gain in stature and prestige it has to shed its undeserved European reputation as an auxiliary branch of the criminal law and its American reputation as a sub-field of sociology. It has to fight and correct the misperception that it is a peripheral discipline at the bottom heap of the social sciences. It has co affirm its scientific nature, its own identity, its originality, and its autonomy. It has to affirm its specificity, its objectivity and its neutrality. It has to dissociate itself from the criminal law and to divorce itself from criminal policy. And finally the time seems to have come to separate the teaching of —— 157 criminology from the teaching of other professional fields such as law, law enforcement, criminal justice, etc. in the same way that medicine 1s taught separately from nursing and the science of economics is taught separately from the professional discipline of accounting. EPILOGUE ! certainly hope I did not sound too critical or too pessimistic! If I did then let me end on a positive and optimistic note by highlighting what I believe is a very positive and promising trend. Forty years ago ! expressed my hope (or call it a dream if you wish) that I will live to see the end of the punitive society. Well, although I have lived long enough this has not yet happened. And yet there is no doubt in my mind that despite recent setbacks, modern societies will continue their inevitable march towards a punishment-free society. Decades, may be centuries from now, future generations will look back upon our current punitive prac- tices, like imprisonment, with the same horror that we feel when we examine medieval practices that have disappeared from the arsenal of penal sanctions in modern society. Historians will have a hard time explaining how a civilized society, for example, the United States, con- tinued to execute people well in the 21* century, or how drug addicts and sexual predators, to give only a couple of examples, were left to languish in prison rather than being placed in proper treatment facilities. With the advent of the non-punitive society disciplines like penology or the sociol- ogy of punishment will become obsolete and will be turned into historical studies. In recent years we have witnessed the emergence of peaceful, non- violent, and non punitive methods of dispute settlement and conflict res- olution. The practice of what has become to be known as “Restorative Justice” is spreading like wildfire. It is perhaps the most encouraging trend I have witnessed in my lifetime. And the trend will continue not only because it is the natural way of solving human and social conflicts but also because the institution of punishment is based on faulty premises and suffers from inherent and insoluble ethical and equity problems ( Fat- tah 1982; 1995; 2002; 2003). And more important still is that it is an archaic and anachronistie practice. The secularization of society, the rec- ognition of human diversity, the liberalization of attitudes towards devi- ance and human misbehavior, the pursuit of cost-effective social policies and practices, have rendered the metaphysical notion of retribution and the theological concepts of expiation and atonement anachronistic and anathematic to contemporary thinking (Fattah, 2008). ÀA non-punitive society is possible and feasible and Greenland Criminal Code is a good example. But restorative justice will end up imposing itself because it is a constructive mode of dealing with human conflicts and is a better sys- — 158 — tem for victims, offenders and society. It ensures that the harm done is repaired, that the chances of future victimization are minimized, and is an excellent tool for closure and healing. But in order to succeed in replacing current punitive practices it needs your endorsement and your support and I urge all of you to stand behind it and to give it that much needed support. TABLEAU 1 : PROPOSED MODEL FOR THE TEACHING OF CRIMINOLOGY AND RELATED DISCIPLINES (ABBREVIATED) Graduate Level Law v Law Schools/ Prerequisite : Undergraduate degree preferably in the Faculties Social Sciences (Sociology, psychology, v political Science, economics); or the human sciences; Bachelor degree in Criminal Justice; etc. LL.B.: LL.L.: Training : stand- Standard Legal training + basic courses M.L.; J.D. ard law curricu- in Criminology, Penology, Criminal lum Policy, Victimology; Restorative Jus- tice, Forensic Sciences, etc. Criminology v Departments of Prerequisite : Undergraduate Degree in one of the Criminology Social Sciences (Sociology, Psychology, Political Science, Economics); a Law Degree; a Bachelor Degree in Criminal Justice; etc. M.A.: Ph.D. Training : Advanced courses/seminars in Crimi- Research & the- nology &Victimology. Focus on quali- ory oriented tative & quantitative research methods, hypothesis-testing, theory formulation, assessment & evaluation, design and innovation; etc. Thesis/Dissertation Undergraduate Level Criminal Justice Prerequisite : High School Diploma or the equivalent v Schools of Crim- Training : Mainly professional with three possible inal Justice orientations : — 159 — TABLEAU 1 : PROPOSED MODEL FOR THE TEACHING OF CRIMINOLOGY AND RELATED DISCIPLINES (ABBREVIATED) v Bachelor of C.J. Focus on correctional practice (empha- Grounding in v criminology sis on skill development, interpersonal M.C.J. & D.C.J &other social communication, etc.) sciences. Exten- b) Focus on Restorative Justice Prac- sive knowledge tices. & analysis of the Focus on Administration & Planning CIS (emphasis on Management and Administration; human resources; information systems, budgeting; etc., etc.) Policingl Law Prerequisite : High School Diploma or the equivalent Enforcement v Police Colleges Training : Mainly vocational : Standard Police Justice Institutes curriculum + Introductory Criminology & Social Science courses. Victimology ; Crime prevention; Courses related to security issues; Courses on Human Rights & Civil Liberties. Criminalistics ; Forensic Science; Criminal Investigation:; interrogation ; etc. Diplomas (For a detailed Certificates curriculum see Fattah 1998 & 1999). REFERENCES BIANCHI, H. (1956) Position and Subject-Matter of Criminology : Inquiry Con- cerning Theoretical Criminology. Amsterdam : North Holland Publishing. CHRISTIE, N. (1971) “Criminologist : Technician or Poet?” Scandinavian Studies in Criminology. Vol. 3, pp. 140-45. Oslo : Universitetsforlaget. DURKHEIM, E. (1956) Reprint. The Division of Labor in Society. New York : The Free Press. FATTAH, E.A. (1982) “Making the Punishment fit the Crime : The Case of Impris- onment. Problems Inherent in the use of Imprisonment as a Retributive Sanc- tion”. Canadian Journal of Criminology. 24 :1, pp.1-12. FATTAH, E.A. (1992) “Beyond Metaphysics : The Need for a New Paradigm. On Actual and Potential Contributions of Criminology and the Social Sciences to the Reform of the Criminal Law”. In R. LAHTI and K. NUoTIo (eds.) Criminal Law Theory in Transition, Helsinki : Finnish Lawyers Publishing Company. — 160 — FATTAH. E.A. (1993a) “La Relativité Culturelle de la Victimisation”, Criminolo- gie, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, pp.121-36. FATTAH, E.AÀ. (1993b) “From a Guilt Orientation to a Consequence Orientation”. In F. DENKER et. al. (eds.). Beiträge zur Rechtswissenschaft. Heidelberg. C.F. Muller. FATTAH, E.A. (1995) “Restorative and Retributive Justice Models : À Compari- son”. In H-H. KÜHNE (ed.) Festschrift für Koichi Miyazawa. Baden-Baden : Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, pp. 305-15. FATTAH, E.À. (1997) Criminology : Past, Present and Future. London : Macmil- lan. N.Y. St. Martin's Press Inc. FATTAH, E.À. (1998) “Some Reflections on Police Education and Training in the Developing Countries in the 21* Century”. Proceedings of the Internatiional Conference on Police Science. UAR : Sharjah Police.- FATTAH, E.À. (1999) “Algunas Reflexiones Sobre Educaciôn y Entrenamiento de la Policia en los Paises en Desarrollo en el Siglo XXI”. Cuadernos de Crimi- nologia (Santiago), No. 9, pp. 25-44. FATTAH, E.A. (2002) “From Philosophical Abstraction to Restorative Action - From Senseless Retribution to Meaningful Restitution. Just Desert and Restorative Justice revisited”. In H.J. KERNER and E. WEITEKANP (eds.), Restorative Justice, Theoretical Foundations, Willan Publishing, Culmcott House, Devon, U.K.. pp. 308-21. FATTAH, E.A. (2003) “Gearing Justice Action to Victim Satisfaction. Contrasting Two Justice Philosophies : Retribution and Redress”. In Hendrik KAPTEIN & Marijke MALSCH (eds.) Crime, Victims and Justice - Essays on Principles and Practice. Burlington, VT : Ashgate Publishing Company. FATTAH, E.À. (2007) “Is punishment the appropriate response to gross human rights violations? Is a non-punitive justice system feasible?” In Restorative Justice : Politics, Policies and Prospects. Eds.: E. VAN DER SPUY, S. PARMEN- TIER, À. DissEL. Published under the auspices of the Faculty of Law, Univer- sity of Cape Town. (JUTA and Co). GILLIN, J.L. (1926) Criminology and Penology. New York : Century Co. KORN, R.R. & MCCORKLE, L.W. (1959) Criminology and Penology. N.Y.: Holt, Reinhart and Wilson. LAMER, À. (1978) “Criminal Justice A Total Look”. Canadian Journal of Crim- inology. 20 : 2, pp. 126-41. MANNHEIM, H. (1965) Comparative Criminology. London : Routledge and Kegan Paul. PiccA, G. (2007) XV Congrès Mondial de Criminologie : entre passé et avenir. Annales Internationales de Criminologie. Vol. 45, nos. 1/2, pp. 7-10. SELLIN, T. (1938) Culture Conflict and Crime. N.Y.: Social Science Research Council. — 161 — ADDENDUM IN DEFENSE OF CRIMINOLOGY ÀA RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR DAVID GARLAND°’S ORAL PRESENTATION AT THE OPENING SESSION OF THE XV" INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF CRIMINOLOGY IN BARCELONA, SPAIN, JULY 2008 Following professor Garland’s inaugural speech at the opening ses- sion of the Congress no time and no opportunity was allowed for ques- tions, comments or discussion. I had no chance to intervene or to express my disagreement with the views he offered about criminology. When I was given the podium as the last plenary speaker I felt obliged, before presenting my own views about criminology, to respond to Pro- fessor Garland’s opinions. Unfortunately, Professor Garland was not present at the last session as he had to leave the day before. Otherwise it would have been really interesting to engage in a fruitful debate about criminology and its future and to get valuable feedback from the audi- ence. Às time was at a premium throughout the Congress my response to Professor Garland could only be very brief and here is what I said : By a stroke of genius, Professor Garland was scheduled as the first plenary speaker and I was scheduled to be the last. This ensured that congress participants whose patience and perseverance brought them to this last plenary session will be given a chance to assess and to choose between two very different visions of what criminology 1s all about, where it is heading, what it ought to become, and where its future lies. What professor Garland’s presentation and mine have in common 1s that they are both critical of the current state of criminology and both have the best interests of criminology at heart. But as much as I enjoyed listening to his brilliant presentation I must confess that my views differ markedly from his. To react and to respond to his views let me refresh your memory by reiterating some of the points he made based on the notes I took (and I do hope they are an accurate reflection of what he said) so that you may be able to see to what extent our positions diverge. Professor Garland does not seem to believe in the autonomy of crim- inology and suggests that criminology has nothing to gain by being taught in a separate administrative structure. He eloquently outlined what he sees as the dangers inherent in such a model. With all due respect for Professor Garland’s view, it does in my opinion overlook the compelling reasons that led to such development from the 1960’s on. Independent, autonomous departments and schools of criminology emerged precisely because the traditional way of having 1t taught in law schools, in sociology or psychology departments, was proven to be a — 162 — hindrance rather than an asset. It was a major hurdle in the way of the development and progress of an interdisciplinary science of criminology. This is because it was the negation of the multidisciplinarity of crimi- nology. It ensured that instead of coming of age and flourishing on its own, it remained in a state of dependency on the older discipline, be it law, sociology, psychology or else. Criminology is a science of synthesis (science de synthèse). How would it be possible for a synthesis science to develop, advance and flourish in a unidiscipliary setting? And how logical is it to teach a syn- thesis science in a unidisciplinary setting?? The movement towards autonomous Departments and Schools of Criminology was simply a successful attempt to affirm its maturity and to liberate it from remaining an auxiliary branch of criminal law or a subfield of sociology and to allow it to advance, develop and thrive on its own. Professor Garland’s argument that instead of becoming a dis- tinct, autonomous academic subject, criminology should remain close to its constitutive disciplines is an anti-evolutionary argument. The natural historical evolution shows that new and fledging branches of knowledge develop, advance, mature and become disciplines in their own right. In the same way that sociology and psychology, for example, matured and detached themselves from philosophy to become autonomous social sci- ences, criminology has, since its origins late in the 19 century, devel- oped its own distinct subject-matter and has sufficiently matured to detach itself from criminal law, from sociology, psychology, psychiatry, medicine, etc. But there are many other points of disagreement between me and professor Garland. He seems to favor a policy-oriented governmental criminology and to advocate what in the 1970’s and the 1980’s used to be called “administrative criminology” . He sees criminology’s main role as policy advisor, as a discipline that serves and furthers govern- ment interests. This, for him, is the “raison d’être” of criminology. He unequivocally stated, and I am quoting, that “criminology would cease to exist were it not for its capacity to deliver the goods to the govern- ment”. He is critical of the position of Stan Cohen, John Hagan, Nils Christie and others who called for a detached, disengaged criminology. My position is exactly the opposite of his as you will sse when I present to you my personal views and my arguments for divorcing scientific criminology from criminal policy, citing illustrious criminologists of the 20' century like T. Sellin and H. Mannheim. C) Administrative criminology is à term used to describe an uncritical criminology whose main focus is to study crime-related issues that politicians and administrators deem worthy of research; a criminology whose main role 1s to provide information and may be advice to governmental authorities. — 163 — If I remember correctly, Professor Garland called criminology an esoteric subject and he seems to think that criminology, being a prob- lem-centered discipline, does not have the potential of reaching a high rank or a high status among the social sciences. I respectfully disagree. The fact that medicine is multidisciplinary and is also centered on a problem, namely sickness and disease, did not stop it from reaching a high rank among other sciences. Another difference between us has to do with the future of criminol- ogy. Professor Garland seems to favor an expansionist criminology. In contrast, I take a purist position that calls for a sharp retrenchment of the subject-matter of criminology. Unfortunately, because of severe time constraints I am unable to continue citing my disagreements with professor Garland, for example my disagreement with his claim that criminology is a contested subject with a low epistemological threshold. But to conclude these very brief comments on his paper let me just mention our divergent views on the training of criminologists. If I understood him correctly, he is not in favor of specialization. Actually he calls it “specialism” and feels it can have a negative effect on general communication. I could not disagree more because as you will see, specialization 1s actually the “Leitmotiv” of my paper. SUMMARY The paper stresses the need for a concise, non-polemical definition of criminology and offers one that emphasizes its empirical, non-specula- tive and non-normative nature and that restricts its subject-matter. The paper asserts that attempts to broaden the scope of criminology and to stretch its subject-matter have been detrimental to the discipline. They have led criminology astray. It argues therefore for a retrenchment and calls on criminology to make territorial concessions and to restrict its field of research to the pursuit of scientific knowledge about crime, offenders and victims. In line with this, the paper calls for separating criminology from the normative/dogmatic discipline of criminal law, from the political/ideological field of criminal policy and from the pro- fessional areas of criminal justice that are simply users of criminological knowledge. The paper argues that there is no logic, rationale or compelling rea- son dictating that the study of social reaction to crime, the study of making, unmaking and remaking the laws, be part and parcel of the empirical, non-normative science of criminology. Ît argues that there 1s no sound rationale for considering distinct disciplines such as penology — 164 — or the sociology of punishment as branches of criminology. One of the questions it asks is “why should a practical, legal exercise like sentencing be part of a science of crime?” The call for criminology to detach itself from criminal policy and to devote itself to the scientific pursuit of knowledge about crime, offend- ers and victims logically leads to questioning current attempts to divorce victimology from criminology and to claim it to be an autonomous dis- cipline it its own right. The paper laments the fact that in their mission- ary zeal victim advocates have killed any hope for victimology to develop into a truly scientific, objective, non-partisan discipline. They navigated it towards becoming a branch of social work. Since social work is not a science but a profession, the only hope for victimology to reclaim the status of a scientific discipline 1s to detach itself from victim policy and to revert to its original position as an integral branch of criminology. Following this, the paper calls attention to the basic differences between “sciences” and “‘professional disciplines”. Criminology, it main- tains, is a social/behavioral science. Criminal justice, policing, correc- tions, probation and parole supervision, after-care are not sciences. They are professions. The relationship of criminal justice to criminology is not dissimilar to that between nursing and medicine. Though related in some ways, they are distinct. Criminal justice is concerned with the “HOW” questions. Criminology's main preoccupation is with the “WHY” questions. The distinction between criminology as a social/ behavioral science and criminal justice as a profession and the need to teach them in separate settings, with different curricula, has long been recognized and is the dominant model in North America. There are uni- versity departments of criminology that have a theoretical and research focus and there are schools (or programs) of criminal justice as well as police colleges that have applied, practical, vocational and technological orientations. The paper then examines at length the fundamental differences between the social/behavioral science of criminology and the normative/ dogmatic discipline of criminal law. It stresses the autonomy of crimi- nology and refutes the popular, yet fallacious argument that criminol- ogy’s subject-matter is determined and circumscribed by the criminal law. It goes on to show why teaching criminology and criminal law under the same roof and within the same administrative structure 1s det- rimental to the development and advancement of criminology. Stressing criminology’s nature as a multidisciplinary, synthesis science it asks how could a synthesis science advance, develop and flourish in a unidiscipli- nary setting? This leads to the argument that the optimal setting for teaching criminology is autonomous multidisciplinary departments at — 165 — the graduate level. And the paper follows this up by proposing an abbreviated model for the teaching of criminology and related disci- plines. To conclude the paper affirms that Criminology’s stagnation, lack of innovation and its slow adaptation to the realities of the 21* century is threatening its very existence as it risks becoming irrelevant to the threats facing post 9/11 society, namely the flagrant abuses of power and the serious violations of human rights and civil liberties. To avoid such distressing scenario, the paper suggests that if criminology is to gain in stature and prestige it has to shed its undeserved European reputation as an auxiliary branch of the criminal law and its American reputation as a sub-field of sociology. It has to fight and correct the misperception that it is a peripheral discipline at the bottom heap of the social sciences. It has to affirm its scientific nature, its own identity, its originality, and its autonomy. It has to affirm its specificity, its objectivity and its neu- trality. It has to dissociate itself from the criminal law and to divorce itself from criminal policy. And finally the time seems to have come to separate the teaching of criminology from the teaching of other profes- sional fields such as law, law enforcement, criminal justice, etc. in the same way that medicine is taught separately from nursing and the sci- ence of economics is taught separately from the professional discipline of accounting. RÉSUMÉ L’auteur insiste dans cet article sur la nécessité d’offrir une définition de la criminologie qui soit concise et non polémique, et en propose une qui met en évidence sa nature empirique, non spéculative et non norma- tive et qui restreint son objet. L'’article fait valoir que les tentatives d’élargir le champ de la criminologie et d’étirer son objet ont porté pré- judice à la discipline. Elles l’ont amené à s’égarer. Il plaide dès lors en faveur d’une réduction et invite la criminologie à faire des concessions territoriales et à restreindre son champ de recherche à la poursuite d’une connaissance scientifique à propos du crime, des auteurs et des victimes. Dans cette ligne, le texte invite à séparer la criminologie de la discipline normativo-dogmatique du droit criminel, du domaine politico-idéologi- que de la politique criminelle, et des zones professionnelles de la justice criminelle qui ne font que faire usage des connaissances criminologiques. Le texte argumente qu'il n’y a aucune raison logique, rationnelle ou contraignante que l’étude de la réaction sociale au crime, l’étude de l’éla- boration, de l’abrogation ou de la transformation du droit, fasse partie intégrante de la science non normative, empirique, de la criminologie. L’auteur argue qu’il n’y a guère de saine rationalité à considérer des dis- — 166 — ciplines distinctes comme la pénologie ou la sociologie de la peine, comme des branches de la criminologie. L'une des questions qu’il pose est : “Pourquoi un exercice juridique comme le sentencing devrait-il faire partie d'une science du crime?” L'invitation à la criminologie de se détacher de la politique criminelle et de se consacrer à la recherche de la connaissance sur le crime, les cri- minels et les victimes conduit logiquement à mettre en question les ten- tatives de faire divorcer la victimologie de la criminologie et de réclamer pour elle le statut de discipline autonome et indépendante. Le texte déplore le fait que dans leur zèle missionnaire les avocats de la victime ont tué tout espoir pour la victimologie de se développer en une disci- pline véritablement scientifique, objective, non partisane. Ils l’ont fait naviguer vers les rives d’une branche du travail social. Comme le travail social n'est pas une science mais une profession, le seul espoir pour la victimologie de réclamer le statut de discipline scientifique est de se déta- cher de la politique criminelle et d’en revenir à sa position originale de branche intégrale de la criminologie. Suivant cela, le texte appelle l’attention sur les différences de base entre “sciences” et “disciplines professionnelles”. La criminologie, sou- tient-il, est une science de la société et du comportement. La justice cri- minelle, la police, l’enfermement, la probation, la libération condition- nelle et la post-cure ne sont pas des sciences. Ce sont des professions. La relation entre justice criminelle et criminologie n’est pas différente de celle qui distingue les soins infirmiers de la médecine. Bien que reliés de certaines façons, 1ls sont distincts. La justice criminelle se pose des ques- tions de l’ordre du “comment”. La criminologie, pour l’essentiel, de l’ordre du “pourquoi’. La distinction entre la criminologie comme science du social et du comportemental et la justice criminelle comme profession, et la nécessité de les enseigner dans des infrastructures sépa- rées, avec des curriculums différents, est depuis longtemps reconnue et représente en Amérique du nord le modèle dominant. Il existe des départements universitaires de criminologie, qui ont un objectif de théo- risation et de recherche, et il y a des écoles (ou programmes) de justice criminelle et des colleges de police qui ont des orientations appliquées, pratiques, professionnelles et technologiques. Le texte se poursuit par l’'examen approfondi des différences fonda- mentales entre la science socio-comportementale qu'’est la criminologie, et la discipline normativo-dogmatique qu'’est le droit criminel. Il souli- gne l'autonomie de la criminologie et réfute l’argument populaire, mais fallacieux suivant lequel l’objet de la criminologie est circonscrit par le droit pénal. Il poursuit en montrant que l’enseignement de la crimino- logie et du droit criminel sous le même toit et au sein de la même struc- ture administrative se fait au détriment du développement et de l’avan- — 167 — cement de la criminologie. Soulignant la nature de la criminologie comme science multidisciplinaire, de synthèse, 1l demande comment une science de synthèse pourrait avancer, se développer et fleurir dans un environnement unidisciplinaire. Ceci mène à l’argument que le meilleur environnement pour l’enseignement de la criminologie est apporté par des départements autonomes multidisciplinaires au niveau de la maîtrise. Et le texte poursuit l’idée en proposant un modèle abrégé pour l’ensei- gnement de la criminologie et des disciplines qui y sont liées. En conclusion, l’auteur pose que la stagnation de la criminologie, le manque d’innovation et la lenteur de son adaptation aux réalités du XXIe siècle menace son existence même, dans la mesure où elle risque de ne plus correspondre aux menaces qui guettent la société de l'après 11 septembre, c’est-à-dire les flagrants abus de pouvoir et les violations sérieuses des droits humains et des libertés civiles. Pour éviter ce scéna- rio désolant, il est suggéré dans le texte que, si la criminologie entend gagner en stature et en prestige, elle doit se dépouiller tant de sa répu- tation européenne imméritée de branche auxiliaire du droit criminel, que de sa réputation américaine de sous-champ de la sociologie. Elle doit combattre et corriger sa perception erronée de discipline périphérique au croupion des sciences sociales. Elle doit affirmer sa nature scientifique, son identité propre, son originalité, et son autonomie. Elle doit affirmer sa spécificité, son objectivité, et sa neutralité. Elle doit se dissocier du droit criminel et divorcer de la politique criminelle. Et enfin, le temps semble venu de séparer l’enseignement de la criminologie d'autres champs professionnels comme le droit, l’application du droit, la justice criminelle, etc., de la même façon que la médecine est enseignée séparé- ment du nursing, et la science économique séparément de la comptabi- lité. RESUMEN En este articulo, el autor insiste en la necesidad de ofrecer una defi- nicion de la criminologia que sea concisa y no polémica y propone otra que evidencia su naturaleza empirica, no especulativa y no normativa y que restringe su objeto. El articulo destaca que los intentos de ampliar el campo de la criminologia y de extender su objeto han perjudicado a la disciplina. La han conducido a difuminarse. Por lo tanto, defiende una reducciôn e invita a la criminologia a hacer concesiones territoriales y a restringir su campo de investigaciôn a la büsqueda de un conoci- miento cientifico sobre el crimen, los autores y las victimas. En esta linea, el texto invita a separar la criminolgia de la disciplina normativo- dogmâtica del derecho penal, del campo politico-ideolôgico de la poli- — 168 — tica criminal y de las zonas profesionales de la justicia penal que ünica- mente utilizan los conocimientos criminolégicos. El texto argumenta que no existe ninguna razôn lôgica, racional u obligatoria para que el estudio de la reacciôn social al delito y el estudio de la elaboraciôn, de la derogaciôn o de la transformaciôn del derecho formen parte integrante de la ciencia no normativa y empirica de la cri- minologia. El autor arguye que no hay mucho de sana racionalidad en considerar como ramas de la criminologia a la penologia o la sociologia de la pena. Una de las cuestiones que plantea es la siguiente : “; Por qué un ejercicio juridico como el sentencing deberia formar parte de una ciencia del crimen?” La invitacion a la criminologia de separarse de la politica criminal y de consagrarse a la investigaciôn sobre el conocimiento del crimen, los delincuentes y las victimas conduce lôgicamente a cuestionar las tenta- tivas de divorciar la victimologia de la criminologia y de reclamar para ella el estatus de disciplina autônoma e independiente. El texto lamenta el hecho de que el celo de los abogados de la victima haya hecho des- aparecer toda esperanza para la victimologia de desarrollarse como una disciplina verdaderamente cientifica, objetiva y no partidista. Ellos la han conducido hacia una rama del trabajo social. Como el trabajo social no es una ciencia sino una profesiôn, la ünica esperanza para la victimologia de reclamar el estatus de disciplina cientifica es separarse de la politica criminal y de volver a su posiciôn original de rama integral de la criminologia. En consecuencia, el texto llama la atenciôn sobre las diferencias de base entre “ciencias” y “disciplinas profesionales”. La criminologia —sos- tiene el autor — es una ciencia de la sociedad y del comportamiento. La justicia penal, la policia, el encarcelamiento, la probation, la libertad condicional y la curaciôn posterior no son ciencias. Son profesiones. La relaciôn entre la justicia penal y la criminologia no es diferente de aque- lla que distingue la atenciôn médica de la medicina. Aunque relaciona- dos en cierta forma, son distintos. La justicia penal se plantea cuestiones relativas al “como”. La criminologia, esencialmente, relativas al “por qué”. La distinciôn entre la criminologia como ciencia de lo social y de lo comportamental y la justicia penal como profesiôn y la necesidad de enseñarlas en infraestructuras separadas, con curriculos diferentes, se reconoce desde hace tiempo y representa el modelo dominante en Amé- rica del norte. Existen departamentos universitarics de criminologia, que tienen un objetivo de teorizaciôn y de investigaciôn y existen escuelas (0 programas) de justicia penal y colegas de la policia que tienen orienta- ciones aplicadas, prâäcticas, profesionales y tecnolôgicas. Prosigue el texto con el examen profundo de las diferencias funda- mentales entre la ciencia socio-comportamental que es la criminologia y — 169 — la disciplina normativo-dogmâtica que es el derecho penal. Subraya la autonomia de la criminologia y rechaza el argumento popular, pero falaz, segûn el cual el objeto de la criminologia se circunscribe por el derecho penal. Continua mostrando que la enseñanza de la criminologia y del derecho penal bajo el mismo techo y en el seno de la misma estruc- tura administrativa se realiza en detrimento del desarrollo y del avance de la criminologia. Subrayando la naturaleza de la criminologia como ciencia multidisciplinar, de sintesis, se pregunta cômo una ciencia de sin- tesis podria avanzar, desarrollarse y florecer en un entorno unidiscipli- nar. Ello conduce al argumento de que el mejor entorno para la ense- fnanza de la criminologia se aporta por departamentos autônomos multidisciplinares en el nivel del ültimo curso. Y el texto prosigue la idea proponiendo un modelo abreviado para la enseñanza de la criminologia y de las disciplinas que estän relacionadas con ella. En conclusiôn, el autor sostiene que el estancamiento de la crimino- logia, la falta de innovaciôn y la lentitud de su adaptaciôn a las reali- dades del siglo XXI amenaza su propia existencia, en la medida en la que corre el riesgo de no corresponder ya a las amenazas que acechan a la sociedad de después del 11 de septiembre, es decir, a los flagrantes abusos de poder y a las serias violaciones de los derechos humanos y libertades civiles. Para evitar este escenario desolador, se sugiere en el texto que, si la criminologia pretende ganar en estatura y en prestigio, debe despojarse tanto de su desmerecida reputaciôn europea de rama auxiliar del derecho penal como de su reputaciôn americana de sub- campo de la sociologia. Debe combatir y corregir su errônea percepciôn de disciplina periférica como ültimo eslabôn de las ciencias sociales. Debe afirmar su naturaleza cientifica, su propia identidad, su originali- dad y su autonomia. Debe afirmar su especificidad, su objetividad y su neutralidad. Debe disociarse del derecho penal y divorciarse de la poli- tica criminal. Finalmente, parece que ya ha llegado el momento de sepa- rar la enseñanza de la criminologia de otros campos profesionales como el derecho, la aplicaciôon del derecho, la justicia penal, etc., de la misma manera que la medicina se enseña separadamente del rursing y la ciencia econômica separadamente de la contabilidad. — 170 — PREMIO HERMAN MANNHEIM : PROF. ESTHER GIMENEZ-SALINAS I COLOMER Tony Peters !) En nombre de la Sociedad International de Criminologia, tengo el gran honor de otorgar el Premio Herman Mannheim, del “Centre Inter- national de Criminologie comparée” de l'Université de Montreal, a la exelentisima Rectora y Profesora Esther Gimenez-Salinas 1 Colomer. Ese premio se otorga a una persona por la totalidad de una carera prestigiosa y excepcional en servicio del desarrollo de la criminologia como ciencia interdisciplinaria, teôrica y socio-empirica. Esther Gimenez-Salinas 1 Colomer, ha estudiado el derecho y la psi- cologia aplicada. Ha obtenido el diploma de licenciatura en derecho de la Universidad de Barcelona en 1971, de psicologia aplicada en 1976 y de Doctor en Derecho Penal en 1978, ambos de la misma Universidad de Barcelona. Muy tipico para Esther ha sido siempre y desde muchos anos su carera mixta, combinando puestos de profesor y catedrâtica de Derecho penal, de derecho penitenciaro y criminologia con muy altas cargas administrativos como Directora General del Centre d’Estudis Juridics 1 Formaciô Especialitzada del Departamento de Justicia de la Generalitat de Catalunya y cargas judiciales como Vocal del Consejo General del Poder Judicial. Desde 2002 Esther es Rectora de la Universidad Ramon Llull. Esa mayor responsabilidad académica implica en este momento su partici- pacion profunda en el proyecto Europea de la reforma fundamental de los programas académicos de estudios en casi todas las disciplinas incluido los programas académicos de criminologia. La larga experiencia de Esther con los estudios de Derecho y Crimi- nologia, sus reconocidas capacidades de liderazgo en sus contactos humanos con los colegas y la gran profesionalidad con que ella siempre la podido movilizar y aplicar “los conocimientos académicos” en los terenos sociales los mâs dificiles como “la justicia para menores” “la jus- ticia penal” y la “ejecuciôn de las penas privativas de libertad”, le ase- guran una fuerza intelectual y una plataforma socio-institucional de apoyo para realizar con éxito reformas fundamentales. ( Prof. Dr. — 171 — Con ella y con un gran numero de sus colegas muy motivados esta- mos convencidos de que en España como en algunos otros paises de Europa, la criminologia esta desarollandose plenamente y va establecerse con un perfil académico adulto. El existo de eso proceso recibirâ los respaldos decisivos de la gran personalidad cientifica de la lauréate del premio Mannheim. Esther Gimenez tiene una lista impresionante de publicaciones mono- grâficas y aportaciones certificas en libros y revistas. Los titulos nos ensenan sus diferentes especialidades en materias como la justicia para menores, el derecho penitenciario, la penologia, la prevenciôn y ya desde mäs de una década su interés para la justicia reparadora. Esther tiene una larga experiencia de investigacion cientifica en que ella reûne el anâlisis y el desarrollo de la aproximaciôn norma- tiva con la del socio-empirica. En sus textos se muestra ademâs un constante interés para el anâlisis internacional comparativo. Su dominaciôn de cuatro lenguas y sus estancias de larga duracion en centros académicos, en Alemania, Francia y los EEUU, se han con- vertido en aportaciones cientificas importantes. El premio Herman Mannheim del CICC de la Universidad de Mon- treal, otorgado hoy se une a une larga lista de premios que Esther ya ha recibido. Refiero solamente a la medalla de oro, premio “Cesare Beccaria” en reconocimiento de sus meritos por fundar una criminologia cientifica para una politica criminal en España, y Europa, otorgada por la Nue Kriminologishe Gesellschaft con sede en Frankfurt Alemania. Desde mäs de 20 anos conozco personalmente a Esther, y he podido colaborar con ella en muy diferentes termas y iniciativas. Siempre le he admirado por combinacar y integrar perfectamente los mâs altos valores humanos y cientificos. La concesiôn del premio Herman Mannheim, a esa gran Señora y personalidad en nuestra disciplina, marcarâ el inicio de una nueva etapa en la manifestaciôn de la criminologia en España. — 172 — PRIX DURKHEIM : PROFESSEUR HANS-JÜRGEN KERNER Denis Szabo “!) HANS-JÜRGEN KERNER ET LA CRIMINOLOGIE DE LA SECONDE MOITIÉ DU XXF SIECLE Le professeur Hans Jürgen Kerner est né en 1943, dans le village de Herxheim, l’État de Rhineland-Palatina, dans la République Fédérale d’Allemagne. Il n’a pas connu les affres des Européens, et en particulier celles des Allemands d’'après-guerre, dont l’adolescence fut marquée par la deuxième guerre mondiale et la dictature nazie. Période de formation Sa formation secondaire était solide. Le Gymnasium a dispensé l’enseignement du grec classique, du latin et des langues étrangêères : français et anglais. Voici, au départ, de fermes fondations dans la cul- ture européenne! Carrière académique De 1963 à 1967, ses études universitaires furent achevées dans les spé- cialités juridiques et criminologiques, en médecine et en psychiatrie légale, aux universités de Munich, Berlin et de Tübingen. Employé à titre de travailleur social à temps partiel en 1967, au service de nuit auprès des personnes sans domicile fixe, le jeune étudiant découvre le côté sombre de l’existence humaine. Son doctorat en droit (Dr.iur) lui fut octroyé en 1973. Thème : Eva- luation de la validité des statistiques criminelles. Finalement, sa spéciali- sation couvrait, en plus de la criminologie, la justice pénale des mineurs, la procédure pénale et la resocialisation des délinquants. Sa titularisa- tion, intervenue en 1986, couvrait ce vaste domaine. La direction de l’Institut était attachée à la chaire. Cependant, avant de se fixer à Tübin- gen, son Alma-Mater, 1l a assumé les fonctions de conseiller (Rat) à l’université de Bielefeld de 1975 à 1979, d’enseignant aux universités de Hambourg (77-80) et de Heidelberg (80-86). Professeur titulaire, doyen de faculté de Droit, 1l s’établit au sommet de la hiérarchie académique de la République Fédérale aux cours des années 1977 et 1986. (P Professeur émérite, Université de Montréal. Président honoraire de la SIC. — 173 — Rôle international Appelé très tôt à enseigner aux universités étrangères, au Royaume- Uni, aux États-Unis, en Asie, en particulier en Chine et au Japon, 1l se fait connaître à travers le monde. Dans sa patrie, 1l a consolidé la criminologie universitaire par la créa- tion, en 1988, d’une nouvelle société scientifique, la Neue kriminologis- che Gesellschaft. Il préside, dès ses origines, les grandes assises nationa- les panallemandes de la prévention du crime. Répondant aux besoins des criminologues européens, 1l les réunit en association et crée la Société européenne de criminologie. Il en est le premier président. On le voit présent partout où se développe la criminologie, 1l assume partout les fonctions de direction et de coordination. Rappelons simplement que, depuis 1985, 1l est membre des organes directeurs de notre Société, la Société internationale de criminologie. Il y co-organise des congrès mondiaux à Hambourg, Budapest, Vienne et Séoul. Il est notre prési- dent de 1995 à 1999. Il a sûrement bien mérité de la criminologie et de la Société internationale de criminologie! Publications Parmi ses publications scientifiques, on relève 33 livres, manuels et monographies, 34 livres publiés sous sa direction et quelques 215 con- tributions à des ouvrages collectifs. Plusieurs sont traduits en français, en italien, en espagnol et en chinois. Entre 1973 et 2008, les grandes pro- blématiques stratégiques fondamentales de la deuxième moitié du XX° siècle ont été abordées. D’'abord le problème du langage scientifique, capital pour une discipline à la lisière des sciences de la vie, des sciences humaines, des sciences sociales et politiques, ainsi que du droit pénal! Il est auteur et coauteur de plusieurs dictionnaires. La réforme de la justice des mineurs était la cause célèbre de sa géné- ration. Tout le monde a souhaité le développement des programmes de prévention, d’éducation, de resocialisation, corrigeant les effets souvent néfastes de l’enfermement et de la répression. De nombreux ouvrages individuels et collectifs ont été consacrés à ce grand sujet. L’interpréta- tion des statistiques criminelles fut une autre cause célèbre des années d'après-guerre. La validité des statistiques criminelles, émanant des ser- vices publics, se posait. Il fallait préciser de quoi on parle : grand sujet de débat dans les milieux criminologiques de l’après-guerre. Les rela- tions entre victimes et auteurs d’agressions ont été approfondies et dif- férentes méthodes ont été proposées pour introduire la victime dans le processus de resocialisation des criminels. Plusieurs de ses ouvrages ont été consacrés à la justice restauratrice. Sur le plan théorique et métho- dologique, les études de cohortes ont connu des innovations importantes — 174 — et connurent une grande popularité à la suite des travaux-pionniers de Sellin et de Wolfgang. Notre lauréat y a apporté des contributions remarquées. À l’horizon des décennies du XXI* siècle, les gangs des jeu- nes violents ainsi que les problèmes de la sécurité interne et externe de l’Etat, retiennent l'attention de la communauté internationale. Il s’y engage résolument. Plusieurs dizaines d’ouvrages et plus de 200 contributions à des ouvrages collectifs embrassent tous les grands défis auxquels est con- frontée la jeune criminologie d’après-guerre. C’est pour cela qu’on peut dire, en toute confiance, que l’œuvre du professeur Hans Jürgen Kerner embrasse les grandes questions scientifiques, stratégiques et politiques de la criminalité et de la justice pénale de l’après-guerre; en d’autres termes, de la seconde moitié du XX* siècle. On ne peut qu’être impressionné par la qualité et la quantité de cet immense labeur qui fut cependant large- ment reconnu par la communauté scientifique internationale et natio- nale. Ainsi, notre lauréat reçut de nombreux prix et distinctions qui doi- vent bien remplir une grande vitrine dans la maison familiale de Keltengrab, près de Tübingen. Famille Une telle carrière ne se conçoit point sans une famille assurant la paix de l’âme et le bonheur domestique. L'amour et le soutien d’Anna, son épouse, le confortent dans son rôle de père auprès de Mathias, d'Eva-Maria et Anna Lena, ses enfants. Ils ont leur part dans le succès et la carrière exceptionnelle et brillante de Hans! À-t-il trop travaillé? Une anecdote éclairera peut être le rayonnement exceptionnel de notre lauréat. Lors d’une réception à Berlin, avant la première guerre mondiale, le chancelier Bethman-Hollweg interpella l’ambassadeur de France, l’illustre François Ponçet, un verre de champagne à la main : « Dites moi, Monsieur l'ambassadeur, pourquoi sommes-nous si peu popu- laires, nous autres Allemands, en Europe” Pourquoi ne nous aime-t-on pas?». La réponse tient en trois mots, réplique l’ambassadeur en souriant : « Vous travaillez trop …». Prosit! Et bien, sans conteste, Hans Jürgen Kerner a aussi travaillé trop. On lui connait sans doute des adversaires, mais point d’ennemis. Il est même l’Allemand que tout le monde aime .…aimer! Souvenirs de Alte Hans Pour terminer, jJ'aimerais évoquer un souvenir qui me touche au cœur, celui lié à la personnalité exceptionnelle de Hans Gôppinger, mai- — 175 — tre de la criminologie allemande d’après-guerre. C’est lui qui a appris la rigueur et la discipline du travail scientifique, à travers ses recherches aux confins de la psychiatrie légale, du droit pénal et de la criminologie, aux jeunes de la génération qui ont grandi dans l’après-guerre. Le «junge Hans» y fut apprenti-marmiton auprès de Alte Hans, en compa- gnie, entre autres, de Gunther Kaiser et de Hans Joachim Schneider. * * * Nous honorons aujourd’hui le junge Hans qui est devenu, au fil des ans, le Alte Hans, en lui souhaitant encore de nombreux lauriers cou- ronnant ses contributions à la criminologie et à la coopération interna- tionale. VIVAT! — 176 — PRIX ETIENNE DE GREEFF : LUIS RODRIGUEZ MANZANERA Uberto Gatti Desde muy joven Luis Rodriguez nunca dudô en su afân de ser cri- minoôlogo, fue a ver a su profesor Alfonso Quiroz Cuarôn y le dijo : Doônde puedo estudiar Criminologia?, porque voy a ser el mejor crimi- nôlogo de México. Eso sorprendiô a su maestro quien era entonces el mejor. Mexicano, obtuvo la Licenciatura en Derecho en la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Nacional Autônoma de México, y la Licen- ciatura en Psicologia en el Colegio de Psicologia de la Facultad de Filo- sofia y Letras de la misma Universidad. Realizo el Curso de Perito en Criminalistica en la Procuraduria General de Justicia del Distrito Federal y el Curso de Interrogatorio Criminal y Poligrafo en el Banco de México. Todos estos conocimientos le dieron el alcance interdisciplinario necesario para emprender su for- maciôn como criminôlogo en Roma, Îtalia. Obtuvo el Doctorado en Derecho Penal en la Universitä degli Studi di Roma, y el Diploma de Criminologia Clinica en la Scuola di Specia- lizzazione di Rebibbia, en Roma, Italia, formändose con Benigno Di Tullio. Podemos hablar del Dr. Rodriguez desde tres aspectos bâsicos : Como docente investigador y académico, y como servidor püblico En la Universidad Nacional Autônoma de México fue Director General de Asuntos Juridicos; y, en la Facultad de Derecho de la misma Universidad : Secretario del Doctorado de la Divisiôn de Estudios Supe- riores, Consejero Técnico y Director General del Seminario de Derecho Penal. Es Profesor titular de Criminologia en la Universidad Nacional Autônoma de México, desde 1969, y en la Universidad La Salle desde 1973; ha impartido cursos en varias Universidades de la Repüblica, en el Instituto de Formacion Profesional de la Procuraduria del Distrito Federal y en el Instituto Nacional de Ciencias Penales. Fue Director de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad La Salle de México, durante nueve anños. Ministros, gobernadores, magistrados, procuradores, jueces, lo reco- nocen como su maestro. — 177 — En su actividad internacional, ha dictado cursos y pronunciado con- ferencias en 30 Universidades del extranjero; se ha desempeñado como Experto de Naciones Unidas en prevenciôn del delito y tratamiento del delincuente. Tuvo una intervenciôn decisiva en la redacciôn de las Reglas mini- mas de las Naciones Unidas para la administraciôn de la justicia de menores ("Reglas de Beijing"), asi como en las directrices de Riat, lle- vando su influencia criminolôgica a la prâctica en los contenidos técni- cos de varios los articulos. Normas que mâs tarde impulsô para que fue- ran contenidas en las leyes de menores de México, donde formô parte de diversas comisiones legislativas. Cuenta en su haber 115 articulos publicados en revistas especializa- das y 19 libros, entre los que destacan : “Criminologia”, “Victimologia”, “Penologia”, “Criminalidad de Menores”, “Clâsicos de la Criminolo- gia”, “Criminologia Clinica”, “La Crisis Penitenciaria y los Substitutivos de la Prisiôn”, “ Cômo elige un delincuente a sus victimas?”. Entre las Sociedades Cientificas Nacionales a las que pertenece se pueden mencionar : Académico de Nümero de la Academia Mexicana de Ciencias Penales y de la Academia Mexicana de Criminalistica; y la Sociedad Mexicana de Criminologia, de la que es Presidente. En lo internacional, es miembro de la Sociedad Mundial de Victimo- logia, Delegado Nacional y Miembro de Comité Cientifico de la Socie- dad Internacional de Criminologia y Secretario General Adjunto de la Sociedad Internacional de Defensa Social. Ha recibido diversas distinciones, entre ellas queremos destacar entre las mâs relevantes : En 1997 el reconocimiento Hans von Hentig de la Sociedad Mundial de Victimologia en Amsterdam, Holanda; el Instituto Nacional de Ciencias Penales le otorgô el grado de Doctor Honoris Causa; la Fundaciôn Victimologia de España le otorgô el Premio Inter- nacional de Victimologia y Defensa de las Victimas. Como servidor püblico tuvo la oportunidad de ser director técnico de Reclusorios de la Ciudad de México, con un equipo técnico de mâäs de 300 profesionales, donde puso en prâctica sus conocimientos clinico-cri- minolôgicos, en su afän de entrenar a los consejos y equipos técnicos cri- minolôgicos con instrumentos, particularmente en las âreas biomédicas, psicolôgicas, sociales y criminolôgicas, para la comprensiôn integral del fenômeno criminal. Realizô prognosis y se adentrô en integraciôn de modelos de trata- mientos para la readaptaciôn social y resocializaciôn de los menores infractores y adultos internos. Incluso en una ocasiôn le correspondid ser mediador en un motin en una de las cârceles mâs dificiles de esa ciu- dad — 178 — Dirigiô la Academia Nacional de Seguridad Pûüblica, del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Püblica de la Repüblica Mexicana, apasionado en unificar a todas las academias de policia del pais, labor que fue alta- mente relevante, donde aplicaron examenes de selecciôn a miles de ele- mentos, capacitaron a mandos policiales, y elaboraron perfiles. Esa misma academia conjuntô el esfuerzo de todos las escuelas del poder judicial y la Suprema Corte, para formar a estos profesionales en mate- rias claves, aportändoles conocimientos ademäs de legales, periciales, criminolégicos y victimolôgicos. Dificil combinar la vida profesional con la familiar, pero queremos decir que Luis Rodriguez se casô con la Dra. Maria de la Luz Lima aqui presente, quien fue una de sus destacadas alumnas, y tiene tres exi- tosos hijos profesionales a quienes adora. Luis es uno de esos criminôlogos afortunados que ha podido influir de manera directa en las politicas püblicas de México e indirectamente a través de destacados alumnos que formo. Enhorabuena Doctor por este merecido premio que hoy recibes. — 179 — PREMIO ESPECIAL DEL PRESIDENTE DE LA SIC ® : PROF. M. LUISA C. CORCOY BIDASOLO Tony Peters Querida Mirentxu : Me ha dado muchisimo contento haberte conocido, descubriendo asi a una colega prôxima y con tantas y tan excepcionales cualidades, tal cosa con ocasiôn de este Decimoquinto Congreso Mundial de Crimino- logia. Me honra y, al mismo tiempo, me alegra profundamente poder galar- donarte con el Premio Especial del Presidente de la Sociedad Internacio- nal de Criminologia. Querido Mirentxu, con la señora Rectora y colega Esther, aceptaste la enorme tarea de organizar este Congreso Mundial en Barcelona. Vuestras Universidades han aceptado acoger a la comunidad mun- dial de los criminôlogos durante una semana y la han brindado un entorno académico de muy alto nivel, poniendo a su disposiciôn una infraestructura que le ha permitido desarrollar todos los tipos de activi- dades que requiere un Congreso con unos mil participantes. Hemos recibido de parte de la señora Rectora, Esther Giménez Sali- nas | Colomer, todo el apoyo para que este Congreso pudiera organi- zarse en la mejores condiciones, ademäs de que Esther nos ha abierto muchas puertas que han permitido vincular al Congreso con las mâs importantes y relevantes instituciones de la Sociedad catalana y espa- nola. Mirentxu, con tu equipo has seguido, orientado, desarrollado y supervisado muy de cerca el proyecto del Congreso Mundial. Contigo he podido colaborar literalmente cada dia durante mâs de dos anños. Tuvimos, aunque trabajando en lugares distantes, la misma preocu- paciôn, desarrollando los temas, el contenido y las cosas prâcticas del Congreso. Con tu pequeño equipo has funcionado como un centro de intercam- bio permanente de informaciôn entre las diferentes estucaras de la SIC () XV Congreso Mundial de la Sociedad Internacional de Criminéloga, Barcelona Julio del ano 2008 C Presidente de la Sociedad Internacional de Criminologia. — 181 — y la organizaciôn local en Barcelona, todos responsables de manera con- junta por la puesta en marcha del Congreso. Mi experiencia personal en ese trabajo largo y, de vez en cuando, duro ha sido siempre positiva, pues se dio en contacto directo con una persona muy inteligente, calma, razonable, optimista y siempre dis- puesta a buscar una soluciôn creativa también en situaciones tensas y complicadas. No fue un trabajo simple. Siempre he podido contar con tus virtudes personales y con tus con- vicciones y experiencia académicas para solucionar los problemas, por lo que en ese proceso de colaboraciôn interpersonal, he aprendido a esti- marlas y apreciarlas. Tengo el convencimiento, la certeza de que compartimos plenamente, cada uno en su posiciôn, los valores del proyecto criminolôgico que estamos promoviendo juntos de todo corazôn. Por tu trabajo y compromiso total y sin reserva en este proyecto, te agradezco y te galardono con ese premio especial. En Barcelona (España) el 25 de Julio 2008. 182 —