AIC_2002

ANNALES

INTERNATIONALES DE CRIMINOLOGIE

INTERNATIONAL ANNALS OF CRIMINOLOGY

ANALES

INTERNACIONALES DE CRIMINOLOGIA

> %,

z «

uB

0313

ANNEE 2002 (volume 40-1/2)

ANNALES INTERNATIONALES

DE CRIMINOLOGIE

organe officiel de la Société Internationale de Criminologie

Président : Lawrence SHERMAN (U.S.A.)

Secrétaire général : Georges PICCA (France)

COMITÉ DE REDACTION DES ANNALES

Président : Lawrence W. SHERMAN (U.S.A.)

Président de la Commission scientifique

Secrétaire : Pierre-Henri BOLLE (Suisse)

Secrétaire de la Commission scientifique

Rédacteur en chef : Georges KELLENS (Belgique)

Rédacteurs associés

Luis RODRIGUEZ MANZANERA (Amérique Latine)

Setsuo MIYAZAWA (Asie), Louise SHELLEY (Amérique du Nord)

La rédaction des Annales internationales

de criminologie exprime ses vifs remercie-

ments à Madame Colette Dawance et à

Monsieur Jorge Palma pour leur aide res-

pectivement en anglais et en espagnol.

The IAC editorial staff wishes to thank

Mrs Colette Dawance and Mr Jorge Palma

respectively, for their help in English and

Spanish.

La redacciôn de los AIC expresa sus sin-

ceros agradecimientos a la Señora Colette

Dawance y al Señor Jorge Palma por sus

contribuciones en inglés y en español res-

pectivamente.

Table de matières

Table of contents

Indice

Reducing crime

new challenges? (13"" World Criminology

Congress

Rio de Janeiro, 2003)

G. Picca

. » » e …s + » + » . » + « + + + + + « » + . e + ». = » . e =s e « « e + » « e — e « e — » &

What do we know about crime prevention?

B.C. Welsh, D.P. Farrington, L.W. Sherman, D. Layton

MacKenzie

. . <. + « < » + » » e e + » — « « + e « . . « e « « e e e —s e » + » » © e © — » # à

11

Police co-operation in the fight against transnational crime

P.-H. Bolle

. e ». « e ». < e + s » © e » ». » e » % + e . < « + © « e + s. » e e e » « « « e — « « »

33

Violence et politique criminelle : 63° Cours international de

criminologie (Florianôpolis, Brésil, 28-30 août 2002)

G. Picca

. » e + + » ». + » « + + + — = » » + » « + —s % « e . « * + e e » » « » e + « e » » 6 = » ®

49

El nuevo Derecho penal juvenil español del siglo XXI

J.L. de la Cuesta

« . . + + + + + » 6 + »s + » » e + < » + e « » » e e + — © + 6 © ». — © » = à

53

L'influence (possible) de la recherche criminologique sur la

politique criminelle

À. Selih

. . … + + e + + + = s. + « + e e e + + + « « » + —s + + = »s e « . — + e e » + e « © « » + © à

73

The Nexus

of Organized International

Criminals and

Terrorism

L.1. Shelley

e e e « s. … *. + < e « + » » » + « « « « « « « . e « « » e e » e » e »s » « # + e » © e

85

Situation of and Countermeasures against Money Laudering

in China

Guo Jianan

93

Is Japan still the safest country in the world?

K. Hamai

. +. « —s « « e + « » « e s. » » + . e e « + « e s. . . e e — « « » » e « « < « e e » « ©

129

__ 5 —

REDUCING CRIME : NEW CHALLENGES

(13th World Criminology Congress :

Rio de Janeiro 2003)

Georges Picca (*)

1l. — In ten months’ time, Brazil and the city of Rio de Janeiro, in

its magnificent natural setting, will be hosting the 13th World Criminol-

ogy Congress. The International Criminology Society, which is organis-

ing this event at the invitation of the Brazilian authorities, wants it to

be an opportunity for useful meetings between all those working in their

respective geographical areas and fields for the prevention of crime and

the operation of the criminal justice system

practitioners, judges,

prosecutors,

social

workers,

academics and researchers.

However,

although this congress is intended to review the current state of

knowledge and to promote new strategies for action, it is also designed

for all those in civil society looking for better ways of fostering the social

integration of young people and the reduction of violent crime.

2. - The previous congress, in 1998, was held in Seoul, Korea, and

was attended by more than fifteen hundred participants from seventy

nations. This was the first event of its kind in Asia. Rio de Janeiro

should attract even more participants.

Five years have gone by and the world has changed, with significant

consequences for the development of crime, as foreseen by the theme of

the last congress

« Crime and justice in a changing world ». Crime 1s

posing new challenges to the world of today : transnational organised

crime, criminal networks exploiting prostitution and children trafficking,

corruption and terrorism, cyber-crime, street violence, etc, which is why

the theme of the Rio congress is « Reducing crime and promoting

justice

challenges for science, policy and practice ». We shall both

analyse crime in its evolving forms and offer new avenues and

appropriate strategies for criminal policy. Three discussion topics should

make it possible to come up with directions for action

taking account

of the realities of today's societies, adapting strategies in research and in

criminal and social policies to these realities, developing a forum for

international cooperation.

(*) General Secretary of the International Criminology Society.

7

3. — Crime has become a priority concern in many states, combined

with the need to make the public feel secure. From being a social

phenomenon, crime has now also become a political issue. Ît is therefore

important to take account of this new dimension for the prevention and

control of crime both nationally and transnationally. All too often torn

between the need for effective action and ethical concerns, the criminal

policy choices made in democratic societies lack clarity, undermining

public confidence in the justice system and the police and thereby public

safety. So, without neglecting fundamental research on offenders’ per-

sonalities, more effective strategies must be found to control and, 1f

possible, prevent the offences that harm society. It has to be said that

policy has not always evolved to deal with the constantly changing

trends in crime.

4. — The essential role of the police and the justice system in a con-

stitutional state is to combat 1llegality, to maintain the national consen-

sus around a certain number of values on which society is based and to

consolidate national solidarity. These are the aims on which criminal

policy choices should be based but a sufficiently broad view must be

taken of the development of crime and of the world. Several indicators

should therefore be analysed.

One of these indicators 1s urbanisation, which has been steadily

increasing and is likely to continue. According to UN estimates, the

urban population is likely to be 65 % of the world’s total population in

2025, compared with 40 % in the middle of the last century. Moreover,

industrialisation is no longer confined to industrialised countries : more

than half of the thirty cities with populations exceeding five million are

in developing countries. In most countries, the majority of crime takes

place in the urban environment, as criminology has demonstrated for

many years. In addition, increased mobility and migratory flows have

made social control more difficult and contributed to social exclusion.

The logical deduction must be that in future the demand for public

safety and justice 1s likely to increase.

In the second place, the fact that a large proportion of crime 1s trans-

national makes controlling it more difficult. For most of man's history,

crime was geographically limited simply because of the constraints of

communication. Today, however, organised crime, drugs trafficking and

terrorism often operate more easily internationally than domestically

because of the diversity of criminal legislation and the inadequate judi-

cial cooperation between states. The way the world has developed con-

firms these comments. In Europe, the end of the cold war profoundly

modified the context of crime, opening up new scope for criminal

networks. Globalisation has also offered many new opportunities for

——

e

organised crime, particularly in the financial field, because of the speed

of communications and the development of technology.

In this situation, criminal policy choices have become more difficult.

In constitutional states, they vary between « zero tolerance » and sundry

reforms intended to deal with the saturation of the policing and justice

systems or introduced under pressure from abolitionists. Meanwhile, in

some parts of the world, legalised practices deliberately violate human

rights and physical punishment from another age continues. The search

for effectiveness in criminal policy must find its natural limits with the

need to observe certain ethical standards.

5. — New ideas are appearing in constitutional states such as the

development of victim support, mediation experiments, the notion of

« restorative justice » and the reinforcement of international judicial

cooperation.

Despite the failure observed since the nineteen sixties, in most

rehabilitation programmes prison populations have remained at high

levels even though the number of offenders serving their sentences within

society may have increased. Such alternatives to conventional punish-

ment are seen as less costly, less alienating for the individual and more

in tune with human rights but, in fact, they are less effective in terms

of violent and organised crime. So it is vital to try to reconcile, on one

hand, the demand for public safety, which does not militate in favour

of excessive liberalisation of the penal system, and, on the other, the

increasing influence of the notion of human rights. The economic and

social reality must also be taken into account.

The changes in economically developed societies since the nineteen

fifties tend to show that crime does not fall as a result of more

prosperous, more egalitarian and more liberal societies. The profit

motive is one of the main driving forces behind today's crime, whether

by using the machinery of modern economies or engaging in brutal

violence. However, certain manifestations of crime are also the conse-

quence of badly managed economic development and the resulting social

inequalities. In these different socio-political contexts, the role of

criminology should prove to be more decisive than it is today.

6. - Reducing crime and promoting justice has become a priority

aim for governments because it also increasingly worries the public at

large. So responses must be found to the new challenges, which concern

not just policy but also the operation of the justice system, the police,

social practices and research in criminology. In this respect, the 13th

World Criminology Congress will be a decisive meeting for all specialists

and all those who work in these fields. We hope that they will attend

in large numbers.

_9—

RÉSUMÉ

international

de

L’auteur rappelle

les enjeux du

13° congrès

criminologie, qui se tiendra à Rio de Janeiro du 10 au 15 août 2003, sur

le thème de la réduction du crime et de la promotion de la justice en tant

que défis pour la science, la politique et la pratique.

ABSTRACT

« Reducing crime and promoting justice challenges for science, policy

and practice » is the theme of the 13" World Criminology Congress,

which shall take place in Rio de Janeiro from 10 to 1S Augustus, 2003.

The author outlines the main objectives of this important event.

RESUMEN

El autor recuerda los objetivos fundamentales del 13° congreso inter-

nacional de criminologia, que se llevarä a cabo en Rio de Janeiro del 10

al 15 de agosto de 2003, y cuyo tema serä la reducciôn del crimen y la

promocion de la justicia como desafios para la ciencia, la politica y la

practica.

— 10 -

WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT

CRIME PREVENTION?

Brandon C. Welsh (*)

David P. Farrington (**)

Lawrence W. Sherman (***)

Doris Layton MacKenzie (****)

Unfortunately, « crime prevention today as in the past has a tendency

to be driven more by rhetoric than reality » (Visher and Weisburd,

1998 :238). However, effective public policy and practice needs to be

based on scientific evidence. This is an approach that has garnered much

support in medicine (Millenson, 1997) and other fields dedicated to the

betterment of society. This is not, however, the practice usually adopted

Anecdotal

evidence,

in criminology or criminal justice.

program

favorites of the month, and political ideology seemingly drive much of

the crime policy agenda in the U.S. As a result, we are left with a

patchwork of programs that are of unknown potential in preventing

crime. Crime prevention programs may or may not work or worse yet

may produce harmful results (Dishion et al., 1999). We are not suggest-

ing that the public is being intentionally misled by lawmakers and

policymakers who are funding programs with scientific evidence of inef-

fectiveness, but rather that lawmakers and policymakers are shirking

their responsibility to the taxpaying public by not funding only those

programs with scientific evidence of effectiveness in preventing crime.

Just as new medicines have to be evaluated and shown to be effective

before they are approved for general use, the same should apply to crime

prevention methods.

In writing on the subject of evidence-based policing, Sherman

(1998 :6) noted that, « Most police practice, like medical practice, 1s still

shaped by local custom, opinions, theories, and subjective impressions. »

But « evidence-based policing challenges those principles of decision

making and creates systematic feedback to provide continuous quality

improvement in the achievement of police objectives » (Sherman,

1998 :6). The need for evidence-based practice is obvious to the larger

field of crime prevention, whether through the police, courts, or correc-

(*) Department of Criminal Justice, University of Massachusetts Lowell.

(**) Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge.

(***) Jerry Lee Center of Criminology, University of Pennsylvania.

(****) Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Maryland.

— ll

tions or through alternative, non-criminal justice approaches such as

violence prevention programs in schools or gang intervention programs

in communities.

This paper summarizes the main findings of what works, what does

not work, and what is promising (and what is unknown) in preventing

crime, and discusses the implications for public policy. The findings are

based on a collaborative research project designed to update and sub-

stantially revise the 1997 report, Preventing Crime : What Works, What

Doesn't, What's Promising, by Lawrence Sherman and his colleagues at

the University of Maryland. This report was commissioned by the U.S.

Congress as an independent, scientifically rigorous assessment of more

than $4 billion worth of federally-sponsored crime prevention programs.

The New York Times called Preventing Crime «the most comprehensive

study ever of crime prevention » (Butterfield, 1997 :A20). The full con-

clusions of our project are published in the book Evidence-Based Crime

Prevention (Sherman et al., 2002).

WHAT IS CRIME PREVENTION?

Crime Prevention Depends on Consequences

Crime prevention is widely misunderstood. In the U.S., the national

debate over crime often treats « prevention » and « punishment » as

mutually exclusive concepts, polar opposites on a continuum of « soft »

versus « tough » responses to crime : peer mentoring versus juvenile boot

camps, for example. The science of criminology, however, contains no

such dichotomy. It is as if public debate over physics had drawn a

dichotomy between flame and matches. Flame is a result. Matches are

only one tool for achieving that result. It is well known that other tools

besides matches, from magnifying glasses to tinder boxes, can cause fuel

to ignite into flame.

Similarly, crime prevention is a result, while punishment is only one

possible tool for achieving that result. Both peer mentoring and juvenile

boot camps may logically succeed or fail in achieving the scientific

definition of crime prevention

any policy that causes a lower number

of crimes to occur in the future than would have occurred without that

policy. In this definition, crime prevention equals crime reduction. Some

kinds of punishments for some kinds of offenders may be preventive,

while others may be harmful, and still others may have no effect at all.

Exactly the same could be said of other programs that do not consist

of legally imposed punishment, but which are justified by the goal of

preventing crime.

12

Crime prevention 1s therefore defined not by 1ts intentions, but by 1ts

consequences. These consequences can be assessed in at least two ways.

One is by the number of criminal events; the other is by the number of

criminal offenders (Hirschi, 1986). Other consequences that can be

assessed are the amount of harm prevented (Reiss and Roth, 1993 :59-

61), the monetary costs of crime (Welsh et al., 2001), and the number

of victims harmed or harmed repeatedly (Farrell, 1995). What all of

these definitions have in common 1s their focus on observed effects, not

on the « hard » or « soft » content of a program.

Which definition of crime prevention ultimately dominates public dis-

course 1s a critically important factor in political and public understand-

ing of the issues. If the crime prevention debate is framed solely in terms

of the symbolic labels of punishment versus prevention, policy choices

may be made more on the basis of emotional appeal than on solid

evidence of effectiveness. By employing the scientific definition of crime

prevention as a consequence, we are in keeping with the mandate of the

1997 report

«to employ rigorous and scientifically

recognized

standards and methodologies. » It broadens the debate to consider the

entire range of policies we can pursue to build a safer society. À

rigorously empirical perspective on what works best is defined by the

data from evaluation findings, not from ideologically driven assump-

tions about human nature.

The value of a broad framework for analyzing crime prevention

policies is its focus on the whole forest rather than on each tree. Most

debates over crime prevention address one policy at a time. Few debates,

either in politics or criminology, consider the relative value of all preven-

tion programs competing for funding. While scientific evidence may

show that two different programs both « work » to prevent crime, one

may be far more cost-effective than the other. One may have a stronger

effect, cutting crimes by 50 %, while the other cuts crimes by only 20 %.

Or one may have a longer duration, reducing offending by younger

people whose average remaining lifetime is 50 years, compared to a

program treating older people with an average remaining life of 20

years. À fully informed debate about crime prevention policy choices

requires performance measures combining duration and strength of

program effect. While such accurate measures of « profitability » and

« payback » periods are a standard tool in business investment decisions,

they have been almost entirely lacking in crime prevention policy

debates (but see Aos et al., 2001).

13 -

Crime Prevention in Different Institutional Settings

However, simply comparing the return on investment from each

crime prevention policy compared to its alternatives can mask another

key 1ssue

the possible interdependency between policies, or the

economic and social conditions required for a specific policy to be effec-

tive. Crime prevention programs are not delivered in a vacuum. À Head

Start program may fail to prevent crime in a community where children

grow up with daily gunfire. À chain gang may have little deterrent effect

in a community with 75% unemployment. It may be necessary to

mount programs in several institutional settings simultaneously such as

labor markets, families, and police - in order to find programs specifi-

cally effective in each.

À setting 1s a social stage for playing out various roles, such as

parent, child, neighbor, employer, teacher, and church leader. There are

many ways to define these settings, and their boundaries are necessarily

arbitrary. Yet much of the crime prevention literature fits quite neatly

into seven major institutional settings : (1) families, (2) communities,

(3) schools, (4) labor markets, (5) places, (6) police agencies, and

(7) courts and corrections. The definitions of these settings for crime

prevention are quite broad, and sometimes they overlap. But this

framework for organizing research findings on crime prevention effec-

tiveness is quite workable.

One theory is that the effectivenèss of crime prevention in each of the

seven institutional settings depends heavily on local conditions in other

institutions. Put another way, the necessary condition for successful

crime prevention practices in one setting may be adequate support for

the practice in related settings. Schools cannot succeed without suppor-

tive families ; families cannot succeed without supportive labor markets ;

labor markets cannot succeed without well-policed safe streets; and

police cannot succeed without community participation in the labor

market. These and other examples are an extension of the « conditional

deterrence » theory in criminology (Tittle and Logan, 1973; Williams

and Hawkins, 1986), which claims that legal punishment and its threat

can only be effective at preventing crime 1f reinforced by the informal

social controls of other institutions. The conditional nature of legal

deterrence may apply to other crime prevention strategies as well. Just

as exercise can only work properly on a well-fed body, crime prevention

of all kinds may only be effective when the total institutional context 1s

strong enough to support t.

By suggesting that the effectiveness of some crime prevention efforts

may depend upon their institutional contexts, we do not present a

pessimistic vision of the future. While some might say that no program

— 14-

can work until the « root causes » of crime can be cured, we find no

scientific basis for that conclusion -- and substantial evidence against 1t.

What this article documents 1s the potential for something much more

precise and useful, based on a more open view of the role of scientific

evaluation in crime prevention

a future in which program evaluations

carefully measure, and systematically vary, the institutional context of

each program. That strategy 1s essential for a body of scientific

knowledge to be developed about the exact connections between institu-

tional context and program effectiveness.

We expect that greater attention to the interdependency of institu-

tions may help us discover how to shape many institutional factors

simultaneously to prevent crime more successfully than we have been

able to do thus far. The apparent failure of a few efforts to prevent

crime does not mean that we should give up. Such failures marked the

early stages of almost all major advances in science, from the invention

of the light bulb to the development of the polio vaccine. The fact that

our review finds crime prevention successes in all but one of the seven

institutional settings (see below) suggests that even more trial and error

could pay off handsomely. In the U.S., the national investment in

research and development for crime prevention to date has been

relatively small (Reiss and Roth, 1993; Blumstein and Petersilia, 1995;

Wilson, 2002), especially in relation to the level of public concern about

the problem. Attacking the crime problem on many institutional fronts

at once should offer more, not fewer, opportunities for success.

Defining crime prevention by results, rather than by program intent

or content, focuses scientific analysis on three crucial questions

1) What is the independent effect of each program or practice on a

specific measure of crime?

2) What 1s the comparative return on investment from each program

or practice, using a common metric of cost and crimes prevented ? (For

recent research on this question, see Welsh and Farrington, 2000 ; Welsh

et al., 2001.)

3) What conditions in other institutional settings are required for a

crime prevention program or practice to be effective, or to increase or

reduce that effectiveness ?

The current state of science barely allows us to address the first ques-

tion, and it tells us very little about the second or third questions. Just

framing the questions, however, reveals the potential contribution that

government support for crime prevention evaluations could offer. That

potential may depend, in turn, on a clear understanding of the location

of every crime prevention practice or program in a broad network of

social institutions.

15

METHODS

To most practitioners, crime prevention is an art. But, the art of

crime prevention (like the art of medicine) can be evaluated and guided

by the science of measuring program effects. Scientific evaluations of

crime prevention have both limitations and strengths. The major limita-

tion is that scientific knowledge 1s provisional. This 1s because 1t is never

certain that a program that has proved effective in one setting will also

be effective in a new setting. The major strength of scientific evaluations

is that rules of science provide a consistent and objective way to draw

conclusions about cause and effect.

The most important limitation of science is that the knowledge 1t

produces is always becoming more refined, and therefore no conclusion

is permanent. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in its analysis of scien-

tific evidence in the 1993 case of Daubet v. Merrell Dow, no theory (or

program) of cause and effect can ever be proved to be true. It can only

be disproved. Every test of a theory provides an opportunity to disprove

it. The stronger the test and the more tests each theory survives, the

more confidence we may have that the theory is true. But all theories

(e.g., about program effects) can be disproved or, more likely, revised by

new findings.

Search for New Studies

Shortily following the release of the 1997 report, with funding

provided principally by the Jerry Lee Foundation, up-dates of the chap-

ters on crime prevention in the seven settings were commissioned from

the original and some new authors. Unlike the 1997 report, the research

for Evidence-Based Crime Prevention was not subject to severe time con-

straints, thus enabling the authors to be even more thorough this time

around. For some chapters, where secondary sources (e.g., reviews of the

literature) were previously used, primary sources were now collected and

analyzed. For all of the chapters in the book, the authors initiated new

searches, computer and/or manual, to identify new programs or more

recent follow-ups of existing programs. Chapters were written mainly in

2000, and included more than 100 new studies that evaluated the effec-

tiveness of crime prevention programs. We acknowledge the outstanding

work of the other chapter authors : Shawn Bushway, John Eck, Denise

Gottfredson, Akemi Hoshi, Stacy Najaka, Peter Reuter, and David

Wilson.

16

À Focus on Impact

The primary factor used to select evaluations of crime prevention

programs for review was evidence (positive or negative) about their

impact on crime. The majority of all evaluations of crime prevention

programs are « process » evaluations that describe what was done,

rather than « impact » evaluations that assess what effect the program

had on crime. While process evaluations can produce much valuable

data on the implementation of programs and the logic of their strategies,

they cannot offer evidence as to whether the programs « work » to pre-

vent crime. Evaluations containing both process and impact measures

provide the most information, but they are rarely funded or reported.

ÀA Focus on Crime

The focus of our work 1s on crime impacts ; that is, knowing if crime

went down, went up, or remained unchanged as a result of the program.

In addition to focusing on crime outcomes, some programs are included

that measured risk factors for crime (e.g., disruptive child behavior,

unemployment, school dropout) or problem behavior outcomes such as

antisocial behavior and alcohol or other drug use.

Scientific Methods Scale

The

scientific methods

used to assess the

scale (SMS) was

methodological quality of crime prevention programs. The scale is

largely based on the classic book by Cook and Campbell (1979). For a

review of methodological quality scales, see Farrington (2003b).

As an example, imagine that the following research hypothesis is to

be tested

« Closed circuit television (CCTV) causes a decrease in

crime. » This hypothesis could be tested by investigating whether areas

with CCTV have lower crime rates than areas without CCTV. However,

assuming that this was found, this essentially correlational design would

not prove unambiguously that CCTV had any causal impact on crime.

Just to highlight one obvious problem, areas without CCTV could differ

in numerous other ways from areas with CCTV, and the differences in

crime rates could be attributable to one or more of these differences in

extraneous variables.

An experimental design, in which the presence or absence of CCTV

is deliberately manipulated, produces less ambiguous results. For exam-

ple, the research hypothesis could be tested by investigating whether the

crime rate decreased in an area after CCTV was installed, compared

with before. However, again, this design 1s relatively weak because it

does not exclude numerous plausible alternative explanations of the

17 —

results. Perhaps the crime rate decreased because of some other change

in the area (e.g., more intensive police patrolling), perhaps the decrease

was merely the continuation of a prior trend, perhaps the decrease was

artefactual because police methods of recording crimes changed, or

perhaps CCTV was installed just after an unusually high crime period

that was then followed by a «normal » downward fluctuation. The

problem is to disentangle the effects of CCTV from these other

possibilities. In order to test these kinds of alternative explanations,

some kind of control condition is needed that does not receive the

experimental intervention (CCTV).

The randomized experiment is usually considered to be the strongest

or most compelling experimental design for testing causal hypotheses,

because it makes it possible to exclude the largest number of plausible

alternative hypotheses (Farrington, 1983; Weisburd et al., 2001). For

example, the research hypothesis could be tested by randomly assigning

city blocks to have CCTV surveillance or not, and investigating whether

crime rates decreased after installation for the experimental blocks com-

pared with the control blocks. This design controls whether or not each

block has CCTV installed or not, and it controls extraneous influences

on crime rates (since these are, on average, equal in experimental and

control conditions).

These ideas underlie the SMS, which is a simple 5-point scale of

methodological quality. In constructing the SMS, the main aim was to

devise a simple scale measuring internal validity that could easily be

communicated to scholars, policymakers, and practitioners. Thus, a sim-

ple 5-point scale was used rather than a summation of scores (e.g., from

0-100) on a number of specific criteria. It was intended that each point

on the scale should be understandable, and the scale 1s as follows

Level 1 : Correlation between a prevention program and a measure

of crime at one point in time (e.g., « areas with CCTV have lower crime

rates than areas without CCTV »).

As mentioned, this design fails to rule out many threats to internal

validity and it also fails to establish causal order.

Level 2 : Measures of crime before and after the program, with no

comparable control condition (e.g., « crime decreased after CCTV was

installed in an area »).

This design establishes causal order but fails to rule out many threats

to internal validity. Level ! and level 2 designs were considered inade-

quate and uninterpretable by Cook and Campbell (1979).

Level 3

Measures of crime before and after the program in

experimental and comparable control conditions (e.g., « crime decreased

13

_

after CCTV was installed in an experimental area, but there was no

decrease in crime in a comparable control area »).

This was considered to be the minimum interpretable design by Cook

and Campbell (1979), and it is also regarded in our project as the mini-

mum design that is adequate for drawing conclusions about what works.

It was also used as the minimum standard for selecting studies to include

in a systemic review of the effectiveness of CCTV in reducing crime

(Welsh and Farrington, 2002). It rules out many threats to internal

validity, including history, maturation/trends, instrumentation, testing,

and mortality. Its main problems center on selection effects and regres-

sion to the mean (because of the non-equivalence of the experimental

and control conditions).

Level 4 : Measures of crime before and after the program in multiple

experimental and control units, controlling for other variables that

influence crime (e.g., « victimization of premises under CCTV sur-

veillance decreased compared to victimization of control premises, after

controlling for features of premises that influenced their victimization »).

This design has better statistical control of extraneous influences on

the outcome and hence deals with selection and regression threats more

adequately.

Level 5 : Random assignment of program and control conditions to

units (e.g., « victimization of premises randomly assigned to have CCTV

surveillance decreased compared to victimization of control premises »).

Providing that a sufficiently large number of units are randomly

assigned, those in the experimental condition will be equivalent (within

the limits of statistical fluctuation) to those in the control condition on

all possible extraneous variables that influence the outcome. Hence, this

design deals with selection and regression problems and has the highest

possible internal validity.

While randomized experiments in principle have the highest internal

validity, in practice they are relatively uncommon in criminology and

also often have implementation problems (Farrington, 1983, 2003a). In

light of the fact that the SMS as defined above focuses only on internal

validity, all evaluation projects were also rated additionally on statistical

conclusion validity and on construct validity. Specifically, the following

four aspects of each study were rated as follows. For statistical conclu-

sion validity :

l) Was the statistical analysis appropriate ?

2) Did the study have low statistical power to detect effects because

of small samples?

3) Was there a low response rate or differential attrition ?

——

19 —

For construct validity :

4) What was the reliability and validity of measurement of the out-

come?

If there was a serious problem in any of these areas, the SMS might

be downgraded by 1 point. For example, a randomized experiment with

serious implementation problems (e.g., high attrition) might receive a

rating of level 4 rather than level 5. The justification for this was that

the implementation problems had reduced the comparability of the

experimental and control units and hence had reduced the internal

validity.

External validity was addressed to some extent in the rules for

accumulating evidence from different evaluation studies. The overriding

alim was again simplicity of communication of findings to scholars,

policymakers, and practitioners. The aim was to classify all program

types into one of four categories

what works, what does not, what 1s

promising, and what is unknown.

What works. These are program types that prevent crime in the kinds

of social contexts in which they have been evaluated. Programs types

coded as working must have at least two level 3-5 evaluations showing

statistically significant and desirable results and the preponderance of all

evidence showing effectiveness.

What does not work. These are program types that fail to prevent

crime. Program types coded as not working must have at least two

level 3-5 evaluations with statistical significance tests showing ineffec-

tiveness and the preponderance of all evidence supporting ineffective-

ness.

What is promising. These are program types where the level of cer-

tainty from available evidence is too low to support generalizable con-

clusions, but where there is some empirical basis for predicting that

further research could support such conclusions. Program types are

coded as promising 1f they were found to be significantly effective in one

level 3-5 evaluation and in the preponderance of the remaining evidence.

What is unknown. Any program type not classified in one of the three

above categories 1s regarded as having unknown effects.

Our

project

recognizes

that

evaluation

studies

vary

in

their

methodological quality by requiring them to reach at least level 3 on the

SMS (the minimum cut-off point for inclusion).

20

RESULTS

An analysis of nearly 700 program evaluations showed that 29

program types worked, 25 did not work, and 28 were promising in

preventing crime. The remaining program types were of unknown effec-

tiveness, largely because the evaluations were poor. For more details, see

our book Evidence-Based Crime Prevention (Sherman et al., 2002).

What Works

Six of the seven settings (except communities) have at least one

program type with evidence of proven effectiveness in preventing crime.

Those settings with the highest number of effective program types were

courts/corrections with nine, followed by schools with seven. For both

labor markets and places, only two program types were effective in

preventing crime : job training for older male ex-offenders no longer

under criminal justice supervision and intensive residential training

programs for at-risk youth (Job Corps); and nuisance abatement and

improved street lighting in open public places, respectively. The four

family program types found to be effective were not limited to one stage

of the life course, but ranged from early childhood (home visiting serv-

ices for newborns/toddlers and mothers and parent education plus day

care/preschool), to middle childhood (school-based child training plus

parent training), to late adolescence (multisystemic therapy).

In the schools setting, program effectiveness was assessed for crime

and three related problem behaviors : alcohol or other drug use (AOD),

antisocial behavior (ASB), and drop-out/truancy (DO/T). Of the seven

school program types that were effective in preventing one or more of

these four problem behaviors, three were effective in preventing crime

(1) school and discipline management (as well as AOD and ASB), (2)

interventions to establish norms or expectations for behavior (as well as

AOD and ASB), and (3) self-control or social competency instruction

using cognitive-behavioral instruction methods (as well as AOD, ASB,

and DO/T). The other effective school-based programs were : classroom

or instructional management (AOD and DO/T), reorganization of

grades or schools (ASB and DO/T), cognitive behavioral, behavioral

modeling, or behavior modification (ASB and DO/T), and mentoring

(ASB and DO/T).

Five measures by police agencies were effective in preventing crime :

(1) increased directed patrols in street-corner hots spots of crime, (2)

proactive arrests of serious repeat offenders, (3) proactive drunk driving

arrests, (4) arrests for domestic assault for employed suspects, and (5)

problem-oriented policing.

- 21

Of the nine program types found to be effective in preventing crime

in the courts/corrections setting, all were corrections-based. Seven of

these corrections programs were institution-based : (1) rehabilitation

with particular characteristics (e.g, target specific problems of offenders,

intensive treatment), (2) therapeutic community treatment of drug-

involved offenders, (3) therapeutic communities with follow-up com-

munity treatment, (4) cognitive behavioral therapy (i.e., moral recona-

tion therapy and reasoning and rehabilitation), (5) vocational education

for adult and juvenile offenders, (6) multi-component correctional

industry programs, and (7) incapacitating offenders who continue to

commit crimes at high rates. The remaining two effective programs took

place in the community : sex offender treatment and community employ-

ment.

What Does Not Work

Twenty-five program types were found to be ineffective in preventing

crime or related problem behaviors across the seven institutional set-

tings. With the exception of places, each of the settings had at least one

program type that was ineffective in preventing crime. The highest num-

ber of ineffective program types were in courts/corrections (9), police (6),

schools (5), and labor markets (3). In each of the families and com-

munities settings, one program type was ineffective

home/community

parent training and gun buy-back campaigns, respectively.

Of the five ineffective school-based program types, only one was inef-

fective in preventing crime : instructional programs that do not focus on

social competency or do not make use of cognitive-behavioral teaching

methods (as well as DO/T). The other four were unsuccessful in prevent-

ing one or more of the related problem behaviors : (1) self-control or

social competency instruction using cognitive-behavioral or behavioral

instruction methods (ASB and DO/T), (2) counseling, social work, and

other therapeutic interventions (ASB and DO/T), (3) mentoring, tutor-

ing, and work study (AOD), and (4) recreation, community service,

enrichment, and leisure activities (AOD).

The three labor market program types that were ineffective were

quite diverse

summer job or subsidized work programs for at-risk

youth, short-term nonresidential training programs for at-risk youth,

and diversion from court to job training for adult offenders as a condi-

tion of case dismissal.

Equally diverse were the six program types found to be ineffective in

the police setting : (1) neighborhood block watch, (2) arrests of some

juveniles for minor offenses, (3) arrests of unemployed suspects for

domestic assault, (4) drug market arrests, (5) community policing with

_ 22 —

no clear crime-risk factor focus, and (6) adding extra police to cities

regardless of assignment or activity.

In the courts/corrections setting, the nine ineffective program types

were : (l) specific deterrence interventions (e.g., shock probation, scared

straight), (2) rehabilitation programs that use non-directive, unstruc-

tured counseling, (3) intensive supervised probation, (4) home confine-

residential

ment,

(5S) community

programs,

(6) urine testing,

(7)

increased referral, monitoring, and management in the community, (8)

correctional boot camps using the old-style military model, and (9)

juvenile wilderness programs.

What Is Promising

À total of 28 program types were identified as promising in prevent-

ing crime or related problem behaviors; that is, they were promising

enough to merit further replication and evaluation. For each setting, at

least one program type was found to be promising, with the families set-

ting having only one promising program type

clinic-based child train-

ing plus parent training. The schools, communities, and labor market

settings had the next fewest number of promising program types at three

apiece, while the places and courts/corrections settings had the highest

number of promising program types at seven each.

Of the four promising police program types two involved community

policing : community policing with community participation in deter-

mining priorities for the police and community policing focused on

improving police legitimacy. The other two were : police traffic enforce-

ment patrols against 1llegally carried handguns and warrants for arrest

of absent suspects when police respond to domestic violence.

Of the seven promising courts/corrections program types two were

court-based : fines and drug courts combining both rehabilitation and

criminal justice controls. Among the five promising corrections-based

program types, three were aimed at reintegrating offenders into the com-

munity (juvenile after care, drug treatment combined with urine testing,

and

transitional

programs

providing

individualized

employment

preparation and services for high-risk offenders) and two were aimed at

preparing offenders for eventual reintegration into the community, but

in an institutional setting (prison-based sex offender treatment and adult

basic education).

Of the three program types in the labor market setting, one showed

promise

in preventing crime

(prison-based _ vocational

education

programs for adults), while the other two showed promise in preventing

crime risk factors such as highschoo! dropout or unemployment : disper-

sing inner-city public housing residents to scattered-site suburban public

__ 23 —

housing and enterprise zones with tax break incentives in areas of

extremely high unemployment.

Two of the three promising school-based program types were

targeted at crime

classroom or

instructional

management and

reorganization of grades or classes (as well as AOD). The third promis-

ing program — recreation, community service, enrichment, and leisure

activities — was targeted at DO/T.

Crime outcomes were the exclusive focus of both the community -

and place-based programs. The three promising community program

types of gang intervention, mentoring, and after-school recreation

applied to all crime types, while the seven promising place-based

program types were specific to particular crime types : (1) multiple clerks

in already robbed convenience stores, (2) improved training and

management of bar staff (drinking-related offenses), (3) metal detectors

in airports (hijackings), (4) guards or sky marshals on airplanes (hijack-

ings), (5), street closures (various offenses), (6) target hardening (theft

and vandalism), and (7) store redesign (shoplifting).

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The results suggest that we do know a fair amount about the « bot-

tom line » of preventing crime. Unfortunately, the effectiveness of many

other programs remains unknown. The results suggest three broad-based

courses of action. First, governments (and industry in the case of

privately funded programs) need to increase resources devoted to those

program types with demonstrated effectiveness in preventing crime. Six

of the seven settings (except communities) have at least one program

type with evidence of proven effectiveness in preventing crime. Less 1s

known about potential interaction effects from implementing effective

programs in different settings at the same time; there may be a great

deal of benefit from implementing effective programs in several settings

at once.

Second, governments need to stop funding those program types with

proven evidence of ineffectiveness. These programs are either making no

difference to crime and offending rates or are producing harmful results.

Action to end programs with harmful effects should be a top priority.

The need for immediate action to stop the funding of crime prevention

programs with evidence of proven ineffectiveness is reinforced by the

likelihood that the taxpaying public would be annoyed to discover that

their tax dollars are being wasted.

Third, governments should begin further testing of those program

types with promising evidence of effectiveness in preventing crime. In

_

24 -

many ways, some of these program types may mark the next generation

of effective crime prevention programs and policies. Importantly, as we

discuss below, only the most rigorous research should be used to

evaluate the impact of these programs on crime and offending

experimental and quasi-experimental designs (Cook and Campbell,

1979; Shadish et al., 2002).

to use the

Arguably, all public services share a common interest

most convincing scientific evidence in the development of public policy

and practice. It is, of course, a well known fact that having convincing

research evidence and having it influence policy and practice are two

very different matters. According to James Q. Wilson (2002 :554),

« Cities and states typically do not invest in what works but only in

what is popular. »

In criminology and criminal justice discussions about implementing

new crime prevention programs, expanding existing ones, or putting an

end to ineffective or harmful ones, political and policy considerations

are dominant. In fact, it is all too common that the strength of the

programmatic evidence under consideration for developing policy

becomes secondary to the political considerations of the day.

Some of these political considerations are important. Other govern-

ment priorities such as military defense spending, environmental protec-

tion, and lower costs of prescription drugs for seniors are competing for

scarce public resources. National polls may show that the public are

more concerned with other public policy issues than crime prevention or

community safety.

Political considerations that are unique to crime prevention include

the perception by politicians that they are being « soft » on crime by

supporting non-criminal justice crime prevention efforts, and the short

time horizons of politicians (Tonry and Farrington, 1995), which makes

programs that only show results in the long term less appealing to

politicians who are trying to get elected every few years.

Political considerations can have a wide range of implications, from

the disappointing effect of dismissing strong evidence of the effectiveness

of a program to the disastrous effect of ignoring strong evidence of the

harmful results of a program. Examples of these effects in criminology

and criminal justice are all too common. Another example of political

barriers to evidence-based crime prevention is that the research evidence

may not be used in the country in which it was produced, not to men-

tion commissioned and paid for. This applied to Sherman and his

colleague’s (1997) report for the U.S. Congress. Despite this report being

the subject of four U.S. Congressional hearings and the authors being

invited on numerous occasions to brief policymakers and other criminal

_— 25 —

justice leaders throughout the U.S. (as well as internationally), the

report’s largest impact has been evident in the United Kingdom, where

it greatly influenced the Home Office report on Reducing Offending

(Nuttall et al., 1998). This led to the 250 million pound (approximately

$ 375 million), 3-year Home Office « Crime Reduction Programme »,

initiated in April 1999.

How to overcome some of the misconceived political barriers and get

more of what works in preventing crime into policy and practice is by

no means an easy task, but fortunately it has received some attention in

criminal justice (e.g., Cullen and Gendreau, 2001 ; Cullen, 2002), public

management (e.g., Nutley and Davies, 2000 ; Nutley et al., 2000), public

health care (Millenson, 1997; Halladay and Bero, 2000), and evaluation

science (e.g., Weiss, 1998), to name a few of the academic disciplines

that have been investigating this important issue.

For criminology and criminal justice, the launch of the Campbell

Collaboration in 2000, which 1s dedicated to preparing, maintaining, and

disseminating evidence-based research in the field of crime and justice

(as well as in the fields of education and social welfare), has meant that

greater attention has been given to evidence-based research and, with

this, the importance of translating sound research into policy and prac-

tice (see Farrington and Petrosino, 2000; Farrington and Welsh, 2001).

Efforts

to work more closely and more constructively with

policymakers, practitioners, and politicians must be a top priority in

advancing evidence-based crime prevention. As important as these

efforts are, they need to be supported by a program of research of new

crime prevention experiments and quasi-experiments. Ît is important to

act on the findings summarized above, by increasing the use of those

programs with demonstrated effectiveness in preventing crime, and

further testing of those programs with promising evidence of effective-

ness in preventing crime.

These new crime prevention experiments and quasi-experiments

should have large samples, long follow-up periods, and follow-up inter-

views. Long-term follow-ups are needed to assess how long effects per-

sist after the intervention ended. Such follow-ups are rare in criminologi-

cal interventions and should be a top priority of funding agencies.

Research is needed to identify the active ingredients of successful

(and promising) crime prevention programs. Many programs are multi-

modal, making 1it difficult to isolate the independent effects of different

components. Future experiments are needed that attempt to disentangle

the effects of different elements of the most successful programs. It 1s

also important that programs include, as part of the original research

design, provision for an economic analysis, either a cost-benefit or cost-

— 26 —

effectiveness analysis, to allow for an assessment of the economic

efficiency of the program.

We are very happy to reach optimistic conclusions. À great deal 1s

known about effective programs to prevent crime. Communities should

invest in wide-ranging multi-modal programs including such elements as

home visitation of pregnant women, parent education, child skills train-

ing, school and discipline management, job training for ex-offenders,

improved street lighting, police patrols targeting hots spots of crime,

proactive arrests of serious repeat offenders, and cognitive-behavioral

therapy in institutions. The time 1s ripe to reallocate some of the money

spent on locking up offenders to the effective crime prevention program

types identified in our book.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We would like to thank Jerry Lee who provided the initial inspiration

for this project and continues to be one of its most important benefac-

tors.

REFERENCES

Aos, S., PHiPps, P., BARNOSKI, R. & LiEB, R. 2001. « The Comparative

A Review of

Costs and Benefits of Programs to Reduce Crime

Research Findings with Implications for Washington State », In Costs

and Benefits of Preventing Crime, eds. B.C. Welsh, D.P. Farrington &

L.W. Sherman, 149-175. Boulder, Colorado : Westview Press.

BLUMSTEIN, À. & PETERSILIA, J. 1995. « Investing in Criminal Justice

Research », in Crime, eds. J.Q. Wilson & J. Petersilia, 465-487. San

Francisco

Institute for Contemporary Studies Press.

BUTTERFIELD, F. 1997. « Most Efforts to Stop Crime Fall Short, Study

Finds ». New York Times, April 16, A20.

Cook, T.D. & CamPReLL, D.T. 1979. Quasi-Experimentation : Design

and Analysis Issues for Field Settings. Chicago : Rand McNally.

CULLEN, F.T. 2002. « Rehabilitation and Treatment Programs », in

Crime

Public Policies for Crime Control, eds. J.Q. Wilson & J.

Petersilia, 253-289. Oakland, California

Institute for Contemporary

Studies Press.

CULLEN, F.T. & GENDREAU, P. 2001. « From Nothing Works to What

Works : Changing Professional Ideology in the 21st Century ». Prison

Journal, 81, 313-338.

27

Duabet v. Merrell Dow. 1993. U.S. Sup. Ct. No. 92-102, June 28, 1993

[509 U.S. 579].

DISHION, T.J., McCCORD, J. & POULIN, F. 1999. « When Interventions

Harm : Peer Groups and Problem Behavior ». American Psychologist,

54, 755-764.

FARRELL, G. 1995. « Preventing Repeat Victimization ». In Building a

Safer Society : Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention (Crime and

Justice, Vol.

19), eds. M. Tonry & D.P. Farrington, 469-534.

Chicago

University of Chicago Press.

FARRINGTON, D.P. 1983. « Randomized Experiments on Crime and

Justice ». In Crime and Justice, Vol. 4., eds. M. Tonry & N. Morris,

257-308. Chicago

University of Chicago Press.

FARRINGTON, D.P. 2003a. « British Randomized Experiments on Crime

and Justice ». Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social

Science, in press.

FARRINGTON, D.P. 2003b. « Methodological Quality Scales for Evalua-

tion Research ». Annals of the American Academy of Political and

Social Science, in press.

FARRINGTON, D.P. & PETROSINO, À. 2000. « Systematic Reviews of

Criminological Interventions : The Campbell Collaboration Crime

and Justice Group ». International Annals of Criminology, 38, 49-66.

FARRINGTON, D.P. & WELSH, B.C., eds. 2001. What Works in Preventing

Crime? Systematic Reviews of Experimental and Quasi-Experimental

Research [Entire issue]. Annals of the American Academy of Political

and Social Science, 578, 1-173.

HarLapaYy, M. & Bero, L. 2000. « Implementing Evidence-Based Prac-

tice in Health Care ». Public Money and Management, 20, 43-50.

HrrscH1, T. 1986. « On the Compatibility of Rational Choice and Social

Control Theories of Crime », in The Reasoning Criminal : Rational

Choice Perspectives on Offending, eds. D.B. Cornish & R.V. Clarke,

105-118. New York : Springer-Verlag.

MILLENSON, M.L. 1997. Demanding Medical Excellence

Doctors and

Accountability in the Information Age. Chicago

University of

Chicago Press.

NuTLEY, S. & Davies, H.T.O. 2000. « Making a Reality of Evidence-

Based Practice

Some Lessons from the Diffusion of Innovations ».

Public Money and Management, 20, 35-42.

NuUTLEY, S., Davies, H.T.O., & TiLLEy, N. 2000. « Editorial : Getting

Research Into Practice ». Public Money and Management, 20, 3-6.

NUTTALL, C., GOLDBLATT, P.& LEwis, C., eds. 1998. Reducing Offend-

ing : An Assessment of Research Evidence on Ways of Dealing with

— 28 —

Offending Behaviour. Home Office Research Study 187. London

Home Office.

PETROSINO, A., TURPIN-PETROSINO, C. & FINCKENAUER, J.O. 2000.

« Well-Meaning Programs can have Harmful Effects! Lessons from

Experiments of Programs such as Scared Straight ». Crime and Delin-

quency, 46, 354-379.

Rriss, A.J., JR. & ROTH, J.A., eds. 1993. Understanding and Preventing

Violence. Washington, D.C. : National Academy Press.

SHADISH, W.R., Cook, T.D. & CAMPBELL, D.T. 2002. Experimental and

Quasi-Experimental

Designs for

Generalized Causal Inference.

Boston

Houghton Mifflin.

SHERMAN, L.W. 1998. « Evidence-Based Policing ». Ideas in American

Policing, July. Washington, D.C. : Police Foundation.

SHERMAN, L.W., GOTTFREDSON, D.C., MACKENZIE, D.L., Eck, J.E,

REUTER, P. & BusHway, S.D. 1997. Preventing Crime : What Works,

What Doesn't,

What's Promising. Washington, D.C.

National

Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice.

SHERMAN, L.W., FARRINGTON, D.P., WELsH, B.C. & MACKENZIE, D.L.,

eds. 2002. Evidence-Based Crime Prevention. London

Routledge.

TITTLE, C.R. & LOGAN, C.H. 1973. « Sanctions and Deviance : Evidence

and Remaining Questions ». Law and Society Review, 7, 371-379.

TONRY, M. & FARRINGTON, D.P. 1995. « Strategic Approaches to Crime

Prevention », in Building a Safer Society : Strategic Approaches to

Crime Prevention (Crime and Justice, Vol. 19), eds. M. Tonry & D.P.

Farrington, 1-20. Chicago

University of Chicago Press.

VISHER, C.A. & WEISBURD, D. 1998. « Identifying What Works : Recent

Trends in Crime Prevention Strategies ». Crime, Law and Social

Change, 28, 223-242.

WEIssurD, D., LUM, C.L., & PETROSINO, À. 2001. « Does Research

Design Affect Study Outcomes in Criminal Justice? » Annals of the

American Academy of Political and Social Science, 578, 50-70.

Werss, C.H. 1998. « Have We Learned Anything New About the Use of

Evaluation ? » American Journal of Evaluation, 19, 21-33.

WELSH, B.C. & FARRINGTON, D.P. 2000. « Monetary Costs and Benefits

of Crime Prevention Programs », in Crime and Justice, Vol. 27, ed.

M. Tonry, 305-361. Chicago

University of Chicago Press.

WELSH, B.C. & FARRINGTON, D.P. 2002. Crime Prevention Effects of

Closed Circuit

Television

A Systematic Review. Home Office

Home Office.

Research Study 252. London

WELSH, B.C., FARRINGTON, D.P. & SHERMAN, L.W. 2001. « Improving

Confidence in What Works and Saves Money in Preventing Crime

__ 29 —

Priorities for Research », in Costs and Benefits of Preventing Crime,

eds

B.C. Welsh, D.P. Farrington, & L.W. Sherman, 269-278.

Boulder, Colorado

Westview Press.

WILLIAMS, K.R. & HAWKINs, R. 1986. « Perceptual Research on General

Deterrence : À Critical Overview ». Law and Society Review, 20, 545-

572

WILSON, J.Q. 2002. « Crime and Public Policy », in Crime

Public

Policies for Crime Control, eds. J.Q. Wilson & J. Petersilia, 537-557.

Oakland, California

Institute for Contemporary Studies Press.

RÉSUMÉ

Cet article fait le point sur les principales connaissances sur ce qui

marche, ce qui ne marche pas, et ce qui est prometteur, en matière de

prévention du crime, et discute des implications de ces connaissances

pour les politiques publiques. Les constatations sont tirées de l’ouvrage

Evidence-Based Crime Prevention publié en 2002. L'objet de cet ouvrage

était de mettre à Jour et de réviser substantiellement le rapport de 1997,

Preventing Crime

What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising, de

Lawrence Sherman et ses collègues de l’Université du Maryland.

L'analyse de quelque 700 évaluations de programmes montre que 29

types de programmes ont marché, 25 pas, et 28 étaient prometteurs en

matière de prévention du crime. Les résultats suggèrent également de

façon générale trois manières d'agir : 1. Il faut augmenter les ressources

vouées à des types de programmes qui ont démontré leur efficacité dans

la prévention du crime; 2. Il faut arrêter de subsidier des types de

programmes qui ont démontré leur inefficacité; 3. Il faut tester plus

avant les programmes prometteurs.

ABSTRACT

This paper summarizes the main findings of what works, what does

not work, and what 1s promising in preventing crime, and discusses the

implications for public policy. The findings are based on the book

Evidence-Based Crime Prevention, published in 2002. The book'’s aim

was to update and substantially revise the 1997 report, Preventing

Crime

What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising, by Lawrence

Sherman and his colleagues at the University of Maryland. An analysis

of nearly 700 program evaluations found that 29 program types worked,

25 did not work, and 28 were promising in preventing crime. These

results suggest that we know a fair amount about how to prevent crime.

30

Results also suggest three broad-based courses of action

(1) we need

to increase resources devoted to those program types with demonstrated

effectiveness in preventing crime; (2) we need to stop funding those

program types with proven evidence of ineffectiveness; and (3) we

should begin further testing of those program types that are promising.

RESUMEN

El presente articulo pasa en revista los principales conocimientos dis-

ponibles sobre lo que funciona bien, sobre lo que no funciona y sobre

lo que aparece como auspicioso en materia de prevenciôn del crimen, y

discute en torno à las implicaciones de estos conocimientos en las

politicas puüblicas. Las observaciones son extraidas del libro Evidence-

Based Crime Prevention, publicado en 2002. El objeto de ese trabajo era

de poner al dia y revisar considerablemente el informe de 1997, Prevent-

ing Crime : What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising, de Lawrence

Sherman y sus colegas de la Universidad de Maryland.

El anâlisis de aproximadamente 700 evaluaciones de programas

muestra que 29 tipos de programas funcionaron bien, 25 no funcionaron

bien, y 28 aparecian como auspiciosos en la prevenciôn del crimen. Los

resultados también sugieren, de un modo general, tres maneras de

actuar

1. Es necesario aumentar los recursos reservados a los tipos de

programas que demostraron su eficacia en la prevenciôon del crimen ;

2. Es preciso interrumpir las subvenciones a los tipos de programas que

demostraron

su

ineficacia :

3. Es

necesario

profundizar

las

investigaciones en torno a los programas auspiciosos.

_— 31 —

POLICE CO-OPERATION IN THE FIGHT

AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL CRIME (')

Pierre-Henri Bolle (*)

Two concepts lie at the heart of our topic : the police and national

territory. The two are closely linked, both in terms of their socio-politi-

cal essence and their institutions.

From a socio-political perspective, police forces are both an expres-

sion and the symbol of law enforcement, an 1llustration of the power

wielded first by the prince, and subsequently by the State. Their role 1s

to preserve internal security, which in this context means security within

the boundaries of a national territory. The authority, power and remit

of the police stop at the country's borders. In this, there are marked dif-

ferences between the police force and the army, yet another embodiment

and a symbol of law enforcement. The army's mission is to secure the

external security of the State, its international sovereignty ; and although

the army guards the country's borders, it may have to breach them, even

in a state where its role 1s purely, or primarily, defensive. History 1s lit-

tered with examples of police forces forced to abandon the chase at the

border, as if they had run into an impassable wall. The fortunate

offenders, having crossed the border, legally or 1illegally, could then sit

back and enjoy their ill-gotten gains for as long as it took to request

international judicial co-operation, after which the culprits could be

apprehended, judged, extradited, or, at the very least, have their spoils

confiscated. But none of this can be done without judicial co-operation,

which is not always possible. Even when 1t 1s granted, the whole proce-

dure can become bogged down in appeals that bring everything to a

standstill. The sad conclusion all over the world 1s that borders hinder

the police and protect the criminals.

Although long accepted as inevitable, and even sometimes acceptable,

particularly when individuals, even criminals, had to be sheltered from

anti-democratic police forces, by the beginning of the 20"" century this

situation had become increasingly unacceptable, especially as a result of

the greater mobility of populations, growing international trade, and,

more generally, the globalisation of our modern world. Undoubtedly,

judicial co-operation has made great progress, at least at the institu-

(") Paper submitted at the 63"" International Course on Criminology. 28-30 August 2002,

Florianôpolis, Brazil.

(?) Professor of Criminal Justice Studies at the Universities of Neuchâtel (Switzerland)

and Galatasaray (Istanbul, Turkey).

_— 33 —

tional level; however, international crime prevention policy can no

longer rely on an instrument which is essentially repressive, and whose

shortcomings, limitations and slowness, are universally condemned, par-

ticularly by those who rely on 1t, i.e. judges in the criminal courts. Worse

still, the police forces have themselves lost faith in the workings of the

criminal justice system. This is something of a paradox, because judicial

co-operation actually provides judicial guarantees to the person who 1s

the object of the request, democratic guarantees that do not exist within

the context of police co-operation. Public opinion, egged on by the

media, finds it shocking and scandalous that States tolerate the presence

and the activities of international criminals on their territory, but that,

as the holder of public authority, they should refuse, for want of judicial

guarantees, access to that same territory by foreign police officers who

are trying to catch those very same criminals.

Police co-operation may be judicially prohibited, institutionally

impossible, and democratically dangerous, it nevertheless remains an

absolutely necessity. Social imperatives, particularly where security and

crime prevention are concerned, carry a particular weight which all

politicians, from both the Left and the Right, are perfectly aware of. It

has been with their support, arguably more tacit than explicit, that

police forces have taken a number of what could be described as daring

initiatives that have often preceded the institutionalisation of cross-bor-

der police co-operation, and they have done so with a remarkable degree

of pragmatism. The one famous éxception to this was the creation in

1923 of what was to become the International Criminal Police Organisa-

tion, or ICPO-INTERPOL, which we shall discuss later.

Let me begin by saying that international police co-operation

developed along two concordant, but not always parallel axes

A. The pragmatic axis, often inspired and supported by a strong

political will, also founded on technical, technological and scientific

progress, and

B. The institutional axis leading to the development, and subse-

quently the application, of international bilateral and multilateral legal

instruments.

À. Let us begin with the pragmatic axis. Of the two 1t is the less

known and the more secret. Despite its effectiveness, it quite clearly suf-

fers from a democratic deficit as it is neither desired nor supervised by

parliaments ; it is not subject to the control of the Courts, and in many

instances it operates without the knowledge of the general public or the

media. It sometimes happens that governments have very little say in the

matter. Typically, it is the result of efforts by the police services them-

34

selves. Whether they like it or not, the supervisory authorities are often

faced with a fait accompli.

Co-operation here may assume different forms, which we have

presented in order of increasing importance and intensity (*).

a) Acquisition and exchange of expertise

certain

states have

developed resources, methods, techniques, technologies and state-of-the-

art police strategies. Experts are invited to share their knowledge with

colleagues abroad, either within the context of a specific enquiry, or as

a contribution to the establishment of a police team, corps or institute

in another state, or even to work in police academies and training cen-

tres. As a result, an international police community has emerged, driven

by a common philosophy, in which the members engage in dialogue and

cooperate within what is essentially an informal structure. People know,

understand and respect each other; there is mutual trust and they act

together. Should the need arise, they would not hesitate to do their own

bit of institution-building, presenting things as if they were acting

entirely in line with judicial requirements. In the fight against interna-

tional drug trafficking. for example, there have even been cases where

foreign police officers pursued their investigations outside their home

state, with or without the permission of the national authorities concer-

ned, in violation of the officer’s own national law as well as that of the

country where the investigation was being carried out. The situation 1s

the same as in the case of espionage, counter-espionage and more

generally all intelligence-related activities, in which officers have often

paid for their zeal with their lives.

b) Politically-driven police co-operation : in this type of co-operation,

the situation is reversed. It is not the police officers themselves who take

the initiative to develop international co-operation, establishing a

framework, working methods and a strategy, but rather the political

authorities who favour the development of closer ties. This 1s often done

without informing the police officers concerned, which of course they

then complain about. These ties, which are the result of informal con-

tacts or ad hoc groups, are not intended, at least at the outset, as a co-

ordination exercise ; and some have argued that these initiatives tend to

result in total chaos. In cases such as these, it is the police who are faced

with a fait accompli, and what is worse, they are often kept pretty much

activities are shrouded in secrecy

in the dark about what is going on

and nobody really knows who belongs to the teams or what their mis-

sions are. In Europe, for example, there has been, and there still is, inter-

national police co-operation between different agencies, some of which

(*) For more information, cf. SABATIER, M.…. La coopération policière européenne

(European police co-operation), Paris, L'Harmattan, 2001, p. 3Sff.

__ 35 —

specialise in combating a particular form of criminality. However, in the

rare cases where information does exist (Pompidou Group, TREVI),

next to nothing is known about the results obtained, making t

impossible to evaluate their effectiveness. These agencies are often bran-

ded with appalling epithets, such as « covert coordination groups » (*),

or « shadowy organisations » (°). Here are a few examples of agencies,

some of which are purely European, while others are responsible for

relations between Europe and the United States of America

— The Cross Channel Intelligence Conference, or Cross Channel Group,

was founded in 1963 at the initiative of the United Kingdom. It

remained completely secret until 1980, when it emerged from the

shadows and appointed liaison officers who meet quarterly. The Con-

ference includes the United Kingdom, France, Belgium and the

Netherlands, all of which border on the English Channel. The main

focus of its activities is on the security of transport services in the

Channel : navigation and 1llegal immigrant smuggling. It is a think-

tank which meets once a year and brings together senior police and

security officers from the four countries. An operational unit works

all year round to facilitate the exchange of information and to deal

with the practical aspects of police work and police training.

NEBEDEACPOL, which stands for Netherlands-Belgium-German

Action Police, was founded at the instigation of the Federal Republic

of Germany in 1969, and brings together police officers from the bor-

der regions of the three countries (°). In 1979, this agency legally

became a private association under German law! An informal police

co-operation body, it was mandated by the countries concerned to

apply the bilateral agreements between the Member States, that 1s the

agreement between Belgium and the Netherlands of 1949, the agree-

ment between Belgium and the Federal Republic of Germany of 1957,

and the trilateral agreement of 1971. Activities cover information

exchange, a communications network, working groups, and ad hoc

meetings, with a view to promoting the cross-border sharing of police

information and real time intervention.

— À group involved in the fight against drug trafficking is STAR, which

is the German acronym for Ständige Arbeitsgruppe Rauschgift

(Standing Committee on Narcotics). It was created in 1967 or 1978 at

the initiative of the BKA, the Federal Office of Criminal Investiga-

(*) RUTER, C.F., La collaboration policière internationale dans une Europe pluriforme

(international police co-operation in a multiform Europe), Déviance et Société, 1992, p. 218.

(°) BENYON, J., WiLLIS, A., BECK, A., TURBULL, L., WOODWARD, R, « Police co-opera-

tion in Europe », An investigation, London, CSPO, 1993, p. 284.

(°) BRAMMERTZ, S., DE VREESE, S, THys, J., La collaboration policière transfrontalière

(cross-border police co-operation), Brussels, Politeia, 1993, p. 164ff; SABATIER, M

op. cit.,

p. 36ff.

— 36 _

tion (/). Participating countries also include Belgium, Denmark,

France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland, what

used to be Czechoslovakia, now the Czech Republic and Slovakia,

Poland, and, curiously, a US agency, the famous DEA (Drug Enfor-

Its mission

IS to evaluate,

harmonise,

cement Administration).

develop, and coordinate anti-drug measures and activities. It 1s basi-

cally a forum for the exchange of ideas.

The South-West working group, established in 1979, includes Ger-

many, Austria, Switzerland, France and Italy. INTEPOL, DEA and

SADEM (*) liaison officers are also represented on the group, the lat-

ter being a special delegation of US law enforcement in Europe (°). Its

task is to allow participating countries to exchange experiences and to

adopt international strategies in the war against drug trafficking.

The Hazeldonk Group, named after a town on the Dutch border, was

founded in 1994 and is composed of French, Dutch and German

judges and police officers. Its aim 1s to combat drug trafficking along

the Antwerp-Rotterdam motorway where there is a flourishing drugs

trade owing to the Dutch government’s lax policy regarding the con-

sumption of « soft » drugs ("°).

In the fight against terrorism : the Club of Berne, founded in 1971 at

the initiative of the US, includes the US, Austria, Germany, Luxem-

bourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Italy, the United Kingdom,

Denmark and Switzerland. It brings together the heads of security and

intelligence of these countries (''). It consists of a forum or think-tank

which evaluates terrorist threats, espionage activity and the 1llicit

transfer of technology, as well as police methods developed to address

these issues. The Club has its own communications systems and

networks.

— The Club of Vienna was created in 1978 or 1979, and brings together

ministers and high ranking officials involved in combating terrorism

and illegal immigration in Austria, Switzerland, France, Italy and

Germany. It does not publish any reports on its activities ('?).

- The QUANTICO working group, established in 1979 at the initiative

of the FBI, is named after the city which is home to the FBI

(/) DewatLer, Y., La collaboration policière internationale ou comment résoudre les

problèmes resultant de la perméabilité des frontières (international police co-operation or

how to solve the problems arising from the permeability of borders), RICPT 1993, p. 226.

(*) Special Assistent Drug Enforcement Matters.

(?) BONNEFOI, S., Europe et sécurité intérieure (Europe and internal security). Trevi

European Union

Schengen, Paris, Encylopédie Delmas, 1995, p. 164; SABATIFR, M., op. cit.,

p. 41.

("°) SABATIER, M., op. cit., pp. 41-42.

("!) CETTINA, N., Les enjeux organisationnels de la lutte contre le terrorisme (the

organisational stakes in the fight against terrorism), Paris, LODJ, 1994, p. 131ff.

(*) ibid. SABATIER, M., op. cit., pp. 46-47.

__ 37 —

school ('*). Its permanent members are : the United States, the United

Kingdom, Germany, France, Sweden, Canada and Australia. It also

invites other members on an ad hoc basis, especially from the coun-

tries of Eastern Europe. It 1s a forum for the exchange of information,

and brings together the ministers responsible for the police services 1n

the Member States. An evaluation of the current situation 1s carried

out during annual sessions.

The Fgmont Group is involved in the fight against financial crime.

Founded in 1995, it brings together the intelligence services of what

were 58 countries up to June 2002, but the figure has now risen to 70,

and is concerned with the fight against money laundering ('*). With

no organisational structure of its own, it has become the most

mysterious club in the world. Its purpose 1s to collect information on

suspect transactions carried out by banks; it communicates via a

secure computerised network; the activities of the network are not

subject to any verification procedure; it operates at two different

speeds, depending on the degree of mutual confidence that exists

between the Member States. Information about it is hopelessly patchy.

À point worth mentioning is that after 9/11, a British initiative to

create a pool of all information relating to the financing of terrorism

failed.

These few examples demonstrate two things

the power of social

imperatives in the field of security mobilises police officers and

politicians alike; and, secondly, the inconsistency of social reactions,

both formal and informal, and the need for greater cohesion. In spite of

the democratic

deficit

mentioned

earlier,

the

second of these

shortcomings did not immediately lead to an institutionalised process in

what is a very sensitive field. Experience has shown the advantages of

informal pragmatic action which reached its culmination with the crea-

tion of TREVI, also known as the TREVI Conference or the TREVI

Group. And it is to TREVI that we shall now turn, since it was the

forerunner of the Schengen Agreement which paved the way for the

development of quasi-institutionalised police co-operation in Europe.

terrorism, radicalism,

TREVI is an acronym which stands for

extremism, international violence ('°). It was created at the initiative of

the European Council in Rome in 1975, in a building very close to the

famous Trevi fountain, by senior European politicians concerned about

the wave of international terrorism unfurling over Europe and the

("*) LE JEUNE, P., La coopération européenne contre le terrorisme ( European co-operation

in combating terrorism), Brussels, Bruyland, 1992, p. 30.

("*) BESsON, S., Le réseau mondial des polices financiers doit gérer sa croissance ( the global

network of the financial police must manage its growth), Geneva, Le Temps, 07.06.2002, p. 30.

("*) SABATIER, M., op. cit., pp. 58-79.

_— 38 —

powerlessness of INTERPOL, paralysed by its own statutes. The

brainchild of the British or Germans, the group was intended to

16

« operate in the greatest confidentiality » (

); however, it ran out of

steam with the birth of the European Union and the adoption of the

Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties. ('”)

The idea underpinning TREVI 1s interesting : the plan was to have

regular informal meetings of EU Interior and Justice Ministers depend-

ing on the topics to be discussed. TREVI was not based on any text and

had no organisational structure. It was an example of pure political co-

operation between governments, the expression of a desire to meet, but

at the same time a refusal to be integrated into the European institu-

tions, to submit to the control of the European Parliament, the Commis-

sion or the Court of Justice. Given its totally informal nature, it was

able to work quickly and flexibly, and to avoid red-tape. In a word, it

was the very paragon of pragmatism. Between 1976 and 1985, TREVI

only met seven times. Although meetings were billed quite simply as

forums for the exchange of ideas, it was the first time that all the EEC

countries came together to discuss law and order and internal security

without worrying about notions such as national sovereignty. It was also

the first European body « where police issues were given the same status

as other European political issues. » ('*)

After the Maastricht Treaty came into force in 1986, paving the way

for the free movement of people, it became necessary to improve police

co-operation. The TREVI ministers decided to meet once every six

months, and in emergency sessions whenever the need arose, as hap-

pened for example during the Gulf war in 1992. The ministers took

another, more fundamental, decision in the area which concerns us : the

extension of the competence of TREVI to international crime, and in

particular to drug trafficking, organised crime, illegal arms sales, human

trafficking, and stolen works of art. Groups of experts were set up for

these different areas, and as of 1991, the European Commission and cer-

tain countries (Austria, Canada, the USA, Morocco, Norway, Sweden

and Switzerland) were invited to attend the ministerial meetings.

However, they were not given access to the meetings of the group of

experts, to the TREVI database or to the highly secure ad hoc informa-

tion network. TREVI had a very successful track record, to the point

that one can say that it was an experimental model for a modern system

of international police co-operation and the precursor of EUROPOL.

('°) id, p. 58.

("7) FUNAUT, C., The « communitization » of police co-operation in Western Europe, The

Hague, Martins Nijhoff, 1993, p. Sff.

("*) SABATIER, M., op. cit., p. 61.

39 —

Apart form its secure network, TREVI also operated in the following

arcas

the exchange of liaison officers, a practice that already existed in the

past, but which TREVI institutionalised and for which it established

a set of rules. As of 1992, TREVI had officers who were responsible

for terrorism, drug trafficking and organised crime. The activities of

these liaison officers were subject to the law of the host country ; they

were not free to direct police actions themselves, but supplied infor-

mation and carried out missions in accordance with instructions from

the sending country, with due respect for the conditions imposed by

the host country;

the constitution of collections

the idea was to collect and centralise

samples obtained from the TREVI states. There were four such collec-

tions

the collection of explosives, before and after an attack, with

analytical details, operating modes and detonation techniques, includ-

ing a technical English French German glossary; the collection of

digital fingerprints on a pan-European level; the collection of drugs,

including a complete catalogue of heroin and heroin derivatives

seizures; and the collection of forged Arab documents.

An undertaking of this nature could not survive without an organisa-

tional structure, without becoming institutionalised. And this 1s what

happened with the entry into force of Schengen and the creation of

EUROPOL. It 1S now time for us to turn to that second channel of

international police co-operation, the institutional axis.

B. The institutional axis involves the conclusion of international

agreements and the creation of supranational bodies or international

organisations. The oldest and best known of these 1s undoubtedly ICPO-

INTERPOL, which was founded in 1923 under the name of Interna-

tional Criminal Police Organisation. À quick overview should suffice,

given that this organisation 1s so well known.

Born during the period between the two world wars, INTERPOL

underwent several metamorphoses until 1982 when, on the strength of

its new statutes, it became an international organisation ; it is the largest

after the United Nations, since it has approximately 180 Member States

today. Îts vocation 1s universal. It 1s structured like an enormous spider’s

web at the centre of which is the General Secretariat. Its databases con-

tain the names of all persons who have been sentenced or who are on

the wanted list of national police forces, records of stolen vehicles, works

of art and weapons, and the modus operandi of international criminals.

In addition, specialised services composed of experts, crime analysts and

IT specialists are on hand who can supply a wealth of data and

statistics, and provide advice and assistance in specific fields, such as

_— 40 —

organised crime, terrorism, vehicle crime, arms, drugs, stolen cars, works

of art, human trafficking, and money laundering. Fach Member State

has a National Central Bureau connected via a vast high-speed com-

munication network carrying highly secure data flows centripetally and

centrifugally. This 1s a highly efficient system, operating virtually in real

time, transporting information of both a tactical and strategic nature.

There are also so called « red notices », the equivalent of international

arrest warrants.

INTERPOL 1s thus an instrument of international

police and judicial co-operation. Its force and efficiency come from its

quasi universality, the non-formalist nature of co-operation, and, last

but certainly not least, its highly skilled agents. It 1s, in short, a profes-

sional and permanent organisation. That being said, INTERPOL suffers

from three major shortcomings which have transformed it into an out-

dated, some would even say archaic, system of international police co-

operation.

Firstly, within the organisation national sovereignty is respected to

the letter. As a result, no Member State is obliged to co-operate. À state

may, for example, decide to withhold information, or refuse to com-

municate or disseminate it; it may refuse a request, or only grant 1t par-

tially, without having to give any reasons. À state does not even have

to notify the General Secretariat of the result of an enquiry for which

it has asked the help of INTERPOL, or through it, that of one or

several Member States.

Secondly, INTERPOL only intervenes in the fight against ordinary

criminal cases (art. 3 of the statutes), including, since 1984, terrorism ;

but the organisation will have nothing to do with « issues or cases of a

political, military, religious or racial nature » (art. 3 of the statutes)

which, in terms of ratione materiae, is rather unfortunate in the fight

against international organised crime, corruption and financial crime.

Thirdly and finally, INTERPOL also clearly includes states with links

to international organised crime, and this has led to a regrettable loss

of confidence in the organisation. This has prompted the establishment

of separate regional networks, the most sophisticated of which is

FUROPOL, which we shall discuss presently. In fact, as of 1971,

INTERPOL established four regional Conferences (Europe, Asia,

America, Africa) within which specific regional issues are addressed.

Experience has shown the advantages of a regional approach to

institutionalised international police co-operation, and Europe has

played, and continues to play, the role of pioneer in this field. Two

important events have marked developments : the establishment of the

Schengen area and the creation of EUROPOL.

__ 41 —

The Schengen area, named after a small town in Luxembourg on the

border with Germany and France, is founded on the Schengen Agree-

ment of 14 June 1985, and on the Convention implementing the

Schengen Agreement of 19 June 1990, which came into force in 1995.

These two instruments do not cover all the Member States of the

EFuropean Union; however they do apply to certain non-Community

countries, such as Norway and Iceland, and soon, if all goes well, Swit-

Zzerland.

The Schengen Agreement is a « testing ground for the free movement

of persons » (') It is an intergovernmental act which was not submitted

to the European Parliament. It is therefore not a Community instrument

in the legal sense of the term. In the field of international police co-

operation, the agreement calls for the following measures

——

the harmonisation of national policies on 1llegal immigration, and

trafficking in drugs, weapons and explosives ;

closer co-operation between the police and customs services, through

better information exchange and the holding of joint meetings;

the development of joint or coordinated programmes aimed at crime

prevention and intelligence gathering;

the improvement and speeding up of international judicial co-opera-

tion in criminal cases:

the creation of a right of hot pursuit and surveillance for police

officers across FEurope’s internal borders.

This « declaration of faith » (“°), which basically takes up most of the

ambitious TREVI programme, was transformed into reality and institu-

tionalised by the Convention on the implementation of Schengen, and

in particular by Chapter III which is entitled « Police and Security ».

The first part contains all the traditional measures of European police

co-operation : the exchange and gathering of information, and assistance

in crime prevention between national police forces. These exchanges are

now compulsory, but must of course respect national legislation

(Schengen Convention, articles 39 and 46). Liaison officers are also

exchanged (Schengen Convention, article 47) on the basis of bilateral

agreements.

To this must be added innovative measures in the field of European

police co-operation (articles 40 and 41). These include, firstly, the right

of cross-border observation which is granted to police officers from a

Schengen state carrying out a criminal investigation on the territory of

another Schengen state. Typically, this will involve tailing suspects,

corroborating findings,

taking photographs,

obtaining

statements ;

9

id. p. 130.

;

) id. p. 133.

;

_ 42 _

however, they are not allowed to carry out house searches, or to ques-

tion and arrest suspects. Secondly, the right of hot pursuit 1s accorded

if a person or persons try to escape over a border into a neighbouring

country. This permission is granted until the competent authorities of

the state concerned have been notified and are able to take over, and of

course it only applies to the area of the national territory identified in

the bilateral agreement between the states concerned. In this respect,

Germany deserves a special mention since it has granted the right of

cross-border pursuit without limitation across the whole of its territory

to Belgian, French, Luxembourg and Dutch police officers. Finally, the

third and perhaps the most important innovation of all, 1s the Schengen

Information System or SIS. This measure 1s of extreme importance since

it introduces an almost revolutionary form of co-operation

it quite

simply requires the pooling of all police information, without the right

to choose the addressee or select what information is to be shared,

unlike INTERPOL. The SIS includes several databases, including :

- Wanted persons, 1.e. persons for whom an extradition warrant has

been issued, missing persons, persons who are under police protection,

persons suspected of preparing to commit a serious crime who are to

be placed under discrete surveillance ;

- goods that have been stolen, misappropriated or lost

vehicles,

firearms, identity documents, and registered banknotes.

Access to the SIS 1s granted to police officers, customs officers, the

penal authorities, immigration officers from the Schengen states, but

only for information on cases which they are investigating.

The system has been operating for seven years, and it has become

increasingly successful thanks to growing mutual confidence between

police officers, the professionalisation of cross-border police co-opera-

tion and good results.

This form of institutionalised cross-border police co-operation com-

plements the informal type of political co-operation that is far more

secretive, less transparent, and essentially undemocratic which we

described earlier. Gradually it will come to replace it., and EUROPOL

shows us how this is likely to happen.

There is some justification to the claim that EUROPOL 1s in a way

«the quintessential form of police co-operation » (*') in Europe, since

we have moved on from the intergovernmental relationship created by

the Schengen system, which we was not covered by the Community law

of the European Union, to the Community level : EUROPOL 1s men-

(?!) SABATIER, J-P., « La coopération policière européenne face à l’objectif de libre cir-

culation des personnes (How European police co-operation can cope with the free movement

of persons) », in the review Droit et Défense, 1996, part 2, p. 36.

_— 43 —

tioned in article K 1.9 of the Treaty on the European Union, which states

that one of the tasks of the Union 1s : « police co-operation for the pur-

poses of preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking

and other serious forms of international crime, including if necessary

certain aspects of customs co-operation,

in connection with the

organization of a Union-wide system for exchanging information within

a European Police Office (EUROPOL ) ».

Some consider it to be an « embryonic European police force » (**),

a kind of FBI in the making. Modelled along the lines of the German

Bundeskriminalamt, FUROPOL was set up in stages. The first was in

1993, with the creation of the Europol Drug Unit or EDU, with 1ts

headquarters in the Hague. The EDU 1s composed of liaison officers

from the police forces, gendarmerie and customs, who exchange infor-

mation amongst themselves within the limits imposed by their national

laws. They work under the authority of a coordinator and his team, and

are helped by administrative and functional staff, such as criminologists,

computer experts, etc. In 1996, about 100 persons, half of whom were

liaison officers, were employed in the Hague. And their numbers have

continued to grow as the responsibilities of the EDU have increased.

Limited at the outset to «the unlawful drugs trade, criminal organisa-

tions involved with it, and related money laundering activities » (**), its

remit has gradually expanded to take in the trade in radioactive substan-

ces, vehicles, clandestine immigration networks, and trafficking in

human beings. The two missions of the EDU are

— the exchange of information on the above-mentioned forms of crime

(tactical, functional, selective and immediate support), and

— generating reports on the general situation and analyses of criminal

activities (strategic, permanent, long-term support).

Experiences with the EDU and its pragmatic approach helped pave

the way for the establishment at last of EUROPOL proper, which meant

the adoption of the EUROPOL Convention of 26 July 1995. This turned

out to be more difficult than anticipated, as some countries, led by the

United Kingdom, wanted a much more modest construction, preferring

the application of the EDU system to the rest of cross-border crime

fighting, whereas other states, particularly Germany, wanted something

more ambitious, a more independent institution capable of becoming a

real Furopean FBI. The Convention is, of course, a compromise, but

(77) SABATIER, J-P., op. cit., p. 335, and : EUROPOL : un embryon de police européenne

) (Europol : an embryonic European police force?), RICPTS 1991, p. 322ff.

(°*) cf. Ministerial agreement of 02.06.1993, quoted by SABATIER, M., « La cooperation

policière européenne (European police co-operation) », op. cit., p. 353.

__ 44 _

nevertheless one that is more in line with the German concept (**). Let

us look at 1t in a little more detail :

a. EUROPOL's mandate : FUROPOL'’s mandate is the same as the one

originally attributed to the EDU. If there 1s unanimous agreement by

the European Council, it may be extended to cover other forms of

serious crimes mentioned in an annex to the Convention, including 18

offences against three types of legally protected interests : life, limb or

personal freedom ; property, public goods and fraud ; and illegal trad-

ing and harm to the environment, to which terrorism was added by

a Council decision of 1998.

EUROPOL's tasks

the so-called priority tasks are to facilitate the

exchange of information, to create databases, to forward informa-

tion, either at the request of a state or spontaneously, and to analyse

that information. In addition, there are what are referred to as sup-

plementary tasks : providing consultancy services and expertise to

national police forces in the field of technical and forensic police and

management methods; to generate general strategic reports with a

view to assisting in the development of criminal policy; and, finally,

to co-operate in the training of police officers.

EUROPOL's structure : the organisation has a star-shaped structure,

as 1s the case for INTERPOL, with the difference that there is a duty

to exchange information.

The EUROPOL information system

the EIS, which was inspired by

the TREVI model, is meant to replace the Schengen SIS at some

point in the future. The system is far more complete and efficient

than the SIS. The reason 1s that its files contain not just information

on individuals who have a criminal record, but also about the crimes

they have committed, including the date and place, the name of the

police force entrusted with the case and the case file number, as well

as sentences handed down for chargeable offences for which

FEUROPOL 1s competent (basically, a Europe-wide register of police

records). Data is fed into the system by liaison officers, but also by

FEFUROPOL itself too, which means that the system also contains data

obtained from its own officers, from third countries and from

INTERPOL. In addition, there are work files for the purposes of

analysis : these are temporary files which detail the progress being

made in collating, processing and using the data within the context

of a criminal investigation. Finally, the EIS includes an index system

which allows liaison officers who consult it to know if there is a

working file that concerns their own country.

(7*) BERTHELET, P., La réforme du mandat d'Europol. « Un pas de plus vers une police

européenne ? (Reforming Europol's mandate. À further step towards a European police

force”) », Revue de la gendarmerie nationale, booklet 201, 2001, pp. 88-95.

—- 45 —

In order to fulfil its mission, EUROPOL has been provided with

administrative organs (a Management Board, a Director, a Financial

Committee) and a legal status

EUROPOL has legal personality, like

any other legal entity in the Member States. It may conclude agreements

with third countries and organisations. Ît is liable for any damage that

may be caused, in which case it would be required to provide compensa-

tion. Disputes, conflicts or disagreements arising out of its actions are

first submitted to the Council of Ministers, and if they cannot be settled

within six months, the case is remitted to the Court of Justice of the

European Communities in accordance with an additional protocol of

23 July 1996. This protocol applies to fourteen of the fifteen members

of the European Union, the United Kingdom having obtained an opt-

out

Clearly, a slow institutional process guided by pragmatism 1s evolving

in Furope, and a European police force is emerging. It is not com-

parable to the American FBI or even the German Bundeskriminalamt,

but marks the development of institutionalised, Community-wide police

services which have nothing to do with intergovernmental agreements, as

was the case of TREVI, Schengen, etc. Europe does not have a

European police force, but it does have European police officers. In

order to increase cross-border police co-operation, Europe still needs to

overcome at least two obstacles that go well beyond the police dimen-

sion. First, criminal law and the criminal code need to be unified, a goal

which 1s still well beyond our grasp. But more importantly, Europe will

have to relinquish its status as a community of nation states and become

a real European federal state. À constitutional conference is currently at

work under the presidency of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, and its remit

involves providing Europe with a basic charter. We shall see what

emerges from this in a few months’ time. One thing, however, is a

foregone conclusion

in this vast debate about the construction of

Europe, questions relating to security and the fight against crime must

be addressed. Hence, police officers, too, will demand their say. Let us

hope that their voices will be heard!

RESUMÉ

L’auteur montre comment la coopération policière internationale

s’est développée selon deux axes concordants, mais pas toujours

parallèles

un axe pragmatique, souvent inspiré et soutenu par une

solide volonté politique et rendu possible par les progrès techniques et

scientifiques, et un axe institutionnel menant à la conclusion et à la mise

— 46 —

en œuvre d'accords bilatéraux et multilatéraux. Il illustre sa démonstra-

tion de nombreux exemples.

ABSTRACT

The author shows that international police co-operation developed

along two concordant, but not always parallel axes : the pragmatic one,

often inspired and supported by a strong political will, also founded on

technical, technological and scientific progress, and the institutional one

leading to the development, and subsequently the application, of inter-

national bilateral and multilateral legal instruments. Many examples are

given.

RESUMEN

El autor muestra como la cooperaciôn policial internacional se ha

desarrollado segûn dos ejes concordantes, pero no siempre paralelos : un

eje pragmâtico, inspirado y apoyado a menudo por una sôlida voluntad

politica y posibilitado por el progreso técnico y cientifico, y un eje

institucional que conduce a la conclusiôn y a la puesta en prâctica de

acuerdos bilaterales y multilaterales. E ilustra su demostraciôn con

numerosos ejemplos.

_ 47 —

VIOLENCE ET POLITIQUE CRIMINELLE :

63° COURS INTERNATIONAL

DE CRIMINOLOGIE

(Florianopolis (Brésil — 28/30 août 2002)

Georges Picca (")

1. — Violence et politique criminelle, tel était le thème retenu pour le

63° Cours international de criminologie qui a eu lieu les 28/30 août 2002

à Florianôpolis, capitale de l’État de Santa Catarina au Sud du Brésil.

Cette manifestation, qui a réuni un auditoire nombreux (neuf cents

participants inscrits), avait été organisée, comme les précédents Cours

internationaux en partenariat entre la Société Internationale de Crimino-

logie et l’Institut juridique Consulex ainsi que les éditions Consulex de

Brasilia, les plus importantes dans leur catégorie, du Brésil. Ainsi s’est

trouvé confirmée l’influence et l’audience de notre Société en Amérique

latine en même temps que le dynamisme de notre Vice président régio-

nal, le Professeur Edmundo Oliveira.

Ce Cours international était notamment destiné comme les précé-

dents (Rio de Janeiro en 2000 et Brasilia en 2001), à contribuer à la pré-

paration du programme scientifique du 13° Congrès mondial de crimino-

logie qui aura lieu les 10/15 août 2003 à Rio de Janeiro (Palazio do

Conventions).

Rappelons que le thème central du Congrès est : « Réduire le crime

et promouvoir la justice : défis pour la science, la politique et les prati-

ques ». Ce thème général sera développé à la fois dans quatre sessions

plénières traitant de problèmes clés actuels de la criminalité et de la jus-

tice pénale et à travers plus de trente ateliers spécialisés et tables rondes.

2. - La violence dans la vie sociale a pris depuis plusieurs décennies

une importance particulière qui ne pouvait que retenir l'attention des

responsables politiques, et des pénalistes et criminologues. Des commis-

sions ont été réunies par les gouvernements, de nombreux travaux de

recherches et publications ont été diffusés, principalement en Europe et

Amérique du Nord.

Il n'était pas par suite dans les objectifs du 63° Cours international

de criminologie de faire un quelconque bilan scientifique ou pratique des

(") Secrétaire Général de la Société internationale de criminologie.

_— 49 —

initiatives existantes en la matière. Rappelons que la violence se mani-

feste aujourd'hui dans les domaines les plus divers (violence dans les éta-

blissements d'enseignement, le sport, violence intra familiale etc.)° et que

selon la gravité des comportements constatés la réaction sociale et pénale

se trouve confrontée à des difficultés nouvelles pour aménager des

réponses satisfaisantes à la fois pour la sécurité publique, le respect des

libertés et l’efficacité de la sanction.

La difficulté principale réside dans le fait qu'il ne s'agit pas seulement

de se référer à des conduites violentes à caractère individuel, aux per-

sonnes ou aux biens, qui ont toujours existé et, continuent d'exister dans

la criminalité traditionnelle (meurtres violents sexuels, vols à main

armée, etc.). Il s’agit en réalité davantage de nouveaux comportements,

de gravité plus ou moins importante, mais qui ont tendance à se généra-

liser et qui revêtent souvent un caractère collectif (violences urbaines,

agressions) générateurs d'insécurité dans la population. Il s'agit égale-

ment de conduites particulièrement insolites et d'une gravité exception-

nelle (serial killers, viol collectif etc.) à caractère inédit.

À ces manifestations nouvelles de la délinquance s’ajoute le dévelop-

pement de la criminalité organisée qui, dans certains secteurs (trafic de

stupéfiants) est aussi à l’origine de comportements violents suscités par

le fonctionnement illicite de réseaux criminels et qui sont le fait générale-

ment de petits dealers.

Les constats sont nombreux sur ces différentes manifestations de la

nouvelle criminalité. Il importe par suite moins d’y revenir que d’orienter

la réflexion sur les réponses que la politique criminelle doit apporter à

ces nouveaux comportements.

Il n’est pas sans intérêt de rappeler, à cet égard que, négligeant les

controverses que l'utilisation de ce terme a pu susciter, il faut entendre

par politique criminelle l’ensemble des procédés par lesquels les sociétés

prévoient et mettent en œuvre les réponses nécessaires aux actes délic-

tueux ou criminels. Le concept, en tant que tel, n'a de portée réelle que

confronté aux pratiques qui fondent la législation pénale et les pratiques

procédurales des États. Par voie de conséquence si l’on peut aujourd’hui

parler à juste raison de coopération policière et judiciaire sur le plan

international 1l n’existe pas, en revanche, de véritable politique criminelle

internationale.

3. — C’est d'’ailleurs principalement dans une perspective pratique

que les travaux du 63° Cours international de criminologie ont été

orientés avec pour ligne directrice la confrontation entre juristes et crimi-

nologues sur à la mise en œuvre des politiques criminelles. Ceci à la fois

dans des contextes institutionnels et culturels différents ainsi qu'’au

regard des incidences de l'’existence d’une criminalité transnationale.

— 50 —

La contribution des différents et éminents conférenciers brésiliens a

permis non seulement d'engager d’utiles débats mais elle a témoigné une

fois de plus des caractères spécifiques de la délinquance inhérente à une

culture nationale. L'expérience déjà ancienne de plusieurs Cours interna-

tionaux ne pouvait à cet égard que confirmer ce point de vue. En

revanche la présentation du « modèle » européen de coopération juridi-

que a travers les excellents exposés du Prof. PH. Bolle (Neuchâtel,

Suisse) et J.L. de la Cuesta (San Sebastian, Espagne) ont suscité un

grand intérêt auprès des participants et ont été à l’origine de nombreuses

questions de leur part.

Sur un plan plus général, l'intérêt de ce nouveau Cours international

de criminologie, ajouté aux travaux des deux précédents (2000 et 2001)

devrait enrichir les débats du prochain Congrès mondial. Rappelons en

effet que lors des deux précédents Cours avaient été successivement

traité la question de la marginalité sociale dans un contexte de globalisa-

tion et le problème de la criminalité organisée. Ces thèmes se retrouve-

ront dans les ateliers et tables rondes spécialisées prévus pour le Congrès

de l’an prochain.

Il faut par suite remercier l’Institut juridique Consulex et son Direc-

teur L.F. Zakarewicz ainsi que ses collaborateurs de l’organisation de

ces trois Cours internationaux, sans oublier le Professeur Edmundo Oli-

veira qui en fut un des animateurs avec ses collègues brésiliens, universi-

taires, magistrats et avocats.

RESUMEÉ

Ce texte rend compte des travaux du 63° Cours international de cri-

minologie, qui s'est tenu à Florianôpolis (Brésil) du 28 au 30 août 2002.

Consacré au thème « Violence et politique criminelle », 1l a permis d’en-

tendre notamment les professeurs Bolle (dont l’intervention est synthéti-

sée dans l’article qui précède) et de la Cuesta.

SUMMARY

This text sums up the work done at the 63" International Crimino-

logy Course, which took place in Florianôpolis (Brazil) from 28 to

30 August 2002. Built around the theme of « Violence and criminal

policy, » it gave us the opportunity to hear Professors de la Cuesta and

Bolle (whose lecture 1s summarized in the previous article), among

others.

_— 51 —

RESUMEN

Este texto da cuenta de los trabajos del 63° Curso internacional de

criminologia, realizado en Florianôpolis (Brasil) del 28 al el 30 de agosto

de 2002. Dedicado al tema de « La Violencia y la politica criminal »,

permitiô en particular escuchar a los profesores Bolle (cuya intervenciôn

es sintetizada en el articulo anterior) y de la Cuesta.

__ 52 —

EL NUEVO DERECHO PENAL

JUVENIL ESPANOL DEL SIGLO XXI

Prof.Dr.José Luis de la Cuesta (*)

A. — FUNDAMENTOS GENERALES

DEL DERECHO PENAL DE MENORES ESPANOL

El modelo tutelar — sistema de intervencion relativo a los menores

delincuentes y en peligro en vigor en España durante la mayor parte del

siglo XX — entrô en una importante crisis a partir de los añ”* 70 y, en

especial, en España, tras la aprobaciôn de la Constituciôn de 1978, lo

que llevôé a un progresivo abandono del sistema tradicional ('). La pro-

teccion de los menores desamparados, encomendada ya desde 1987 a los

servicios sociales de las Comunidades Autônomas y a la Jurisdiccion

civil, encontrô una especial regulaciôon a partir de la Ley de Protecciôn

Juridica del Menor, de 1996. Sin embargo, el cambio en cuanto a la

intervencion sobre los menores delincuentes tardô mâs en llegar.

Aun cuando la nueva Ley Orgâänica del Poder Judicial de 1985, que

creô los nuevos Jueces de Menores, exigia la presentaciôon de un

Proyecto de nueva Ley de Menores por parte del gobierno al Parla-

mente, el mandato legal no fue cumplido. Sôlo la declaraciôn de incons-

titucionalidad de la vieja Ley de Tribunales Tutelares de Menores 1948

por parte del Tribunal Constitucional (Sentencia de 14 de febrero de

1991) puso en marcha el proceso legislativo de sustituciôn de la vieja Ley

de Tribunales Tutelares de Menores, que fue modificada de manera

urgente por la Ley Orgânica 4/1992. Esta instaurô un sistema provisio-

nal (tutelar/penal/social) a la espera de una reforma màäs profunda.

La verdadera transformaciôn del sistema ha Ilegado, a las puertas del

nuevo siglo, a través de la Ley Orgânica 5/2000, de 12 de enero (“)

(aprobada en aplicaciôn de lo dispuesto por el art. 19 del nuevo Côdigo

Penal de 1995)(*), reguladora de la responsabilidad penal de los

menores y que entrô en vigor en enero del año 2001, tras sufrir diversas

modificaciones durante su periodo de vacatio legis

la mâs importante

(*) Director del Instituto Vasco de Criminologia

(") J.L. DE LA CUESTA, « La aboliciôn del sistema tutelar : evoluciôn del Derecho español

en materia de jôvenes y menores delincuentes », Harlax, 37, 2001, pp. 7-61.

(7) Boletin Oficial del Estado nûüm. 11 de 13 de enero de 2000.

(*) Que declard

«los menores de dieciocho años no serän responsables criminalmente

con arreglo a este Côdigo. Cuando un menor de dicha edad cometa un hecho delictivo podra

ser responsable con arreglo a lo dispuesto en la Ley que regule la responsabilidad penal del

menor ».

53 —

la reforma operada por la L.O. 7/2000, de 22 de diciembre, en relacion

con los delitos muy graves y de terrorismo (*).

La L.O. 5/2000 se ocupa de regular tanto los aspectos materiales,

como procesales y ejecutivos, de la intervenciôn sobre menores infrac-

tores, estableciendo un sistema, integrado en las estructuras (judiciales,

policiales etc.) ordinarias. El sistema funciona en coordinaciôn con los

servicios sociales de las Comunidades Autônomas, a quienes corres-

ponde apoyar la actividad de los Juzgados de Menores y la ejecucion de

las medidas adoptadas por éstos respecto de los menores infractores.

es éste - a

Tampoco es totalmente ajeno al Derecho penal de mayores

través del Côdigo Penal (que, como en el plano procesal, la Ley de

Enjuiciamiento Criminal) resulta de aplicaciôn supletoria (disp.final 1) -

y de las leyes penales especiales quien define los comportamientos sus-

ceptibles de enjuiciamiento por parte de los Jueces de Menores (art. 1,1)

y, en general, las bases de la responsabilidad penal del menor (art. 5)

De otra parte, existe un régimen especial (actualmente en suspenso) para

la aplicaciôn de la Ley Penal del Menor a ciertos jôvenes (mayores de

18 años y menores de 21) y se prevé la continuaciôn del cumplimiento

de determinadas medidas (libertad vigilada o el internamiento del mayor

de 23 años) a través de las instituciones de adultos.

B. — PRINCIPIOS FUNDAMENTALES

I. — Responsabüidad penal del menor

El modelo seguido es un modelo mixto, en la linea abierta por la

reforma de 1992 y respetuoso de la Convenciôn de Derechos del Niño.

Un modelo que parte, sin matizaciones, de la admisiôn de la responsabi-

lidad « penal » de los menores de 18 años, tratando de restar énfasis a

la idea de protecciôn y a actitudes paternalistas con respecto a la infrac-

ciôn realizada por el menor. La minoria de edad (de 18 años) no es, por

tanto, ya una causa de inimputabilidad (*) (la culpabilidad también se

precisa para la exigencia de responsabilidad penal al menor) (*), sino un

limite personal a la aplicaciôn del Côdigo Penal de adultos, que da paso

a la aplicaciôn de la Ley de Responsabilidad Penal de los Menores. En

efecto, en Derecho español la edad limite de imputabilidad penal se

encuentra establecida ya en los 14 años (art. 3) y entre los 14 y 18 años

(*) X. ETXEBARRIA ZARRABEITIA, « Algunos aspectos de Derecho sustantivo de la Ley

Orgâänica 5/2000, reguladora de la Responsabilidad Penal de los Menores y de su Reforma

en materia de terrorismo », Icade, 53, 2001, pp. 77 s.

(°) En contra, B. FEIJOO SANCHEZ, « Sobre el contenido y la evoluciôn del Derecho Penal

español tras la LO 5/2000 y la LO 7/2000 », Revista Juridica, UAM, 4, 2001, pp. 24 s.

(*) J. CUELLO CONTRERAS, El nuevo derecho penal de menores, Madrid, 2001, p. 49.

__ 54 —

puede darse la imputabilidad penal, cuanto menos como semiimputabili-

dad (’), o imputabilidad disminuida (*).

Estamos ante una responsabilidad formalmente penal que encuentra

su fundamento exclusivo en la comisiôn por el menor de una infraccion

penal (delito o falta), sin la concurrencia de circunstancias eximentes 0

de extinciôn de la responsabilidad penal (art. 5-1) (°). Una responsabili-

dad que se distingue de la de los adultos, pues abre la puerta a una inter-

vencion materialmente educativa, lo que justifica importantes diferencias

y permite eludir (aunque no de manera absoluta) principios esenciales

del derecho penal de mayores, como el de proporcionalidad de la san-

ciôn, la prevenciôn general, asi como limitar ampliamente la interven-

ciôn procesal

de

las victimas,

excluidas como partes

procesales

(art. 25) (").

La fundamentaciôn de la intervenciôn educativa con base en la res-

ponsabilidad penal del menor no deja de plantear problemas en cuanto

al del tratamiento de los menores sin discernimiento, insuficientemente

abordada por la Ley 5/2000 y que mereceria, sin duda, una reconsidera-

ciôn. En efecto, si se va a declarar una responsabilidad penal habria que

exigir en todos los casos la constataciôn de una madurez suficiente por

parte de los menores (en particular, si son menores de 16 años) y no sôlo

la ausencia de las causas de inimputabilidad definidas por el Coôdigo

Penal de adultos. De otra parte, en los supuestos de inimputabilidad, la

imposiciôn de medidas terapéuticas por parte del Juez de Menores,

deberia apoyarse siempre en la peligrosidad criminal.

II. — Responsabilidad penal y reeducacion

Desde la perspectiva de la Ley, la declaraciôn de su responsabilidad

penal es el primer paso en el proceso de reeducaciôn y reinserciôn del

menor. El menor, el joven deben percatarse a través de ella de la impor-

tancia de los hechos cometidos y de la trascendencia de la intervenciôn

social a que éstos han dado lugar. Para ello, lo primero que se precisa

es que el menor y el joven puedan llegar a comprender el proceso, el sen-

tido de la intervenciôn. Aun cuando la Ley insiste en este punto y lo

reconoce de manera explicita, son muchas las dudas en cuanto a la clari-

(7) I. SANCHEZ GarCia DE PAz, « La nueva ley reguladora de la responsabilidad penal

del menor », Actualidad Penal, 33, 2000, p. 715.

(*) O. GarCia PÉREZ, « La evoluciôn del sistema de justicia penal juvenil », Actualidad

Penal, 32, 2000. pp. 683 s.

(?) En caso de no imputabilidad, el menor podräà ser sometido a medidas de interna-

miento terapéutico o de tratamiento ambulatorio (art. 5,2).

("*) J.L. DE LA CUESTA, « The Position of Victims and Victim Support in the New Spa-

nish Juvenile Crimimal Law », en E. FATTAH & S. PARMENTIER (eds.), Victim policies and cri-

minal justice on the road to restaurative justice. Essays in Honour of Tony Peters, Leuven,

2001. pp. 59 s.

55 —

dad de sus normas procesales y serâ dificil que muchos menores las com-

prendan bien y puedan participar adecuadamente en el proceso.

La especial coloraciôn educativa de la intervenciôn derivada de la

declaraciôn de responsabilidad penal del menor determina, igualmente,

el refuerzo de la posiciôn del equipo técnico, asi como la exigencia de

que todos los participantes en el proceso de menores deban ser profesio-

nales especializados (disp.final cuarta). Esto no resulta, con todo, sufi-

cientemente claro en cuanto a los cuerpos y fuerzas de seguridad.

IIT. — El superior interés del menor

En realidad, y a la luz de la regulaciôn legal, el criterio bâsico que

ha de impregnar toda la intervenciôn es el superior interés del

menor (''). Este principio repetidamente mencionado por la Ley, ha de

inspirar las actuaciones judiciales, del Ministerio Fiscal (art. 23) y del

propio abogado del menor y sirve de fundamento para relativizar y valo-

rar dentro de un conjunto de factores psico-socio-familiares del justi-

ciable la gravedad del hecho ejecutado (art. 7-3); para aplicar el princi-

pio de oportunidad reglada en el proceso (art. 18 y 19); y para la adop-

ciôn de toda decisiôn (arts. 28 y ss.), en particular, en todo lo relativo

a la elecciôn y determinaciôn de la medida imponible (art. 7,3). Ahora

bien, a pesar de su calificaciôn como un principio general y supremo de

la intervenciôn, la ley no ha concretado suficientemente el contenido de

este concepto. Dada su ambigüedad esto constituye un importante

defecto, que deberia haberse evitado mediante las oportunas referencias

al desarrollo personal del menor, sus necesidades educativas, etc. Y es

que el « interés del menor » dificilmente puede ser otro que el interés en

su reeducaciôn y resocializaciôn ('?). De aqui el papel relevante que en

su definiciôn alcanza el equipo técnico : se trata de un interés que ha de

ser estudiado por profesionales en las ciencias de la conducta a través

de criterios no formalistas (art. 27) y en una intensa coordinaciôn con

el Fiscal y el Juez.

C. — CAMPO DE APLICACION

El nuevo Derecho Penal de Menores español se dirige, en principio,

al enjuiciamiento de los menores que hayan cometido una infracciôn

penal entre los 14-18 años (art. 1) ("*). Por debajo de los 14 años de edad

("") J.R. PALACIO SANCHEZ IZQUIERDO, « El principio del superior interés del menor »,

Surgam, 466-467, 2000, p. 57. También A. JUAN & E. LOPEZ MARTIN, « El interés del menor

como columna vertebral de la Ley 5/2000 de 12 de enero », en Justicia de menores e interven-

ciôn socioeducativa, Murcia, 2001, pp. 107 s.

("*) J.R. PALACIO SANCHEZ IZQUIERDO, « El principio… », cit., p. 58.

("*) En 1992, las edades eran de 12 a 16 años.

— 56 —

quienes cometan hechos delictivos son remitidos por el Ministerio Fiscal

a las instituciones competentes en materia de protecciôon de menores

(art. 3) ("*).

La ley introduce una importante distinciôn en el tratamiento de los

menores de 14 a 16 años y los jôvenes de 16 a 18 años (art. 9-4 y 5).

Estos ültimos pueden quedar sometidos a una intervenciôn penal de

mayor intensidad en los supuestos de mayor gravedad.

En todo caso, el acceso a la mayoria penal no pone fin a la continua-

ciôn de la ejecuciôn de la medida impuesta al menor; ésta ha de prose-

guir hasta que se alcancen los objetivos propuestos (art. 15). Ahora bien,

a partir de los 23 años el joven sometido a internamiento serä remitido

a un centro de los previstos por la Ley Orgänica General Penitenciaria.

De conformidad con lo previsto por el art. 69 del Côdigo Penal, el

art. 4 de la Ley establece el régimen de aplicaciôn de la Ley de Respon-

sabilidad Penal de los Menores a mayores de 18 años y menores de 21

que hayan cometido una falta o de delito menos grave ('”) sin violencia

o intimidaciôn en las personas ni grave peligro para la vida o la integri-

dad fisica de las mismas. Esta posibilidad se encuentra, con todo, actual-

mente en suspenso (hasta el año 2004) ('*).

D. — PECULIARIDADES DEL PROCEDIMIENTO

El proceso penal de menores regulado por la Ley se presenta como

un proceso judicial homologado — quizàs hasta demasiado parecido al

de adultos —, dirigido por un magistrado especializado, el Juez de

menores ('’), y con plena garantia de la presunciôn de inocencia, del

ejercicio del derecho de defensa en todas las fases del proceso y del dere-

cho de apelaciôn ante la Audiencia Provincial ; hasta se prevé un recurso

de casaciôn en interés de la ley para los casos mâs graves (arts. 41 y s.).

Es un proceso en el que la participaciôn del Fiscal es intensa : dirige

la investigacion de los hechos y la acciôn de la policia judicial, instruye

el proceso (art. 23) — que puede ser declarado secreto (art. 24) —, pro-

mueve la acciôon de la Justicia y la defensa de la legalidad; al mismo

('*) J. LoRCA MARTINEZ, « Las medidas de protecciôn de menores y la intervenciôn de

la entidad püblica en la LORPM 5/2000 de Responsabilidad Penal de los Menores », Estudios

Juridicos. Ministerio Fiscal, 1-2001, pp. 79 s.

("*) Son delitos menos graves, en el Derecho español, los castigados con penas menos

graves; en general, en el caso de la prisiôn, la de hasta tres años (art. 33,3, a) CP).

("°) Disposiciôn transitoria ünica de la L.O. 9/2000 (BOE 23 diciembre 2000).

("”) Del lugar de la comisiôn de los hechos (art. 2,3), salvo si los hechos han sido cometi-

dos en varios territorios. En este caso se debe decidir cual es el juez competente teniendo en

cuenta el domicilio del menor (art. 20,3). En materia de terrorismo, el competente es el Juez

Central de Menores de la Audiencia Nacional (disp.adicional cuarta).

__ 57 —

tiempo ha de garantizar el respecto de los derechos de los menores,

velando por su interés (art. 6). Ahora bien, el Fiscal no puede adoptar

decisiones restrictivas de los derechos fundamentales del menor; sôlo el

Juez de menores es competente a solicitud del Fiscal y por resoluciôn

motivada (art. 23-3).

I. — Diversion

Caracteristico del proceso de menores es la flexibilidad que se otorga

en cuanto al ejercicio de la oportunidad de persecuciôn, manifestaciôn

del « principio de oportunidad reglada en interés del menor » ('*) reco-

nocido en el Derecho penal de menores.

Asi, el art. 18 autoriza al Fiscal a desistir de la incoaciôn del expe-

diente por faltas o por delitos menos graves cometidos sin violencia o

intimidaciôon en las personas (salvo que el menor haya cometido con

anterioridad otros hechos de la misma naturaleza), dotändole de una

facultad muy amplia e insuficientemente sometida a control. El funda-

mento de la decision debe ser la posibilidad de correcciôn del menor en

el ambito educativo y familiar y la decisiôon del Fiscal debe ir acompa-

fñada del traslado de lo actuado a la entidad püblica de protecciôon de

menores para que proceda a organizar la intervenciôn conforme a las

normas del Derecho civil y la Ley de Protecciôn Juridica del Menor ('?).

También se prevé (art. 19) la posibilidad de sobreseimiento del expe-

diente ya abierto, en los caso en que se produzca la conciliaciôn o repa-

raciôn entre el menor y la victima. El Fiscal ha de tener en cuenta la gra-

vedad de los hechos (en particular, la falta de violencia o intimidaciôn)

y las circunstancias del menor; y el equipo técnico actûa como media-

dor.

La conciliaciôn se considera producida « cuando el menor reconozca

el daño causado y se disculpe ante la victima y ésta acepte sus discul-

pas » (art. 19,3). En cuanto a la reparaciôn — que opera aqui en el marco

de la « responsabilidad penal » (*°) y no de la responsabilidad civil —, se

identifica legalmente con « el compromiso asumido por el menor con la

victima o perjudicado de realizar determinadas acciones en beneficio de

aquéllos o de la comunidad, seguido de su realizaciôon efectiva ». No

basta, por tanto, con la buena voluntad del menor. Es preciso que la vic-

("*) JR. PALACIO SANCHEZ IZQUIERDO, « La abogacia en la ley penal. Turno de oficio »,

en CONSEJO VASCO DE LA ABOGACÏiA, La Ley Orgänica 5/2000 de Responsabilidad Penal de los

Merores, Bilbao, 2001, p. 204. También F. BUENO ARÜS, « El Anteproyecto de Ley Orgänica

reguladora de la Justicia de Menores elaborado por el Ministerio de Justicia », Eguzkilore,

11, 1997, p. 164.

("?) Criticamente, G. LANDROVE DiAZ, Derecho Penal de Menores, Valencia, 2001, p. 287.

(*°) M. RICHARD GONZALEZ, « El nuevo proceso de menores », La Leyv, 28 junio 2000,

p

4

58 —

tima acepte las disculpas, en el caso de la conciliaciôn (*'), o que acepte

el compromiso de reparaciôn asumido por el menor (7*). La doctrina

considera, con todo, que esa aceptaciôn no ha de ser necesariamente

expresa ; es suficiente con que no manifieste su rechazo o su negativa a

aceptarlo (7*); de otra parte, se admite también la reparaciôn a través del

cumplimiento de la medida educativa propuesta por el equipo técnico en

su informe.

Evidentemente, para que la conciliaciôn y reparaciôn produzcan sus

efectos es preciso que tengan lugar de manera efectiva. Sôlo entonces

(salvo que la reparaciôn no haya podido tener lugar por causas ajenas

a la voluntad del menor) el Fiscal puede dar por concluida la instrucciôn

y solicita al juez el sobreseimiento y archivo de las actuaciones. En caso

de incumplimiento de la reparaciôn o actividad educativa se continüa

con la tramitaciôn del expediente (art. 19,5).

Puesto en marcha el proceso e incluso pronunciada la medida, la Ley

deja también abierta otras posibilidades de suspensiôn (asi como de

modificacion y sustituciôn de las medidas impuestas) (arts. 14 y 51) que

pueden llegar a poner fin a la via penal (**).

Il. — Medios coercitivos

El art — 28 permite que el Fiscal, cuando considere que hay indicios

racionales de criminalidad o riesgo de eludir o de obstruir la acciôn de

la justicia por parte del menor, solicite al Juez de Menores la adopciôn

de medidas cautelares que garanticen la defensa y custodia del menor.

Estas medidas cautelares (7°) pueden traducirse en el internamiento

en centro, en libertad vigilada o en la convivencia con una persona,

familia o grupo educativo, y debe ordenarlas el Juez — de conformidad

con el interés del menor — oido el Abogado del menor y el equipo téc-

nico, asi como a la representaciôn de la entidad püblica competente en

materia de protecciôn o reforma de menores.

Las medidas cautelares — cuyo tiempo de cumplimiento se aÈonarâ en

su integridad para el cumplimiento de las medidas que se impongan pos-

teriormente al menor en la misma causa o en otra - se pueden aplicar

(°") Criticamente, M.C. GÔMEZ RIVERO, « Algunos aspectos de la Ley Orgänica 5/2000,

de 12 de enero, reguladora de la responsabilidad penal del menor ». Actualidud Penal, 10,

2001, p. 168.

(7*) Si la victima es menor de edad o incapaz, debe asumir el compromiso su represen-

tante legal, con la aprobaciôn del Juez de Menores (art. 19,6).

(°*) J.N. MARTI SANCHEZ, « Protecciôn de la victima y responsabilidad civil en la ley

penal de los menores », Actualidad Penal, 4, 2001, p. 77.

(24

) F. MENA ALVAREZ, « Reglas para la determinaciôn de las medidas aplicables : modi-

ficacion y sustitucion de medidas », Estudios Juridicos. Ministerio Fiscal, 1-2001, pp. 221 y ss.

(ÿ*) T. GISBERT JORDA, « Las medidas cautelares », Estudios Juridicos. Ministerio Fiscal,

1-2001, pp. 103 s.

__ 59 __

también a los menores inimputables, sospechosos de la comision de un

hecho delictivo. Ahora bien, en estos casos, el Fiscal (art. 29), sin perjui-

cio de concluir la instrucciôn, ha de solicitar la adopciôn de las medidas

cautelares civiles dirigidas a la protecciôn y custodia del menor; de otra

parte, el proceso no se interrumpe, puesto que el Juez de Menores es

competente para la imposiciôon bien del internamiento terapéutico o del

tratamiento ambulatorio, medidas terapéuticas contempladas por la Ley

para el caso de que sean las adecuadas al interés del menor.

IIT. — Detenciôn e internamiento provisional

1. En caso de detenciôon - que ha de practicarse en dependencias ade-

cuadas y separadas de las utilizadas para los mayores de edad

(art. 17,2) - , el menor tiene el derecho a declarar ante su abogado y sus

padres, tutor o guardiän, y en su caso, en presencia del Fiscal. El Fiscal

debe ser informado de la detenciôn en el plazo de 24 horas y puede man-

tener detenido al menor hasta 72 horas, momento en que éste debe ser

puesto en libertad o conducido ante el juez de menores (art. 17).

El menor detenido tiene los mismos derechos que toda persona en su

situaciôn y, en particular, el derecho a la asistencia letrada (art. 520

LECrim) y al habeas corpus (art. 17, 6). También tiene derecho a recibir

los cuidados, protecciôn y asistencia social, psicolôgica, médica y fisica

que precise a la vista de su edad, sexo y caracteristicas individuales

(art. 17,3).

La detenciôn de los menores mereceria una reglamentaciôn mâs pro-

funda, con determinaciôn explicita de los medios de control y coercitivos

que la policia puede emplear respecto de los menores. En todo caso, a

través de las « Normas provisionales sobre tratamiento policial de

menores » (*°), se han creado los Grupos o Equipos especializados en el

tratamiento policial de menores (GRUME) en las Brigadas Provinciales

de Policia Judicial y, en su caso, en las Comisarias Locales.

2. Antes de la finalizaciôon del plazo de detenciôn el Juez de Menores

puede ordenar — en funciôn de la gravedad de los hechos o su de reper-

cusion y alarma social, y « valorando siempre las circunstancias perso-

nales y sociales del menor » — el internamiento provisional del menor

durante tres meses, susceptible de prolongarse por otros tres meses mäs

(art. 28).

3. En cuanto a la detenciôn e internamiento provisional por delitos

de terrorismo, la reforma de diciembre de 2000 prevé la creaciôn de esta-

blecimientos especificos para Ilevarlas a cabo con el control del personal

especializado que el Gobierno ponga a disposiciôn de la Audiencia

(°°) Policia, nûm. 153, 2000, pp. 25 s. (en especial, p. 29).

- 60

Nacional, en su caso, mediante convenio con las Comunidades Autôno-

mas (disp.adicional cuarta).

IV. — Otras peculiaridades

1. El proceso penal de menores se caracteriza por la no admisiôn de

las acciones presentadas por particulares (art. 25). La victima, los perjudi-

cados, aun cuando, evidentemente, pueden denunciar los hechos (en

cuyo caso el Fiscal debe notificarles la incoaciôn del expediente

art. 16,2), no pueden constituirse en parte en el proceso. Esto — que ha

sido criticado por las « situaciones de indefensiôn » (*’) que puede origi-

nar — determina el « monopolio de la acciôn penal » por parte del Minis-

terio Fiscal lo que sirve, en todo caso, en la L.O.5/200 no sôlo para ase-

gurar la primacia de las metas educativas, sino igualmente ("*) para

garantizar «el juego del principio de oportunidad ».

Lo anterior no es incompatible con el hecho de que, excepcional-

mente, se permita la participaciôn del perjudicado tanto en la fase de

instrucciôn como en la audiencia, de una manera limitada y respecto de

determinados hechos. Admite, en efecto, el art. 25 la personaciôn del

perjudicado en aquellos procedimientos relativos a hechos constitutivos

de infracciones penales graves o menos graves, cometidas por mayores

de 16 años y en los que haya concurrido violencia o intimidaciôn en las

personas o grave riesgo para la vida o integridad fisica de las mismas.

La participaciôn se centra, en cualquier caso, en conocer lo actuado,

proponer, practicar y valorar pruebas sobre el hecho y sus circunstancias

(no sobre el menor), formular alegaciones sobre los hechos probados y

sobre la participaciôn del menor (no sobre las medidas) e interponer

ciertos recursos, en particular, el de apelaciôn contra la sentencia en

determinados casos.

El perjudicado que se haya personado pueda asistir a la audiencia y

manifestar alli lo oportuno sobre la prâctica de nuevas pruebas y serà

oido en relaciôn con los hechos probados y la participaciôn del menor.

La exclusiôon de las acciones penales por los particulares en nada

afecta a la exigencia de la responsabilidad civil, cuyo régimen se encauza

a través de la Ilamada « pieza separada » (arts. 61-64) (*°), un procedi-

(77) R. VENTURA Fac1 & V. PELAEZ PÉREZ, Ley Orgânica 5/2000 de 12 de enero regula-

dora de la responsabilidad penal de los menores. Comentarios y jurisprudencia, Madrid, 2000.

p. 124.

(°*) G. LANDROVE Diaz, La Moderna Victimologia, Valencia, 1998, p. 293.

(°°) J.L. DE LA CUESTA ARZAMENDI, « Responsabilidad civil », en CONSEJO VASCO DE LA

ABOGACIA, cit., pp. 175 s.; | NAVARRO MENDIZABAL, « LA RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL EN LA LEY

ORGANICA DE RESPONSABILIDAD PENAL DEL MENOR », Icade, nüm.53, 2001, pp. 121 ss. Ver

también, Estudios Juridicos. Ministerio Fiscal, 1-2001. pp. 249 y ss.

- 61 —

miento de « naturaleza juridica inédita y especial » (*’), independiente de

la acciôn penal, pero dificilmente calificable como proceso civil. Al mar-

gen de ello, los particulares pueden, como en el Derecho penal de adul-

tos, reservarse la exigencia de esa responsabilidad civil ante la jurisdic-

ciôn civil (art. 109.2 Côdigo Penal) o personarse en la pieza en cualquier

momento si ésta se ha abierto por iniciativa del Fiscal, sin renuncia

(n° reserva) por parte del perjudicado. Conviene igualmente indicar que

en el marco de la responsabilidad civil se regula de manera especifica la

responsabilidad solidaria de los padres, tutores, acogedores y guarda-

dores legales o de hecho, calificada de modo generalizado como respon-

sabilidad objetiva, aun cuando deberia exigir en todo caso una minima

falta de diligencia (*").

2. También es de resaltar en el marco del procedimiento de menores

el especial protagonismo del equipo técnico (?). Este, inicialmente inte-

grado por un psicôlogo, un educador y un trabajador social, aun cuando

su composiciôn serà objeto de determinaciôn por las Comunidades

Autônomas, tiene atribuidas importantes competencias

informar sobre

la situaciôn del menor, sobre la posibilidad de reparaciôn o conciliaciôn

de la victima, sobre la conveniencia de las medidas cautelares o definiti-

vas, su orden de cumplimiento, su modificaciôn, sustituciôn o suspen-

sion; y realizaciôn de propuestas

en particular, de cara a la no conti-

nuaciôn de la tramitaciôn del expediente, en interés del menor, por

haber sido suficiente el reproche al mismo a través de los trämites ya

practicados o por considerar inadecuado al interés del menor cualquier

intervenciôn dado el tiempo transcurrido desde la comisiôn de los

hechos (art. 27,4).

À la vista de la experiencia de la Ley de 1992, y para evitar que la

intervenciôn del equipo técnico no se traduzca en un mero dictamen

escrito, la ley deberia haber insistido en la comunicaciôn entre el equipo

técnico y el Juez de menores (**).

E. — ESPECIFICIDADES DEL JUICIO ORAL

En cuanto a la fase de audiencia, la Ley procura regularla sobre la

base del procedimiento abreviado, si bien admite una mayor flexibilidad

(*°) R. VENTURA Fac1 & V. PELAEZ PÉREZ, Ley.., cit., p. 212.

(*') J.L. DE LA CUESTA ARZAMENDI, « Responsabilidad civil », cit., p. 184.

(°°) M.J. DoLz LaGo, « Labor y funciones del equipo técnico », Estudios Juridicos.

Ministerio Fiscal, 1-2001, pp. 129 s.

(**) También J. FUNES ARTIAGA, « Menores y jôvenes en situaciôn de conflicto social :

posibles respuestas », Justicia juvenil en la C.A.P.V. Situacion y perspectivas, Vitoria-Gasteiz,

1997, p. 65.

_— 62 -

y hasta se otorga al Juez un mayor margen de arbitrio (p.e. de cara a

la propia apertura de la fase de Audiencia).

Tras establecer que la conformidad del menor y su letrado con la

solicitud del Fiscal lleva directamente a la sentencia de conformidad

(art. 32), la Ley se ocupa de regular la asistencia a la Audiencia del

Ministerio Fiscal, el perjudicado personado, el letrado, un representante

del equipo técnico y el menor, que puede ir acompañado de sus repre-

sentantes legales, salvo que el juez acuerde lo contrario. También se

autoriza la participaciôn en la audiencia del representante de la entidad

püblica competente en materia de protecciôn o reforma de menores

(art. 35).

De acuerdo con lo dispuesto por el art. 35,2 el « Juez podràâ acordar,

en interés de la persona imputada o de la victima, que las sesiones no

sean püblicas ». También puede ordenar motivadamente que el menor

abandone temporalmente la sala si, de oficio o a solicitud de las partes,

considera que el interés del menor asi lo aconseja (art. 37,4)

Terminada la audiencia, el Juez de Menores dicta sentencia sobre los

hechos en un plazo mäximo de cinco dias (pudiendo anticipar el fallo

al término de la sesiones), debiendo valorar las pruebas y las alegaciones

del Fiscal y del letrado del menor y las manifestaciones de éste, asi como

atendiendo a las circunstancias y gravedad de los hechos y los datos

debatidos sobre la personalidad, situaciôn, necesidades y entorno fami-

llar y social del menor y su edad. Valorado lo anterior determina la

medida o medidas propuestas, indicando su contenido, duraciôn y obje-

tivos. Todo ello debe hacerlo el Juez procurando utilizar un lenguaje

claro y comprensible para la edad del menor (art. 39).

F. — PROTECCION ESPECIAL RESPECTO

DE LOS MEDIOS DE COMUNICACION

La audiencia, « que como regla general » (**) serâ püblica, puede no

serlo si asi lo decreta el Juez en aplicaciôn del art. 35,2, el cual establece

ademâs taxativamente que « en ningûn caso se permitirâ que los medios

de comunicaciôn social obtengan o difundan imâgenes del menor ni

datos que permitan su identificaciôn ». Esta norma obliga tanto al Juez

como al Fiscal, que debe preocuparse por su estricto cumplimiento.

( 34

) J.A. TOMÉ GARCIA, « Aspectos procesales en la nueva ley del menor », Icade, nûm.

53, 2001, p. 176.

_— 63 —

G. — El SISTEMA DE SANCIONES

[. — En general

Al tratar supra de las vias de diversion se ha hecho ya referencia a la

importancia que la conciliaciôn y el acuerdo de reparaciôn entre el

menor y la victima pueden alcanzar de cara a la evitaciôn del proceso

penal. Pues bien, corresponde al equipo técnico (art. 27,3) poner de

manifiesto en su informe las posibilidades que observa de cara a la repa-

raciôn o conciliaciôn y hasta proponer, en su caso, el contenido y finali-

dad de la actividad reparadora que pueda dar lugar al sobreseimiento

previsto por el art. 19 o favorecer la decision de dejar sin efecto la ejecu-

ciôn de la medida (art. 51,2). Lôgicamente, la elaboraciôn de esta pro-

puesta requeriräà del equipo técnico la realizaciôn de una cierta actividad

mediadora.

En virtud del principio acusatorio, el Juez de menores no puede

imponer una medida mâs restrictiva de derechos ni por tiempo superior

a lo solicitado por el Ministerio fiscal, ni se permite que, en el caso de

las privativas de libertad, éstas superen el tiempo que hubiera durado la

pena de prision imponible por el mismo hecho de haberse cometido por

un mayor de edad (art. 8). Reglas generales para la elecciôn de las medi-

das son las contenidas en el art. 7,3 donde se alude a « atender de modo

flexible no sôlo a la prueba y valoraciôn juridica de los hechos, sino

especialmente a la edad, las circunstancias familiares y sociales, la perso-

nalidad y el interés del menor, puestos de manifiesto los dos ültimos en

los informes de los equipos técnicos y, en su caso, de las entidades pûbli-

cas de protecciôn y reforma de menores ».

En casos de inimputabilidad sôlo puede imponer, como ya se ha indi-

cado, el internamiento terapéutico o el tratamiento ambulatorio, que

deberian apoyarse siempre en la existencia de una peligrosidad criminal.

La Ley no alude a los menores sin discernimiento, una cuestiôon que

mereceria ser reconsiderada, ya que toda declaraciôn de responsabilidad

deberia requerir la constataciôn de una madurez suficiente por parte del

menor y no sôlo la ausencia de las causas de inimputabilidad previstas

por el Côdigo Penal.

Il. — Las sanciones en particular

Aun cuando, a la vista de su regulaciôn, un importante sector de la

doctrina las considera auténticas penas juveniles (“°), por presentarse

(°°) J. CEREZO MIR, Derecho Penal. Parte General : Lecciones, Madrid, 2 ed.… 2000.

p. 106; O. GARCiA PÉREZ, cit., p. 686; X. ETXEBARRIA ZARRABEITIA, « Aspectos sustantivos »,

en CONSEJO VASCO DE LA ABOGACIA, cit., p. 32.

— 64 —

como auténticas « sanciones punitivas » (*°), en la terminologia legal

estamos ante « medidas ». Son medidas susceptibles de aplicarse por los

Jueces de Menores, las siguientes (*?) :

Medidas privativas de libertad : Internamiento en régimen cerrado, en

régimen semi-abierto, en régimen abierto. Internamiento terapéu-

tico (**).

Medidas no privativas de libertad : Tratamiento ambulatorio ; asisten-

cia a un Centro de dia; permanencia del fin de semana ; libertad vig1-

lada (simple o con supervisiôn intensiva); convivencia con una familia

o grupo educativo ; prestaciones en beneficio a la comunidad ; amones-

taciôn ; realizaciôn de tareas socio-educativas; privaciôn del permiso

de conducciôn de ciclomotores o vehiculos a motor, del derecho a

obtenerlos, o de licencias administrativas para caza o pesca o el uso

de cualquier tipo de arma; e inhabilitaciôn absoluta

Aunque la lista es amplia, se sigue echando en falta una apertura

hacia respuestas mâs imaginativas que quizà puedan hallar aplicaciôn a

través de los programas socio-educativos. También puede discutirse si

las medidas previstas ayudarân realmente a la responsabilizaciôn del

menor.

La duraciôn de las medidas no debe exceder, en general (art. 9,3), de

dos años (las prestaciones en beneficio de la comunidad, de 100 horas

y la permanencia de fin de semana

ocho fines de semana), limite que

puede considerarse adecuado.

Ahora bien, los mayores de 16 años en el momento de la comisiôn

de los hechos, pueden recibir una medida de hasta cinco años (200 horas

de prestaciones en beneficio de la comunidad, y hasta 16 fines de

semana), si cometen el delito con violencia o intimidaciôn en las perso-

nas o con grave riesgo para la vida o integridad fisica de las mismas y

el equipo técnico aconseja la prolongaciôn de la medida (art. 9-4). Ade-

mâs, excepcionalmente (art. 9,5), y si los hechos mencionados alcanzan

extrema gravedad (siempre lo son los casos de reincidencia), el interna-

miento se impone en régimen cerrado de l a 5 años y se completa con

libertad vigilada con asistencia educativa (ejecutada por las instituciones

püblicas de adultos) hasta por otros S años, sin que pueda suspenderse

(°*) I. SANCHEZ GARCIiA DE PAZ, « La nueva ley.. », cit., p. 719.

(‘”) J.R. MuNoz Oya, « Estudio sobre las medida en la Ley Orgänica Reguladora de la

Responsabilidad Penal de los Menores », Estudios Juridicos. Ministerio Fiscal, 1-2001,

pp. 185 s.

(**) FUNDACION DIAGRAMA, « Las medidas de internamiento y sus modalidades », en Jus-

ticia de menores…, cit., pp. 173 s.; A.L. ORTIZ GONZALEZ, « La medida de internamiento en

la Ley Reguladora de la Responsabilidad Penal de los Menores », Icade, num. 53, 2001,

pp. 185 ss.

— 65 —

o sustituirse la medida hasta el transcurso del primer año de cumpli-

miento efectivo del internamiento.

En caso de delitos muy graves (esto es, homicidio, asesinato, viola-

ciôn o agresiones sexuales cualificadas) y otros sancionados en el Côdigo

Penal con pena de prisiôn igual o superior a 15 años, los menores de 16

años recibiran una medida de internamiento en régimen cerrado de | a

4 años, complementada por la libertad vigilada hasta por tres años mas

y los mayores de 16 años internamiento en régimen cerrado de | a 8

años y libertad vigilada hasta por 5 años mâs (sin que pueda sustituirse,

suspenderse o modificarse la medida, hasta el transcurso de la mitad de

la duraciôn de la medida de internamiento impuesta (disp. adicional

cuarta c).

Cuando los hechos sean de terrorismo y el sujeto sea responsable de

mâs de un delito y alguno esté castigado con pena de prisiôon igual a

superior a 15 años, el internamiento podrä elevarse a 5 años (para los

menores de 16 años) y a 10 años (para los mayores de 16); ademas en

atenciôn « proporcionalmente a la gravedad de delito, el nümero de los

cometidos y las circunstancias que concurran en el autor », se impondrà

la medida de inhabilitaciôn absoluta por un tiempo superior entre 4 y

15 años al de la duraciôn de la medida de internamiento (disp.adicional

cuarta c).

La Ley prevé la posibilidad de suspensiôn (durante dos años) de la

ejecuciôon del fallo (art. 40) para las medidas de duraciôn inferior a dos

años. Son condiciones para la misma, el no ser condenado por sentencia

firme por delito cometido durante el tiempo de la suspensiôn y que el

menor asuma el compromiso de mostrar una actitud y disposicion de

reintegrarse a la sociedad no incurriendo en nuevas infracciones. Ade-

mâs, el Juez puede someter al menor a un régimen de libertad vigilada

durante la suspensiôn o imponerle la obligaciôon de realizar una activi-

dad socioterapéutica, si lo recomienda el equipo técnico o la entidad

püblica de protecciôn o reforma de menores; en esta actividad puede

hasta preverse la necesaria participaciôn de los padres, tutores o guarda-

dores del menor.

Amplias son las competencias judiciales en cuanto a la modificaciôn,

suspensiôn, reducciôn o sustituciôn y cesaciôn de la medida impuesta,

atendiendo sôlo al interés del menor y a si se ha producido ya una sufi-

ciente expresiôn hacia el mismo del reproche merecido por su conducta

(art. 14). Estas decisiones pueden, en efecto, producirse « en cualquier

momento », debiendo respetar durante la ejecuciôn lo dispuesto por el

art. 51.

- 66 —

IIL. — Relaciôn entre las diferentes medidas

El Juez puede imponer una o varias medidas, si considera que esto

es lo que mejor se acomoda al interés del menor. Ahora bien, cuando

sean varias las medidas y no puedan cumplirse simultäneamente, el Juez

puede o bien sustituir todas o algunas de ellas o establecer el orden de

su cumplimiento sucesivo, sin que el plazo total de cumplimiento pueda

superar el doble de tiempo de la mäs grave (art. 13).

Criterios generales en cuanto al orden de cumplimiento (que puede

ser alterado por el Juez) es comenzar por las medidas de internamiento

y, entre ellas, por el internamiento terapéutico ; al margen de lo anterior,

entre medidas de la misma naturaleza, el orden legal es el cronolégico

(art. 47).

Si durante el cumplimiento de una medida el joven es condenado en

aplicaciôn del Côdigo Penal y el cumplimiento simultäneo de la pena o

medida impuesta no es posible, la pena de prision se cumplirà a conti-

nuaciôn de la medida, salvo que por tratarse de condena por delitos

graves, el juez, atendidas las circunstancias del joven, considere mâs ade-

cuada la ejecucion inmediata de la pena de prisiôn (art. 47,5).

IV. — Reglas de determinaciôn y aplicaciôn de la medida

en Derecho Penal de Menores

Los hechos constitutivos de faltas sôlo pueden dar lugar a la medida

de amonestaciôn, permanencia de fin de semana (hasta 4 fines de

semana), prestaciones en beneficio de la comunidad (hasta 50 horas) y

privacion del permiso de conducir o de otras licencias administrativas

(art. 9,1). En cuanto al internamiento en régimen cerrado ünicamente se

aplicarà cuando en los hechos se haya empleado violencia o intimidaciôn

en las personas o si se ha actuado con grave riesgo para la vida o inte-

gridad fisica de las mismas (art. 9,2), y nunca a los hechos imprudentes

(art. 9,6).

La ley se inspira en el contenido del Côdigo Penal en el estableci-

miento de las reglas a seguir para el concurso de infracciones (en el

concurso ideal y medial, se tiene exclusivamente en cuenta la infraccion

mâs grave) (art. 11) y en la infracciôn continuada o con pluralidad de

victimas (art. 12); en este supuesto se impone una sola medida tomando

como referencia el hecho mâs grave y en la mâxima extensiôn permitida

por el art. 9, salvo que el interés del menor aconseje la imposiciôn de la

medida en una extension inferior.

Tambien se ocupa de regular la prescripciôn de los delitos y de las

medidas (art. 10), si bien los hechos cometidos por mayores de 18 años

y menores de 21 o constitutivos de delitos muy graves o de terrorismo

67 —

(disp.adicional cuarta), se rigen por las normas generales del Côdigo

Penal.

H. — EJECUCION DE LAS MEDIDAS : PECULIARIDADES

La ejecuciôn de las medidas (*°), fundada sobre el principio de legali-

dad (art. 43) y bajo el control del Juez de menores (art. 44), es compe-

tencia de las Comunidades Autônomas, pero las entidades püblicas de

protecciôn o reforma de menores pueden alcanzar convenios con otras

entidades püblicas o privadas sin Animo de lucro y sin cesiôn de la res-

ponsabilidad de la ejecuciôn (art. 45). Rige el principio de proximidad :

ha de destinarse al menor al centro mâs adecuado de entre los mâs

prôximos a su domicilio, salvo que el Juez de Menores acuerde lo

contrario en interés del menor (art. 46,3).

Para la ejecuciôon de cada medida, la Administraciôn designa un pro-

fesional responsable. La Administraciôn debe enviar al Juez de Menores,

al Fiscal y al abogado del menor informes sobre la ejecuciôn y sobre la

evoluciôn personal del menor (art. 49). En caso de sustracciôn a la ejecu-

cion de la medida, el menor es de nuevo internado en el centro donde

se encontraba o en otro centro mâs adaptado a su situaciôn. Si la

medida impuesta era la estancia de fin de semana, el menor permanecerà

en su domicilio para cubrir sin interrupciôn el tiempo que falta; si la

medida no era privativa de libertad, el Fiscal puede proponer al Juez su

sustituciôon por otra medida no privativa de libertad ; excepcionalmente,

su internamiento en régimen semiabierto (art. 50).

La ejecuciôn de las medidas de internamiento (*°) se divide en dos

fases

internamiento en el centro y libertad vigilada (art. 7,2). La Ley

recoge reglas particulares para la ejecucion de medidas privativas de

libertad en centros especificos (no penitenciarios), que pueden ser o no

centros de protecciôn de menores o centros socio-sanitarios (art. 54).

Las medidas impuestas por delitos de terrorismo se cumplen bajo el

control del personal especializado y en los centros que el gobierno ponga

a disposiciôon de la Audiencia Nacional, en su caso, mediante convenio

con las Comunidades Autônomas (disp.adicional cuarta d).

Principio fundamental de las actividades de los centros ha de ser la

resocializaciôn (art. 55). Esto obliga a garantizar los derechos de los

(°°) B. SAN MARTIN LARRINOA « Ejecuciôn », en CONSEJO VASCO DE LA ABOGACÏA, la

Ley

cit., pp. 141 s. También, E. LôÔPEZ MARTIN & M.A. DÔLERA CARRILLO, « Ejecuciôn de

las medidas no privativas de libertad », en Justicia de menores…, cit., pp. 141 ss. Ver igual-

mente Estudios Juridicos. Ministerio Fiscal, 1-2001, pp. 417 s.

(4()

) P. LôPEZ CABELLO, « Ejecucion de las medidas privativas de libertad », en CONSEJO

VASCO DE LA ABOGACIiA, La Ley, cit., pp. 155 s. Ver también Estudios Juridicos. Ministerio

Fiscal, 1.-2001, pp. 459 s.

_— 68 —

internos no afectados por la condena (y recogidos en el art. 56; los

deberes se recogen en el art. 57), asi como a organizar la vida interna

en la forma mâäs parecida a la vida en libertad (art. 55,2). El reglamento

deberâ fijar el sistema de permisos de salida ordinarios y extraordinarios

(art. 55,3), asi como otros mültiples aspectos relativos al funcionamiento

del establecimiento. El menor tiene derecho a ser informado por escrito

y en lenguaje comprensible sobre todo ello, asi como sobre los medios

a su disposiciôn para presentar reclamaciones, quejas o recursos

(art. 58).

Reglas especialmente importantes en materia de internamiento son

las normas disciplinarias (art. 60) y todo lo relativo a las medidas de

vigilancia y de seguridad (art. 59). Las correcciones disciplinarias deben

ser respetuosas (por su contenido, por su forma y por el procedimiento

de aplicaciôn) de las disposiciones y de los principios constitucionales ;

pueden ser siempre objeto de recurso — por escrito u oralmente — ante el

Juez de Menores (art. 60,7). La dignidad de la persona y su derechos de

alimentaciôn, enseñanza obligatoria y comunicaciones y visitas se garan-

tizan en cualquier caso (art. 60,1). La ley no se ocupa de la descripciôon

de la infracciones disciplinarias muy graves, graves o leves, remitiéndose

al Reglamento. Por contra, las sanciones disciplinarias (*') se recogen en

el articulo 60 que distingue las aplicables a las infracciones muy graves,

a la graves y a las infracciones leves.

I. — REGISTRO DE ANTECEDENTES

Por Real Decreto 232/2002 de 1 de marzo se ha regulado el Registro

de Sentencias sobre Responsabilidad Penal de los Menores establecido

por la disposiciôn adicional tercera de la L.O.5/2000. Es éste un Registro

ünico para todo el territorio español y abierto en el Ministerio de Justi-

cia (art. 2) donde se inscriben las sentencias firmes dictadas por los

Jueces y Tribunales en aplicaciôn de la Ley reguladora de la responsabi-

lidad penal de los menores. Datos susceptibles de inscripciôn, ademäs de

los propios de la sentencia, son los relativos a las circunstancias perso-

nales del menor y a las medidas impuestas, con expresiôn de su dura-

ciôn, lugar de cumplimiento, suspensiôn, reducciôn o sustituciôn y fecha

de prescripciôn, de cumplimiento o finalizaciôon (art. 3 RD).

Sin perjuicio de su utilizaciôn a efectos estadisticos, los datos sôlo son

accesibles por los ôrganos jurisdiccionales que conozcan de procedimien-

(*") Separaciôn del grupo (en casos de evidente agresividad, violencia y alteracion grave

de la vida en comün); separaciôn durante el fin de semana ; privaciones de salidas de fin de

semana ; privaciôn de salidas recreativas; privaciôn de participaciôn en las actividades recrea-

tivas; y amonestaciôn.

— 69 —

tos penales sobre menores y por el Ministerio Fiscal, debiendo ser facili-

tada la informaciôn por el Ministerio de Justicia en un plano de tres dias

(art. 6).

La cancelaciôn de los datos se produce de oficio transcurridos diez

años desde que el menor haya alcanzado la mayoria de edad (o cum-

plido los 21 años) y siempre que las medidas se hayan ejecutado plena-

mente o hayan prescrito.

J. — DATOS EMPIRICOS DEL DERECHO PENAIL DE MENORES

En la actualidad existen 70 Juzgados de Menores que, en el año 2001

(primer año de aplicaciôn de la nueva Ley) conocieron de 22.476 asun-

tos, resolviendo 20.051 (pendientes al finalizar el año

10.029). Emitie-

ron un total de 1.890 sentencias (

42)_

Dado que se acaba de cumplir un año desde la entrada en vigor del

nuevo sistema no se disponen todavia de informaciones suficientes sobre

su aplicaciôn. De todos modos, a partir de un estudio recientemente

publicado sobre la delincuencia juvenil desde 1997 a 2000 (**) pueden

suministrarse algunos datos acerca de las caracteristicas generales de la

delincuencia de menores en España, que en 1999 supuso un total de

11.691 detenidos (10.660 chicos y 1.031 chicas).

Conforme al citado estudio los menores de 18 años detenidos supu-

sieron en 1997 un 8,6% del total de detenciones practicadas, un indice

que se fue elevando hasta Îlegar al 11,2% en el año 2000. Fueron las

infracciones contra la propiedad donde el peso de la delincuencia juvenil

se presentô de manera mâs destacada (y donde se concentré la reinciden-

cia), alcanzando un 16 % la protagonizada por menores de 18 (30 % en

el caso de los menores de 21 años). En todo caso, a menor edad del

delincuente, mayor peso relativo tuvieron los hechos contra el patrimo-

nio (79% de los delitos cometidos por menores de 14 a 18 años, frente

al 63,2% de los cometidos por mayores de 18 y menores de 21), y los

contrarios a la libertad e indemnidad sexual (1,0 % de los hechos come-

tidos por jôvenes de 18-21 ; 1,2% de los cometidos por menores de 14-

18 años); por el contrario, a mayor edad mâs fueron los delitos contra

la seguridad colectiva (principalmente contra la seguridad del trà-

fico)(14,4 % de los hechos cometidos por jôvenes de 18-21 ; 5,7 % de los

cometidos por menores de 14-18 años) y contra las personas (lesiones)

(6,4% de los hechos cometidos por jôvenes de 18-21; 5,2% de los

(“*) Fuente

Anuario El Pais 2002, Madrid, 2002, p. 206.

(**) J.L. PÉREZ MARTIN, « La delincuencia juvenil en España

un anâlisis estadistico »,

Cudernos de la Guardia Civil, XXV, 2001, pp. 103 s.

— 70 —

cometidos por menores de 14-18 años), si bien con menor utilizacion de

la violencia fisica y mâs empleo de armas de fuego. Los hechos fueron

cometidos de manera ampliamente mayoritariamente por menores de

nacionalidad española (los extranjeros menores de 18 años oscilaron

entre el 10 y el 20%) y de sexo masculino, quedando la delincuencia de

mujeres por debajo del 10 % hasta los 18 años (aun cuando en la franja

de edad de 19-20 años alcanzô el 20 %).

K. — TENDENCIAS DE FUTURO : REFORMAS, PROYECTOS DE LEY

Hacia el futuro, el reto fundamental que se presenta en la actualidad,

es la adecuada aplicaciôn de la nueva Ley, que exige, en primer lugar,

una suficiente dotaciôn de medios (**) y, también, su desarrollo norma-

tivo. Es amplio, en efecto, el espacio abierto por la Ley a la regulacion

reglamentaria, habiéndose habilitado por la disposiciôn final séptima el

plazo de un año de la vacatio legis para la adaptaciôon de la normativa

de «las Comunidades Autônomas… para la adecuada ejecuciôn de las

funciones que les otorga la presente ley ».

En este plazo, la Comunidad Autônoma de Cataluña aprobô una

Ley 27/2001 de 31 de diciembre, de Justicia Juvenil, publicada en el

Boletin Oficial del Estado de 9 de febrero de 2002, regulando los princi-

pios rectores de la intervenciôn, los derechos generales y especificos de

los menores y jôvenes sometidos a la misma, las competencias de la

Generalidad y la participaciôn de entidades püblicas y privadas en este

âmbito. Igualmente regulô la ejecuciôn de las medidas en medio abierto

(Tit.IT) y, sobre todo, la ejecuciôn de los internamientos (Tit.III, arts.

15-60), asi como el apoyo a los procesos individuales de reinserciôn y las

funciones de inspecciôn y de tratamiento y gestiôn de la informaciôn.

La importancia del desarrollo legal es muy alta a la vista de las lagu-

nas existentes en cuanto a la ejecuciôn de las medidas. Desaparecida de

la disposiciôn adicional lo relativo al desarrollo reglamentario por el

Gobierno (previsto inicialmente en el Proyecto de Ley), y sin perjuicio

de que esa falta de menciôn no impida ese desarrollo por el Gobierno,

la fôrmula catalana parece muy razonable (*°), siempre que se respete lo

ordenado por la regla novena de Beijing en el plano internacional : esto

es, siempre que se parta del contenido de la legislacion para adultos

como un minimo garantizado en el tratamiento de menores y jôvenes.

(**) Las Comunidades Autônomas pidieron 43.000 millones pta (un‘* 7.000 millones 1).

J.C. RiOS MARTIN, « LA LEY DE RESPONSABILIDAD PENAL DE LOS MENORES, CAMBIO DE PARA-

DIGMA

DEL NINO EN PELIGRO AL NINO PELIGROSO », Icade, 53, 2001, pp. 241.

(**) J.L. DE LA CUESTA ARZAMENDI, « La ejecuciôn de las medidas », Eguzkilore, 14, 2000,

p. 52.

— 71 —

RESUME

La nouvelle loi relative à la responsabilité pénale des mineurs est

entrée en vigueur en Espagne en janvier 2001. En vertu de cette loi, les

jeunes de 14 à 18 ans peuvent être déclarés pénalement responsables par

les juges de mineurs s’ils commettent des faits qualifiés de délits ou de

fautes par le Code pénal ou les lois pénales spéciales. La déclaration de

responsabilité pénale ne donne pas lieu à l’application des peines réser-

vées aux adultes, mais à un système de mesures spécifiques pour mineurs

délinquants. Même si la procédure devant le juge des mineurs diffère du

procès des adultes, elle n’en est pas moins respectueuse des principes,

droits et garanties de procédure proclamés par la Constitution.

ABSTRACT

The new Spanish law on juvenile criminal responsibility went into

effect in January 2001. In accordance to this law, young people between

the ages of 14 and 18 can be declared criminally responsible by juvenile

courts 1f they commit acts determined as offences or misdemeanors by

the criminal Code or by special criminal laws. The declaration of crimi-

nal responsibility does not entail the application of adult sentences but

it means resorting to a system of specific measures for juvenile offenders.

Even 1f the procedure in juvenile courts differs from the one in adult

courts, it still safeguards principles, rights, and guarantees of procedure

proclaimed by the Constitution.

RESUMEN

En enero de 2001 entrô en vigor en España la nueva Ley de responsa-

bilidad penal de los menores. Conforme a la misma, los mayores de 14

años y menores de 18 pueden ser declarados penalmente responsables

por los Jueces de Menores si cometen alguno de los hechos calificados

de delitos o faltas por el Côdigo Penal y las Leyes penales especiales. La

declaracion de responsabilidad penal no da paso a la aplicacièn de las

penas de adultos, sino a un sistema de medidas especificas para los

menores delincuentes. También el proceso ante el Juez de Menores

difiere del proceso de adultos, si bien es plenamente respetuoso de los

principios y derechos y garantias procesales declarados por la Constitu-

cion.

__ 72 —

L’INFLUENCE (POSSIBLE)

DE LA RECHERCHE CRIMINOLOGIQUE

SUR LA POLITIQUE CRIMINELLE

Alenka Selih (*)

Le rapport entre la recherche criminologique et la politique criminelle

semble être un thème récurrent. Avec le temps 1l ne perd pas pour autant

de son actualité. Par pure coïncidence, il y a presque trente ans, ce thème

a été traité dans les Annales Internationales de Criminologie par mon

prédécesseur à la Faculté de droit et a l’Institut de criminologie ('). Le

thème garde aujourd'hui le même intérêt dans des conditions très diffé-

rentes de celles des années soixante-dix.

I. — LE RAPPORT ENTRE LA CRIMINOLOGIE

ET LA POLITIQUE CRIMINELLE

]|. En comparant la criminologie à la politique criminelle, celle-ci est

considérée, autant que l’ensemble de toutes les activités des organes

d'Etat et du système légal destinées à surveiller le comportement des

gens, beaucoup plus ancienne que la criminologie, dont les débuts ne

remontent pas plus loin qu’au commencement du 19° siècle (*). Depuis

qu'il y a des recherches criminologiques, et notamment des études empi-

riques, se pose la question du rapport entre les deux branches. C’est une

question qui n'est pas seulement actuelle, mais aussi toujours ouverte.

Actuelle, parce que la politique criminelle est censée —- autant qu’une

activité rationnelle - reposer aussi sur les résultats de recherches crimi-

nologiques de différents genres; un question ouverte, parce qu’il existe -

au moins selon l’opinion de quelques-uns — toute une « liste de questions

de recherche criminologique qui provoquent des soucis en politique » (*).

Cette inquiétude résulte de l’expérience de la collaboration entre la cri-

minologie et la politique criminelle, qui est et qui reste toujours une par-

tie de la politique; comme 1l est rapporté par les auteurs étrangers, les

politiciens de toutes les couleurs cherchent souvent des vues des experts

comme alibi pour leurs propres vues, qui peuvent être pourtant diffé-

(*) Professeur, Faculté de droit et Institut de criminologie; Université de Ljubljana, Slo-

vénie.

(") VonpoPIVEC, (1974).

(?) SCHÜLER-SPRINGORUM (1990), 313.

(*) SCHWIND, (1993), 204.

73 —

rentes de celles des experts (*). La constatation que la meilleure crimino-

logie serait celle qu'on pourrait appliquer à la politique criminelle est

correcte seulement lorsqu'il s'agit de résultats de telles recherches, dont

les points de départ et les résultats sont conformes aux postulats d’un

Etat de droit contemporain.

Dans le rapport entre le criminologie et la politique criminelle, 1l n’est

pas possible d’ignorer le fait que le processus de recherche est fondamen-

talement une activité rationnelle, bien qu'il soit impossible d’accepter ce

fait sans aucune réserve, étant donné que les chercheurs ont aussi leurs

propres orientations de valeurs et qu'ils agissent dans le cadre de cer-

taines approches théoriques. Pourtant, la constatation concernant l’acti-

vité rationnelle, ne peut pas être en totalité appliquée au processus de

la mise en œuvre de certaines mesures ou groupe de mesures entrepris

par la politique criminelle. Le processus de la création de la législation,

qui représente la base de la régulation du problème de crime, dépend

souvent de toute sortes de conditions qu'on ne peut pas considérer

comme rationnelles

soit de sentiments personnels ou collectifs, soit les

intérêts les plus différents, les systèmes de valeurs, les préjugés, etc… (°)

Il en est de même pour les autres domaines de la mise en œuvre de la

politique criminelle, qu’il s’agisse de la détection des infractions ou de

l’exécution de sanctions pénales et dans ce cadre, de l’implantation du

principe de resocialisation ou de la rééducation. La demande d’incorpo-

rer les éléments qui pourraient assurer une plus grande rationalité dans

tous les processus lies à l’élaboration et à la mise en œuvre de la politi-

que criminelle pourrait donc contribuer à ce que celle-ci soit plus prévi-

sible, transparente et adéquate.

La criminologie peut transmettre à la politique criminelle son savoir

et les résultats de ses recherches, en l’« équipant » ainsi avec des éléments

rationnels, nécessaires pour prendre des décisions

elle sait interpréter

des données statistiques et des tendances statistiques ; elle transmet le

point de vue « dominant » sur un certain problème ; elle peut signaler

une déduction fausse — un exemple, et même un des plus fréquents, est

la conclusion que les peines sévères prévues dans la loi ont un grand

effet préventif sur la criminalité, alors qu’il est établi empiriquement que

c'est plutôt le risque assez élevé d’être découvert qui est le facteur pré-

ventif. Une contribution importante de la science criminologique qui

n’est pas à négliger non plus, est la formulation des propositions concer-

nant la politique criminelle.

2. Par delà cette orientation rationnelle de criminologie, il est cepen-

dant impossible d'ignorer que l’objet même de la recherche - c’est-à-dire

$

-

S

CHWIND, op. cit. 205.

‘

3

CHÜLER-SPRINGORUM, op. cit. 315; M. JAGER (1993), 229-230.

_- 74 -—

la criminalité et les phénomènes déviants tels qu’ils existent dans la

société — ne peut pas être défini rationnellement dans son ensemble. Si

l'on considère seulement la grande diversité de phénomènes particuliers

dans le cadre de la criminalité, on peut dire, par exemple, que l’homicide

volontaire et la mise en danger de l’environnement par négligence n’ont

pas d'autre chose en commun que le fait d’être tous les deux déterminés

par la norme légale comme des conduites punissables. On sait aujour-

d'hui que la criminalité autant que la totalité des infractions les plus

diverses, est considérée dans une certaine mesure comme un phénomène

fictif et comme tel difficile à définir : le chiffre noir ; la connaissance que

ce qui compte comme criminalité, est en effet le résultat de l'action des

organes de contrôle social et pas tellement une catégorie objective don-

née, diminue en plus la possibilité de l’inclure entièrement dans le cadre

rationnel. D'autre part, il est certainement vrai que les hypothèses et les

méthodes de recherche, ainsi que l'application de standards d’interpréta-

tion contribuent tous à la rationalité de la recherche et réduisent des élé-

ments irrationnels dans la recherche.

IL. — LA POLITIQUE CRIMINELLE D’AUJOURD’HUI

Dans la deuxième moitié des années quatre-vingt-dix, on a été témoin

en Europe d'un nouveau processus lié à la criminalité

la politique cri-

minelle tombe de plus en plus sous l’influence de la politique, quelque

part mêème de la politique populiste. Aux élections parlementaires dans

nombreux pays - en Grande Bretagne, en France, en Allemagne —, un

des thèmes les plus importants dans la bataille électorale a été justement

l’attitude des candidats envers la criminalité. La nouvelle gauche, qui a

gagné les élections et qui a désigné son orientation principale comme la

« troisième voie » a exprimé son attitude envers la criminalité par le slo-

gan «tough on crime, tough on causes of crime » (« mesures sévères

contre la criminalité, mesures sévères contre les causes de la crimina-

lité »), si l’on prend le slogan des partisans du /abour britanniques

comme le slogan le plus typique et le plus ancien (°). Pourtant, le gouver-

nement /abour s'est engagé surtout à réaliser la première partie de ce slo-

gan. Dans les dernières années, le gouvernement a adopté la législation,

qui cherche l’équilibre entre la logique de sécurité et de la nouvelle pun1-

tivité (7). Comme les Etats européens du continent jettent leurs regards

sur l'Ile pour s‘y modeler dans ce domaine, il n'est pas trop osé de pré-

tendre que la politique criminelle en Europe s'éloigne dangereusement de

surtout

l’orientation libérale et rationnelle et repose de plus en plus

6

7

ODE und LUTZ (2001), 205.

‘

t

ODE und LUTZ, op. cit. 206-215.

75 —

après le 11 septembre - sur des catégories comme la protection de la

société ; l’efficacité de système entier de contrôle social; le devoir de cha-

que individu comme être rationnel de se protéger soi-même — c'est le cir-

cuit d'inclusion ; la demande que les exclus soient traités par des profes-

sionnels — c'est le circuit d'exclusion ; la demande de prendre en considé-

ration le public et les attitudes politiques à l’égard de la politique crimi-

nelle (*).

La Slovénie, qui n’a pas connu une politique criminelle trop répres-

sive, a pourtant, dans ces dernières années, commencé à suivre cette

orientation

la législation pénale de fond est devenue plus sévère; les

nouvelles revendications dans la direction mentionnée se font de plus en

plus valoir; les organes de la justice criminelle soulignent l’importance

de prendre en considération dans la fixation de peine par les tribunaux

le principe de la peine juste et de la rétribution ; les procureurs généraux

expriment publiquement leur satisfaction avec l’imposition des peines les

plus sévères; et les tribunaux ne font que suivre ces tendances. La

demande d'une efficacité plus grande de la justice pénale, déclenche

d'autre part les revendications de pouvoirs accrus, surtout pour la

police. La « guerre contre la criminalité » à la slovène sera certainement

un des objets de la bataille électorale aux élections présidentielles qui

auront lieu cette année et plus encore aux élections parlementaires en

2004.

À cause d’une telle situation, le chercheur travaillant dans le domaine

du droit pénal et de la criminologie, se pose nécessairement la question

de savoir si les résultats de la recherche criminologique peuvent avoir

quelque signification pour la politique criminelle - et si la réponse est

positive, quelle est cette signification.

IM. — L’IMPACT (POSSIBLE) DE LA RECHERCHE CRIMINOLOGIQUE

SUR LA POLITIQUE CRIMINELLE EN SLOVÉNIE

1. La tentative d’établir l’influence éventuelle de la recherche crimi-

nologique sur la politique criminelle, c’est-à-dire de sa mise en œuvre, est

un travail ingrat, puisqu’'il n’est possible de le faire qu’au niveau de spé-

culations. Il est plus problématique encore lorsqu'il est entrepris par le

directeur de l’organisation de recherche criminologique la plus ancienne

dans le pays. Mais peut-être est-ce justement cette circonstance qui a

dicté une certaine attitude critique, ainsi qu’une modestie nécessaire.

Dans cette revue Je me limiterai uniquement à la recherche effectuée par

(*) BODE und LUTZ, op. cit. 212-213.

76 -

l'Institut de criminologie à la Faculté de droit de l’Université de Ljubl-

jana.

Apres avoir parcouru à peu près 130 projets de recherche de l’Institut

effectuées entre 1954 et 2001, 1l est possible de faire quelques généralisa-

tions. Il est évident, qu'il y a deux grands domaines qui se dégagent de

l'ensemble de la recherche et dans le cadre desquels 1l y a toute une série

de projets qui ont été orientés soit vers la pratique et ont eu grâce à cela

la possibilité de l’influencer, ou bien 1ls ont abordé des questions qui ont

été très actuelles au point de vue du travail quotidien; ces deux

domaines sont la pénologie et la délinquance juvénile.

2. Si l’on examine les thèmes de la recherche pénologique, On

constate qu'il s'agit de projets qui étaient souvent choisis en accord avec

des organes de l’exécution des sanctions pénales (de la peine d’emprison-

nement). Même lorsque les résultats de ces recherches étaient parfois

contraires aux attentes et aux souhaits de ces organes, ils ont dû avoir

au moins la fonction d’une sorte d’avertissement à l’égard de questions

que ces recherches ont traitées. Parmi les thèmes de projets de recherche

il y a les suivants

la sélection des condamnées pour l’établissement

pénitentiaire ouvert; les mesures contre les délinquants malades men-

taux; la classification et le groupement des condamnés; l’organisation

des prisons locales; l’organisation des établissements de transit pour les

condamnés libérés ; l'assistance post-pénale ; les établissements péniten-

tiaires ouverts et de semi-liberté ; les jeunes adultes en prison ; les peines

d'emprisonnement de courte durée ; le récidivisme ; les capacités spatiales

des établissements pénitentiaires slovènes; le climat social dans les pri-

sons slovènes, une recherche qui a été répétée plusieurs fois (°). Un des

chercheurs a conçu dans ce domaine une approche théorique envers

10

l'exécution de la peine d'emprisonnement en Slovénie ; (

) cependant les

résultats des dernières recherches sur le climat social dans les prisons —

les recherches qui sont conduites tous les cinq ans ("") démontrent que

le régime de l’exécution de cette peine s’éloigne de ce modèle et qu’il

s'approche peu à peu d'un modèle plus répressif de l’exécution de peine.

3. Un autre domaine, où 1l est possible de conclure que les recherches

ont exercé une certaine influence sur la politique criminelle est le

domaine de la délinquance juvénile. Je me limiterai ici aux quatre projets

qui ont eu — d’après avis rationnel autant que possible - une influence

sur la mise en œuvre de la politique criminelle. Le premier de ces projets

est aussi un des plus vieux — l’analyse et l'évaluation de l’exécution de

la mesure de surveillance renforcée par l’organe de tutelle. Cette mesure

9

L'auteur de presque tous les projets est F. Brinc

comp. BRINC (1976, 1982, 1988).

) PETROVEC (1997).

£ |

") BRINC (2001).

— 7

éducative a été introduite par la législation de 1960, et quelques années

plus tard, le groupe de recherche n'a pas seulement effectué l’analyse et

l’évaluation de son exécution, mais il a donné toute une série de proposi-

tions pour son imposition et son exécution ('*).

Au milieu des années soixante-dix, on a réalisé le projet de genre

recherche-action qui a eu un impact assez grand sur l'exécution de

mesures éducatives de caractère institutionnel. Il s’agit de l’« expérience

de Logatec », qui apporta à notre environnement une approche nouvelle

et avec celle-ci, aussi un nouveau modèle théorique ('*). Parmi différents

projets de recherche, c’est celui-ci pour lequel on peut dire qu'il reposait

sur certaines prémisses de valeurs - son point de départ était l’idée de

l’ éducation permissive qui commençait à s'affirmer à cette époque-là. À

mon avis, ce projet a inauguré une activité de long terme de recherches

dans le domaine de l’analyse et des concepts de l’éducation institution-

nelle en Slovénie, qui trouva son expression finale dans le projet de réno-

vation conceptuelle et architecturale des établissements d’éducation ('*).

Le troisième domaine où l’on peut parler de l'influence de recherches

criminologiques sur la politique criminelle et qui est lié à la délinquance

juvénile, touchait les problèmes de l’enfant maltraité et des droits des

enfants en général ('°). Ce projet de recherche a été entrepris par l’Insti-

tut au début des années quatre-vingt et constituait la première recherche

empirique de ce genre, relativement modeste d'’ailleurs, qui contenait les

données sur ce problème ; plus tard, l’Institut a poursuivi le travail com-

mencé avec plusieurs projets ét a essayé en même temps de disséminer

en Slovénie le savoir acquis par ces recherches.

Comme dernier projet de recherche dans le domaine de la délin-

quance juvénile, on doit mentionner l’introduction de la médiation entre

la victime et le délinquant juvénile, un projet que l'Institut a entrepris

immédiatement après l’adoption de la nouvelle législation pénale ('*).

L’importance de ce projet repose sur le fait qu'il représente la première

expérience menée dans le cadre des tribunaux des mineurs en Slovénie ;

il a été réalisé par deux ministères publics qui ont commencé avec les

procédures de médiation — sous des conditions spéciales et avec toutes

les autorisations préalables nécessaires — même avant que cette possibi-

lité ait été explicitement prévue par une disposition spécifique du Code

de procédure pénale. Comme 1l est connu aujourd'hui, c’est justement

cette procédure qui est devenue quelques années plus tard une des

formes principales de « diversion » des jeunes délinquants de la procé-

î S

KABERNE (1969).

ODOPIVEC, (1973).

4

S

ELIH (1982), Dekleva (1992)

Ë

:

SELIH (1985).

—2 2220 272 - 772 szçs

â

DEKLEVA ( 1995).

78 —

dure pénale et elle passe à présent pour une forme affirmée de fonction-

nement des procureurs publics.

4. Entre autres projets de recherche à propos desquels 1l est possible

de parler d'un certain impact sur la politique criminelle, 1l en est encore

quelques-uns qui sont à mon avis également remarquables. Pour certains

de ces projets on peut assumer qu'ils ont influencé dans une certaine

mesure la législation et parmi eux, 1l faut mentionner surtout trois pro-

jets à propos desquels cette influence pourrait être établie : par le projet

sur la position juridique des jeunes délinquants - auteurs de contraven-

tions, leur situation s'est rapprochée, selon l’analyse comparative de

deux groupes, de celle de jeunes délinquants - auteurs d’infractions plus

graves (‘”).

Les dispositions du Code pénal en vigueur sur la protection de l’Etat

et de son système constitutionnel (infractions politiques) ce sont certai-

nement inspirées du projet de recherche sur la protection pénale de

l'Etat, ainsi que du projet sur les procès de Dachau, qui furent des

procès montés ayant eu lieu en Slovénie dans les premiers années après

la deuxième guerre mondiale (‘*).

Finalement, mais nullement en dernier lieu, 11 y a eu le projet de

recherche sur la victimisation qui faisait partie d’un projet international

et qu'on a réussi a incorporer dans le programme des recherches statisti-

ques réalisées par le Bureau de statistique de la République de Slové-

nie ('”). Et pour finir, il y a lieu de mentionner aussi la recherche sur les

vols dans les magasins libre-service que l’institut a menée 1l y a 30 ans.

S1 l’on regarde cette recherche à la lumière de la situation actuelle, on

peut dire qu'il s'agit d’un type de recherche qu’on rangerait aujourd’hui

parmi les recherches - assez répandues récemment — de la prévention

situationnelle (“°).

IV. — EN GUISE DE CONCLUSION

Cette présentation sommaire et d’une manière arbitraire des projets

en matière de recherche criminologique, pose la question de savoir

quelles sont ses tendances et quelle politique criminelle elle est censée

encourager. En répondant à cette question, je voudrais me limiter à la

criminalité classique qui constitue même aujourd'hui la plus grande par-

tie de la criminalité établie - environ 90 pour-cent.

”) SKABERNE (1977).

E

*) BAvCON (1985), le même (1989).

?) PAVLOVIÉ (1998).

Ë

“") PESAR (1981).

__ 79 _

En analysant les résultats des projets de recherche, on a l’'impression

que la recherche criminologique en Slovénie soutenait dans le passé

l’orientation que l’on pourrait appeler le « minimum optimal » (*"). Dans

le domaine de l’emploi des moyens répressifs et du contrôle social, la

recherche criminologique a défendu la thèse qu’il est nécessaire d'utiliser

les moyens de cette sorte économiquement autant que possible en vue

d’atteindre à la fois le but de protéger la société et en même temps de

ne pas dépasser les bornes d’intervention dans les droits des individus,

quand la réaction répressive passe d’une sanction sociale acceptable à

l’application négative et excessive de mesures de contrainte. Si l’on com-

pare les données existantes et accessibles sur la criminalité et sur les réac-

tions à la criminalité dans les pays de l’Europe centrale et de l'Europe

orientale avec les mêmes données en Slovénie, on peut constater que le

niveau de mesures répressives appliquées en Slovénie se rapproche plutôt

des données comparables des pays de l'Europe occidentale quu des don-

nées de pays de l’Europe centrale et orientale. Ce qui est aussi une des

raisons pour lesquelles la manière de réagir à la criminalité dans la der-

nière décennie n'était pas nettement différente de celle adoptée dans les

pays de l’Europe occidentale et peut-être meme dans les pays scandi-

naves. Cependant, 1l est très important d’y ajouter à haute voix aussi un

sérieux caveat : les tendances de la politique pénale des tribunaux s’éloi-

gnent dans le dernier temps de ce « minimum optimal » et se détournent

d’un fonctionnement modéré et plus ou moins rationnel; la même

constatation vaut aussi pour la politique criminelle dans le domaine de

l’exécution des sanctions pénales - l’accroissement continu des personnes

dans les prisons et le recours à une manière plus structurée de l’exécution

de la peine d’emprisonnement pourraient provoquer un développement

qui ne peut être souhaité ni par les chercheurs ni par les citoyens. C'’est

pour cette raison qu’il est nécessaire de répéter que le principe selon

lequel le droit pénal représente le minimum éthique ou comme on aime

dire l’ultima ratio de la société, nous oblige aussi à adopter le principe

suivant lequel l’application de mesures répressives ou de mesures de

contrôle social comme réponse à la criminalité n’est admissible que dans

le cadre du principe minimum optimum. Cela vaut aussi bien pour tous

les pays de l'Europe centrale et orientale qui sont récemment sortis d’un

systeme totalitaire : 1l ne faut pas que la spirale de répressivité se répète.

(!) SCHÜLER-SPRINGORUM, op. cit. 325-326.

ms e - -

30

LIFTÉRATURE

BAVCON, L. dir. : Dachausk1 procesi. Ljubljana, Inétitut za kriminologijo

pri Pravni fakulteti 1989, 1084 s. (Les procès de Dachau)

BAVvcoN, L. dir. : Kazenskopravno varstvo drZave in njene druZbene ure-

ditve (politièni delikti). Ljubljana, Inétitut za kriminologijo pri Pravni

fakultet: 1985, 399 s. (Protection pénale de l’Etat et de son ordre

social — les délits politiques)

BRINC, F. : Druzbeno vzdusje v zavodih za prestajanje kazni zapora v

Republiki Sloveniji. Ljubljana, Institut za kriminologijo pri Pravni

fakulteti 1995, 294 s. (Le climat social dans les établissement péniten-

tiaires dans la République de Slovénie)

BRINC, F. : Druzbeno vzdusje v zavodih za prestajanje kazni zapora v

Republiki Sloveniji. Ljubljana, Institut za kriminologijo pri Pravni

fakulteti 2001, 184 s. (Le climat social dans les établissements péni-

tentiaires dans la République de Slovénie)

BRINC, F. : Izvrsevanje kazni zapora v odprtih in polodprtih kazenskih

pobljsevalnih zavodih SR Slovenije. Ljubljana, Institut za kriminolo-

gijo pri Pravni fakulteti 1982, 664 s. (L’exécution des peines d’empri-

sonnement dans les établissement pénitentiaires ouverts et de semi-

liberté dans la République socialiste de Slovénie)

BRINC, F. : Izvrsevanje kratkotrajnih kazni zapora v SR Sloveniji. Ljubl-

jana, Institut za kriminolog:jo pri Pravni fakulteti 1988, 590 s. (L’exé-

cution des peines courtes d’emprisonnement dans la République

socialiste de Slovénie)

BRINC, F. : Organizacija, metode dela in uspesnost pomoëi odpuséenim

obsojenim osebam. Ljubljana, Institut za kriminologijo pri Pravni

fakulteti 1976, 472 s. (L’organisation, les méthodes de travail et l’effi-

cacité de l’assistance donnée aux condamnés libérés)

Bope, B., LUTZ, T. : Kriminalpolitik gegen sozialen Ausschluss? Krimi-

nologisches Journal 33/2001/3, s. 205-215.

Crime and criminal justice in an integrating Europe. European Journal

of Criminal Policy and Research 5/1996/1, s. 5-87.

DEKLEVA, B. idr. : Nove vrste vzgojnih ukrepov za mladoletnike (predv-

sem programov socialnih treningov, poravnanja z oskodovancem ter

opravljanja koristnega dela za skupnost) : analiza pogojev zanje, raz-

voj usposabljanja za njihove 1zvajalce ter spremljanje njihove uspeés-

nosti

Ljubljana, Institut za kriminologijo pri Pravni fakulteti 1995,

122 s. (Les nouvelles sortes de mesures éducatives pour les délin-

quants juvéniles — particulièrement les programmes d’entrainement

social, la réconciliation avec la victime et l’accomplissement du travail

— 81 —

au profit de la communauté - : l’analyse de conditions pour la mise

en œuvre de ces mesures, l’éducation du personnel et l'évaluation de

leur efficacité)

DEKLEVA, B. dir. : Spremljanje uresnièevanja in uspeSnosti naérta pre-

nove zavodskega obravnavanja otrok in mladostnikov z motnjami

vedenja in osebnosti ter razvijanje sodobnjesih oblik in vsebin dela v

prenovljenih zavodih. Ljubljana, InStitut za kriminologijo pri Pravni

fakulteti 1993. (L’observation de la mise en œuvre et de l'efficacité du

projet de rénovation du traitement institutionnel des enfants et des

jeunes ayant des troubles de comportement et de personnalité et le

développement de formes et de contenus contemporains de travalil

dans les institutions rénovées)

Institut za kriminologijo pri Pravni fakulteti. Pregled raziskovalnega

dela 1954 - 1995. Ur. I. Sket. Ljubljana, Institut za kriminologijo pri

ravni fakulteti 1996. (Institut de criminologie à la Faculté de droit.

Revue des recherches effectuées de 1954 à 1995)

JAGER, H. : Irrationale Kriminapolitik. V : Festschrift für Horst Schüler

Springorum. Kôln etc., Carl Heymanns Verlag KG 1993, s. 229-243.

JAGER, M. : Kriminalitetna politika in kaznovalna zakonodaja v Slove-

niji danes — o dilemah in 1zzivih razvoja. Revija za kriminalistiko in

kriminologijo 53/2002/1, s. 3-11. (La politique criminelle et la légis-

lation pénale en Slovénie aujourd’hui — quelques dilemmes et défis du

développement)

PAavLovIÉ, Z.

Mednarodna anketa o viktimizacij1

Slovenija 1997.

Ljubljana, Institut za kriminologijo pri Pravni fakulteti 1998, 58 + 36

s. (L’enquête internationale sur la victimisation — la Slovénie 1997)

PEsAR, J. : Tatvine v samopostreZznih trgovinah. Ljubljana, Institut za

kriminologijo pri Pravni fakulteti 1981, s. 271 + 16. (Les vols dans

les magasins libre-service)

PETROVEC, D. : O namenu kaznovanja (slepa ulica absolutnih teorij).

Ljubljana, Institut za kriminologijo pri Pravni fakultet: 1997, 269 s

(Considérations sur le but de la punition

l’impasse des théories

absolutistes)

SCHÜLER-SPRINGORUM, H. : Kriminologie als Herausforderung der Kri-

minalpolitik. Kritische Viertelsjahresschrift fur Gesetzgebung und

Rechtswissenschaft (KritV) 73/1990/3-4, s. 313-326.

SCHWIND H.-D. : Kriminalität als gegenstand der Kriminalpolitik. V :

Festschrift für Horst Schüler Springorum. Kôln etc., Carl Heymanns

Verlag KG 1993, s. 203-229.

SKABERNE, B. idr. : Analiza in uspesnost izvajanja vzgojnega ukrepa

strozjega nadzorstva skrbstvenega organa. Ljubljana, Institut za kri-

- 82

minologijo pri Pravni fakulteti 1969, 327 s. (L'analyse et l’efficacité

de l'exécution de la mesure éducative de surveillance renforcée par

l’organe de tutelle)

SKABERNE, B. idr. : Pravni poloZaj mladoletnih storilcev prekrskov in nj1-

hovo obravnavanje v praksi v Sloveniji. Ljubljana, Institut za krimi-

nologijo pri Pravni fakulteti 1977, 332 s. (La position légale des

jeunes délinquants — auteurs de contraventions et leur traitement

dans la pratique)

SELIH, À. idr. : Analiza, ocena in usmeritve zavodske vzgoje otrok in

mladostnikov z motnjami vedenja in osebnosti v SR Sloveniji. Ljubl-

jana, Institut za kriminologijo pri Pravni fakulteti 1983, 215 s.

(L’analyse, l’évaluation et l’orientation de l’éducation institutionnelle

des enfants et des jeunes avec des troubles de comportement et de

personnalité dans la République socialiste de Slovénie)

SELIH, À. idr. : Nekateri vidiki trpinéenja otrok - pravno, medicinsko in

socialno-skrbstveno obravnavanje. Ljubljana, Institut za kriminolo-

gijo pri Pravni fakulteti 1985, 170 s. (Quelques aspects du mauvais

traitement des enfants — les considérations légales, médicales et d’as-

sistance sociale)

SELIH, À. idr. : Pravni vidiki otrokovih pravic. Ljubljana, Institut za kri-

minologijo pri Pravni fakultet: 1992, 235 s. (Les aspects légaux des

droits des enfants)

Vopopivec, K. : Relationship between Scientific Research and Criminal

Policy. Ljubljana, Institut za kriminologijo pri Pravni fakulteti 1970,

95 s.

VopopiveC, K. idr. : Spreminjanje vzgojnih metod v vzgojnem zavodu v

Logatcu. Ljubljana, Institut za kriminologijo pri Pravni fakulteti

1973, 323 s. (La modification des méthodes d’ éducation dans la mai-

son d'éducation à Logatec)

RESUMÉ

À la lumière des pratiques observées dans les pays d'Europe centrale

et orientale et spécialement en Slovénie, l’auteur étudie le rapport entre

criminologie et politique criminelle, la politique criminelle d’aujourd’hui,

et l'impact (possible) de la recherche criminologique sur la politique cri-

minelle en Slovénie. Elle s'inquiète de tendances des tribunaux à s'éloi-

gner du « minimum optimal », c'est-à-dire de décisions modérées et

rationnelles, ainsi que de tendances à l’alourdissement de l'exécution des

peines d’emprisonnement, et du risque qui en résulte de répéter la spirale

__ 83 —

de répressivité que ces pays avaient connue avant de sortir de systèmes

totalitaires.

ABSTRACT

In light of practices observed in Central and Fastern Europe, particu-

larly in Slovenia, the author examines the relation between criminology

and criminal policy, today's criminal policy, and the potential impact of

criminological research on Slovenia’s criminal policy. She sounds the

alarm regarding the courts’ tendency to stay from the « optimal mini-

mum, » i.e. moderate, rational decisions, and regarding the trend toward

harsher implementation of prison sanctions and the resulting risk of

repeating the spiral of repression endured in those countries before their

emergence from totalitarian regimes.

RESUMEN

À la luz de las präcticas observadas en los paises de Europa central

y oriental, y especialmente en Eslovenia, la autora estudia la correlaciôn

existente entre la criminologia y la politica criminal, la politica criminal

contemporânea y el impacto posible de la investigaciôn criminolôgica

sobre la politica criminal en Eslovenia. Expresa también su inquietud

ante las tendencias de los tribunales a alejarse del « optimal minimum »,

es decir, de la adopciôn de decisiones moderadas y racionales, asi como

ante las tendencias al aumento de la ejecuciôn de penas de prisiôn y ante

el riesgo de obtener, como resultado de ello, una repeticiôn de la espiral

de represividad que estos paises habian experimentado antes de salir de

sistemas totalitarios.

——

84

THE NEXUS

OF ORGANIZED INTERNATIONAL CRIMINALS

AND TERRORISM

Louise I. Shelley, PhD (*)

The problems of organized crime and terrorism were often considered

separate phenomena prior to September |

1th

. The security studies com-

mittee, the military and parts of law enforcement increasingly viewed

But these

terrorism and transnational crime as strategic threats.

problems were often seen as distinct. Seminars would discuss the emerg-

ing threat of transnational crime or terrorism but the important links

between the two were rarely made.

September 11" has changed the strategic thinking in this area.

Terrorism and transnational crime are now central threats to our

national and international security. Yet more needs to be understood

about the links between these two phenomena. Many illustrations of the

crime and terrorism link in Western Europe and the United States have

appeared in the mass media. Much less has been written on this subject

in the Pacific context. But the same linkages occur that have been 1den-

tified elsewhere and the linkages between the two phenomena compound

the potency of each. Illustrations of the links between organized crime

and terrorism are the following :

1) Terrorists engage in organized crime activity to support themselves

financially

2)

Organized crime groups and terrorists often operate on network

structures and these structures sometimes intersect, terrorists can hide

themselves among transnational criminal organizations

3)

Both organized crime group and terrorists operate in areas with little

governmental controls, weak enforcement of laws and open borders

4

Both organized criminals and terrorists corrupt local officials to

achieve their objectives

>)

Organized crime groups and terrorists often use similar means to

communicate-exploiting modern technology

6)

Organized crime and terrorists launder their money, often using the

same methods and often the same operators to move their funds.

Each of the points above will be 1llustrated with examples from the

Pacific Region. The particular areas where these links will occur are in

areas with weak controls and little effective political authority :

(*) Director, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center.

_— 85 _

— Russian Far Fast

_

Southern Philippines

—

Sri Lanka

|

Golden Triangle

|

Parts of Indonesia.

FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM ÎILLICIT ACTIVITY

The increasing share of the world economy attributable to illicit

activity provides the financial resources for transnational crime groups

to operate and hire expertise. The source of the illicit capital in the

Pacific region are such illicit commodities as drugs, human beings

smuggled and trafficked, small arms and valuable natural resources such

as timber. À particular feature of organized crime in the Pacific region

is piracy, some of it linked to the maritime transport of high technology.

This is proving increasingly profitable for the organized crime groups.

Counterfeiting of goods, dollars and CDs and other electronic equi-

pment is a major financial problem for organized crime. This is not

exclusively an organized crime problem as North Koreans are involved

in the massive counterfeiting of dollars.

The nexus of drug crime and terrorism widely recognized in Colom-

bia (FARC) and in the Balkans (KLA) 1s highly prevalent in Asia. The

most notable examples of this are in Afghanistan (Taliban and AIl

Qaeda) and Sri Lanka (Tamil Tigers) but the linkages also exist in the

Northern region of the Pacific Rim among the North Koreans, the

Russians and other organized crime groups operating in the region.

Many of these groups are involved in more aspects of the drug trade

than just cultivation but help transport and even distribute drugs closer

to the main markets.

The blending of the legitimate and the 1llegitimate characterizes the

financing of their operations. The resources of the terrorists or the

profits of transnational crime groups are combined with legitimate funds

making it hard to detect where the criminal ends and the legitimate

funds begins. For example, in the Bank of New York Case, millions of

funds emanating from criminal activity were combined with legitimate

accounts of corresponding banks in Russia. Al Qaeda uses charities to

move money. Some of the charities funds are directed towards social

welfare activities in the community whereas a tithe or more is used to

support terrorists.

86 —

ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS OPERATE AS NETWORKS

Transnational crime groups often operate on a network structure.

The network structure is not unique to this group but characterizes

many other terrorist groups and many of the new transnational

organized crime groups. Unlike the top-down-hierarchical structure of a

mafia-type organization, newer organized crime groups such as Russian-

speaking groups and terrorist groups such as the Al Qaeda function as

networks. It gives organizational flexibility, reduces the possibility of

penetration and provides greater efficiency. These structures make it

more difficult to identify leaders. The newer criminal groups and leading

terrorist organizations resemble more modern legitimate business struc-

tures than the older corporations like Ford and the steel industry.

Organized crime group networks are often of the same nationality,

though they form alliances with other crime groups to conduct their

activities. In contrast, the networks of groups such as Al Qaeda are

themselves transnational. They can unite individuals from the Middle

Fast with those in the Far Fast. Likewise, the organized crime groups

from the Russian Far East work with North and South Koreans,

Japanese, Chinese and Vietnamese among others. The networks are not

affiliated with any particular state. They are non-state actors striking at

the citizens of a state, states or different states.

BASE OF OPERATIONS

Organized crime groups and terrorists function where the controls of

the central state are least, where there are porous borders and weak law

enforcement. In areas with weak controls, transnational crime groups

operate. Others provide the home base for terrorist groups. In some, a

cooperative or/even symbiotic relationship exists between the crime

group and the terrorist group operating within the region. The Russian

Far East has become a central locale for the operation of organized

crime and terrorists because t

IS far from the central controls of

Moscow and the governmental and law enforcement structures are

heavily infiltrated by organized crime ('). The same absence of controls

characterizes the area adjoining the Golden Triangle. The terrorist

(") See Organized Crime Watch on the website of which has publications of the Russian

Far East center. For in depth analysis of crime in the Far East see A.G. Korchagin, V. A.

Nomokonov and V.1. Shulga, Organizovannaia prestupnost' i bor'ba s nei (Organized Crime

and the Struggle with It)Vladivostok, 1995 : Organizovannia Prestupnost' Dal'nego Vostoka :

Obshchie i regional'nye cherty (Organized Crime of the Far East General and Regional

Characteristics)Vladivostok : 1998 and V.A. Nomokonov and V.I. Shulga, « Murder for Hire

as a Manifestation of Organized Crime, » Demokratizatsiya Vol.6, no.4, 1998, pp. 676-80.

— 87 —

groups of Myanmar can support themselves by the drug trade and can

operate with impunity near Southern China, Laos and to a lesser extent

Northern Thailand. The Southern part of the Philippines remains out-

side of central state control. Likewise, the Fukian province in China

from which so much human trafficking originates 1s an area outside the

control of the Chinese central government where complicit officials

allow the crime groups to operate.

Indonesia, in the post-Suharto period, has lost the central controls of

the previous period. The lack of state control, the weak and ineffective

law enforcement and the multi-national nature of the society makes it

possible for terrorist groups to operate in parts of the country. Further-

more, while significant transnational crime groups are not yet institu-

tionalized, there are increasingly visible organized violent groups.

CORRUPTION OF OFFICIALS

Organized crime and terrorist groups are dependent on officials who

can be corrupted or look the other way. The bossism of the local politi-

cal bosses in the Philippines, the corruption of cadres in the Chinese

Communist Party (*), the pervasive corruption of the Soviet political

system and the now infamous corruption of the Suharto government

have provided a fertile ground for these crime groups to operate. In the

Philippines, prostitution, smuggling and protection rackets of crime

groups have been tolerated by the authorities, often because they take

their local cut (*).

In Thailand, the police derive a significant amount of their income

from the pervasive prostitution. Pay-offs to the police are a central part

of the operations of the crime bosses (*). This endemic corruption means

that there has been no curb on the growth of organized crime.

In the Far East of Russia and in China, strong crime groups, with

links to the surviving Communist power structure have stepped in to fill

the power vacuum and now operate on a global scale. Members of the

security apparatus, the FSB, in Russia and in Public Security Bureau of

China are involved. In China, as in Russia, the collusion of government

officials 1s central to the capacity of smugglers to operate. Crime groups

also work with corrupt officials in other countries and cooperate with

(?) Xiaobo Lu, Cadres and Corruption

The Organizational Involution of the Chinese

Communist Party. Stanford : Stanford University Press, 2000.

(*) John T. SipeL, Capital, Coercion and Crime

Bossism in the Philippines. Stanford :

Stanford University Press, 1999.

(*) Pasuk PHONGPAICHIT, « Sugsidh Piriyarangasan and Nualnoi Treerat », Guns Girls

Gambling Ganja

Thailand's Illegal Economy and Public Policy,. Chmang Mai : Silkworm

Books. 1998.

88

international crime groups as necessary (*). The trade in human beings

from both countries owes much to the legacy of corrupted Party power

structures.

COMMUNICATIONS

Terrorists, like transnational organized crime, exploit information

technology to maximize the effectiveness of their operations. They use

cellular and satellite telephones, the Internet, email and chat rooms.

They code their messages through encryption and steganography (hiding

messages within other messages). They exploit the anonymyzer features

of the Internet to evade detection. The Internet is a tool for perpetration

of their crimes. Whereas, organized criminals run gambling on the Inter-

net, terrorists solicit funds through websites for charities that fund

terrorist groups. International fund movements are facilitated by infor-

mation technology. Instructions for money transfers through the finan-

cial centers of the legitimate global economy are made through the

phone and Internet. Yet, the underground banking system of hawala

(the banking of the Indian subcontinent) is even more dependent on

rapid and secure transmissions of information by phone and web (°).

Members of the terrorist group are provided special training in com-

puters and software and computer engineers are hired by the groups to

facilitate communications.

International organized crime groups and terrorists both employ spe-

cialists. These specialists conduct intelligence operations, move money,

and specialize in information technology and communications. The most

successful of these groups have educated specialists within their ranks

while others contract out for these services. Those hired on a contractual

basis may be knowing accomplices or may be hired through inter-

mediaries, unaware who are the end users of their services. For example,

Asian language specialists are hired by Russian organized crime to be

their intermediaries.

Criminals and terrorists both engage in illicit activity. The transna-

tional criminals do this solely to make money. Whereas for terrorists,

this ordinary criminal activity is used to support their larger political

and ideological objectives. Yet the crimes committed by these two

(°) Ko-lin CHIN, Smuggled Chinese Clandestine Immigration to the United States.

Philadelphia : Temple University Press, 1999, pp. 41-45;: W. MyYERS « Transnational ethnic

Chinese organized crime

A Global Challenge to the Security of the United States, Analysis

and Recommendations, » Testimony before U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-

committee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations, April 21, 1994.

(°) Nikos Passas, Informal Value Transfer Systems and Criminal Organizations. Hague

Netherlands, Ministry of Justice, 1999.

— 89 —

groups differ only in motive and not in substance. Both types of trans-

national criminals traffic drugs, human beings, counterfeit, and engage

in diverse forms of fraud.

MONEY LAUNDERING

Money laundering is a central part of organized crime activity in the

Pacific Rim as well as elsewhere in the world. The problems of

investigating this activity are particularly

severe because of the

widespread use of underground banking systems in the region such as

hawala in the communities of the Asian sub continent and the gold

exchanges of the Chinese community. Russian organized crime in the

region has developed enormous varieties in the ways that 1t launders

money. The absence of regulation of it its banking system has provided

fertile ground for money laundering. Furthermore, the absence of con-

trols in Japan over the banking system and the collusion between the

banks and organized crime have aggravated this problem.

The possibility of moving 1llicit funds so easily in the region promotes

the ability of transnational criminals and terrorists to operate. Further-

more, it allows the funds of both these groups to commingle with

facility.

CONCLUSION

Transnational crime will be a defining problem of the 21* century

because of the enormous economic discrepancies between developing

and developed countries, the presence of many weak states in which

crime and terrorist groups can operate and an international demand for

the goods and services which these groups provide. This problem 1s par-

ticularly apparent in the Pacific region where rapid economic develop-

ment has created a widening divide between the haves and have nots.

This is true within countries such as the widening financial gap among

citizens in China and the very significant differences in income per capita

among countries within the region. For example, the enormous dif-

ference in the standard of living between the citizens of the Russian Far

Fast where monthly income averages less than a

100 a month and

neighboring South Korea and Japan with high income levels provides a

fertile ground for 1llicit activity of both the criminal and political kind.

This outcome 1s particularly true when one considers the weak political

controls and criminalized elite that operated in many regions of the

Russian Far East.

90 —

The massive international 1llegitimate economy allows the illicit to

operate with facility amongst the licit. The enormous discrepancies in

regulation in a globalized world allows criminals and terrorists to exploit

this lack of consistency to their advantage. This 1s particularly true with

the large amounts of money that move on the basis of trust and not

through formalized financial institutions.

The United States has declared a war against terrorism. As national

strategy is developed to counter the security threat of terrorism, it 1s

imperative that the struggle be based not just on attacking the most

visible manifestation of the program but the larger conditions which

allow these groups to operate. This will require more attention to the

problem of weak states, lack of harmonization in regulation and the

failure to have effective law enforcement cooperation across borders.

Enhanced training of law enforcement personnel is not sufficient.

Individuals must see their benefits in cooperating with the authorities in

attacking organized crime. The proceeds of organized crime and

terrorism must be channeled to development.

The war against terrorism cannot be separated from the fight against

transnational crime. The points of convergence of the two forms of

transnational crime make it impossible to address one without the other.

By focusing on the crime element of the terrorism problem, it 1s possible

to detect terrorist operations in ways that might not otherwise be detec-

table.

Moreover, many of the strategies presently being applied to combat

terrorism, following of money trails, freezing of assets, and safeguarding

borders are ones used to combat transnational crime. The current

emphasis on locating the financial resources of terrorists and harmoniz-

ing laws regulating international financial movements are just part of a

need to achieve greater transparency and international cooperation in

law enforcement and financial regulation.

Transnational organized criminals and terrorists use network struc-

tures to run their operations. Our national strategy needs to respond to

networks with networks. Coalitions and cooperation are needed as to

get at the larger structures that allow the cells to operate effectively.

The national strategy to fight transnational crime and criminals must

focus away from the state level policies of the Cold War era to the non-

state actors who operate among the cracks of the state systems,

penetrating countries and exploiting the differences in state based regula-

tion. This is particularly true in many regions of Asia. Major structural

change in government, the private sector and in international relations

needs to be made to effectively address the security threats posed by the

joint problems of transnational crime and terrorism.

_— 91 —

RÉSUMÉ

Traditionnellement, criminalité organisée et terrorisme étaient sou-

vent vus comme des problèmes distincts, abordés séparément par les

services secrets, les militaires et la Justice. Le 11 septembre a représenté

un tournant dans la vision stratégique des liens entre criminalité transna-

tionale et terrorisme. Aujourd'hui, les points de convergence apparais-

sent suffisamment nettement pour qu'’il ne soit plus possible de traiter

de l’une sans traiter de l’autre. En étudiant l’élément criminel du

problème du terrorisme, les opérations terroristes deviennent mieux

détectables.

ABSTRACT

The problems of organized crime and terrorism were often considered

separate phenomena prior to September 1

1th

. The security studies com-

mittee, the military and parts of law enforcement increasingly viewed

But these

terrorism and transnational crime as strategic threats.

problems were often seen as distinct. Nowadays, the points of con-

vergence of the two forms of transnational crime make it impossible to

address one without the other. By focusing on the crime element of the

terrorism problem, it is possible to detect terrorist operations in ways

that might not otherwise be detectable.

RESUMEN

Tradicionalmente, el crimen organizado y el terrorismo eran con-

siderados como problemas

esencialmente diferentes,

y abordados

separadamente por los servicios secretos, los militares y la Justicia. El 11

de septiembre de 2001 representô un momento de ruptura en la visiôn

estratégica de los lazos entre el crimen transnacional y el terrorismo.

Hoy, los puntos de convergencia aparecen como suficientemente claros

como para que ya no sea mâs posible abordar uno sin ocuparse del otro.

À través del estudio del elemento criminal del problema del terrorismo,

las operaciones terroristas pueden ser detectadas con mayor facilidad.

_— 92 —

SITUATION OF

AND COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST

MONEY LAUNDERING CRIME IN CHINA

Guo Jianan (*)

Money laundering is a relatively new concept that became popular

with 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic

Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. However, the phenomenon of this

kind has been going on for a long period of time. With the exacerbation

of organized crime and drug-related crimes, the harm money laundering

poses has been upgrading. Pino Arlacchi, Executive Director of the U.N.

Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention at Vienna, told at the

International Conference on « Illegal Economy and Money Launder-

ing » held in St. Petersburg on June 5, 2001 that the global proceeds of

crime could reach 1-3 trillion every year. According to the UN estimates,

up to |-2 billion are laundered each year in some developing countries,

whilst in some developed countries, the figure could strike at 100 billion.

Up to 300-500 billion are laundered every year in world financial cen-

ters ('). According to IMF estimates, the total amount of the money in

the laundering industry accounts for 2-5% of the amount of GDP

worldwide (*).

I. — CONCEPT OF MONEY LAUNDERING

Money laundering is the process by which offenders disguise the

origins of the proceeds of crime and create the illusion that the money

they are laundering 1s theirs legitimate income. The term « money laun-

dering » is said to originate from the U.S. in 1920°s (*). The U.S. govern-

ment forbade such activities as gambling, prostitution and bootleg liquor

that in most cases, run by Mafia in the underground. Alphonse Capone,

after succeeding to the chieftainship of Capone Family in 1925, engaged

in these businesses with impunity. The amount of his assets had summed

up to 100 million by 1927. The proceeds gained through 1llegal channels

were all dirty money that needed to be transformed into legitimate ear-

(*) Institute for Crime Prevention ; Ministry of Justice; People's Republic of China.

(") http://www.sina.com.cn 2001/06/06.

(7) Bing Yang : Investigation in Dirty Money by Worldly Joint Hands, on Beijing Youth

Newspaper, 1998/04/29.

(*) Peter Lilley (UK) : Dirty Dealings, translated by Dong Zhenhua, published by

Xinhua Publishing House, Page 3, The First Edition, January 2001.

__ 93 _

nings, by infiltration into legal industries and businesses. Laundromats

were chosen by Capone-headed Chicago Mafia because they were cash

businesses. It was done by mixing their illicit earnings with the legitimate

earnings they received from laundering businesses every day, and report-

ing the taxable sum to tax office. Thus, the money deducted by taxes

and duties became clean and legal.

The concept of money laundering 1s originated therefrom. However,

it Is not a professional term until after the conviction of Al Capone. He

was prosecuted in June, 1931 and convicted in October, 1931 for tax

evasion. Ît was this that he was sent to prison for rather than the

predicate crimes such as gambling, prostitution and bootleg liquor. He

was sentenced with 11 years’ imprisonment, penalties and litigation fees

running up to 80,000 (*). With that, money laundering entered the law

dictionary. Nonetheless, this term was frequently used during the period

of Water Gate investigation in the 1970°s (*). The U.S is also the first

country that adopted anti-money laundering legislation. Laws related to

money laundering were passed in as early as 1970, and then in 1986, the

Money Laundering Control Act was promulgated (°).

The 1988 United Nations Convention Against Ilicit Traffic in Narcotic

Drugs and Psychotropic Substances pushed money laundering forward to

world stage. It is explicitly agreed that each party shall adopt such

measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offenses under 1ts

domestic law against money laundering related to drug trafficking (/).

To observe the obligations, signatory countries and regional organiza-

tions began to modify penal legislations and formulate local laws defin-

ing money laundering in connection with drug trafficking as criminal

offenses. In 2000 United Nations Convention Against Transnational

Organized Crime, the coverage of predicate offences for money launder-

ing as provided for is expanded from drug trafficking in United Nations

Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic

Substances to various serious offences (*). Accordingly each signatory

country and regional organization undated its legislation. Take EU for

example, it caused Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Con-

fiscation of the Proceeds from Crime to be adopted in November 1990,

and then the first anti-money laundering directive, namely, COUNCIL

(*) Billy Steel, Money Laundering A Brief History, on Billys Money Laundering Infor-

mation Website; À brief history of money laundering, on countermoneylaundering.com.

(°) Id

(°) Anti-money laundering working committee of China : Handbook of anti-money laun-

dering of Bank of China, Page 8-9.

(7) Article 3 "Crimes and Punishment" of United Nations Convention Against Illicit

Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropie Substances.

(*) Article 6 « Criminal Conviction of Money Laundering Activities » of United Nations

Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime.

__ 94 —

DIRECTIVE of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial

system for the purpose of money laundering. After the United Nations

Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime was adopted in later

2000, the Council of the European Communities caused the second

directive to be adopted in December 2001, namely, Council Directive on

modification of the directive of 10 June 1991 on preventing of the use

of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering, insomuch

as to have further broadened the scope of predicate crimes of money

laundering, from drug trafficking to all other criminal offenses.

The terrorist attack in September 11, 2001 shocked the whole world.

The fund controlled and utilized by terrorists and transnational criminal

organizations aroused high attention of the US and the international

community. Confronted with this situation, many countries have set

down to amending money laundering-related legislations. Again, take

EU for example, the Council of Europe is preparing the third anti-

money laundering directive so as to brave new challenges, such as the

increase of virtual transactions volume via Internet, the issue of protec-

tion for crime-reporting employees of financial and non-financial institu-

tions, the role of lawyers in anti-money laundering battles, and financing

for terrorism.

Money laundering is a three-stage process that requires (°) :

Placement, moving the funds from direct association with the crime.

Launderers collect the dirty money or place it into the financial system.

In this stage, many ways and means could be used by launderers target-

ing at making the money appear obtained from legal business transac-

tions.

Layering, disguising the trail to foil pursuit, with such techniques as

shares, bonds, loans and other conduits. It usually consists of a series

of transactions designed to conceal the origin of the funds. This is the

most complex stage of the process, and the most international in nature.

The money launderers might wire transfer funds from one country to

another, then break them up into investments in advanced financial

options or in overseas markets.

The final stage of money laundering is termed integration, making

the money available to the criminal once again with its occupational and

geographic origins hidden from view. It is at this point that the funds

return fully assimilated into the legal economy. Having been placed

initially as cash and layered through a number of financial operations,

(?) Peter Lilley (UK) : Dirty Dealings, translated by Dong Zhenhua, published by

Xinhua Publishing House, Page 216, The First Edition, January 2001: What Exactly Is

Money Laundering, on moneylaundering.ca; What Is Money Laundering, on counter-

moneylaundering.com.

-— 95

the criminal proceeds are entirely integrated into the financial system

and can be used for any purpose ('°).

IL. — SITUATION, PENALTY

AND PREVENTION OF CRIME OF MONEY LAUNDERING

Lateness in awakening to the new concept of money laundering,

legislation and law enforcement against money laundering crime on

mainland China legged behind, and the money laundering crime preven-

tion mechanism is far from being perfect.

1. — Situation of money laundering crime on mainland China

For reasons as stated above, the investigation into and punishment

against money laundering are less vigorous and effective. Up until the

moment, there has been no such a criminal offense with conviction of

money laundering crime by the judicial authorities of the mainland

China. However, this does not mean that China is immune from money

laundering activities. On the contrary, money laundering has posed a

serious threat to the mainland China. Many reports and statistics can

prove this.

According to relevant estimates and statistics, during the consecutive

three years from 1997 to 1999, there was a total amount of capital

14.1

billion,

flight 58.8billlon from mainland China,

respectively

31.7 bilion and 13billion, a significant part of which was for the purpose

of money laundering (‘").

In latter 2001, an 1llegal private bank with 100 billion yuan in opera-

tion was exposed in Shantou city, Guangdong Province, by the dis-

ciplinary inspection committee and judicial authorities. As estimated by

the lawyer in charge of the case, the dirty money laundered by this bank

before integrating into overseas financial system amounted up to RMB

200 billion annually, among which smuggling proceeds summed up to

RMB 70 billlion and income of corruption governmental officials over-

valued RMB 30 billion. Lai Changxing, the most wanted criminal of

smuggling offenses, once delivered a great amount of cash by trucks to

a private bank in Jinjiang city, Fujian Province from which he received

equivalent US dollars or HK dollars at the exchange rate on black

market in his Hong Kong company. The money transferred to offshore

bank would be used in part to pay goods, the rest of which would be

O

d

.

’

,

F

xposure of China’s Capital Flight, from Dazhong website, 2001/07/10.

— 96 …

used to purchase luxury assets or conduct other investment busi-

nesses ('*).

In addition, the « foreign direct investment » of Hong Kong had

advanced impressively from 14.7 billion in 1998 to 64.3 billion in 2000.

It is believed that a great part of this money came from money launder-

ing run by illegal banks ('*).

In September 2001, Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against

Corruption (ICAC) succeeded in investigating and finding out a huge

transnational money laundering syndicate which was suspected to have

bribed and colluded with bank clerks, and have laundered an amount of

HK 50 billion

in

total.

Orchestrated _ with

inland procuratorate

departments, ICAC arrested 39 suspects in mid September, 2001. Lai

Changxing was one of the most important clients of the bank. He remit-

ted the dirty money through the laundering bank to a bank account

opened by his son in Canada ('*).

Cases can be easily found with the conviction other than money laun-

dering. This is resulted from the gap existing between the current penal

legislation and the status quo of money laundering crimes on mainland

China.

code,

According to prevalent criminal

money

laundering

predicate crimes are limited to drugs trafficking, organized crimes and

smuggling crimes. Not until recently that the standing committee of the

National People’s Congress included the terrorist crimes into its

legislative interpretations. Therefore, many criminal offenses are dealt

with predicate crimes where the main body in these cases actually direc-

ted their behaviors for the purpose of money laundering. Those assisting

with the predicate crimes are dealt with convictions such as 1llegal busi-

ness operations.

Mainland China, in particular, is more vulnerable to the attack of

money laundering crimes for some historical problems. It is the expecta-

tion of international community that China join in the battle against

international anti-money laundering crimes. These problems include, a

booming money laundering market because of the rampant crimes of

drugs trafficking, smuggling and organized crimes; a financial system

short of order and rule; a second channel for money laundering by

illegal private loans; little awareness of anti-money laundering of finan-

cial workers and staff; financial legislation legged behind with many

loopholes in favor of money laundering; weak supervision and regula-

("”) Money Laundering Market through Private Banks of Underworld in Shantou, from

Beifang website, column of News Front.

(* Id

("*) Liang Zhi

Uncover of 50 trilllon dollars Money Laundering by HKICAC, from

Sina website, 2001/09/29.

__ 97 —

tions of the financial authorities; lack of experiences of judicial

authorities, etc.

1) — Rampant crimes of drug trafficking,

smuggling and organized crimes

Profit-seeking crimes as mentioned above generated a lot of dirty

money that need to be laundered. Take drug trafficking for example,

drug-related crimes have been escalating since 1980’s, hitting the record

of Drug Prohibition Movement in the 1950’s. In 2001, registered drug

users across the country added up to 0.86 million, whilst the number of

actual drug users went beyond that figure. At present, the counties and

cities over China relating to drug trafficking and using accounts for

72.7% of the total. Drugs threat looms large in the majority of the cities

in China ('°). From 1983 to 1990, courts of various levels accepted and

heard a total number of 18457 cases relating to drug crimes, inter alia,

the number of cases accepted and heard in 1989 went upward by

20.73 % compared with that in 1988, further going upward by 57.77 %

in 1990. There 1s an uprising trend in recent years. In 2000, drug-com-

bating departments of the public security organs nationwide uncovered

altogether 96,000 drug-related criminal cases, increasing by 61.4% com-

pared with that in 1999 ('°). In the year after, there were altogether

110,000 drug-related cases uncovered, 73,000 drug trafficking suspects

arrested, 13.2 tons of heroin, 2.8 tons of opium, 4.8 tons of meta-

amphetamine (ice drug), 2.07 million ecstasy pills and 208.2 tons of

various chemical substances confiscated. The public security organ,

foreign trade and economy commission, trade and economic relations

committee, customs, industrial and commercial administrative office and

drug control department at various levels enhanced the strength of

supervision and regulation over the eight major narcotic drugs such as

ephedrine, and with concerted efforts, blocked an amount of 1352 tons

of narcotic chemicals from entering overseas market (‘”).

Influenced by a worldwide network of drug trafficking, China has to

face the rough reality of drugs. First of all, the pattern of «entry by

various routes, and penetration in every direction » of drugs remains

unchanged ; second, the spread and numbers of drug users keep on the

increase. For the time being, there are altogether 2,051 counties and

cities confronted with drugs problem, 205 of which has found more than

one thousand drug users; third, it has become more and more serious

("*) The Start of Nationwide Anti-drugs Battles, from Sina website, 2002/02/11.

("°) À visit to the chief and director of the ministry of public security Mr. Jia Chunwang

on International Anti-drugs Day, from news report of Netease website, 2001/06/26.

("”) The Start of Nationwide Anti-drugs Battles, from Sina website, 2002/02/11.

-— 98 _

and rampant that traffickers both at home and abroad collaborated to

produce and sell synthetic chemicals such as meta-amphetamine and

ecstasy in mainland China. Fifth, narcotic chemicals have easy access to

market through 1illegal channels. Under stricter control of ephedrine and

traditional chemicals and narcotic substances, criminals have begun

seeking substitutes to produce drugs. Propelled by huge profits, a few

chemical factories conduct production against the law so as to cause

part of narcotic chemicals to be smuggled into overseas market, which

has produced a very bad fame for the mainland China (‘*).

Take organized crimes for example, the people’s court of China at all

levels dealt with 300 cases involving organized crimes, and sentenced

12,000 convicts altogether from April to December in 2001 ("”).

Smuggling cases are keeping on the rise. The people’s courts of China

in 2001 tried and closed files of 847 cases, with an increase of 122 %

compared with that in the preceding year (°°).

In regard to corruption criminal cases, the prosecuting organs estab-

lished and investigated 367,447 cases involving bribery offenses and

more than 40,000 convicts, among which there were 1319 cases involving

more than millions of amount of bribery, and six carders at provincial

and ministerial level were investigated and tried by law (*").

In the above-mentioned profit-seeking criminal cases, only after mak-

ing the dirty money appear clean and legal can those criminals enjoy

their « fruits », and provide funds for further criminal offenses. There-

fore, with the increasing demand, illegal performers engage in transferr-

ing dirty money across borders so as to cover up the source of money.

However, due to the weakness of punishment and prevention endeavors

against money laundering on mainland China, it has become very hard,

even impossible in judicial practices to investigate and confiscate the

dirty money transferred by criminals. In some cases, ironically, criminals

can still lead a life as luxurious as before in spite of being tried before

the court.

2) — Disorder of financial system

Before 1994, financial reform in mainland China paced slowly and

legged behind other reforms in economic domains. Defects in old finan-

cial system such as high monopoly, integration of political guidance and

“) Id

!

”) 12,000 Criminals Tried Last Year in China, from Sina website,2002/03/11.

(?°) Work Report of the Supreme People’s Court by Xiao Yang, on the fifth session of

the ninth national people’s congress.

(?") Work Report of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate by Han Zhubin, on th fifth ses-

sion of the ninth national people’s congress.

p

99 —

enterprise management, and merger of banking and enterprises have

dragged the economic reform backward. Over three years or more, the

goal set for the first stage of financial reform was achieved, in aspects

as follows

an initial establishment of central bank adjusting system

under the direction of the State of Council which will carry out

monetary policies independently; and an initial establishment of finan-

cial organizations system with the main body of state-owned commercial

banks, with co-existence of multiple financial institutions.

The

diversification of the

bodies

of financial

organizations

unavoidably bring forward diversity of economic interests, thus leading

up to outburst of fierce competition as well as disorder in the market.

In order to win over more clients and deposits, banks are in a position

to attract clients and expand business scale by such leverage as broaden-

ing access to opening bank account, directly or indirectly raising bank

interest, or easing cash management. For instance, a « bank deposit

war » once broke out in Qianxi county, Hebei province in 1993. AIl the

7 branch offices of the county's Agricultural Bank of China needed in

dire emergency an amount of capital as much as several milllons RMB

yuan resulted directly from client’s drawings. The trigger for this war

was that, the two new type financial organizations in this county,

namely, rural cooperative foundation and economic development foun-

dation marked their deposit interest for 6 months and five years to be

0.6cent and 2.1 cent higher respectively than that of other banks. Hence,

all other banks rushed to raise their interest as well, to retain their

clients. Under this circumstance, which bank would care about the

source or the nature of the money pumped in by clients? Worse, some

banks pretended not to know the origin of the money though they did,

and assisted clients with money transfer or other disposals. As a result,

it is difficult to prevent and investigate money laundering activities effec-

tively in areas where financial market competitions are in a mess.

3) — À second channel for money laundering by illegal loan

On the one hand, owing to the strict macroeconomic adjustment

measures for financial loan, and the state’s slanted policy in favor of

large and middle-sized state-owned enterprises, many township enter-

prises, private enterprises and business individuals feel short of bank

loan support; on the other, a lot of « hot money » floats among the

people shunning from low interest bank deposit and seeking other ways

to increase the value of the money at hand. This explains the reason for

emergence of illegal loans underground. It 1s learned that private banks

exist in not only developed areas such as Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong

and Shangdong provinces, but also in southwestern far areas such as

100 -

Sichuan and Guizhou provinces. Although private banks do not open

businesses like before due to the State’s financial reorganization, the so-

called « rural joint share cooperative foundation » is actually run by a

few big shareholders by jJoint capital, in the name of cooperative set up

by village or town enterprises. These cooperative foundations enjoy by

permission of local government authority more favorable and relaxing

policies than other banks, to be able to provide more flexible and easy

conditions as regards opening account, drawing deposit and transfer

services. Às a result, on the one hand, they are a heavy blow to standard

financial organizations such as banks, on the other, private banks and

folk cooperative foundations do no examine the money in and out of

account. More risks in operation than banks, but less chances to be

caught by judicial investigation and punishment. In this way, private

banks become the second channel for money laundering. As a matter of

fact, there happened cases in which convicts laundered dirty money

through private banks. As mentioned hereinbefore, the money laundered

by the private underground bank excavated in the port city Shangtou

reached several billlons RMB. In short, it is a loophole for mainland

China anti-money laundering task force to plug in against the bad

management of civil loaning and financing organizations.

4) — Little awareness of anti-money laundering

of financial workers and staff

There have been great leaps and bounds in financial field in recent

years since the economic reform and opening to the outside world. On

the one hand, financial organizations and networks shoot up in short

time, whilst on the other, for short of qualified graduates from financial

university and college, many financial organizations have to lower their

labor engagement standard so as to recruit a large number of young

people who have not received professional education or have noble mind

and career qualifications. In particular, not a few of them are children

of previous workers and staff of financial system, and start work in

financial organizations without any examination or selective competi-

tion. Some of these people have got bad habits or a record of misdeeds

before work, which would make them vulnerable to temptations of

money and outlaws so much as to make use of the financial facilities to

violate the law. Some, however, are on the straight, but with no good

education or no interest in business studies and moral enlightenment. It

would be hard for them to ascertain or examine technically those ques-

tionable financial dealings or even obvious transactions relating to

money laundering. Statistics show that, young convicts under 35

accounts for 86 % of the total convicts in financial criminal offenses

from 1992 to 1994. There were 101 suspects on investigation list in

101 —

financial system of Hebei province in 1993, among whom 83 were from

basic credit cooperatives and saving banks accounting for 79.2% of the

total suspects. Just imagine the picture if these people would undertake

the task of battle against money laundering and coordination with judi-

cial authorities in related investigations.

In some areas, leaders of financial organizations put stress on busi-

ness growth which 1s deemed as a « hard ware », neglecting moral educa-

tion and career training considered to be a « soft ware » in the construc-

tion and operation of financial organizations. Some employees can’t

resist the temptation of money bribe and beauty seduction, while many

others work negligently and carelessly so as to create opportunities for

illegal activities and criminal offenses. For example, it is provided for by

rules and regulations that blank voucher, official seal, and employees’

name list should be kept in strict confidence. However, there have hap-

pened many cases where criminals stole and misused these things. It

would be as easy as a pie to carry out financial crimes in such financial

organizations as described above.

5) — Financial legislation with loopholes

in favor of money laundering

Compared with other economic industries, financial legislation and

formulation of working rules and regulations of financial organizations

of PRC have achieved more progress. Since the 1980’s, the State Coun-

cil, POC, SAFE and CSRC have enacted hundreds of administrative

regulations and statutes, such as Regulations for Savings Management,

Regulations for Cash Management, Regulations for Gold and Silver

Management,

Provisionary Regulations for Foreign Exchange and

Regulations for Enterprise Bonds Management. Many contents of these

regulations and statutes can be applied to prevent money laundering

activities. However, not targeting at money laundering, they have limita-

tions on the function and effect in prevention of money laundering

crimes. Ît 1s especially so with the rapid growth of world financial

market where many financial innovations and derivatives emerge before

the mainland China. It takes time to learn first, and then bring them

under legal framework. In addition, new and high technology, especially

telecommunication technology for paperless transactions, has been

widely used in financial transactions, as well as bringing confusion and

to financial

For

Stock

challenge

legislation.

example,

Shanghai

Exchange once became the haven for stealing and selling shares of other

people for defects in dealing rules. More than ten cases have occurred

so far nationwide, which forced Shanghai SE to revise its dealing rules.

—

102

_

The reason for backwardness in financial legislation rests in the little

knowledge of China’s financial legislators about as well as hesitation to

accept world anti-money laundering practices and rules. The « Four

Principles » on anti-money laundering presented in 1988 by Basel com-

mittee, and « 40points suggestions » put forward by international finan-

cial action group in 1990, have become the standard rules acknowledged

and accepted by world financial organizations. It is unlikely to effec-

tively prevent money laundering at present in China, or to effectively

apply Article 191 relating to money laundering crimes in the lately

Criminal Law of the PRC, before specialized laws and regulations are

made in concord with worldly accepted rules and practices.

6) — Weak supervision and regulation

of the financial authorities

Financial supervision can be divided into two : outward monitoring

and inward monitoring. The outward monitoring refers to the super-

visory management for the whole financial market and various financial

organizations of the central bank and its local branches. Financial

supervision is a two-way monitoring on both financial profession and

legal practices, thus requiring the supervisory personnel to be versatile

in both finance and law. However, for the time being, there is very few

such talent in the majority of financial organizations in China. In recent

years, the supervisory organ neither investigates nor prohibits wild

generation of financial organizations, illegal fund-raising and financing

cases so much so that normal financial order 1s hard to maintain.

Inward monitoring refers to the supervisory management for the

operation of the organization conducted by audit department of the

financial organization. However, the duel supervisory functions of the

audit department, on behalf of both the higher level organization and

the leaders of the organization it works for, will definitely contradict

each other. For example, Mr. Gao, the president of Shenzhen branch of

Citibank violated the rules many times to issue a large amount of loan

and accept bribes for that purpose. Within several straight years, neither

the audit department of the bank nor the one of higher level had found

out any dubious tracks! Under so futile supervision, how can money

laundering activities be stopped in time?

Additionally, it’s worth mentioning that the financial crisis in the

region of Southeast Asia alerted the supervisory authorities of China to

keep close eye to financial risks. Many policies, rules and regulations in

this regard, such as Guidelines for Enhancing Inner Control of Financial

Organizations, have been released with the aim of preventing financial

crisis. Yet, no policy or rules for prevention of money laundering has

— 103 —

been in place so far. It should be pointed out that serious money laun-

dering crimes could also destroy the faith hold by the public in financial

organizations in a degree to ignite financial crises.

7) — Lack of experiences of the judicial authorities

The name of crime, money laundering, is newly added to the Criminal

Law of the PRC. With no precedent or experiences, it poses a new

challenge to public security organ, procuratorate and court at all levels

for them to acknowledge, investigate and try money laundering criminal

cases. Therefore, it is possible that the judicial authorities do not know

when the case happened, or cannot investigate when the case is reported,

or find it hard to ascertain the case when it 1s investigated. So to say,

it is quite normal, but anyway, it 1s a urgent task for every judicial

workers to strengthen studies on anti-money laundering knowledge and

techniques training.

2. — Status quo of punishment and prevention

of money laundering crimes

On the whole, international communities settle down to the work in

two ways, on the matter of punishment and prevention of money laun-

dering crimes, namely, formulating and perfecting relative legislations,

and establishing and perfectigg relative mechanism.

1) — Legislations on punishment and prevention

of money laundering crimes

At present, anti-money laundering legislations of mainland China

consist of punitive legislation, preventive legislation and international

covenants in which China has participated.

a) Punitive legislation

In the era of planned economy, the government implemented strict

plan management over economy and finance. There was few large-scale

economic crimes in society, hence, there was little demand for transfor-

ming a large amount of 1llegal benefit to legal one. Furthermore, China

kept closed door to foreign economy, so that very few transnational

criminal organizations could cross the territory to do the job. Conse-

quently, it was entirely blank in the chapter of old criminal code to

punish or prevent money laundering crimes.

With the door opening to the outside world, and the market-oriented

economy, China has taken part in much more international communica-

p

104 —

tions. Naturally, different financial sectors are becoming open one after

another, inviting money laundering into China. Many foreign launderers

invest a large amount of dirty money in China to engage in all kinds of

businesses. In some coastal cities, drug trafficking, smuggling and

organized crimes are wilder than ever in the dealings of money launder-

ing. In the course of participating to formulate and sign the United

Nations Convention Against Ilicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psy-

chotropic Substances, China has reached agreement with other members

to get « Determined to deprive persons engaged in illicit traffic of the

proceeds of their criminal activities and thereby eliminate their main incen-

tive for so doing », thus paving the way for China’s legislative theory

against money laundering. Criminal legislation academics proposed

single crime conviction for money laundering, isolated from traditional

stolen property convictions.

On September 4, 1989, the standing committee of the National

People's Congress granted access to the United Nations Convention

Against Micit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, to

accord with international practices. To follow up, the 17* session of the

standing committee of the Seventh National People’s Congress passed

Decision on the Prevention of Narcotic Drugs (« Decision ») in December

1990. It 1s stipulated in Article 4 under the Decision that « whoever

covers up or withholds the illegal nature and source of property gained

from selling of narcotic drugs shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprison-

ment of not more than seven years, criminal detention or public sur-

veillance and may concurrently be sentenced to a fine. » This 1s the earliest

legislation of China in regard to money laundering.

Later, to break through the boundary of money laundering in drugs

crimes, the State Council amended the Criminal Law of the People's

Republice of. China in March

1997 («new PRC

criminal

law »).

Article 191 of the new criminal law of the PRC stipulates that,

« Whoever commit any of the acts below to cover up or withhold the source

or nature of what one knows is obtained from narcotics crimes, organized

crimes of the underworld, or crimes of smuggling, or gains obtained

through such crimes, are to be sentenced to not more than five years of

fixed-term imprisonment or criminal detention, and are to be in addition

or exclusively sentenced to a fine not less than 5 percent and not more than

20 percent of the amount of money laundered, and the gains obtained

through committing the crimes mentioned above are to be confiscated;

when the circumstances are serious, the sentence is to be not less than five

years and not more than 10 years of fixed-term imprisonment and a fine

not less than 5 percent and not more than 20 percent of the amount of

money laundered :

!) providing funds accounts;

— 105 —

2)

assisting to turn money and goods into cash or financial instruments;

3)

assisting to transfer funds through transferring accounts, or other ways

of settling accounts;

4)

assisting to remit funds abroad; and

3)

other ways to cover up and withhold what is illegally obtained through

committing crimes, and the nature and sources of such gains. »

This article 1s a product of the international legal obligation commit-

ted by China in performing the United Nations Convention Against Hlicit

Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, also, it is a flag

of China’s following the tide of international criminal legislation

development. Although it borrows the idea of Article 4 of the Decision,

it makes big progress in Article 191 whereby presents a more detailed

description of money laundering activities, in contrast to the simple

statement of Article 4 of the Decision. After the 9.11 errorist attack, as

international terrorism looms large, the standing committee of NPC has

passed legislative interpretation to expand the predicate crimes of money

laundering which includes terrorist funds.

However, it remains to be improved in Article 191 of the new PRC

criminal law whereby limits the predicate crimes of money laundering to

such three categories as narcotics crimes, organized crimes of the under-

world, and crimes of smuggling. Theoretically speaking, except for the

above three predicate crimes of money laundering, any other criminals

may also need to cover up or withhold the nature and source of 1ll-

begotten huge property. Article 191 actually hints that money launder-

ing of illegal gains obtained form other criminal offenses shall not form

the money laundering conviction, nor shall it be punished therefore.

Such a provision as Article 191 obviously goes against the rationality

and equity of criminal law.

In practice, other than narcotics crimes, organized crimes and crimes

of smugglings, such crimes as corruption, bribing, embezzlement, tax

dodging and tax evasion, financial fraud are becoming more and more

rampant. Criminals need to have the dirty money laundered to make it

appear clean. Anyway, with the implementation and perfection of bank-

ing supervisory regulations, cash control and supervisory regulations

and the reporting system of individual property, it will get harder for

criminals to cover up the nature and source of property gained from

illegal activities, also, it will get more common and aggressive for them

to have dirty money laundered. Without laws and regulations in due

time, it will pose a gigantic threat to financial order, and social stability.

Hence, the extent for money laundering crimes has to be enlarged, to fit

in with fast changing situation.

-— 106 —

b) Preventive legislation

On the strength of more experiences in anti-money laundering actions

and legislations, the time matures to shape and release administrative

_regulations and statutes for the special purpose of anti-money launder-

ing

The State Council, financial and customs supervisory authorities have

already set down certain regulations and statutes that are conducive to

control money laundering.

ii Regulations enacted by the State Council

There are two, one is Cash Management Rules and the other 1s Real

Name Rules for Individual Savings.

In addition, Regulation of the People's Republic of China on Foreign

Exchange Contro!l promulgated by Decree N° 193 of the State Council

of the People’s Republic of China on January 29, 1996, and Notice of

the State Council on Further Strengthening and Improving Foreign

Exchange Income and Expenditure promulgated in 2001 are also helpful

to prevent and control money laundering activities.

ii. Statutes enacted by the People's Bank of China

The People’s Bank of China (« POB ») is the main watchdog for

financial businesses other than securities and insurance industry. The

statues enacted by POB include

a

Bank Account Management Rules

Domestic Foreign Exchange Account Management Rules

Foreign Exchange Account Outside China Management Rules

â

Large Amount Cash Payment Registration Regulations

ili._ Statutes enacted by the State's Administration of Foreign Exchange

These statues enacted by the State’s Administration of Foreign

Exchange (« SAFE ») include

a. Regulations for the Entry and Exit of China's Territory with Foreign

Exchange jointly promulgated by SAFE and Customs General

Administration of the PRC on December 31, 1996.

Rules for Remittance of Foreign Exchange Abroad by Domestic

Citizens, Notice on Certain Issues Relating to Deposit and Withdrawal

of Large Amount

Cash Savings by Citizens and Non-citizens,

Administration Regulations for Domestic Foreign Exchange Account,

and Provisionary Regulations for Foreign Exchange Registration of

Foreign Investment Enterprises.

Provisionary Regulations for Administrative or Disciplinary Punish-

ment for Behaviors against Foreign Exchange Control such as False

— 107 —

Purchase of Foreign Exchange, Illegal Arbitrage, Foreign Exchange

Dodging and Illegal Sale and Purchase of Foreign Exchange jointly

promulgated by POB, Customs, SAFE, Ministry of Personnel and

Ministry of Supervision and Inspection on January 25, 1999.

In conclusion, there are not a few administrative regulations and

statutes in effect in China concerning the prevention of money launder-

ing that are not yet perfect or complete. Most urgently, a comprehensive

anti-money laundering law which has a twenty-year long history in some

foreign countries should be made at present time.

c) Related International Covenants and Treaties

Some international covenants, bilateral and multi-lateral treaties

China participated have contents relating to money laundering control,

which have the same effect of domestic law. Up until now, the mainland

China has signed and executed United Nations Convention Against Illicit

Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and United

Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. There is a

big part of content concerning punishment and prevention of money

laundering, such as the chapter of « Criminal Conviction of Money

Laundering », « Measures for Anti-Money Laundering Activities »,

« Confiscation and Detention » and « International Cooperation ».

Meanwhile, there are some international legal documents with no strings

of compulsory legal obligations for signatory, such as Core Principles for

Effective Banking Supervision promulgated in September 1997 by Basel

Committee on Banking Supervision. Article 3 in the part of « Precondi-

tions of Effective Banking Supervision » provides that « The department

in charge of license issue shall have the right to set down related

standards and refuse to accept any applications failing to meet the

requirement of standards. The procedures for license issue shall at least

include examination of the ownership structure of banking organiza-

tions, business plan and inner management of directors and senior

management bureau, as well as examination of estimated financial con-

ditions including the capital fund. Where foreign banks apply, they shall

first of all obtain the approval of the supervisory authority where the

bank is located. » Article 15 provides that, « banking regulators shall

make sure that the bank has a complete set of policies, procedures and

practices, including the strict policy of ‘know your client’, so as to

promote the professional ethics and standards of the financial depart-

ment, and to prevent the bank from being intentionally or uninten-

tionally used by criminals. » Domestic laws have absorbed the spirit of

related UN covenants and treaties and other legal documents, and

108 —

further put it into practices and actions against money laundering

Crimes.

2) Anti-money laundering mechanism

So far, there has not been any special anti-money mechanism set up

in China. The task of anti-money laundering is shared by different func-

tional departments, among which the financial department 1s playing a

major role. There are four supervisory sections in the POB, namely,

Supervision Department I, Banking Supervision Department II, Depart-

ment of Non-Bank Financial Institutions, Department of Cooperative

Finance.

Apart from the above four departments, the Security Office is in

charge of comprehensive analysis of financial fraud, theft, and robbery

cases, and formulating preventive measures. With money laundering

issue in perspective, the Office has formed an anti-money laundering

office engaging in anti-money laundering work beyond securities and

insurance arena.

Within commercial banking system, the Bank of China, facing the

most potential threat of money laundering, has promulgated Basic Prin-

ciples on Anti-money Laundering Practices for Overseas Institutions of

Bank of China in 1998, set up anti-money laundering working committee

and secretariat. The said committee printed Handbook for Anti-money

Laundering of Bank of China after its establishment.

The public security organ is mainly responsible for the investigation

of money laundering crimes. Recently, the Ministry of Public Security

has set up a special department in charge of money laundering investiga-

tion.

The major problem confronted by the mainland China in anti-money

laundering respect 1s the lack of cross-department anti-money laundering

working group. The industry involving money laundering is not limited

to financial system, but expands to such areas as retail and wholesale

businesses, real estate, and construction, especially in the case of transac-

tions in cash. Ît is critically important and indispensable to set up a

cross-department anti-money laundering working group as well as a spe-

cial financial information institution. Some relevant authorities of China

have been considering this ever since 9.11rerrorist attack incident, but

unfortunately, this idea has not been realized yet for various reasons.

109 —

I. — THE PROGRESS ACHIEVED

CONCERNING THE PUNISHMENT AND PRECAUTION

OF MONEY LAUNDERING IN EUROPE

In view of the maturity of its economy system and juridical system,

the Europe responded to the money laundering previously. The legisla-

tion and mechanism of its punishment and precaution became more and

more perfect and took a lead in comparison with other regions owing

to deepening counter money laundering activities. Thus it is quite impor-

tant for reference for China mainland’s completion of the legislation and

the mechanism of counter money laundering. For this reason, I made

research upon the legislation and mechanism of anti-money laundry in

EU, Belgium and Britain which represent continental law countries and

common law countries respectively in February,2001.

1. — The legislation of anti-money laundry

1) The European Community

The United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic

Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna Convention) published by

U.N on December 19, 1988 1s the first international document prescrib-

ing money laundry. Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Con-

fiscation of the Proceeds from Crime (Strasbourg Convention) adopted

by EU On November 8 constituted the foundation of anti-money laun-

dry legislation for EU, which was a regional convention used for EU to

implement the Vienna Convention.

To carry out the Vienna Convention and the Strasbourg Convention,

the EU council formulated and published the first anti-money laundry

directive, namely Council Directive on preventing of the use of the

financial system for the purpose of money laundering, in which predicate

crimes of money laundry (namely, the crime that can be committed by

laundering the proceeds) mainly adopted the crime definition (e.g.drug

crimes)in Vienna Convention and other indispensable crimes considered

by each member country. The Council Directive prescribed clearly :

Each member country should guarantee that the money laundering

prescribed in the Council Directive will be prohibited; Each member

country should guarantee that the credit and finance institution must

require the clients to present their identification in commercial activities

and to verify the clients identification in the case of the transaction over

1500 Euro or suspicion on money laundering and report the suspicious

transaction to the authority; Each financial institution should preserve

the transaction record for no less than 5 years; Fach member country

—-

110

should supervise its credit and financial institutions to set up valid inside

commanding system and train the staff members on anti-money launder-

ing; Fach member country should formulate its laws and regulations in

accordance with this Council Directive no later than June, 1993. After

the Council Directive come into effect, each EU country formulated its

separate anti-money laundering laws.

As the multinational organized crimes became rampant increasingly,

the EU Council adopted action plan to fight against organized crimes

in 1997 (called 1997 Action Plan for short). In this plan the EU and each

member country expressed its desire to strictly implement the specific

international conventions and its state laws (including Council Direc-

tives) for anti-money laundering, to maintain the highest level coopera-

tion and bilateral intelligence exchanging among financial institutions,

legal enforcement institutions and judicial institutions and realized the

necessity to develop anti-money laundering subject training. In this

Action Plan, it used chapters to define money laundering and involved

data interchanging of European police, predicate crimes of money laun-

dering, investigation power, property confiscation of the absent criminal,

the expansion of sharing capital and report obligation with other coun-

tries, currency and new technology, and the prevention of overusing

cash etc. Às one part of 1997 Action Plan, the EU Council ascertained

united actions to discern, track, freeze,seal up and confiscate the

criminal proceeds.

In 1998, the EU Council adopted action plan to further implement

Amsterdam Convention concerning freedom, security and judicature

(named 1998 Action Plan for short). The Plan required EU and its each

member country to strengthen and develop judicial cooperation on anti-

money laundering within two years since the date the Convention came

into effect and to set up an exchanging and analyzing system on anti-

money laundering among the European police organization frame within

five years.

On June 20 1999, the EU made proposal on revision of anti-money

laundering Council Directive to EU Council, in which it claimed to

expand predicate crimes from drug selling to other severe crimes and to

broaden the discernment of clients identification and the obligation of

suspicious transaction report to non financial institutions.

The Tampere Summit in 1999 was particularly discussing the topic on

judicature and police cooperation within EU throughout history. At

least nine items among the decisions were directly concerning anti-

money laundering (from article 51 to 58).

51. Money laundering 1s core of organized crimes. It should be

made clear wherever the money laundering occurred. The EU

111 —

Council decided to undertake specific stages to discern, track,

freeze,seal up and confiscate the criminal proceeds.

52. To ask the member state to completely enforce the anti-money

laundering Council Directive, Strasbourg Convention 1990 and

FATF Suggestion in its own country and dependencies.

53. The

European Council

required

the

EU Council

and

European Congress to adopt the revision draft of anti-money

laundering Council Directive submitted by the EU Council as

quick as possible

54. In view of enhancing data protection, finance transaction and

transparency of companies ownership, interchanging intelligence

among the present FIU should be speedy. Judicial department and

FIU are entitled to acquire the intelligence without the limitation

by the bank’s confidential articles in case of the necessity of

investigation.

55. The European Council requires that the criminal laws and

procedures should be alike (e.g. tracking, freezing and confiscation

of fund). The scope of predicate crimes composition should be

unified and abundant.

56. To ask the EU Council to broaden power limitation of the

European police organization, including the ordinary money laun-

dering irrespective of which crimes that creates the laundering

money.

57. Unified criterion should be made to prevent to utilize outside

EU registered companies to conceal the criminal proceeds and

launder money.

58. To ask the EU Council to draw up a report on discerning the

articles in states’ bank, finance and company laws that contradict

the international cooperation and to draw the necessary conclu-

sion.

On March.27, 2000, the EU Council adopted the Strategy of The

EU'’s Prevention and Command of Organized Crimes In The New Cen-

tury, in which money laundering by utilizing internet and electronic

currency ; track,freezing and confiscation of the fund and the conviction

of money laundering were concerned.

On October

17, 2000, the EU Council reached four political

agreements on financial/judicial ministers conference

firstly, adopted

the revised draft of anti-money laundering ; Secondly, adopted the frame

decision on tracking, freezing,sealing up and confiscating criminal

proceeds; Thirdly, adopted the broadening of the European police

organization's power limitation and the European police organization

convention protocol

which

included ordinary

money

laundering ;

—

112

the Decision On

Fourthly,

adopted

Coordinating Financial And

Intelligence Institutions of Each Member Country to Cooperate on

exchanging Intelligence.

On November 30, 2001, the European Criminal Police Organization

Convention was revised in accordance with Council Directive, which

broaden the European police organization’ power to money laundering

Cases.

On June 26, 2001, the Council adopted the Frame Decision On

Money Launderings Tracking, Discerning, Freezing, Sealing up and

Confiscating Criminal Proceeds and Methods. The Decision required

that the criminal law and procedure, especially including confiscating

fund and the scope of money laundering predicate crimes should be

unified in all member countries. Each member country should undertake

necessary steps to ensure money laundering crimes to be sentenced to a

maximum of four year imprisonment. Each member country should

carry out this decision before December 31, 2002.

On December 4, 2001, the European Congress and EU Council adop-

ted the second anti-money laundering Directive, namely Council Direc-

tive on modification of the directive of 10 June 1991 on preventing of the

use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering. The

second Council Directive's modification mainly had two points in com-

parison with the first Council Directive

firstly, it expanded the scope

of money laundering predicate crimes from drug crimes to all serious

crimes . Secondly, it broadened the scope of institutions which assumed

anti-money laundering report obligation from banks, currency exchange

office and finance institution to lawyers, accountants, auditors, real

estate merchants, jewellers auctioneer and gambling owner. Further-

more, the second Council Directive required each member country to

accelerate the cooperation of different countries’ finance and intelligence

institutions pursuant to the EU Council's Decision On Coordinating

Financial And Intelligence Institutions of Each Member Country To

Cooperate on Interchanging Intelligence on October 17, 2000.

With the development of the economy, new problems and challenges

appeared in anti-money laundering practice, e.g. the increase of indirect

financial transaction through internet technology, the protection for the

employees performing the obligation of reporting in financial and non-

financial institutions, lawyers situation in anti-money laundering and

terrorism finance etc. The EU experts are consulting the possibility of

the third anti-money laundering Council Directive.

113 —

2) Belgium

As stated above, the legislation of anti-money laundering may be

divided into criminal legislation and preventive legislation. So does in

Belgium. The criminal legislation is mainly in the stipulations of

article 505 in present criminal code. In accordance with the article,the

following deeds all belong to money laundering crimes.

to transform or shift fund or property for the purpose of covering up

and withholding the illegally proceeds or its source or the conduct

which assists the criminal person connected with 1illegal proceeds to

escape from legal punishment ;

To cover up and withhold the nature, sources, position, distribution,

transformation and the alike of certain fund or property of what one

knows is obtained through committing crimes ;

To acquire, own or utilize certain fund or property which, of what one

knows is obtained by committing crimes ;

To participate or form partnership in executing the foregoing con-

ducts; or the aborted above - mentioned conducts ; or to assist, teach

or urge to conduct the above-mentioned deeds or to provide consulta-

tion to the conduction of above-mentioned deeds.

In accordance with the prescription of this article, any conduct which

launders any serious criminal proceeds will commit crime. The con-

stitution of money launder predicate crimes mainly includes

Terrorism crime

Organized crime

Illegally traffic in narcotic

Illegally traffic in weapons or forbidden articles

Illegally traffic in labor force

Illegally traffic in persons

Exploiting prostitute

Illegal use or transaction of hormone substance

Hlegal sales of human organs and tissues

EU budget swindle

Severe organized tax swindle

Bribing government officials

Crimes concerned with stock market

Finance swindle

Kidnapping hostage

Fraudulent bankruptcy

The conduct of accepting and laundering the criminal proceeds will

be sentenced to imprisonment from 15 days to 5 years or a fine from

26 Euro to 10 thousand Euro and be confiscated the whole 1llegal

proceeds, goods and securities resulting from 1llegally proceeds and the

— 114 —

investment by illegal proceeds. In the case of the 1llegal proceeds being

dealt with, the substitute or the property equal to the 1llegal proceeds

may be confiscated.

The preventive legislation of anti-laundering in Belgium includes Law

of 11 January 1993 on preventing the use of the financial system for the

purposes of laundering money and Royal Decree of 11 June 1993 on the

composition, organisation and independence of the Financial Intelligence

Processing Unit.

Law of 11 January 1993 on preventing the use of the financial system

for the purposes of laundering money was formulated to carry out the

first Council Directive published by EU in 1991. According to the law,

financial institutions must perform the following obligations

—

To discern the clients’ ( not long-term business relationship clients in

the case of transaction over lO0thousand Euro ) and their all repre-

sentatives’ identification ;

To discover suspicious transactions ;

To preserve the records and documents of the transaction at least for

S years from the date the transaction’s concluded.

To train clerks and set up appropriate inside controlling procedure.

To appoint employees in charge of correct enforcement of anti-money

laundering prescriptions inside the institution.

To report the suspicious transactions to Belgium financial and

intelligence handling center ;

The institutions refuse to perform the above-mentioned obligation

shall be sentenced to a administrative fine from 10 thousand to

50 million Belgium Franc.

The financial institutions and persons applicable to the law mainly

included :

__

the Belgium National Bank

—

AlI registered credit institutions

—

Stock companies

Life insurance companies

Post offices

stock exchange

public good trust companies

companies engaging in capital or finance business

investment consultation companies

individual or legal person engaged in transaction of foreign currency

by cash, credit etc.

lease company

credit card companies

customer credit companies

— 115 —

mortgage companies

——

public notary

personnel who enforce the court's verdict

auditors

outside accountants

tax counsel

real estate agent

capital transportation companies

gambling houses

__

In accordance with Imperial Decree On The Structure, Organization,

Operation And Independence of Financial Intelligence Handling Center,

the Belgium's Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Finance set up Finan-

cial Intelligence Processing Unit which played a very important role in

Belgium anti-money laundering mechanism.

3) The United Kingdom

The British anti-money laundering legislation is also divided into

criminal legislation and preventive legislation. The main stipulation of

criminal legislation was mainly defined in Criminal Trial Law in 1988

and Anti Narcotic Transaction Law in 1994 and Anti Terrorism Activity

Law in 2000. According to the relevant prescriptions of the three laws,

money laundering crime may be divided into 3 categories.

I. Assisting money laundering crime. According to the definition of

British criminal bill, the clerks in financial institution assisting others in

acquiring, covering up and preserving the criminal proceeds may commit

assisting money laundering crime. The subjective aspect of the crime 1s

the doer helps others to acquire, cover up or preserve fund of what he

knows or suspects. If reporting the fund suspicious of criminal obtaining

to the specific institutions, the reporter may be relieved from crimes. If

not report in case of suspicion, he may commit assisting money launder-

ing crime. À maximum of 14 year imprisonment, fine or combined

punishment may be adapted to this kind of crime.

I. divulging information crime. According to the relevant prescrip-

tions of Britain law, the clerks in financial institutions or other insiders

may commit divulging information crime, if he try to influence the

investigation by divulging any information that may effect the investiga-

tion. In the composition of the crime, the doer may divulge information

to anyone, the information may be message or « any affair ». À maxi-

mum of 5 year imprisonment, fine or combined punishment may be

adapted to this kind of crime.

116

Ili. failure to report relevant information crime. The crime is only

applicable to the fund of drug traffickers or terrorists. In accordance

with British preventive law, people must report to the relevant

departments, in case that he knows or suspects the fund of certain trans-

action belongs to drugs traffic or terrorists, otherwise he may commit

misprision crime. To ascertain the criterion of this crime on subjective

aspect is that the connected person actually knows or there are

appropriate reasons showing that he should know or suspects that the

fund belongs to drugs traffic or terrorist. À maximum of 5 year

iImprisonment, fine or combined punishment will be adapted to this kind

of crime.

According to British law, if the doer of money laundering is also the

subject of predicate crimes, he will only be punished according to

predicate crimes as against money laundering crime.

Before « 9.11 event », the British anti-money laundering legislation 1s

concentrated in Anti-Money Laundering Activities Law which was for-

mulated to carry out the first anti-money laundering Council Directive

of EU. In accordance with this law, the financial institutions assume the

following obligations in anti-money laundering :

— discerning clients identification

— appointing money laundering report official

— reporting suspicious transactions

— preserving transaction record

— training clerks on anti-money laundering

If the financial institutions do not perform these obligations and

commit crime, the connected personnel may be sentence to a 2 year

imprisonment, fine or combined punishment, irrespective that the actual

money laundering activity happens or not.

After the « 9.11 event », Britain reexamined its preventive laws,

revised Anti-Money Laundering Law 1993, promulgated Anti Money

Laundering Law

2001,

revised _ Anti

Terroriim’: Law 2000 and

promulgated Anti Terrorism, Anti Committing Crimes and Security Law.

Anti Money Laundering Law 2001 broadened the adapting scope of Anti

Money Laundering Law 1993 to foreign exchange office, remittance

institution office and cheque exchange place (currency service merchant).

The Law also prescribed that currency service merchants must registered

on customs which is responsible

to ensure the currency service

merchants to abide by the Law and to file prosecution against illegal

conduct of currency service merchant and money laundering crimes. The

Ministry of Finance also revised relevant laws on finance supervision to

strengthen financial supervision. According to law, Britain combined 11

former institutions in charge of financial supervision and established

_

117 —

Finance Supervision Bureau which is in charge of supervising the whole

British financial institutions and financial business.

At present, Britain is planning to make more rectification on anti-

money laundering law. In October 2001, the Ministry of Inside Affairs

submitted a bill on criminal property to the congress which is now in

its second examination by the congress. The Bill combined the law on

anti money laundering in Drug Traffic Law 1994 and Criminal Trial Law

1988 separated the money laundering connected with terrorism from

Anti Terrorism Law 2000, prescribing it solely and formulated a criteria

on judging money laundering. The Bill was also proposed to set up

criminal property tracing bureau to prevent from money laundering and

to trace all the property resulting from or using for committing crime

wherever the property was : to trace from overseas 1f they were abroad,

to trace from the criminals’ property if they squandered them and to

trace from their legacy 1f they died.

2. — Anti-money Laundering Mechanism

1) The European Community

The institution engaging in anti-money laundering of the EU 1s the

European criminal police organization. Established in accordance with

The European Criminal Police Organization Convention, the European

criminal police organization- is a cooperative organization of the EU

member countries’ police department. Its main responsibility is to

accelerate the validity and cooperation of the member countries’ preven-

ting and fighting against severe organized crimes. Àt present, it 1s the

financial crime department of the EU criminal police organization in

charge of anti-money laundering cases, but that is not its responsibility

to undertake the investigation on concrete cases owing to the considera-

tion of maintaining countries’ sovereignty. Usually upon the require-

ment of each member country or its own supervision, the Financial

Department will find or verify the relevant clues through financial

crimes intelligence center and return the cases to the connected member

countries for investigation and settlement in case of obtaining obvious

clues.

2) Belgium

The institution engaging in anti-money laundering of Belgium 1s

financial intelligence handling center. The EU published the first anti-

money laundering Council Directive which required the member coun-

tries to legislate its own laws and set up appropriate institutions accord-

ing to the Council Directive. When the Belgium government formulated

118

Law of 11 January 1993 on preventing the use of the financial system for

the purposes of laundering money and Royal Decree of 11 June 1993 on

the

composition,

organisation _ and

independence

of. the

Financial

Intelligence Processing Unit, .1t also set up the Belgium Financial

Intelligence Processing Unit. The Unit commenced to operate on

December | in the same year. The Unit is a completely independent

autonomous administrative institution although it receives the supervi-

sion from the Belgium Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Finance.

The Financial Intelligence Processing Unit's task is to accept the

reports concerning suspicious transactions from financial institutions

and transfer the report of inclined severe money laundering crime to

justice department after analyzing, selecting the received reports and

supplementing necessary information. It will file the reports which it

considers no necessity to transfer to justice department.

The financial institutions play important roles in anti-money launder-

ing. The Belgium financial institutions also set up specific anti-money

laundering mechanism. Each financial institution governed by the

Belgium anti-money law must appoint « Mr. Clean » who is in charge

of reporting the suspicious transactions submitted by the institution’s

clerk to the Financial Intelligence Processing Unit. In the case of discer-

ning or suspecting certain transaction of money laundering, « Mr.

Clean » in the constitution must report it to the Financial Intelligence

Processing Unit before the transaction’s conclusion and must point out

the time limit of the transaction if possible. In the event of the transac-

tion’s nature or the possibility to hamper prosecuting money laundering

criminals and the impossibility to report before conclusion of the trans-

action, « Mr. Clean » must report to the Financial Intelligence Process-

ing Unit just after the transaction concluding and attach the reason for

after-transaction report.

According to statistics from the Financial Intelligence Processing

Unit, the Unit totally received 53200 suspicious transaction reports from

its beginning operating at the end of 1993 to June 2001 and registered

10160 reports after examination. 3513 registered cases were considered

with severe money laundering signs and was transferred to judicial

office. The reports the Unit received were involved in 6.7 billion Euro.

505 people in 337 cases were awarded punishment and the term of

imprisonment added up to 1059 years, the fine added up to 1.17 million

Euro and the value of the property confiscated added up to 2872 million

Euro.

119 —

3) The United Kingdom

The British anti-money laundering mechanism 1s comparatively com-

plicated and it 1s concerned with many departments in which there are

institutions respectively in charge of financial supervision, prosecution

and handling money laundering information etc.

In Britain,the institution in charge of financial supervision is Finance

Supervision Bureau. Established on December 1!, 2001, it 1s the unique

financial supervision institution in Britain. Being as a private company,

it sets up a shareholder conference and has 2185 personnel. its fund 1s

mainly collected from financial institutions without any budget from the

Ministry of Finance of the country. In 2002, the annual budget of

Finance Supervision Bureau 1s 0.18 billion pounds.

In accordance with the relevant laws, the Finance Supervision Bureau

has four functions

firstly, to formulate market information so as to

enhance the public finance consciousness ; Secondly, to provide protec-

tion to clients through financial supervision business ; thirdly,to reduce

financial

crimes,

especially the occurrence of money

laundering ;

Fourthly, to issue permit and business license to financial service institu-

tions. All financial institutions in the country must accept the supervi-

sion and limitation of the Finance Supervision Bureau. The Finance

Supervision Bureau is entitled to undertake certain punishment measure

if financial institutions conduct 1llegally.

The Finance Supervision Bureau also has responsibilities in prevent-

ing and fighting against criminal crimes. In Britain, there are altogether

three forms for illegally financial conducts and financial crimes

one 1s

money laundering, the other one 1s financial defraud ; the third 1s inter-

nal manipulating market. Money laundering 1s the most serious crime in

Britain and the Finance Supervision Bureau is entitled to formulate the

professional standard of anti-laundering and to undertake the necessary

penalty measures while it discerns the conducts violate anti-money laun-

dering laws.

The British institution in charge of money laundering handling 1s the

British National Criminal Intelligence Bureau which is a completely

independent department. Economy office is set up in the Bureau. Being

the specific anti-money laundering institution, the economy office’s main

responsibility

Is to collect the suspicious reports from financial

departments. There are altogether 70 clerks in it and they may come

from the police, the customs, tax department, financial managerial

agency or welfare agency.

While

the

Economy office of the British National

Criminal

Intelligence Bureau receives suspicious reports, it will preserve the

reports into data bank and then transfer the selected reports to the

120

police or the customs. The latter will carry out investigation. The cases

will be transferred to the imperial procuratorate 1f the collected eviden-

ces can prove money laundering crime.

Since the British comprehensive implementation of anti-money laun-

dering in 1997, the number of suspicious reports from financial system

to the Economy office increased gradually. According the statistics,

there were 12 clerks in the Economy office handling 14000 suspicious

transaction reports in1998 and nearly 30000 suspicious transaction

reports from banks and other financial institutions in 2001. It is

estimated over 50000 reports in 2002.

The British also set up suspicious transaction report official system

In financial agency. Each bank has a suspicious transaction report offi-

cial to the country and the official's main task is to collect information

on money laundering. He will write reports and submit them to the

British National Criminal Intelligence Bureau if he discern certain

suspicious transaction. Each clerk in financial agency must report to the

official while he finds suspicious transaction and the official will decide

whether or not to report to the British National Criminal Intelligence

Bureau. If the bank the official works in violates the relevant laws, he

1s entitled to report to the National Finance Supervision Bureau. The

financial suspicious transaction report official usually receives 20000

suspicious reports each year. Meanwhile, the bank must completely

collect clients materials connected with the transaction and preserve

them quite well at least for 5 years.

In Britain, it is the customs to prosecute drug crimes and money

laundering crimes. According to the prescription of law, the imperial

procuratorate carries out the power of prosecution, exclusive of the

cases concerning drugs, tax and money laundering. This 1s because the

Cases

aTre

not

familiar

to

the

concerning money

laundering

procuratorate. However, the purpose of it 1s to prevent drug crimes and

to reduce the fund source of drugs crime through prosecution and con-

trolling money laundering.

In addition, many institutions outside financial institution also set up

specific anti-money laundering official e.g. law firms. The law firms also

have obligation to discern the clients’ identification. Law firms won't

accept the clients’ commitment, if the new clients don't meet the legal

requirement of identification discerning. Law firms also train lawyers

and clerks on anti-money laundering. In case of suspicion, the lawyer

may not refuse the clients’ entrustment on the excuse of money,

otherwise, he may commit divulging information crime. In Britain,

lawyers have no report obligation on suspicious transaction, but the

——

121 —

report will be the cause of relieving lawyers' responsibility in case of the

money laundering crime existing.

VI. — THE SUGGESTION ON THE PREVENTING

AND PUNISHING MONEY LAUNDERING CRIMES

The following suggestions are presented concerning China’s mainland

anti-money laundering task, in accordance with the present situation of

the mainland anti-money laundering legislation and anti-money launder-

ing mechanism, with the European practice as reference.

1. — To Enhance valuing money laundering matters

In present society, the damage resulting from money laundering 1s

endless, because it may accelerate to deteriorate the severe crimes such

as smuggling, drugs traffic, corruption, organized crimes, terrorism, mul-

tinational organized crimes and multinational terrorism crimes; it also

may damage the ordinary national and international financial order and

perish the government foundation. Hence the international society took

money laundering seriously since 1980. The « 9.11 event » occurrence in

2001 caused the international society to attach great importance to

money laundering. The American government required the whole inter-

national society to control Iand prevent money laundering to block

financing terrorism.

In China mainland, money laundering also entails valuing. The

China mainland is vulnerable to be harmed by money laundering owing

to the incomplete financial laws, not 1deal financial order, not high level

financial clerks, illegal private loans and the large quantity phenomena

of unfair competition. And the country and peoples will be damaged

inestimably 1f the religion extremists and people separatists develop with

arms rapidly through money laundering. Hence the country must

enhance the valuation on money laundering and its damage, quicken the

steps on anti-money laundering legislation and set up sound anti-money

laundering mechanism.

In addition, the consciousness of anti-money laundering should be

strengthened to people through propaganda, because 1it is a new concept

to most of the people and anti-money laundering is hard to take into

effect without the support by them.

2. — To Perfect Anti-money Laundering Legislation

In recent years, China mainland has passed some anti-money laun-

dering laws and regulations. The Criminal Code adopted by the People’s

122

Congress defined money laundering crime and the relevant departments

also promulgated laws such as Rea! Name Rules for Individual Savings,

Rules for Remittance of Foreign Exchange Abroad by Domestic Citizens

and Large Amount Cash Payment Registration Regulation. Yet there are

many aspects entailing consummating in comparison with the legislation

of the EU, Belgium and Britain. There are three aspects needing taking

into account to consummate the China’s mainland anti-money launder-

ing legislation

criminal legislation ; preventive legislation ; professional

regulations.

!1) Criminal legislation

On criminal legislation, many aspects in article 191of Criminal Code

which defines the money laundering crime are not perfect. Firsly, it is

too narrow to limit predicate crimes only to drug, gangland organiza-

tion, smuggling and terrorism in this article. In fact, the EU,Belgium

and Britain have broadened the scope of predicate crimes from the pre-

vious drugs crime to all serious crimes. That alternation needs a process.

We should use their experience for reference and to broaden the scope

of predicate crimes to assure laundering any serious criminal proceeds

conduct to be money laundering crime. The damage of laundering other

criminal proceeds may not be ignored, e.g. according to transparent

international evaluation, there were 20 — 40 billion fund among the total

1000 — 3000 billion fund pertaining to corruptive fund. In China

mainland, it is not rare to legitimate corrupted money and embezzled

state-owned property .In Belgium and Britain, the money connected

with money laundering usually be divided into black money and dirty

money. The money gained by drug traffic and smuggling is black money

and from corruption, taking bribe, evading tax and blackmail is dirty

money. To legitimate both dirty money and black money will commit

money laundering crimes.

Secondly, as the article defines, the subjective aspect of money laun-

dering is the knowledge of the 1llegal proceeds from drugs crime,

gangland organization crime and smuggling crime and collaborating

launder money. In the EU, Belgium and Britain, the composition of this

crime is « know or suspect criminal proceeds ». The scope limited to « to

know » 1s too narrow and should be rectified as « ought to know » or

« know or suspect ».

At last, the article prescribe that the objective aspect of the crime 1s

restricted to assist the subject of predicate crimes in money laundering,

while the EU, Belgium and Britain also embrace divulging information

crime and misprision crime. The law will be more forcible to prevent

— 123 —

serious crimes such as money laundering if the prescription is more

abstract.

2) Preventive legislation

The EU, Belgium and Britain now have adopted preventive legisla-

tion, e.g. the two anti-money laundering Council Directives of EU and

its third Council Directive, the Belgium Law of 11 January 1993 on

preventing the use of the financial system for the purposes of laundering

money and British Anti Money Laundering Law and the Criminal

Profits Draft which is being discussed by the Congress. As aforesaid

stated, these laws played great important roles to prevent from money

laundering crimes. But, China mainland has no such specific laws so far.

The anti-money laundering legislation in China mainland is far behind

its situation. Now, we have the People’'s Conference representatives

proposed such drafts to formulate anti-money laundering law. We think

we should formulate preventative anti-money laundering law to avoid

the deterioration money laundering.

3) Profession regulations

Âs stated above, the specific departments have promulgated some

profession regulations to prevent money laundering crimes, e.g. the

prescriptions on big sum cash payment, foreign exchange administration

published by the People’s Bank of China and Foreign Exchange Bureau.

The present difficulties are firstly, since these regulations are not par-

ticularly made for money laundering, they can not meet the actual

requirement to fight against money laundering; Secondly, the regula-

tions were not enforced effectively, owing to the financial workers’

ignorance of the necessity of anti-money laundering and large quantity

of disordered competition. Hence 1t is necessary for the financial system

to formulate specific regulation to prevent money laundering and

enforce them effectively.

2. — To establish valid anti-money laundering mechanism

It is necessary for China mainland to establish specific working

mechanism to fight against the rampant money laundering home and

abroad. The specific department such as the Central Political and Law

Committee are valuing this problem. We consider anti-money launder-

ing information agency should be firstly established during the process

of erecting anti-money laundering mechanism. This may meet the

requirement of mainland anti-money laundering and international

cooperation. Now many countries have established systems like the

——

124

_

Financial Intelligence Processing Unit in Belgium and the British

Criminal Intelligence Center Economy Crime Office in Britain. 58 mem-

bers in the Egmont Group have established such institutions. We have

two proposals

one is these institutions must be specific and no part-

time agency or person may accomplish the task, the other 1s these

institutions must be independent, e.g. The British Criminal Intelligence

Center Economy Crime Office was previously erected in the police

department and transferred into an independent institution through

legislation.

On the basis of establishing specific money laundering information

collecting department, we should timely erect and perfect the suspicious

transaction report system o f financial and other departments and

appoint particular anti-money laundering examining and reporting offi-

cials in the relevant departments with explicit power and obligation.

Only in this way could our anti-money laundering institutions play

important roles.

4. — To strengthen the international cooperation

of anti-money laundering

The international cooperation of anti-money laundering must be

enhanced owing to the international characteristics of money laundering.

The international society has reached such consensus. There are two

approaches for us to use in international cooperation. One is particular

working team for the Financial Action Task Force on Money Launder-

ing (FATF), the other is the Egmont Group.

Being as an inter-governmental body, FATF was set up in 1989. Îts

purpose 1s to formulate and promote anti-money laundering policy both

at national and international level. In 1990, FATF raised the Forty

Recommendations for anti-money laundering and kept on evaluating

and renewing these Recommendations. There are 29 countries hereto in

FATF. The European Committee and the Gulf Cooperation Organiza-

tion also joined the working team. Since the Recommendations were

raised by the G-7 Summit, most of the developed countries are members

of the team with the adoption of the Forty Recommendations . The

working team has significant influence in the international anti-money

laundering field. When we visited EU, many EU officials including EU

External Relationship Department Asian Department head Mr. Yades

expressed their hope for China to enter into the working team and adopt

the Forty Recommendations. They also stated they were accelerating all

countries attending Asian Europe Conference to join the team and

accept the Forty Recommendations. We suggest that our country

appraise the advantage and disadvantage of our entrance to the team

— 125 —

and join the working team in case of advantage prevailing, for we need

international assistance more urgently than they do. If China mainland

trace the great sum of illegal fund remitted abroad through this channel,

it may significantly benefit domestic fighting against corruption and

crimes.

Established in 1995, Egmont Croup is an informal cooperative

organization between some countries’ financial intelligence centers. Îts

purposes embrace broadening financial intelligence exchanging scope

and systematizing it meanwhile, improving the particular technology,

enhancing the workers’ ability in financial intelligence center and utiliz-

ing modern high technology to strengthen the communication among

different country’s financial intelligence centers. The team held 3 times

of meetings in the year of establishment and one time a year after 1996.

According to the introduction of British Criminal Intelligence Center

Economy Crime Department and Belgium Financial Intelligence Pro-

cessing Unit, the team is an effective channel for different country's anti-

money intelligence institutions and personnel in exchanging intelligence

and developing cooperation. The communication among the team mem-

bers may avoid many unnecessary procedures and 1s of high efficiency

and convenience. Including Hongkong China and Taiwan Province,

there are 58 countries and regions joining the team till now. We suggest

that China mainland make further research on the team and join it at

proper time so as to serve for China’s combating money laundering.

Since the team was erected in Belgium, the president of Belgian Finan-

cial Intelligence Processing Unit invited China mainland to join the team

time and again.

Besides the two channels, China mainland should utilize the joined

cooperative channel such as International Criminal Police Organization

to extradite criminals and trace criminal proceeds. Anti-money launder-

ing should also be noted in bilateral criminal judicial assistance.

RÉSUMÉ

Après avoir présenté la situation du blanchiment d'argent ainsi que

sa prévention et sa répression en Chine continentale, l’auteur fait une

série de suggestions en prenant les dispositifs législatifs européens

comme référence.

— 126 —

SUMMARY

After a presentation of situation, penalty and prevention of money

laundering in mainland China, a lot of suggestions are given concerning

anti-money laundering tasks in this country, with the European practice

as reference.

RESUMEN

Luego de exponer la situaciôn del lavado de dinero asi como la de

su prevenciôn y represiôn en China continental, el autor hace una serie

de sugerencias tomando como referencia los dispositivos legislativos

europeos.

127

IS JAPAN STILL THE SAFEST COUNTRY

IN THE WORLD?

Koichi Hamai (*)

INTRODUCTION

Japan has enjoyed the reputation of the safest country in the world

for a long time (Clifford, 1976; Adler, 1983). Crime has never been on

the political agenda until very recently. However, since 1990, after a con-

sistent economic slump, people in Japan appear to be losing confidence

in their safety as well as their economy. Newspapers are reporting a lot

about the rising tide of youth violence. Incidents such as the slaughter-

ing of families in Tokyo (') that happened at the end of 2000 and the

school stabbing spree (*) in Osaka in June, 2001, are frequently reported

in detail by the mass media. It has been asserted that « Japan’s Myth

of the safest society in the world» is finally becoming corrupted.

Japanese people are more worried about crime and have begun to think

that public safety has worsened. According to the survey conducted by

the Information Research Office of the Japanese Cabinet, in December

of 2000, the percentage of responses to the statement, « Public safety

(security) 1s getting worse, » increased from 18.8% in 1998 to 26.6% in

2000.

OFFICIAL STATISTICS ON CRIME

The mass media, when it points out that crime rate 1s increasing, use

police statistics, that is, the numbers of reported crime to the police, or

the number of arrests. « The White Paper on Crime » issued by the Min-

istry of Justice, often cited or used when crime and criminal justice are

the issues in discussion, uses these same figures. When the mass media

report, they mentioned, « According to the White Paper on Crime

(*) Ministry of Justice ; Japan; (HAMAIk@ aol.com)

(*) In Setagaya of Tokyo. Miyazawa, a 44-year-old business consultant, his wife Yasuko.

41, and their 8-year-old daughter Niina were stabbed to death on 30 Dec. 2000, while their

6-year-old son Rei was strangled. No suspect has been arrested yet.

(7) A knife-wielding man stormed into an elementary school Friday morning on 8 June

in lkeda, Osaka Prefecture. and fatally stabbed eight children and wounded 15. Mamoru

Takuma, à 37-year-old psychiatrice outpatient from Ikeda, ran amok inside Osaka Kyoiku

University Ikeda Elementary School at around 10 :15 a.m.…. stabbing 21 first

and second-

graders and two teachers.

- 129 —

accepted by the Cabinet today, since the crime rate has increased by 5 %

in 2000 from last year, crime in Japan 1s getting more violent. »

The figures show that the numbers of violent crimes reported to the

police, such as

bodily injury ; extortion ; assault; and intimidation, are

increasing fast from 1999 to the year 2000. The mass media headlines

such as « Crime in Japan is out of control. » were common. For exam-

ple, the Japan Times of 17 November, 2001 reported, « Crime rate hits

new high but arrests at record low : according to the 2001 white paper

on crime — violent robbery, physical assault, indecent assault and

property damage have shown a marked increase in the last two to three

years. » Thus, from the reports of the mass media, the attitudes and per-

ception of the public to crime is being formed.

But, are these reports correct? We need to examine the process of

how the police statistics are compiled. The police only record an incident

as a crime when an incident is reported and the police recognize that

they have to intervene. Hence, even if people encounter crime or witness

crime, some may not consider it to be a crime or may not report it to

the police due to various reasons (such as that it is not serious enough

to report to the police.). In addition, even 1f an incident 1s reported to

the police, the police may not regard it as a crime or may deal with it

informally. In other words, it is necessary to understand that the police

statistics will be influenced not only by the perception and action of vic-

tims or witnesses, but also by the attitudes and policy of the police in

filing a complaints and keeping records. Based on this understanding, !

will examine the figures of violent crimes in Figure |.

In the police statistics, the murder rate is considered to be the most

reliable figure having fewer unknown incidents. If security and order in

the society have deteriorated and crime has become more violent, the

number of murders, the most violent crime, should also increase. But

there is no such extreme change between 1999 and 2000 found in the

murder figure (*). Furthermore, if society is really becoming more

violent, there should be fundamental change in the society that causes

it. But no such change has taken place. Thus, it is very natural to con-

sider that the number of violent crimes in Figure ! 1s not reflecting

change in real crime rate, but 1s reflecting change in peoples’ and police

attitudes or responses (record keeping) to crime.

Are there any events in 2000 or earlier that could affect police

activity and policy in dealing with crimes? « Yes. » The year of 1999 and

2000 will be remembered as the years when the police faced the most dif-

ficult time in its history due to endless scandals. Among many scandals,

(*) The number of murders decreased from 1391 in 2000 to 1340 in 2001.

130

p

the most famous two incidents are the Okegawa stalker murder (*) and

Tochigi lynch murder (*) cases (both cases occurred in the late 1999). In

both cases, the victims were finally killed mainly due to police inaction.

In both cases, although the family members or the victims continued to

ask the police to take action to protect the victims, claiming that their

lives were threatened, the police were very reluctant to do anything to

intervene. They considered, the matter should be solved personally or

within the family and they did not have to take any action, because the

problems

happened

in victims

personal

relationships.

After

the

incidents, this process was uncovered by the mass media, and the police

were heavily criticized.

The police finally accepted their responsibility and apologized to the

families of the victims, and the National Police Agency issued several

instructions, in order to prevent the same mistakes, on how to deal with

complaints and reports from citizens. In principle, it ordered the local

police headquarters to accept any complains related to violence against

people. In August 2000, the National Police Agency also issued « the

Summary of Restructuring the Police. » In its introduction, it is written,

«the maintenance of public safety is the base of the nation and its

development. Therefore, it is very important and urgent to restructure

the police in charge of public safety, and regain the trust and confidence

in the police by the people. ‘It also states’ in order to establish the police

for the people, we should strengthen the reception process of complains

and accusation, strengthen measures against new wave of crimes such as

stalker, child abuse and youth violence, and be more sensitive to victims

and improve support for victims. » In other words, the attitude or the

manner of the police in dealing with complains and accusation has

greatly improved. In addition, on December 16, 1999, the National

Police Agency also issued the instruction focusing on protecting women

and children and instructed the police to take necessary actions even 1f

the complaints are about violent acts in intimate relationships or molest-

ing women on crowded trains. The police have now installed special

recep-

(*) In July 1999, Ino and her family complained to police that she was being stalked by

her former boyfriend. Police were also informed of the defamatory fliers that were posted

around Ino’s neighborhood. Saitama police, however, allegedly requested that Ino and her

family drop a criminal complaint in the defamation case. Three Saitama police officers were

later fired, indicted and found guilty of falsifying written evidence related to Ino’s defama-

tion. Ino, a second-year student at Atomi College, was stabbed to death on Oct. 26 in front

of a train station in Okegawa, Saitama Prefecture.

(*) Sudo was forced into a car by a group of teenagers on Dec. 2 and later strangled in

a wooded area near the town of Ichikai, Tochigi Prefecture, according to police. The boys

had been targeting the victim since October, assaulting him and forcing him to take out loans

of over 7 milllion yen which he handed over to his tormentors. When the parents filed the

abduction report, an officer at the police station was quoted as telling them that the « police

will not act unless 1t becomes a criminal case. »

— 131 —

tion desks for such victims in police stations as well as in the major train

stations, and also encouraged victims to report such incidents to the

police by putting up notices at stations and on public transport saying

« molestation (domestic violence or stalking) 1s a crime. Do not allow it.

Please report the incidents to the police.» As a result, more violent

incidents have been reported to the police. Such complains and incidents

reported to the police that formerly would have been ignored, began to

be accepted and recorded as a crime. Thus, the number of the violent

incidents recorded by the police dramatically increased in the year of

2000. Based on such statistics, the mass media report that crimes in

Japan are becoming more violent and heinous. However, the number of

the victims who died due to violence did not go up between 1999 and

2000. While the number of the victims injured by violent acts, increased

by 41.2 % from 28,973 to 40,897, 93.8 % of those (41.2 %) suffered only

slight injury. This means that the people whose injuries were not serious,

are more likely to report the incidents to the police and the police

receive the complaints more seriously.

In addition, recently, falling clearance rates are often cited by the

mass media as evidence that public safety 1s at stake in Japan. According

to the police statistics, while the clearance rate for serious crimes (*) in

1995 was 90.5 %, the same rate in 2000 fell down to 60.4 %. Based on

these kind figures, the image of rising crimes is formed among people.

People might have an impression that serious crimes are deteriorating

our society and the police are losing control over crime. However, 1f the

clearance rates are looked at carefully, it is not difficult to find out what

is causing the fall. More than half of the serious crimes are indecent

assaults. Most of the indecent assaults took place on public transport

(such as touching breasts or hips of young women (’).) Since 1995, the

number of indecent assault reported to the police increased from 3,644

to 7,412 as the National Police Agency issued the above instructions.

Indecent assaults on crowded public transport, can be solved only by

arresting offenders in the act of assault. Therefore, the more incidents

are reported to the police, the more clearance rate falls. However, the

falling clearance rate is always discussed in relation to notorious murder

cases that are not solved yet such as slaughtering of families in Setagaya,

even though the clearance rate for murder remains stable at around

95 ; 0.

(*) Serious crimes in police statistics include murder. robbery. arson, rape, kidnap and

indecent assault.

(7) According to the ICVS 2000, in Japan only 9.7% of the victims of sexual assaults

reported the incidents to the police.

132

CRIME VICTIMS (\'l("l‘lI\“lle\'l‘l()N) SURVEYS IN JAPAN

Because of the problems with police statistics, an alternative measure

of crime, crime victim surveys was introduced. Crime victim surveys are

based on the same methodology as public opinion surveys, which use

sampling techniques and questionnaire. The International Crime Victims

Survey (ICVS) 1s a victimization survey developed as a measure of crime

by a group of researchers in collaboration with Dutch government to

compare crime victimization rates in different countries. Although there

were several attempts to compare crime rates in different countries with

police data, figures of offenses recorded by the police are problematic

due to differences in the way the police define, record and count crimes.

The first ICVS took place in 1989, the second in 1992, the third in

1996 and the fourth in 2000. Surveys have been carried out in 24

industrialized countries since 1989.

While Japan has not yet established its own national crime victimiza-

tion survey, it was invited to participate in 1989 and 1992 ICVS. Japan

did not participate in 1996 ICVS. Later in the year of 2000, the fourth

ICVS was planned and the working group of ICVS requested the Minis-

try of Justice of Japan to join the project. Às a national expert of Japan

from the Justice Ministry, l was in charge of conducting 2000 ICVS in

Japan.

THE RESULTS OF 2000 ICVS OF JAPAN

1. — Crime victimization rates

In general, Japanese crime victimization rates are lower than most of

the countries except for cycle thefts. For burglary, including attempts,

the Japanese victimization rate 1s the second lowest next to Finland. For

contact crimes (robbery, sexual assault and assault with force) which are

considered to be closely related to fear of crime, Japan is the lowest

among the countries in the ICVS.

2. — Satisfaction with police activities

The level of agreement with the statement « the police in community

1s kind and helpful » in Japan 1s the lowest next to the Netherlands and

Poland. The equivalent rate of agreement with the statement « the police

in community 1s doing good job to prevent crimes » 1s also among the

lowest next to Portugal, Poland and the Netherlands.

133

3. — Fear of crime (concern about crimes)

In ICVS, respondents are asked three questions about fear of crime,

« How safe do you feel walking alone in your area after dark? » « How

safe do you feel when you are at home alone after dark? » and « What

do you say are the chances that over the next months someone will try

to break into your home? » In the likelihood of burglary and safety at

home, the rate of fear of crime in Japan 1s relatively higher than in most

of other countries, which is quite disproportionate in view of the low

victimization rate.

4. — Attitudes to punishment

In ICVS, in order to measure the attitudes to punishment, res-

pondents are asked « Take for instance the case of a man of 21 years

old who 1s found guilty of burglary (stealing a color TV set) for the

second time. Which one of the following sentences do you consider the

most appropriate for such a case? » They are also asked for the most

effective way of reducing youth crime. Even though the Japanese vic-

timization rate of burglary is among the lowest, the proportion of people

in Japan choosing imprisonment, most severe punishment, for the crime,

1s the second highest following the United States. The rate of choosing

«increasing sentences » for preventing youth crime in Japan 1s the

highest.

When we focus on the cfime victimization rates in 2000 ICVS, even

though « Japan's Myth of safest society in the world » has been said

corrupted by the mass media, Japan still is the safest country in the

industrialized world. This 1s especially true for violent crimes. However,

the fear of crime in Japan, which 1s relatively high compared with those

in other countries, does not reflect the results of actual victimization

rate. In addition, the Japanese satisfaction with the police in preventing

a crime as well as reporting rate to the police, are among the lowest.

This tells us that people’s trust in police in Japan is quite low. Moreover,

reflecting the high level of fear of crime, the people of Japan demand

more severe punishment for offenders than those of other countries.

DISCUSSION

In summary, « Japan's Myth of the safest society in the world » 1s not

necessarily corrupted in real world, but the image of the safe society in

people’s mind or safe feeling among the people is being eroded. Fear of

crime among the people is certainly rising in Japan. Japan may be no

longer a crime free society, at least in people’s mind, where they can live

134

without worrying about a crime in their daily life. Dussich et al (1997)

found the same fact, based on their own research, that since 1995 the

fear of crime victimization has increased more for the Japanese than for

the

Americans,

and also found that for specific violent crimes,

Americans had much higher fear levels, but Japanese had a much higher

level of a vague general fear of violent crime. They conclude that the

perception of increase in fear was not related to the actual or real rates

of victimization, but related to the people's impression of crime

increases.

If this is true, why have the people in Japan suddenly begun to lose

confidence in its safety and begun to worry about a crime ? As the pre-

vious studies pointed out (Ferraro,1995; Williams et al,2000), fear of

crime is very complicated subject. There are many possible factors

influencing the increase in fear of crime. With the data set of ICVS, in

order to explore the reasons why the level of fear in Japan is dis-propor-

tionally high, I performed logistic regression and found that the satisfac-

tion with the police is one of the most important variables affecting the

level of fear of crime. Thus, low level of trust in the police could raise

fear of crime among the people more than actual victimization. And the

recent reports on decreasing clearance rate by police in newspapers

might have affected the high level of fear among the Japanese people.

On the other hand, Grabosky (1995) points out that high level of fear

of crime 1s likely to be found in the community where changes in the

area of populations and economy are undergoing, even though there

may be no apparent increase in criminal activity in the community. He

explains that uncertainty, which accompanies change, may be reflected

in fear of crime. Taylor (1995) also mentioned that fear of crime may

be another expression of anxiety about unemployment in the society

where rapid social and cultural changes are experienced in globalization.

Japan has enjoyed so called lifetime employment in which there was

almost no uncertainty about the future of life. Until very recently, once

people joined a company, no one had to worry about being laid off.

However, after the bubble economy was burst, Japanese society and its

economy are facing a big challenge from globalization. In order to sur-

vive, many companies are under pressure of restructuring. No one is

immune from possible lay-off, and business 1s no longer as usual. Uncer-

tainty for the future has prevailed in the society. This may be one of the

reasons of high level of fear of crime in Japan. Yamagishi (1999) points

out that the sense of security in Japan has been maintained based on

lack of uncertainty in society. Japan has an established informal

mechanism in its society preventing people from breaking rules with

mutual control and surveillance. But recently, the mechanism maintain-

ing order in its society, has deteriorated mainly due to globalization, and

people want to maintain security with formal control and severe

100

135 —

punishments in compensation for the loss of informal mechanism.

Jacobs and Helms (1996) suggested that society uses prisons to correct

for a deterioration in the informal social control mechanisms such as the

family. The prison population in Japan, which had been stable and

never experienced overcrowding for more than 30 years, has begun to

rise since 1993. In the year of 2000, the population reached and sur-

passed its capacity and 1s still increasing rapidly. Japan may be following

the rule that Jacobs and Helms suggested. Moral panic may be taking

place in Japan.

REFERENCES

ADLER, F. 1983. Nations not Obsessed with Crime. Fred B. Rothman &

Co

CLIFFORD, W. 1976. Crime Control in Japan. Lexington Books.

DussicH, P.J., FRIpAY, P., OKADA, T., & YAMAGAMI, À. 1997. Influences

a Com-

on Fear of Crime Victimization in America and Japan

parative analysis. Paper prepared for presentation at the 9" Interna-

tional World Symposium on Victimology.

FERRARO, K. 1995. Fear of Crime

Interpreting Victimization Risk.

State University of New York Press.

GrABOSKYy, P.N. 1995. Fear of Crime and Fear Reduction Strategies.

Trends & Issues, No.44. Australian Institute of Criminology.

JacoBs, D. & HerMs, R.F. 1996. Toward a political model of incarcera-

tion

À time-series examination of multiple explanations for prison

admission rates. American Journal of Sociology, 102, pp. 323-357.

VAN KESTEREN, J. et al. 2000. Criminal Victimization in Seventeen

Industrialized Countries. NSCR, Wetenschappelijik Onderzoek- en

Documentatiecentrum.

TAYLOR, I. 1995. Book Review : « Fear of Crime-Interpreting Victimiza-

tion Risk », by Ferraro, K.F. in Urban Studies, 32/9 : 1567-8

WILLIAMS, F.P., MCSHANE, M.D. & AKERS, R.L. 2000. Worry about

Victimization

an Alternative and Reliable Measure for Fear of

Crime. Western Criminology Review 2(2).

YAMAGISHI, T. 1999. From secured society to trusted society : the future

of the Japanese system. Chyuko Shinsho.

RÉSUMÉ

L'image mythique du Japon comme pays le plus sûr au monde reste

largement conforme à la réalité observée dans les enquêtes de victimisa-

136

tion, mais dans l’esprit de la population japonaise cette image s'érode

pour faire place à un sentiment d’'insécurité grandissant. Une explication

peut venir de la faible confiance de la population vis-à-vis de la police,

et de l’annonce dans les journaux de moindres taux d'élucidation des

affaires criminelles par la police. Une autre explication peut être l'in-

sécurité générale suscitée par la globalisation de l’économie et les risques

de chômage de personnes qui autrefois auraient eu leur carrière assurée

dans l’entreprise. L'affaiblissement des contrôles informels est parallèle

à une augmentation de la population des prisons.

ABSTRACT

« Japan’s Myth of the safest society in the world » is not necessarily

corrupted in real world as show victimization surveys, but the image of

the safe society in people’s mind is being eroded. Fear of crime among

the people is rising in Japan. Low level of trust in the police could be

one explanation. Another one could be found in the community where

changes in the area of populations and economy are undergoing. After

the bubble economy was burst, Japanese society and its economy are

facing a big challenge from globalization, breaking so called lifetime

employment in which there was almost no uncertainty about the future

of life. The loss of informal social control mechanisms such as the family

Is parallel to a rise of prison populations.

RESUMEN

La imagen mitica de Japôn como el pais mäs seguro del mundo

corresponde ampliamente a la realidad observada en las encuestas de

victimizaciôn, pero en la mente de la poblaciôn japonesa esta imagen se

deteriora y cede el paso a un sentimiento de inseguridad creciente. Una

explicaciôn posible es el débil nivel de confianza de la poblaciôon con

respecto a la policia, unida al anuncio en los periôdicos de la dis-

minuciôn de las tasas de clarificaciôn de casos criminales por parte de

la policia. Otra explicaciôn puede ser la inseguridad general despertada

por la globalizaciôn de la economia y los riesgos de paro de las personas

que, antes, habrian tenido su carrera en la empresa asegurada. La dis-

minuciôn de los controles informales es paralela a un aumento de la

poblaciôn de las prisiones.

- 137 -

BULLETIN D’ADHÉSION

NOM (M. Mme Mlle)

Prénom

« e + » —s + + e « = + = + + + v « e » e + + » » + + + + e + = « e + + » e + « »s e + # « = « » # + + + + + . » = + + » + = = . .

Nationalité

Profession

. —- « — . + =s e = = * + + = + » » e + + « + « + v + e + »s » + » + + » »s e s » = » + = » » + = s = » + + + + » + « + + … + «

Titres Universitaires

e —- … e e + %s e + v + s e + + = + »s + + » « »s » + » # + « + + + + » » » + + + + + + v + + + » » + » » = À

ADRESSE (privée)

« « « « + » » = « « » + =s #s + + + = « + + + » v « » e + » + + + + e + + » » # + » + + » + + e = « + + + + + « + e + + . + # »s » + + + « « À

« « « « — * + . »s = « —s « e + + . = + + » = « + + + + e » + + # e + » + « + +s e + + = + . + + = =s « + « « —s »s + =s » « + + s »s » e « + + » +

« « < * + » + # + = + 6 + + =* + + e » e + « e + + » v e + e » e + »s = e « = + + « + « »# + + + + »s + » + » + + + + + + + + + + » + = » + » =

e … e = + + + + »s + + + + + + # » + + + + + » » + » » + + + + » » + » » + » + + + + + = »s + + — + + + + + # » + + « + + » + + + + + =. » + +

Tél

« « e . . . < = + + = + « v + + » + + + » + « + + » » + + + = —

E-mail

e « e + « e + + + » e = e e « + + + + « + + « ». »s + » + .

Fax

Internet

« « e + « + + e »s s » « + s « + + « + + =s « + =s . . ..

ADRESSE (professionnelle)

« e » + + . + + e + = »s + + = + ». + + + + » + + » + # + #s + + + + » = » + + = « + + » » + » + + # » = + » + + + + » + » =s + ». + » »> » = » e

« … + + + »* + + + + » « + « » = + + « + + + + + » + + # + + » + + + + + « + + + « + + + + + » + + + » + + + + + + + » + » » » » + + + ». . .

« . « » » # + # « » = e + e » + « e = « +s « + + » + + + + + + » »s »s » + + + + + = + + + + + v »s + + » # + + + + + + » » + » + » + + + + ». »

« « —… —* + = e = « e + + + + + = « » » + … » #s » » « « = e + + + + + + + v « e + + « e + =s « »s e + « e + = + + »s « » »s + + + » « + . » + + .

Tél

e + … »* e + » e + + + + « = + + % + »s = + » + + + + + + » + + =

E-mail

« = + + + + + + » + + + + v » + = ». + » + + + + + » » + e

Fax

. . + ». . . . .. .. ... . . .. .. .. . ... ...

Internet

. e + + + + + + + v +e + + + + + » + + + + + + + » » + »

Déclare adhérer le

. « + + » » « » + + + + + + + + + + + + + v + + + + + + + + . » + + + + » + »* + + + » » = + + =s » + + =s » + »

à la SOCIÉTÉ INTERNATIONALE DE CRIMINOLOGIE et s’engage à acquit-

ter la cotisation annuelle de

40 euros ou 80 $US (Membre individuel)

100 euros ou 130 $US (Associations ou Collectivités)

Le règlement doit être effectué à l'ordre de la

SOCIÉTÉE INTERNATIONALE DE CRIMINOLOGIE

4-14, rue Ferrus

75014 PARIS

Tél : (33.1) 45.88.00.23

Fax : (33.1) 45.88.96.40

e-mail : crim.sic@ wanadoo.fr

site web :

http://perso.wanadoo.fr/societe.internationale.de.criminologie/

C.C.P — PARIS

FR/38/30041/00001/2106260U020/S5

PSSTFRPPPAR —

CHEQUES POSTAUX DE PARIS

16, rue des Favorites —

75900 PARIS CHEQUES.

139

APPLICATION FORM

LAST NAME (Mr. Mrs. Miss).....…....001000000 000 RL

First Name

» « + »* + + » » « « » s + = # + + = e . + + < . + » + = « + « + « + » + + + » =s + + + + + » + + = + + # + + + + + + » » »

Nationality

. « — — + + « » + + + =s …s < »s = + =s e =s + + + » » + =s e + »s * + « ». » =s + + »s + « + » + + + + + » » + + » + + » + . . + «

Profession

—… + + + + + + « = + « =s »s =s + » = # + #s « + + + »s » =s + . = » ° « »s » + + » + + » » » + + + + » s + + » + + + + + + + + »

University Degrees

ADDRESS (home)

a . — + » » + + « e = =s s. =s + + s. + » e « e » + »s » + « « e »s + « + » # + » + # » » + + » + « » > + » = » + + + + + + + + + + + » + » + + =

. + € € * » # # + + = =s = =s « « . . + + + « + + + » = « + »s + + + « » »s + « =s + » + »+ » » + + + » + » » » » + + + # + + = + + + + + + + » »

. = « + # » + = =s « » »s e + s » v + + + « e + « s. = »s »s » » » « + + + + + + + + + + » » = + + + + + + + + + + + + + + » + + + » + » = + = +

Tel

…. e + + - » » »s + »s s + + + » » + + + + » ». + » » » + ». « « e

E-mail

. . .. ... ... ... .. .. . .. . ... ...

Fax

« . … — + . + » »s » + « + » + + + + + + »s + + + » » + + + . ».

Internet

. e … e + s« » + »s » = »s + + = » + + + » + » + » + » + »

ADDRESS (office)

« « + … « + + »s » + » e + e » « e »s + » +s + + + + + + + . + » + + » + » » + » + » + + + » + + + + + + + + » » + + »s + + » + + + + » + + » =

. « — + € e » — « + « e + = « » »s « = »s s + = = + « «s % + = = + . + » … e + … « = «s » e + + + “ + « + + + + + + » » + + + + « » + . + + # =

« « # e + + « »s + « « « »s + + = « + + e « + = + » + « = e + « « + » » + + + e + + + + + + + + + = + + » + + + + + + + + + + + + » + + + » »

Tel

« . …. e e »* » « + « » « « + » + + + + + » + + + + » + + + » + +

E-mail

“ e « . . . » . ... ... ... .. ... .. . ...

Fax

. . —. + » + + « » + »s —s « »s + + . + + + + + » . e +s + = »s à =

Internet

° … e + + e + + « + »s « + + « » + + « + + + + + + » + =

| hereby acknowledge my membership

in the INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY OF CRIMINOLOGY and agree to pay my

annual membership fees

40 Euros or 80 $US (Individual member)

100 Euros or 130 $US (Associations and Communities)

Payment should be made to the order of

SOCIÉTÉ INTERNATIONALE DE CRIMINOLOGIE

75014 PARIS

4-14, rue Ferrus

Tel : (33.1) 45.88.00.23

Fax : (33.1) 45.88.96.40

e-mail : crim.sic@ wanadoo.fr

web site

http://perso.wanadoo.fr/societe.internationale.de.criminologie/

C.C.P — PARIS

FR/38/30041/00001/2106260U020/55

PSSTFRPPPAR —

CHEQUES POSTAUX DE PARIS

16, rue des Favorites —

75900 PARIS CHEQUES.

—

141

BOLETIN DE ADHESION

APELLIDOS (Sr. Sra. Srta.)

e » + —. = + + e + « » e « » + « + + « + . . + « « + + + « « + « « » = + « e » « + » » » e

Nombre

. . « …. » + + » » »> + + » » + + s + + » + »s + + + + » + » + + + » + + + + + + + » + « + « + + + » + » » + + + e + . + » -

Nacionalidad

Profesiôn

* . + » + + + » + » + » » = + + + + + v » + + » + + + + + + + “ » . + + # + » + + + = »s = e + + = + + + + + = « e + + . ..

Titulos Universitarios

* . . + » »* » » + + » + + » + + + = « + + » + « + + + + + e + e » =s = + =s »s » + + » + »s = =s « . « ..

DIRECCION (privado)

. + + » + + »s »s + » + + » + » » + » » = + » » + + + + + » + + + » + + + »s « « + + + + + « # » + + + e + + + « + + =s 6 « + » » + + = « ..

« * * = . ». + e + + = =s »s + + » + + » + + « … + » e + + + « e » + » » »s « + = + » « » . « + » » + « » » + e »s + + + + » e » » e » e + » .

= = e + + + » » + + +s + + ». » » + » »s »s + + + + + + + + + » » » + + » + » + » + + » + + + + + + » » + =s + + + + + < » » « + « + e : . .

« « + »# » + e + + » « + + « + + » + # + + + » = = < + « + + . + + e . « » « + « » = » + » + + + = »s « = + + = e » + + » » =s « < —. « . .

Tel

. - …. « . . + e + »s + + + + + » » < + + » » + + + » + » + + + »

E-mail

. . —. + e + »s + + + + = « » « « »s + # = = « e + + » . ».

Fax

° . . + = + + » + + + » + » + » + » » + + + + + + + + + + + »

Internet

DIRECCION (profesional)

« e « * + » « » « + + + + + + » + + e »s + + » + + = + e … «s + + e + » + = e . « … » » . + « » + e + + e » = « « » »s + » « « « . + « . . ..

« * = * + + + + + % « = + » + + + » + < + … + » + + « —s e + . « » + = »s » + e + » » » e + » e « « + + » = « + « — « + »s = =s » = »s « » . ..

« » * * = » + . ». + e + = + + + + e + + + »s » + < = s e »s »s + + * + »s = = < . + « v + = e « « » « » « « « + < » « + » # « « » « « . » = = .

« * + » * e + + v + » + » » + + + + + + + + + + » + e « + + + + + + # + + e + ». = « + e » + » + + + * + e « + + e + v + » « e + « + . »s « æ

Tel

E-mail

. »* + + » + + + + + + + + + » = » + + + + + + =s . . e .

Fax

« . e . e + « + . + — + e » + « « = « » + « + e + . « … « .

Internet

. + = —. ». » + + = » =s » » e = » … « e » « » = « » e +

Declara su adhesion el

. . …. + ». » + » » + + + + + » + + » + » »s + + + + # + + + + + + = »s + .s + + + s« » + »s + = = + » . ..

a la SOCIEDAD INTERNACIONAL DE CRIMINOLOGIA y se compromete

a pagar la cuota anual de

40 Euros o 80 $US (Miembro individual)

100 Euros o 130 $US (Asociaciones y grupos colectivos)

El pago debe efectuarse a la order de la

SOCIÈTE INTERNATIONALE DE CRIMINOLOGIE

4-14, rue Ferrus — 75014 PARIS

Tel. : (33.1) 45.88.00.23 — Fax : (33.1) 45.88.96.40

e-mail : crim.sic(a wanadoo.fr

site web :

http://perso.wanadoo.fr/societe.internationale.de.criminologie/

C.C.P — PARIS

FR/38/30041/00001/2106260U020/5S

PSSTFRPPPAR —

CHEQUES POSTAUX DE PARIS

16, rue des Favorites —

75900 PARIS CHEQUES.

143