AIC_1986

ANNALES INTERNATIONALES DE CRIMINOLOGIE

INTERNATIONAL ANNALS OF CRIMINOLOGY

ANALES INTERNACIONALES

DE CRIMINOLOGIA

ANNÉE 1986 (volume 24 - n° | et 2)

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NOTE DE LA RÉDACTION

Un certain nombre de modifications ont été décidées par le

Comité Exécutif dans sa réunion du 30-31 mai 1986, s'agissant de

la rédaction des Annales Internationales de Criminologie.

A la suite de son élection au Secrétariat Général, M. Georges

PICCA a demandé d'être déchargé des fonctions de rédacteur en

chef. C'est notre ami Georges KELLENS secrétaire général adjoint,

qui a bien voulu accepter d'assurer cette responsabilité. Qu'il en

soit ici remercié. Il sera assisté de quatre rédacteurs associés, qui

représentent quatre régions du monde dans lesquelles la Société

est implantée.

Nous espérons que cette restructuration du Comité de Ré-

daction permettra aux Annales Internationales de Criminologie

de prendre un nouvel essor en vue de favoriser la liaison entre

nos membres et, de contribuer au développement scientifique de

la criminologie.

LETTRE DU PRÉSIDENT

Après un an de présidence de la Société Internationale de

Criminologie, depuis février 1985, je m'adresse à tous les membres

de notre Société pour exprimer une série de sentiments, que je

sens en moi-même, et qui vont d'une émotion profonde à un sen-

timent de gratitude pour la confiance qu'on a démontré pour

ma personne.

J'exprime notamment un remerciement et un souvenir ami-

cal au Président qui m'a précédé, le Professeur Denis Szabo de

Montréal.

Je suis profondément ému et honoré par cette désignation,

comme Italien, comme médecin et comme criminologue.

En tant qu'Italien, mes sentiments s'adressent avant tout en

direction du passé, à l'origine de notre Société et à la grande fi-

gure inoubliable de notre grand maître, Benigno Di Tullio, fon-

dateur et Premier Président de la S.I.C.

En tant que médecin, et notamment médecin légiste psychia-

tre et criminologue, je constate que dans l'histoire de notre Socié-

té cette présidence a été confiée à des criminologues qui repré-

sentent

l'interdisciplinarité de notre science

(dans

le domaine

socio!og:que, juridique et clinique)

et, pour ce qui concerne la

médecine, à des figures illustres de la science médicale, telles

que Benigno Di Tullio, Denis Carrol et Trevor Gibbens. Ces noms

représentent pour moi un héritage inoubliable qui sera le guide

de mon activité future.

En tant que criminologue je suis orienté vers l'avenir, sui-

vant une perspective interdisciplinaire qui est à l'origine de notre

science ;

jai

toujours cultivée suivant les

une perspective que

enseignements fondamentaux des Présidents qui m'ont précédé.

Je me rapporte particulièrement aux Présidents Thornsten Sellin,

Jean Pinatel et Denis Szabo, trois symboles pour moi d'une « fra-

ternité »

« humaine »

dans le domaine du

interdisciplinaire et

droit, de la sociologie et de la clinique.

Je remercie de tout mon cœur, dans l'esprit d'une fraternité

scientifique et humaniste, les Présidents Sellin, Pinatel et Szabo,

avec la certitude qu'ils représentent et représenteront, par leur

présence active parmi nous, un exemple à suivre pour bien opérer

dans l'avenir au profit d'un développement efficace des activités

de notre Société.

Après un an de présidence je suis en mesure de vous présen-

ter un bilan synthétique des activités de la S.IC. en 1985.

Notre Société a participé officiellement en mars 85, au Col-

loque Inter-Associations (avec les trois grandes associations sœurs

A.ID.P., F.IP.P. et S.I.D.S.) tenu en Italie, à Saint-Vincent, sous

l'égide de l'O.N.U., et dédié à l'étude des dimensions nouvelles de

la criminalité et de la prévention du crime dans le contexte du

développement.

Au mois d'août 85, notre Société a participé au VII® Congrès

des Nations Unies pour la Prévention du Crime et le traitement

des Délinquants, tenu à Milan. Notre participation s'est concréti-

sée soit au sein des réunions des O.N.G. qui se sont déroulées à

cette occasion, telles que la réunion sur les « femmes victimes de

la loi» avec la collaboration de M"*

Barbara Price

(John Jay

introductif de M""

College of Criminal Justice)

et un rapport

L. Shahani, Secrétaire Général du Congrès ; soit dans le cadre

spécifique de l'organisation d'une réunion Inter-Associations (A.I.-

D.P., F.1P.P., S.IC., S.ID.S.), dédiée aux problèmes de la « protec-

tion des victimes du crime ». Notre délégation officielle au Congrès

était composée par moi-même, M"* C. Sommerhausen, M. U. Gatti

(rapporteur), Mrs T. Bandini, P. Lejins, G. Picca, D. Szabo et

M"* A. Marangopoulos.

En septembre 85, un Cours international de criminologie a

été organisé, sous l'égide de notre Société, à Belem (Brésil), dé-

dié aux problèmes de la politique criminelle

rapporteurs

M

J. Vérin, le président M. Ancel et le professeur De Figueiredo Dias.

En septembre 85, notre Société a participé au Colloque Inter-

national du 25° anniversaire de la fondation de Montréal.

M. D.

Szabo en tant que Président du Colloque, moi-même en tant que

rapporteur et président d'un « panel », À. Reiss en tant que prêé-

sident de la Commission Scientifiquç de notre Société.

En octobre 85, nous avons organisé à l'Université Catholique

d'Amérique à Washington, la 1" Conférence Aquinas de Crimi-

nologie sur

la responsabilité civique. J'ai

présenté

le rapport

introductif, ensuite M. M. Novak a exposé son rapport fondamen-

tal sur le sujet « Character and Crime

an inquiry into the causes

of the virtue of nations », suivi par un commentaire de M. Â.

Reiss. Les actes de cette conférence internationale sont en cours

de presse. Etaient présents pour notre Société le Père Mailloux

et M. P. Lejins.

En novembre 85, la S.I.C. a été représentée à Strasbourg, au-

près du Conseil de l'Europe, au VII* Colloque Criminologique que

j'ai organisé et présidé sur le sujet « Etudes sur la responsabilité

pénale et le traitement des délinquants malades mentaux ». Plu-

sieurs membres de notre Société étaient présents

Mrs H. Kerner

et Ferracuti en tant que rapporteurs.

Enfin notre Société a été représentée, en novembre 85, au Sé-

minaire International du 50° anniversaire de l'Ecole de Crimino-

logie de l'Université de Bruxelles. Plusieurs membres de notre So-

ciété étaient présents en tant que rapporteurs, M. D. Szabo était

rapporteur de synthèse.

La revue de notre Société, les Annales Internationales de Cri-

minologie, a finalement normalisé le rythme de ses parutions sous

l'impulsion de son rédacteur en chef M. G. Picca, par la publica-

tion d'un volume double (1985) dédié aux Actes du Congrès Inter-

national de Vienne.

Les problèmes financiers soulevés par

l'organisation de ce

Congrès concernant les fonds que notre Société a dù avancer pour

régler la dette de 5.000 Dollars à « Interconvention » de Vienne, ont

été résorbés par une première contribution obtenue au printemps

85 et par une deuxième et définitive contribution en 86 qui nous

permettra de rentrer dans nos fonds. Encore une fois notre Socié-

té doit exprimer sa gratitude à M. H. Kerner, dont l'intervention

u été décisive pour la ÿsolution de ce problème.

Les travaux de nos deux Centres Internationaux, à Montréal

et Gênes, sont actuellement comme dans le passé, dans une phase

d'activité dynamique. Nos remerciements et nos félicitations s'a-

dressent particulèrement aux chercheurs et aux Conseils de Direc-

tion des Centres pour leur activité, notamment au Président du

Centre International de Criminologie Clinique M. M. Colin et M.

D. Szabo Président du CIC C. (Montréal).

Au cours de l'année 85, une réurion spéciale a eu lieu à Paris

pour la constitution de la nouvelle Commission Scientifique qui

actuellement est présisi” ‘ par M le Professeur A Reiss de ‘’Univer-

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Les activités que nous avons réalisées au cours de l’année 85

sont le résultat d'une coopération fondamentale, dont j'ai bien

apprécié l'efficacité, soit au sein de la Commission Scientifique.

scit au sein du Conseil de Direction, par l'œuvre des quatre vice-

présidents : Mrmes I. Anttila et L. Aniyar de Castro, MM. P. Lejins et

Hall Williams, du tresorier M. Y. Roumajon. Un remerciement tout

à fait particulier s'adresse au Secrétariat Général, à M. J. Vérin,

et après sa démission au cours de l'anné 85 au nouveau Secrétaire

Général élu M. G. Picca, dont la collaboration très efficace au ser-

vice de la criminologie et de notre Société s'est manifestée et conti-

nue de se manifester d'une façon magistrale et très fidèle.

Sur la base de ces prémisses, et dans le cadre de cette collabo-

ration remarquable, je vais continuer mon activité au service de

la Société et de la criminologie mondiale, c'est-à-dire d'une crimi-

nologie sans frontière, dans la perspective de réaliser une action

finalisée à la formation de l'homme et au développement de sa

personnalité.

Giacomo Canepa

Directeur de ('Institut de Médecine

Légale de l'Université de Gênes

Président de la S.I.C.

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT

| was elected as President of the International Society of Cri-

minology one year ago, in february 1985, and presently ! would

like to express to all the members of our Society my profound emo-

tion and my gratitude for the confidence you have given to me.

I would like to particularly thank the former President, Mr

Denis Szabo from Montreal.

| feel very touched and greatly honoured by this nomination,

as an Îtalian, as a Medical Doctor and as a Criminologist.

As an ÎItalian first, ! am thinking about the past of our Socie-

ty and the great figure of our master Begnigno Di Tullio, founder

and first President of the S.I.C.

As a Medical Doctor, that means forensic psychiatrist and

criminologist, I notice in the history of our Society that presiden-

cy was granted to criminologists representing the multi-discipli-

nary of our science (sociological, juridical and clinical fields) ;

and, in the medical field, ! am thinking about great figures of

medical science as Begnigno Di Tullio, Denis Carrol and Trevor

Gibbens, names which represent for me an unforgettable heritage

and guide my acts.

As a criminologist, ! am in favour of an interdisciplinary view-

point, according to the basic lessons from presidents who preceded

me. l am particularly thinking about Presidents Thornsten Sellin

Jean Pinatel and Denis Szabo, three symbols of an « interdiscipli-

in

and

narity and human Dbrotherhood »

juridical,

sociological

clinical fields.

1 thank from the heart, in a spirit of scientifical and humanis-

tic brotherhood, Presidents Sellin, Pinatel and Szabo, and ! am

certain they are and will be, their active presence among us, an

example to follow in order to permit the effective development

of our Society activities.

Aîter a year of presidency, ! am able to submit to you a syn-

thetic assessment of the activities of the Society during 1985.

Our Society took an official part, in March 1985, in the Inter-

Association Symposium (with the three Major Associations I.A.P.L.

[.P.P.F., I.S.S.D.) held in Saint Vincent (Italy)

under the United

Nations aegis, and devoted to « the new aspects of criminality and

crime prevention in the context of development ».

In august 1985, our Society took part in the 7 th. United Na-

tions Congress for Crime Prevention and Treatment of Offenders,

held in Milan (Italy). More precisely we took part on the one hand

in meetings of N.G.O. as the one about « women victims of law »,

with the collaboration of Mrs Barbara Price (John Jay College of

Criminal Justice), and an introductory paper by Mrs Shahani

General Secretary of the Congress

then on the other hand in

specific inter-association meetings (I.A.P.L., IP.P.F., IS.C., I.S.S.D.)

devoted to « the protection of victims of crime ». Our official dele-

gation was made up of myself, Mrs Colette Somerhausen, Mr

Uberto Gatti

(rapporteur), Mr Tullio Bandini, Mr Peter Lejins,

Mrs Alice Marangopoulos, Mr Georges Picca and Mr Denis Szabo.

In september 1985, our Society organized an

International

Course of Criminology in Belem (Brasil) devoted to problems of

criminal

policy. The recorders were Mr Verin, President Marc

Ancel and Professor Figueiredo Dias.

In september 1985, our Society took part in the International

Symposium for the 25 th. Anniversary of the School of Criminology,

University of Montreal : Mr Denis Szabo as Chairman of the Sym-

posium, myself as recorder and Chairman of a « panel », and

Mr Albert Reiss as Chairman of the Scientific Committee of our

Society were present.

In october 1985, we organized at the American Catholic Uni-

versity,

Washington

(USA),

the

«First Aquinas International

Conference in Criminology on Responsible Citizenship ». I presen-

ted the introductory paper, then Mr Michael Novak expounded

his report about « Character and crime

an inquiry into the cau-

ses of the virtue of nations », followed by Mr Albert Reisss com-

mentary. The proceedings of this conference are in the process of

publication. Also Father Noël Mailloux and Mr Peter Lejins, emi-

nent members of our Society, took part in the Conference.

In november 1985, the Society was represented to Council of

Europe in Strasbourg (France) for the 7 th. Symposium in Crimi-

nology organized and chaired by myseif, about « Studies on penal

responsibility and treatment for the psychopatic offenders ». Several

U

45

members of our Society took part in it. iMr Hans Kerner

Franco Ferracuti as recorders.

At last, our Society took part in the International Seminar

for the Jubelee of the School of Criminology, University of Brux-

elles (Belgium) in november 1985. Several members of our Society

partcipated in it and Mr Denis Szabo was in charge of final sum-

mary report.

The review of the Society, ie. the International Annals of

Criminology, has at last regulated the rate of its publication

through the impetus given by Mr Georges Picca, Chief Editor, by

the publication of a special double-issue (1985), devoted to the

proceedings of the International Congress of Vienna.

The financial problems brought up by the organization of this

Congress, relating to the debt of 5.000 settled up by the Society to

« Inter-convention » of Vienna, were solved by two grants, the

first one in Spring of 1985 then in 1986. One more time the Society

has to express its thanks to Mr Kerner whose intercession was

decisive to solve this problem.

The works of our two International Centers, in Montreal (Ca-

nada) and Genoa (Italy) are, as usual, particularly dynamic. We

especially thank researchers and Boards of Directors for their

activities, and in particular, Mr Denis Szabo, President of the Inter-

national Center for Comparative Criminology and M. Marcel COLIN

Président of the International Center for Clinical Criminology.

During 1985, a special meeting held in Paris for constituting

the new Scientific Committee, actually composed of Professor Albert

from the University of Yale as President, Mr Hans Kerner as Vice

President and Mr Pierre-Henri Bolle as Executive Secretary.

All these activities carried out during 1985 are the result of

a fundamental cooperation, of which I have appreciated the effi-

ciency, both of the Scientific Committee, and of the Board of Direc-

Mrs Inkeri

tors, through the works of the four Vice presidents

Anttila, Mrs Lolita Aniyar de Castro, Mr Peter Lejins, Mr John

Eryl Hall Williams, and of Mr Yves Roumajon, Treasurer.

1 have to express a special thank to former General Secretary

Jacques Verin who resigned in 1985, and to the new one Mr Georges

Picca, whose precious collaboration on criminology and to our

Society never ceased being effective.

On the basic of these premises and in the scope of this remar-

kable cooperation, ! am going to continue my work to serve our

Society and world criminology, that means a criminology without

two borders, from the global viewpoint of the education of man

and the development of his personality.

ANNALES

INTERNATIONALES

DE CRIMINOLOGIE

organe officiel de la Société Internationale de Criminologie

Président : M. Giacomo CANEPA (Italie)

Secrétaire général : M. Georges PICCA (France)

COMITÉ DE RÉDACTION DES ANNALES

Président : M. Albert J.R. REISS Jr. (U.S.A.)

Président de la Commission Scientifique

Secrétaire : M. Pierre-Henri BOLLE (Suisse)

Secrétgire de la Commission Scientifique

Rédacteur en chef : M. Georges KELLENS (Belgique)

Rédacteurs associés

Mmes Lolita ANIYAR DE CASTRO (Amérique Latine), Louise SHELLEY (Amé

rique du Nord), MM. Alphonse BONI| (Afrique), HIRANO (Asie).

ÉDITORIAL

Ce numéro des ANNALES INTERNATIONALES DE CRIMINOLOGIE

est entièrement consacré aux relations pouvant exister entre le développement

économique et la criminalité. S'il ne s'agit pas d’un thème nouveau, il se trou-

vera néanmoins enrichi par les diverses contributions réunies dans cette publi-

cation.

C’est à notre Collèque et amie Louise SHELLEY, Associate professor à

l’'Américan University de Washington (U.S.A.), que revient le mérite d'avoir

rassemblé les différentes études que nous publions aujourd'hui et, d'en avoir

assuré la présentation. Nous l’en remercions vivement.

Ainsi qu'on pourra en juger, le thème général qui sert de fil conducteur

à ce numéro des ANNALES a été traité suivant des approches variées. En

outre, si dans leur grande majorité les contributions retenues sont de langue

anglaise, leurs auteurs viennent d’horizons différents. Afin de faciliter la lec-

ture des articles, ceux-ci ont été suivis d'’un bref résumé en français et en

anglais, ainsi que nous nous proposions de le faire dans les précédents numéros

du bulletin.

*

*

*

Comme le souligne Louise SHELLEY, dans sa présentation, si le dévelop-

pement économique a des incidences certaines sur la criminalité, les traditions

culturelles et politiques n'’en conservent pas moins un rôle important dans

l'explication des formes nouvelles de délinquance. À cet égard, les recherches

de Yves BRILLON, sur la situation en Afrique, et le témoignage de Luis

SALAS sur une société en mutation profonde comme CUBA, sont exemplaires.

Le développement économique, ou le changement politique ont certes contri-

bué à transformer le droit, mais aussi, parfois à réduire l'importance de formes

traditionnelles de contrôle social, plus efficaces que celles qui s'‘y sont substi-

tuées. Martin KILLIAS analyse, pour sa part, plus particulièrement, au plan

méthodologique, le rôle de diverses variables structurelles, tant sur la crimina-

lité que sur les procédures de répression. Gary LA FREE et Edward KICK ont

également situé leur démarche dans une perspective évaluative. Quant à

Théodor N. FERDINAND, S. MUKHERJEE, Dane ARCHER, Rosemary

GARTNER et Clayton HARTJEN, ils nous présentent des études plus loca-

lisées mais, qui n’en offrent pas moins autant d'illustrations au thème général.

C'est en revanche un aspect particulier, celui de la criminalité féminine

dans ses relations avec le contexte économique et social, qui est traité, d’une

part, dans l’article de Maria LOS et, d'autre part, dans celui de Cathy SPATZ

et Abigail STEWART. Enfin Slavomir REDO souligne dans sa contribution

l'intérêt des analyses transnationales que permettent, notamment dans le

domaine considéré, les réseaux de correspondants de l’Organisation des Nations

Unies.

#

*

*

Les ANNALES INTERNATIONALES DE CRIMINOLOGIE remercient

tous ceux qui ont, par leur contribution, permis la réalisation de ce numéro

et souhaitent que celui-ci suscite auprès des lecteurs l’intérêt espéré.

Georges PICCA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE DES MATIERES

Introduction: Crime and Modernization Reexamined Louise

e e —- —s » e e »e & e . » . e e e . À e . . e

Shelley, American University

Les Incidences du développement sur la criminalité Africaine

. e e —. e =. e < +e +e ® —. +e =e e . À

23

Yves Brillon, Université de Montreal

Crime and Development: Some Observations on Women and

39

Children in India Clayton A. Hartjen, Rutgers University . . .

Crime in Post-Revolutionary Cuba Luis Salas, Florida Inter-

83

national University

A Brief History of Juvenile Delinquency in Boston and a

Comparative

Interpretation

Theodore

N. Ferdinand,

Northeastern University

. e e « —e. e e e e = ® e e e » e e . À e . e e e »

59

Social Change and Female Crime Under Communism: A

Study of the USSR and Poland Mario Los, University of

Ottawa

. . « e - . - À ° . . . . À . e ». Àe . À. . À . . . À e . »s e +e e . e =* —

111

Female Criminality and the Status of Women Cathy Spatz

Widom, Indiana University and Abigail Stewart, Boston

University

- . —+e. +e %* e e =c =e = % . e À . © - . . À . - e e e e . . À . . À . À

137

The United Nations Crime Trend Surveys: Comparative

Criminology in the Global Context Slawomir Redo, United

Nations

° . - À . . À . . À . . À . « e e e . . e e © e .… À e e . . À . . À . À.

163

Power Concentfation, Legitimation Crisis and Penal Severity :

A Comparative Perspective Martin Killias, Université de

Lausanne

° . À . . . À . . . - . . À . . À . . À C . . . - . - . . … . … « e

181

10

Cross-National Effects of Developmental, Distributional and

Demographic Variables on Crime: A Review and Analysis

Gary La Free, University of New Mexico and Edward Kick,

University of Utah

. . . . . . . À . . . . . - e . . . À ° . e - . . . - À

213

11l

Economic Development and Crime: À Case of Burglary

237

S. Mukherjee, Australian Institute of Criminology

12

Violence and Economy' À Modest Hypothesis on Inequality,

Unemplcymert an* <mc

ane AÆirker, University of

‘ alifc.r'a-Sane Ci

r

“ Jsétidfy Gartrer

… vers ty o!

VISCOOSiaI

. . . . . Q

. .

.- .

255

CRIME AND MODERNIZATION REEXAMINED*

Louise I. Shelley**

RÉSUMÉ

Cet essai introductif conclut à l’existence de relations d’interdépen-

dance complexes entre le processus de développement économique et la cri-

minalité. Après examen des effets du développement dans les états socia-

listes, notamment sur la population délinquante et sur les modes de répres-

sion du crime, il apparaît que l’influence de l’industrialisation et de l’urbani-

sation sur la criminalité n’est pas identique pour toutes les sociétés. Bien que

pour beaucoup d’entre elles, industrialisation et urbanisation aient été à

l’origine de profonds changements dans la typologie de la criminalité,

comme le démontre «Crime et Modernization », les traditions historiques,

culturelles et politiques gardent une place importante dans l’explication de

ces nouvelles structures criminelles. D’ailleurs certaines recherches démon-

trent que les modifications sociales ponctuelles peuvent être plus précieuses

pour expliquer l’étiologie du crime que ne l’est le processus global du déve-

loppement. Cependant, saisir l’impact des grandes forces socio-économiques

sur le crime est d’une importance cruciale pour comprendre l’évolution de la

criminalité depuis deux siècles.

SUMMARY

This introductory essay concludes that a complex relationship exists

between the process of economic development and crime. After examining

the effect of development on developing and socialist societies, offender

populations and the punitive response to crime, it is apparent that indus-

trialization and urbanization have no consistent effect on crime across all

societies. While industrialization and urbanization have resulted in import-

ant changes in crime patterns in many societies, as Crime and Modernization

suggested, historical, cultural and political traditions are still of great im-

portance in explaining observed crime patterns. Furthermore, certain

research suggests that more limited societal changes may be more valuable in

explaining crime causation than the overall process of development. But the

understanding of the impact of larger social developments on crime is of

critical importance to our understanding of the evolution of crime in the

past two hundred years.

* The Research for this article was done white the author was on a John

Simon Guggenheim Memorial Fellowship.

** Associate Professor Schools of Justice and International Service American

University.

_7 -

INTRODUCTION

Criminological theory originated in nineteenth century Europe. Major

scholars, like Marx and Durkheim, theorized why crime had become an

increasingly pervasive phenomenon in society. From divergent perspectives

they considered the impact of economic conditions and social structure on

crime. But as criminological theorizing shifted to the United States in the

twentieth century, a new more pragmatic focus developed. In a departure

from its historical roots — criminologists focused on the interaction of

individuals and social groups to explain the etiology of crime.

Criminology in the past fifty years has been dominated by such indi-

vidualistic and group theories as anomie, differential association and culture

conflict. But there has been a growing dissatisfaction with the limited

explanatory power of these theories. Consequently, a new research trend is

emerging. Many scholars, like those included in this volume, are returning

to the major questions posed by the nineteenth century criminological

theoreticians, exploring the relationship between larger social and economic

forces and crime.

Contemporary researchers on crime and development assume divergent

approaches. While adherents of the conflict. My thanks to Christopher

Birkbeck, James Hackler, Gary LaFree and Rita Simon for their helpful

comments on this essay. Perspective focus primarily on the relationship

between crime patterns and economic structure, other scholars choose to

emphasize a combination of economic and social variables in their crimino-

logical analysis.

Domestic crime patterns shaped the formulation of individual and

group crime theories. But to study the impact of social and economic forces

on crime, scholars must abandon their ethnocentric biases and develop

research that is implicitly or explicitly comparative. Consequently, much

recent criminological research addressing major theoretical questions, as

exemplified by the volume’s essays, uses crime data from several countries.

These scholars are returning to a research tradition established by nine-

teenth century European scholars.

The research style of contemporary scholars may mask inherent simi-

larities with their nineteenth century predecessors. Whereas criminological

analyses then were primarily qualitative, incorporating only some illustrative

statistics, contemporary social science research has become more method-

ologically sophisticated. Theoretical questions are now often addressed

using advanced quantitative methods and field research techniques, as

illustrated by many of the essays included in this collection. But while the

increasing complexity of the research methods may at times overshadow the

theoretical implications, these new analytical tools help clarify the complex

relationship between economic development, social conditions and crimi-

nality.

-_-8—

The contributors to this collection have not avoided the difficult

questions posed by criminology. They have used all available research tools

to address the relationship between crime, the developmental process and

other social and economic forces which might influence crime commission.

Using diverse analytical techniques and analyzing crime patterns on all

continents, they reach divergent conclusions. There is no apparent consen-

sus as to the relative importance of industrialization, urbanization, social

and political structure in determining national and international crime

patterns. Indigenous historical, cultural and social factors are deemed very

influential. The absence of unifying trends challenges the analysis of Crime

and Modernization (1981) in which I suggested that the forces of industri-

alization and urbanization were the major explanatory forces of the trans-

formation of criminality in the past two hundred years. This essay, using

the volume’s articles as illustrative material, allows me to reexamine the

book’s analysis and address some of its weaknesses.

Crime and Modernization (1981) synthesized numerous national and

comparative studies addressing the relationship among industrialization,

urbanization and crime. Taking a historical perspective, the book analyzed

crime patterns in undeveloped capitalist countries, in developed capitalist

societies and in socialist societies. The same units of analysis used by most

of the research studies included in this collection. Examining the changes in

crime rates, commission patterns and offender populations in these diver-

gent nations, it ascertained whether there were any common trends in crimi-

nality across nations since the onset of the industrial revolution.

The book’s principle conclusion is that there is nothing haphazard

about observed crime patterns, they are a logical response to changing social

conditions. Furthermore, the nineteenth century developmental process

established a model for the future relationship between crime and develop-

ment followed first by the developing countries. Moreover, it concluded

that the course of economic development selected by a nation affects its

crime patterns. While socialist countries have different crimes and a distinct

geographical distribution of offenses, the impact of the form of societal

development followed is subordinate to the general forces of socio-econ-

omic development. Ît also concluded that industrialization and urbanization

alter fundamentally the relationship between property and violent crime.

They also change the nature of the offender population causing more

women and juveniles to be perpetrators. Furthermore, in most societies the

punitive response to the crime problem has been generally ineffective in

controlling crime.

The essays of this volume pinpoint several areas of weakness in Crime

and Modernization (1981) by illustrating the complexity of the relationship

between economic development and crime. First, they indicate that devel-

oping countries are not now following the criminal evolutionary model

established by the industrializing nations in the nineteenth century. Second,

-_9_

the impact of socialism may not be as strong in the developing nations as in

the countries already partially industrialized. Furthermore, the impact of

socialism may not be subordinated to socioeconomic development but

rather to hisorical and cultural traditions. Third, changes in commission

patterns for violent and property offences are not explained solely by the

processes of urbanization and industrialization. Fourth, development has not

had a consistent impact on the offender population in all societies. Lastly,

the societal response to crime is affected not only by a society’s resources

and level of development but also by its historical and legal traditions.

The rest of the essay will analyse the five previously mentioned areas of

inquiry that challenge and expand the findings of Crime and Modernization

(1981). The authors’ divergent views help expand our understanding of the

relationship between larger socioeconomic forces and crime.

CRIME AND DEVELOPMENT IN DEVELOPING NATIONS

In many third world nations the relationship between development and

crime is currently a heated question as these countries try to avoid the high

crime rates that have accompanied industrialization and urbanization in

other societies. As they search for desired developmental models, many

question whether existing criminological theory is applicable to the Latin

American, African or Asian experience. (Birkbeck, forthcoming; Clinard,

1983; Cohen, 1982; Sumner, 1982). While many scholars assert that devel-

oping countries are not replicating the patterns established in a previous

century (Sumner, 1982; Zaffaroni, 1982), neither can they generalize with

certainly about the impact of economic development on crime in a particu-

lar region.

In nineteeth century Europe, rising crime rates were one of the greatest

costs of industrialization and urbanization (Blackwelder, 1984:335). But in

the twentieth century, crime rates while alarming, are not necessarily the

most threatening problem faced by many of the developing nations. Ques-

tions of personal survival and political strife often overshadow the concern

for crime. In many African countries faced with famine and political insta-

bility, the evolution of the crime problem is a minor concern. Moreover, in

many other industrializing nations, the crimes of individual citizens rep-

resent only a small share of total crime commission. The state is often

responsible for more violent acts against individtal citizens than the ordi-

nary criminal (Archer and Gartner, 1984:15-16) as numerous assaults against

the citizenry are carried out by death squads or the nation’s security police

ensuring compliance and submission to the established political and econ-

omic order.

À paucity of research, available statistics and the politicization of crime

hinders and understanding of the extent and nature of the crime problem in

many developing nations. For this reason the case studies included here of

— 10 —

crime in Black Africa, India and Cuba are important because they illustrate

the diverse relationship between crime and development on the three devel-

oping continents. While the authors all suggest that the nature of the crime

problem has changed recently in the region studied, the extent and reasons

for the change vary. In India, Hartjen found little change in crime rates and

the offender population as the traditional way of life, particularly in rural

areas, has been preserved. Salas indicates that it is the advent of socialism

rather than the process of economic development that has led to the trans-

formation in criminality. Only Brillon suggests that the breakdown in

traditional society and the developmental process have been responsible

for the exacerbation of the crime problem. AIl the authors emphasize that

strong cultural, historical and political forces determine and individualize

the character of crime in these diverse societies.

Many developing countries have neither modernized, industrialized nor

urbanized. Brillon points cout that African development has not led to large

scale urbanization as a greater proportion of the African population still

resides in rural areas than on other continents. In Latin America, urban-

ization has proceeded rapidly but there has not been massive industrial-

ization and urbanization proceeding simultaneously. Development has very

different meanings on these diverse continents.

Nineteenth century European industrialization and urbanization led to

such tangible signs of modernization as increased educational levels, im-

proved medical care and a higher standard of living. But while life expect-

ancy has increased in many developing countries, other signs of modern-

ization are absent. Furthermore, there is little likelihood that the developing

nations will ever achieve the standards of the now developed nations as the

technological and economic gap between the industrializing and industrial-

ized nations widens annually. Moreover, the highly stratified political and

economic structures of many developing nations ensures that many indi-

viduals will continue to live an extremely precarious existence.

The tensions of daily life and day to day survival take their toll on

individuals. For some. crime becomes an outlet or even a solution to the

problems of their daily existence. Crime is a viable alternative for the many

individuals who lack any means of financial support. But financial necessity

is not always the primary explanation for crime commission. As Brillon

points out, the breakdown of traditional African society has left a vacuum

in many lives leading to increasingly frequent crime commission. This fate

is shared by many other developing societies where the traditional way of

life has been disrupted without the substitution of the social benefits of

developed society. But Hartjen suggests that in India where village life has

frequently been preserved, the surrounding development has not had

criminogenic consequences for many members of society.

Many historians of eighteenth and nineteenth century crime have

confined their analysis to continental Europe. Though most of these

_ 11 —

countries had colonies, little scholarly attention has been paid to the inter-

action of the more developed European nations with their colonies. The

colonies were discussed primarily as repositories for the criminals exiled

from England and France. But contemporary scholars can not study the

crime patterns of either the developed or developing nations in isolation.

The increasing interdependence of the world and the large scale population

migrations force consideration of the impact of the developing and indus-

trialized nations on each other.

The three cases studies published here are of developing nations and

regions which have all spent years under colonial rule. For some nations the

legacy of the colonial period is of paramount importance in explaining

contemporary crime problems. For colonialism, carried out by both capi-

talist and socialist countries, may result in the destruction of indigneous

cultures. As Brillon suggests, the destruction of African tribal life as a

consequence of years of colonial rule is a major explanation for the growth

of contemporary African crime. But in other nations post-colonial political

and economic developments have more explanatory value. Many of the

developments, however, link the developing nations with those of the indus-

trialing world.

New found wealth has disrupted the established way of life in many

developing countries, often leading to increased crime. The discovery and

exportation of oil as well as the development of international drug trade

have led to suddenly increased wealth. But unlike oil money, the proceeds

of drug trade are often received by individuals rather than by the state.

International drug trade, often itself illegal, is also criminogenic. As the

growth of organized crime and increased judicial corruption have resulted

in many developing countries.

Many developing countries have been enriched by oil and drug traffic,

but other governments have incurred large economic debts to the developed

nations. These debts, particularly in Latin America, have profoundly affec-

ted these societies. The increased financial hardship, particularly of mem-

bers of the lower socio-economic classes, has aggravated the already existing

crime problem. Even socialist Cuba is not economically independent. While

it has escaped economic indebtedness to the capitalist industrialized nations,

Luis Salas points out that it relies on extensive foreign aid from the Soviet

Union. Developing countries today lack the financial autonomy known to

the first industrializing nations.

The diverse social, economic and political conditions of the developing

countries ensure diverse crime problems but a common inability among

many to cope with increased crime. Crime rates have risen in most of the

developing world, but some societies have suffered extremely precipitous

growth whereas others have experienced more moderate increases. The

—12—

African and Indian studies included here provide contrasting examples. In

some countries recorded rates for property crime have escalated dramati-

cally while in others, violence is more prominent (Gurr, 1980; Radzinowicz

and King, 1977). In still others, rates of violent crime are severely under-

reported as much violence is legitimated by the repressive political structure.

But in many societies, crime often has a consistent and unfortunate impact.

It is a major destabilizing force in society.

Whole total crime rates may be lower in the developing nations thanin

the industrialized countries (United Nations, 1977), the effect of the crime

problem may be greater because the societies are ill-equipped to deal with

the costs of crime. As the social services needed by members of society are

often either unaffordable, inaccessible or poorly distributed. Furthermore,

the corrupt and inefficient law enforcement and judicial agencies are often

incapable of dealing with an increasingly complex crime problem.

Hartjen and Salas provide contrasting examples of societal crime

control. In India, adherence to the traditional way of life provides a bulwark

against increasing crime rates. While Salas details the interventionist policy

followed in socialist Cuba. There increasing social control over all aspects of

personal life lessens the opportunity for crime commission. As these two

studies suggest, the possibility of crime commission can be reduced if social

control is achieved either through community means or state intervention.

CRIME AND SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT

Crime and Modernization indicated that the ideological expectation

that crime would wither away under socialism has not been fulfilled. The

advent of socialism has not led to the elimination of criminality. Instead,

development in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet

Union has led to many of the same crime patterns observed in the developed

capitalist societies. In both types of societies increased rates of property

crime, a reduction of violent crimes relative to those committed against

property, and an increase in criminality among juveniles and females has

been observed. Despite these apparent similarities between crime patterns in

both socialist and capitalist societies, it should not be suggested that the

two diverse forms of development have produced the same crime patterns.

Great differences prevail in the crime rates, forms of crime committed and

the geographical distribution of crime in developed socialist and capitalist

societies.

The observed differences in crime patterns in the economically diverse

societies is explained both by the advent of a socialist economy as well as

by the level of social control necessitated by a centralized planned economy.

The most direct impact of the socialization of the means of production has

been the creation and elimination of certain categories of crime. Most

— 13 _

pronounced of these new offenses are those concerning the prohibition

of capitalist activity.

The advent of socialism has shaped more than the definition of crime.

Controls over population movement have affected the process of urban-

ization and the internal distribution of criminality. Many major cities in the

USSR and Eastern Europe, favored by demographic policies that authorize

the expulsion of serious offenders and the restricted entry of youthful

males, have lower rates of criminality than secondary cities which have no

control over their populations (Shelley, 1980). Furthermore, by means of

ideological exhortation and coercion, socialist authorities have been able to

closely involve the ordinary citizen in crime control at the workplace, the

place of residence and as auxiliaries to law enforcement authorities.

Not all social and economic planning have helped reduce crime rates.

While extensive measures of population control have helped suppress levels

of generally recognized forms of crime commission, the failures of the

central planning process have led to the growth of certain categories of

economic crime. Shortages have led to a large illicit market in needed goods

and services (Grossman, 1977). The state

“ndividual is often

KOe

… 1s steal socia.

*

the victim of property crimes «-

rty because

they can not acquire r

A “ ,ds segally. Los and sa

scribe the

1

pervasiveness c° ‘

-n in both the industrially develar À nations

of Polan”

7

hie ceveloping Cuba.

tocuses on th: involvement of the Polish and Soviet female pon:

! economic «rimes. The significant participation of women in

‘ner sector cf the economy where much theft of socialist property

. -x3, ensures that many women are deliberately or inadvertently drawn

. O crime. Ît is hardly then surprising that women formerly employed in

cv es account for half of the female population. Female offenders are

irequently prosecuted not only because theft from stores is easily detected

but because most women lack the immunity from prosecution often pro-

vided well placed males by their Party membership. Again it is shown that

the dynamics of the socialist system differentiate the crime patterns of

socialist and capitalist societies. While women are responsible for approxi-

mately the same proportion of total offenses as in other developed nations,

women in Poland and the USSR are convicted primarily for private

entrepreneurial activity and theft of state goods while in capitalist societies

female property crimes are directed against individuals.

Los’ essay affirms the conclusions of Crime and Modernization, sug-

gesting that socialism has a strong and consistent impact on the develop-

ment of crime patterns in diverse nations. In the Polish and Soviet cases she

describes, the structure of the economic system is decisive in determining

much of female criminality. Historical, cultural and religious differences are

_ 14 _

subordinated to the overwhelming impact of socialism and the requirements

of a planned economy.

Salas, after examining the crime patterns of socialist Cuba, concludes

that while the advent of socialism has had a profound impact on the defi-

nition and prosecution of crime, strong historical and cultural traditions

continue to influence the dynamics of Cuban criminality. He asserts that

Cuba shares some of the distinctive criminal characteristics of the devel-

oping countries of Latin America while maintaining many similarities with

the socialist countries of Fastern Europe and the USSR. Los’ essay and

Crime and Modernization concur that when socialism is introduced in

societies already partially or fully industrialized, centrally planned develop-

ment is a greater determinant of the nature of crime patterns than national

or cultural differences. But Salas goes beyond the analysis of developed

socialist societies, exploring the relationship between socialism, the develop-

ment process and crime in Cuba.

Sala’s work in Cuba raises interesting questions for the future analysis

of the relationship between crime and development in now industrializing

socialist countries. His work implies that the impact of socialism may be less

pronounced in a developing socialist country than in nations that have

already industrialized. For if socialism is not the primary determinan of

crime patterns in Cuba, one of the few developing countries to have been

consistently socialist for twenty years, then the impact of the socialist

system on criminality may be even less pronounced in some Asian societies

which have only recently become socialist or in some African societies

which fluctuate between socialism and other governmental systems. Scholars

studying civil law in developing socialist societies have reached similar

conclusions. They have found that indigenous historical and cultural tra-

ditions may shape the nature and enforcement of civil law as much as the

advent of socialism (Crespi Reghizzi, 1984; Ginsburgs, 1984). But little

research has examined the relationship of criminal law to criminality in

developing socialist nations (Sumner, 1982). Clearly, Salas has indicated an

important direction for future criminological research.

DEVELOPMENT AND THE OFFENDER POPULATION

The diverse studies included here, analysing the relationship between

the developmental process and offender populations reach no definitive

conclusions. But this is consistent with the analyses of the previous sections.

For a complex relationship exists between the processes of indutrialization,

urbanization and crime. While Crime and Modernization suggested that

societal development results in increased female and juvenile participation

in crime, this volume’s essays suggest that it is the form rather than the

frequency of participation which as changed. In many of the countries

studied, women and youth while not committing more crime, are per-

petrating more varied and more serious offences.

— 15 —

AIl the studies concur that offender patterns are affected not only by

development but also by the political, social and cultural structure of

society. In some societies, particularly the industrialized nations, there has

been a significant increase in the female and juvenile contribution to crime

commission (Simon, 1976). But this change has not been observed through-

out the world, particularly in many developing countries. There the pro-

portional contribution of women and youths to total criminality remains

small though often it has increased from insignificant levels. Restraining the

criminal involvement of the two groups are the endurance of traditional

social controls as well as restricted opportunities to commit offenses. the

Indian cases examined by Hartjen (1984) provides evidence that the con-

tinuation of established village life may restrict female and youthful involve-

ment in crime. Even though India has urbanized, no major changes have

been observed in the age and sex of the urban offender population. Indian

criminals are now, as in the past, almost always adult male offenders.

Crime rates may not be the best measure of the impact of development.

Ferdinand, Widom and Los all cite noticeable changes in offender patterns

that they ascribe, in part, to the developmental process. Ferdinand, while

concurring that juveniles are responsible for only a negligible share of total

crime commission in some developing countries, believes that the telling

effect of industrialization is a dramatic change in the character of urban

delinquency. Originally, youths were responsible for relatively minor

offenses. But as urban communities attempt to control their behavior,

delinquent youths respond scornfully and their behavior becomes more

threatening to the community. Ferdinand contends that a common evol-

utionary pattern exists. Juvenile delinquency progresses through three

stages — wayward, incorrigible and contracultural — as society becomes

increasingly industrialized.

While Ferdinand’s thesis needs more testing, it suggests that since

development does not necessarily have a consistent effect throughout a

society, very different juvenile commission patterns can coexist in the

urban and rural areas of a single country. While youth crime may threaten

the urban community, tratitional social controls may diminish its impact in

village society.

The studies on female crime concur that development has no consistent

effect on women’s rates of criminality. Development in some societies may

affect female crime patterns. But in other countries the social, political and

biological changes that accompany the developmental process have pro-

foundly influenced the types of female crime commission. In India, Hartjen

reports no significant increase in female criminality has occurred despite

increasing urbanization and industrialization. When the traditional way of

life endures, the motivation as well as the opportunity for much female

crime commission is diminished. But when women do have greater chances

— 16 —

to commit crime, female crime rates often rise in new areas of crime com-

mission. But often the increase is confined to only limited crime categories.

Focusing on socialist Poland and the USSR, Los concludes that in these

societies the increase in female crime is confined primarily to economic

offenses against the state. Increased female involvement in the labor force

mandated by the socialist development process provides only a partial

explanation for this growth. Rather pervasive shortages resulting from

deficiencies in the central planning process, make those with access to

needed goods particularly vulnerable to criminal involvement. Neither

development nor the socialist system separately explain the growth in

female participation in economic crime. Instead the observed growth is a

result of the complex interaction of the developmental process and existing

social and political conditions.

Widom reaches a similar conclusion after examining a large body of

quantitative data from 43 developing and industrialized nations around the

world. Increases in female crime are confined to only a limited number of

offenses. Growth in these categories is explained not by increased female

involvement in the labor force, a primary measure of development but

rather by the social, political and reproductive changes that acompany the

developmental process. But these changes in female status do not have

consistent effects; some produce increases in certain categories of crime

commission while reducing criminality in others.

While Widom’s results require further testing with additional years of

data, they provide a provocative conclusion. Specific political, social and

biological changes accompanying development may explain more about the

dynamics of criminality than the overall process of development. Further

support for this idea is provided by other contributors to this volume whose

works will be discussed in a later section.

DEVELOPMENT AND THE RESPONSE TO CRIME

The preceding discussion of crime patterns in developing and socialist

nations and of criminal offenders suggests that few generalizations can be

made about the relationship between crime and development. When the

development process does have explanatory value, its impact must be con-

sidered in conjunction with domestic, political, social and economic con-

ditions. If such a tenuous link is drawn between the dynamics of criminality

and development, can anything more concrete be said about the relationship

between development and the way society treats its criminals? For while

crime is usually an individual act, the punitive response to crime is a collec-

tive act that refiects the historical, cultural and religious traditions of a

society.

-_17 —

Killias suggests that a relationship exists between societal development

and punishment challenging other research (Carranza, 1983) suggesting that

legal heritage has more explanatory value. Supporting Foucault’s assertion

(1977) that the emregence of the prison coincided with the development of

industrialized society, Killias concludes that developed nations which can

afford to maintain a prisoner population apply less physicl punishments

than developing nations. Killias, like the other contributors to this volume

however, concludes that development alone does not provide a complete

explanations. Whereas overall trends in punishment may be explained by

larger social and economic forces, domestic political affairs and periodic

crises influence the punitive response. While the financial resources of a

society help determine the punishments selected, crises of domestic political

authority lead to noticeably increased incarceration rates.

CRIME AND DEVELOPMENT : ALTERNATIVE DIRECTIONS

The contributors to this collection have studied crime patterns in many

diverse nations. Their conclusions suggest that Crime and Modernization

overemphasized the impact of industrialization and urbanization on crime.

While these two major social and economic forces influenced crime signifi-

cantly, these studies suggest that other social, economic and political con-

ditions may explain more about the evolution of crime rates. But how can

one find more satisfactory explanations with the paucity of research data

necessary for the testing of research hypotheses?

The analysis of international crime data is extremely problematic

(Vigderhous, 1978). Differences of legal definitions, lack of sophistication

of personnel charged with collecting and assembling data, and the pol-

iticization of the crime problem compound the problems of using inter-

national data (Archer and Gartner, 1984:29). But several of the contributors

discuss data bases that may partially overcome some of the enumerated

obstacles to comparative research.

Redo suggests that the United Nations, by means of increasingly sophis-

ticated surveys, is collecting data that should make it possible to probe more

fully the relationship between development, social forces and crime. But as

Archer and Gartner (1984:20) have pointed out the results of these surveys

are unavailable to individual scholars who may choose to test their own

hypotheses about crime causation. They, therefore, developed their own

historical data archive assembling criminal statistics on several major of-

fences and 110 nations and 44 major international cities. These data are

used by Archer and Gartner and LaFree and Kick in testing alternative

explanations for the dynamics of criminality.

Archer and Gartner examine the relationship between unemployment

and rates of violence. They find that different homicide rates are observed

— 18 —

in countries with diverse social policies. Countries with more redistributive

policies that shelter their citizens from some of the more disorienting

effects of unemployment, may reduce the upward swings in violence that

often accompany increasing unemployment rates. According to this hy-

pothesis, social policies may affect rates of violence. But the adoption of

redistributive measures is only possible in more economically developed

societies that possess both the financial resources and trained personnel

necessary to administer such programs. Thus while the process of economic

development is linked to cycles of violence, social welfare policies that

accompany development may be of greater explanatory value. Further

testing of this hypothesis, particularly in relation to the socialist societies

that provide full employment for their citizens, will help ascertain whether

forms of economic development affect rates of violent crime commission.

While Archer and Gartner examine the impact of unemployment rates

on homicide, Mukherjee examines its effect along with that of domestic

product per capita on burglary rates in Australia. His research shows that

during different periods in the present century, these economic indicators

have had a varied impact on crime. But economic effects on property crime

are most noticeable during times of pronounced change as in the depression

and periods of rapid economic expansion. But burglaries, in particular, are

linked to economic growth, increasingly available goods and changes in

lifestyle. It would be useful to test this observation by performing longi-

tudinal analyses in other industrialized nations.

The Archer and Gartner and Mukherjee studies together suggest that

economic changes to influence crime. Increased unemployment may result

in more homicide and property crime but less burglary. But Archer and

Gartner suggest that the societal response to transitory economic develop-

ments may help determine the costs of unemployment to a nation.

LaFree and Kick conclude that population growth, a demographic

change resulting from development, explains trends in murder and violence

better than indicators of industrialization. According to their analysis,

declining population growth rates have an opposing effect on the two

divergent forms of crime commission. Theft rates rise and murder rates

decline. Their explanation for this phenomenon is rooted in the Durkheimian

analysis of social structure (Durkheim, 1964). Suggesting decline in popu-

lation growth often reflects decreasing social cohesion. Murder, which

frequently results from interpersonal conflicts, consequently declines when

human relations become less intimate. But theft, requiring anonymity,

increases when social controls are reduced in an increasingly impersonal

society.

The three essays suggest alternative directions for exploring the relation-

ship between social and economic forces and crime rates. While they do not

deny that the process of development affects crime, they suggest that more

— 19 _

limited developments may be important in explaining crime causation

and evolution.

Social policies and demographic trends reveal fundamental values and

underlying changes in society. Understanding the impact of these forces

may be crucial to an enhanced appreciation of the relationship between

crime and development in the past 200 years.

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BLACKWELDER, J. K. (1984). ‘’Crime, Policing and the Dangerous

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CARRANZA, L. E. (1983). El preso sin condena en America Latina y

el Caribe: estudio comparativo estadistico y legal de treinta paises y

propuestas para reducir el fenomeno. San Jose, Costa Rica: ILANUD.

CLINARD, Marshall B. (1983), ‘‘The Influence of Modernization in Com-

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CRESPI REGHIZZI, G. (1984), ‘“Communist Party and the Law in Somalia”

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DURKHEIM, E. (1964), The Division of Labor in Society. New York: Free

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FOUCAULT, M. (1977), Discipline and Punish. New York: Pantheon.

GINSBURGS, G. (1984), ‘‘Membership in the Mongolian People’s Revol

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on Ruling Communist Parties and their Status Under Law, Kiel,

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GROSSMAN, G. (1977), “The Second Economy of the USSR”. Problems

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HARTJEN, C. A. and PRIYADARSINI S. (1984), Delinquency in India: À

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RADZINOWICZ, Sir L. and KING J. (1977), the T-

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York: Basic Books.

— 20 —

SHELLEY, L.

(1980) ‘““The Geography of Soviet Criminality”. American Sociological

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(1981) Crime and Modernization. Carbondale, Il.: Southern Illinois

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SIMON, RJ. (1976), ““American Women and Crime”. Annals of the

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SUMNER, C. (ed.) (1982), Crime, Justice and Development. London:

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— 21 —

LES INCIDENCES DU DÉVELOPPEMENT

SUR LA CRIMINALITÉ AFRICAINE

Yves Brillon, Ph.D.*

L’Afrique noire reste, encore aujourd’hui, un contiﬁent négligé par les

criminologues. Les recherches, bien que de plus en plus nombreuses, y sont

— pour la plupart — ponctuelles et d’uné désolante superficialité. De plus,

elles sont teintées de mimétisme et d’ethnocentrisme ; ce qui fait que l’on ne

perçoit guère la «spécificité » de la criminalité africaine ni celle des réactions

sociales, formelles ou informelles, qu’elle provoque.

Cela peut provenir du fait que le processus de modernisation a trans-

formé l’ordre ancien, a détruit les institutions traditionnelles et a criminalisé

certains comportements ancestraux. Les lois modernes furent érigées en

dehors des communautés indigènes sans tenir compte des structures de leurs

relations sociales. Ce qui fait que des comportements criminels « furent

constitués» juridiquement «hors contexte», c’est-à-dire en ignorant que

ces comportements tiraient leur origine ou bien de croyances religieuses, ou

bien de l’organisation coutumière de la famille, ou bien des lois régulant la

sexualité, la production, le travail, les échanges et les successions… Il en fut

ainsi de la criminalisation de la sorcellerie, de la dot, de la polygamie, des

dépenses somptuaires accompagnant les mariages, les funérailles et les

initiations… Selon Sumner (1982), cette «réification» de comportements

criminels se consolida peu à peu jusqu’à devenir des choses allant de soi

pour les systèmes légaux modernes de même que pour les analyses crimino-

logiques. Ces dernières, pour la plupart, oublient le contexte historique et

occultent la dynamique qui confronte le droit nouveau aux droits coutu-

miers des populations autochtones.

A cause de cela, les chercheurs, en considérant l’évolution des États

africains, ont tendance à considérer celle-ci selon le schème des sociétés

occidentales et président — en se référant à l’example de la Révolution

Industrielle, en Europe — une augmentation rapide de la criminalité. Cette

augmentation sérait directement reliée au développement économique et

à .ses conséquences, c’est-à-dire, plus spécialement, à l’urbanisation et à

l’industrialisation: phénomènes qui provoquent l’exode rural, l’effondre-

ment des structures sociales traditionnelles ainsi que les conflits de cultures

et de valeurs. Pour beaucoup d’auteurs, ce sont là les coûts -sociaux du

progrès, les offrandes sacrificielles que les pays sous-développés doivent

* Chercheur agrégé Centre International de Criminologie Comparée.

_ 23 _

immoler à cet insatiable Moloch occidental, dieu de la « Civilisation », en

vue d’accéder au mirage paradisiaque de la modernité. Mais cette façon de

voir et de penser s’avère sans doute trop ethnocentrique pour permettre de

déceler les composantes typiques de la genèse, de la nature et de l’évolution

de la criminalité africaine.

LE MYTHE MESSIANIQUE DE LA COLONISATION

Le développement et les bienfaits de la civilisation européenne ne

furent pas choisis par les populations autochtones mais imposées par les

puissances coloniales. En Afrique noire, la colonisation a représenté, à

maints égards, une sorte de cataclysme, de déflagration culturelle qui, en se

propageant de proche en proche, a fortement ébranlé les cosmogonies

anciennes et à, par le fait même, miné, sapé, et érodé les équilibres des

sociétés traditionnelles. L’arrivée et la domination de l’homme blanc ont

plongé l’Africain dans un profond désarroi. Ce dernier s’est retrouvé désem-

paré par la découverte soudaine et par l’emprise d’un autre monde qui, par

le seul fait d’exister, lui révélait l’extrême vulnérabilité de son propre univers.

L’introduction d’une économie monétaire, l’implantation d’industries

et l’importation d’une technologie nouvelle furent les principaux éléments

qui s’échappèrent de cette boite de Pandore, que constituait la civilisation

occidentale, et qui furent causes de changements radicaux dans la mesure où

ces innovations suscitèrent un décloisonnement des entités ethniques, une

redéfinition des rapports sociaux et une réorganisation des moyens de pro-

duction et des échanges économiques et commerciaux. Les caprices de

l’histoire ont voulu que, par la colonisation, soient mis en confrontation des

sociétés capitalistes, hautement industrialisées, à idéologie individualiste,

avec des sociétés de type collectiviste, exclusivement agricole, sans grande

technologie et dont l’économie était largement orientée vers l’autarcie. Il

s’en est suivi, pour ces dernières une corrosion des institutions de base, un

saccage des croyances et des valeurs qui se sont apparentés à un lent et insi-

dieux génocide culturel.

Convaincus de la supériorité de leur culture et de l’aspect civilisateur de

leur mission, les colonisateurs conçurent le droit comme un instrument de

promotion collective, comme une source d’évolution devant servir à faciliter

l’unification politique et le développement économique. En conséquence,

dès que les colons, commerçants missionnaires, administrateurs et militaires

s’installèrent en Afrique, les règles juridiques et les systèmes pénaux des

métropoles furent automatiquement implantés afin d’assurer «l’ordre

colonial » .

Ainsi, le droit pénal, en Afrique, est-il loin d’être l’expression codifiée

des valeurs d’un ordre social établi. Il est l’outil que l’on utilise pour la

création même de cet ordre (Costa, 1969). Il a pour objet de transformer les

— 24 _

traditions et les mœurs. En cela, il reflète la volonté d’une élite «occiden-

=

talisée» d’imposer des normes de «type européen »

à une majorité popu-

laire, largement agricole, considérée comme inculte et comme n’étant pas

encore suffisamment évoluée socialement. Le droit a donc un caractère

« pédagogique » , voire même « prophétique » , dans la mesure où il annonce la

société de consommation et d’abondance de demain. Pour assurer cette

action «civilisatrice», «salvatrice», il doit s’opposer à la survivance des

multiples droits coutumiers, «archaïques» et «barbares». Droits primitifs,

droit tribaux, donc multiples, divers et aux frontières étroites; droits qui

vont à l’encontre même de la «civilisation» et, surtout, de «l’unification

nationale». Aux yeux des autorités gouvernementales, il faut donc à tout

prix supprimer ces ilots de régionalisme qui assurent la survie d’une Afrique

ancienne et dépassée. Pour cette raison, les droits coutumiers, à toutes fins

pratiques, furent mis « hors la loi». Il en a résulté une anomie due à la

superposition d’une justice moderne, souvent mal comprise de l’ensemble

des citoyens, à des structures juridico-administratives pré-coloniales et

familières, jadis bien intégrées dans les communautés villageoises, et qui

continuent, sous l’arbre à palabre, à fonctionner dans la clandestinité.

L’ACCULTURATION PAR LE DROIT

Il est évident, comme le dit Sumner (1982), que le droit pénal, imposé

par les colonisateurs et repris par les gouvernements autochtones, avait pour

objectifs tout autant de contrôler la sorcellerie et la polygamie que de

détruire ou de neutraliser, en les incorporant, les structures politiques indi-

gènes. On a ainsi éroder le pouvoir des autorités claniques légitimes. Ce qui a

eu des conséquences profondes sur l’ensemble des conditions de vie et de

pensée des communautés tribales. En étranglant le pouvoir des chefs tra-

ditionnels, on a condamné à mort les anciennes civilisations africaines

puisque celles-ci ne peuvent survivre qu’en fonction du passé, c’est-à-dire

des coutumes (héritées des ancêtres) dont les Anciens et les chefs sont les

véritables dépositaires.

Encore aujourd’hui, dans les États africains, les lois sont souvent direc-

tement orientées de manière à forcer le changement de certaines coutumes,

normes et mentalités que l’on considère comme « primitives » . Les études de

Coissy (1974), de Costa-Lascoux (1975), de Mélone (1975), de Rives (1975)

et de Sumner (1982) identifient cette volonté des gouvernements de faire

jouer au droit pénal une fonction de protection des intérêts politiques et

économiques de l’État en luttant contre le tribalisme et les particularismes

ethniques. Cela se traduit par deux types de mesures législatives, les unes

incriminant des comportements admis par la coutume mais qui s’avèrent

contraires au concept de «Nations», les autres sanctionnant des pratiques

qui vont à l’encontre du développement économique.

— 25 _

Dans la première catégorie, on a criminalisé la constitution d’asso-

ciations amicales régionales (comme dans l’Empire centrafricain, en Haute-

Volta et au Tchad), les signes d’identification tribale, tels que les sacrifica-

tions et autres marques corporelles propres aux diverses ethnies (Côte

d’Ivoire, République Populaire du Congo, Empire centrafricain). « Le droit

pénal, comme l’affirme Costa-Lascoux, ici pour mission de culpabiliser et

d’éliminer . définitivement des comportements particularistes en favorisant

une morale collective » (1975, p. 105). Morale collective, faut-il s’empresser

d’ajouter, étroitement calquée sur la morale occidentale.

Dans la seconde catégorie, la mise en œuvre d’une politique de dévelop-

pement justifie la répression contre tout ce qui est de nature à compromet-

tre le progrès. Ainsi les dépenses somptuaires et ostentatoires que provo-

quent les funérailles, les mariages, les cérémonies religieuses et communau-

taires sont souvent interdites (Sénégal, Cameroun, Dahomey). Il en va de

même de la dot que l’on a supprimée (Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire, Empire centra-

fricain) ou réglementée (Mali, Cameroun, Guinée). Dans le même sens Alliot

(1965-1966) et Coissy (1974) notent que la majorité des gouvernements

africains répriment de façon particulière certains phénomènes socio-écono-

miques comme l’oisiveté, le vagabondage, la mendicité, l’usage d’alcool,

l’absentéisme scolaire… Cela, parce que les comportements antisociaux

apparaîssent comme directement responsables du sous-développement. De

nombreux législateurs, en réprimant ainsi les infractions liées à l’oisiveté,

s’attaquent moins à la dangerosité potentiel de l’acte (le vagabondage étant

de nature à favoriser la commission de délits) qu’à l’infraction économique

(le travail étant conçu comme une obligation, un devoir, une nécessité

collective pour accéder à la modernisation). Ainsi, le vagabondage, comme

le remarque Mélone (1975), est moins envisagé comme un état criminogène

que comme une attitude faisant obstacle au développement de l’économie

nationale.

Beaucoup d’incrirhinations visént avant tout, comme le dit avec euphé-

misme Rives, «à éliminer certains facteurs criminogènes et notamment

l’absence de propension à l’épargne qui caractérisent une grande partie de

la population et qui est la cause d’un certain nombre d’infractions pertuba-

trices de la vie économique» (1975, p. 186). On ne saurait, avec plus de

subtilité faire apparaître — en voulant le déguiser — le sens de la politique

criminelle de beaucoup d’États d’Afrique qui consiste à changer certaines

habitudes de vie d’«une grande partie de la population » parce qu’elles ne

sont pas conformes au dessein économique dont les perturbations sont

désormais stigmatisées comme des «crimes» contre le «développement».

L’acculturation par le droit provient du fait que l’appareil jurîdique, par

les sanctions pénales, cherche à renforcer des normes qui ne correspondent

pas toutes à celles des populatior:s (condamnation de la dot, des ord:‘ies, de

la sorcellerie, de l’infanticide d’enfants-tabous, de la pblygzmî*: …). Le

— 26 —

législateur, par l’intermédiaire des tribunaux, force l’implantation d’un ordre

nouveau, l’imposition de règles de conduite « plus civilisées » et, en cela, il va

à l’encontre de certaines normes traditionnelles qui ont été intériorisées tout

au long du processus de socialisation. Et pour bousculer le changement, les

administrations se servent de peines, et ce faisant — aux yeux des citoyens —

elles en viennent

institutionnaliser un certain nombre d’injustices dans la

mesure où elles transgressent les coutumes ancestrales

LA LOI DES VILLES ET LA LOI DES CHAMPS

En 1965. à Vavoua, en Côte d’Ivoire, une femme accusée de sorcellerie

demanda, pour prouver son innocence, à subir — selon la coutume —

l’épreuve du poison, c’est-à-dire une ordalie. Aussitôt après avoir avalé la

décoction néfaste, elle mourût. La chose parvint à la gendarmerie et le chef

du village fut arrété, comme responsable de cet homicide. Il fut jugé, par les

tribunaux étatiques, et condamné. Devant une telle situation, comment

peut-on faire comprendre aux villageois que la fidélité aux coutumes peut

être un acte condamnable ? Pour eux, il n’y avait pas de doute : si la femme

était morte c’est qu’elle était-vraiment une sorcière. Telle était la croyance

de la tribu, tel était la coutume immuable. Pourquoi alors leur chef, repré-

sentant des ancêtres, représentant des lois, de ce qui est bien et de ce qui est

mal, est-il devenu un accusé, un malfaiteur et a-t-il été condamné ? Ou se

trouve la justice ?

La différence dans les normes légales conduit donc les groupements tra-

ditionnels

s’isoler, à se replier sut eux-même, à mépriser un système judi-

ciaire qui protège les coupables (les sorciers) et qui condamne les innocents

(ceux qui rendent la justice des Anciens). L’existence de ces deux corps de

lois et de ces deux types de juridictions encouragent les gens à garder dans

la clandestinité les aspects de leur vie sociale et de leurs croyances qui

entrent en contradiction avec le mode de vie et de pensée des «blancs» et

de leurs imitateurs, les « élites» africaines des grandes villes. À cause de cela

les villageois ne feront appel au parquet que lorsqu’ils n’auront aucune autre

alternative (parce que la chose s’est rendue aux oreilles d’un policier ou d’un

gendarme…) ou que lorsqu’ils pourront en tirer profit (lorsque le jugement

traditionnel ne satisfait pas la victime ou, comme c’est plus souvent le cas,

l’accusé…). Ce qui prouve que l’on ne change pas des mentalités et des

croyances avec des lois ou des règlements.

Lle témoignage de Kouassigan, sur la réalité juridique, telle qu’il la vit

à l’heure actuelle est, à cet égard for instructif : « La vie politique africaine

écrit-il, témoigne de l'échec constant de la règle de droit que l'on tente de

légitimer par le prétexte de stabilité politique nécessaire au développement

économ1que et social» (*974 p. 13). Au Nigéria, la voix de Karaoi-Whyte

directeur

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un instrument de la politique coloniale, dans le but de réaliser l’unité terri-

toriale et de remplacer les coutumes barbares et la moralité primitive par la

moralité supérieure du droit commun» (1982, p. 343). Il remarque que

méme pour ce qui est des offenses criminelles coutumières reconnues, le

code apparaît comme une négation des concepts traditionnels et comme,

par conséquent, la promotion de ce que le gouvernement colonial considé-

rait être nécessaire au maintien de la paix et d’un gouvernement stable.

Par le droit, il s’agissait — avant tout — d’établir la « pax britannica » ou

la «pax gallica». Et dans ce processus, il n’y eut aucun effort, ou si peu,

pour comprendre les notions ancestrales de droit; notions que les gouverne-

ments autochtones rejettent aujourd’hui. La preuve de cela réside, par

exemple, dans les lois qui punissent le recours aux mécanismes de conci-

liation et d’arbitrage pour les crimes graves, qui banissent l’usage des ordalies,

qui condamnent les formes traditionnelles de mariage. Et, en ce qui concerne

cette dernière institution, Karabi-Whyte remarque que le code criminel nigé-

rian a témoigné de la façon la plus convainquante son indifférence et son

mépris face aux valeurs culturelles de la communauté quant aux dispositions

régissant le mariage selon la coutume; mariage polygame de droit. De cette

inadéquation des lois découle leur inapplication, surtout dans les régions

rurales. Le pluralisme juridique débouche sur un opportunisme quant à la

voie à suivre pour régler un litige. Cela peut provenir du fait, comme le dit

Alliot (1965-66), que «la conception actuelle du droit pénal créateur de

l’avenir s’oppose à la conception traditionnelle et à la conception coloniale,

toutes deux tournées vers la défense d’un ordre établi» (p. 220). Ainsi, pris

dans le tourbillon extrémement rapide du développement, le droit pénal

joue une part active dans un processus d’acculturation, voulu et prémédité

qui risque de créer un fossé, à la fois culturel et idéologique, entre les

milieux urbains « civilisés» et les milieux ruraux « primitifs».

Nous ne pouvons que regretter que les philosophies pénales africaines,

entièrement orientées vers le rétablissement de l’harmonie entre les divers

segments de la communauté, aient été remplacées au profit d’une philoso-

phie «punitive» axée sur le châtiment du coupable; philosophie rétributive

qui ne tient souvent même pas compte de la victime. Or, chez les Africains,

il ne peut y avoir de justice sans que l’on apporte réparation aux torts cau-

sés à la partie lésée. L’ironie du sort veut que, à l’heure actuelle, dans nos

sociétés dites « civilisées» , beaucoup d’auteurs, dont Neils Christie et Louk

Hulsman, décrient le recours aux peines et aux châtiments et préconisent la

mise sur pied de procédure conciliatoires et arbitrales qui donneraient une

place centrale aux «droits» des victimes. L’on peut s’étonner que ces pen-

seurs, dans leurs élaborations théoriques, ne se soient pas davantage penchés,

pour y prendre exemple, sur les anciens modèles africains de justice.

En effet, la justice coutumière cherchait en premier lieu à réparer les

préjudices et à effacer les sentiments de haine et de vengeance qu’avait fait

— 28 —

naître, entre deux individus, deux familles ou deux clans, la commission

d’un délit ou d’un crime. Les parties opposées recherchaient, avec l’aide des

Anciens ou des chefs, une solution compensatoire qui assurait une répara-

tion à la victime. Cette préparation permettait de réconcilier les personnes

ou les groupes en litige et de ramener la paix au sein de la communauté. Îl

est dommage que le développement ait « officiellement » presque totalement

effacé cette justice, empreinté de respect pour les individus et leurs proches,

et qu’il l’ait remplacer par des procédures de confrontation et de coercition.

DÉVELOPPEMENT ÉCONOMIQUE

ET STRATIFICATION SOCIALE

Le développement a provoqué des mutations autant au niveau des structu-

res de pouvoir qu’à celui des valeurs et des activités sociales et économiques.

L’accroissement de l’industrialisation et l’instauration d’une agriculture inten-

sive, basée sur la monoculture régionale (café, cacao, arachide…) a permis un

clivage social entre la nouvelle classe dirigeante et la masse ,entre les nouveaux

riches et la paysannerie traditionnelle. Les villes se sont développées, symboles

de la richesse et de la modernisation, et ont provoqué un exode rural sans pré-

cédent. Or cette migration vers les villes est, comme le dit Sumner (1982),

davantage le fruit de forces répulsives du milieu agricole, consécutives à sa des-

tructuration, que de forces attractives des grandes agglomérations. Selon lui,

l’exode rural donne l’«opportunité», aux individus, de passer du sous-emploi

rural au non-emploi urbain; ce que l’on pourrait traduire comme étant, pour

la population paysanne, le passage d’une pauvreté excessive à une pauvreté

relative.Il s’agirait,en quelque sorte, d’une promotionau niveau de la pauvreté.

Une des conséquences les plus criardes du développement réside dans

l’établissement d’une nouvelle stratification sociale, basée sur le pouvoir, le

prestige et l’argent. Stratification qui sépare l’élite du reste de la population.

Les inégalités sociales entre une minorité privilégiée et le prolétariat sont

d’autant plus évidentes qu’elles sont outrancières. Lors des Indépendances,

le départ des fonctionnaires européens a créé un vide qui a été comblé par

les citoyens indigènes. Les emplois supérieurs s’accompagnaient de bénéfices

et d’avantages considérables puisqu’ils comportaient des indemnités pour

les européens expatriés, en plus d’être rémunérés selon les normes salariales

en vigueur dans les métropoles occidentales. La succession se fit sans réamé-

nagements qui tiendraient compte des ressources des anciennes colonies. Au

Nigéria, pour prendre l’exemple de Kayode (1983), les hauts fonctionnaires

recevaient une maison, entourée d’un terrain d’un demi-hectare, située dans

un quartier chic de la ville appelé «Government Reservation Area», une

domesticité appropriée, une voiture achetée avec un prétdu gouvernement,

de généraux frais mensuels pour la faire marcher, des allocations d’entretien

pour chaque enfant et des vacances payées chaque année. Voilà quelques

un des privilèges qui étaient octroyés à la nouvelle bourgeoisie africaine.

Et cela se retrouvait, plus ou moins prononcé ou exagéré, dans tous les

— 29 _

États africains nouvellement indépendants. Ces inégalités scandaleuses se

«

sont établies selon deux axes,

a

savoir entre, d’une part, une poignée de

personnes riches et la masse populaire et, d’autre part, entre les villes et les

villages. Kayode (1983) montre que, au Nigéria, 5% de la population

contrôlent environ 40 % des revenus bruts. Cette disparité dans les revenus

se traduit en une distinction, concrète et hautement évidente. entre ceux

«qui ont » et ceux «qui n'ont pas »

Un des facteurs qui a joué un rôle important dans cette différenciation

sociale est l’éducation. Celle-ci a créé une classe de bureaucrates bien nantis

de chefs d’entreprises, de professionnels et de techniciens. En instruisant

l’école a divisé. Comme le système éducatif véhicule un contenu plus litté-

raire et théorique que manuel et pratique, il a élargit le fossé culturel entre

les générations et a déraciné l’enfant de son milieu. Les jeunes, plus instruits

que leurs aînés et plus perméables aux idées et aux aspirations que colpor-

tent les sociétés occidentales, supportent moins bien l’autorité des chefs

coutumiers et rejettent une partie de leur culture qui apparaît, à leurs yeux

trop conservatrice et léthargique. Bien que n’ayant reçu qu’un début de

scolarisation, les adolescents se refusent de plus en plus à tout travail

manuel ou agricole et préfèrent quitter le village pour la ville plutôt que

d’assumer une fonction subalterne au sein de la communauté. On rejoint là

ce que Dumont, en 196

écrivait déjà

«Pour la plupart des gosses des villes et des campagnes, l'école repré-

sente d'abord le moyen d'accéder à la caste privilégiée de la fonction publi-

que. L'enfant de paysant, poussé par ses parents, en déduit vitel’impossibi-

lité d'une réelle promotion à l’intérieur de la profession agricole, le seul

moyen de s'élever est donc d'en sortir» (p. 72)

Or, l’école constitue pour bon nombre de jeunes Africains un miroir

aux alouettes. Békombo (1969) décrit assez bien ce mirage

«Grace aux

techniques nouvelles de communication de masse, le jeune villageois imagine

les lumières de la ville, les emplois qui foisonnent, les portes grandes

ouvertes qui conduisent vers l’apogée sociale

Le désir de ces jeunes est

d’'abandonner la pénible culture des champs, un père autoritaire et pauvre,

un milieu familial régi par la magie et qui ne fait qu’entretenir un espoir

jamais réalisé» (p. 30). Dans toutes les grandes villes africaines, on assiste

donc à l’arrivée massive de jeunes scolarisé qui arpentent les rues à la recher-

che d’un emploi de cadre ou de fonctionnaire. N’étant pas assez instruits

ils rejoignent vite les rangs des chômeurs et des insatisfaits. Une recherche

faite au Niger (Poitou, 1978) montre que l’inadaptation de l’enseignement

que la déperdition scolaire qui en résulte ainsi que la mauvaise intégration

sociale des jeunes en milieu urbain constituent des problèmes graves qui peu

vent avoir des incidences criminogènes. « L'enfant noir scolarisé, écriteile,

devient véritablement un meétis culturel qui doit se confox mer simiita n

ment à plusieurs systèmes normatifs, plus o*! rrs

c atiiaiosg y

“

— 30 —

Métis culturel, à la fois déracinés de son milieu et à la fois incapable de s’in-

tégrer dans le circuit économique moderne, faute de quahﬁcat10n adé-

quates et faute de débouchés suffisants.

LA CRIMINALITÉ AFRICAINE

UN PHÉNOMENE DIFFICILE A DÉTECTER

Les taux de criminalité,en Afrique, défient en quelque sorte les modèles

criminogènes classiques, puisqu’ils sont parmi les plus bas au monde. Par

exemple, au Nigéria, le taux de criminalité se situait, en 1976

339 pour

100.000 habitants contre, par exemple, 6000 en Allemagne de l’Ouest et

5900 aux États-Unis. Or, la pauvreté, l’exode rural, le chômage, les conflits

de cultures, l’urbanisation sauvage et rapide

tout semblerait concourir à

un développement spectaculaire de la criminalité. Jusqu’à maintenant, il

n’en est rien. Du moins, en apparence. Et ceci s’explique par deux raisons

fondamentales

la première est la persistance des structures sociales tradi-

tionnelles; la seconde est la faiblesse des organismes de contrôle étatique. Il

convient donc d’examiner l’incidence de ces deux facteurs sur le phenomene

criminel africain.

Persistance des structures sociales traditionnelles

Dans la plupart des États africains, près des trois quarts de la population

vivent encore dans les régions rurales. Il est évident que, dans les villages

l’implantation d’une économie monétaire et, surtout, l’introduction d’un

caractère individualiste dans les relations sociales, ont porté un dur coup à

certaines coûtumes et à certaines façons d’agir et de pensée. Mais il n’en

demeure pas moins que la famille élargie et les structures lignagères et clani-

ques, contmuent à se maintenir tout en évoluant.

Ces structures, autoritaires et coercitives, freinent ainsi au maximum

l’agir délinquant parce qu’elles reposent sur des tabouts et des croyances

religieuses très ancrés dans les mentalités des gens. À cause de cela, il est

indéniable que la criminalité rurale est, et de loin, beaucoup plus faible que

la criminalité urbaine. Cela a été longuement démontré ailleurs (Vanderlinden

1983; Brillon, 1980; Poitou, 1978). Il est encore indéniable que la solidarité

ethnique pousse les villageois à préserver la bonne entente entre les clans en

reglant entre eux, bon nombre d’affaires criminelles. Si la criminalité rurale

s’avère moins abondante que celles des agglomeratmns urbaine, elle est aussi

plus cachée.

En effet, quand un délit ou un crime est commis, s’il n’est pas «trop

grave» ou «trop visible » , les villageois préféreront souvent régler le litige au

sein de la communauté de façon à maintenir la paix au village. Pour y parve-

nir, on procédera selon le droit traditionnel en vue de réinsérer dans le

— 31 —

groupe la personne fautive tout en évitant, en compensant la victime, le pro-

cessus de vengeance. On optera alors pour des procédures de conciliation,

d’arbitrage et d’indemnisation. Une enquête faite à Abidjan, en 1974,

auprès de 1000 Africains (500 Ivoiriens et 500 étrangers) montre que 62 %

de l’échantillon étaient d’accord avec l’énoncé suivant : « Quelle que soit la

gravité de l'acte commis par un membre d’un même village, il vaut mieux

d’abord essayer de régler l’affaire à l’amiable entre les familles plutôt que de

faire intervenir la police ou la gendarmerie». Selon le même échantillon

(Brillon, 1980), 79,6 % des Africains se disaient en faveur du recours, en

milieu villageois, à des procédures conciliatoires pour mettre fin à un litige

soulevé par la commission de délits et de crimes.

Si le phénomène criminel, en Afrique, affiche des taux si bas s’est donc,

en premier lieu, parce que la criminalité, en zone rurale, est beaucoup mieux

contrôlée par les interdictions coutumières et c’est aussi, en second lieu,

parce que la justice traditionnelle absorbe une grande partie des différents;

ce qui fait qu’une part non négligeable de la criminalité reste cachée aux

organismes officiels de défense sociale.

Faiblesse des agences pénales modernes

Kayode (1983) constate que, au Nigéria, la majorité des informations

criminelles qui arrivent à la police proviennent d’une mince fraction de la

population. Une large portion du territoire, géographiquement parlant,

échappe à toute fin pratique, à la surveillance policière : environ 75 % des

forces de l’ordre nigériannes sont stationnées dans les capitales régionales et

dans les autres centres urbains où ne vivent, au total, que 25 % des Nigérians.

Pour l’ensemble de la population, on ne compte qu’un policier pour 1.800

habitants. Nous avons pu constater le même phénomène en Côte d’Ivoire

(1980), où les forces publiques se concentrent dans les grandes villes (un

policier pour 835 habitants) alors que, dans les régions rurales, elles sont

très clairsemées (un gendarme pour 3.652 habitants). Ceci explique le fait

que les trois plus grandes villes ivoiriennes, qui ne renfermaient que 17 % de

la population nationale, en 1970, n’en regroupaient pas moins de 56 % des

citadins et, sur le plan de la criminalité connue des tribunaux, elles totali-

saient 47 % de toutes les affaires pénales.

De ces données, on peut déduire que dans les villes, où la promiscuité

ethnique rend plus ardue la survivance des procédures et des droits coutu-

miers, il est plus aisé de faire admettre une nouvelle conception juridique et

d’amener les populations à recourir aux agents gouvernementaux de contrôle

social. C’est en milieu urbain, creuset où se heurtent et se transmuent les

anciennes institutions, où l’occidentalisation des modes de vie et de pensée

secrète une société de masse et de consommation caractérisée par l’anony-

mat, la multiplicité des cultures et des valeurs, que se fait le plus intensément

sentir l’anomie. Toutes ces conditions facilitent le passage à l’acte, cela

— 32 —

d’autant plus que les villes mettent cruellement en relief les inégalités socia-

les entre les riches et les pauvres. De plus, une forte proportion de riches

vivent dans l’opulence et la corruption. Dans de nombreuses administra-

tions, il n’y a pas de doute, comme l’affirment Kayode, pour le Nigéria

(1983), et Nortey, pour le Ghana (1983), qu’il y a une quantité énorme de

pots-de-vin, de fraudes, de détournements de fonds publics, d’escroqueries

et de contrebande.

L’agissement et l’impunité des «puissants» ne sont pas de nature à frei-

ner la criminalité des plus pauvres. La criminalité de ces derniers est, le plus

souvent, de peu de gravité et même, parfois, de nécessité. Dans l’apparition

des conduites délictueuses ou criminelles, on peut donc inclure, comme le

fait Poitou (1981-83) les explications qui résultent d’un effet d’imitation

ou d’un processus de «tantalisation». «En effet, la ville — théâtre privilé-

gié des changements sociaux — est aussi le lieu priviliégié où se développent

divers processus — désintégration des normes, occidentalisation, frustra-

tion — qui interviennent dans l’étiologie de la délinquance ouest-africaine »

(p. 114). Les nouvelles « valeurs citadines» de la «libre entreprise » balayent

tout devant elles. Le sérieux de la vie familiale est jeté par-dessus bord,

«les vieilles respectabilités étant abandonnées avec les vieilles servitudes »

(Davidson, 1969). Les enfants sontles premières victimes de ces change-

ments sociaux. L’effondrement des interdits qui étaient à la base de l’éduca-

tion tribale, l’émiettement de la solidarité clanique qui garantissait une pré-

sence affective, font que — dans certaines familles urbaines — les enfants

manquent d’encadrement éducatif. La délinquance juvénile trouve, dans ces

conditions, un terrain favorable à son épanouissement.

CRIMINALITÉ ET DÉVELOPPEMENT : UN LIEN AMBIGU

Le développement économique postule l’élévation du niveau de vie et

l’amélioration des conditions d’existence. Il se réalise par une rationalisation

progressive et de plus en plus poussée de l’exploitation des matières pre-

mières, et par la production massive des biens de consommation; ces

mesures étant pilotées par des entreprises multinationales dont les objectifs

essentiels sont de rendre concurrentiel l’écoulement des produits sur les

marchés national et mondial. Généralement, l’industrialisation, qui est le

moteur de l’essor économique, a pour conséquence immédiate un accroîsse-

ment urbain important. Les industries ont besoin, en effet, pour prospérer,

d’une concentration de main-d’œuvre et d’une infrastructure de services de

tous ordres devant assurer la commercialisation et la vente de leur produc-

tion. Ces services se centralisent, dans la plupart des cas, dans les grandes

villes. Ce développement économique ne s’accompagne pas toujours, loin de

là, de l’amélioration de la qualité de la vie parce qu’il s’amorce souvent sans

planification et au mépris des réalités existantes, des motivations des popu-

lations, de leurs valeurs, des structures politiques économiques et religieuses.

— 33 —

La technologie ainsi introduite répond avant tout aux besoins des investis-

seurs étrangers qui ne se préoccupent guère de faire éclater, par leurs acti-

vités, la cohésion des architectures sociales préexistantes

Face à cette édification d’une économie de marché, fondée sur la mobi-

lité et l’innovation, face

l’urbanisation rapide, les sociétés traditionnelles

se sont vues obligées d’évoluer pour survivre et pour s’introduire dans les

nouveaux circuits d’échanges commerciaux. Ce qui est devenu, pour elles

une nécessité vitale dès que les économies autarciques ont été détruites au

profit des cultures spécialisées. Face à ces modifications structurelles, elles

sont, toutefois, paralysées par des coutumes et par un système de valeurs et

de croyances qui furent érigés, avant tout, pour maintenir la stabilité et

l’ordre à l’intérieur du clan, de la tribu et du groupe ethnique. Cette situ-

ation qui oppose modernisme et traditionalisme bouscule les communautés

agricoles et déclenche ce que Balandier (1971) appelle le processus de

«dé-structuration et de re-structuration ». Ce processus complexe aboutit à

des transformations notables qui touchent la plupart des institutions tradi-

tionnelles. Il se produ1t alors des changements à un rythme accéléré; ce qui,

faute d’avoir été prévu et endigué, donne naissance à des problèmes de

pathologie sociale.

Il est certain que le dévelappement de l’Afrique par les capitaux étran-

gers ont forcé des mutations sociales et économiques. La plupart des États

africains sont devenus dépendants dès fluctuations qui secouent les marchés

internationaux. Ce qui a entrainé une instabilité fondamentale de l’écono-

mie de ces pays qui, d’une part, sont sensibles aux modifications soudaines

qui touchent le prix de leurs produits et qui, d’autre part, connaîssent des

poussées inflationistes répétitives qui font monter en flèche le coût de la vie

En conséquence de cette fragilité économique, on observe, avec Mandel

(1968), les phénomènes suivants

des périodes cycliques et prolongées de

chômage; de sérieuses perturbations dans l’écologie générale à la suite de

l’érosion des sols; une surexploitation des terres qui provoque leur stérilité

une sous-alimentation de la population qui découle de l’expansion excessive

de la monoculture qui a des effets désastreux sur la fertilité des champs

C’est ce qui fait dire à Sumner (1982) que «la criminalité n’est pas seule-

ment le résultat du développement mais qu'’il en est la cause » (p. 30). Cette

spoliation des terres agricoles provoquent l’exode rural, de développement

des bidonvilles et, dans les agglomérations urbaines, la dégénérescence des

cultures africaines traditionnelles

Dans le contexte d’une économie de libre échange, avec une migration

non contrôlée vers les villes, où les différences de revenus entre les diverses

classes sociales sont de plus en plus visibles, il apparaît assez clair que les

facteurs, liés au développement, deviennent criminogènes. Selon Kayode

(1983), ces facteurs favorisent chez les moins bien nantis, le recours au vol

comme étant une «redistribution », bien qu’illégale, des biens. Par ailleurs

— 34 _

les conditions économiques ajoutent à l’instabilité politique de ces régions,

dans la mesure où elles débouchent sur un chômage massif de la population.

La guerre civile au Nigéria, de 1966 à 1970, les coups d’États au Ghana,

en Ouganda, en République centrafricaine… se sont accompagnés d’une

flambée de la criminalité de violence. Au Nigéria, après la guerre du Biafra,

les soldats libérés se sont mis à piller, à rançonner les gens et à tuer pour

vivre. Ce qui amena, en 1970,le gouvernement à instaurer la peine de mort.

Au Ghana, au milieu des années 60, les vols à main armée se multiplièrent à

la suite du premier changement de régime; cela parce que la junte amnistia

des criminels politiques et de droit commun sans procès (Nortey, 1983).

Plus tard, entre 1966 et 1972, avec le développement prodigieux de la

contrebande, les voleurs à main armée s’attaquèrent aux camions qui trans-

portaient les marchandises. Comme la police concentrait tous ses efforts sur

le maintien de la sécurité politiques, les vols de banque, les saccages de villa-

ges devinrent d’autant plus fréquents, selon Nortey, que les criminels jouis-

saient d’une certaine impunité à cause de l’insuffisance des forces policières.

En Ouganda, avant le règne d’Idi Amine Dada,la population perdit confiance

dans les institutions étatiques et prirent, parfois, la justice entre ses mains.

La politique et la criminalité étaient interreliées du fait qu’un grand nombre

de jeunes, sans emploi, fromentèrent des troubles et des manifestations dans

les villes (Clifford, 1983). Les vols à main armée prirent, là aussi, un essor

inquiétant.

CONCLUSION

Il faut reconnaître qu’il y a une certaine ambiguité dans le lien qui

existe entre développement et criminalité. Il est indéniable que les condi-

tions économiques ont des incidences sur la sécurité publique et sur la stabi-

lité politique. Le processus de développement est la conséquence de forces

et de dynamisme internes et externes. Il est, en partie, orienté de l’extérieur

par les pays industrialisés qui influent, par là-même, sur la dé-struturation

des sociétés africaines. Celles-ci, dépendant de leur vigueur et de leur capa-

cité d'adoptation et de re-structuration, réagissent plus ou moins positive-

ment aux influences externes. Or, c'est dans cette phase de transformation

sociale que la criminalité a le plus tendance à se développer. Pour l’instant,

l’influence encore efficace des anciennes structures sociales et familiales

freine une désorganisation qui pourrait devenir périlleuse. Seuls un dévelop-

pement plus harmonieux et une évaluation générale du niveau de vie des

populations pourraient être en mesure de contenir, dans l’avenir, un accrois-

sement désordonné des conduites criminelles. Les inégalités sociales entre les

Africains riches et les pauvres, tout comme celles qui séparent les pays

industrialisés de ceux du «tiers monde », sont si criantes d’injustice que l’on

peut s'étonner de voir à quel point les structures traditionnelles parviennent

à contrôler la déviance et la criminalité. Avec leur disparition… le pire serait

du domaine du possible…

— 35 —

Un autre aspect des incidences du développement sur la criminalité, en

«

Afrique, est le fait qu’il a donné naissance

a

un conflit de «droits», qui

découle directement du processus d’acculturation. Il est évident que le droit

nouveau et les institutions administratives nécessaires à son fonctionnement

répondent davantage aux conditions de vie urbaine qu’à celles de la majorité

rurale de la population africaine. Cependant, même dans les villes, où la

cohabitation d’ethnies diverses et multiples rend pratiquement obligatoire

l’existence d’un «droit commun», qui soit au-dessus des droits particuliers

à chaque groupement, le système pénal insuffisamment développé pour être

efficace semble lui-même contribuer à une «régression » vers une justice pri-

mitive. Sanogho (1976) constate que, depuis très récemment, au Mali, des

fusillades qui ont fait des victimes parmi les voleurs, «ont marqué la ten-

dance des habitants à l’autodéfense devant les carences administratives. De

plus en plus, des cas de lynchage sont relevés» (p. 95). Le même phénomène

se retrouve à Abidjan à Lagos, à Kampala ou à Kinshasa.

Ce qui laisse supposer que la justice moderne est non seulement inadap-

tée à la pensée traditionnelle mais que, en plus, elle est incapable de juguler

la nouvelle criminalité qu’engendre les villes. Certes, ce n’est pas là un trait

spécifique à l’Afrique noire. Au contraire, cela est commun à tous les sys-

tèmes pénaux des sociétés industrielles et, particulièrement, des plus déve-

loppées. La différence réside dans le fait que les groupes ethniques parve-

naient à contrôler leur criminalité et que, aux yeux de la population indi-

gène, le système des blancs, présenté comme «supérieur», ne fait pas la

preuve de sa supériorité. Où peuvent conduire ces réactions en spirale qui

accentuent de plus en plus la dysfonction des institutions pénales ? Peut-

être, à plus ou moins long terme, à une «africanisation » de la justice crimi-

nelle, qui s’inscrira dans la sagesse des traditions et des coutumes africaines…

Du moins est-il permis de l’espérer.

RÉFÉRENCES

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Paris : Les cours de droit.

BALANDIER, G. (1971), Sens et puissance. Paris : P.U.F.

BÉKOMBO, M. (1969), Vie familiale et délinquance en Afrique noire.

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BRILLON, Y. (1980), Éthnocriminologie de l’Afrique Noire, Paris : J. Vrin

>

Montréal : P.UM.

CLIFFORD, W. (1983), Criminology in Developping Nations — African and

Asian, Examples. in E. H. Johnson (Ed.): International Handbook of

Contemporary Developments in Criminology. General Issues and the

Americas. London : Greenwood Press.

COISSY, D. M. (1974), La politique criminelle des États d’Afrique noire.

Genève : Éditions Médecine et Hygiène.

— 36 —

COSTA, J. (1969), Penal Policy and Underdevelopment in French Africa, in

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Paul.

COSTA-LASCOUX, J. (1975), Le droit pénal, l’unité nationale et le déve-

loppement économique. In Archives de Politique Criminelle, N° 1. Édi-

tions À. Pédone : Paris.

DAVIDSON, B. (1969), Les Africains, introduction à l’histoire d’une

culture. Paris : Éditions du Seuil.

DUMONT, R.(1962), L'afrique noire est mal partie. Paris : Seuil.

KARABI-WHYTE, A. G.(1982), Le pluralisme culturel et la formulation de

la politique criminelle. In Rev. Int. de Crim. et de Pol. Tecn., Vol.

XXXV, N° 4. Oct.-Dec. 1982.

KAYODE, O. (1983), Nigeria. in E. H. Johnson (ed.) International Hand-

book of Contemporary Developments in Criminology. Europe, Africa,

The Middle East and Asia. London : Greenwood Press.

KOUASSIGAN, G. A. (1974), Quelle est ma loi ? Tradition et modernisme

dans le droit privé de la famille en Afrique noire francophone. Paris :

A Pédone.

MANDEL, E. (1968), Marxist Economic Theory. London : Merlin Press.

MELONE, S. (1975), Les grandes orientations actuelles de la législation

pénale en Afrique : le cas du Cameroun. in Archives de politique cri-

minelle, N° 1. Paris : Éditions A. Pédone.

NORTEY, D. N. A. (1983), Ghana. in E. H. Johnson (ed.) International

Handbook of Contemporary Developments in Criminology. Europe,

Africa, The Middle East and Asia. London : Greenwood Press.

POITOU, D. (1981-1983), Délinquance juvénile et urbanisation au Niger et

au Nigéria. in Cahiers d’Études Africaines, XXI-1-3, pp. 111-127.

POITOU, D. (1978), La délinquance juvénile au Niger. Études Nigériennes,

N° 41. Institut de Recherche en Sciences Humaines : NIAMFY.

RIVES, G. (1975), Les problèmes de l’évolution de la politique criminelle

au Sénégal depuis l’Indépendance . in Archives de politique criminelle,

N° 1. Paris : Éditions A. Pédone.

SUMNER, C. (1982), Crime, Justice and Underdevelopment : Beyond

Modernisation Theory. in C. Sumner (ed.), Crime, Justice and Under-

development . London : Heinemann.

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je ? N° 2103. Paris : P.U.F.

35

SUMMARY '

Development in Africa has affected criminality in two ways: the ﬁrSt is

through the transformation of law, the second is by the erosion of tra-

ditional forms of social control, that are more effective than the new. With

colonisation, and the ‘establishment of independent governments, the

criminal codes were introduced with the goal of unifying the multi-ethnic

states. With this national unity, the traditional forms of political and legal

power were swept away. As 75 % of the population remain rural.

20 îypes

of the

of law coexist: that of the cities, inspired by the west; anu

countryside, loyal to tradition. The. Africans remain in a state

ipomie.

This has consequences for the criminality as well as for the p«

nsti-

tutions of the state. With the development of a market economy nd an

educational system, an unprecedented rural exodus has occurred. l:

sC

the population has been forced to adapt to a modern life. They hav. zen

their traditional social structures, founded on taboos and religious t. iefs

dissolved. This has reduced family and clan contracts, destroying the family

and leading to the development of delinquency and crime.

RÉSUMÉ

LES INCIDENCES DU DÉVELOPPEMENT

SUR LA CRIMINALITE AFRICAINE

Le dévéloppement, en Afrique, a eu des incidences sur la criminalité à

deux niveaux : le premier est celui de la transformation du droit et le

deuxième, celui de l’érosion des anciennes formes de contrôle social, beau-

coup plus efficaces que les nouvelles. Avec la colonisation, puis avec la mise

en place des gouvernements autchtones, des codes pénaux ont été promul-

gués dans le but d’unifer, à l’intérieur de chaque État, les multiples ethnies.

Par cette unification nationale, on a balayé les. formes traditionnelles de

pouvoir, à la fois politique et juridique. Comme les populations africaines

sont, à 75 %, agricoles et rurales, on a vu se superposer deux types de droit :

celui des villes, d’inspiration occidentale, et celui des campagnes, fidèle aux

traditions. Par là même, les Africains se sont trouvés en situation d’anomie.

Ce qui a eu des conséquences à la fois sur la genèse de la criminalité et à la

fois sur une sous-utilisation des institutions pénales étatiques. Par ailleurs, le

— 38 —

CRIME AND DEVELOPMENT : SOME OBSERVATIONS

ON WOMENAND CHILDREN IN INDIA (1)

Clayton A. Hartjen*

CRIME ET DÉVELOPPEMENT : QUELQUES OBSERVATIONS

SUR LES FEMMES ET LES ENFANTS EN INDE

La fréquence et la répartition des arrestations pour 9 types de crimes

graves répertoriés dans les statistiques officielles des États Unis et de l’Inde,

sont analysées ici afin d’évaluer de quelle manière le développement écono-

mique peut être associé aux différents facteurs considérés comme influan-

çant directement les taux de criminalité et de dangerosité. Comparée aux

données Américaines la proportion d’arrestations de femmes et de mineurs

en Inde est extrémement basse. En fait, les femmes Indiennes diffèrent

substanciellement des femmes Américaines en ce qui concerne la réparti-

tion des arrestations entre les 9 types de délits étudiés, alors que le schéma

d’arrestations de mineurs est pratiquement identique. Il a été avancé que

ces différences entre la proportion et la répartition n’étaient que le reflet

des différences de comportement et de réaction sociale au crime des femmes

et des mineurs existant actuellement entre ces deux pays. Dans cette opti-

que on peut dire que la fréquence des arrestations de femmes et de mineurs

en Inde est inférieure car, comparativement avec les États Unis, ils ont

moins d’opportunité ou de raison de sombrer dans la déviance, et s’ils le

font, leur comportement est traité de manière informelle et officieuse. Dans

la mesure où ces considérations sociales et interractionnistes se retrouvent

au niveau du développement économique du pays, les variations des taux de

criminalité à travers les sociétés peuvent être finalement expliquées par

l’influence des formes économiques et des stades de développement.

ABSTRACT

The arrest frequencies and distributions for nine serious crimes reported

in official statistics in the United States and India are analyzed to assess

how economic development may be associated with various factors that are

believed to directly influence rates of criminality and criminalization. Com-

pared to Americans, the arrest proportions of women and juveniles in India

are extremely low. In addition, Indian women differ substantially from

* Associate Professor of Sociology Rutgers University — Newark.

— 39 _

u

American women in terms of the distribution of arrests accross the nine

offenses while the arrest patterns of juveniles were quite similar. It is argued

that these differences in arrest proportions and patterns reflect actual

differences in behavior and societal (official) reaction to the criminality of

women and juveniles in the two countries. In this regard, the arrest fre-

quencies of women and juveniles in India are low because they have com-

paratively fewer opportunities or reasons to deviate and, even if they do

their behavior is likely to be treated in an informal, unofficial manner. To

he extent that these socio-interactional dimensions are related to a country’s

level of economic development, variations in crime rates across societies

ultimately may be explained by the influence of economic forms and levels

of development

INTRODUCTION

Variations in crime rates among societies are likely to occur to the

extent that they differ in economic development, insofar as economic

development is related to and influences political organization, urbanization,

family structure, participation of women and children in the labor force,

patterns of interpersonal relationships, and status and identity sources.

These differences in ratés would include (1) absolute levels of criminality

and criminalization, (2) the frequency with which specific fôrms of behavior

occur Or are counted as crimes, and (3) the relative frequency with which

particular categories of people are engaged in crimes or are labeled as

criminal offenders. Ît is the last of these three p0551b111t1es that is of central

concern in this paper.

‘

The sparse, highly unreliable, and frequently incomparable data on

feMnale criminality in various countries universally suggests oñ thing — rates

of arrest for women are lower (often dramatically so) than are rates for men

(e.g., Adler, 1981; Adler & Simon, 1979; Bowker, 1981 ; Jones; Marshall

1982

1983). But other than this observation, few conclusive statements

can be made regarding the relative criminality of women and men in so-

cieties throughout the world. Similar statements can be made regarding

crime rates for juveniles, except that youth in most developed societies have

disproportionately high crime rates compared to adults (e.g., Friday, 1980)

The most common way of comparing male/female or adult/juvenile

crime rates is to compare rates of arrest, usually in terms of a percentage or

ratio analysis. Variability in these rates exists of course. But, since arrest

rates are most directly a measure of criminalization rather than criminality,

it is by no means clear whether this variability is a reflection of actual

differences in criminal behavior, variations in societal reaction to female

for youthful offenders, or both (Alder, 1984; Austin, 1982; Curran, 1984

Empey, 1979; Hartnagel, 1982; Hill & Harris, 1981; Klein & Kress, 1976

— 40 —

Phillips & DeFleur, 1982; Schwartz, et. al., 1984; Visher, 1983). Whatever

its source, variance in the crime rates of women and juveniles is ultimately

related to the effects of socio-economic and cultural differences among

countries on the status and role women and young people occupy and play

in societies.

Even given the above limitations, on the bases of available data, it does

seem reasonable to assume that in most countries women are less likely than

adult males and children are less likely than adults generally to experience

overt legal control in the form of criminal arrest. Moreover, the extent to

which authorities rely on criminal law to control or suppress certain

activities differs both in absolute use and relative use vis a vis various cat-

egories of people from society to society. Thus, by treating ‘“legal control”

(in the form of arrest and other rates) as a phenomenon to be explained in

its own right, it might be argued that any explanation of its relative use is a

consequence of those factors which (1) generate differences in behavior

(frequency and type) deemed worthy of such control as well as (2) those

that influence the perceptions of authorities as to the need for or desir-

ability of invoking the criminal law in specific instances.

The likelihood that the members of particular groups will be involved

in criminality, or criminality of specific types, and the chances group

members have of being criminalized for this involvement, depend upon the

location of groups within the society’s socio-power structure (Black, 1976,

1980; Turk, 1972). To the extent that the composition of a society’s socio-

power structure, and the location of various groups within it, is related to

the society’s level of economic development, the relative occurrence of

illegal behavior and its control by means of criminal law would ultimately

differ from society to society in terms of level of development. The impli-

cations of this idea for enhancing our understanding of criminal epidemi-

ology can be illustrated by analyses of specific countries. The situation of

women and youth in India provides an opportunity for one such analysis.

ARREST RATES AND DISTRIBUTIONS :

Some Comparisons

Table I presents the percentages of women and juveniles (persons below

age 18) arrested during 1974 for comparable crimes in India and the United

States (2). In spite of the limited number of offenses included in this

comparison, the most dramatic thing revealed by these figures is the enor-

mous differences in the relative frequency with which women and juveniles

are arrested in India compared to the United States. Indeed, for Indian

Penal Code (I.P.C.) offenses women equalled only ! .7 percent of all persons

arrested in 1974. In contrast, for Index crimes in the United States, women

comprised 19 percent of the persons arrested in that year. Similarly, about

—- 4] —

3 -percent of the persons arrested for I.P.C. crimes in India were juveniles,

whereas over 45 percent of the persons arrested for Index crimes in the

United States were of the same age category.

TABLE I

Arrests of Women and Juveniles as Percentages of Total Arrests

in India and the Unitçd States, 1974*

Women

- Juveniles

_ Offense

U.S.A

India

U.S.A.

India

Murder

. . ° . . . . À . . . . -

14.6

2.1

10.1

0.9

Manslaughter

- ° . À- . À . À . …

12.4

1.3

10.0

0.3

Rape

0.0

0.9

19.4

2.3

Robbery

. . . . . . . . . . . .

6.8

0.5

32.6

0.9

Burglary

. L e . . . . ». . . .

5.4

1.2

53.3

3.6

Theft

. ° . . . . . . . ». . . . .

30.7

2.0

48.9

3.8

Embezzlement

263

0.6

7.1

0.5

Fraud

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

32.6

l.1

5.2

0.4

Forgery & Counterfeiting. . .

28.6

0.0

13.3

0.0

——

* Sôurce: Computed from, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in America, 1974

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), pp., 188-189, Bureau

of Police Research & Developmeat, Crime in India, 1974 (New Delhi: Ministry of

Home Affairs, 1977), pp., 54 & 77.

Besides the generally extreme differences in relative percenfages of

arrests, considerable variation exists in the types of crimes for which women

and children are arrested vis a vis men and adults in the two countries. The

most striking of these is the large discrepancy between the percentages of

American and Indian women arrested for the property offenses of theft,

embezzlement, fraud and counterfeiting. Almost 30 percent of the persons

arrested for these offenses in the United States are women, about double

their contribution to overall arrest figures. By contrast, in India women

make up less than one percent of these, less than one-half their overall

arrest contribution. Comparatively, juveniles make up 45 percent of the

individuals arrested for the common property offenses or robbery, burglary,

and theft in the United States but less than 3 percent of those arrested for

these offenses in India are juveniles; proportions that are similar to the

overall differences in juvenile arrest percentages in the two countries as such.

To some extent these figures represent differences in the responses of

authorities to the criminality of women and children in the two countries.

For example, illegal conduct on the part of women is probably less fre-

quently reported (than is that of males) to authorities in both countries, but

possibly even less so in India than in the United States. When reported,

authorities are also probably less inclined to deal with the criminality of

_ 42 _

women in an official manner in India than in the United States, perhaps

depending upon the type of behavior in question (3). But differences in

societal response alone cannot explain the rather large differences in the

percentages reported in offcial arrest statistics. It is also quite likely that

men, women, and juveniles violate laws with different frequencies and/or

are engaged in different kinds of illegality — differences that for a variety

of reasons may themselves influence criminalization efforts or probabilities

This is suggested by the percentages reported in Table II

When the percentage distributions of the persons arrested for the nine

offence are compared by offence type, several observations can be made

For one, regardless of country, gender, or age, the individuals arrested for

these nine offenses are overwhelmingly arrested for the property crimes of

burglary and theft. The arrested women and juveniles in both countries

are somewhat more frequently arrested for these offenses than are men

or adults generally; averaging about 78, 82

, and 90 percent for men, women

and juveniles respectively. But beyond these similarities, the arrest distri-

butions are quite varied.

Of significance is the comparatively higher frequency with which the

arrested women in India are arrested for murder compared to American

women. Although the percentages of all ,persons arrested for personal

crimes as a category is about ten times higher among American women than

Indians (see Table I), a considerably greater proportion of the Indian

women are arrested for these crimes. This is similarly, although not as

dramatically, true of Indian men compared to American men. For juveniles

the arrest percentages for personal crimes (especially murder) are also

much higher for Indian youth; otherwise the arrest dlstrlbutlons are almost

identical for Indian and American juveniles.

Also small proportions of both American and Indian youths are appre-

hended for embezzlement, fraud, forgery and counterfeiting. While the

percentages for women are higher than those for juveniles in both countries

compared to Americans Indian women are unlikely to be arrèsted for these

four property crimes. Indeed, as an offense category, the arrest percentages

for these offenses are con51derably greater for American women than for

any other group.

In this regard, except for the generally low frequency with which

women and children are arrested in India compared to the United States

for those experiencing this fate juveniles in both countries appear to be

quite similar. This is true also of men, if to a lesser extent. On the other

hand, although the vast majority of the women arrestees in both countries

are apprehended for traditional property crimes, women who are arrested

in India are about five times more likely to be arrested for personal crimes

than are Americans, while American women are about five times more

likely to be arrested for forgery and other bourgeois-type property crimes (4)

_ 43 _

TABLE III

Percentage Distributions of Arrests for Men, Women, and Juveniles, by Offense an Country*

Offense

Men

Women

Juveniles

India

U.S.A

India

U.S.A

India

U.S.A

Murder

. . . « . . . . . . . . . . . .

9.3

l.1l

11.6

0.7

2.7

0.2

Manslaughter

. . . . . . . . . . . « .

1.0

0.2

0.8

0.9

0.0

0.0

Rape

. . . . . . . . . ° . . . . . . .

0.8

l.7

0.4

0.0

0.6

0.6

Robbery

.… " . . » . . . . . . . . . .

4.8

9.6

1.6

2.5

1.4

6.0

Burglary

. . . . . . . . . . . »À . . Û

25.2

30.6

18.4

6.3

293

30.8

Theft

. . ° . . . . . . . . . . . . ° .

53.1

47.9

644

76.0

65.0

60.5

Embezzlement

. ° . . . . Û . . . . .

3.1

0.4

l.1

0.5

0.5

0.1

Fraud

- . . . . . . . . . . . . ° . . .

2.5

5.8

1.6

10.1

0.3

0.8

Forgery & Counterfeiting

. . . . . .

0.1

2.7

0.0

3.9

0.0

1.0

TOTAL**

. . . . - . . . . . Û . . .

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

. . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . .

(474,919)

(1,054,707)

(7,986)

(294,789)

(14.861)

(589,292)

*

Percentages computed from, Federaly Bureau of Investigation, Crime in America, 1974 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing

Office, 1975), pp., 188-189 and Bureau of Police Research & Development, Crime in India, 1974 (New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs.

1977), pp…. 54 & 77.

** Totals may not equal 100 because of rounding.

The similarities and differences in arrest distributions are highlighted by

the figures in Table III which presents the ‘‘“index of dissimilarity” scores for

pares of arrest distribution percentages. As suggested by this table, the

distribution of arrests for American women is unlike that of any of the

other groups. Thus, if gender itself were in some way a significant factor in

criminal epidemiology, we would expect the scores of Indian and American

women to be closer than they are. As it is, the offense distributions of

American women more closely resemble those of Indian men than Indian

women. The criminality of Indian women is quite different from that of

American men, but their offense distribution is similar to that of Indian

men suggesting that region is more significant than gender. The substantial

differences in arrests for personal crimes on the part of Indian women and

bourgeois-type property crimes on the part of American women probably

accounts for these figures. Most similar are American and Indian juveniles,

whose score of 6.8 is the lowest in the matrix.

TABLE III

Index of Dissimilarity Matrix of Arrest Percentages

Indian

Indian

Indian |American|American|American

Women

Men

Juveniles

Women

Men

Juveniles

Indian Women

- . . . .

247

13.6

28.4

11.8

17.7

Indian Men

. . . . . - .

——

33.8

33.9

26.2

28.8

Indian Juveniles . . . .

—

16.9

16.1

14.8

American Women

—

18.9

12.9

American Men

. . . . À

_

6.8

American Juveniles

_—

Note: These scores are computed from the percentage distributions presented in

Table IL. The larger the score the greater the difference (or dissimilarity) in the

distributions of arrest percentages for each pare comparison.

DISCUSSION

Explaining the variations in the crime rates of women and juveniles in

India compared to the United States involves answering two questions:

(1) Why are arrest rates for women and juveniles (proportionate to men and

adults) substantially lower in India than in the United States, and (2) Why

(especially with regard to women) are the patterns of arrest for specific

crimes so different ” Differential reaction is surely involved. But these

variations in overall arrests also reflect some degree of difference in the

behavior of people — behavior that is conditioned by opportunity. motiv-

ational, and learning structures (5). In turn, these are affected by differences

- 45 —

in the level of economic development. Specifically, economic development

has profound implications for the status of women and young people and

the roles they normally play in society; influencing their participation in the

out-of-home labor force, their relative power in comparison to men and

aduits, societal expectations regarding their behavior, their life course, and

the like

One”s social position and role definition also influence one’s

probability of being perceived as deviant (or a deviant of a particular kind)

And these variables are related to the chances that one will engage in

conduct with a high probability of being seen and reacted to as criminal

Both of these (behaviors and evaluations of them) are ultimately reflected in

official crime rates

Available research suggests that the relationship between rates of crime

and economic development is by no means linear or consistent (Adler

1983), especially when it comes to rates for specific categories of persons

such as women within these socœtœs Marshall (1982:35), for example,

notes:

We know that high crime rates and high arrest rates are, usuallv_related

to a high level of economical and technical cesriroment. Surprisingl,

though, female arrest rates and female/mule c..

Fu:

‘kv

Qs F

n:21 consistently

related to either the overall crinie 6 :

18 COMNFY, OF fi

A

;h

! fecKno

logical development

Bui

Ï fit

4

2OUNC

hreci relsted to development, researein h

that fema:v crime rates For specific types of crimes (such as fraud anc >neity

sI

c

relates to opportunity contingencies (such as employment ou!

Hcusehoid) and that these contingencies are

fmienced by economic c

opssent. Hartnagel (1982: 486-488) notes that the crimes commitied bv

woren are like!y to mirror their traditional role in society and be consistent

wih traditional female-role expectations. But Hartnagel also points ouùi that

criuniriaiity Is also a reflection of role-determined opportunities to coinmt

vertain types of crimes. In this regard, development may generate economic

opportunities and economic needs for females within their traditional

social roles, even though the actual status of women may be little changed

by development. These opportunities and needs not only influence the level

of female criminality but also the specific forms such behavior is likely to

take. À similar statement applies equally to juveniles (Härtjen & Priyadarsini

1984). In short, level of economic development is significant as far as crime

rates are concerned because it shapes opportunity and motivational struc-

tures that are immediately related to criminal involvement. In addition, it

determines the statuses societal members might occupy and how the

behavior of status occupants is perceived and reacted to by societal mem-

bers and authorities

How might this help explain the crime rates of women and juveniles in

India? As a pre-industrial society, India shares many features common to

— 46 —

other such societies, features that may be related to criminal epidemiology.

For one, agrarian/pastoral societies tend to have integrative structures

(usually the family or clan) that serve to inhibit the growth of deviant

behavior and stimulate conformity to traditional roles and norms (Green-

berg, 1978; Newman, 1980; Shelley, 1981). As such, rates of criminality

are likely to be low in these societies and lower still among those persons

whose social position most clearly requires normative conformity. Secondly,

pre-industrial societies have few discretionary resources with which to

employ service workers (such as police and judges) to control deviating

members. Instead, informal mechanisms of control are relied upon, (e.g.,

referring the offender to a dominant family member, village elder, or other

respected individual). As a result, independent of rates of criminality,

rates of criminalization (i.e., formal arrests) are likely to be low, and even

lower among those segments of the population seen to be most amenable

to informal control — as women and children in India appear to be.

Women

Legally Indian women a-re probably more ‘’emancipated”’ than American

women. But socially Indian women are a subject group dependent on male

relatives as chaperones and sources of support throughout their lives

(Goldstein, 1972). The world, for the great bulk of Indian women, is the

world of home and hearth. While many of them work, few work outside the

home or live independent lives as employed individuals. According to ‘the

1971 census of India, 48 percent of the male population are listed as

workers, whereas only 13 percent of the women were employed and this

ratio appears to have changed very little in the last few decades. Using

employment in factories as a measure of “‘outside the home” employment,

the ratio of women to men employed in this capacity is and has been low

for the past several decades hovering around 11 percent (Central Statistical

Organization, 1980: 68-69 & 354) (6).

This does not mean that women are not working. Indeed they are.

Their labor is essential to the farm, cottage industry, or family business.

Rather, these figures reflect the fact that although working, women are

not employed in the sense that they are wage or salary earners with inde-

pendent incomes. Even then, few employed women in India are indepen-

dent in any sense of that word, although they may in fact desire to be.

Rather, working women almost universally give much of their salary to

father, husband, brother, or son instead of keeping it for themselves and

disposing of it as they see fit. Being unmarried and ‘“on one’s own” is

practically unheard of. As Goldstein (1972: 152) notes in her study of

women college graduates in Bangalore:

None see any alternative for the unmarried female but to accept the

practice of chaperonage and the need to eventually live with brothers.

_ 47 _

They recognize the marriage state and motherhood as the prime status

through which women gain recognition — and where in the world is it

otherwise” At the same time their desire to work is partially prompted by

the wish to be ‘independent’, to have some income and individuality of their

OWN

In short, even the most educated and liberated of Indian women live

sheltered, almost sequestered, lives in the company of relatives and domi-

nant males, being of service to the family whether that of one’s father,

husband, brothers, or sons. Thus, while they may have the motivation to

engage in criminality, few women in India have an opportunity to act in

terms of these motives. As a consequence arrest rates for women are likely

to be low. And, even then, illegality on their part is likely to be referred to a

male family member and treated in an informal manner rather than resulting

in an official arrest (7).

Indeed, whether from need or greed, Indian women may want ot better

their financial situation through illegal ways. But the opportunities to do so

are severely limited for them. This is particularly true for the more sophisti-

cated bourgeois-type property crimes for which Indian women are rarely

arrested. Few Indian women have the skills (literacy, accounting) to commit

these crimes besides not being in the position to do so even if they did.

Until recently a comparatively small number of Indian women received

educations beyond the elementary level and literacy rates remain extremely

low for women even today. But even if educated, most women are not put

in positions of financial trust, and since checks and other negotiable instru-

ments are not extensively used in India, the crime of check forgery that

accounts for a substantial proportion of the arrests of American women is

uncommon in India.

Both in India and the United States the most frequént property crime

for which women (and others) are arrested is theft. That arrest rates are

lower for Indian women than for Americans reflects the limited role women

play even in ‘“ordinary’’ economic matters in India. However, perhaps more

in India than in the United States such conduct is a response to survival

needs than anything else counterbalancing the limited opportunities Indian

women have to commit such crimes. Thus, for example, among the vast

impoverished population of Indian women who help support their families

by working as domestic servants, petty pilfering from employers is not

uncommon — a form of crime that is usually ignored unless it becomes

excessive or chronic. Other destitute women may steal food from shops or

vendors, filch laundry from clotheslines, raid a neighbor’s crops, or other-

wise act in ways that violate laws (e.g., resorting to prostitution or beg-

ging) (8). This is especially likely to be true of those women who lack a

family or relatives to support them: a situation which, by its very nature,

means they are outside the traditional female-role relationship and are thus

not as subject to its benefits or control.

— 48 _

Murder and manslaughter together constitute a substantial segment of

the offenses for which the few Indian women who are arrested are subjected

to legal control. Research on women who murder in developed countries

indicates that the great bulk o this activity on their part is directed toward

lovers or other family members (see Adler and Simon, 1979). To the extent

that these findings can be generalized, the proportionately high frequency

of arrests for this activity among Indian women is quite understandable

given the centrality of the family to their lives and the immense pressures

placed on Indian women in this context. This would be particularly true,

for example, of the bride in her in-law’s home, the barren woman, or the

one whose family did not provide the dowry agreed upon. Similarly, the

woman coerced into an undesired marriage, prevented from gaining the

education she seeks, or who is simply exploited and degraded by relatives

may have strong motivations to rid herself of the cause of her plight. In this

regard, while opportunities to commit property crimes, or property crimes

of specific types, may be more or less available to various people, such

opportunities are not as restricted where personal offenses like murder are

concerned. Rather, the motivations to commit the act may be more or less

varied and/or the chances of escaping from situations producing these

motivations may be more or less available. Thus, for example, whereas an

American woman caught in an intolerable marriage can legitimately (legally

and socially) escape by separation or divorce, an Indian woman in a similar

situation has little recourse but to rid herself of the husband. Although it

is legal, for the bulk of Indians divorce is simply unthinkable. It is quite

possible, therefore, that murder would come to be seen as more tenable (9).

In short, women in India are immersed in a social status and role

position which tightly incorporates them into the central institutions

(namely family) of the society. Although their status is low (varying by age

and rank in the family) compared to men, they have a central place within

the larger society. Even for those who may yearn for ‘‘liberation”’, few

expect to depart much from traditional relationships. In contrast to

American women Indian women are indeed a sheltered and shackled lot.

What little crime they apparently commit, therefore, is largely directed

against members of, or is committed on behalf of, the family. Even then,

few women are placed in a position to engage in illegal activity anyway,

especially those of a more sophisticated property kind, so that rates of

crime generally are low among Indian women.

Juveniles

In a number of ways, a similar situation explains the relatively low

arrest rates for juveniles in India. In the United States the high rates of

juvenile delinquency found throughout the youth population have been

attributed to the influences of the youth subculture and its associated

— 49 _

‘“’generation gap”, as well as the widespread opportunities for deviance

provided by a post-industrial economy (see Friday, 1980; Friday & Hage,

1976; Greenberg, 1978; Toby, 1963). According to this view, the emphasis

placed on one’s work-role in industrialized and post-industrial societies, and

the widespread exclusion of young people from participation in the labor

force, has made adolescence an extended life stage and heightened, if not

actually generated, a sense of alienation among young people. Thus, being

excluded from the dominant reward and normative system of the society,

young people are not likely to have any strong commitment to it or its

norms. Moreover, being isolated from the dominant world of adults, young

people develop a separate normative and reward structure, one that can be

antagonistic to that of adults. This exclusion and alienation of young people

thought to be fostered by the requirements of economic development are

considered responsible for the high rates of crime and delinquency exhibited

by young people throughout much of the developed world.

In addition, high rates of criminalization for juveniles in these countries

reflect the fact that social control has become increasingly specialized and

professionalized — handed over to official agencies such as the police and

the courts. Especially for groups viewed as outside, antagonistic to, or

threatening of the dominant society (as youth are often seen in developed

societies), reliance on formal control agents increases the probability that

relatively large numbers of the members of such groups will be subjected to

formal control, thereby increasing their rates of arrest; something which can

itself be used to justify the need for formal intervention in the first place as

well as its expansion. Post-industrial economy, in short, not only provides

young people ample opportunities to commit illegal acts, it also stimulates

illegal behavior on their part while simultaneously increasing the likelihood

that such conduc will be subjected to formal legal control.

The economic situation of countries like India has just the opposite

impact on juvenile behavior and its control (Hartjen & Priyadarsini, 1984).

Like Indians generally, young people are emersed in an extensive network

of interpersonal relationships, obligations, and ties (largely associated with

the extended family and other kin). And young people in India are also

provided status and sources of identify (such as jati or subcaste member-

ship) quite apart from their labor-force participation. One’s work does not

define the essence of one’s life nor determine one’s social and personal

sense of self to the extent this is true in most developed countries. Conse

quently, Indian young people not actively participating in the labor force

do not experience the alienating and isolating effects that seem to exist

among unemployed young people (and others) in the United States. Indeed,

even though they may not be employed in the renumerative sense, Indian

children and young people are essential to the nation’s economy and the

well being of the family in a way that is inconceivable for youth in devel-

oped countries. For one, many Indian youth do work — normally in' some

— 50 —

unskilled and menial capacity such as ‘’rag pickers# or eow herders, or as

laborers in the family ‘’cottage”’ industry or farm. The labor and earnings of

children may be all that keeps family members from starvation. In addition,

children who are not employed in some renumerative capacity are of econ-

omic value in pre-industrial societies. For instance, the numerous tasks

involved in simply running a household in India require the active partici-

pation of all family members. Thus, caring for younger siblings, collecting

cow dung or wood for the fire, and fetching water are only a few of the

chores routinely performed by children; tasks that make them not only

members of the family but also active participants in it. And in societies

that lack old-age and retirement programs children are essential to the

future economic well being, indeed survival, of parents.

Perhaps reflecting their economic role, children are socially integrated

into the very fabric of the society — rather than being a marginal and

alienated group of affiliates found in developed societies. Children are

normally included in almost all social activities, an “hanging out” with peers

away from the view of adults is rare.

This integration of young people in Indian society helps to explainfheir

low arrest rates to the extent that it reduces their motivations or oppor-

tunities to deviate. Being a part of the society young people in India develop

a ‘“‘stake in conformity” and a commitment to its dominant norms. They are

less likely therefore to flaunt or violate those norms by acting in illegal ways.

But, as with women, Indian juveniles have few opportunities to commit

criminal acts, even if they want to. Being almost perpetually in the company

of adults and other relatives, the privacy to deviate is rare and much deviant

behavior is prevented by the simple presence of others. Thus, both because

of few reasons and limited opportunities to violate criminal laws on the part

of juveniles, the occasions for invoking the law are relatively few and,

therefore, arrest rates are l'ow.

As in the United States (and elsewhere) arrest statistics in India imply

that juvenile criminality is largely a lower-class phenomenon in sofar as

about three-fourths of those arrested are listed as comeing from impov-

erished economic circumstances whereas only a minute percentage could be

called affluent (Bureau of Police Research and Development, 1977: 86).

Self report research (Hartjen and Priyadarsini, 1984) also suggests that

serious forms of theft are more frequently reported by lower-SES juveniles.

Nevertheless the incidence of such conduct is relatively low. Status and

petty crime is found thoughout the juvenile population in India. However,

while delinquency among the more affluent does occur, there is no evidence

of widespread misconduct among higher-status youth. A small amount of

cocane and other drug useage may be found among affluent Indian youth,

but this apparently is rare and, indeed, given the rather sheltered lives of

well-to-do Indian childœn undetected conduct of this kind would be nearly

_ Sj _

impossible. Those young people who are arrested as offenders appear to be

those who, for one reason or another, have lost a family network or sup-

portive kin (Hartjen and Privadarsini, 1984). Predominant among these are

homeless or orphaned youth who turn to various forms of theft to survive.

Their apprehension and possible incarceration appear to reflect a social

service effort whereby destitute children are provided care and education as

much as a concern with preventing and punishing crime.

Besides having relatively little reason to invoke criminal laws to control

the behavior of young people in India, the general proclivity to treat of-

fenses in an informal, unofficial, manner also insures that rates of arrests for

juveniles will be low. More so than adults, children are subject to a host of

control agents that do not involve the police or courts. Older family mem-

bers, village and community leaders, school teachers, and adults generally

can all be called upon or feel free to intervene in the case of ‘“delinquent’’

youth. Moreover because they are part of the dominant society young

people are not as readily perceived as threatening, therefore they are not

perceived as requiring repressive reaction to the extent that this is true of

youth in developed societies. And, because of their economic participation,

youth'in India have a degree of power unavailable to American juveniles.

In this regard, they have a greater ability to avoid, or not be subjected to,

formal control. As a consequence, their official rates of crime are low.

CONCLUSION

Criminality rates are likely to be comparatively low in those societies

(or among the members of groups within them) that have the fewest op-

portunities to commit criminal acts and/or whose members feel themselves

to be meaningful participants in the larger social system and, as a conse-

quence, see few reasons for violating laws or other social norms — even

when they can. Given these possibilities, an understanding of criminal

epidemiology requires that criminologists investigate the factors that

influence opportunity structures and integrative mechanisms. Cross-national

and international research implies that these factors are ultimately affected

by political-economic structures. As suggested here, crime rates among

women and young people in India are relatively low, in part, because these

persons have little chance to break the law and/or few reasons to do so.

To some extent, these contingencies reflect the features of pre-industrial

economic development as it exists in India. Much more extensive research

would be necessary to detail just how India’s economic characteristics, or

the features of economic pre-development as such, operate to shape op-

portunity and integrative mechanisms.

Similarly, regardless of criminality rates, :ates cf maminaluat

}

1

likely to be relatively low in those societies

p "9 ainong

— 52 —

members of those groups within them for whom) alternative, informal,

mechanisms of control are most available. In this context, women and

children are not subjected to legal control in India only because they are

less criminal, but because they are more subject to other forms of control

and this subjugation is surely a reflection of the pre-industrial economy

of India.

Informal control can, of course, simply constitute a form of social, as

opposed to legal, repression and could in many cases be more inconsistent,

arbitrary, and severe than criminal law. Indeed, in many respects, one could

argue that this is the case in India, although forces appear to operate that

mediate if not block extensive abuse in this regard. But to what extent

informal control is a necessary correlate of pre-industrial, and legal control

of industrial development, is not known. However, it does appear to be true

that economic development produces social conditions that foster the use

of formal controls while pre-industrial development produces circumstances

that impede their use. How this occurs is yet to be investigated to any great

extent.

The, admittedly limited, analysis presented in this paper is only sugges-

tive of the need for much more extensive research (and theory) concerning

the relationship between economic systems and the factors associated with

criminal epidemiology. Studies based on aggregate statistical data can only

be suggestive in this regard. They cannot demonstrate how social arrange-

ments operate to inhibit or promote criminal behavior or legal control.

What are needed are case studies, research based on alternative data sources

(Such as self-reported criminality studies), and extensive investigations of

the police and other lawenforcement agencies regarding their selection and

processing of persons as criminal offenders. Research in these areas has, of

course, begun. Much more of it is needed.

_ 53 _

NOTES

(1)

My thanks to S. Priyadarsini for ther comments on this paper

(2)

Unfortunately, as is the common problem with using available data

for comparative analyses in criminology, comparisons based on an

extensive list of offenses were not possible. Fither official data in one

country does not include offenses listed by another, or even when

offenses are comparable breakdowns by sex, age, or other relevant

variables may not be made. Thus, while they are commonly used in

comparative research, the offenses included here are highly unrepre-

sentative of the crimes for which people can be arrested in both India

and the United States. This should be kept in mind throughout the

discussion

(3)

That the relationship between gender and societal reaction may be

quite complicated is only now becoming clear. For example, in one

recent study of discrepancies in the judicial treatment of men and

women, Curran (1983) found that not only were women processed

differently from men but that the differences in treatment also varied

by processing stage and type of behavior

(4)

The term bourgeois seems to nicely reflect the nature of these of

fenses as a class of crimes in that they all require some degree of skill

commonly associated with white-collar, middle-class, or educated

persons

(5)

Interestingly, within India regional differences do not appear to exist

in either female or juvenile arrest rates as far as relative percentages

are concerned. Exceptionally high or low proportions are, of course

found occasionally. But this is unusual. Thus, for example, the mean

I.P.C. arrest percentage for women by state was 2.40 in 1974 with a

small standard deviation of only 2.04. For juveniles the mean was

5.63 with a standard deviation of 4.64

(6)

When the percentages of women employed in factories was correlated

with the arrest percentages by state, only a small (pearson F

09)

correlation was found. In part, the apparent lack of a strong associ

ation between out-of-home economic activity and arrest rates reflects

a lack of variability in arrest percentages as well as factory employ-

ment percentages across states so that alternative, but not avaﬂable

measures may produce other results.

(7)

While this is generally also true for men in India, given the status of

women (and children) as ‘“dependent persons

it is more likely that

they would be accorded informal treatment than would men, except

in the case of serious deviance (e.g., see Visher, 1983). Indeed, in one

instance the author observed a young wife who had run away from

her husband being kept locked up in a woman’s jail apart from regular

inmates until her husband and in-laws could come to fetch her. Some

indications of the differences in orientation people might have toward

_ 54 _

offenders on the bases of their gender is included in Hartjen and

Priyadarsini (1984: 139-164) but from a comparative perspective this

is an issue that requires further research.

(8)

Available data on prostitution or related offenses in India is at best

sketchy and highly unreliable. Such conduct is prohibited by the

Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Children Act. Offenses

regarding this law are listed as ‘“special and local” law offenses rather

than Indian Penal Code violations and are recorded by states and

territories without gender breakdowns. However, according to the

Indian officials I and Priyadarsini interviewed most of the women who

are apprehended for crimes or are incarcerated as offenders have been

accused as prostitutes.

(9)

As in the United States, highly unusual and bizarre offenders are

likely to receive media attention. Thus, in India, on occasion media

reports may dramatize the careers of some serious/repetitive female

offender, such as one case of a woman dacoit accused of numerous

murders. This kind of criminality, however, is probably highly

unusual, although reliable evidence regarding the participation of

women with men in organized criminal activity is not available.

REFERENCES

ADLER, Freda,

(1981) The Incidence of Female Criminality in the Contemporary

World (New York: New York University Press, 1981).

(1983) Nations Note Obsessed With Crime (Littleton, Colorado, 1983).

ADLER, Freda & Rita James Simon (eds.) (1979), The Criminality of

Deviant Women (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1979).

ADLER, Christine (1984), ‘“Gender Bias in Juvenile Diversion”, Crime &

Delinquency 30 # 3: 400414.

AUSTIN Roy L. (1982), ‘’Women’s Liberation and Increases in Minor,

Major, and Occupational Offenses”, Criminology 20 # 344: 407-430

BLACK, Donald

(1976) The Behavior of Law (New York : Academic Press)

(1980) The Manners and Customs of the Police (New York: Academic

Press).

BOWKER, Lee H. (1981), ‘’The Institutional Determinants of International

Female Crime”, International Journal of Comparative and Applied

Criminal Justice 5 #1 : 41-50.

BUREAU OF POLICE RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT (1977), Crime in

India, 1974 (New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs).

CENTRAL STATISTICAL ORGANIZATION (1980), Statistical Abstracts,

India 1979 (New Delhi: Ministry of Planning).

CURRAN, Debra A. (1983), :Judicial Discretion and Defendant’s Sex”,

Criminology 21 # 1:41-58.

_ 55 ”

CURRAN, Daniel J. (1984), “The Myth of the ‘New’ Female Delinquent”,

Crime & Delinquency 30 #3: 386-339.

EMPEY, LaMar T. (ed.) (1979), The Future of Childhood and Juvenile

Justice (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia).

EMPEY, LaMar T. (1982), Amerivan Delinquency: Its Meaning and Con-

struction (Homewood, Il1.: Dorsey Press).

FRIDAY, Paul C. (1980), ‘‘International Review of Youth Crime and

Delinquency””, in Graeme R. Newman (ed.) Crime and Deviance: À

Comparative Perspective, pp., 100-129 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage)

FRIDAY, Paul C. & Jerald Hage (1976), ‘‘Youth Crime in Postindustrial

Societies: An Integrated Perspective”, Criminology 14: 347-368.

GOLDSTEIN, Rhoda (1972), Indian Women in Transition: À Bangalore

Case Study (Metuchen, N. J.: The Scarecrow Press).

GREENBERG, David F. (1978), ‘‘Delinquency and the Age Structure of

Society”, in Peter Wickman and Phillip Whitten (eds.) Readings in

Criminology , pp., 66-86 (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath).

HARTIJEN, Clayton A. & S. Priyadarsini (1984), Delinquency in India: A

Comparative Analysis (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press)

HARTNAGEL, Timothy F. (1982), ‘“Modernization, Female Social Roles,

and Female Crime: À Cross-National Investigation”, The Sociological

Quarterly 23:477-490.

HILL, Gary D. & Anthony R. Harris (1981), “Changes in the Gender

Patterning of Crime, 1953-77: Opportunity vs. Identity”, Social Science

Quarterly 62 # 4: 658-671.

JONES, Howard (1981), Crime, Race and Culture (New York: John Wiley &

Sons).

KLFIN, Dorie & June Kress (1976), “Any Woman°s Blues: A Critical

Overview of Women, Crime and the Criminal Justice System) Crime

and Social Justice 5: 34-46.

MARSHALL, Ineke Haen

(1982)‘‘Women Work and Crime: An International Test of the

Emancipation Hypothesis International Journal of Comparative

and Applied Criminal Justice 6 #1 : 25-38.

(1983)‘’The Women’s Movement and Female Criminality in the

Netherlands’’, in Israel L. BaraK-Glantz & Elmer H. Johnson

(eds.) Comparative Criminology, pp., 87-102 (Beverly Hills,

Calif.: Sage).

NEWMAN, Graeme R. (ed.) (1980), Crime and Deviance: A Comparative

Perspective (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage).

PHILLIPS, Dretha M. & Lois B. DeFleur (1982), “Gender Ascription and

the Stereotyping of Deviants”, Criminology 20 #3-4: 431-448.

SCHWARTZ, Ira M., Marilyn Jackson-Beeck, & Roger Anderson (1984),

‘“The ‘Hidden’ System of Juvenile Control”, Crime & Delinquency 30

#3:371-385.

— 56 —

SHELLEY, Louise E. (1981), Crime and Modernization: The Impact of

Industrialisation and Urbanisation on Crime (Carbondale & Edwardsville,

[Il.: Southern Illinois University Press).

TURK, Austin T. (1969), Criminality and Legal Order (Chicago: Rand

McNally).

TOBY, Jackson (1963), ‘“’The Prospects of Reducing Delinquency Rates in

Industria Societies”’, Federal Probation 27: 23-25.

VISHER, Christy A. (1983) ‘“Gender, Police Arrest Decisions, and Notions

of Chivalry”, Criminology 21 #1 : 5-28.

— 57 _

A BRIEF HISTORY OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

IN BOSTON AND À COMPARATIVE INTERPRETATION

Theodore N. Ferdinand*

More comparative research is badly needed in delinquency studies. Most

of the current theories are based on research done in western nations at a

post-industrial level of development: the United States, England, West

Germany, and Sweden. Despite their obvious cultural differences, Western

nations all seem to exhibit a very advanced form of delinquency, i.e., a

form that expresses contracultural themes, that is rooted in well defined

adolescent social groups, and that signifies solidarity with the values and

ideals of these groups (Ferdinand: 285-292).

To be sure other forms of delinquency abound in these nations as well:

delinquency stemming from impulsive behavioral disorders; delinquency

reflecting an absence of proper guidance and supervision for youths

interested in adventure and pleasure; or delinquency arising from a lack of

opportunity, to name a few. But these forms are found in pre-industrial and

industrial societies as well. Contractural delinquency is peculiar to post-

industrial societies.

Comparative research can offer a perspective that research focusing on

developed, Western nations alone can never reveal. It permits a develop-

mental perspective, i.e., a perspective that indicates which forms of delin-

quency tend to fall together into an historical pattern. ! want to suggest that

we can discern three stages in the development of delinquency in the United

States — wayward, incorrigible, and contracultural delinquency — and

probably in other Western cities as well, and that other nations at less

advanced levels of development display less advanced forms of delinquency.

These stages appear in the industrializing community as the sources of

criminogenic pressures shift. In the first stage the vast urban migrations that

accompany the early stages of industrial development prompt a rather

disorganized form of crime and delinquency. As the industrial center invents

social mechanisms for integrating urban migrants, resistance to these

methods springs up among some groups and sponsors new forms of crime

and delinquency. And, finally, as these new forms are institutionalized,

delinquency assumes a third pattern. The model presented here assumes a

changing community stimulating new forms of deviancy, which in turn

follow a distinctiYe path of socio-cultural change in their own right.

;"Pr0fecsnr Collage c‘ Crmina! ‘ustiice Fortheastern Universit- Bostnr

:4A 021 : >

CL)

WAYWARD DELINQUENCY

In the United States, shortly after the American Revolution juvenile

crime was minimal in the pre-industrial towns of the Eastern seaboard and

Wwas treated for the most part as adult crime. With industrialization, how-

ever, juvenile crime grew rapidly and within a few decades had forced

separate court processing and custodial institutions for juveniles. Their

crimes focused largely on property, and those juveniles that were arrested

were treated with leniency even when their offenses were relatively serious.

In Boston the crime rate for juveniles (see Figure 1) was stable at a very

low level through the 1820s and early 30s. In the mid-1830s, however, it

began to rise, and by the mid-1840s it was the fastest growing component

in antebellum Boston’s crime problem.

Juvenile crime in Boston was directed primarily against property.

Although juveniles had made a negligible contribution to property crime

before 1834, by 1840 they accounted for 71.9 percent of the burglaries

brought before Boston’s Municipal Court, and 36.0 percent of other

property offenses. These two offense categories embraced 87 percent of

their crimes in the Municipal Court in 1840.

Many unattached men and boys with limited resources were among the

early arrivals to the city (thus giving it a very high sex ratio) as well as whole

families still oriented to the village and its pre-industrial ways (1). These

people were seeking a better life, and they brought with them willingness

and hope. But they were ill-equipped for urban life and often found a

smooth adjustment difficult. Deviancy by default was a common result.

During the first stage of industrialization, therefore, large numbers of

homeless children together with children whose families have only rcently

left the hinterland and can provide only limited guidance are typically

drawn to the city. These children are neither employed nor enrolled in

schools, and they spend much of their time roaming the city streets in

search of excitement and criminal opportunities (Ferdinand: 281-283).

They were an important factor in the crime wave that gripped Boston in

the late 1830s and 1840s, and they are prominent in the delinquency

problems of developing nations today.

Âs juvenile crime mounts in the industrializing city, paradoxically, it

remains as low as ever in the villages of the hinterland. The contrast in this

regard between the industrial city and the pre-industrial countryside is

never sharper than during this early period (Cavan and Cavan: 43-62; Toby:

122-124).

The rapid escalation of juvenile crime in nineteenth century Boston

alarmed city officials, and their explanations all seemed to focus on the lack

— 60 —

of proper parental supervision. Rather typical were the comments in 1845

of Samuel D. Parker, the District Attorney of Suffolk County.

more minors have been convicted within the last eighteen months

than during the five or six preceding years. The employment of so many

boys in peddling small articles, such as matches, soap, fruit, etc., was one

cause — the neglect of their parents to keep their children at home evenings,

another — of this alarming state of morals among the young (Boston Eve-

ning Journal: 1845).

Their crimes though numerous and predatory were largely petty.

The biggest problems these children posed were: what to do with them

after they had been apprehended, and how to prevent their becoming

criminals in adulthood? Their delinquency reflected the fact that neither

families nor urban social institutions were shaping them for adulthood.

These deficiencies meant that many children were left to their own resources

both in filling their time and in preparing for the future. Many of them

found companionship with other ‘“‘street arabs” and indulged in a variety of

minor, utilitarian crimes. They became wayward delinquents.

INCORRIGIBLE DELINQUENCY

Shortly after industrialization took hold in America’s eastern cities, i.e.,

in the 1830s in Boston, institutions began to emerge — for example, the

public schools, Sunday Schools, employment bureaus, penal institutions,

YMCAs, and finally the Boy Scouts — that promised to orient these young

people more effectively to industrial society. These institutions offered

them basic skills that were essential to industrial careers; they fostered

discipline, diligence, and dependability; and they exposed them to the

logical, technical perspective of industrial society. The children who flocked

with their families to the cities were absorbed into these ‘‘culture factories”

(Schultz: 1973), and their free time was occupied with instruction during

the day, homework at night, and recreation or religion on the weekends.

The problem of juvenile waywardness seemed to be solved.

But from the very beginning many children found it difficult to

perform satisfactorily in the new schools. The personal discipline, the

intellectual rigor, the submission to school authority and routine all proved

serious challenges to some, and some of them experienced humiliation and

even degradation in these new social institutions. Many of them resented

this whole experience. What had seemed a solution to juvenile waywardness

only induced a new form of juvenile deviance — incorrigibility. As these

delinquents vented their resentment against the institutions that proved

their undoing, truancy and school vandalism became chronic problems in

— 61 —

industrial society. These children were also defiant toward parents who

pressured them to accept the discipline and goals of the schools. In short,

they fought society’s best efforts to curb their childish impulses and became

in the eyes of society incorrigible. The bulk of them were lower class

youngsters, but a few from middle and even upper class families also found

their way into incorrigibility.

Another factor here was the emergence in the city of multiproblem,

disorganized families that were ill prepared to socialize their children to

urban life. If the mother raised the children alone, she was often thoroughly

demoralized. Her own prospects were very poor; she lived from hand-to-

mouth; and she could give only superficial attention to her older children

and their well-being. They were unlikely to continue in school, once they

reached an age to decide for themselves, but they were truant from school

more through ennui and lack of interest than an inability to succeed. Their

incorrigibility reflected not so much defiance of school authorities as a

failure to accept educational objectives.

These families reflected the rigors of urban life, especially as they bore

down upon single mothers with meager resources. Unlike the migrant

families that crowded into urban centers as industrialization was just getting

underway, they typically reflected a long experience of urban living. The

migrant families of the early industrial period were poorly prepared for

urban life and could offer little guidance to their children, but they saw

urban life as an opportunity. The disorganized families of mature industrial

cities were demoralized and cared little for the institutions or ideals of

urban society. Children as well as parents focused on the immediate and had

little hope of realizing long-range goals. Like the migrant families they were

almost exclusively lower class, but unlike them they were the end result of

several generations of maladjustment to urban life.

In Boston the juvenile crime rate as measured by police arrests reached

a peak just as the Civil War began and declined steadily to one-third that

level by the end of the century (see Figure 2). Incorrigibility in the form of

stubborn children hit a high in the 1860s but then fell to about fifty percent

its earlier level by the 1900s. Truancy also grew sharply during the 1860s

and reached its peak in 1869, after which it, too, declined to the turn of the

century (see Figure 3). Runaway children, however, grew slowly through-

out the nineteenth century to a high point in the first decades of the

Juvenile Court during World War I (see Figure 4).

There is some indication, therefore, that Boston’s juvenile problem

peaked around the Civil War, and much of the difficulty seemed to center

on the family. As with delinquency suicide among young people also

reached new highs around the Civil War (Figure War (Figure 6). Mor over,

since suicides were roughly comparable among bors »11 girls durine ‘his

period, the causes seem to have been rooted in t} - ‘ar:i:y whèere vos- an

— 62 —

girls suffered_in roughly equal proportions. In the late nineteenth and

early twentieth century, however, boys outdistanced girls, and the problems

of adolescents began to extend beyond the family — to the school.

Around this time the schools themselves were also running into dif-

ficulties. In the 1850°s a heated controversy erupted regarding the style of

instruction and discipline to be used in the schools. Traditional educators

preferred an ascetic approach to education in which children learned

obedience, self-discipline, and restraint, whereas reformers favored cul-

tivating the natural interests and talents of children so that learning could be

a pleasurable experience and the schools could produce pupils who thought

for themselves (Katz: 121, 132-142). There was no suggestion in this debate

that the schools were alienating their pupils, but the ‘‘soft-line” educators

were successful in imposing their philosophy on the schools of Boston and

presumably the children were exposed to a less arduous experience.

Criticism was not stilled, however, and in the 1880’s complaints began

again:

Grave fears have been entertained that such a system of high pressure

as is believed to prevail at some of our high class female institutions will

break down of its own folly... Everybody is going crazy from overwork

and a large percentage of this trouble can be traced to the habits of

school life… An intelligent person cannot spend a half a day in most of

public schools in this city without remarking the bad ventilation, the

Overworked teachers, the restive and strained appearance of the pupils; and

when you follow these children to their houses, note the continued grinding

of the daily lessons upon sensitive organizations… and see what a blight it is

upon boyhood and girlhood… (Boston Sunday Herald, 1885 ).

The author of this editorial was concerned that the schools and their

regimen were breaking down the health of their pupils. He was not con-

cerned with delinquency but with the physical and emotional well-being of

the children. The point is clear, nevertheless, that there was something amiss

in the schools and that it was having a destructive effect upon the children.

CONTRACULTURAL DELINQUENCY

These new institutions — but particularly the schools — also laid the

foundation for a third form of deviance: contracultural delinquency

(Cohen). In addition to the new pressures, the schools also brought troubled

adolescents together where they might devise a social solution to their

individual problems. The result was a new form of delinquency embracing

primarily children who rejected the legitimacy of the school and its values;

who chose instead a contracultural view of the world: and who often held

_ 63 —

little hope or desire for a conventional life in adulthood. It embraced

children from a broad range of social and economic backgrounds, and the

crimes they committed ranged widely — from serious violent crimes to drug

abuse to minor property crimes. It was rooted in youth culture, and it

represented a reaction against the dominant values of middle class society.

Post-industrial society, in other words, spawned a third form: contracultural

delinquency, that took shape as a symbolic statement against the new

institutions of industrial society.

Like the incorrigible children of an earlier era, these adolescents were

defiant toward parents and school authorities and scornful of traditional

values. But unlike their incorrigible predecessors contracultural delinquents

established a cultural base in peer groups sympathetic with their iconoclasm.

As this youth culture gathered momentum, it embraced a much broader

swath of young people than just those who were at odds with adult auth-

ority. It also sponsored both a much higher level and a much wider variety

of deviance. The newcomers to delinquéncy included many middle class

teenagers and girls who readily learned the iconoclasm of their peers. But

their deviancy followed their encounter with contracultural ideas; it was not

spontaneous so much as it was learned from peers.

The evidence for these contracultural delinquent gangs is largley

anecdotal, but it is abundant. The work of Walter Miller in Boston; Short,

Lincoln, and Spergel in Chicago; Klein in Los Angeles; and Fyvel in London

all point to the wide-spread existence of such gangs in Western cities. These

gangs all fit a common pattern — they are iconoclastic and anti-social,

narcissistic and stylish in dress. Although they are readily identifiable, they

do not appear clearly in official crime data, and their impact on delinquency

is difficult to pin-down with precision. They resemble only superficially the

gangs of the ninetheenth century of of Thrasher’s Chicago.

It is possible, therefore, to identify three distinct periods in American

urban history, each with its own characteristic form of delinquency. During

the early industrial period social institutions were embryonic, and urban

migrants were left to their own resources. Gangs of youths gathered in the

city streets, and their idleness together with the anonymity of city-life led

to a sudden, burst of juvenile crime in the form of wayward delinquency.

As industrial society emerged its early structural weaknesses were

corrected, and the bulk of the children and adolescents were absorbed into

the schools. The early form of juvenile deviance — waywardness — subsided,

but only to be replaced with a new form — incorrigibility — that signaled

serious problems among some children in adapting to the routines and

disciplines of the schools.

These children represented two distinct streams of maladjustment.

Many of them were deeply demoralized by their failures in school. They

— 64 _

repudiaded school authorities and rejected their values. Others were the

products of long-term ineffective urban families in which the parents were

dismal failures in facing the challenges of urban life. Where the children

emerged of sound mind and body (and they often didn’t), they were

allowed free reign, which usually meant that they ran with other kids and

rejected the constraints of school.

Juvenile incorrigibility could only have arisen after adolescence as a

status and the appropriate social institutions had emerged. It also depended

upon the appearance of an urban pattern of living with the immense re-

sponsibilities it threw upon the individual. Under the weight of these

pressures, many parents proved ineffective and their children often rejected

the very institutions that were designed to help them mature into the adult

world. Incorrigibility, therefore, was basically a defiant reaction against the

urban institutions that had arisen to relieve the problems of an earlier era.

The evidence for the first phase of delinquency, waywardness, and its

links with an early stage of urban-industrial development is relatively strong.

Nineteenth century observers commented repeatedly on the gangs of home-

less, nomadic children to be found in America’s major cities and their con-

nection with minor property crime (Hawes: 91; Picket: 109-115). This

tradition can even be traced into the 1920s and Frederic Thrasher’s work

(1927: Part II) in Chicago.

The second phase, incorrigibility, is less well documented. The late

nineteenth century has been inadequately studied as far as delinquency is

concerned, but as we have already seen, there is some evidence regarding

delinquency in general and incorrigibility in particular in Boston during this

period.

The third phase, contracultural delinquency, and its relationship with

post-industrial society have been carefully explored in the work of Cohen,

Cloward and Ohlin, Greenberg, Ferdinand, and others, though there is still

some controversy surrouning its causes (Kornhauser: Chapter S).

DELINQUENCY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

These three historical periods with their specific forms of delinquency

clearly represent a sequence. Each period exhibits its characteristic form of

delinquency, and as the institutions of the period develop, the form and

substance of delinquency changes accordingly. Interestingly enough, this

schema also throws light on the delinquency in the developing nations of

the world.

— 65 —

LATIN AMERICA AND AFRICA

Many of the nations of Latin America and Africa are in an early indus-

trial period of development with many rootless, poverty-stricken migrants

crowding into their burgeoning cities and producing among other things a

heightened level of crime and delinquency. Most of the children are neither

employed nor enrolled in school; and they roam freely through the com-

mercial areas of their cities, catching odd jobs, stealing, and in general

°

>

exploiting whatever opportunities come their way (Clifford, 1974: 149-180

Clinard and Abbott: Chapter 5 ; DeFleur: 81-146).

In Buenos Aires large numbers of rural migrants have gathered in

suburban shanty towns and fostered several serious problems for the city

including high levels of unemployment, crime, and delinquency (Germani).

Disorganized families have appeared in these shanty towns in significant

numbers and contributed in their own way to the severity of these problems.

À limiting factor, however, has been the ‘barriadas’ that helped to

establish new arrivals in the social patterns of the migrant community and in

this way facilitated their adjustment to the city. These barriadas recreated

the stability and personal quality of village life in the urban neighborhood,

and where they appeared, the transition from the rural area to the metro-

polis was eased for the migrants (Mar).

In contrast to many developing cities in Latin America, San Juan,

Puerto Rico, however, seems to have advanced to the stage of incorrigibility.

Public education is well developed in the city, and delinquency involves

mainly school dropouts from impoverished urban areas (Kupperstein and

Toro). Juvenile migrants are less likely to be delinquent than youths from

long-term urban poor families (Ferracuti et al.: Chapter 6), and gang delin

quency is almost nonexistent (1).

Delinquents in San Juan with a history of rebellion against formal

education have not yet formed themselves into organized gangs. Incor

rigibility is the primary factor in their delinquency, but it is directed more

against the school than the family. Contracultural delinquency has not yet

become a problem.

THE ORIENT

Some nations of the Orient — most notably India and Japan — seem to

have by-passed the first phase, waywardness. Although their cities have

swelled to immense proportions, their urban migrations have not involved

long distances, and the unity and stability of village life has been success

fully transplanted to the cities. Close communal bonds have been preserved

— 66 —

(Wagatsuma and DeVos: Chapters ! and 2); few homeless men or boys have

ever appeared; and little delinquency developed in either India or Japan

during the early stages of urban-industrial growth.

In Japan urban neighborhoods are organized into informal, local

associations, han, that have responsibility for the well being of the neighbor-

hood (Bayley: 92-94). They organize 20 to 30 families in the immediate

neighborhood into effective units furthering local initiatives, and in the

process they strengthen mutual dependency and solidarity. The Japanese

urban family is also unusually strong, and as a consequence the national

divorce rate has actually declined as the population has become more urban

(Kwashima and Steiner). Until 1968 delinquency remained relatively low,

too (see Figure S).

In India the picture is not so clear, but here too there is evidence that

delinquency is not as prominent as in other developing countries (Cavan and

Cavan: 90-95). Wayward delinquency is not uncommon in the largest cities,

but the combined effects of caste and community immerse urban Indian

families in a close web of control that frustrates many criminal tendencies.

The Indian urban family is further strengthened by the prevalence of

cottage industry, which unites all members into a whole devoted to the

family’s needs. Indian juveniles rarely form cliques or gangs with other

juveniles as is common in other countries. Their focus is the family and its

collective goals (Hartjen and Priyadarsini: 77-82).

China has also encouraged close neighborhood structures in her major

cities via the neighborhood committees. These committees weave the city

districts into closely knit communities. But chronic political strife and

particularly the Cultural Revolution have taken their toll, and these com-

mittees lack to some extent the impact of the Japanese han on family life.

Though no published crime data are-available, China seems to be experi-

encing mounting crime and delinquency in her major urban centers, and she

IS reacting aggressively against them both with public executions and public

campaigns directed to the youth (Boston Globe, 1983, 1984; South China

Morning Post: p. 7).

As industrialization took hold, stratification in terms of social class

began to emerge in Japanese cities along side the pre-industrial caste system,

and the lower classes began to show a heightened degree of family disor-

ganization and pathology (Wagatsuma and DeVos: Chapter 4). Even though

this family pathology was only a pale shadow of that found in the west, it

Wwas responsible for small but significant amounts of crime and delinquency

in major Japanese cities.

In addition Japan began to assemble a modern education system, and

after World War IT it was able to provide its citizens a comprehensive, com-

pulsory educational system that compares favorably today with many

_ 67 —

Western systems. It is intensely competitive particularly at the early levels,

and the emphasis it places on excellence imposes a heavy strain upon

Japanese students. Those who fail experience serious stress, and suicides

are not uncommon (New York Times, 1984a; 1984b Rohlen: 330-332). A

national debate is underway, not unlike the controversy that surrounded

Boston’s schools in the 1850°s, as to whether too much pressure in placed

on children in secondary schools to excell.

Though limited data are available (DeVos and Mizushima, 1962;), it

seems likely that some juveniles who are sifted out of the competition for

honorific careers have become alienated from traditional values and hostile

toward Japanese institutions. The rise in delinquency rates in Japan since

1969 (while adults rates have declined slightly) suggests that indeed, school

alienation may be culminating in delinquency among many Japanese youths

(see Figure 5).

There are also reports of extensive peer group formations — both

delinquent and non-delinquent — among Japanese youth. The radicalization

of Japanese college students stretches back to the post-war period (Krauss:

Chapters 1 and 3), and motorcycle gangs (Clifford, 1976: 117) as well as

delinquent gangs of school dropouts have appeared in several Japanese cities

(Fenwick: 125-126; Wagatsuma and DeVos: 51-54).

Adult gangs occupy an important tradition in Japanese history, and

criminal gangs — both adult and juvenile — continue it into the modern

era (DeVos and Mitzushima, 1967). Youthful alienation could well combine

with this long tradition and aggravate Japan’s already serious problem with

organized crime and gang delinquency.

Japan is rapidly approaching its post-industrial phase and is beginning

to show many signs of contracultural delinquency. China and India have yet

to develop comprehensive public school systems and are, perhaps, decades

away from the delinquency problems that industrial and post-industrial

societies often encounter.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

My argument, as presented here, suggests that delinquency along with

industrializing society shows a regular developmental pattern. In the

beginning stage as migrants flood the urban centers, they overwhelm

existing urban institutions, and many are left with little economic or social

support. But as these rootless poor cumulate in the city, they pose a

growing crime and delinquency problem. Industrializing cities meet these

problems, insofar as they can, by creating associations and structures to help

integrate the rootless poor into a stable, urban life. For the most part these

— 68 —

efforts are successful. They provide for a much smoother integration of

newcomers into the urban social structure; they help prepare juveniles for

industrial careers; and in general they foster the ideals, habits, and skills that

are needed in urban industrial society.

But these new structures contain their own problems. The social rigors

of urban life prove too much for some newcomers; they lapse into a variety

of personal pathologies and abandon any pretense at conventional urban

life. Along with these adult casualties, many juveniles face their own

troubles in the schools where a significant portion are forced to abandon

their quest for honor and self-esteem and instead opt for a pattern of

defiance and deviance.

Moreover, these adult and juvenile outcasts reinforce one another.

Children of disorganized families are often crippled in the social and

academic competition they face in schools, and school drop-outs are handi-

capped in the quest for an honorable adult career. An intractable lower class

emerges that resists all attempts to relieve the problem. The best efforts of

urban society to solve the poverty problem has instead created another: the

alienated, defiant problem.

Finally, as the alienated and defiant find one another in the schools and

correctional centers of the city, they recognize their common plight and

find social recognition with one another. They form informal groups and

pursue their common goals. They institutionalize alienation and defiance.

There is an inexorability to this progression, just as there is to the stages

of industrialization. The third stage depends to a large extent upon the

second, although the sequence is by no means inevitable, as we have seen.

Moreover, the movement from one phase of crime and delinquency to the

next, does not in any way eliminate the earlier one, Juvenile crime was so

high in Boston during the 1860s, because not only were large numbers of

young Irish migrants committing property crimes, but also a growing

number of other young lads were being arrested for stubborness, truancy,

and running away. Instead of succeeding one another, the phases simply

merged.

This way of viewing delinquency and social structure suggests that

comparisons of delinquency among different cities or societies must as a

first step take account of their respective levels of development. A com-

parison of delinquents in Los Angeles with those in Mexico City is likely

to find that violent offenses in Los Angeles are l:rgely a problem of gangs

while minor property crimes are more ofter committed by individuals. In

Mexico Ciiv, on the othes hand, juct the opposite is lile!y to b: the case.

DMiforent taciers #re u work in “he vw0 —tues, differ uf pattercs of deha-

à

cuercy devetez, Lad 0. Trrentrer 1 sar nesr

4

— f3 -

Cross-cultural comparisons of crime or delinquency require both a

theoretical model that integrates different patterns of delinquency into a

single paradigm and an indication of where the cities that are being com-

pared fit into the paradigm. Otherwise, comparisons of different cities and

their crime problems represent little more than idle curiosity and specu-

lation

This way of viewing delinquency and social structure also suggests that

our efforts to cope with the problem must be adapted to its ever changing

nature. The wayward Irish delinquents of antebellum New Y

vere not

the same as New York’s gang delinquents of the 1970s. The :

!‘>r were

much more cynical and anti-social than their predecessors in ti

1840s.

Programs pushing pro-social skills, careers, and goals would have becn much

more appropriate and would have had much more impact in the 1840s than

in the 1970s. The War on Poverty of the Johnson administratio:: was

certainly a disappointment as far as delmquency prevention was conce ned

(Hackler, 1966; Posten, 1971).

No one society presents just a single pattern of delinquency during a

given epoch. But as a society develops, the complexity of its delinquency

problem increases such that post-industrial societies generally exhibit all

the forms of delinquency of previous eras as well as the pattern charac-

teristic of its own era. Modern remedies must reflect this fact. They must

anticipate several different patterns of delinquency

Similarly, the institutions of juvenile justice must also be responsive to

the changing forms of delinquency. The parens patriae policies of the early

juvenile court were nicely designed for the wayward child of the late nine-

teenth century. But they were less effective with the incorrigible child, and

they seem of little value with the contracultural delinquent

Our juvenile justice system is slowly adapting itself to the variegated

needs of wayward, incorrigible and contracultural delinquents. Îts bifur-

cated jurisdiction — status offenders and delinquents — is a clear reaction to

the growing sophistication of a segment of today’s delinquents. The atten-

tion given the family in the early juvenile court also reflects its attempts to

deal with wayward and incorrigible delinquents

In short the theoretical model outlined here offers a paradigm for

understanding and comparing delinquency in societies at very different

levels of socio-economic development. It suggests preventive measures as

well as procedural reforms as the juvenile system attempts to cope with

delinquency. It offers answers to several of the crucial problems confronting

criminologists and juvenile justice professionals today

It points the

direction that we must go in comparative research

— 70 —

FOOTNOTES

(1)

Females outnumbered males throughout the pre-industrial period in

Boston, and the ratio of males to females was still only 0.897 males to

1.000 female in 1830. By 1840, however, the ratio had switched to

1.116 males for every female, as industrialization in New England

gathered momentum.

(2)

Criminality also by-passed first generation young people in American

cities during the early part of the twentieth century (Wood: 1947

Shulman: 196-213).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BAYLEY, David H. (1976), Forces of Order. Berkeley: University of

California.

BOSTON EVENING JOURNAL (1845), ‘“Increase in Juvenile Depravity”,

February 17,p. 1.

BOSTON GLOBE

(1983) ‘Chinese execute 5000 since start of crime crackdown”,

November 24 p. A42.

(1984) ‘‘In China, juvenile delinquents are redirected with a soft

touch”, March 14, p.3.

BOSTON SUNDAY Herald (1885), ‘Children in Danger’, January 11,

p. 12.

CAVAN, Ruth Shonle and Jordan T. Cavan (1968), Delinquency and Crime:

Cross Cultural Perspectives. New York: J.B. Lippincott.

CLIFFORD, William

(1974) An

Introduction to African Criminology. Nairobi: Oxford

University Press.

(1976) Crime Control in Japan. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

CLINARD, Marshall and Daniel J. Abbott (1973), Crime in Developing

Countries: À Comparative Perspective. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

CLOWARD, Richard A. and Lloyd E. Ohlin (1960), Delinquency and

Opportunity. New York: Free Press.

COHEN, Albert K.(1955), Delinquent Boys. New York: Free Press.

DEFLEUR, Lois (1970), Delinquency in Argentina. Pullman, Wash.:

Washington State University Press.

DEVOS, George A. and Keiichi Mitzushima

(1962)‘‘The School and Delinquency: Perspectives from Japan”,

Teachers College Record, Vol. 63, N° 8: 626-638.

(1967) ‘“Organization and Social Functions of Japanese Gangs: Histori-

cal Developments and Modern Parallels”, in Aspects of Social

Change in Modern Japan, R.P. Dore, ed., Princeton: Princeton

University Press.

—71 —

FENWICK, Charles (1983) ‘’The Juvenile Delinquency Problem in Japan:

Application of a Role Relationship Model”, International Journal of

Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, vol. 7, N° 1, 119-128.

FERDINAND, Theodore N. (1980), “Delinquency in Developing and

Developed Societies” in Critical Issues in Juvenile Delinquency. David

Shichor and Delos H. Kelly, eds., Lexington, MA: Lexington, Books.

FERRACUTI, Franco, Simon Dinitz, and Esperanza de Brenes (1975),

Delinquents and Nondelinquents in the Puerto Rican Slum Culture.

Columbus: Ohio State University Press.

GERMANI, Gino (1961), “Inquiry into the Social Effects of Urbanization

in Working-Class Sector of Greater Buenos Aires”, in Urbanization in

Latin America, Philip M. Hauser, ed. New York: Columbia University

Press, 1961, pp. 206-233.

GREENBERG, David F. (1977) ‘’Delinquency and the Age Structure of

Society””, Contemporary Crises, Vol. 1, N° 2, Summer. Hackler, James

HACKLER, James (1966) ‘‘Boys, Blisters, and Behavior”’, Journal of

Research in Crime and Delinquency. Vol. 3, July, pp. 155-164.

HARTIEN, Clayton À. and S. Priyadarsini (1984), Delinquency in India.

New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

HAWES, Joseph (1971), Children in Urban Society. New York: Oxford

University Press.

KATZ, Michael B. (1968), The Irony of Early School Reform. Cambridege :

Harvard University Press.

KORNHAUSER, Ruth R. (1978), Social Sources of Delinquency. Chicago:

University of Chicago Press.

KRAUSS, Ellis S. (1974) Japanese Radicals Revisited. Berkeley: University

of California Press.

KUPPERSTEIN, L. R. and J. Toro-Calder (1969), A Socio-Cultural and

Socio-Legal Analysis of Juvenile Delinquency in Puerto Rico. Rio

Piedras: University of Puerto Rico, Social Science Research Center.

KWASHIMA, Takeyoshi and Kurt Steiner (1960), ‘“Modernization and

Divorce Rate Trends in Japan”. Economic Development and Cultural

Change. Vol. IX: i, pt. 2, 213-239.

LEWIS, Oscar (1966), La Vida: :: A Puerto Rican Family in the Culture of

Poverty. New York: Random House.

MAR, Jose Matos (1961), ‘‘Migration and Urbanization”, in Urbanization in

Latin America, Philip M. Hauser, ed., New York: Columbia University

Press, 1969, pp. 170-190.

NEW YORK SUNDAY TIMES

(1984a) ‘‘Japan’s Youth Seem Old Before Their Time”, March 11,

p.22E.

(1984b) ‘‘Japan Acts to Revise School System”, August 12, p. 3

PICKETT, Robert S. (1969), House of Refuge. Syracuse: Syracuse Univer-

sity Press.

POSTEN, Richard W. (1971), The Gang and the Establishment. New York:

Harper & Row.

_ 79 _

ROHLEN, Thomas P. (1983), Japan’s High Schools. Berkeley: University of

California Press.

SCHULTZ, Stanley K. (1973), The Culture Factory — Boston Public

Schools, 1789-1860. New York: Oxford University Press.

SHULMAN, Harry Manuel (1961), Juvenile Delinquency in American

Society. New York: Harper & Row.

SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (1981), “A tightening of discipline”,

May 24, p./

TOBY, Jackson (1979), ‘Delinquency in Cross-Cultural Perspective”, in

Juvenile Justice the Progressive Legacy and Current Reforms, LaMar T.

Empey, Ed., Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, pp. 105-149.

WAGATSUMA, Hiroshi and George DeVos (1984), Heritage of Endurance,

Family patterns and Delinquency Formation in Urban Japan. Berkeley :

University of California Press.

WOOD, Arthur L. (1947), ‘“Minority Group Criminality and Cultural

Integration”, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol.: 498-510.

_ 73 —

300

27

240

-10

180

cases per

10,000 children

10-15 years

1D

120

30

EO

30

—

/

—-

0N

B E ( 7 0 L C

mt

c

œ

> {:‘“l'î"T7—rîl—î PR TT

N

(9e)

GU

VTC

O

D

07€

Source : The Municipal Court Records

FIGURE 1

Juvenile Defendants (per 10,000 children 10-1 5 years)

Before Boston’s Municipal Court : 1814-1850

— 74 _

2950

2655

‘ |

2360

2Ç65

1770

arrests

_ —

1 4.

à /

d

\A

V

/ \

1149

E#s

€ 3 :"

ï

ITITTITIUTITTITITITO III

TUTITTTTTOTTTTTITIT

T1 111

îTî‘î

!

!

[

Loattrs

KEÎUÎÜ

H

C

pe

'.—l

\]

t

Ë

ë

e

Ê

O6ET

006

GT615

Source: Annual Reports Boston Police Department

FIGURE 2

Juvenile Arrests (per 10,000 children 10-1 5 years)

in Boston 1849-1921

_ 75 —

©

135

» 20

105

9f\

arrests per 10,ÔÔO

truancy

children 10-15 yrs

75

cO

435

stubborn

children

13

q T t TT TT Tt

IERARASERR CIR CVR T

e

'—-À

'—‘

p

\J

OO

611

0S8TI

J9ET

©

ë

ë

006T

Ê

—

Û

L

Source: Annual Reports Boston Police Department.

FIGURE 3

Stubborn Children and Truancy Arrests (per 10.000 children 10-1S years)

in Boston: 1849-1921

— 76 —

90

81

72

635

34

irrests

45

36

27

18

Y v "

Ct t 10111111 tai h 11 1000

e>

’_J

pe

M

-

GC 6T

GIBT

CLET

0661

,

D

CTAT

Q( ‘>I

Source: Annual Reports Boston Police Department.

FIGURE 4

Arrests for Running Away (per 10,000 children 10-15 years)

in Boston: 1840-1921

_77 —

Cn

arrests

e =.m0 . âtn e 20000s É E rn Réte en

À. À.

Aa 0 N

res)

jocs

voRn

1965

jara

1975

1ore

Source: Fenwick: 120, and Ministry of Justice, Summary White Papers on Crime,

Government of Japan, 1981 .

FÏGURE 5

Juvenile Arrests per 1,000 youths 1+19 years in Japan: 1951-1979

— 78 —

10.93-=-

9

9

—

nales

n

f/ »

—

rate per

/

C

-

100, OOQ

Î\

\

J

\/.

females

}

M-

E

]

/

Ï'ÏlTÏ'ÏTTÏTÏTDTÏÏ'Ï'Ï'ÏTTLÏTÏTÜTÏTÆTTÏÎ‘H l'lTJÏTÏ'ÏTT TTLÎÏTTÏ TH ÏD'TT TT

co

œœ

e

œo

cCo

d

Qe

Un

O

O

O

-

O

e2)

O

O

ve

O

O

'-—-‘

O

Source: Massachusetts Department of Health. Annual Reports of Vital Statistics:

1843-1920.

Note: Since no long-term data on suicides in Boston are available, I have utilized

Massachusetts data, which closely reflect the trends of Boston — the single largest

community in the state.

FIGURE 6

The Suicide Rate Among Young People, 15-19 years in Massachusetts

— 79 _

ABSTRACT

Historical research in Boston suggests that developing cities exhibit a

regular progression from wayward delinquency through incorrigible delin-

quency to contracultural delinquency, as they develop from an early

industrial, to a mature industrial, to a post-industrial stage.

Wayward Delinquency is committed by youthful migrants to devel-

oping cities who have no established roots. They wander the city com-

miting minor crimes, and as the city develops their numbers grow rapidly.

Incorrigible delinquency arises when the city institutes compulsory edu-

cation and other mechanisms for socializing children to industrial society.

Many children cannot accept the discipline of these new structures and rebel

against them. In addition pathologic families begin to appear as the rigors of

urban individualism overwhelm a small portion of the city’s inhabitants.

Their children in turn often display a pattern of delinquency that reflects

their pathogenic origins. Contracultural delinquency emerges when these

rebellious and defiant children coalesce into iconoclastic gangs scornful of

conventional values and careers.

The major cities of China and India are developing some symptoms of

wayward delinquency, but much of Latin America and Africa seem to be

midway between wayward and incorrigible delinquency. Japan is moving

rapidly toward contracultural delinquency, and many cities of the West are

already there.

RÉSUMÉ

«BREF» APERÇU HISTORIQUE DE LA DÉLINQUANCE

A BOSTON ET INTERPRÉTATION COMPARATIVE

l’étude historique de la ville de Boston montre que les cités pendant

leur croissance connaissent une évolution inévitable qui les fait passer d’une

délinquance rebelle à une délinquance incoercible pour aboutir à une délin-

quance de contre-culture, et cela en même temps qu’elles traversent les trois

stades de l’évolution industrielle : archaïsme, maturité et post-industrialisa-

tion.

La délinquance «rebelle» est le fait de jeunes qui migrent vers les cités

en croissance et qui sont sans véritable racine. Ils vont de villes en villes,

commettant de petits larcins et leur nombre augmente rapidement avec le

développement de la cité. La délinquance «incoercible» apparaît au moment

où le milieu urbain industrialisé instaure des mécanismes de socialisation à

l’égard des enfants, comme la scolarisation obligatoire. Beaucoup d’entre-

eux n’acceptent pas la discipline de ces nouvelles structures et se rebellent

— 80 -

contre elles. De plus des familles pathogènes apparaissent pendant que les

rigueurs de l’individualisme urbain submergent un petit nombre de citadins.

Par voie de conséquence leurs enfants adoptent un type de délinquance qui

reflète leurs origines pathogènes. La délinquance de «contre-culture» quant

à elle, prend naissance au moment où ces enfants rebelles et provocateurs se

rassemblent en groupes iconoclastes, méprisant les valeurs et les carrières

conventionnelles.

Les principales villes Chinoises et Indiennes sont en train de développer

des symptômes de délinquance «rebelle», alors que beaucoup de cités

d’Amérique Latine et d’Afrique semblent être à mi-chemin entre ce type de

déviance et la délinquance dit «incoercible». Le Japon quant à lui est en

train d’évoluer rapidement vers une délinquance de contre-culture alors que

beaucoup de villes Occidentales ont déjà atteind ce stade.

_ 81 —

CRIME IN POSTREVOLUTIONARY CUBA

Luis Salas*

INTRODUCTION

While some scholars have attempted to link crime to development

(Clinnard and Abbott, 1973) and modernization (Shelley, 1981), these

attempts have come under severe criticism, especially by Third World

scholars who challenge comparability of development strategies (Zaffaroni,

1982) and argue for development theories which are unique to regional or

continental concerns.

Latin American criminologists have argued that economic development

models which were applicable to industrialized societies during the 19th

century are not transferable to modern Latin America (Zaffaroni, 1982).

This is due to a variety of factors unique to the region: 1) the scope and

type of dependency relationship which exists between Latin America and

capitalist industrialized societies; 2) the unequal distribution of the national

wealth, a factor which is closely associated with colonial antecedents and

the current dependency relationship; 3) the fact that many forms of Latin

American crime and/or violence are institutional responses to growing

societal pressures for reform; 4) the growing inequality between debtor

nations and capitalist lenders (Zaffaroni, 1982).

Shelley, on the other hand, focuses her review of crime and develop-

ment on modernization issues and thus seeks to avoids many of the pitfalls

encountered by Clinard and Abbott (1973) (Shelley, 1981). Zaffaroni

(1982: 39) counters that it is fruitless to speak of modernization in a region

In which ‘…if we began to speak of development in terms of growth, we

would have to conclude that our countries are commencing a process of

atrophy ” if not actual decline. For analytical purposes, she groups the

countries of the world into developing, developed and socialist countries.

Zaffaroni (1982), likewise makes this distinction, and when he speaks of

Latin America excludes socialist countries.

Grouping of these countries on this basis inevitably leads to suspect

conclusions. Socialist writers have supported this grouping concept since

it follows neatly their argument that development, and the resulting socially

dislocating factors, are not in themselves criminogenic (Viktorov, 1974).

* Director, Assocta

* Director, Associate Professor Criminal Justice Department Florida Inter-

national University.

— 83 _

Rather, the capitalist criminologist, uses development as a convenient

scapegoat and fails to recognize the causal link between crime and capi-

talism.

If socialist countries were all industrialized European countries, follow-

ing an identical political process, this grouping might make sense but they

are not. To compare the Cuban economic situation, cultural background

and erratic political course with that of the Soviet Union would be like com-

paring the United States with Haiti on the basis that they are both capitalist

countries.

We will not try to group Cuba with any other country. Were we to do

so, we would group it with Spanish speaking Latin American countries with

large black populations but this ignores a unique cultural and political

tradition which would make even this grouping questionable. This article

will examine the problem of crime in postrevolutionary Cuba, placing

special emphasis on those acts which have been criminalized, claims of

declining crime rates, control mechanisms and Cuban explanations for the

existence of crime in a socialist society.

We will not focus on the individual offender but will review the effect

of conditions associated with the revolutionary process on criminalization

and repression decisions. Space limitations and lack of reliable data do not

permit a full discussion of all crimes so that we will identify the crimi-

nalization of conduct due to: 1) the new distribution of goods and the

means of production; 2) the need to maintain systemic legitimacy and

political stability; 3) economic development measures; 4) and, repudiation

of conduct associated with capitalist corruption.

BACKGROUND

A persistent notion has been voiced, encouraged by Cuban officials,

that prerevolutionary Cuba was an economic shambles and ‘“.…one of the

most crime-ridden societies on the planet” (Brady, 1983: S). This ignores

the reality of this island nation. Pre-Castro Cuba did not fit the mold of

typical Third World underdevelopment. Life expectancy at birth, for

example, was over 60 years, a rate surpassed only by Argentina, Uruguay,

Puerto Rico and Jamaica. By any criteria, per capita income, gross national

product, number of students, number of cars, telephones, etc. Cuba

equalled or surpassed most of her Latin American neighbors (Luxenburg,

(1981).

Even though Cuba had achieved a relatively advanced level of modern-

ization, there was unequal distribution of the economic success, wiih à

disproportionate share of the national wealth being concentrated in .5risar,

areas to the detriment of the rural population. The suecess of the k evoit..isi

_ 84 _

lay in the radical transformation of this economic model into a socialist

model devoted to equalizing national distribution and rural development.

Unlike other socialist countries which have adopted somewhat fixed

development strategies, Cuba has undergone radical shifts in their economic

and political models. The first major period of reform occurred immediately

after the Revolution and was characterized by radicalization of the Cuban

economy and concern over the very survival of the Revolution. By 1961

Cuba had adopted a Soviet model which resulted in a loss of at least 7 % in

total growth (Mesa Lago, 1981a). Some growth was perceived during the

period of 1964-1965 but was followed by a period of radicalization, 1966-

1970, under Guevarist concepts which resembled the development model

proposed by Mao. The economic consquences of this experiment proved to

be disastrous and it was finally abandoned in 1970. The institutionalization

stage which followed, along traditional Marxist economic paths, produced

some growth during its initial stages which has been curtailed due to recent

recessions (Mesa Lago, 1981 a).

Cuba’s economic dependency on the United States disappeared during

the first years of the Revolution but was substituted with Soviet depen-

dency. This new dependency model is unlike the prior US-Cuban relation-

ship (1). Cuba remains a monoculture economy with little prospects for

industrialization or diversification and has incurred a large foreign debt with

socialist and market economies. The Soviets, however, do not have direct

investments in Cuba and thus have not transferred capital from the island.

Additionally, the Soviets have been very lenient in their economic treatment

of Cuba and while ‘“Cuba remains heavily dependent on the USSR by most

criteria…, the Soviets do not seem to exploit the island economically”

(Mesa Lago, 1981b: 27).

PAUCITY AND RELIABILITY OF DATA AND SOURCES

Great care must be exercised in the analysis of quantitative criminal

justice data derived from Cuban sources. Unlike other societies, data do not

appear as a compilation to be found in a spécialized journal or report.

Rather, this information may be discovered in a variety of sources, ranging

from official reports of the Ministry of the Interior to speeches by major

political figures (Salas, 1980).

The same dangers faced by US criminologists is encountered by those

interpreting Cuban data. Arrest rates, for example, may merely represent

a shift in enforcement or definitional patterns (Salas, 1979a). This is com-

plicated by the political nature of crime statistics.

The political usage of crime figures is illustrated by the fact that most

information presented to the Cuban public on,national crime problems is

_ 85 —

compared with similar offenses in the United States or prerevolutionary

Cuba (Salas, 1980). These figures, in turn, have been relied on by Cuban

and foreign observers to reach conclusions on revolutionary achievements

(Brady, 1983; Wald, 1978) or to analyse the political culture and measure

the development of the ‘“New Man” (Dominguez, 1978).

One of the most difficult problems in analyzing foreign crime statistics

is the variety of legal definitions of crimes, both those which we consider to

be universally defined and those that are unique to the society under study.

Table 1 presents a breakdown of all property crimes which took place from

1959 to 1977 (some years were excluded due to lack of information).

TABLE 1

Crimes Against Property in Cuba

Year

Property Crimes per 100,000 | Percentage of total Amount

Population

of Reported Crime

1959

543.1

18.70

1960

482.7

18.17

196 1

4616

20.37

1962

4894

20.00

1963

2326

9.59

1964

133.2

6.55

1965

372.2

17.80

1966

317.0

19.35

196 7

335.2

26.40

1968

3414

28.96

1969

203.8

33.00

1977

608.3

36.64

Sources: Jorge 1. Dominguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution (cambridge, Mass.: Belknap,

1978): As Servants of the People We Have Been Able to Achieve an Even Greater

Understanding”, Granma, May 11, 1969., pp. 7-9: ‘Dictamen sobre el informe de

rendicion de cuentas del Tribunal Supremo, leido por Julia Meceda. Granma, July 1.

1978.

À cursory review of these figures would indicate that there has been a

dramatic reduction in these offenses. Brady, in reviewing these statistics

from 1959 to 1968, concluded that: ‘“(t) hese statistics, taken together with

available journalists, travellers, and scholars’ accounts confirm my own first

hand impression from studies in Cuban cities: that Cuba has broken the

back of its serious crime problem” (Brady, 1983: 7). More detailed review

leads to other conclusions.

— 86 —

The most dramatic decrease in these offenses occurred during the

period 1963-1964. This dramatic reduction has been attributed by Cuban

officials to a draconian law which reclassified robberies of inhabited dwell-

ings as political rather than common crimes. The modification also included

robberies in which the perpetrator impersonated a police or military official

or participated with a minor (Salas, 1979a). The fact that the death penalty

could be imposed in these cases was seen by Cuban officials as a deterrent

which produced these reductions (Granma Weekly Review, 1979). When

one takes into account the fact that these crimes were not reported as

property offenses during this period, the conclusion, of declining rates, is

suspect. By 1965, the tourts began to treat offenses as common crimes

once again and the rates begaq to climb back to their original levels.

Another danger in examining statistics which reflect the overall crime

rate or specific crime families is the lack of information as to which crimes

are being counted and which are ignored. For example, the Cuban govern-

ment released a graph that purported to show the ‘’General Total of Crimes

During the Period 1959-1968” (Granma Weekly Review, 1969: 7). The

graph indicates a steady decline in the overall crime rate, but there is no

information anywhere as to which crimes are included and which are

excluded. Ignorance of these factors makes this data questionable. That

these figures are among the most popular among foreign observers is per-

plexing. Their widespread use results in the proliferation of inaccurate

statistical analysis. (Brady, 1983; Dominguez, 1978; Wald, 1978).

Research reviewing Cuban data face many of the same difficulties

inherent in criminal justice statistics: incompleteness of definitional infor-

mation, unreliability of data and manipulation of the content and presen-

tation of such data. These limitations, so long as they are realized, do not

foreclose analysis. Reported data may be pieced together with noncriminal

sources to give us an idea of the way crime is perceived in Cuban society.

DEFINITIONS OF CRIME

The Cuban definitions of crime have fluctuated during different periods

of revolutionary rule. Unlike U.S. criminal codes which tend to group

offenses according to the punishment imposed, the Cuban codes group

crime into crime families according to the similarity of the activity being

regulated.

In reviewing crime it is impossible to separate this phenomenom from

the stages of revolutionary development which have determined the course

of this political movement. Immediately after the revolutionary triumph,

Cuban crimina! law underwent a radical transformation with a widespread

reshifting of common crimes to the political crime category (Sänchez, 1974).

_ 87 _—

Most of these were economic offenses, which were prioritized during the

initial nationalization period. An emphasis was also placed on the repression

of morally offensive behavior, such as pimping and prostitution, which the

revolutionaries decried as evidence of capitalist corruption.

The manipulation of criminal definitions in Cuba was a result of politi-

cal, social and economic events and trends. Enactment of Læw 1098 in 1963

is illustrative (Ley 1098, 1963). During this time Cuba was under economic

siege and facing severe hardships. Economic measures were taken which

demanded that much of the population be mobilized to agricultural areas

and many homes were left unattended. Burglaries became a serious problem.

The new law prescribed severe penalties, leading to the dealth penalty, for

burglars, those impersonating public officials and those using minors in the

commission of crimes. It also redefined such crimes as political offenses,

allowing the defendant to be tried by revolutionary courts instead of

ordinary courts. Revolutionary couts had been established for trials of

political cases and were characterized by reduced standards of proof and a

lack of procedural rights for the accused.

This redefinition resulted from very practical considerations. If workers

who had been mobilized to the countryside had to continually worry about

the safety of their family and possessions their productivity and volun-

teerism would be affected. Likewise, for a system which had as its basis the

overthrow of a corrupt regime, even the semblance of official participation

in petty crime was intolerable.

The definition of juvenile delinquency is also illustrative of the way in

which criminal definitions are modified to fit societal needs. Cuba°s flir-

tations with Guevarist concepts of egalitarianism and the building of com-

munism without intermediate developmental steps resulted in massive

strains accompanied by rising delinquency rates (Bernardo, 1971; Mesa

Lago, 1981a). During this period traditional institutions were ignored or

purged, mobilizations of large numbers of young persons from urban to

rural areas became commonplace, and moral incentives to increase worker

productivity replaced material ones. Many changes took place during this

stage which struck at the heart of Cuban culture. The role of the male was

downgraded and the emancipation of women was legislated. Even basic

institutions such as the family were affected by new legislation which

mandated a redefinition of sexual roles within the family structure (Côdigo

de Familia, 1975). The uncertainty of this period was accompanied by a

great deal of social disharmony and rising delinquency rates. In 1967

minors had participated in 41 % of all crimes committed in Cuba; by 1971

the rate had risen to 50 % (Salas, 1979b).

The economic and societal reforms also produced other results which

in turn affected crime rates and patterns. The demographic changes which

occurred during the period of revolutionary rule are illustrative.

_ 88 _

Cuba is probably one of the first developing countries to have experi-

enced a baby boom and declining birth rates similar to the experience of

industrialized countries after World War II (Diaz Brisquet and Pérez, 1981).

While one may attribute increases in crime to social and econgmic con-

ditions, it is important to consider the rapid increase in the 15-19 year old

age group since it is this population which is traditionally rmmost prone to

criminality.

In light of these distressing figures, the government amended its laws in

1973 and lowered the age of criminal responsibility from eighteen years of

age to sixteen years of age (Ley 1249, 1973). While this reduced official

delinquency figures, by 1977, the problem of juvenile crime remained

serious, as the postrevolutionary baby boom came of age, and Castro

called for a war against delinquency characterized by the adoption of more

repressive legislation (Salas, 1979b).

After much discussion, a new criminal code, which reclassified common

crimes into their traditional categories, was adopted in 1979. The criminal

code proposes twelve categories of offenses. Ten of these crime categories

fit into any criminal classification scheme in Latin America while two of

these: state security and economic crimes are new offenses attributable to

political and economic considerations. Both of these crime categories seek

to control conduct detrimental to the governmental monopolization of the

means of production or challenge the political supremacy of the Party.

CUBAN EXPLANATIONS OF CRIME

The flight into exile of much of the Cuban legal profession effectively

depleted the ranks of criminologists and penologists. A trademark of the

first years of postrevolutionary rule was the equation of crime with counter-

revolutionary activity and the convergence of the common and political

crime categories.

Convocation of the National Forum of Internal Order in 1969 was the

first attempt to bring together experts in the area of order maintenance to

discuss problems of crime and delinquency (Salas, 1979a). Two important

resuits of this meeting were the decisions to revise all legal codes, leading

to unifermity of the judicial system, and the selection of psychology as the

dominant social science in the criminological and treatment fields.

Cuban criminology has been deeply influenced by Soviet thought (2).

The Cuban theories of criminality, like their Soviet counterparts, presup-

pose the malleability and perfectability of human beings and the social

causation of deviant behavior. Capitalism is at the core of all criminality.

Crime is a function of capitalist society which tries ‘““to maintain some level

of delinquency, within determined limits…”’ Hernändez de Armas, 1977:295).

_ 89 _

The abolishment of capitalism is the first stage toward the eventual

elimination of crime. Cuban explanations for the persistence of crime in

socialist society can be characterized as political and nonpolitical. Political

explanations tend to place blame on capitalist influences. Nonpolitical

explanations may be divided into psychological and functional explantions.

The primary cause of delinquency is the class conflict inherent in

capitalist society. Socialism is merely a preliminary stage in the building of

a communist society and during this period there will be remnants of

capitalism which persist and influence criminal behavior (Viera, 1977).

These remnants express themselves as negative ideals such as individualism

and selfishness which are transmitted among subcultural groups (Hernändez

de Armas, 1977).

In addition to these innate conditions, negative values may also be

transmitted as part of a capitalist conspiracy to corrupt Cuban society ;

especially its youth, who are the target of publicity campaigns aimed at

encouraging the development of such values as hedonism and individuality.

Institutional failure is also responsible for the persistence of criminality.

Institutions serve two primary functions in the struggle against crime: they

are instrumental in the development of socialist consciousness, and; create

the proper environment for the suppression of criminal activity (Salas,

1979b). Primary emphasis is placed on the family and the school as the

principal agents of socialization.

The family bears the principal responsibility for childrearing and

formation of the “New Man”. Much of the commentary regarding errors in

childrearing have centered around discipline and methods of parental

control. Campaigns have been carried out to educate parents in positive and

nonpunitive methods of discipline (Salas, 1979b). These efforts to reform

patterns of discipline are geared at changing traditional familial roles in

which the father played a dominant and authoritarian role. The government

has recognized that modification of these family patterns has turned out to

be a more difficult task than expected (Martinez Alier and Martinez Alier,

1974).

Recent changes in the economic system demanding greater skills,

required for a planned economy, have also given rise to other concerns.

Foremost is the fear that selection of the most promising students for

special schools may result in the creation of an elite class. Fidel Castro,

referred to this when he encouraged adult family members to control the

emergence of elitist feelings among their children (Castro, 1978).

Other institutional failures also contribute to the existence of criminal

activity. The order maintenance apparatus is blameworthy since it is charged

with reducing criminal opportunities. In addition to these orcrational

— 90 _—

deficiencies, there are certain social and economic conditions which allow

criminal behavior. Some of the most identifiable faults are lack of consumer

goods, bureaucratism, lack of professionalism among State workers, and

inordinate emphasis on moral incentives.

Another assumption of Cuban criminology is the negation of crime as a

necessary social condition. Cubans have stressed, for example, that modern-

ization and development do not lead to increased criminality. The fault is

not with modernization but rather with capitalist development models

(Sanchez Garcia, 1976).

Psychologists have been influential in the development of Cuban

criminal policies. Âs early as 1963, Cuban psychologists were arguing for the

primacy of their science in dealing with offenders since these people were,

after all, mentally sick (Salas, 1979a).

Recent governmental reforms indicate that greater importance will be

devoted to the scientific study of crime but future reforms will be carried

out in accordance with historical legal notions. Adoption of the criminal

code signifies a belief in the deterrent effect of penal sanctions that have, in

general, been made harsher. The fact that recidivists have been singled out

for especially harsh sentences may signify a conclusion that certain criminals

may be beyond rehabilitation. Reclassification of prostitution as a crime

may also signal a retrenchment from the treatment model advocated earlier.

The premise behind the code is a return to legal methods of dealing with

offenders under the concept of social defense.

Comments by Fidel Castro (1980) at the National Assembly confirm

the prioritization of criminal sentences as the primary tool in combatting

crime. At that meeting, Castro criticized the leniency of penal provisions in

the Code, and argued for greater severity and an increase in the maximum

penal terms available for serious crimes and recidivists.

The return to legal means of social control is primarily due to the

resurgence of the legal profession. The rehabilitation of this profession,

whose status had been downgraded during the Guevarist period, is a direct

resuit of the planning model adopted in 1970 and has led it to assume a

position of leadership in the determination of criminal policy (Salas, 1983).

PRIORITIZATION OF CRIMES AGAINST THE STATE

AND THE ECONOMY

In outlining the differences between socialist and capitalist criminal

policy, the President of the Cuban Supreme Court recently justified the

harsher ‘reatment of oftenses vhich challvige the economic premises of the

collecitve “ystem and natiorai owrership of }e ‘zeans 67 production. T:, <

— 34 -

behavior, be explained, which threatens the survival of the economic and

political system is thus akin to counterrevolutionary activity (Varona

Duque, 1983).

Many of the crimes defined as undermining the national economic

policy were first classified as counterrevolutionary crimes but have since

been redefined as economic crimes. Some of the behavior prohibed by this

section includes failure to meet economic, production or safety goals,

abuse of power by officials, revelation of economic secrets, consumer fraud,

hoarding and speculation, squatting, illegal sale of goods and currency

trafficking (Salas, 1979a).

Cuban officials point with pride to the elimination of official corrup-

tion, an integral part of prerevolutionary history. After independence from

Spain, corruption became endemic in government. Even though most

governments entered with promises of ending corruption, they soon suc-

cumbed to the same practices.

One of the first acts of the revolutionary government was the enact-

ment of legislation which upgraded the sanctions in cases of graft (Salas,

1979a). In addition, these offenses were redefined as counterrevolutionary

crimes, placing the defendants under the jurisdiction of revolutionary courts.

There is very little information on the number of corruption cases since

the revolutionary takeover and much of this information is misleading

since any theft from state enterprises is now considered to be public graft.

In 1963 there were 422 cases of misappropriation, and by 1968 the figure

had reached 3,022 cases (Granma Weekly Review, 1969). By 1977, thefts

by public officials accounted for over $ 1.7 million during a six month

period, while a similarly high figure was recorded during 1978 (Granma,

1978b).

While prevolutionary corruption was based on individual greed and the

acquisition of material wealth, postrevolutionary corruption is characterized

by the enhancement of power and status. Dominguez (1978: 231), in his

study of Cuban politics, points out that ‘“(c)orruption in revolutionary Cuba

primarily, but not exclusively, takes the form of using power to obtain

access to other things; it does not often involve money, not necessarily out

of revolutionary virtue but because of structural change-money no longer

mediates power and the goals of corruption... Power itself became the

currency of corruption”.

Abuse of power takes many forms. Efigenio Amejeiras, a prominent

guerilla leader and subsequently a Central Committee member and chief

of police was accused in 1966 of using his position for immoral purposes

(Salas, 1979a). He recanted publicly, escaped prosecution and is now hailed

as a revolutionary hero.

— 92 —

The desire to maintain power has also led to violations. Andrés

Castellanos, general secretary of the Communist Party in a municipality

altered the records of sugar cane cutters to aggrandize their production

figures. Although he was fired from his post, he was not charged with any

crime and maintained his party membership (Dominguez, 1978).

Abuse of official positions to maintain and exercise power does not

evoke as strong public reaction as the acquisition of material wealth. Most

of the latter cases involve misappropriations. The description of such an

offender is reminiscent of the description of white collar criminals in

capitalist countries:

in general, the personality of one who commiits it is different from

that of the habitual criminal, the thief, the marijuana smoker, for example.

He is always a worker- since in order to misappropriate he must be a worker.

In general he never commits the crime again (Granma Weekly Review,

1969: 9).

Thefts from state enterprise may range from petty appropriations to

large scale organized rings. For example, in a 1980 case, a theft, by adminis-

trators and employees of more than 25000 sacks of detergent worth $ 1.3

million pesos was reported. The participants, as well as superiors, who had

taken bribes or were found negligent, received harsh prison sentences

(Bohemia, 1980).

Misappropriations are treated very harshly. The harshness of the penal

sanction is underscored by the fact that most sentences carry caveats that

bar future State employment. In a system in which the State is not only the

principal employer, but oftentimes the only employer, this sanction may be

akin to banishment.

One of the primary economic crimes faced by the leadership is black

marketeering. Since 1961 there has been a continuous increase in the

demand for consumer goods without a proportionate rise in their avail-

ability. This has been accompanied by a greater supply of income to the

population without a corresponding increase of goods on which to spend it.

In order to control the distribution of goods, the government intro-

duced rationing in 1962. The black market became a pervasive element of

Cuban economic life almost from the inception of rationing. It spread across

all commodites and involved, both as sellers and buyers, a large proportion

of the population (Lewis, Lewis and Rigdon, 1977a). Even state agencies

Wwere not exempt from participation in the black market. One case, for

example, involved a state pharmaceutical firm which was purchasing goods

on the black market to meet production goals and raising prices illegally to

appear to be cost effective. The organizational goal appeared to be adminis-

trative survival, not personal corruption, and the black market was the most

viable source of goods needed to meet production targets (Salas, 1979a).

— 93 _

Illicit sale of consumer goods was associated with small businesses (3)

while illegal sale of agricultural products was primarily carried out by smalil

farmers. In addition to these small merchants, organized gangs have also

been involved in the black market. One group of forty-four persons, for

example, was arrested in possession of enough rice to fill the monthly needs

of 7,650 consumers (Salas, 1979a).

The government has been selective in its repression of this crime. In the

case of small businesses it waited until 1968 to act decisively in curtailing

their activity. Farmers, on the other hand, have largely been left untouched.

Most criminal legislation penalized the purchaser of black market agricul-

tural products, leaving the farmer unregulated (Salas, 1979a). This was

apparently due to the favoritism which the government accorded to rural

areas and its inhabitants.

While the government has attempted to regulate this conduct by

criminalization, legal enforcement does not appear to have had much

success. The most successful attempt to curb this activity is the legalization

of much of this conduct by lifting of economic restrictions and decrimi-

nalizing the behavior.

Another area of economic regulation encompasses crimes against state

property. The largest percentage of these are classified as property crimes.

For reporting purposes all thefts of property, private and public, are re-

ported as property crimes. As late as 1977 and 1978, these crimes consti-

tuted approximately 36.34 % of all crimes prosecuted by the Cuban ju-

diciary (Salas, 1979a).

Property crimes have been characterized as presenting some of the most

serious threats to the socialist well being since they are the most ‘“typical

reminiscences of the capitalist mentality” (Castro, 1977). They also affect

development targets. Mobilization of workers in production tasks facilitates

the commission of many of these crimes and economic plans could be

affected if workers felt leary about leaving their homes. Overrepresentation

of juveniles, over 41 % of these crimes involved minors, is viewed as a failure

of those institutions in which there has been the greatest investment to

develop the ‘“New Man”. (Salas, 1979a). Lastly, they involve much of the

population (4).

All of the figures reported by the national government indicate theft,

both from private and public entities, to be a serious problem. They have

increased from 379.33 per 100,000 in 1960 to 559.42 per 100,000 in 1977

(Salas, 1979a). Of these, the majority are minor thefts, with 51.72 % being

thefts of property worth less than 25 pesos (Granma, 1978a).

State concern over this problem is also justified due to the high nro-

portion of juvenile participation. In 1967, for example, minors acconnted

for 27 % of all thefts (Con la Guardia en Alto, 1©49).

— 94 —

Robbery is the most serious property crime since it involves not only

the taking of property but also the placing of someone in physical jeop-

ardy (5). Robbery rates have ranged, during different periods, from 25 % of

all property crimes to 11 % (Salas, 1979a). As in thefts, minors are also

heavily involved in robberies. Up to 12 % of all robberies in 1968 involved

minors, acting alone or as members of groups (Salas, 1979a) (6).

One of the most unusual aspects of this crime is the existence of

organized rings operating in both the taking of property and its distribution.

Oscar Lewis, for example, reports an incident in which seventy-two army

personnel were arrested for stealing materials from state warehouses (Lewis,

Lewis and Rigdon, 1978). |

The centrally planned economy of Cuba required laws to regulate the

labor force. Penal law has also been used to control worker conduct and

productivity. The first legislation sanctioning worker conduct was passed

in 1962. This law imposed monetary sanctions for lateness, early departure

from work and unjustified absences (Mesa-Lago, 1963). In addition, the

Ministry of Industries established a work camp for the rehabilitation of

supervisors and employees who had committed serious faults in carrying

out their duties (Salas, 1979a).

Consolidation of labor control mechanisms was a primary motivation

behind the enactment of the ‘‘Law on Labor Justice”. Violations of the law

included tardiness, absenteeism, disobedience, negligence, lack of respect

to superiors, damage to equipment, fraud and robbery (Mesa-Lago and

Hernändez, 1971). The primary sanctions were monetary fines and loss of

Wages to be administered by new labor courts.

These new measures were ineffective in increasing worker productivity

demonstrating the failure of the Guevarist notions of nonmaterial worker

incentives. By 1970, Castro complained that 20 % of the labor force was

absent from their work site daily (Dominguez, 1978). This led to a redefi-

nition of the role of labor unions, economic reforms and the enactment of

the ‘“Law Against Loafing” (Kennedy, 1973).

One of the most interesting aspects of the law against loafing was the

Way it was presented to the Cuban people. À draft of the new legislation

Was published in all the major newspapers and a massive discussion of the

new law took place, with some three million persons participating (Kennedy,

1973). At these assemblies, participants were encouraged to condemn the

evils of loafing and to engage in demonstrations against loafers. In some of

these meetings effigies of loafers were burned (Salas, 1979a).

The three primary targets of the legislation were: those who were

physically able to work but remained unemployed, those who had aban-

doned their work place for more than fifteen days without authorization

— 95 —

and those who had been punished by work councils repeatedly. When there

are no aggravating circumstances, the loafer may be sent to a work camp or

subjected to house arrest for a period not greater than a year. Those with

aggravating circumstances, such as repeaters, may be sentenced to a rehabili-

tation center for a period not to exceed a year. One of the most unusual

aspects of the law is the transfer of essentially penal jurisdiction from the

traditional court system to the labor courts.

ÀA special concern of the drafters was the coverage of the new law.

While the law presumes that all men from 17 through 60 and all women

from 17 through 55 are physically able to work, it exempts women and

farmers from its coverage. The decision to exclude women was only reached

after a great deal of debate. Labor Minister Risquet explained this dilemma:

There are men and there are women. The problem isn't the same for

both. Women have the job of reproducing as well as producing… Politically,

our people wouldn't understand if we were to treat men and women alike

(Granma Weekly Review, 1970).

The short-term effect of the legislation was positive, with many of the

previously unemployed being incorporated into the work force. All indi-

cations are that the courts were lenient with the cases presented and that

few cases actually resulted in the application of severe sanctions. The

success of the law may be attributed to the deterrent effect which it had as

well as the peer pressure which was brought to bear by workers (Salas,

1979a).

The recent downturn of the Cuban economy has brought renewed

complaints from the leadership about worker laxity and lack of produc-

tivity and has resulted in new labor legislation which facilitates the impo-

sition of sanctions by local labor organisms. Again penal law has been used

as a tool of behavior modification.

TRADITIONAL CRIMES

While economic crimes are a clear byproduct of the new socialist

political model, the majority of crimes are common to most cultures and

existed prior to the revolutionary takeover. Yet even in these cases, the

political model affects the way in which these crimes are repressed and

viewed.

We have selected traffic offenses for in depth examination of their

relationship with modernization, the scarcity of goods in Cuba and the

universality of the offense. Traffic violations are viewed by many as not

being important enough to be considered as crimes even though driver

behavior is primarily regulated by police.

— 96 —

By United States standards, Cuba should not have very many traffic

accidents. There are a relatively small number of vehicles on the roads due

to decreased importation of vehicles, high gasoline prices and a shortage of

replacement parts. The scarcity of cars and parts has led to a variety of

illegal practices designed to satisfy consumer demands. The State, in turn,

has responded by enacting legislation regulating the sale, disposition and

repair of automobiles (7).

While traffic violations are decriminalized and downplayed in import-

ance in the United States, discussions of traffic accidents have occupied the

vast majority of space in publications devoted to criminal matters as well as

speeches by major political figures (Salas, 1979a). The importance of this

behavior to the Cuban government is largely due to the economic con-

sequences of their political actions.

Because of the scarcity of vehicles and the lack of production facilities,

most new machinery has been imported from socialist or capitalist countries

Willing to extend credits to Cuba. This has resulted in large expenditures of

foreign currency on these items (8). Losses due to accidents represent

prohibitive costs to Cuba?s strained economy (9).

Salas (1979a) reviewed traffic accident figures for the period 1963-

1971 and concluded that while the total amount of traffic accidents

decreased during certain periods of time, the severity did not, as shown by

the rising rate of deaths per accident. This trend continues today (Castro,

1980: 48). While urban areas were overrepresented in the number of total

accidents, due to the amount of vehicles in those areas, the rate of death

in rural areas was higher. This was probably due to the condition and nature

of rural highways. If one reviews the rise and fall of rates throughout the

years, one finds that they correspond to development efforts taing place at

the time. During periods in which there was a high degree of mobilization

of volunteer labor to rural areas, the rates seem to increase, while they are

reduced as the emphasis on mobilization decreases.

Cuba, like other societies has faced the problem of a lack of stigmatiz-

ation and popular condemnation of vehicular deviance. This has been attri-

buted, as elsewhere, to the newness of traffic legislation and the universality

of the conduct. Castro (1971) (10), emphasized this when he complained

that:

AIl crimes are not the same. Sometimes we see people of whom we have

a good concept. Sometimes we even see Party militants in jail. What did he

do? Well he violated the traffic laws. We do not consider the traffic violator

as a criminal, but he is a potential criminal because of irresponsibility

(Castro, 1977).

-_97 _

Traffic offenses in Cuba, for the most part'have been de facto decrimi-

nalized, with only the most severe offenders receiving penal sanctions (Salas,

1979a). Since Cubans have concluded that harsh sanctions are not effective

or practical, they have relied on massive educational campaigns aimed at

curbing driver negligence.

Traffic law violations are not normally thought of as crimes either by

legislators or criminologists. Yet they involve a serious threat to the physical

well being of citizens and a great economic hardship to the State. In a

society such as Cuba where these losses are a serious impediment to develop-

ment efforts, the seriousness of the offense takes on larger proportions.

OFFENSES ATTRIBUTED TO CAPITALIST CORRUPTION

Certain offenses, such as prostitution and gambling were defined by the

postrevolutionary government as generated by the corruptive elements of

capitalism. Substantial efforts were devoted to their eradication.

The elimination of prostitution is one of the achievements that the

Cuban government is proudest of. Brady, in his review of Cuban criminal

policy, praises these efforts and quotes” …several scholars (who) estimated

that prostitution was, for women, the third leading form of employment”

(Brady, 1983: 6) (11). While there are no reliable figures, everyone agrees

that it was a serious problem.

Approximately three months after the revolutionary victory, raids took

place in some parts of Havana and prostitutes were detained, fingerprinted

and photographed. They were advised to have periodic medical certificates

that had to be updated weekly (Lewis, Lewis and Rigdon, 1977b). In 1960

the government took some steps, resembling prerevolutionary efforts at

restricting areas of employment, by establishing tolerance zones, usually

located in areas contiguous to residential areas. These efforts were not

aimed at eliminating prostitution, but rather at facilitating its control,

especially in medical terms (Randall, 1974).

The first concrete move against the trade came in 1961 with the enact-

ment of legislation which declared pimping, along with alcoholism and drug

addiction, to be precriminal behavior. This change allowed police to detain

pimps without resorting to the traditional court system and to transfer them

to ‘‘rehabilitation’’ camps (Randall, 1974). Prostitutes were also rounded up

and encouraged to enter rehabilitation programs. Those who refused were

harrassed and barred from working for specified periods of time, usually

fifteen days (Rojas, 1973 ). Upon completion of training they were given

housing, employment, counseling and were supervised to prevent a reoccur-

rence (Salas, 1979a). These measures were continued and by 1966 organized

prostitution was effectively eliminated.

- 98 _

There is some prostitution in Cuba today, although not organized and

involving girls working part-time in order to obtain material goods from

tourists and sailors visiting the island. Castro complained of this as he

warned that the government would not allow a resurgence of prostitution

with the increased tourism (Castro, 1977).

To many observers of the Cuban efforts to eradicate prostitution, one

of the most unique features has been the systematic may in which the

problem was attacked and the contradiction of allowing recalcitrant prosti-

tutes to continue to work almost under government sponnsorship as late as

1966. Lockwood (1969), in an interview with Castro, expressed his perplex-

ity that ‘‘posadas’” were allowed to continue, albeit under State control, as

centers for sexual encounters. Castro explained:

aturally these centers to which you refer have been in operation

because they satisfy a social need. Closing them makes no sense. There have

not, of course, been resources to augment them. But what has been fought

differently is prostitution. That is a vicious, corrupt, cruel thing that gener-

ally affects women of humble origins who, for an infinite number of

economic and social reasons, wind up in that life. The Revolution has been

eliminating it, not in an abrupt, radical and drastic way, but progressively,

trying to give employment and educational skills to the women so that they

might learn other skills that would permit them to work and earn a living in

a different manner (Lockwood, 1969).

Recent enforcement drives indicate that a hasher position has been

adopted. Prosecutors are compelled to seek incarceration, for not less than

a year, in every prostitution case. In 1978. reeducation measures were felt

to be inadequate to cope with the dramatic increases and the behavior was

declared a crime.

Gambling in Cuba has a long and varied history. The most interesting

feature of most forms of gambling is that they were institutionalized and

controlled by the government. The large amount of money involved in-

evitably led to corruption and the involvement of organized crime. The

Revolution led to a massive flight of organized crime figures who ran the of

casinos in Havana but gambling continued unimpeded. One of the greatest

anomalies of this early period was the coexistence of revolutionary fervor

alongside the opulence of casinos. Thomas (1971: 873) explains this con-

tradiction by ‘‘the reluctance to increase unemployment by dismissing the

croupiers. But it also served to keep some counterrevolutionaries from other

temptations’’. By 1961 all casinos had been closed.

The most prevalent form of gambling was the national lottery which

Was operated by the government and had provided one of the primary

mechanisms for corruption among government officials. The lottery was

restructured in 1959 and continued in operation during the early years of

— 99 _

revolutionary rule. In 1968, Cuba’s own ‘‘cultural revolution” took place

with the nationalization of small businesses and closing of bars. In this

atmosphere of socialist puritanism, the existence of a state operated lottery

was contradictory and it was formally abolished (Salas, 1979a).

Most forms of gambling were barred during the early revolutionary

years, except for cockfighting. The government explained its reluctance in

the following way: “(n)aturally some of these forms of gambling are so

ingrained that they are not easy to eradicate. We have, for example, the case

fo the cockfight which is a form of gambling entrenched in our rural areas.

This explains why the Revolution has not taken steps to abolish it’’ (Castro,

1961: 45).

The Cuban example presents the contradiction of a revolutionary

government maintaining gambling, albeit temporarily, as an official insti-

tution. The reasons were varied. À very practical reason was that this sector

employed many persons who could not be absorbed easily into the econ-

omy. Gambling provided sorely needed funds to the government and

retired from circulation money that might otherwise have entered the black

market or been used in courterrevolutionary activities. Social functions

were also served by the maintenance of this activity. Cockfighting, for

example, provided lower class men a traditional form of entertainment as

well as a mechanism for the relief of frustration. To a large extent, many

of the measures adopted by the system have been aimed at creating new

activities that contain many of the characteristics found in gambling.

CONCLUSION

The Cuban development process illustrates the futility of grouping

countries Or assigning direct linkages between crime and modernization.

Cuba lies between the socialist model and that of the developing countries

of the Third World.

The Cuban Revolution occurred in one of the most advanced nations

in the hemisphere but by all international standards of development Cuba

was still a developing country. The gains of modernization were however

unequally distributed among the population with the greatest imbalance in

the rural-urban distribution.

The new government moved quickly to abolish class distinctions,

among their some major achievements. The most notable gains of the

revolutionary government have been a dramatic decrease in the rate of

illiteracy, expansion of educational opportunities at all levels, improvements

in health care (life expectancy, for example, is 72 years) and attempts at

reforming cultural traditions of sexism and racism. These gains however,

have generated severe strains in the Cuban social fabric.

— 100 —

Cuban officials have claimed that one of the greatest achievements of

their regime has been a radical decrease in criminality which, in their view,

was directly linked to the capitalist model. Foreign observers have been

quick to accept these claims yet all the evidence points to the fact that

Cuban officials consider this to be a major societal problem which shows no

signs of disappearing.

Cuban officials ascribe criminogenic conditions to the capitalist model

yet refuse to consider that their economic model may also display crimi-

nogenic factors. Crime is a factor of legal definitions and these in turn are

deeply affected by cultural, economic and political conditions. Definitional

shifts occurred throughout the criminal spectrum. Burglary was redefined

due to its effect on mobilization efforts while the delinquency age was

lowered, assumedly because of the new role which youngsters were to play

in Cuban society. Myriad economic acts were criminalized due to the threat

they presented to the new economic order.

In dealing with radicalized social systems, the tendency is often to

forget that all societies have a past and that past has substantial impact on

the course of future events and criminalization decisions. Women, for

example, were exempted from the law on loafing due to the historical role

of women in Cuban culture. Cockfighting was never outlawed because of its

rural roots.

Traffic is a crime category which illustrates the difficulty of crimi-

nalizing conduct which is not socially sanctioned. Cuban leaders, for

example, recently admitted that imposing greater penalties on drunk drivers

was impractical since the offense did not carry a serious stigma and neither

judges nor the population would be willing to impose severe penalties on

this crime.

While political and systems are influenced by many concrete factors,

they are also motivated by abstract principles, primarily ideology. This is

particularly true in the case of Cuba during the Guevarist period. One of the

main ideals of the Cuban Revolution was ruralism and the negation of urban

life. While the city was a parasitic growth, the countryside was seen as a

depository of the values of the ‘“New Man”. Crime was a product of the

urban environment and would not be found in rural areas.

Adherence to the rural ideal led to differential treatment of problems.

The regime demonstrated a reluctance to move against farmers even when

they were in violation of the law. The most concrete example was the

black market in which sanctions were addressed primarily at the consumer

rather than the perpetrair:r. While the lottery was abolished, the govern-

ment f3 :

to move ugainst cu.kfighting. This ‘eniency was based on

Puiiticai vor:1ders-ions and ‘h - “lew ot 1ie peasant ©3 à vctun of hs en-

Virorment 1J the oppic:sun . "

f the hande c£ oapiralist lancCow.u cS.

101

This tolerance was also demonstrated in the treatment of prostitutes who

were viewed as victims of capitalist exploitation.

Criminalization serves a variety of purposes and in a revolutionary

process one of the main ones is a symbolic rejection of capitalist inmorality.

Corruption thus became one of the primary targers of the revolutionaries.

Offenders were treated differently, with the harshest sanctions being applied

to those officials who acted out of materialistic motives and leniency

expressed toward those who acted to acquire or enhance their power. The

elimination of gambling and prostitution are also illustrative of t!’

:henom-

ENOM.

Adoption of the new economic model resulted in the greates: “umber

of new offenses added to the criminal code. Economic crimes are perceived

-

by the leadership as presenting the most serious threat to the existe

O1

the new political and economic order. Property crimes committed ag-iust

State enterprises now become economic crimes against the State. The na:ure

of corruption changes and embezzlement from enterprises is perceived as

more serious.

The greatest difficulty in dealing with Cuban issues is the radical shifts

which occurred in the economic and political models adopted during the

revolutionary process. During the Guevarist period there was an emphasis on

political considerations at the expense of economic planning and a resort to

treatment modalities and peer pressure as means of social control. Since

economic sanction and reward mechanisms were absent, worker conduct

could only be regulated by resort to public condemnation and legal repression.

Institutionalization has brought about a rebirth of legalism. Nonlegal

penalties have been abandoned in favor of traditional legal sanctions and

there is a new emphasis on the deterrent, not rehabilitative, function of

criminal law. On the other hand, there has been a reduction in the amount

of conduct which is criminally regulated since there are now economic

reward mechanisms. The government, for example, has realized that certain

forms of black market activity cannot be controlled through law and has

moved to expand the availability of consumer goods and to allow a certain

degree of private enterprise.

Crime is not a product of any one factor but a consequence of a variety

of forces and trends. Delinquency rates, for example, have risen in accord-

ance with the demographic composition of the population. Birth rates, on

the other hand, have been affected by government policies. During the

period of greatest mobilization, for example, Cuba displayed a very low

bith rate. Increased longevity, while a lofty goal, places new strains on an

economy which is unsuited to care for a large elderly population. Expansion

of educational opportunity creates a large group of young people with

greater training than the economy can satisfy. Prioritization of rural

— 102 —

development may create a disenfranchised urban lower class who may

become disenchanted with unmet promises.

The Mariel boatlift is illustrative of the effect which nonlegal and non-

developmental events can have on criminality. The year following the

exodus, crime decreased in most areas of Cuba. The Cubans have recognized

that the exodus had some effect on this decrease. This may be due to the

following factors: 1) the amount of serious recidivists who were exiled; 2)

the disproportionate representation of young males among the entrants; 3)

the decrease in the demand for services which the exiles had represented ;

and, 4) the elimination of thousands of dissatisfied citizens.

Cuba’s history of socialist development illustrates the difficulty of

grouping countries into camps in accordance with economic, political or

cultural variables. Shelley (1981) and Zaffaroni (1982) chose to group

the countries of the world into developed, underdeveloped and socialist

camps. Under this scheme Cuba would be grouped with such diverse coun-

tries as China and the Soviet Union yet this ignores the course of Cuban

history, those forces which influenced it and its current economic reality.

While Cuba is undeniably a socialist state it is at least as influenced by

its Latin American roots and economic dependency as it is by its ideology.

As such it continues to be an underdeveloped country with many of the

characteristics of its capitalist Latin neighbors. To group it solely on the

basis of broad political principles and then to make broad comparisons

leads to erroneous conclusions as to Cuba and the groups used for analysis.

— 103 —

NOTES

(1)

Soviet economic assistance, excluding military aid, has quadrupled

since 1974, reaching about three billion dollars in 1979. This increase

was the result of falling sugar prices and rising costs of petroleum

products. This three billion equaled about one quarter of Cuba’s GNP

for that year. This did not include purchases of 72% of Cuba’s

exports as well as selling to Cuba about 75 % of Cuban imports

(Theriot, 1982).

2)

The clearest example is the work of Margarita Viera (1977) who has

published the only Cuban textbook on criminology and refers primar-

ily to Soviet authors and experiences.

(3)

After the revolutionary takeover, Castro moved to nationalize the

majority of large businesses and those owned by persons who field

the island. Small businesses continued to be operated privately since

they provided the system with a variety of political and economic

benefits. By 1968, in the midst of radicalization of the economy,

Castro moved to close down these businesses, singling them out as

one of the primary causes for a black market economy (Salas, 1979a).

Beyond the immediate goal of curbing illegal activity, this drive also

served to shift blame for many of the economic failures of the regime,

a factor which cannot be discounted in criminalization or enforce-

ment drives in the area of economic crimes.

(4)

Unlike other offenses in which urban areas are overrepresented in

national crime figures, these crimes seem to be spread throughout the

national territory (Salas, 1979a).

(5)

Cuba has followed traditional Latin American differenciation between

theft and robbery based on the threat which it poses to the victim

rather than the value of the articles stolen. Theft is a taking of pro-

perty without a threat of violence while robbery includes that possi-

bility as an essential element.

(6)

In one article, the government warned shoppers to be wary of young-

sters riding bicycles. In many cases women had had their pocketbooks

stolen while awaiting buses (Bohemia, 1967).

(7)

See, for example, Ley No 1096 (1963), which compelled the sale of

vehicles to the Ministry of Transportation, prohibited the salvage of

automobiles and the sale of replacement parts. The measure was

backed by criminal penalties and the threat of impoundment.

(8)

Figures released by the Cuban government, reveal an average of

$ 5,628,571 in annual losses with total costs due to traffic accidents,

over 14 years of $ 78,628,521 (Salas, 1979a: 58).

(9)

In addition to replacement costs, these accidents also represent

expenditures in other fields. One of those fields most affected is the

public health sector. During one period of time, for example, the

average length of stay in a hospital for a victim of an accident was

— 104 —

18 days, with more than 500,000 day/beds being used in the treat

ment of these patients (Castro, 1971)

(10)

The importance of this problem to Cuban officials, is emphasized by

the amount of times in which Castro has personally incorporated the

problem of traffic accidents in major addresses

(11)

I have never seen this claim substantiated by any serious scholar who

has examined any reliable data. Even the largest Cuban figures do not

approach these levels. The official in the government in charge of

rehabilitation programs for prostitutes, gave figures of 10,000 prosti

tutes working in Havana and 30,000 to 40,000 employed in all of

Cuba (Lewis, Lewis and Rigdon, 1977b). Others, including Castro

have placed the figure at 100,000 even though there are no adequate

figures to support any of these claims (Castro

1977). Cardenal

reported a figure of 25,000 houses of prostitution in Havana after

interviewing a former prostitute (Cardenal

1976). This claim is

possibly the most outrageous of all

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— 105 —

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SUMMARY

One of the primary problems facing comparative criminologists is the

determination of the critical by which countries will be grouped for study.

Some researchers have chosen to focus their study on development and

modernization and have used these criteria to place countries among

developed, underdeveloped and socialist countries.

The Cuban development process illustrates the difficulty of grouping

countries or assigning direct linkages between crime and modernization.

Cuba lies between the socialist model and that of the developing countries

of the Third World. While Cuba is undeniably a socialist state it is at least as

influenced by its Latin American roots and economic dependency as it is by

its ideology. This, in turn, is reflected in the way crime is perceived and

defined.

The purpose of this article is to review the effect of conditions associ-

ated with the revolutionary process on criminalization and repression

decisions. Space limitations and the unreliability of much of the data do not

permit a discussion of all crimes so that we will focus on selected offenses

and the impact which the new socialist system have had on their crimi-

nalization. The following factors shall be considered: 1) the new distribution

of goods and the means of production; 2) the need to maintain systemic

legitimacy and political stability; 3) economic development measures; 4)

repudiation of conduct associated with capitalist corruption. This analysis

shall also take into account the effect of Cuban culture on these decisions.

RÉSUMÉ

« LE CRIME DANS LA SOCIÉTÉ CUBAINE

POST-RÉVOLUTIONNAIRE »

L’un des principaux problèmes auxquels se heurtent les chercheurs en

matière de criminologie comparée est l’établissement de critères de diffé-

renciation qui leur permettront de catégoriser les pays étudiés. Certains

d’entre eux ont choisi de mener leurs travaux à partir des notions de déve-

loppement et de modernisation, notions qui leur ont permis de répartir les

pays en trois groupes distincts : pays développés, pays sous-développés et

pays socialistes.

— 108 —

La manière dont Cuba s’est développée illustre la difficulté qu’il y a à

vouloir regrouper entreeux certains pays ou à établir des liens de relations

directes entre criminalité et modernisation. Cuba est issue à la fois du

modèle socialiste et des pays en voie de développement du tiers-monde.

Bien qu’il soit incontestablement socialiste, l’État Cubain est influencé

autant par ses racines latino-américaines et sa dépendance économique que

par son idéologie. Ce qui ne manque pas de se refléter dans la manière dont

la criminalité est perçue et définie.

Le but de cet article est d’examiner les effets des conditions du crime

liées au procès révolutionnaire de la criminalisation et de la répression. Des

impératifs de place ainsi que le peu de fiabilité de la plupart des données

statistiques n’ont pas permis de prendre en considération tous les types de

crimes. Nous en avons donc sélectionnés certains et avons centré notre étude

sur le rôle que le nouveau système socialiste a joué quant à leur criminalisa-

tion. Les facteurs suivant seront considérés :

1 ) la redistribution des biens et les moyens de production

2) la nécéssité de maintenir la légitimité du système et la stabilité poli-

tique

3) les mesures de développement économique

4) répudiation des conduites liées à la corruption capitaliste. Cette

étude prendra également en considération l’influence de la culture Cubaine

sur les décisions politiques.

— 109 —

SOCIAL CHANGE AND FEMALE CRIME UNDER

COMMUNISM: À STUDY OF THE USSR AND POLAND

Maria Los*

COMMUNIST TRANSFORMATIONS

AND THE CHANGING STATUS OF WOMEN

The Soviet Union and Poland offer an interesting case of the impact

of social change on female crime, as women and men in these two countries

have very similar levels of both education and involvement outside the

home. However, despite this apparent equalization of male and female

status, little is known and published about crimes committed by women and

the punishments meted out to them. Similarly, a serious analysis of the

unique place of women in the social structure is virtually absent. Super-

ficial political declarations regarding full equality and emancipation of

women are substituted for more reliable and realistic research and analysis.

Some may ask whether the Polish and Soviet situations confirm or

disprove those theories which predict significant increases of female crimi-

nality with the process of ‘liberation’ of women and their incorporation into

the official organized structure of society. Yet there are so many possible

interpretations that there can be no one clear answer as to the emancipation

of Polish and Soviet women. Developments in both countries prove that

communist style emancipation is not a smooth or necessarily beneficial pro-

cess. À female journalist recently made the following observation in a Polish

weekly:

Ît is truly sad to look at them in the streets: gray and tired, burdened

with bags, not a trace of glamour and coquetry… Today they do not even

understand any more why their predecessors so badly wanted to be equal

to men ( Starczak-Kozlowska, 1982: 4; this author’s translation from

Polish).

Polish women are employed outside the home almost as frequently

as men. They account for 46 percent of the workforce ; 75-80 percent of

women between 25 and 40 years of age who have one child hold regular

jobs outside the home as do 58 percent of those with four children (Plenska.

1980: 465). Women constituted 51 percent of the Soviet labour force in

1978 (Barry and Barner-Barry, 1982: 199). These high levels of employment

* University of Ottawa

C111—

have not been achieved, however, through fundamental change in the gender

structure. Rather, the intensive industrialization of the Stalinist years and

the post-World War II period in Poland required the mobilization of all able-

bodied citizens. Mnay women were concerned int the labour force by two

major mechanisms. First, the state-controlled wage structure necessitated

the full-time employement of both parents. Secondly, Soviet anti-parasite

legislations has mandated the employment of all unmarried women.

While many women do enjoy their work, they have not achieved full

economic, social and political equality as a consequence of their broad

admission to the work force. À strong division between male and female

occupations remains. Men predominate in the relatively well paid engineer-

ing, industrial and construction jobs while women are more often employed

in the poorly paid fields of education, health care and social services,

administration and the criminal justice system and retail trade (1).

In 1984 Polish women earned about 73 percent of the salaries earned

by men (Lésnicka, 1984: 3; see also Coser, 1980). Women have not only

lower incomes but they are also excluded from positions of power. They are

virtually absent from the executive bodies of the Communist Party (the first

towan was introduced to the Politburo in 1981) and are grossly under-

representated in the Diet, where they constitute 23 percent of all deputies

(Maly Rocznik.…, 1983: 16).

Soviet women share the fate of their Polish counterparts. They are also

greatly underrepresentated in management and supervisiory positions. Their

participation in the government and the party is minimal. In recent years,

they have made up approximately 30 percent of all deputies to the Supreme

Soviet ( a ‘rubber stamp’ body with no real power), their participation in

other political bodies has been much less pronounced. For example, in

1981, there were 17 female members (or 3.6 percent) among 470 members

of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, nine of whom were only

candidate members (Barry and Barner-Barry, 1982: 136). There are cur-

rently no women in the Politburo, the body in which the real power is con-

centrated. There are no women in the 109-member USSR Council of

Ministers (Barry and Barner-Barry, 1982: 90).

The power structure of these societies continues to evolve along the

traditional gender lines despite women’s high educational and vocational

involvement. Men assume positions of authority both at work and at home.

The failure of men to assume familial responsibilities, has prevented women

from moving into more responsible positions. Consequently, women have

remained in a state of ‘semi-liberation’.

THE ESSENCE OF WOMEN”’S SOCIAL ROLE

Life is extremely difficult for Polish and Soviet Women. Not only is

little done to either encourage men to participate more actively in family

— 112 —

responsibilities but also little effort is made to provide adequate child care

or support for women’s house-keeping chores. The stress on heavy industry

and military production has resulted in severe shortages of such consumer

goods as household appliances, baby items, clothing and automobiles.

Moreover, agricultural mismanagement has led to chronic food shortages

and to the well known long lines at stores. The difficulties of daily. living

increase and facilitate political control over women because they lack both

time and energy to fight for a greater share of power or for the liberalization

of the overall political system.

Family planning is a problem in both societies. In the absence of

adequate birth control programs, abortion remains the main way of regu-

lating the family size. In the USSR, the average woman undergoes six to

eight abortions (Zeldes, 1981 : xi; Johnson, 1981: 5). In large cities, 80 per-

cent of pregnancies are terminated voluntarily (Stern, 1980: 135-140).

Infants are born in overcrowded hospitals and subjected to infections,

resulting in a high rate of infant death (see e.g., Field, 1983: 13-16). In their

rented rooms, tiny apartments or crowded accommodations shared with

relatives, young parents do not have the benefit of disposable diapers,

instant baby formulas, convenient baby clothing, utensils, and appliances,

which make western mothers’ lives so much easier. They might purchase

some of these articles in hard currency stores, provided they have the

currency, or on the black market if they are wealthy enough. After spending

their paid maternity leave at home, mothers return to work, and hence, have

to plan for their young children. In 1980, only 8.5 percent of all Polish

children under three years of age were placed in state nurseries, which are

essentially baby storages whereby one nurse cares for 15 to 25 children

(Mankiewicz, 1981b: 4-5). Desperate mothers can try to force their parents,

grandparents or any other retired relatives to care for their babies and this

is, in fact, the most frequent solution. If they have relatively well paid

jobs, they may try instead to hire a ‘woman’. The costs often outweigh their

worth, however; they are often unreliable and tend to disappear after a few

days, weeks or months taking with them whatever valuable objects they can

steal. In essence, since ‘servants’ are considered a capitalistic luxury, dom-

estic and babysitting services are neither organized nor subject to any

controls.

Working mothers, who somehow manage to solve the problem of baby-

care during their working hours still have to stand in lines every day in order

to buy family groceries after work (the lack of a car, freezer or large re-

frigerator, necessitates this daily shopping). They then have to cook, clean,

wash (automatic washers are very rare, drying machines are practically

nonexistent, and laundromats unknown), and mend socks, stockings and

baby clothes (items very rarely available in stores). These are but a few

activities typcially performed by women, and research findings indicate

that, on average, a Polish mother with two children spends a seven hour day

— 113 —

seven days a week working at home in addition to her forty six hour work

week. It must be noted that this estimate does not include time spent

shopping (Starczak-Kozlowska, 1982: 4).

The situation among Soviet women is not different. À Soviet expert

determined that a husband’s work week (including housework) is about

50 hours, while that of the working wife is 80 hours (see Barry and Barner-

Barry, 1982: 199). Lining up for food and other necessities is equally or

even more prevalent in the Soviet Union. À recent article in the weekly

Nedelya stated that on average, women spent 5.8 hours a week in lines and

only 4.5 hours with their children. Moreover, the goods they buy after

having waited so long are often spoiled or faulty (‘“‘Soviet Women…”, 1983).

Children theoretically become eligible for placement in child centres on

their third birthday. In reality, however, many such applications are not

even considered due to chronic overcrowding and the inadequate number of

facilities (2) (Mankiewicz, 1981a: 3). According to the official statistics, the

total number of three to six year old children attending child centres in

Poland in 1979 amounted to approximately 34 percent of all children in

this age group (Rocznik.…., 1980;415).

These few examples of the problems which the majority of women

experience daily are cited in order to expose this side of women’s life

which appears to be largely unaffected, or rather negatively affected, by

their social emancipation which is partial and one-sided. Due to the needs of

the economy, women have been effectively forced to handle two full-time

jobs in place of the one which they traditionally held. Their inclusion into

the workforce was also dictated by the desire of the new communist autho

rities to subject them, as society’s major socialization agents, to compre

hensive ideological indoctrination which, in turn, can be more easily con

ducted in the workplace than in the isolated world of their private homes

While women have accepted the importance of their work as an indi-

cator of their status, they are fully aware that they are simultaneously

evaluated in terms of the quality of their performance as mothers and

homemakers. This, of course, means that they are constantly subjected to

the stressful consequences of this acute role conflict, split identity and

troubled conscience, regardless of their individual style and adaptation with

respect to these opposing pressures. This also means that they are still under

the influence of traditional cultural patterns of expectations and social

controls, which promote different moral standards and virtues for men and

women. In essence, the paramount responsibility for the upbringing and

moral education of their children strengthens their ties with the Church and

traditional community values which are generally perceived as being

threatened by the opportunistic and hypocritical political culture imposed

on children through the schools and the mass media.

— 114 —

By introducing their chi.ldr.en to the national cultural tradition, women

hope to strengthen their integrity and moral convictions in the current

world of new alien values and massive attempts to construct a ‘new socialist

man’. Historically, in Poland, this tradition has included a model of the

Polish Mother who sacrifies herself to the family, insofar as caring for,

educating, and instilling patriotic values in her children, as well as remaining

faithful to her husband when he goes to endless wars to defend the home-

land against its enemies. She is infinitely brave, patient, dutiful and virtuous,

a person in her own right, but choosing inevitably to live for others. À

delicate creature, she can, however, be both a tender mother and a resource-

ful provider for her children bereaved by their heroic father fallen on the

battlefield. The combination of these two roles and the attempt to perfect

their performance in both is not new for Polish women, as history has

forced them again and again to fill the places left empty by their men called

through their patriotic duty into the services of the fatherland.

The same is true for Soviet women, as they too, during many wars and

recently during the years of communist economic mobilization, have been

forced to carry the double burden of these two demanding and often

conflicting tasks, the burden of a ‘double working day’ as they often call it.

It must be noted, however, that any spontaneous feminist organizations or

attempts to create a women’s liberation movement are banned in these

countries, just as are any other types of grass-roots organizations. À women’s

group, organized in the Soviet Union in the late 1970s, which even began

publishing a samizdat feminist journal entitled Women in the USSR, was

soon brutally suppressed and most of its leaders forced into exile abroad.

SOCIAL CHANGE AND TRADITIONAL FEMALE DEVIANCE

A number of studies in Poland (most of them conducted by M.

Jasinska (3); see 1967, 1976 and 1982) inquired into the plight of women

involved in prostitution. Despite the noncriminal status of prostitution in

Poland, it is by no means a trade free of criminal stigma. There exist special

morality squads whose main task consists of controlling prostitutes and

their criminal connections. In effect, prostitutes are very often arrested

on charges of disturbing order and stealing personal property from drunken

clients. In recent years, they have also been frequently arrested and con

victed by the petty offence boards for failing to have a valid medical certifi-

cate (4). In comparison to the 1950s, however, the actual criminal involve

ment of contemporary prostitutes appears to be far less serious and wide

spread.

Two large-scale studies conducted by Jasiñska in the late 1950s and

1970s provide interesting insights into the changes of the size, structure and

demographice composition of the population of young prostitutes. The

— 115 —

number of women under 25 years of age involved in prostitution has in-

creased considerably during the twenty years between the two studies.

Previously, street prostitution was more prevalent, but the more recent

research shows an overwhelming preference for more discrete forms of

solicitation in such establishments as restaurants and hotels, where the staff

act willingly as intermediaries between the prostitutes and potential clients.

Taxi drivers also constitute another group heavily involved in such procur-

ing, an offence punishable by a maximum of ten years’ imprisonment. Only

about twenty percent of the interviewed women appeared to be working for

pimps.

Over sixty percent of the young prostitutes interviewed during the end

of the 1970s and beginning of the next decade, came from ‘blue collar’

backgrounds. The earlier research, on the other hand, showed a higher

percentage of ‘underclass’ prostitutes and found that 72 percent of their

parents had never completed elementary education. Similar to the earlier

study, however, the recent data indicate that the family background of

young women involved in prostitution is extremely unstable. Over 50 per-

cent were not raised in a two parent family as a result of one parent’s death,

parental divorce or an unknown father. Forty five percent were brought up

at least partially during their childhood by people other than natural parents.

Over 50 percent lived for some time under the same roof with an alcoholic.

In 30 percent of the cases, mothers or fathers of the prostitutes changed

partners very frequently and several fathers or step-fathers maintained

sexual relationships with their daughters.

Approximately half of the interviewed women ran away from home

during their chilhood or adolescent years. Most of them dropped out of

school quite early. Approximately 25 percent of the interviewed women

began working as prostitutes between the ages of 16-17 years, about 40 per-

cent between 18-19 years, while the remaining 35 percent became involved

in prostitution when they were at least 20 years old. Practically one third of

the interviewed prostitutes drank heavily, most had long histories of ve-

nereal diseases and gynaecologial problems. Thirty percent had children

residing with relatives or in orphanages (Jasiñska, 1982: 85-88).

In sum, it appears that, just as in other countries, prostitution becomes

a viable choice for women coming from problem families, who leave home

early to escape abuse or hardship and who do not have any competing pro-

fessional options due to the lack of qualifications and generally lower

legitimate financial opportunities for women. It is, however, striking that no

effort is made to open some other avenues for these women, and the only

services extended to them are venereal disease tests and ‘rehabilitation’

efforts by the police.

Contrary to the claims of the Soviet authnrities as well as some west-rn

experts (e.g. Mandel, 1975), prostitution is quite cor*-ce in the "ISSK z

well. There again, economic aspects play an impo ‘“n. 77

— 116 -

What are the real reasons that women became prostitutes in the Soviet

Union? Apart from the boredom of daily existence, which is particularly

acute in the USSR, it is mostly a question of material incentives, even

though Soviet propaganda still asserts that the material conditions that con-

tribute to prostitution have long since disappeared. The governement

maintains that a subsistence level income is ninety-two rubles, sixty-five

rubles a month. Thus a prostitute can take on only a handful of customers

a month and still get by (Stern, 1980: 195).

As in Poland, prostitution is not a crime in the Soviet Union. Never-

theless, Soviet prostitutes are subject to anti-parasite laws which lead to

their frequent arrests and exiles from large cities. For this reason, many

of them secure some type of employment for the sake of appearance. As

in Poland, overt soliciting is not prevalent in the USSR. While it does exist,

especially at railroad or subway stations, it has been largely replaced by the

active involvement in procuring by employees of restaurants and hotels,

shoeshine boys and, above all, taxi drivers. The punishment for procuring is

five years of hard labour followed by internal exile. The level of education

of Soviet prostitutes is very low, alcoholism rampant and health problems

numerous. In the absence of adequate health care services and modern con-

traceptives, Soviet prostitutes ‘often contract and transmit venereal disease,

and illegal abortion is the standard method of contraception — either

performed by helpful friends or self — administered’ (Stern, 1980: 195).

Ît appears, therefore, that neither Polish nor Soviet authorities have

succeeded in their efforts to eradicate prostitution, which they have de-

clared to be just another relic of the capitalist past. The hope that the new

conditions as well as the severe penalties for those who exploit prostitutes

will liberate women and remove any need on their part to engage in this old

trade has clearly not been fulfilled.

SOCIAL CHANGE AND FEMALE INVOLVEMENT IN CRIME

Ît has been noted by Adler (1977) and Pleñska (1980) that the ratio of

female to male crime rates increased somewhat in the post Second World

War period in Poland, when women were integrated en masse into the socio-

economic mainstream, but decreased after approximately one decade.

Adler believes that normative controls over women, exercised by the Church

and state, have continued to operate and that the emancipation of women

transcended them only temporarily. In other words, a vocational upgrading

has not, in fact been followed by a psychological and moral liberation of

Women.

Plenska seems to share these views. She goes beyond them to claim that

the upswing in the number of convictions of women in the period of

—117—

intensive industrialization after the Second World War was due to the in-

crease in opportunities to commit crimes against state property. According

to the statistics, economic offenses did indeed account, to a great extent,

for the increase in female criminality in Poland. Pleñska attributes the sub-

sequent diminution in female conviction rates in part to the legislative

changes of 1953, which decriminalized minor crimes against state property.

She aslo notes that, while the penal law in Poland has been traditionally

oriented towards controlling male deviance, prostitution and other ‘moral

delinquences’ have not been criminalized, and thus increases in these types

of deviance may go unnoticed.

This initial increase in recorded female criminality relative to that of

males cannot be, however, explained simply in terms of female emanci-

pation implies a process in itself, a struggle for fuller participation and

liberation. The rapid increase of women’s employment and involvement in

traditionally male roles in Poland, however, was necessitated by various

external, objective factors.

The magnitude of male casualities of the war and communist take-over

explains, to some extent, the necessity for the maximum involvement of

women in the reordering of the country and its economy. As well, it high-

lights the purely demographic aspects of the higher proportion of women

found in official crime statistics. Indeed, it may well be, that if the numeri-

cal changes in the proportions of both sexes in the total population were

properly accounted for, the significance of the shift in the conviction ratio

would actually disappear. Similarly, the unusually high ratio of female to

male convictions (2:1) in 1946 in the Soviet Union could be explained by

the vast reduction in the male population as a result of the war and Stalin’s

policy of genocide (Zeldes, 1981 : 77).

In any event, it must be noted that increased occupational activisation

of women was but one process among many interrelated, traumatic social

and economic transformations experienced by Poland after the Second

World War. Intensive industrialization and collectivization of agriculture

patterned on the Stalinist model, meant a total subordination of individual

needs and values to the requirements of the economy and ideology. The

massive population exodus out of the countryside and into the cities and

new industrial centres led to the destruction of community ties and tra-

ditional controls (5). These uprooted, predominantly young migrants

proved to be particularly crime prone. Moreover, many female migrants,

unable to find jobs within the underdeveloped services and unwilling to

perform heavy construction tasks, eventually turned to prostitution.

The post-war change of the Polish borders necessitated yet another

significant shift of large numbers of the population, mainly from the eastern

parts of Poland taken over bey the Soviet Union, to the newly recovered

— 118 —

western territories (6). Statistically speaking, the drastic increase in crime

in this part of Poland had a significant impact on the national crime rates

and delinquency during that period (see, e.g., Maroszek, 1963, 1975; Kobus,

1975 and Kryczka, 1978). These developments also affected considerably

the general picture of female delinquency especially as usual controls and

traditional values lost importance under the conditions of cultural conflict

and anomie.

Similar increases in female crime were noted in the Soviet Union in the

early period of the Bolshevik rule. According to Louise Shelley, ‘the female

contribution to crime increased steadily between 1922 and 1928, and at the

end of the first decade of the Soviet rule women were responsible for twice

as much of the total crime rate as they were at the onset of World War

(Shelley, 1982: 266). She explains that this increase resulted from general

social disorganization and a climate of violence caused by the turmoils of

revolution and war, rather than from any significant enhancement of female

socioeconomic status. The war left many women on their own and forced

them to provide for their families under general conditions of want or even

famine. As a result, many women had to resort to theft to save their chil-

dren from starvation. Moreover, their greater involvement in work outside

the home meant also greater opportunities to commit economic crimes,

while their mass migration from rural to urban areas in search of work led

to multitude of adjustment problems and family disorganization. In ad-

dition to these obvious problems caused by any major social upheaval or

à war, Shelley points to criminal consequences of some, more specific,

deliberate changes introduced by Soviet authorities into the lives of Soviet

Women.

Social legislation was introduced throughout the USSR that challenged

the sanctity of marriage, legalized abortions, and provided for ready divorce.

These fundamental changes in family life and parental responsibility, as well

as accompanying legislation that encouraged female entry into the labour

force, precipitated a dramatic change in the lifestyle of women and the

Way women viewed themselves. The disruption of traditional patterns of

female behaviour, particularly in cities, while advantageous for many more

educated and sophisticated women, had criminogenic consequences for

many others (Shelley, 1982: 284 ).

These processes were especially dramatic in the Central Asia republics

where communist authorities attempted to ‘use women to break up Moslem

traditional societies’ (Massell, 1979: 259) and ‘to undermine the kinship

System and the village community — revolving around clanloyalties, and ties

of family and custom — …by encouraging and sponsoring divorces initiated

y women and by involving them in massive and dramatic violations of

traditional taboos’ (Massell, 1979: 260).

— 119 —

In sum, it would seem rather inappropriate to link any of the tempor-

ary post-war increases in the proportions of female criminality, whether

real or spurious, to the women’s social emancipation without considering

the very complex circumstances and social transformations of that tumultu-

ous period in both the Soviet and Polish history. In fact, the present ratio

of male to female convictions in these countries indicates that, in the long

run, the broad admission of women to the work force has had a very limited

impact on the traditional gender differences in the degree of criminal

involvement.

According to the official Polish statistics, in 1981 there were 13,000

adult female convictions compared to 116,000 adult male convictions, a

ratio of 1:9. This ratio did not vary significantly during the last decade, and

was approximately 1:8 in 1980. It was, however, relatively higher in the

1960s when it ranged from 1:5 to 1:8, and it exhibited its highest level in

the 1950s when it ranged from 1:3 to 1:4 (Maly Rocznik…, 1983: 288; Los,

1983a: 49). Soviet data for the 1960s indicate that the ratio of male to

female convictions fluctuated between 1:4.5 to 1:7, and was not much

different in the 1920s when it ranged from 1:6 to 1:7 (Zeldes, 1981 : 77-78).

The proportion of women in the pre-revolutionary criminal statistics was

much smaller, however, and the ratio of female to male convictions was

approximately 1:13 (see data in Shelley, 1982: 265).

It should be noted that while some general statistical information on

convictions of women in Poland is periodically published, this is not the

case in the Soviet Union. What follows is a detailed analysis of the nature

and dynamics of female convictions in Poland, supplemented whenever

possible by Soviet data. In 1979, 11.2 percent (17,406 cases) of all adult

convictions in Poland involved women. As illustrated in tables | and 1 A, the

types of offences common among convicted men and women were quite

different.

While female convictions accounted for 6.5 .percent of all convictions

for crimes against life and liberty (13.3 percent of convictions for homi

cide), 2.9 percent of all convictions for crimes against public safety and the

safety of land, water and air traffic and 2.8 percent of convictions for

offences against family and guardianship, the female share of convictions

for economic crimes was a staggering 61.4 percent, for fiscal offences 28.8

percent and for offenses against public order 20.8 percent.

In order to understand the legal and social meanings of these data, the

specific types of offences in which women seem to be relatively over-

represented must be examined. For example, despite the rather low overall

representation of women in convictions for crimes against state property

(10.6 percent), their share in crimes involving simple usurpation of state

property, usurpation of property of great value and property for which

— 120 —

TABLE I

Valid Convictions by the Courts in 1979 in Poland (Men and Women)

Total

Men

Women

Type of Offence

Ratio Men

NO

%

NO

%

NO

%

to Women

Against state property

43,270

27.8

38,688

27.9

4,582

26.3

8.4:1

Economic offences

5,811

3.7

2,245

1.6

3,566

20.5

1:1.6

Fiscal offences. .. .. ... 21 2 .«

3,144

2.0

2,238

1.6

906

5.2

2.5:1

(Against state property, economic and

fiscal offences together)

° . . . . ° . . . .

(S2,225)

(33.5)

(43,171)

(31.2)

(9,054)

(S2.0)

(4.8:1)

Against private property

39,231

25.2

35,690

25.8

3,541

20.3

10:1

15,426

9.9

14,418

10.4

5.8

14.3:1

Against life and health (including rape). .

1,008

Against family and guardianship (non-

payment of alimonies,

bigamy,

chitd

abduction and abuse, etc.)

20,641

13.2

20,065

14.5

576

3.3

34.8:1

Against public safety and the safety of

land, water and air traffic

9,046

5.8

8,780

6.3

266

1.6

33.1

state

institutions

and func-

Against

tionnaries (including the police)

6,025

3.9

5,325

3.8

700

4.0

7.6:1

Against honour and personal inviolability

2.4

(false allegations, insults, etc.) .. .. . ..

3,701

2,899

2.1

802

4.6

3.6:1

Against

criminal

justice

system and

against documents

. ° . . . . . * . e . ° ° .

5,111

3.3

4,383

3.2

728

4.2

6:1

Against public order

1,161

0.7

919

0.7

242

1.4

3.8:1

Other

. ° . . . . ° . ° . . . . ° * ° ° . . ° .

3,309

2.1

2,820

2.1

489

2.8

5.8:1

TOTAL

. . . . . ° . . . . . . . . . ° ° . . °

155,876

100.0

138,470

100.0

17,406

100.0

8:1

Source : This table has been constructed on the basis of tables 16 (773) and 19 (776) in Rocznik…., 1980: 483 and 484).

TABLE IA

Valid Convictions by the Courts in 1979 in Poland (Men and Women)

Men

Women

Total

Types of Offence

NO

NO

%

%

NO

Ÿ

Against state property

. L ° . . Q . ° ® . Q ® Q . . ». * ° °

38,688

89.4

4,582

10.6

43,270

100.0

Economic offences

° . * L . ® ° ° * ° . . ° . ° ° . » . . .

2,245

38.6

3,566

61.4

100.0

5,811

Fiscal offences

L L . . » . . ® ° ° ° . ® . ® ® . L * * . » ® °

2,238

71.2

906

28.8

3,144

100.0

(Against state property economic and fiscal offences

. » L . . . à ° ° . ° . ° . * « ° . ® Q . . ® . . ° .

together)

(43,171)

(82.7)

(9,054)

(17.7)

(S2,225)

(100.0)

Against private property

. . . . . . » ° . . . . ° . ° . . *

35,690

91.0

3,541

9.0

39,231

100.0

. . . L . . ° . . *

93.5

6.5

100.0

Against life and health (including rape)

14,418

1,008

15,426

(Homicide)

. ° . . ° * ° * . . . ° . . L . À ° ° ° ° ° . ° . °

(273)

(86.7)

(42)

(13.3)

(315)

(100.0)

Against family and guardianship (non-payment of

alimonies, bigamy, child abduction and abuse, etc.). . .

20,065

97.2

576

2.8

20,641

100.0

Against public safety and the safety of land, water

and air traffic

. . À. . ° . . . . . . . . . . . ° . . . » . . °

8,780

97.1

266

2.9

9.046

100.0

Against state institutions and functionnaries (including

the police)

. . . . » ® ° Q . . . . » ° . ° ° . . . . . À . Q °

5,325

88.4

700

11.6

6,025

100.0

Against honour and personal inviolability (false alle-

gation, insults, etc.). ... ... 2144 41 4 1110

2,899

78.3

802

21.7

3,701

100.0

Against criminal justice system and against documents.

4,383

85.2

728

14.2

5,111

100.0

. ° . . Û . . . ° . ° ° . . ° L . + ° Q L

919

79.2

242

20.8

1,161

100.0

Îggiï5t public order

« - Q . Q * ° . . ° . Q e Q . . ° . . . . . . . . Q ° .

2,820

85.2

489

14.8

3,309

100.0

OTAL

° ° ° . . * ° Q ° . . . ° ° Q ° . ° ° * . . . . . . . À

88.2

11.2

138,470

17,406

155,876

100.0

Source : This table has been constructed on the basis of tables 16 (773) and 19 (776) in Rocznik…, 1980: 483 and 484.

one is responsible,k as well as usurpation of property in collaboration with

other persons, is significantly higher (13.4 percent). It appears that it is

crimes against state property which involve the use of force or violence for

which women are particularly rarely convicted; they represent only two per-

cent of all convictions of this type (7).

The statistical distribution of female convictions differs considerably

from that of male convictions. What is particularly striking about the female

contribution to the criminal convictions for various types of crime is the

fact that women accounted for 61.4 percent of convictions for economic

offences. According to the Polish criminal code, these offences are com-

mitted by the employees of the state economy who contribute to the

destruction or improper use of the state property or cause a shortage as well

as by those who acquire with the purpose of reselling at a profit or who

actually sell goods without authorization. Convictions for these crimes

constitued 20.5 percent of all female convictions, but only 1.6 percent of

male convictions. Moreover, the share of economic crimes, fiscal offences

and crimes against state property was a full 52 percent of all female con-

victions as compared to 31.2 percent of all male convictions. These data

indicate clearly that convicted women are much more likely than men to

be sentenced for offences related to the communist economic order, while

men tend to be more frequently convicted for more traditional crimes

involving violence, neglect of family and guardianship responsibilities and

violation of private property. This tendency seems to be consistent with

Soviet data. For instance, the Soviet press quotes many more examples of

women convicted for speculation, bribery and economic crimes than for

more conventional types of crime (e.g. Cherepanov, 1980: 6; Kurasov,

1980: 6; Kapelyushny, 1983: 2; Troyan, 1983: 6; Kazikhanov, 1983: 6;

Inoveli, 1983: 4). According to Zeldes,

in 1923, the proportion of women among those convicted for em-

bezzlement stood at 14 percent… by 1967 it reached 36 percent… For

Speculation and black-marketeering the percentage is almost 60 percent,

and, for fraud and deception of consumers by sales personnel, it is greater

than 70 percent (Zeldes, 1981: 78-80; see also Juviler, 1976: 151) (8).

Both economic crimes and crimes against state property are extremely

Wwidespread in all communist countries (see e.g. Los, 1980, 1982, 1983b).

Most of them are never prosecuted, either because of their uncontrollable,

epidemic proportions or the perpetrator’s political importance, and there-

fore, impunity. It must be noted that law enforcement in the area of econ-

Omic crimes is very selective and subject to manipulation. As well, it is

subjected to much more political interference, and especiallv by the local

party elites, than law enforcement in the area of conventional criminality.

Official statistics C” economic « rve ar: not an “ccurste measure of the

purvasiven(:ss tfo the :nenomeénun.

- 123-

The peculiarly high share of Polish female convictions for improper

performance of one’s administrative duties in the state economy, for illegal

use of state property under their management and for usurpation of state

property of considerable value (9) cannot be explained by women’s employ-

ment patterns. People who occupy managerial positions can cause more

damage to the economy than rank and file employees. But women are only

rarely appointed to these higher positions. It ssems that women are not

able to avoid prosecution as can more powerful male managers. Women

are also vulnerable to prosecution as accomplies in crime. Polish law does

not differentiate criminal responsibility by extent of participation in con-

spiracy cases (see Podemski, 1981). Since women often work as cashiers or

accountants, they are more likely to be aware of and therefore included

in operations of criminal conspiracies, but their actual role may be limited.

Nevertheless, they are quite obvious targets. As investigations rarely probe

above the subordinate employees, women are particularly vulnerable.

Another type of economic crime for which women are disproportion-

ally convicted is that of causing, even unintentionally, a shortage in the state

economy (10). Women accounted for 66 percent of those found guilty of

this offence. Crimes such as these can only be committed by persons who

occupy positions of responsibility or who are members of the management

group for their economic unit. Those familiar with the organization of the

Polish or Soviet economy know that many disturbances and losses in pro-

duction output are caused by faculty central planning and a lack of syn-

chronization in the functioning of various economic units (see, for example,

Besançon 1981). Such aspects of the organization of the economy cannot,

however, be criminalized. Blaming low-level managers or functionaries for

economic faisires is part of the routine political process which promotes

scapegoating and ritualistic purifications of the system.

In Poland, 68 percent of female convictions for economic crimes fall

into the category of speculation: the accumulation of goods with the intent

of resale at a profit, an offence punished by deprivation of liberty for up to

three years. À full 60 percent of those convicted for petty speculation in

1979 were women. To understand the nature of this kind of crime, it must

be remembered that, in Poland as in the Soviet Union, there are chronic

shortages of foodstuffs and consumer products. The prosperity of black

market and other forms of illegal redistribution of goods is thus an inevi-

table consequence of a centralized and too rigidly planned state economy.

It must be noted that there are various types of speculation which may

involve women in rather different ways. The most common and visible type

of speculation in both Poland and the USSR consists of buying rare goods

in state stores, from peasants, or from employees of state enterprises, and

reselling them at higher prices on street corners, at private markets or

through other black market channels. It does not require much organization

— 124 —

or any special skills, and is relatively easily detected since the offender is

directly involved in all the transactions (illegal purchases, illegal sales, etc.).

This kind of speculation is clearly numerically dominated by women, many

of whom work in the retail trade (see ‘:Ukrywanie…’, 1983: 4 for some

typical examples). Women are well familiar with the operation of the

market, the nature of shortages, and the mentality of buyers, because they

themselves are the providers for their families and the frustrations caused by

constant shortage are part of their daily experience.

In addition to these petty speculators in everyday consumers items

(food, clothing, cosmetics, flowers, etc.), there also exists a much better

organized network of wholesale dealers who trade in large amounts of stolen

state property (for example, with private businessmen), art (usually

smuggled abroad), apartments, cars, agricultural machinery, construction

materials, or any other products, whose open sales are restricted by some

political regulations. In order to secure the release of large quantities of

these goods to black market, such networks have to include very high

regional or even central functionaries, whose cooperation is crucial for their

successful operation and relative impunity. Due to the ineffective law

enforcement and assured political protection of this kind of speculation, it

is difficult to determine to what extent, and in what role, women are

actually involved. There can be no doubt, however, that this kind of specu-

lation is much more detrimental to the economy and more profitable to the

participants than the highly ‘feminized’, and criminalized, street corner

speculation in stockings of flowers.

Another previously mentioned category of crime for which women are

likely to be prosecuted is that of fiscal offences. Among these, trading in

foreign currency is by far the most frequently penalized. In 1979, women

accounted for almost 29 percent of these convictions in Poland. It should be

noted that ‘hard’ currency has a special, almost magic, power within com-

munist countries, especially since citizens are not officially allowed to

purchase western currencies despite the fact that many consumers goods

(foodstuffs, cosmetics, clothing, cars, coal, building materials, apartments,

etc.) which are in short supply on the open market, are readily available in

‘hard currency stores’ operated by the state. What has resulted, therefore, is

the existence of a developed double currency system. While the state is

desperate for foreign currency in order to import goods and to service

foreign debts, the citizens are as desperate to obtain needed goods. As a

resuilt, the whole complex world of illegal middlemen and middlewomen

(currency speculators and blackmarketeers) has emerged to service these

unsatisfied needs and facilitate the desired circulation of money. Hard

Currency is provided by foreign tourists, smugglers, corrupt foreign trade

Officials, and various other deals and exchanges. Much of it ends up in the

State’s possession through the network of special stores, a fact which

Suggests that the enforcement of the law in this area may be somewhat

— 125 —

selective. It is well known that more successful currency dealers operate

with the blessing of the authorities and buy their immunity by ‘paying off

special commissions from their spoils. Some offenders have to be singled out

for prosecution, however, to counter any public suspicion regarding the

total corruption of the police or its outright indolence. Women seem to be

clearly overrepresented in this group. They are often prostitutes working in

expensive hotels and restaurants which attract many foreign visitors. Not

only do they demand payment for their services in foreign currency, but

they are also ‘employed’, by their pimps of currency speculators themselves,

to make illegal exchanges of money for their clients.

Yet another type of crime in which women are overrepresented is the

illegal sale of alcoho!l. Women, according to 1977 statistics, accounted for

58.7 percent of all cases (see Los, 1983a: 52). Alcoholism is among the most

acute social problems in both Poland and the USSR and the demand for

alcohol is always great. The legal purchase of spirits is, however, difficult

at night, on Saturdays, or in cases of already intoxicated or juvenile cus-

tomers since the state prohibits the sale of alcohol in all these instances.

Hence, there is a high enough demand for illegal alcohol to support large-

scale networks of underground dealers whose supplies come in part from

moonshining, in part from ordinary stores, and partially from hard currency

stores where alcohol prices are relatively competitive despite the need to

purchase currency on the black market. Needless to say, the state economy

profits from these alcohol purchases made by traffickers in hard currency

stores since they inevitably channel large amounts of black market foreign

money into the state’s purse.

Bootlegging is the domain of older destitute women in both Polish

and Soviet society. Rural women in the Soviet Union turn to this form

of illegal activity to supplement their meager pensions (Shelley, 1980: 216).

Women involved in alcoho! sales and moonshining in Poland are frequently

ex-prostitutes, whose age and state of health do not allow them to continue

in their trade, but who do not have any legitimate place in society. They

can usually rely on their former clients and friends to spread information

about their new ‘business’ and to secure sufficient numbers of customers.

Convictions of these women interrupt their criminal activities during the

period of their imprisonment, but they usually return to their trade as soon

as they can in the absence of any legal opportunities, reference groups or

viable economic alternatives. Thus, their occasional imprisonment does

not disturb the balance of the neatly designed system of mutual services

and profits in the highly integrated system of illicit and licit markets.

In sum, official statistics, which indicate the relatively high involvement

of women in nonconventional, economic offences, have to be treated with

caution. While there is no doubt that womer da participate quite actively

in various types of economic and fiscal offezces, it 15 r“vessary 12 ve tT7a «

— 126 —

of the highly selective and biased functioning of the criminal justice system.

It should be noted that prosecution for economic and fiscal offences is a

purely political matter and that no legal action may be initiated against a

party member without a clearance from the appropriate party committee.

Nonetheless, it appears that women’s involvement in these crimes is actually

considerably greater than their participation in conventional offences, and

especially those crimes which involve violence.

SOVIET ACCOUNTS OF FEMALE CRIME

Neither the Soviet nor Polish criminological literature offers any

explanation for the obvious discrepancy in officially recorded female

delinquency rates in the more traditional areas of crime and these related

to the communist economy. In fact, the nature of female crime and the

patterns of its prosecution have been totally neglected by Polish crimi-

nologists.

Among the Soviet authors, M.N. Golodniuk displays the most con-

sistent interest in the female offender. One of the studies, conducted by

Golodniuk in the 1970s, looked at female recidivists serving time in a Soviet

labour colony of ordinary regimen. According to this study, it is the dif-

ference in male and female personalities which can explain the differences in

rates of criminality between the sexes (Golodniuk, 1975).

Golodniuk found that female recidivists were most frequently con-

victed for: theft of personal property, hooliganism, theft of socialist pro-

perty, theft in connection with vagrancy, refusal to take jobs (parasitism),

violations of internal passport regulations and illegal abortions. The partici-

pation of women in both crimes against persons and crimes with violence

was very low. When committed, such crimes were as a rule, triggered by

difficult personal relationships with victims, who were usually relatives or

acquaintances. Approximately fifty percent of the women studied were

intoxicated that traumatic personal relationships, family disorganization,

economic hardship and alcoholism had considerable influence on the

criminal involvement of these women. Moreover, Golodniuk claimed that

many of these convicted women had no faith in themselves and nurtured

dreams of finding a strong man who would provide leadership and protection

In a more recent publication by the same author (Golodniuk, 1980), far

less attention is paid to the alleged criminal personality of female offenders

and much more to social and economic conditions. As well, the analysis is

more directly focused on offences committed by working women against

state property. The author claims that a considerable proportion of women

convicted of crimes for gain related to their jobs were engaged in physically

heavy, unskilled labour (in industry, warehouses, etc.). Such crimes are

— 127 —

also frequently committed by women working in food stores where they

have many opportunities to deceive customers. These types of work pro-

duce fatigue, irritability and disillusionment with respect to the occupation.

While they are physically demanding and involve financial responsibility,

they are very low-paid. Golodniuk stresses that the use of equal standards

for men and women at jobs requiring considerable physical effort places

women in disadvantageous conditions. Female responsibility for home-

making and child-rearing inhibits their professional careers, limits skills-

upgrading and causes excessive physical and nervous stress.

According to Golodniuk, this ‘double burden’ of work and home

responsibilities, the official indifference to the needs of working women,

the increasing rate of family breakdown, the alcoholism of husbands, the

psychological trauma of divorce and the financial difficulties of divorced

women left with children, all contribute to the incidences of female crime.

She suggests that the prevention of such crime requires the implementation

of a set of a measures, socioeconomic, political and ideological in nature,

aimed at improving the social position of women (Golodniuk, 1980: 41).

À POSSIBLE EXPLANATION OF THE PECULAR PATTERN

OF FEMALE CRIME

While the post-war increases in the overall female crime rates were

clearly of a temporary nature, the persistence of women’s overrepresen-

tation in convictions for unconventional, economic offences and their

underrepresentation in the area of conventional crime calls for some ex-

planation.

It follows logically from the earlier argument regarding the social

position of women and the nature of their emancipation that they con-

tinue to be subjected to traditional controls to a much greater extent than

men. The role of mother imposes upon women the exceedingly difficult

task of the preservation and intergenerational transmission of the threatened

values of their national cultural traditions and religious (either Christian or

Moslem) moral norms. The informal infrastructure of these societies which

secures the survival of traditions depends to a great extent upon the preser-

vation of the traditional model of the patriotic and selfless mother.

The importance of the men’s status, on the other hand, seems to

decrease as the employment of women weakens their role as economic

providers for the family, and their involvement in the upbringing of children

still carries a stigma of feminity, a threat to their masculine egos in many

social strata. In fact, while the female feeling of both economic and moral

responsibility for the family grows, the male sense of responsibility and

purpose seems to dwindle. The lack of opportunities for grass roots, social

— 128 —

and political involvement (with-the exception of the period of the Solidarity

movement in Poland) and the high levels of political and economic alien-

ation in countries ruled by one party in a fully centralized manner, adds to

the insecurity and relative futility of their social position. An understanding

of these culturally and politically conditioned status differences of women

and men in communist countries helps to explain and interpret the lack of

increase of female involvement in conventional crime compared with the

rates of this type of crime among men.

These arguments do not explain, however, the relatively high female

conviction rates for nonconventional economic and fiscal offences. It is

possible that there does exist a systematic anti-female bias within law en-

forcement towards this type of crime. While Western societies have a double

standard that may shield women from the harshness of the justice system,

women in these societies, who lack the political clout to protect themselves

may be subject to reverse discrimination, suffering disproportionately for

their involvement in this area.

The discriminative prosecution notwithstanding, there are also some

plausible explanations was to why women are actually quite actively in-

volved in the illegal economic activities. Radical transformations in econ-

omic organization and property relations in Poland and the Soviet Union,

with the accompaning criminalization of many new areas of economy-

related activities, have not been paralleled by corresponding changes in

social consciousness and the informal normative culture of these societies.

The lack of economic efficiency and impact of party control as well as the

overtly aetheist ideology of the new order have prevented a natural fusion

of old and new values. It seems quite probable that, while women continue

to obey the traditional mores and norms which apply to more conventional

crimes, they may not feel so restrained in new areas where no authoritative

guidance is provided by tradition. Moreover, these new areas are detached

from the home environment and do not seem to have any immediate

relevance to women’s performance in their cultural role as mother. This

role is regulated by the coherent and familiar morality of face-to-face

relationships aimed at the protection of human life and health, family, and

private property. While this disjunction between the new and old morality

can be found among both men and women, the latter ssem to be more

bound by the traditional morality due to their different upbringing and

more intense involvement in the moral education of children.

— 129 —

NOTES .

(1)

In Poland 1981 women constituted 76 percent of-those employed

in education, 81 percent of all employees in health care and social

services, 61 percent in administration and criminal justice system, and

70 percent in retail trade. On the other hand, women constituted only

37 percent of all employees in industry, 19 percent in constructions,

27 percent in agriculture and 26 percent in transport (Maly Rocznik…,

1983: 45). The respective figures for the Soviet Union appear to be

very similar (Barry and Barner-Barry, 1982: 199).

The same journalist suggests elsewhere that child care facilities have

been in the early 1980s limited in order to force mothers to stay at

home, an act which is expected to help alleviate the problem of

surplus manpower (Mankiewicz, 1981 b: 4).

(3)

Magdalena Jasinska, who teaches at the University of Warsaw, has

conducted two major studies on young prostitutes in the Warsaw

area. The first study took place in the late 1950s, the second one in

the late 1970s and early 1980s. Fach project involved in-depth inter-

views with 100 prostitutes as well as interviews with their families,

policemen, doctors, restaurant and hotel staff. While the prostitutes

in the first study were identified by variety of methods, the women

in the second project were identified and approached during their

dermatological check-ups. Both projects were conducted with a great

care to preserve the anonymity of the respondents and to gain their

trust.

(4)

Prostitutes caught without a valid certificate from a dermatological

clinic are often prosecuted under the petty offence code. Such actions

violate, however, the United Nations convention on human trade and

exploitation of prostitution, ratified by Poland in 1952.

(5)

In the period between 1946 and 1955, 3.5 million people moved from

the countryside to the cities (Dyoniziak et al., 1978: 57).

(6)

According to the official statistics, 4.5 million people had settled in

the western territories by 1950. Almost three million came from other

parts of Poland while 1.5 million were repatriated from the Soviet

Union (Dyoniziak at al., 1978:55).

(7)

More specific data available for 1977 show that convictions of women

constituted as much as 32.3 percent (1,970 cases) of all convictions in

1977 for illegal use of state property which they were employed to

manage, protect or supervise. (This crime is punishable by deprivation

of liberty for one to ten years). Additionally, women accounted for

20.2 percent (82 cases) of all convictions for the usurpation of social

property of considerable value. This is considered a very serious crime

and carries a penalty of five to 25 years of deprivation of liberty.

Moreover, female convictions constituted 18.6 percent (283 cases) of

— 130 —

convictions for the usurpation of state property committed in agree-

ment with another person(s), an offence involving penalties for one

to 25 years of deprivation of freedom.

(8)

According to Zeldes, theft of personal property accounts for approxi-

mately 40 percent of all Soviet female convictions, embezzlement of

state property for 18 percent, fraud and deception of consumers by

sales personnel for 12 percent, speculating and black-marketeering for

10 percent, vandalism and disorderly behaviour for 6 percent, murder

for 4 percent, robbery for 3 percent and other crimes for 7 percent.

The respective percentages for men are: hooliganism, 38 percent;

embezzlement, 27 percent; theft, robbery and armed assault,

18 percent; crimes against persons, 10 percent and other offences,

7 percent (Zeldes, 1981 : 78-80).

(9)

The perspective percentages in 1977 were: 56.9 percent, 32.3 percent

and 20.2 percent (see Los, 1983a: 60).

(10)

According to s. 218 of the Polish Criminal Code, ‘whoever, failing to

perform a duty or exceeding his authority in the field of supervision

over social property, its protection or its management, creates, even

unintentionally, a possibility of the occurrence of a shortage, if a

significant shortage in the property ensues shall be subject to the

penalty of deprivation of liberty for from six months to five years'

(The Penal Code…, 1973).

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“SOVIET WOMEN SPEND MORE TIME LINING UP THAN WITH THEIR

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STARCK-KOZLOWSKA K- :V82), “ Zycie w galonie” (Life in à galle;»

244 343

5

— 133

STERN, M. (with A. Stern)

(1980) Sex in the USSR. New York, N.Y.: The New York Times Co.

Troyan,S.

(1983) ‘‘Face to Face with the Law: Moral Degradation”, Izvestia,

11 January: 6. Condensed in CDSP, 35(2), 9 February: 19.

“UKRYWANIE TOWAROW” (1983), (Hiding of Goods), Zycie Warszawy,

21 November: 4.

ZELDES, I. (1981), The Problems of Crime in the USSR. Springtield, IIl

Charles C. Thomas.

ABSTRACT

The present article examines the participation of women in thre: forms

of crime and deviance: traditional female deviance (e.g. prostitution,. on-

ventional crime (e.g. against private property or violent crime) and

on

conventional crime, specific to the organization of the economy in these

countries (e.g. speculation, appropriation of state property, etc.). Using the

existing statistical data and research findings, it is shown that, despite

radical social change, Polish and Soviet women continue to be grossly under-

represented in convictions for so-called conventional crime. Their share in

convictions for nonconventional crime, however, appears to be unusually

high. To understand these findings it is necessary to realize that, despite

their occupational and educational liberation, women still remain both the

primary socialization agents and homemakers. This double burden imposed

by family and occupational roles as well as their responsibility to transmit

moral and patriotic values make women less susceptible to violations of

traditional ethnical codes and religion-based mores. As well as being too in-

volved in life’s responsibilities, social controls such as the Church and

informal control systems monitor them too closely to allow for overt

involvement in criminal life styles. Yet, unconventional economic crime

presents women with new criminal opportunities, free of conventional

criminal stigma and consistent with their occupational roles. Employment

provides women the opportunity to engage in economic and fiscal offences

which are not regulated by the traditional ethics and, therefore, do not

openly conflict with their traditional role as socialization agents.

RÉSUMÉ

CHANGEMENTS SOCIAUX ET CRIMINALITÉ FÉMININE

SOUS LE COMMUNISME : ÉTUDE DE L’URSS

ET DE LA POLOGNE

L’article examine la criminalité féminine sous trois formes de crime et

déviance: la criminalité traditionnelle féminine (ex. prostitution), la

— 134 —

criminalité traditionnelle (ex. délits contre la propriété ou crimes violents),

et la criminalité non-traditionnelle, spécifique à l’organisation de l’économie

dans ces pays communistes (ex. spéculation, appropriation de la propriété

de l’État, etc.). Selon les données statistiques et les résultats de recherche,

les femmes polonaises et soviétiques continuent d’être exagérément sous-

représentées dans les condamnations du crime soit-disant traditionnelles,

malgré des changements sociaux radicaux. Cependant, leur part dans les

condamnations de criminalité non-traditionnelle paraît être très élevée. Pour

comprendre ces conclusions, il est nécessaire de réaliser que, malgré leur

libération professionnelle et éducative, les femmes sont encore aussi bien

agents primaires de socialisation que maîtresses de maison. Ce double far-

deau imposé par leur rôle familial et professionnel, ainsi que leur responsa-

bilité de transmettre des valeurs morales et patriotiques, rend les femmes

moins susceptibles aux violations des codes traditionnels éthiques et reli-

gieux. En plus d’être responsables des tâches quotidiennes, les contrôles

sociaux, tel que l’Église et les systèmes informels, empéchent les femmes

de s’engager ouvertement dans la criminalité traditionnelle. Cependant, la

criminalité économique et non-traditionnelle offre des nouvelles opportu-

nités criminelles aux femmes, sans stigmate et compatibles avec leur rôle

professionnel. L’emploi fournit aux femmes la chance de s’engager dans

des délits économiques et fiscaux qui ne sont pas réglés par les éthiques tra-

ditionnelles et, par conséquent, qui ne sont pas en contradiction avec leur

rôle comme agents de socialisation.

— 135 —

FEMALE CRIMINALITY AND THE STATUS OF WOMEN*

Cathy Spatz Widom**

and

Abigail J. Stewart***

INTRODUCTION

Over the last fifteen years, popular and scholarly interest in female

criminality has been heightened, with the result that we have seen an

explosion of research and theorizing. While there has been much debate

about the rate of increase of female crime verus male crime and the distri-

bution of crimes committed by females (Simon, 1975; Smart, 1977; Weis,

1976; Steffensmeier, 1982), little consensus has been achieved. Regardless,

a strong commitment to further understanding of female crime remains.

Major theories about the causes or correlates of crime have generally

been directed at explanations of lower-class male criminal behavior. In the

past, these ‘‘mainstream’’ theories were not applied to female criminal

behavior, rather theories and popular conceptions about female crime were

based on stereotypical assumptions about women. As a result, gender

identity or expectations about appropriate sex role identity have played a

major role in popular explanations of female crime (Widom, 1984), which

have tended to involve biological or psychological factors rather than social

and economic causes.

Recently, with the increased attention and publicity that has been given

to notorious female criminals and the apparent increases in female crime

rates, there has been much speculation about the role of the ‘women’s

movement”. Fluctuations in the rate and patterns of female crime have been

attributed to factors such as women’s ‘’emancipation” and their increased

equality vis-à-vis men.

*

Requests f0r' reprints should be addressed to Cathy Spatz Widom,

Department of Forensic Studies, Indiana University, 302 Sycamore Hall.

Bloomington, Indiana 47405. This is a revised version of a paper origin-

ally presented at the 1977 annual meeting of the American Society of

Criminology. The authors wish to thank David G. Winter and Michael

Sokol for assistance with the computer analyses and Wesley G. Skogan,

Michael G. Maxfield, Philip Parnell, and Ruth Colker for comments on

%%

an earlier draft of the manuscript.

Indiana University, Professor, Department of Forensic Studies.

*** Boston University, Assistant Professor, Department of Psychology.

- 137 —

The present paper is an attempt to empirically examine the relationship

between female crime rates and certain variables reflecting the status of

women across a variety of nations. As a framework for this analysis, we

draw upon major theories that have been advanced to explain female crime,

as well as relevant general theories, and to place these in the conctext of

development. We consider both traditional explanations — heretofore

limited to male crime — as well as a variety of sex-role-related theories and

include variables reflecting the social, economic, and political status of

women, as well as general societal factors typically included in explanations

of male crime rates. By assessing relationships across a number of different

nations, we hope to understand the correlates of female crime in the widest

possible variety of settings (levels of industrialization, political systems, and

so on). Future research might examine the evolution of women’s role in

conjunction with female crime rates over time.

There are two mays of measuring the dependent variable (1) :

Level

Female arrests =

Females arrested as a percentage of

Females

total female population at risk.

Distribution

Female arrests =

Females arrested as a percentage of all

Total arrests

arrests (male and female).

The first is a measure of the number of arrests relative to population at

risx, while the second is a measure of the relative distribution of arrests

across sex. In principle, the two could be completely uncorrelated: the first

indicates level, while the second measures distribution. The first measure

reflects level, and may or may not go up and down with male rates. The

second measure controls for the amount or rate of crime and can reflects its

full range of values, regardless of amount. For example, women and men

could be arrested in equal numbers in a particular country, but because

there is very little crime in that country, the level of arrests for women

woulb be very small. However, the distribution of female arrests (number of

females arrested divided by the total number of arrests for males and

females) would be quite high. Some of the theories we examine attempt to

explain level, while others address distribution.

A brief description of each theory is followed by hypotheses derived

from each. These hypotheses then form the basis of analysis and discussion

of resuits.

THEORIES OF FEMALE CRIME

Some theorists assume that there is an association between industrial-

ization and women’s growing crime and many assume a relation;hip

— 138 —

between the ‘“women’s movement” and increases in female crime. However,

as Smart (1977) points out, it is problematic to attribute changes in the

behavior of women and girls to the influence of the women’s liberation

movement. Social movements are themselves the outcome of economic,

social and political changes and processes and, although such movements

may instigate change, they are also the result of existing changes. Thus,

criminal women and delinquent girls may be dissatisfied with the restric-

tions and limited opportunities associated with the traditional feminine role,

but the changes in their consciousness are as likely to be caused by changing

material conditions as by the principles of the women’s liberation move-

ment.

‘’Those theorists who assume that a simple causal relationship exists

between the Movement and increases in the rate of female criminality

ignore the material and structural changes that are taking place in the

lives of women and girls which are to some extent independent of demands

for equality of the sexes” (Smart, 1977, p. 74).

In any case, the women’s movement, to the extent that it is perceived

as relevant to female criminality, is best understood as having its effects

indirectly by modifying either the absolute or relative status of women.

Another pervasive assumption is common to what we will loosely refer

to as equality theory. Equality theory is an attempt to explain changes over

time in female criminal activity, and cultural differences in male: female

privileges, they also become their equals in crime (Nettler, 1974). There are

several variants of equality theory, with each emphasizing what it considers

to be critical factors. In addition , these theories refer to one or other of the

dependent variables discussed above. The general form of equality theory

states that female crime increases as a function of the increasing equality of

women. Âs males and females approach equality, female arrest rates should

increase for both level and distribution (that is, relative to males).

In this simplest form, equality theory leads to the prediction that one

of the consequences of the emancipation of women is an increase in female

criminality. The emancipation hypothesis is an old argument, which has

persisted throughout the century. In the early 1900's Lombroso (1903)

warned of the dangers of educating women and removing the constraints

of domesticity and maternity. As recently as 1969, there was a widespread

belief in a direct causal relationship between female emancipation and

female crime. We note in the staff report submitted to the National Com-

mission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence: ‘’It is also the case that

the ‘‘emancipation’’ of females in our society over recent decades has

decreased the differences in delinquency and criminality between boys and

girls, men and women, as cultural differences between them have narrowed

(Mulvihill et al., 1969, p. 425). We use emancipation here in the narrow

sense to refer to legal emancipation and operationalize it in terms of number

of years that women have had the full vote.

— 139 -

Another form of equality theory emphasizes the status of women. The

status of women hypothesis predicts that as the status of women increases,

the participation of women in all forms of crime will also increase. Thus,

this hypothesis predicts to level of female arrests, not to the distribution of

female arrests relative to arrests for males. Hacker (1941) observed that the

female crime rate tended to converge with the male rate in countries where

females had the greatest equality with males (such as in Western Europe,

Australia, and the United States), and to be most divergent in countries

where females had lower relative status. Bertrand (1973) found that in

societies where women were restricted to the traditional female role in the

home (e.g., Venezuela), little crime was committed by women. Sutherland

and Cressey (1974) noted that in war years, when women take over the

occupations of men and in other ways approach social equality, the female

crime rate increases. ‘“The significant difference is in the social position of

the girls and women as compared with boys and men, and the difference in

social position either determines the frequency and intensity of the delin-

quency and anti-delinquency patterns which impinge upon them or deter-

mines the frequency of opportunities for crimes which are available to

them” (p.130).

What we have labelled the sex-role differentiation hypothesis locates

the source of variation in female crime rates on the extent of sex role

differentiation in a society. As women’s roles change and they experience

more opportunity and more tension and frustration, women will be more

likely to engage in crime (Smart, 1977). For example, Houchon (1967)

calculated sex ratios in crime for nine regions in Africa and found that the

rates for men exceeded those for women by differences ranging from 900

to 1l to more than 20,000 to 1. These regional differences were attributed to

work-role and privilege differences between men and women. Thus, this

theory predicts that the more distinct and different the sex roles, the greater

the reported differences between the sexes in crime rates. As sex roles

become more similar, the differences between the sexes in crime rates

should also decrease. Thus, this theory addresses relationships about the

distribution of females arrested, relative to total arrests.

Opportunity theory is based on the assumption that women occupy

and perform roles in the criminal world which are defined by their sex-

determined lack of opportunity (Weis, 1976). According to Simon (1975),

as women increase their participation in the labor force, the opportunity to

commit certain kinds of crime will also increase. Countries in which women

are represented in the commercial labor force in large members are likely to

have the highest levels of female white collar crime (e.g., fraud and minor

larceny), since it is in these countries that women will have the greatest

opportunity to commit them. Às Wwomen are provided with opportunities

traditionally reserved for males, their attempts to gain equal status will

encompass criminal as well as civil behaviors. As others have pointed out

- 140 —

(e.g. Miller (1976)), this theory is based on the notion that the typical

female offender is a white collar criminal involved in embezzlement or some

other form of corporate fraud, whereas in reality the perpetrators of these

offences are infrequently represented in the records of the criminal justice

system and rarely come to the attention of the courts.

The economic theory of crime causation suggests that crime is a

“rational’’ response to a situation of economic deprivation (Nettler, 1974).

Adler (1975) argued that liberated female criminals are chiefly interested

in improving their financial circumstances and only secondarily in com-

mitting acts of violence. Thus, the motivation for female crime is economic

and females with lower levels of economic well-being should have higher

rates of crime. Female crime is viewed as a preferred livelihood, especially

for specific crimes, such as prostitution. The relationship between economic

level and violent crime is less clear.

In contrast to the predictions of economic theory, Simon (1975) found

that high overall crime and arrest rates were associated with higher levels of

economic development and technological advancement. However, Simon

found little relationship between the rate of female crime and level of

economic development.

Clearly, these theories of female criminality direct researchers’ atten-

tion to different issues, and in some cases lead to opposite predictions.

Thus, for example, ‘“cpportunity” theory predicts that crime will increase

as a function of economic development, whereas ‘’economic” theory

predicts that it will decrease with economic development.

Although not generally included in discussions of female criminality,

social disorganization theories of crime causation predict a relationship

between disruptive social conditions (familial, marital, economic, environ-

mental, and educational) and delinquency and criminality (Bloom, 1969).

According to Sutherland and Cressey (1974), ‘‘’one of the best expla-

nations… is that a high crime rate is due to social disorganization” (p.77).

Turner (1969) found that areas in Philadeiphia high in resident offenders

were characterized by low income and low occupational status, high den-

sity, high proportion of blacks, and a high proportion of unrelated individ-

uals living in households and contributing to their income. Archer and

Gartner (1976) discussed the effects of wars in disrupting the social order

of societies and included in these disruptions property losses, rapid indus-

trialization, changes in the labor force, sudden population migrations,

breaking up of families, and so on. Although high levels ot disorganization

are thought to relate to increases in arrest rates, the theory should apply

equally to males and females. Thus, hypotheses based on disorganization

are directed toward the level of female arrests, not toward the distribution

of arrests between males and females.

— 141 —

The purpose of this study is to examine these various theories simul-

taneously in an attempt to understand the correlates of female arrest rates

across a variety of nations. General hypotheses derived from the theories

and variations on some of the hypotheses follow.

HYPOTHESES

Equality Theory

As women and men approach equality, female arrests should increase.

A

As women become emancipated, female arrest rates should in-

crease. (EMANCIPATION)

B

As sex roles become more similar, differences between the sexes in

arrest rates should decrease. (SEX-ROLE DIFFERENTIATION)

C

As the status of women increases, the participation of women in all

forms of crime will also increase. (STATUS OF WOMEN)

Opportunity Theory

As women become more economically active, there will be an increase

in the level of women arrested. As the particinat:>n of women in the

labor force increases thvre <vill !*c an increase in fcimnales arrested for

white-collar crimes.

A. As levet où iecsanc yucal development increases, there wil! be an

ncicase in the tove! of female arrests.

1. Fhe associalion between level of technological development and

increases in female arrest rates wil] be restricted to white-col!ar

crimes.

Economic Theory

Lower levels of economic participation of women will be ussociated

with increases in the level of female arrests.

A. Specifically, lower levels of economic participation of women will

be associated with increases in female arrests for property, prosti-

tution and related crimes, but unrelated to arrests for violent

Crimes.

Social Disorganization Theory

High levels of social disorganization and disruption will be associated

with increased levels of female arrests.

METHOD

Female arrest statistics collected by the International Criminal Police

Organization (Interpol) and published in International Criminal Statistics

— 142 -

for .l971-1972 were used to assess female criminality in different countries.

Each volume contains the number of offences and offenders known to the

police per year, the types of crimes for which the arrests were made, and

classification by offender sex.

Status of women data were taken from standard objective sources such

as the United Nations Demographic Yearbook and the United Nations

Statistical Yearbook (see Stewart and Winter, 1977). Included in the analy-

ses are only those countries for which both sets of data (female arrests and

status of women) were available. As can be seen in Table 1, a reasonable

array of nations from around the world are included. Since these analyses

are not restricted to highly industrialized nations, they are valuable in

providing an important comparative perspective in which to examine

theories of female crime.

TABLE I

List of Nations Included

Asia

Europe

Africa

Ceylon

Austria

Fgypt

Indonesia

Denmark

Kenya

Iraq

Finland

Libya

Israel

France

Mauritius

Japan

Greece

Morocco

Malaysia

Ireland

Nigeria

Pakistan

Netherlands

Tunisia

Phillipines

Noway

Saudi Arabia

Portugal

Syria

Romania

Thailand

Spain

Turkey

Sweden

United Kingdom (a)

West Germany

North America

South America

Oceania

Canada

Argentina

Australia

Dominican Republic

Chile

New Zealand

Netherlands Antilles

Colombia

United States

Peru

a) England and Wales only.

Several caveats should be mentioned. Unfortunately, official crime

statistics are probably the most unreliable and difficult of all social statistics.

Data on the status of women probably runs a close second. Ît is well known

that arrest rates vary with differences in police activity and arrest practices

(Sutherland and Cressey, 1974). In addition, the problems associated with

general arrest statistics are magnified in regard to females because of the

— 143 —

potential for differential handling of female offenders by the criminal

justice system and for changes over time that might have influenced these

rates (Nagel and Weitzman, 1972; Widom, 1978; Ekstrand and Eckert,

1978).

Furthermore, arrest rates may be confounded with better record-

keeping in the more technologically advanced countries. In addition, even

though the total sample is 43, the number of countries used in calculating

specific correlation coefficients may be much smaller because of the data

were unavailable.

Nation-states are the units of analysis. Independant variables have been

chosen to operationalize specific predictions from the theories described

above, but theorists have used the concept of ‘“status of women” to refer to

a variety of things. In addition, there is a problem in separating the effects

of one independent variable (extent of female participation in the labor

force) from the effects of other variables which may be closely related (e.g.

amount of manufacturing, level of technology, or level of education).

The Appendix provides a detailed description of the names, definitions,

and sources for the variables included in these analyses. In cases where male

and female data are directly compared (rates, ages, and so on), the variable

is always coded so that a high score indicates lower status of women (for

example, male minus female percent economically active). In cases where

comparison is implicit (e.g. female level I students as a percentage of all

level I students), a high score would indicate greater opportunity, higher

status or greater equality for women.

Most of the variables are straightforward, but those referring to ‘’econ-

omic differentiation” require further comment. These variables indicate

how sex segregated is a nation’s work force. Differentiation in the work

force can be classified into five categories of status, ten of occupation, and

nine of industry. Thus, for example, one can determine whether women,

relative to men, are concentrated in the status category of employer (versus

employee), or in the occupation category of administrative/clerical (versus

professional/technical, sales, production, etc.) or in the industry category

of commerce (versus agriculture, mining, manufacturing, etc.). The overall

index of differentiation reflects the segregation by sex of the work force

across the particular series of categories (status, occupation, and industry).

Ît is calculated by summing, across all categories of the series, the absolute

differences between the percent of economically active males in the

category and the percent of economically active females in the category,

and dividing this sum by two. This measure reflects differentiation or

segregation, and is independent of sex differences in the propensity to be

economically active overall.

Table 2 indicates which specific variables are utilized to test the various

hypotheses, and the predicted relationship of the independent variables with

— 144 —

both dependent variables. Although there is some overlap, each hypothesis

is tested with a different variable or set of variables. Pearson product-

moment correlations are used to assess the extent of association between

the independent variables and arrest rates. We discuss these analyses in terms

of associations or relationships since the data for the indepenent and de-

pendent variables were drawn from the same approximate time period.

Strictly speaking, we should use multiple regression techniques to establish

the independent, unique association of each predictor variable with the

female arrest rates, with the effects of the other variables statistically con-

trolled. This is impossible in the present cases because of the small (and

fluctuating) numbers of cases for many variables. Thus, any interpretation

of the results presented here should be tempered with the caution that since

the independent variables are in many cases highly correlated, some of the

correlations with arrest rates may well be spurious.

RESULTS

Table 3 presents the correlations between educational, economic, legal,

technological and social disorganization variables and level of female arrests

(percentage of females arrested/female population) across a variety of

nations. Table 4 presents correlations for the same variables and the distri-

bution of female arrests (percentage of females arrested/total arrests). In

each of these tables, correlations are reported for total arrests and the

specific offences of murder, sex crimes, major larceny, minor larceny, total

larceny, counterfeiting, fraud, and drugs. Table S summarizes the results in

terms of hypotheses and specific predictions. Predictions associated with the

hypotheses.

Several versions of equality theory received strong support and specific

indicators of social disorganization were related to individual offences. On

the other hand, sex role differentiation and economic theory received little

support. In its form linking opportunity to technological development,

opportunity theory received some support; however, in its more restricted

form which focused on white collar crimes, the results were disappointing.

As women achieve equality with males in certain spheres (that is, the

smaller the difference between males and females in legal age of marriage,

infant mortality rate, and suicide rate), the level of female arrests decreases.

On the other hand, greater equality between the sexes in other respects

(illiteracy, economic activity, economic differentiation, and life expectancy

at 1 year) is associated with higher rates of arrests.

Emancipation, as measured by the number of years women have had

the full vote, was significantly related to the level and distribution of female

arrests. For level, total arrest rates as well as major, minor, and total larceny)

were significant. For distribution, significant correlations were found for

these same crimes plus murder, counterfeiting, and fraud. Female arrests for

sex crimes were not to this legal status variable.

— 145 —

TABLE II

Summary of Differential Predictions of the Hypotheses

[Predicted Direction of Relationship (+ or —)]

Variables

Level

Distribution

Hypothesis

1.EQUALITY:

Male-female legal age of marriage

. . À . - . À ° .

Female-male illiteracy rate

- . À- e . ° . À . . À e À

. ° . À - . À °

% Male-female economically active

Economic differentiation in:

- status

° ° . À . ° . . À ° ° . . . À ° . . e À e » ° .

- industry

° e À . . ° ° . ° . À e À- . . e » . e » ° . »

- occupation

. . ° . . .… À . . . À e À . À . À « . - .

Male-female suicide rate

. . . À. . À . . À . . » . À

L ° . . . .

Male-female life expectancy at 1 year

Female-male infant mortality rate :

- 1-6 days

. . . e À . ° . . . À. . . . . À - . e . . . .

- 7-27 days

- 28-364 days

. ° . . . À . ». ° ° . ° ° . . À . . ». À

lA. Emancipation:

years women have had full vote

1B

Sex-Role Differentiation :

. . À . - . . -

Male-female legal of marriage-

Economic differentiation in:

- status

. . À . À . . . . e e e ° e » ° . . . . À

- industry

. . ° ° . . . . . ° . - . . . ° . . . À

- occupation

. . ° . . À ° ° . ° . À ° . e … . °

+++

1C

Status of Women:

of years women have had full vote

+

Male-female legal age of marriage

° . e À . À

Median years education for females

. e À . À

+ !

Female illiteracy

. ° . À . e . . Àe . À. ° . * .

% Female level I students

. . e - . L ° . .

% Female level II students

. . . À . . . . ° .

. ° - . À . . - °

% Female level II students

% Females economically active

° ° . ° . À- .

% Married females economically active

+++++

OPPORTUNITY :

% Females economically active

+

2A. Level of technological development :

% Workers agriculture

. . Û ° ° . ° . ° . . .

% Workers manufacturing

Kwh per capita

° . . . ° ° . . . . . ° . » . °

GDP per capita

° . ° ° . À ° . À. ° . À ° . . e

+++i

3.ECONOMIC:

. . . À ° ° . ° .

% Females economically active

3A. % Females economically active:

- for property crimes

° . À . . . . ° . . . . -

—

- for prostitution and related crimes

- for violent crimes

. ° . » - . e » ° . À. ° . À

No rclai.ionship

44.SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION :

% Illegitimate births

. . . . . À e - . ° ° ° . À . .

Divorce rate

Unemployment

. . . . . ° . . ° . À ° ° ° . À. . .… .

Months at war

° ° ° . e . . . . ° . . ° ° ° ° . ° . À

. . . . . - . À ° . À . . À . À .

Child/woman ratio

Female illiteracy

. . ° . ° . ° ° ° ° ° ° . . . * . .

++++++

— 146 —

TABLE II

Correlations Between Educational, Economic, Legal, Technological and Social Disorganization Variables

and Level of Female Arrests (females arrested/total females) Across a Variety of Nations

Major

Minor

Total

Counter-

Total

Murder

Sex

Larceny | Larceny | Larceny

feiting

Fraud

Drugs

EDUCATION:

- Median years education females

. . . . ° ° .

117

259

139

793

751l

153

643

581

404

E S

% X *

X%*

* *

- Total-Female Median years education

-184

138

-145

073

-357

-194

-203

-174

-3*63

- Female Illiteracy

° . . . . À Q . . . . . . ° . .

-362

-289

197

-195

-371

-358

-666

-401

À% % À

-4*68

- Female-male Illiteracy

. ° . . . ° * . . Û ° .

-203

-341

-014

-023

-271

-262

-586

-407

%

447

- % Female Level I Students

. . . . . - ° . . .

214

-004

-338

253

243

160

3*83

3*66

3Î7

- % Female Level II Students

. . ° ° ° . ° ° . .

218

074

-357

129

3Z4

3;13

294

179

4*25

- % Female Level III Students

. . . . » . » . °

149

009

-198

051

160

124

234

218

264

- % 1° and 2° Students

. . . . . . ° ° . ° . . .

382

-145

-218

341

646

652

372

378

%%*

% % %

3Z4

ECONOMIC :

- % Female Economically active

233

-207

-141

051

204

195

190

189

111

-O11

-094

-087

-124

-135

-152

- % Male-Female Economically active

-257

-O11

011

- Married Female Economically active

109

-174

-137

233

392

402

372

206

290

- Economic differentiation - occupation

-087

-207

-162

266

251

269

228

-018

143

- Economic differentiation - industry

. . . . .

-109

168

-061

198

090

105

-074

-013

121

279

-295

-367

-117

-212

-292

- Economic differentiation - status

-028

-207

- 3*74

TABLE III (continued)

LE :

- #years.full vote

. e À . ° . ». ° ° « . . . . . .

648

-257

e sf x

-119

u

(

s,

220

276

290

- Male-Female legal age of marriage

287

107

018

373

363

303

-090

352

082

TECHNOLOGY:

- % workers agriculture

. . À ° ° . . ° . » .… © °

-242

-121

189

639

-654

-331

-275

32

% %x

% * *

—4*62

- % workers manufacturing

° ° ° . . À . . . . À

213

040

-237

664

674

193

509

* **

# % *

499

3Ë9

- 1971 KWH per capita

e . . . ° . . . ° . . ° .

222

-157

149

299

186

e

50e

2

50s

- 1963 GDP per capita

. À. . ° . . . . * . e . .

475

022

763

761

610

719

—138

e

* d k

À Àe k

æ

* % *

% % *

DISORGANIZATION:

- Male-Female Suicide rate

. . ° ° ° . ° * . ° *

134

-220

156

359

358

388

065

287

e

- % illegitimate births

. . » . » L ° . . ® . À ° °

152

-025

-195

—

-101

-192

-134

-086

-028

- Divorce rate

* . . À . » ° ° . . ® . . ». ° . e À .

190

-071

303

073

242

270

106

373

4*12

- Male-Female life expectancy at 1 year

-232

265

-246

-3*99

-180

-315

-4ZS

45

—4*30

- ?çmak-Male Infant Mortality Rate:

à -

&

r - . ° . À ° ® L . ». L . ° . ° e »* ° ° °

227

-316

076

236

264

273

117

162

104

/-2

; v2YS

» . . . . ® L . . . ° ° * L ° e À ° .

029

059

086

491

504

205

174

237

—3Ë9

# *

%

- 22-364 days

. . . . . ° ° ° ° . À . * . . . ° .

095

-291

-043

094

153

010

043

3*85

3*95

-nemployment

. . . ». « » . . À . . » . À . . .

-148

459

184

-290

-461

-359

159

057

-4*70

1NS si War

. . * * . ° . e ». . ° . . . e + .

188

-102

145

190

473

4*51

# %*

761

184

202

rh‘!ﬁ;

» _an Ratio

* ° . . . ° . . . . . ° . .

-137

3]9

330

-264

45

45

E

-207

-159

— —— ——{ten—2.—2m0"" e

TABLE IV

Correlations Beween Educational, Economic, Legal, Technological and Social Disorganization Variables

and Distribution of Females Arrests (Females arrested/total arrests) Across a Variety of Nations.

Total

Murder

Sex

Major

Minor

Total

Counter-

Fraud

Drugs

Larceny | Larceny | Larceny

feiging

EDUCATION :

- Median years education Females

. . . . . ° .

4*61

199

-118

-005

% %%

695

# % %

721

%%*

711l

552

183

- Total - Female Median years education

-193

-180

-170

-078

-348

-333

-204

-290

009

- Female illiteracy

. . . ° ° ° . . ° . . . . . ° .

091

030

296

043

-378

-305

-567

-561

«

#%

- Female - Male Illiteracy

-094

-074

379

-026

-257

-209

-271

-231

5s

- % Female Level I Students

. ° . . ° . . . . .

191

097

-018

547

330

575

553

—3*67

# % Àk

sQ

%%%

« À% *

- % Female Level II Students

198

057

-134

530

266

584

E

% % %

s00

‘76

% & %

. ° . ° . . * . °

- % Female Level III Students

161

-095

344

-059

277

257

3*65

%%*

508

% > À

596

- % 1° and 2° Students

. À « . ° . ° . ° ° . ° °

238

161

—3*74

047

* #% *

722

% % *

710

425

%%%

514

p

ECONOMIC:

- % Female economically active

. . . ° . ° . .

292

075

093

-261

260

262

180

5

3:}4

- % Male-Female economically active

-229

-047

-276

192

-035

-033

-245

-050

-493

-091

408

014

345

266

074

- % Married Female economically active

-239

5i)5

®

- Economic differentiation - occupation

-112

-017

-377

224

293

108

-373

345

4*67

- Economic differentiation - industry

-136

031

-159

-025

142

002

-207

226

007

- Economic differentiation - status

151

-205

539

-042

-327

-224

-140

-361

-369

% *

TABLE IV (continued)

LEGAL:

- # years full vote

° . . ° . . ° . . . . ° . . . .

4*11

020

-212

015

652

48

317

p

4*16

- Male-Female legal age of marriage

. ° . . - .

287

107

018

373

363

303

-090

352

082

TECHNOLOGY :

- % workers agriculture

-050

-226

3*61

-137

-682

% À À

-586

* X *

-220

E

-219

- % workers manufacturing

. . . . . . . . . . .

119

277

-366

184

793

713

212

618

% À% %

% % %

% x

çoa

- 1971 KWH per capita

. . . . . . . . Û . . . .

216

148

-190

092

640

536

068

# k %

% %%

e

3f3

- 1963 GDP per capita

. . . ° . ° . . . . . . °

303

260

-204

163

745

718

344

641

* #xŒ

æ % %

LE S

M

DISORGANIZATION:

- Male-Female Suicide rate

096

106

360

498

-076

347

S

536

2

- % Illegitimate births

. . . . . . . . . . . . . °

211

071

-001

242

-288

-271

-156

-000

653

*x*

- Divorce rate

. . . . . . . . . ° . . . . . . . . .

063

037

066

186

279

308

-073

163

ça

- Male-Female life expectancy at 1 year

-389

-408

248

635

-650

-237

-318

-4*36

* # *

# #X

-4*2 l

- Female-Male I.M.R. :

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Û

-1-6 days

378

231

074

157

4*38

4*2 9

311

217

001

-7-27 days

° . . . . . . . . . . ° . . Û . . . . .

-083

146

-072

-065

53s

4;17

163

194

-261

- 28-364 days

. . . . . . . * . . . . . . . . . .

-027

-090

-126

-091

349

-115

053

-158

4£)1

Unemployment

. . . . . Û . . * * . . . . . . °

-409

-064

044

059

030

5;10

2

<

-5*95

- Months at war

° . . . . ° . . . . . . - ° . . .

204

353

011

366

489

371

138

433

595

- Child/Woman ratio

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

-194

-149

052

-717

-717

3*84

% %

% X %

-3*61

=

=

TABLE V

Summary of Results

Significant Correlations Only

Hypothesis

Variables

Level

Distribution

1.EQUALITY:

TL

Male-female legal age of marriage

J

Female-male illiteracy rate

-CTF, -F

% Male-female economically active

° . . . . . . .

-CTF

Economic differentiation in:

-status .. .. .. 22210 44244 4 44 4 1 1 20

-L

- industry

. . À . À . À . À . À . . ° . - . . . . . - .

- occupation

° ° . . À . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . -

D9 u to

Male-female suicide rate

- . À- . . - . - . . - . . .

CFT

U

Male-female life expectancy at 1 year

-L, -CFT

-M,

r

-—

T

Female-male infant mortality rate :

- 1-6 days

. . . . ° . . . . . - . . . - . - * . . . - .

- 7-27days. .. ... 221112111111 2 20

L,-M

- 28-364 days

oeoe

lA. Emancipation:

ycars women have had full vote

e » . . . .

T,L

T,M,L,C,F

1B

Sex-Role Differentiation:

Male-female legal of marriage

. . . . . . . .

TL

Economic differentiation in:

- Status

. L . L . À . ». . . . . . - . . . . . .

-L

- industry

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ° . . .

- Occupation

. . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . ° -

1C

Status of Women:

of years women have had full vote

T,M,L,C,F

Male-female legal age of marriage

. . . . . .

[

Median years education for females

Ê

’F’

T,L,C,F

Female illiteracy

-C,-F

-C,-F,-D

% Female level i students

% Female level II students. .. .. .. ...

$

LD

% Female level IH students

. e - . . . . . .

ë

ë

% Females economically active

. . - . . . .

(Ë:

Ë

% Married females economically active.

2.0CPPORTUNITY :

% Females economically active

. . . . . . . . . °

C,

2A. Level of technological development:

% Workers agriculture

. . . . . . - . . . .

-L

% Workers manufacturing

F

Kwh per capita

. - ° . Û . . . . - . . Û . . °

. . . . . . - . . . . . . . . .

T,C,

Ë

Ê

Ë

,D

IË

ë

GDP per capita

3.ECONOMIC:

% Females economically active

C,F

4.SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION:

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

% Illegitimate births

Divorce rate

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ° . . . . . .

D

Unemployment

. . À . . Û . . . . . . . . ° . . . .

S,-L,-

Months at war

° . . - . . * . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Child/Wwoman ratio

. . ° . . . . . ° . - . . . . . .

M) D

SL

L

-C

Sa' 9571 »

L,-C,-F,-D

F‘emale illiteracy

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . À . . -

_C,

F

-C-F-

—s

Offense Key: T = total, L = larceny, CFT = counterfciting, F = fraud, D = drugs,

M — murder, and S = sex.

— 151 —

Of the four independent variables selected as a direct test of the sex-

role differentiation hypothesis, only two showed significant correlations

(economic differential in status with sex crimes and economic differential in

occupation with drugs).

Our findings indicate that as the status of women increased, the level of

female total arrests and arrests for larceny, fraud, and drugs also increased.

Conversely, there was a decrease in females arrested for sex crimes.

Let us examine in more detail the education variables as illustrative of

the relationship between the status of women and arrest patterns. Generally

the higher the level of education for females in a society, the higher the

rates of arrest. (Relationships with illiteracy follow the same pattern, only

lower levels of female illiteracy were associated with higher rates of counter-

feiting, fraud, and drugs). In contrast, the level and distribution of females

arrested for sex crimes is negatively related to education. Thus, the more

educated females are across these societies, the lower the level and distri-

bution of female arrests for sex crimes.

Thus, we found that equality, emancipation, and status of women

theories were generally supported. The results in 3, 4 and 5 suggest limited

and weak associations between economic variables and female arrest rates.

Those relationships which were significant influence the distribution rather

than the level of arrests. In contrast to predictions, economic participation

of women (% females economically active) was not related to levels of

females arrested for all or individual offences.

According to opportunity theory, as women become more economic-

ally active, they should be more involved in crime and arrested more often.

Furthermore, the more technologically developed a nation (assuming that

women will share in the level of the development of their country), the

higher the level of females arrested. We have already seen that the percent-

age of females economically active did not correlate significantly with levels

of arrest. However, level of technology was positively related to the level

and distribution of female arrests for larceny, fraud, and drugs. That is,

measures of industrialization such as percent workers in manufacturing,

KWH per capita, or GDP per capita, were all strongly associated with in-

creases in these crimes. In contrast, higher rates of females (relative to

males) arrested for sex crimes were found in the more agricultural countries.

While level of technological development was related to the distribution of

females arrested for white-collar crimes relative to total arrests, the limited

version of opportunity theory limiting its predictions to white-collar crime

did not receive support — since its predictions were addressed to level, not

distribution.

The results in Table 3, 4 and 5 indicate that a number of social disor-

ganization and disruption indicators were significantly related to female

— 152 —

arrests, for level and distribution. The percentage of illegitimate biths was

associated with the level of females arrested for murder and drugs, and

divorce rate was with level of arrests for drugs. Interestingly, as unemploy-

ment goes up, the distribution of arrests of females (relative to males) for

sex crimes also goes up, but for larceny and drugs it goes down.

Murder and Sex Crimes. Female arrest rates for murder and sex crimes

generally did not reveal the same pattern of relationships as arrests for other

crimes. For example, the level and distribution of arrests for murder were

not related to educational, economic, or technological conditions; whereas

they were related to a number of social disorganization variables (% illegit-

imate biths, infant mortality rates, and child/woman ratio). Similarly, the

level and distribution of females arrests for sex crimes were not related to

median years education female, but were negatively related to the extent

to which females were in primary and secondary schools (% females in

primary and secondary schools and college). That is, the higher the pro-

portion of females in school, the lower the level and rate of females arrested

for sex crimes, relative to men. Females arrests were higher, relative to

male arrests, in countries with higher rates of workers in agriculture, higher

rates of unemployment in the years 1964-66, a higher child/woman ratio,

and a larger economic status differential.

DISCUSSION

While theories of crime have generally become more sophisticated and

complex, there has been a tendency to reduce the phenomenon of female

criminality to rather simplistic causes. From the biological theories of

female criminality of the early 1900’s, there has been a shift in emphasis to

the consequences of women’ emancipation. However, the concepts of

equality, emancipation, or status of women refer to complex constructs

which have complex relationships with female crime.

What do we conclude from these findings? The most definitive con-

clusion is that the problem of female crime is neither unidimensional nor

simple. It is somewhat difficult to separate the effects of equality from

opportunity, and each of these from the overall effects of modernization.

Each of the theories examined in this paper received some support, whereas

none was completely successful in predicting level or distribution of female

arrests. Using concurrent data, we have seen how female arrest rates are

related to variations in the legal and actual status of women, as well as to

variations in general non-status related factors.

Legal emancipation proved be a strong correlate of level of female

arrests (total and larceny) and distribution (relative to males) for a broader

range of crimes (total, murder, larceny, counterfeiting, and fraud). Thus,

— 153 —

the longer women have had the vote, the more likely they are to be rep-

resentend in arrested statistics.

Higher levels of societal disruption and disorganization were associated

with lower arrest rates for larceny, fraud, and counterfeiting, but higher

levels or arrests for murder. This relationship would be even more meaning-

fully pursued using longitudinal cross-cultural data.

Opportunity theory received only partial support from these results.

Female economic activity per se was not related to arrest rates for females.

Rather, we found the general level of opportunity in a society were strongly

related to arrests. Specifically, countries with higher levels of industrial-

ization, technological development, and education had higher rates of

female arrests. On the other hand, countries with more traditional social

orientations (a large agricultural component and lower levels of education)

had higher rates of female arrests for sex crimes.

The sex-role differentiation hypothesis received very limited support

from these data. Although sex segregation by status was associated with

higher rates of women (relative to men) arrested for sex crimes and segre-

gation by occupation with higher rates of arrests for drugs, these differen-

tiation variables may be better understood as indicating a lack of oppor-

tunity, rather than inequality. In all cases economic differentiation by sex

also isolates women from opportunity.

Contrary to expectations, the simple form of economic theory tested

here was not supported by our findings, although this may be an artifact

of poor nations keeping less accurate arrest statistics. For example, the

positive correlation between Gross Domestic Product per capita and larceny

may indicate only that richer countries make and record arrests for larceny,

while poorer countries cannot afford to do so. Or, in some countries,

larceny may not be treated as criminal. Regardless, it is surprising that

arrests for sex crimes were not associated with any of the economic vari-

ables reflecting the participation of women in the labor force.

Ît is clear from these results that we need more complex models, larger

data sets to permit more control over multicollinearity, and data drawn

from different time preriods to make further progress in understanding

patterns of female arrests and criminal behavior.

In almost all human societies females have higher life expectancy rates.

However, as the discrepancy between male and female life expectancy rates

decreases (that is, as biological conditions improve for males or deteriorate

for females), the rate of female arrested for larceny, counterfeiting, fraud,

and murder increases. This may reflect improved medical conditions associ-

ated with increasingly industrialized nations. Another possibility is that as

women participate more fully in society, the stresses associated wth such

— 154 —

activities result in increasing medical and/or physical problems for women

(Platt, 1984), decreasing their biological advantage.

Social, political, and biological equality affect female arrest rates dif-

ferently. Increases in social equality are related to increases in property

crimes (larceny, fraud, counterfeiting), but to decreases in sex crimes.

Increases in political equality are related to increases in property crimes

and increases in biological equality to increases in arrests for murder.

In some cases, equality and crime vary inversely. For example, higher

education among women is associated with lower arrests for sex crimes.

The relationship between variables reflecting equality and female arrests for

murder are both more subtle and more intriguing. Female arrests for murder

increase with advances in equality — political and biological. For women,

then, equality represents a tripleedged sword.

Early prophets of doom may have been correct in arguing that do

emancipate women — to educate them, to give them equality, and to in-

crease their general status in society — is also to lead them to the paths of

criminal behavior. What these prophets did not foresee was the complexity

of the relationships.

- 155 —

FOOTNOTE

()

This distinction was suggested by Wes Skogan (personal communi-

cation).

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— 157 —

APPENDIX

Names, definitions, and sources for independent variables

Name

Definition

Source

EDUCATION:

Median years education for females

Median years education for women

UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1972

age 25-34

table 1.5.

Overall median years education minus

Median years education for the entire

UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1972

female median

population age 25-34 minus median years

table 1.5.

education for women age 25-34.

Female illiteracy rate

UNDY 1970, table 11.

Female - male illiteracy rate

Calculated from the separate rates for

UNDY 1970, table 11.

each sex.

Female % level I pupils

Percent of total pupils enrolled at level I

UNESCO Statistical YearBook 1972,

(primary) who are female

table 3.2.

Female % level II pupils

Percent of total pupils enrolled at level II

UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1972,

(secondary) who are female

table 3.4.

Female % level III pupils

Percent of total pupils enrolled at level III

UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1972,

(tertiary, i.e., collegeplus) who are female

table 4.1.

Percent zrimary/secondary students

Primary and secondary students as percent

UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1972,

of the population age 5-19.

table 1.5.

7CONOMIC:

“e Fertaiz economically active

UNDY 1970, table 12.

& 4- - ferrale % economically active

Calculated from separate percent for each sex

UNDY 1970, table 12.

À -rzic{ vomen %

Percent of married women who are econ-

acc:iomically active

UNDY 1968, table 9.

with data on number of married women

omically active (with consensually married

if so reported).

in population.

. -vnomic differentiation in status

Index of differentiationâä by sex

Calculated from UNDY 1964, table 11.

in work status.

-

*crne-ic differentiation

<

Index of differentiationä by sex

Calculated from UNDY 1964, table 10.

Le

1N

in occupation.

N . 6.

- Giffereritiation

Index of differentiationä by sex

Calculated from UNDY 1964, table 9.

14 INQUsizV

in industry.

——neus MD 0m

LEGAL:

Years women have had full vote

Number of years women have had full vote

United Nations, Constitutions, Electoral

(can vote in all elections and can hold office)

Laws and Other Legal Instruments Relating

to the Political Rights of Women, (1968),

table 4.

Male - female legal age of marriage

Calculated from legal ages for each sex.

UNDY 1968, table 28.

TECHNOLOGY:

Percent workers in agriculture

Workers in agriculture as percent of econ-

UNDY 1964, table 9.

omically active population.

Percent workers in manufacturing

Workers in manufacturing as perctent of

UNDY 1964, table 9.

economically active population.

Kwh. per capita

Kilowatt hours electricity consumed per

Electricity: UNSY 1972, table 142:;

capita (latest figures).

Population: UNSY 1972, table 19.

GDP per capita

Gross domestic product in US $ per capita

UNSY 1972, table 187.

for the year 1963.

SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION :

Male - female suicide rate

Calculated from the separate rates

UNDY 1967, table 24 (BE49 category

for each sex.

of death cause).

Percent illegitimate births

Illegitimate births as percent ofall births

UNDY 1969, table 21, moving average of

(with consensual marriages counted as

latest 3 years.

marriage).

Divorce rate

Divorces per 1000 married couples

UNDY 1968, table 35.

Male - female life expectancy

Calculated from the separate figures

UNDY 1971, table 34.

at l year

for each sex at age 1.

Female - male infant mortality rate,

Calculated from the separate rates for

UNDY 1971, table 29.

age 1-6 days

each sex.

Female - male I.M.R,, age 7-27 days

Calculated from the separate rates for each sex

Same as above.

Female - male I.M.R., age 28-364 days

Calculated from the separate rates for each sex

UNDY 1971, table 29.

UNEMPLOYED 1964-66:

Months at war 1931-1965

Number of months the nation was at was

J.D. Singer and M. Small, The Wages of

War 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook

during 1931-196S inclusive.

(New York, 1972), table 11.1.

Child/woman ratio

Number of children age S or less per

UNDY 1969, table 8.

1000 women age 15-49.

Note: UNSY = United Nations Statistical Yearbook, UNDY = United Nations Demographic Yearbook.

ABSTRACT

The relationship between female crime rates and the status of women is

examined using information from 43 nations around the world. Hypotheses

derived from four major theories — equality, opportunity, economic, and

social disorganization — are tested, as well as variations of equality theory

(emancipation, sex-role differentiation, and status of women) which lead to

different predictions. Correlations are computed for variables reflecting the

status of women and general levels of development and disorganization

across these nations and two dependent measures of female arrest rates —

level and distribution. Caveats concerning the quality of the data are dis-

cussed and the difficulty in separating the effects of equality from oppor-

tunity and each from the overall effects of modernization is noted.

Relationships to male crime are neither unidimensional nor simple.

While equality, emancipation, and status of women theories received sup-

port, economic theory focusing on the participation of women in the labor

force did not. Moreover, social, political and biological equality affect

female arrest rates differently. Increases in social equality are related to

increases in property crimes (larceny, fraud, and counterfeiting), but to

decreases in sex crimes. Increases in political equality are related to increases

in property crimes and increases in biological equality to increases in female

arrests for murder.

RÉSUMÉ

CRIMINALITÉ FÉMININE ET STATUT DE LA FEMME

Le lien causal entre le taux de criminalité féminine et le statut de la

femme est étudié ici grâce aux renseignements recueuillis à travers 43 pays

différents. Les hypothèses issues des 4 théories principales — égalité, oppor-

tunité, désorganisation économique et sociale — sont réexaminées au même

titre que le sont les variables qui composent la théorie de l’égalité (émanci-

pation, différentiation des rôles selon le sexe et statut de la femme), théorie

qui a conduit à l’établissement de prédictions diverses.

À travers ces pays les corrélations de prédictions diverses variables

reflétant le statut de la femme et les niveaux globaux de développement et

de désorganisation ont été évaluées, ainsi que les deux composantes du taux

d’arrestation des femmes — niveau et distribution —. Des mises en garde

concernant la fiabilité des données statistiques sont mentionnées et la diffi-

culté qu’il y a à différencier les effets de l’égalité de ceux de l’opportunité

puis, pour chacun de ces principes des effets généraux de la modernisation,

est notée.

— 160 —

Les liens de cause à effet concernant la criminalité féminine ne sont ni

unidimensionnels ni simples. Alors même que les théories sur l’égalité,

l’émancipation et le statut des femmes recevaient approbation, la théorie

économique fondée sur la participation des femmes aux forces productives

était négligée. De plus les principes d’égalité sociale, politique et biologique

affectent différemment le taux d’arrestation des femmes. La généralisation

de l’égalité sociale est liée à la fois à l’accroissement des crimes sur les biens

(larcins, fraudes, contrefaçons) et à la diminution des crimes sexuels. La

généralisation de l’égalité politique est reliée à l’augmentation de la crimina-

lité axée sur la propriété, et l’égalité biologique influence l’accroissement des

arrestations de femmes pour meurtres.

— 161 —

THE UNITED NATIONS CRIME TRENDS SURVEYS:

COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY

IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT*

Slawomir M. Redo**

“The International Statistical Institute in 1946 deced that ‘‘a ma-

terial comparison of national criminal statistics (has) been judged

impossible from the begining because of the diversitv of penal law and

of the statistical-technical methods of the various countries…!', Not-

withstandin… “The United Nations, from the early days of its establis-

ment… selected criminal statistics as one of its main areas of concern

in social defense…’’ Wich of these two prestigious organizations is

correct’… Is it possible that both organizations are right, despite the

apparent complete opposition of the views expressed in these quo-

tation ””

Wilkins 1980:23

INTRODUCTION

There is a growing awareness in the criminological literature of the

importance of comparative research on criminality. Criminologists express

the opinion time and over again that in view of this importance ‘‘compara-

tive criminology should… develop concepts and generalizations at a level

that distinguishes between universals applicable to all societies and unique

characteristics representative of one or a small set of societies’”’ (Clinard and

Abbot 1973:2), for — as other author states

“thinking without com-

parison is unthinkable. And in the absence of comparison, so is all scientific

thought and scientific research” (Swanson 1971:145).

It is evident that the United Nations with its global corerage and, there-

f0re, possibility of requesting crime related data from all Member States has

* The author woﬁld like to thank his colleagues from the Crime Prevention

and Criminal Justice Branch, Minoru shikita, Irene Melup, Robin W.

Burnham and Rodrigo Paris-Steffens for helpful comments on an earlier

draft. However, responsibility for the views expressed herein rests with

the author alone. These views do not necessarily reflect those of the

United Nations Secretariat.

** United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch, Social

Affairs Officer, Vienna International Center, A-1400, P.O. Box 600,

Austria.

— 163 —

been in a quite unique position to carry out comparative projects. This

article will describe the lengthy and complicated process of developing the

three United Nations crime trends surveys, starking from the early compara-

tive studies in the late 1940’s to the latest Survey of Crime Trends, Oper-

ations of Criminal Justice Systems, and Crime Prevention Strategies under-

taken in 1982, all of which have remained rather unnoticed in the crimino-

logical literature (1). The present article will examine both the substantive

and methodological aspects of these surveys and, consequently, will trace

the changing emphasis of these surveys from a principally one-dimensional,

legalistic undertaking, to multidimensional, ‘*developmental’’ analyses.

[. THE GLOBAL STUDY OF 1950

Awareness of the need for comparative studies in the field of crimi-

nality was first generated in the United Nations at the end of 1940°s. In

fact, in vew of the earlier cross-national comparisons of prison populations

made before World War II for the League of Nations (1938), and other

comparisons made by individual researchers (Anonymous 1932, Verkko

1937), this need had been recognized by the Organization as early as 1948

when the Statistical Commission, a subsidiary body of the Economic and

Social Council (ECOSOC), drafted a recommendation that the United

Nations Secretary General should ‘‘take the initiative in arranging for

adequate programmes of development of the various branches of social

statistics’’. This recommendation was subsequently adopted by ECOSOC

(UN Secretariat 1950 b) which at about the same time also adopted another

draft resolution originated by another of its subsidiary bodies namely, the

Social Commission (now the Social Development Commission), in which it

expressed inter alia the need to deal ‘’with immediate necessities in the field

of crime prevention and control”’, such as the study of “‘criminal statistics

Wwith a view to report on the state of crime” (UN ECOSOC 1953; UN

Secretariat 1952).

Such a study was prepared by the Secretariat in 1950 and covered the

decade 1937-1946, the period chosen ‘“because it represented the most

recent decade on which criminal statistics could be obtained”, and because

‘“it was seen that there would be the natural advantage of having a period

in which the impact of world war II on the criminality of the individual

country might be reflected” (UN Secretariat 1950 a). It contained, inter alia

the data made available by 31 Member States on offences known to the

police, persons found guilty or convicted in one of the following offence

categories:

a) offences against persons (homicide, assault, rape)

b) offences against property (larceny, burglary, robbery, arson)

c) offences against the family (desertion, non-support, cruelty and

neglect)

— 164 —

d) offences against public health and order (drunkenness, gambling,

disorderly conduct)

e) offences against the State (treason, espionage, collaboration with

the enemy).

Another measurement base, namely, prison statistics, was used to deter-

mine the incidence of these crimes types only in a supplementary way, as

the Secretariat felt that this was the least satisfactory kind of measurement

(UN Secretariat 1950a:10). These studies found that, in the surveyed

countries, the number of offences known to the police had increased after

the beginning of World War II in four out of seven (Belgium, Denmark,

France, Iraq) providing this kind of data. In two others (Finland and the

Union of South Africa) an increase took place toward the end of the war,

and in the remaining country (Canada) no great changes occurred. These

equivocal findings were deemed not to “‘provide a basis for conclusions as

to the possible causes of the variations among the different nations” (UN

Secretariat 1950a:18). However, when the category of belligerant nations

was considered, separately it was observed that, in these countries, the rates

increased during the ten-year period under investigation. “Of the countries

reported on, approximately one half experienced some increase in the

number of offences known to the police, persons convicted, persons

charged, etc.” (UN Secretariat 1950a).

Aside from crime trends data, the study contained information on the

demographic characteristics of the criminal population and on recidivism

rates. Both the scope of the areas covered and the number of Member

States which made available their data for this early study, place it among

the first truly widely comparative and yet relatively unknown undertakings

in criminology.

That study revealed also many inticate problems relating to com-

parisons of criminality in a cross-national perspective. Since the request of

the Secretary-General for submission of crime data did not contain any

suggestion for some explanation of the terms used to denote specific crime

types, included in the replies, the data provided reflected national legal

definitions which were, however, not known by the Secretariat. Moreover,

the data could not be considered reliable due to the varying extent of the

dark figure of unreported criminality among Member States.

In effect it was concluded that ‘‘national systems for the collection and

publication of criminal statistics are now so diverse as to preclude the

possibility of sound international comparisons” (UN Secretary General

19S1:1).

il. STANDARL CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCES

4

« k 0* in‘ab,

Ctc

nau cr

c. ased 4 153 diversity ‘wos er

‘Fs Ü

5hae ereas

f ut ;untionaii

CCepne s0 Xpa

GÉAne à

195 -

honorary capacity as an advisory body to the Secretary General and the

Social

Commission”

established under the afore-mentioned ECOSOC

resolution 155 C (VIII) (Clifford 1978; UN ECOSOC 1952).

After a review of the results of the study, the group offered a series

of observations and recommendations with regard to the preparation of

‘“a standard classification of offences… referring to three major offences,

namely criminal homicide, aggravated assault and theft without violence

(robbery and burglary)”. (UN Secretariat 1959:7) After further reflexion,

the group, which was by then renamed the Ad-Hoc Advisorv “ «mimittee

3 broad

of Experts, worked out more precise recommendations, includ.

rationale on how to prepare such a standard classification of offe‘1es (2).

The Committee recommended, inter-alia, that a study should be cor:-:ucted

by the Secretary-General on the penal code of each coun‘ry, with " view

to nothing all the offences which could in practice be grouped under e: .1 of

those three headings. On this basis, one would be able to draw u; for

each country a model schedule of selected types of offences which would

meet the conditions for cross national ‘‘static’ equivalence comparisons.

Specifically, the model schedule would a limine include or exclude certain

forms of behaviours prohibited in national legislations so as to reduce the

above-mentioned ‘“‘difficulties relating to terminology, definitions and classi-

fications… (and), at the same time, the process of inclusion and exclusion…

would make it perhaps possible, through the delimitation of its scope, to

formulate agreed definitions of the three offences” (Ibid.: 9).

This complex task was completed by the Secretariat in 1959, in the

form of a report, based on information provided earler by Member States

in the course of the preparation of the above report (3): by the afore

mentioned expert group, by national correspondents and by non-govern-

mental organizations. After reviewing the penal legislation of seventy seven

States (4), some of them federated, very precise schedules of inclusion

and exclusion were worked out for each country, in the above three cat-

egories. This meticulous report revealed the enormous complexity of the

problem and offered equally complex solutions to the theoretical legal

questions which it posed. In this sense, there is no doubt that the report

could be classified as piece of extremely thorough research on crime trends.

Yet this very fact, reveals at the same time a fundamental weakness of

absolutistic comparisons, i.e., their impracticability. This conclusion pre-

vailed among the experts and organizations to whom the standard classi-

fication of offences was sent for comments, but it was not shared by the

Secretariat itself, at least in the beginning.

À representative illustration of this view is found in the position taken

by INTERPOL, which argued that the introduction of the standard classi-

fication of offences into national statistics raised more questions than it

solved. It held that, if international statistics are ‘“extracts” from previously

existing national criminal statistics, what purpose is there in endeavouring to

— 166 —

establish universally valid definitions? Since each country gives a legal

description of a punishable act in accordance with its own conceptions of

the social order, the international statistics should merely show side by side

and virtually intact those cases of homicide, assault and theft which are

regarded as such by the reporting countries. Secondly, the introduction of

standard classification of offences would cause a partial duplication of

statistics with the already existing ones. In addition to this difficulty, some

types of crime related data would require not only the involvement of the

central statistical offices of governments, but for instance as in the case of

convictions — also the involvement of lower and higher courts which would

have to analyse their every judgement against the definitions recommended

in the standard classification. Moreover, ‘“there are many countries… which

may not have any centralized system for judicial cases and which today are

not even in a position to carry out a project of centralization based on

specifically national and clearly established data” (UN Secretariat 1959/III:

53). Consequently, in view of these ‘“practically insurmountable obstacles”,

INTERPOL expressed the belief that ‘‘it is necessary on account of the

difficulties to limit one’s objectives and be very modest in drawing con-

clusions as there will always be a considerable margin of error and appreci-

ation’”. Instead, it was suggested that the Secretariat could consider possi-

bility of, inter-alia, a ‘’comparison of the total figures of existing national

criminal statistics’’ (UN Secretariat 1953/IIT:54).

Although, as indicated, the Secretariat did not in the beginning accept

this advice and was of the opinion that the model schedules drafted did

provide an appropriate basis for the establishment of international criminal

statistics, nevertheless no further concrete efforts were made to this end

after the issuance of the 1959 report.

That year also represented the end of the kind of methodological

approach adopted by the United Nations in drafting the questionnaires

for the global crime trend studies. This approach, it can be said, relied

essentially upon strict legal definitions of offences and was not concerned

with practical ways of their introduction into national crime statistics. In

this context, it took no account of the on-going impact of socio-economic

and cultural changes which over time affect national definitions of these

offence types and would, in turn, create the need for re-adjustment of the

already ‘‘agreed definitions”” of criminal homicide, aggravated assault and

theft without violence to their perspective and yet periodically alterable

national counterparts.

IIT. ANOTHER APPROACH:

SOCIAL CHANGE AND CRIME TRENDS

Despite the serious methodological problems which the Secretariat ran

into while drafting the standard classification of offences for the crime

- 167 -

trend study, this work was not discontinued, but only interrupted. Available

United Nations documentation does not reveal, however, under what

particular circumstances this temporary deadlock took place.

One reason could be that a rigid legalistic approach to the compar-

ability of offence categories finally fell in the Secretariat into complete

disfavour under heavy criticism from the outside. If similar projects were to

continue, some other approach would have to be adopted. Whether this was

really the case, it is difficult to say now since, six years later after publi-

cation of the standard classification, the Third United Nations Congress on

the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (Stockholm, 1965)

reiterated that ‘’in making comparative approaches of crime and delin-

quency (..) extreme caution must be exercised because of the differences in

the reliability of the statistics, the degree to which statistical data are

generally available, the degree of enforcement of laws, and whether or not

laws are identical and comparable”’, (UN Congress 1965:12) which reflects

the main thrust of the standard classification of offences project. Yet, the

same Congress introduced the notion of ‘‘social change”, stressing that the

laws do not always keep up with the social changes occuring in the society”.

The Fourth United Nations Congress, held in Kyoto in 1970, added, that

‘“the relationship between changes in a country’s economic and social

structure and people’s attitudes and modes of behaviour was not yet ad-

equately traced nor properly understood””, and that ‘‘the relationship

between development and crime… became both the vantage point for

reviewing (emphasis added) and co-ordinating past endeavours and the

venue for formulating practical principles for policy and for divisiong

imaginative programmes for action’’ (UN Congress 1971 :8). One could infer

from these statements that, in view of the importance of comparative

studies, which should continue to be methodologically rigorous, never-

theless some greater flexibility should be allowed in the course of their

preparation. Such an approach which abandons impractical strict legalistic

comparisons, would take due account of the inevitability of various external

changes affecting the definitions of offence categories and subsequent

variations in their processing, as well as in the processing of the offenders

through the criminal justice system.

Speculative as this interpretation may be, it nevertheless provides some

clues to the understanding of why the next global crime trends projects,

conducted in 1977, did not draw on the model schedules but adopted a

much less rigid approach.

[V. UNITED NATIONS CRIME TRENDS

AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SURVEY OF 1977

With this newly introduced emphasis on the socioeconomic aspect of

the crime phenomenon, work on the crime trends survey reveived a strong

— 168 —

impetus in the United Nations. In General Assembly resolution 3021

(XXVIT) of 18 December 1972 Member States were invited to inform the

Secretary-General of the situation concerning crime prevention and control

in their respective countries and the measures being taken ‘’so that a final

report, based on such information, could be submitted to the Assembly…”

Such a report covering the period 1970-1975 was prepared by the Secretary-

General and submitted to the thirty second session of the General Assembly

in 1977 (UN Secretary General 1977) (5). From a methodological point of

view its main feature was that instead of static equivalence kind of com-

parisons, the preparatory suvey allowing for the collection of data for the

report was based on the broad and dynamic equivalence type of com-

parability of offence categories. The survey, apart from other issues, in-

volved the question on the dynamics of particular types of crime without,

however, defining their meaning even roughly. These offence categories

consisted of: non-negligent homicide, assault, sexual offences, kidnapping,

robbery, theft, including burglary and housebreaking, fraud and other types

of white-collar crimes, illegal traffic in drugs and substance abuse — all

of them, belonging, despite the impossibility of drawing up a definitive and

universal list of crimes, to ‘‘the common core of acts defined as criminal in

practically all countries’”’. (UN Secretary-General 1977:6-7) As expected,

such a broad and inevitably vague categorization of offences could allow

only for a very tentative analysis of world crime trends (due to the lack of

definitions). In this connexion, the Secretary-General’s report noted that

‘“the very nature of crime and its manifold expression make it difficult to

translate the general practice of criminality in the world into reliable com-

parable and quantifiable data.… Moreover, not all parts of the world docu-

ment crime events adequately and, even where they try to do so, lack of

uniformity in legal systems in statistical classifications and recording pro-

cedures, in police rnethods or geographical spread may render comparison

misleading…’’ (UN Secretary-General).

Taking into account these limitations, already noted in the global

survey of 1950, the report of the Secretary-General, pointed out that the

world rate of reported intentional homicide had increased over the six

years period under investigation by 20 per cent, theft by 46 per cent,

robbery by 179 per cent, and drug abuse by 114 percent. À more detailed

breakdown, for developing and developed countries, revealed that the over-

all rate of criminal offenders in the developing countries for the period

1970-1975 was approximately 800 per 100,000 population, and that the

number of offenders increased at an annual rate of approximately 25 per

cent. On the other hand, the over all rate of criminal offenders in the

developed countries was at that period approximately 1.000 per 100,000

population and the number of offenders had increased steadily at an annual

rate of | per cent. Às far as crime rates were concerned, in the developing

countries intentional homicide increased by only 4.6 per cent over the six

year period, but theft and robbery increased by 43 and 42 per cent,

— 169 —

respectively. In the developed countries, it was noted that ‘‘crimes of

intentional homicide, kidnapping and illegal traffic in drugs have compara-

tively low rates, but crimes of theft, fraud and assault are by far predomi-

nant crimes in the developed countries”. (UN Secretary-General 1977:

9 et seq.)

The notion of ‘“developing’’ and ‘‘developed” countries, although to

some extent political, implies also that the survey was extended to include

an analysis of crime related data against socioeconomic variables. Indeed,

these data were correlated with the data on the proportion of the work

force in agriculture, infant mortality rate, school attendance ratio, gross

domestic product per capita, and illiteracy rate. These correlations produced

some surprising results. For instance, it was ‘‘tentatively” observed that

‘“some countries which have high rates of illiteracy also have low rates of

juvenile crime” (UN Secretary-General). Even more surprising was the

finding that ‘‘countries with a low proportion of the work force in agri-

culture tended also to have low rates of drug crime” (UN Secretary-General

1977). The same variables were used against criminal justice resources data

— a pioneering part of the survey, where it was found that ‘‘“generally”, gross

domestic product was strongly related to personnel levels; inter-alia, the

countries with high gross domestic product per capita tended also to have a

higher ratio of judges, prosecutors and correctional staff, but the opposite

was the case for law enforcement agencies. This seems to suggest that

economically less developed countries put appreciably more resources into

the police force than into other criminal justice agencies” (UN Secretary-

General 1977).

Although much could be said about the methodological side of this

survey, which lends itself to some criticism (lack of definition of crime

types, choice of socio-economic variables which could contribute to the

above mentioned ‘“‘surprising’’ results etc.) it nevertheless constituted a

very serious, and pioneering in some areas, effort to cover the crime situ-

ation in the global perspective. Consequently, the General Assembly, to

which the report of the Secretary-General containing the results of the

survey was submitted, noted it with satisfaction in its resolution 32/60 of

3 January 1978. With the appearance of this report, the departure from

uni-dimensional legalistic patterns of cross-national comparisons in the

United Nations became evident. A new generation of global crime trends

surveys was born (6).

V. THE SECOND UNITED NATIONS SURVEY

OF CRIME TRENDS, OPERATIONS

OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS

AND CRIME PREVENTION STRATEGIES

The Sixth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the

Treatment of Offenders (Caracas, 25 August-5 September 1980), after

- 170 -

discussing the agenda item on ‘’Crime Trends and Crime Prevention Strat-

egies”’ (UN Congress 1981:5-6, 23-27) has adopted a resolution in which it

requested the Secretary-General ‘‘to intensify efforts to co-ordinate the

collection of comparable cross-national statistics on crime and justice in

each of the Member States…” At the same time the Congress in its major

document, the Caracas Declaration, stressed that all activity of the Member

States in the criminological area ‘‘should be considered in the context of

economic development, political systems, social and cultural values and

social change…’’ These two concerns were duly taken into account by the

Secretariat while drafting the questionnaire for the Second Survey of Crime

Trends, Operations of Criminal Justice Systems and Crime Prevention

Strategies, covering the period 1975-1980.

The questionnaire was finalized after lengthy consultations and dis-

cussion with experts, various United Nations offices and the United Nations

regional institutes on crime prevention and the treatment of offenders. It

contained 37 questions, of which many were subdivided. As its title illus-

trates, it pertained to statistical and policy questions on the incidence of

criminality, internal and external functioning of criminal justice systems and

crime prevention activities, both at the national and the largest city levels.

The questions on crime trends considered both the dynamics of crime and

the number of offenders (adult and juveniles) processed through the entire

criminal justice system. The following crime categories were selected for this

purpose: intentional and non-intentional homicide, assault, drug crimes,

rape, kidnapping, robbery, theft, fraud including embezzlement, bribery and

corruption. These crime categories, including attempts, where applicable,

have been broadly explained in the technical notes with a request, in cases

where they do not correspond to the national terminology, to provide data

corresponding as closely as possible and to indicate the differences (UN

Secretariat 1982). The following explanations of ‘“‘broad categories of

crimes’”’ were given:

‘“Intentional homicide refers to death purposely inflicted by another

person, including infanticide.

Non-intentional homicide refers to death not purposely inflicted by

another persons, including manslaughter but excluding traffic accidents

resulting in death.

Assault refers to a physical attack against the body of another person,

including battery but excluding indecent assault.

Drug crimes refer to intentional acts that may involve cultivation,

production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, possession, offering for

sale, distribution, purchase, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, broker-

age, dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport, importation and exportation of

drugs and psychotropic substances. Some countries may wish to refer to the

provisions of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 and other

— 171—

regulations adopted in pursuance of the provisions under the Convention on

Psychotropic Substances of 1971

Rape refers to sexual intercourse without valid consent.

Kidnapping refers to the abduction and seclusion of a person by deceit,

force or threat of force, with or without ransom demands.

Robbery refers to the taking away of property from a person over-

coming resistance by force or threat of force.

Theft refers to the stealthy taking away of property without the

owner’s consent, including burglary and housebreaking. It includes theft

of a motor vehicle, and both simple and aggravated theft as defined by the

criminal law of each country. Shoplifting and other minor offences, e.g.

pilfering and petty theft may or may not be included according to the usual

practice of each country.

Fraud and embezzlement refer to, respectively, the acquisition of

property of another by deception or the wrongful appropriation of the

property of another which is already in one’s prossession.

Bribery and corruption refer to requesting and/or accepting a material

or personal benefit, or a promise there of, in connection with the perform-

ance of a public function, for an action which may or may not be a viol-

ation of law, promising as well as giving material or personal benefit to a

public officer in exchange for a requested favour”’.

Care was taken of assuring that the data on incarceration rates would be

requested, since as Leslie Wilkins, one of the commentators on the draft

questionnaire put it — ‘‘incarceration rates, are, perhaps, the only com-

parable data we can hope for” (Wilkins 1982; but Schumann 1983).

The questions on the operations of criminal justice systems related

inter-alia, to the size, breakdown, selection and training of personnel. They

are, in some instances, put as pertinent to both, the whole country and the

largest city. Where applicable, they cover 1975-1980 period or, where not,

they refer to the situation as of the end of 1980. Also, where applicable, the

specific subquestions pertained to implementation of the United Nations

instruments in the field or crime prevention and the treatment of offenders,

such as the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by the

General Assembly resolution 34/169, and the Standard Minimum Rules for

the Treatment of Prisoners.

Apart from these, the following major questions pertained to the:

1l ) Age of criminal responsibility,

2) Prosecutors’ role in the context of ‘’opportunity” or ‘“legality” principles,

3) Community courts,

4) Non-custodial sanctions for adult offenders,

S) Alternative sources of data, including victimization studies,

_172—

6) Role of volunteers in correctional work,

7) Allocation of budgetary resources, in local currency, to criminal justice

activities.

The questions on crime prevention strategies were perhaps method-

ologically the most difficult to formulate since, as a rule, there is no central

crime prevention agency which could answer them in an exhausive way.

Even if such an agency exists, the area in question does not easily lend

itself to comprehensive and comparative classification or quantitication. ÀÂs

was rightly noted in the latter connexion, since the ‘‘real causes”’ of crime

have not been unequivocally identified, it is unclear what should be defined

as ‘“‘crime prevention strategy” (Ad-Hoc Meeting 1981:12). Therefore,

whatever question is asked in this regard, there cannot be a ‘‘satisfactory”

answer. Aware of this problem, the Secretariat nevertheless felt that in order

to arrive at some preliminary results describing the state of the art in this

field in the global perspective, there should be four major questions. The

first pertained to the types and frequency (if such data are available) of

crime prevention activities sponsored by government agencies during the

period 1975-1980 in the whole country. An illustrative inventory of these

types was given. It was subdivided into two kinds of activities: those aimed

at improvement of the quality of life of the offenders and potential of-

fenders, and those aimed at decreasing physical opportunities for the

commission of crime. The second major question was of an open-ended

character, and asked about any other types of crime prevention activities

that do not fit the types mentioned earlier. The third question was also

of that character and related to ‘“‘crime prevention in the largest city”, and

the fourth one is about criminal justice planning and evaluation of crime

prevention strategies. The part on evaluation contain asking about the

methods, used to assess the effectiveness of crime prevention activities and

their relative frequency of application.

As can be seen from the above, the questionnaire approached the area

of crime prevention and control in a systemic way. This approach was

particularly important for the section of the questionnaire dealing with

“the operations of the criminal justice system”. The crime related data

obtained from responding Member States are expected to allow to analyse

the dynamics of the flow of cases/persons through the entire criminal

justice system and to make comparisons of the ‘‘branch ratios”, i.e. pro-

portion of the total offenders population or/and total number of registered

criminality being processed and taken action on by the relevant criminal

justice agencies. There are, of course, numerous other opportunities to

utilize these data, and, therefore, finding out the ‘‘branch ratios”’ merely

an example of one of them.

Many of the crime data obtained will serve next as the variables to be

correlated with the social indicators, especially at the country level. It is

-173—

hoped that both their choice and degree of robustness will allow for more

conclusive results than those of the first survey.

VI. SOME PRELIMINARY RESULTS

OF THE SECOND SURVEY

Whereas the Member States’ replies are still being received by the Crime

Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch, the analysis of those already com-

puterized (63 altogether including 2 narrative) has been underway for some-

time (7). Preliminary results of this analysis were considered at a special

advisory meeting held in Fall 1983 in the USA (UN Secretariat 1983) and

were next presented to the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control

(UN Secretary-General 1984:5). This analysis revealed inter-alia, that some

countries report as few as 0.2 prosecutors per 100 police officers, while

others report 4 or 5 prosecutors respectively. With regard to judges, such

ratios to police officers range from 0.2 to 8.5. Correctional personnel ratio

to police officers ranges even more dramatically from 1 to 46. Further, it

was found out that in Scandinavian countries, which were relatively socio-

economically and culturally homogenic, these di!ferences still persisted.

Furthermore, in Norway there is almost twice as many prosecutors per 100

police personnel as in Denmark and three times as manv idges. rHlowever,

the first country had rovc"!'y ore fifth less correctionai p«r::nnci, Finland

has comparatively more ;

vs ihan either Denmark or Norway, büt rela.

tively fewer correcticnat rersonnel. À more complete analysis of the Second

Survey' “csults will be presented to the Seventh United Nations C'orgress

on tèe Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders {Ital; , M::45,

26 Aupust - 6 September). Abundance of data made it possible to aliaca::

par'; Of an overall analysis to the United Nations regional institutes at

Hicisinki (HEUNI 1984) and Fuchu (UNAFEI) which on their behalf plan to

p:esent to the Seventh Congress their own reports including horizontal

icrOss-national) and vertical (country criminal justice profiles) analyses fo:

“uropean and Asia and Pacific countries, respectively. In the course of these

analyses proposals are made to the Secretariat on the structure of the Third

United Nations Survey (1980-1985).

Many of the crime data obtained from the Second Survey will serve

next as the variables to be correlated with other social indicators, especially

at the country level. It is hoped that both their choice and degree of robust

ness will allow for more conclusive results than those of the first survey.

VII. METHODOLOGY AND SUBSTANCE RECONSIDERED:

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON THE UNITED NATIONS

CRIME TRENDS SURVEYS

Conflicting with the view quoted in the introduction to this article is

the opinion that ‘’building universal theories of deviance… means that one

— 174 —

must usually move to such a high level of abstraction to encompass all cases

of the object of study that the result is often banal”’ (Mankoff 1980:146;

Beirne 1983).

In fact, time and over again serious doubts are expressed on the utility

of such comparative analyses and, as the numerous United Nations resol-

utions show, Member States’ interest in conducting them is renewed with

the same frequency. Who then is right’.

It is then not my intention to judge who has more convincing argu-

ments although by the very fact of being in the service of the international

organization [ may be denounced as a supporter of such comparisons. The

arguments formulated by the critics of comparative analyses, however, have

often been convincing, especially when it is argued that official recordings

of the incidence of crime at the national level may be of questionable value,

which may be even more true when it comes to cross-national comparisons.

Sufficient evidence was collected here to show that the United Nations

crime trends surveys both methodologically and substantively fall short of

the required rigor and reliability of results. Yet, noting these obvious short-

comings Î wish to emphasize the need for and value of the surveys.

Their need stems from the fact that ‘‘universal and absolute uniformity

among people is utterly impossible” (Durkheim 1968:69) hence thinking

without comparison is unthinkable. However, to arrive at such a trivial con-

clusion it is not necessary to conduct international comparative surveys.

One can safely argue without any, even preliminary, analysis that the crime

rate of country À is different from that of country B. For this it would be

enough to note that spatially coexisting ‘‘contemporary” societies differ

nevertheless among themselves in their location on the ‘‘time table” of

development. After all, there are not event two societies which are exactly

alike and there are only few which could be defined as static, but no doubt

in a varying sense. Hence, they must have different crime rates. The need for

these surveys stems rather from the assumption that the data allowing for

formulation of a picture of criminality in one country, when related to

socio-economic and cultural factors, may also allow to draw some, at least

tentative, conclusions, (— and this is far better than educated guesses —) on

the possible, yet avoidable, developments in criminality in another country.

Existing data, whether more or less reliable, when collected, show also what

classes of data are most frequently used to diagnose the extent of crime and,

by the same token, which data are not available, but could have been help-

ful for a better diagnosis of this phenomenon. The last survey adopts a

systemic approach to criminality and its control and prevention in view of

which an inventory of gaps in data base has a special significance.

“At this point it needs to be emphasized that the results of the Second

Survey made it possible not only to prepare a set of reports, but also to

— 175 —

initiate preparation of the ‘‘“Manual on Collection and Analysis of Criminal

Justice Data”. This technical publication which probably will be available at

the time of the Seventh United Nations Congress provides practical advice

for those who are in charge of generation and gathering of crime related

data on ways of improving the substance of national data bases and means

for their processing. This publication is intended for a wide destribution

among member states with a view to show how an informed analysis of the

crime data may assist in better decision making in the criminal justice

system. The systemic approach adopted in the Second Survey was, no

doubt, very helpful in making comprehensive observations in this regard in

the Manual. Methodologically, this is an improvement in comparative

analysis available so far. But the increased methodological vaule by itself is

not here a point, nor another advantage of obtaining largest city data, as

suggested independently by some researchers (Archer and Gartner, 1983).

Any kind of data, if they are to serve useful purposes, must be made mean-

ingful nationality and this implies that any comparative analysis must go

beyond a narrow treatment of crime, and should account for relevant socio-

economic and cultural factors influencing it.

As has been shown, this is the approach gradually adopted over time in

the United Nations surveys; these changes may make them also more

reliable substantively.

The degree of reliability of these surveys has also to do with the ways

in which the national crime rates are produced. For the consensus oriented

criminologist the policy adopted in the United Nations crime trends surveys

is, probably, acceptable. Data received from Member States are used as sent,

indirectly confirming the consensual view that crime is defined and recorded

as incidences that infringe on collective or community ‘‘sentiments”. For

the conflict oriented criminologist, however, who stresses the role of

interest groups in definitions and recording of crime, such an approach is

too simple, if not inappropriate. Furthermore, the approach used by the

United Nations does not allow for cultural variations in definitions and

perceptions of crime. But conflict criminologists fail to acknowledge that

a common core of acts are regarded cross-nationally as criminal.

The definition of crime and its dynamics are but one point here to

mention. If we consider that the United Nations crime trend survey have

been gradually extended to include the role of various socioeconomic

factors, it would be hard to argue that they adopt a truely straighforward

consensual attitude. The questions of criminality in the wake of economic

crisis Or rapid modernization gives rise to several possible interpretations,

where both conflict and consensus, two sides of one coin, pay their pro-

portionate roles.

— 176 —

FOOTNOTES

(1)

See, however, Shelly 1981 , Vetere and Neuman 1977, Viccica 1977.

(2)

Report by the Secretariat, p.7. These recommendations were later

considered by the Social Commission to which the body of experts

reported and, finally, by the Economic and Social Council. The

Council in its resolution requested inter alia the Secretary General to

conduct a study on ‘‘the achievement of agreed definitions” of these

offence types ‘‘in order to determine the practicability of an ultimate

compilation of comparable international statistics” (UNECOSOC

1957).

(3)

The major compilatory and analytical work was done by the con-

sultant Professor Albert Hess from the U.S.A.

(4)

In addition to the criminal legislation of the 32 countries participating

in the 1937-1946 United Nations study of crime trends, legislation of

the following 45 countries was examined: Afghanistan, Albania,

Austria, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burma, Combodia (Kampuchean Demo-

cratic Republic), Ceylon, Chile, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador,

Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Federal Republic of Germany,

Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Japan, Jordan,

Republic of Korea, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Morocco,

Monaco, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Romnania,

Spain, Sudan, Switzerland, Thailand, USSR, United Arab Republic

(Egypt), Uruguay, Yugoslavia.

(5)

There is a special reason for this pathetic statement. The 1970-1975

Crime Trends and Criminal Justice Survey, although second of this

kind in the United Nations history, became — mostly, ! think, because

of a long interval between it and 1937-1946 Study — to be called

‘“The First United Nations Survey”. However, it could also well be

true that its “developmental”’ character made it really first among the

surveys concerned.

(6)

The following countries responded to the questionnaire: Algeria,

Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bolivia, Barbados, Canada,

Chile, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,

Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Guyana,

Indonesia, Iran, Irag, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kuwait, Malaysia,

Maldives, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Quatar, Pakistan,

Poland, Peru, San Marino, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, Syrian Arab

Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom of Great Britain and

Northern Ireland, United States of America, Yugoslavia. Seventeen

other countries submitted a non-quantifable information.

(7)

By 30 September 1984 the following countries responded: Argentina,

Austria, Australia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium,

Belize, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus,

Czechoslovakia\, Denmark, Ecuador, Germany, Federal Republic of,

—177—

Fiji, Finland, France, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy,

Jamaica, Japan, Jordan Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Madagascar,

Mauritius, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan,

Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rumania, Saint-

Lucia, Senegal, Seychelles, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Syria,

Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvaly,

United Arab Emirites, United Kingdom, USA, Yugoslavia, Zimbabawe.

SUMMARY

This article describes the lengthy and complicated process of developing

the three Unided Nations crime trends surveys, starting from the early com-

parative studies in the late 1940°s to the later survey of crime trends, oper-

ations of criminal justice systems and crime prevention strategies under-

taken in 1982, all of which have remained rather unnoted in the crimino-

logical literature. Both the substantive and methodological aspects of these

surveys are discussed in order to trace the changing emphasis of these

surveys from a principally one-dimensional, legalistic undertaking to multi-

dimensional, ‘“developmental”’’ analyses. Let it be emphasized that these

recurrent surveys meet an oft-expressed request by Member States for broad

cross-national analyses of crime trends and have become over time more

encompassing, illustrative and systemic. Some of the major results of these

surveys are presented here. Finally, the author suggests that despite specific

shortcomings which exist in cross-national analyses of crime trends and

operations of criminal justice systems, such analyses are nonetheless very

useful in selecting particular policies. To this end, the results of the Second

United Nations Survey (1975-1980) will be submitted for consideration and

action to the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime

and the Treatment of Offenders to be held in Milan, Italy, 26 August -

6 September 1985.

RÉSUMÉ

«LES ANALYSES MENTORIELLES

DES TENDANCES DU CRIME PAR LES NATIONS UNIES:

CRIMINOLOGIE COMPARATIVE

DANS LE CONTEXTE GLOBAL»

Cet article décrit la procédure longue et compliquée destiné à dévelop-

per les trois rapports des Nations Unies sur les tendances du crime, depuis

les premières études comparées des années 40 jusqu’à la dernière recherche

sur les tendances du crime, les systèmes de justice pénale et les stratégies de

prévention entreprise en 1982, toutes celles-ci étant passées plutôt inapper-

çues dans la littérature criminologique.

—- 178 —

L’aspect substanciel ainsi que méthodologique de ces études a été

étudié afin de souligner l’évolution des centres d’intérêt qui sont passés

d’une entreprise légaliste et principalement unidimensionnelle à des analyses

multidimensionnelles et de développement. Insistons sur le fait que ces

études périodiques répondent à la demande, maintes fois exprimée par les

États membres, de larges analyses transnationales sur les tendances du crime,

et sont devenues avec le temps plus fournies, illustratives et systémiques.

Quelques uns des principaux résultats de ces études sont présentés ici. En

conclusion, l’auteur déclare qu’en dépit de leurs défauts, les analyses trans-

nationales restent néanmoins très utiles pour établir des choix de politiques

particulières. Dans cette optique les résultats du second bilan des Nations

Unies (1975-1980) sera soumis pour étude et pour l’établissement d’un pro-

gramme d’action au 7ème congrès des Nations Unies pour la prévention du

crime et le traitement des délinquants qui se tiendra à Milan en Italie du

26 Août au 6 Septembre 1985.

— 179 —

POWER CONCENTRATION, LEGITIMATION CRISIS

AND PENAL SEVERITY: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE*

Martin Killias* *

I. INTRODUCTION

In the past ten years, criminal justice research on sanctions has dwelt on

alternatives to imprisonment (1) and theories on the stable level of punish-

ment in a given society (e.g., Blumstein and Cohen, 1983). Despite available

alternatives and the ‘’homeostasis’” theories to the contrary, the incarcer-

ation rates of many countries continue to increase; the American rate of

sentenced prisoners in State and Federal institutions rose between 1972

and 1979 by about 45 percent (Hindelang et al., 1981 : table 6.16), reaching

its highest level in history (Cahalan, 1979). These rates should provoke more

interest in the research of variations in the levels of punishment, and, con-

comitantly, in theories that explain variations in, rather than the stability

of, punishment. Such theories could also be used to address the question of

the enormous cross-national differences in incarceration rates — a phenom-

enon largely ignored in stability of punishment theories, although some

cross-sectional research has been conducted on fluctuations of incarceration

rates (e.g., Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin, 1977; Blumstein and Moitra,

1979).

[I. THFORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theories that explain variations in the level of punishment fall into

two basic, if simplistic, classifications: those that emphasize social structural

variables, such as modernization and power concentration, and those that

Point to the amount of social conflict, measured by indicators of social

* This paper wa.s written while the author was a visiting scholar at the

School of Criminal Justice, State University of New York at Albany. He

wishes to express his thanks to many teachers and students who gave him

unvaluable insights into many aspects of the present topic. Particular

thanks are due to Professors Robert H. Hardt for numerous helpful sug-

gestions concerning the analysis, Graeme R. Newman for help with data

gathering, and Beverly A. Smith for smoothing the paper’s English style.

Outside Albany, the author is indebted to Eugene Doleschal, Director,

NCCD, for data on incarceration rates and the median time served by

prisoners.

** Professeur de Criminologie, Université de Lausanne-Dorigny.

— 181 —

crisis, such as unemployment rates. These theories can be briefly sum-

marized in the following way.

1. The social structural perspective

In a largely ignored article entitled ‘Two Laws of Penal Evolution” (2),

Durkheim presented these hypotheses on variations in penal severity. First,

penal severity decreases with development, since crime in primitive societies

offended religious commands rather than individual, secular interests.

Second, imprisonment would become the dominant form of punishment in

modern societies, because they, in contrast to primitive societies, have the

resources at hand to construct and operate penetentiaries. Third, penal

severity reaches a peak every time the form of government becomes ‘‘absol-

ute””, i.e. whenever power is highly concentrated within a society. Whether

religion per se is really the key variable in explaining penal severity, or

whether the key is that religious authority was assumed by absolutist

government to legitimize extreme degrees of power concentration, does not

have to bother us since power concentration in itself might be a sufficient

cause of an increase in penal severity. This was also the position of

Montesquieu, who had advanced an almost identical hypothesis 150 years

before Durkheim (Montesquieu, 1748/1977: book VI, ch. 6 and 13) (3).

2. The conflict perspective

Sorokin (1937/1962:599-606), one of the first writers on penal severity,

explained variations in punitiveness by the amount of conflict within a

given society. To illustrate his point, Sorokin presented figures from France

and Russia that reveal very high numbers of executions in times of serious

civil disorder and revolution. Sorokin ascribed these variations to a lack of

consensus on basic cultural values. Although his evidence does indicate that

penal severity increased in times of social crisis, it seems that in these

instances the power structure, rather than society’s basic values, were in

trouble. It hardly seems feasible that dissent on basic crimes such as robbery,

theft, murder and rape could have rapidly reached such dramatic dimensions

and then as rapidly ebbed when the climax had passed (4). Theories, there-

fore, that explain social crises in terms of strain within the social structure

may account better for such peaks of penal severity.

Following the Marxian tradition, Rusche and Kirchheimer (1939)

claimed that the punishments used to control the lower classes are deter-

mined by criteria of economic rationality. In societies with a large surplus

of manpower, capital and corporate punishments are used ; whereas, impris-

onment and forced labor are dominant whenever there is a scarcity of man-

power. Rusche and Kirchheimer assumed that the increased power of lower

class individuals and organizations made a widespread return to capital

punishment unlikely. Modern authors such as Quinney (1977) and Melossi

- 182—

and Pavarini (1979) again emphasize the role of the labor market, con-

sidering imprisonment as a means to reduce unemployment. In seeing the

factory and the prison as complementary institutions to control the lower

class (5), they base their reasoning on an implicit incapacitation model.

The empirical evidence on the labor market hypothesis has been mixed.

À number of studies suggest that the unemployment rate had a significant

impact on the use of imprisonment in capitalist societies (cf., e.g. Jankovic,

1977; Greenberg, 1977; Yeager, 1979) although this relationship did not

hold during the Great Depression (Jankovic, 1977) and in a cross-sectional

study of the American states (Garofalo, 1979) (6). Available historical data

on execution rates (‘7) indicates that the death penalty has never been used

to control the labor market (Steinert and Treiber, 1978). Rather, the elite

maintains the social order by threatening capital punishment rather than by

large-scale executions (Hay, 1975), which mght or might not have been

economically rational.

In modern industrialized societies, government is expected to promote

the citizens’ welfare as well as reduce unemployment. Incarceration more

people for longer periods of time could be a governmental response to the

perceived of unemployment, rather than an effort to ease labor market over-

supply. One could then expect incarceration rates to rise whenever the

social order undergoes a period of crisis, whether this crisis is due to high

unemployment rates or to political factors. Greenberg’s (1980) study of

Poland’s highly fluctuating imprisonment rates suggests that the changes in

the incarceration rate seemed to be closely related to political events,

especially the political crises Poland underwent in 1956 and again in 1968

rather than to labor market forces. Studying incarceration rates in terms of

political and social crises helps overcome the ‘’economic reductionism’”

(Greenberg, 1980) of many Marxist criminologists. Considering unemploy-

ment as a crisis factor, makes it possible to integrate the labor market

approach with Sorokin’s version of the conflict hypothesis.

3. Legitimation Crisis and penal severity

Max Weber stated sixty years ago (Weber, 1925/1954:335) that any

power has a certain need for self-justification. Rulers can induce their

subjects to believe that the power gap between them is in their best interest.

Or they can settle issues that previously had seemed insoluble. Or they can

base their authority on a long standing tradition. Finally, they can empha-

size their expertise or that of their staffs.

Such justifications of power can be identified both at the macro-

sociological level, but also in social psychological studies on power legit-

imation in smaller groups (Wallster et al., 1973). For example, power

positions in the work place tend to be legitimized by reference to some

status such as education, seniority or expertise. At the societal level, Heintz

— 183 —

(1972:140) hypothesizes that the legitimation of power becomes more

difficult the more the power gap between the ruler and the subordinates

grows. The chance of a legitimation crisis increases proportionately with the

extent of power concentration. If power is conceived of as a phenomenon

of interaction rather than as a consequence of material resources (Luhmann,

1975:9 (8); Schneider, 1978:35), then power is more often created and

maintained by the threat of force rather than by its actual use (Luhmann,

1975:60-69). The steps through which a legitimation crisis is transformed

into an increase in penal severity (not only in the law codes, but also in

practice) needs, however, more clarification.

If the deligitimation of the existing power structure leads to an open

challenge of the rules, then the actual use of force including that of the

criminal justice system will increase. Thus the violent response of the ruler

to the violence of his opponents is reflected in peaks of executions, es-

pecially those of political prisoners. But why should any regime answer to

a general legitimation crisis by emphasizing some ‘‘war on crime” which, as

Wilkins (1976) noted, notoriously boils down to a ‘’war on criminals?” Does

non-political street crime threaten any government? As Taylor (1980) noted

in an analysis of electoral campaigns in Britain and Canada, the conservative

parties’ law and order stances may be understood as an attempt to reduce

the legitimation crisis of the given social order, since focusing on street

crime deflects the public’s attention away from potentially delegitimizing

issues. Given the wide agreement on the undesirability of (street) crime, law

and order policies are a way to increase consensus within a society, just as

going to war against neighbors may be an efficient way to reduce interior

dissent. Whenever politicians make crime an electoral or a general political

issue, they may be motivated by a search for legitimation rather than by a

fear of the crime. The increase in penal severity emanating from law and

order policies may thus be a side-<ffect of a search for consensus rather than

an end in itself.

How can we predict that a legitimation crisis will arise, to be followed

by an increase in penal severity? We may expect that the probability of a

legitimation crisis and, concomitantly, of a rise in penal severity, increases:

— the less the rulers succeed in meeting the standards which emanate from

their own self-justification, and/or

— the larger the power gap between the rulers and their subordinates grows,

i.e. the more power is concentrated among a few (9).

These two hypotheses are derived from the proposition that legit-

imation crises lead to increases in penal severity. And since the first one

integrates earlier research from the conflict perspective, whereas the second

one restates Durkheim’s and Montesquieu’s power concentration hypoth-

esis, one may conclude that the concept of legitimation crisis makes possible

the integration of these two seemingly contradictory perspectives.

— 184 —

III. RESEARCH DESIGN

1 . Cross-national analysis

Most of the research on penal severity has been based on historical and

time-series analyses of criminal justice policies within one or, in some cases,

a very few societies (10). Such research designs permit the consideration of

a large number of independent variables and help avoid the problem of the

unknown validity of the indicators used. On the other hand, being directed

toward interpreting and explaining rather than predicting development, such

studies tend to be less conclusive, and inferences regarding other societies

remain rather speculative. Of course, it is not very meaningful to argue for

or against the superiority of any of these two approaches, since they both

serve an important function in the development of social science (11). Given

the present preponderance of time-series and historical studies on penal

severity, the present study has been designed to analyse this topic using a

sample of as many nations as possible.

2. The dependent variable

Penal severity can be operationalized in two different ways: first, we

can look at the forms of punishments the judiciary has at its disposal, and

compare different nations by using an underlying scale of penal severity ;

second, we can consider the severity within a given form of punishment,

e.g. by looking at the length of imprisonment or the amount of fines. Both

of these operationalizations have to cope with Christie’s (1968) version of

the stability of punishment hypothesis. According to Christie, the change

in punishments over the past 200 years can not be attributed to humanitari-

anism, nor a decrease in society’s punitiveness, but to a shift in the under-

lying scale of penal values. In other words, what once may have been

‘“worth” the death penalty may, according to modern standards, only

deserve five years in prison, and what once may have deserved imprison-

ment, may today be equivalent to a fine. Christie explains this shift in penal

values by an increase in susceptibility, so that our (supposedly more lenient)

punishments cause the same amount of suffering as did the more cruel ones

of the past. There seems to exist an immanent rank ordering of different

forms of punishment which is valid across historical periods and national

boundaries.

The relative severity of different forms of punishment can be assessed

in a generally valid way by using their position within the process of par-

doning, i.e. by looking at which form of punishment is commuted to what.

In all the societies and in all the periods on which we are sufficiently in-

formed, there is a consistent pattern: qualified forms of capital punishment

are commuted into ‘‘simple”’ forms of the death penalty, imprisonment is

used as a substitute for executing the offender, long imprisonment terms are

— 185 —

reduced to shorter ones, and prison sentences tend to be commuted to non-

incarcerative sanctions, such as fines (12). It seems, therefore, warranted to

say that societies whose laws provide for the death penalty are characterized

by more penal severity than abolitionist ones, and that societies using longer

prison terms for the same kind of offenses are more punitive than others.

Regarding the use of imprisonment, penal severity is, in the absence of

more adequate data, usually measured by comparing incarceration rates.

This way of operationalizing penal severity has to cope, however, with the

objection that these data reflect nothing more than different levels of crime.

Although it would be an overstatement to say that crime rates do not have

any impact on incarceration rates, the availble evidence, nevertheless,

supports Wilkins (1965:85) assumption that this impact is not too large. For

example, there is some indication that Eastern European countries have

lower crime rates than Western Europe (Kaiser, 1976; Shelley, 1981), but at

the same time they have some of the highest incarceration rates in the

world. In a number of studies (e.g., Doleschal 1979) the median time served

by prisoners in different countries was compared with the incarceration

rates of these nations, and there seems to be a strong tendency that

countries with high incarceration rates punish their criminals with much

longer prison terms (13). Besides, studies on the incarceration rate in

America consistently find a weak or, at best, a moderate correlation be-

tween incarceration and crime rates (14).

The best way, of course, to assess the validity of incarceration rates as

measures of penal severity would be to use crime rates as a control variable.

For most of the countries that figure in our sample, the United Nations has

gathered data on the number of offenses reported to the police and of iden-

tified offenders during the years 1970-1975. Unfortunately, these data are

not published and could not be obtained for the present analysis (15). In an

unpublished analysis of these data, however, Newman and Vetere (1978)

found a correlation (r) between the rate of adult offenders recorded by the

police and the incarceration rate of only .08, a finding that is the more

remarkable since offender as well as prisoner rates are based on persons (16).

Newman and Vetere suggest, interpreting this finding, that some countries

may process and record a high number of offenders, yet punish them with

non-incarcerative sanctions or short prison sentences, thereby keeping the

incarceration rate at a relatively low level. Other countries, in contrast, may

process far fewer people, but punish them very harshly which, in turn, in-

creases the incarceration rates. In sum, this finding strongly supports

Wilkins (1974) statement that incarceration rates reflect penal severity

rather than crime rates. Since the rate of offenders, being a control variable

in the present context, would have to be introduced into the regression

equation before the other independent variables, the fact that it accounts

for less than 1 percent of variation in prisoner rates means that the ignor-

ance of these data does not affect the results seriously, at least not if

stepwise regression is used.

— 186 —

3. The independent variables

The legitimation crisis in the form of a failure of the government to

meet expectations emanating from its own self-justification has, in the

present study, been operationalized by the unemployment rate. As men-

tioned above, this indicator has been used by many other writers on incar-

ceration and penal severity, too, although as a part of a different theoretical

framework. But to the author’s knowledge no attempt has been made so far

to analyse its impact in a cross-national study.

As indicators of power concentration, whose relevance in the present

context has been explained above, two different measures were used. First,

the degree of power concentration at the governmental level has been

assessed by distinguishing between countries having democratic and those

with non-democratic forms of government. The criterion for this classifi-

cation has been whether the executive and/or the parliament have been

elected in a free, open vote, i.e.according to the one-man-one-vote principle,

in which the candidates number more than the available seats. Consequently,

military governments, one-party regimes, and absolute monarchies have

been classified as non-democratic. One may criticize this criterion on the

grounds that it is rather crude; on the other hand, it seems closer to the

concept of power concentration than indexes which include also several civil

liberties (17), and it seems to imply to a lesser degree a moral distinction

between ‘‘good’”’ and ‘‘bad” governments. Second, power concentration

within a society has also been measured by Corrado Gini’s index of income

concentration. This index can assume values between .0, indicating a per-

fectly equal income distribution, and 1.0, indicating concentration of all

income at the top (18). In Western societies, the Gini index is generally con-

sidered a very valid measure of power concentration, given the high corre-

lation between wealth and power in capitalist countries. In communist

nations, however, power may be associated with bureaucratic (dispositional)

competences rather than with possession (Djilas, 1957: 44-66), and even

chances to acquire consumer goods may be less a function of income than

in capitalist countries (Weede, 1981). With income distribution not being a

valid measure of power concentration under the communist system and in

line with recent research in this field (Weede, 1981), no data on income

distribution from communist countries have been analyzed in the present

study.

Since both the form of government and the income concentration are

highly correlated with social development (Bollen, 1979; Bornschier, 1978),

the annual per capita national income has been introduced as a control

variable. This measure is generally considered a more valid single indicator

of development than the gross national product, the percent of work force

in agriculture, the percent o£ population illiterate, etc.. because it is based

G a nation’s wealih patiier

uan On liarau terts‘ics oi its population cr

187

production. This indicator allows also to take into account Durkheim’s

main hypothesis, that penal severity decreases with modernization.

Among the most serious problems cross-national research has to cope

with is missing data. Due to a lack of available data, the size of the sample

is reduced every time a new variable is taken into account. This precludes

the study of several possibly influential independent variables the inclusion

of unemployment, e.g., reduced the number of nations for which all other

data have been available to merely 21, down from an original sample of 55.

To prevent the sample from becoming even smaller, only the variables

mentioned here have been analyzed. In an attempt to compromise between

sample size and availability of data, each independent variable has also been

analyzed using al those nations for which it was available, but for which

other data were missing.

4. The data

Data on incarceration rates of 47 nations were taken from a survey con-

ducted by the United Nations in 1975 (19). On eight more countries, data

were taken from various sources (20). As far as possible, data for 1972 were

used in order to make the sample as homogenous as possible. Whenever data

for 1972 were not available, the year for which they could be obtained is

indicated in table 1.

Information on whether a country retains capital punishment or not

was taken from the Penal Codes of 23 nations and from a number of inter-

national surveys (21). In partial disagreement with some observers (e.g..

Lopez-Rey, 1980) who even consider a country as retentionist when its laws

provide for the dealth penalty only in times of war, only countries that

retain it for formal times and for crimes that are of some relevance during

such times (22) were counted as retentionist. No attention was given to

whether the death penalty has not been used over a long period of time, as

in Belgium, or whether executions are quite frequent. The United States,

Mexico, and Australia, were not included because some of their federal

states do retain capital punishment, while the majority of them do not.

Regarding the form of government, the necessary information was

gathered from the pertinent volumes of the World Almanac (23) and the

usually more inclusive Fisher Weltalmanach (23).

Gini index data were taken from an international survey by Bornschier

(1978) (24). Since the income distribution within a given nation is ex-

tremely stable over even extended periods of time (25), the data used in the

present analysis can be considered valid indicators of income concentration

in the year for which the incarceration data were obtained. However, to

prevent large gaps between incarceration and Gini index data, the analysis

has been restricted to countries where the latter are not more than 10 years

older than the former.

— 188 —

Data on unemployment rates were taken from the U.N. Statistical

Yearbook 1978 (26). Wherever possible, data for the year preceding the one

for which incarceration rates were available have been gathered.

Data on the per capita national income in 1972, respectively in the year

for which incarceration rates were known, have been taken from the perti-

nent volumes of the U.N. Statistical Yearbook (27). Since changes in per

capita national income are affected by fluctuations of exchange rates, and

since most incarceration rates were from 19"2, all figures were adjusted for

dollar rates in 1972. (See table 1 next page).

IV. RESULTS

1. Capital punishment

As table 2 illustrates (29), there is a very strong negative association

between development (per capita national income) and the retention of

capital punishment (30):

TABLE Il

Capital punishment and development

(Nations with a least 5,000,000 population only) (30)

per capita national

income

low (X $ 1000)

high $ 1000)

N

capital punishment

Abolished

° . . . . À . . . . . * . . .

6 %

45 %

17

Retained

. . * . . . . - L . . . . . .

94 %

55 %

61

78

100 %

100 %

(47)

(31)

G =-.85*

Chi2? =16.37

p <.001

* Note that Gamma should be interpreted with caution, since its amount is due only to

the lack of abolitionist countries among the less developed nations. Among the devel-

oped ones, there is no parallel tendency.

Even stronger is, as table 3 reveals (31), the association between form

of government and retention of the death penalty among the developed

nations (32), i.e. if the level of development is controlled (33).

— 189 —

TABLE I

Raw Data

Prisoners

Income con-

Form of

cap

Per capita

% unemplo yed

per 100,000

pun

* *

naticnal income

centration (Gini

(in 1971)

government

(in 1972)*

(in 1972)

Index)

(in 1972)

Argentina

* . . ° » .

109

1016

nd

Australia

. - . + . «* »

89

3485

3198 (1967/68)

Au st_ria

. ° . . À. . . .

109

2427

3693 (1967)

à

Belgium

° ° . . . ° .

3345

Benin

55 (1974)

nd (1974)

Canada

98 (1974)

3828 (1969)

Chile

108

587

4949 (1968)

Ëî9

Colombia

. . ° ° . À .

186

337

5436 (1970)

. ® . . ° ° ° L

31

1210

Denmark

Cyprus

. . [ . . ° ®

69

3795

î

i

. . . . . » .

58

3648 (1966)

(1973)

Ecuador

260

5300 (1969)

E!ÙSalvador

° ° . . . ®

175

1E +1 T4

289

5387 (1965)

oeo

Fiji

124 (1974)

4687 (1968)

(1974)

Finland

02

918 (1974)

4633 (1967)

2.3

prrm baré e puneé ph pueet

France

* * . . + » . L

61

3349

4214 (1970)

FR Gerr:iany

86

3765

3918 (1970)

Ç:crman DR

. ° . . .

262

2475 (1974)

3:0o0.00O353500O0.0O0O.8O.

&

pouen ve

=4N Cn m UU D H— O \O 090 <3 ON Un B U D ——

fong Kong

» . » ° .

112 (1980)

se

1855 (1975)

4249 (1971)

4.5 (1977)

{- ija

36 (1974)

136 (1974)

4697 (1967/68)

1974)

A e

sia

289 (1977)

4438 (1971)

p fN

1980)

Æ

e *

- " . . Q * ° . Û .

48 (1980)

425 (1973)

en

ÊÎei.:pd

. * ° ° . . . .

35

1723

23

es ( E

134

2215

raly

51

1998

3967 (1969)

ä

er

orv Coast

* . . . .

130

391

5242 (1970)

cf aica

. ° Û * Q . . .

121

816

anpan

. . ® * Q . Û .

46

2418

4125 (1971)

11 (1973)

î

165

148

e?

-

Ê

2

. . . ° ° . °

6076 (1969)

120

rr

FFFHHHHI 01 AHHHH10001

786

* . . . . . .

25

343

5057 (1970)

Qaezsopno.non.no.asooe

31

Mexico

83

632 (1970)

5680 (1969)

d

32

Morocco

96

+

241

5080 (1965)

nd

33

Netherlands

21

3139

3925 (1967)

1.6

d

34

New Zealand

. . . À .

85

2880

3530 (1971/72)

nd (1974)

35

Nigeria

. ° ° . ° . ° .

42 (1974)

+ |

211 (1973)

nd

36

Norway

39 (1974)

|

3863 (1974)

3609 (1970)

(1973)

37

Panama

120

152

4881 (1969)

nd

38

53 (1974)

nd

Philippines

° . . . . ° . °

339 (1974)

4840 (1971)

(1973)

39

Poland

191 (1971)

1800 (1974)

nd

40

Portugal

44 (1974)

1337 (1974)

1.8 (1974)

nd (1974)

41

Sierra Leone

88 (1974)

se

202 (1974)

5672 (1968)

d (1974)

42

South Africa

. . . .

400 (1975)

1302 (1975)

5652 (1965)

nd

43

Spain

40

1240

3907 (1964/65)

1.5

nd (1972)

44

Sri Lanka

64

167

LHI 451 #HI

3536 (1973)

45

Sweden

° . . ° ® ° ° .

54

4649

3495 (1972)

2.5

46

Switzerland

. . . . »

42

4252

4009 (1968)

47

Syrian Arab.R.. . .

35

314

7.5

nd

48

Thailand

° ® . . ° ° °

124

184

5029 (1962)

nd

49

Trinidad & T

106

732 (1970)

5340 (1965)

12.6

50

Tunesia

° . . ° . ° ° Q

103

403

4937 (1970)

nd

51

USSR

. . ° ® L ° Q . °

391 (1975)

1809 (1974)

nd

52

United Kingdom

75 (1974)

3116 (1974)

3461 (1973)

2.7 (1973)

53

United States

189

21 A4H+H+HH1

4984

4090 (1972)

5.9

54

Venezuela

127

1104

6005 (1971)

6.0

SS

Yugoslavia

101 (1977)

+ !

11.4 (1976)

nd

Note:

* VWith the exception of Poland, these figures include sentenced as well as unsentenced prisoners, both in local jails and in nationally

operated prisons. Poland’s rate is based on the number of sentenced inmates only.

** A “+” sign stands for retaining, a

“_,9

sign for having abolished capital punishment. Countries with ( ) sign have not been included in

the analysis presented in tables 2 and 3, either because they have less than 1 million population, or, if their population is between 1 and

S millions, because they have a per capita national income of less than $ 1000 (in 1977); Hong Kong has been excluded because it is

665s

°

not formally indepçndent. A

sign means that the situation regarding capital punishment is unclear or unknown.

TABLE III

Capital punishment and form of government

(Nations with at least $ 1000 per capita national income in 1977

and 1,000,000 population only) (32)

form of

government

democratic

non-democratic

capital

punishment

Abolished

° ° . - . . . . . . . . . . À

76 %

17 %

22

Retained

. . . . ° . . . . . ° . ° . .

24 %

83 %

21

100 %

100 %

43

. . . . .… —… . . ° . . . . . . . ° . °

(25)

(18)

88

Chi? = 14.74

p <.001

If no such control is introduced, the association is almost perfect

(G — .93), since there are extremely few poor countries with non-demo-

cratic forms of government that have abolished capital punishment. The

lack of abolitionist countries among developing nations, no matter what the

form of government, i.e. the lack of variation in the dependent variable,

makes a parallel analysis of the association between form of government

and retention vs. abolition of capital punishment among third world nations

impossible.

This lack of variation in the dependent variable, once the level of

development is taken into account, makes it also impossible to analyse the

impact of income concentration on whether the death penalty is abolished

or retained (34).

2. Incarceration rates (35)

2.1. Incarceration rates and development

Although the signs of the zero-order correlation between per capita

national income and incarceration rates are in the direction predicted by

Durkheim, they are nevertheless very low (r & —.15) and far from being

significant. For the 54 nations on which data on per capita national income

and incarceration could be obtained, the zero-order correlation is only

—.028. When incarceration rates in these 54 nations is regressed, using per

capita national income and form of government simultaneously as indepen-

dent variables (36), the b-coefficient of the former is far from being signifi-

cant (t = .90). This finding contrasts sharply with the strong impact that the

same indicator of development was found to have on whether capital

punishment is retained or abolished (see table 2). Since Newman and Vetere

—

—

(1978) found a relatively strong correlation (r

55) between gross

— 192 —

domestic product and the number of correctional personnel (per 100,000

population), one might suspect that the reason for this paradox is that

developed and developing countries differ in their control strategies. As

prisons are expensive to operate, it seems feasible that countries suffering

from scarcity of resources incarcerate fewer people for shorter periods of

time than developed nations, and compensate for this lack of deterrence

with the use of cheaper, but crueler, punishments, such as the death pen-

alty. Indeed, there is a surprisingly weak association (G = .26) between

capital punishment and incarceration rates (37). Penal severity, therefore,

cannot be regarded as a one-dimensional concept. Rather, one should

differentiate between two control models that do not necessarily go along

with each other, namely a ‘‘terror model”, aimed at deterrence by cruel

punishments, and a ‘“discipline model” that is based on incarcerating more

people for longer periods of time. This interpretation can be based on an

inversion of Beccaria’s famous statement that not the cruelty, but the

certainty of punishment works as a deterrent, and it is in line with modern

research on the (inverse) relationship between these two variables (cf.

Pepinsky, 1980: 82).

Taken together, the relationships found between development on the

one hand and capital punishment and incarceration on the other support

Durkheim’s two laws of penal evolution if they are refined in the following

way

]l) Durkheim’s hypothesis that penal severity decreases with develop-

ment, if the dependent variable is operationalized by the shift in the forms

of punishment, i.e. from capital and corporal to non-physical sanctions,

rather than by the severity in sentencing within a given form of punishment;

and

2) Durkheim’s prediction that imprisonment will become the dominant

form of punishment, if it is restated that with development the use of

physical forms of punishment will decrease. By this rerinement, Durkheim°s

two laws are actually reduced to one.

2.2. Incarceration rates and form of government

The zero-order correlation between incarceration rate and form of

government is .307 (N = 54), and the association coefficient (Gamma) is

.16 (38). When the incarceration rate is regressed, using per capita national

income and form government as independent variables (36), the latter’s (but

not the former’s) regression coefficient is significant at the .02 level

(t = 2.48). In the analysis of variance, form of government explains 11 per-

cent of variation in incarceration rates (N = 54) when introduced after the

indicator of development. This finding is in the line with the result of

table 3, although the impact of the form of government on incarceration

rates is much smaller than on capital punishment. In line with what has been

said above on the impact of development on crime control strategies, it

— 193 —

seems that dictatorships are indeed more punitive than other forms of

government, for they tend to punish more cruelly, instead of incarcerating

more people for longer periods of time. This interpretation conforms with

Luhmann°s (1975:9) hypothesis that not the use, but rather the threat, of

force works as a means to maintain power. Ît also is supported by historical

studies on the interaction between terror, i.e. threat with cruel responses,

and selective sanctioning practices under the Hanoverian kings (Hay, 1975).

2.3. Incarceration rates and income concentration

TABLE IV

Correlation Matrix (Sample of 39 nations)

. Incarceration rate

° ° - . ° . . . . * . À « À °

-.152

. Development (p.c. national income). . .

_—

. Form of government

. À . ° “ . . . . . À ° .

332

463

—A U tiv —

. Income concentration (Gini index) . . .

460

127

417

Among the three independent variables presented in table 4, the Gini

index is most strongly correlated with incarceration rates (r = .460). Be-

cause of the multicollinearity between this variable and per capita national

income (r = —.727), a simultaneous multiple regression analysis is not

warranted. Stepwise multiple regression, however, is more appropriate

whenever an intrinsic causal order among the independent variables can be

assumed (Nie et al., 1975:339). In assessing the causal order among the

three independent variables, we can presume that high income concen-

tration and non-democratic forms of government do not cause under-

development, but rather that these forms of power concentration are likely

to occur at certain stages of development (Bollen, 1979; Bornschier, 1978).

Therefore, it is in order to introduce per capita national income into the

regression equation first. To determine whether form of government or

income concentration should be introduced second is somewhat difficult.

as highly privileged elites tend to defend the status quo by using dictatorial

forms of government; on the other hand, all governments, and non-demo-

cratic ones probably even more, try to influence the income distribution

by adopting certain economic policies. To avoid any problematic decision

in this regard, the analysis has been conducted in both ways, displayed in

tables 5 and 6.

— 194 —

TABLE V

Incarceration rate regressed on 3 independent variables (N = 39) I:

Development, Income Concentration, Form of Government

Independent

R Square

F/p

F/p

variables

Multiple R

R Square

Change

R Square

R Square

1. Development

(p.c. national

income) . . .

152

023

023

1.22 ns.

1.22 ns

2. Formof

government .

332

110

087

5.82 .05

4.60 .05

3. Income con-

centration

(Gini index) .

580

336

226

17.71 .001

11.89 .O1

TABLE VI

Incarceration rate regressed on 3 independent variables (N = 39) II:

Development, Form of Government, Income Concentration

Independent

R Square

F/p

F/p

variables

Multiple R

R Square

Change

R Square

R Square

Development

(p.c. national

income) . . .

152

023

023

1.22 nss.

1.22 nss.

tV

Form of

government .

332

110

087

5.82 .05

4.60 .05

Income con-

centration

(Gini index) .

580

336

226

17.71 .001

11.89 .O1

As tables 5 and 6 reveal, development, once more, does not contribute

any substantial fraction to the total amount of variation explained. Besides,

income concentration is clearly a more powerful explanatory variable than

form of government, no matter which one is introduced first. Since form of

government is, as has been discussed above, very strongly associated with

retention vs. abolition of capital punishment (see table 3), whereas income

concentration is less strongly associated with the said dependent variable

(34), the result of tables 5 and 6 is somewhat puzzling. It ssems that non-

democratic forms of government and high income inequality go along with

the two different crime control strategies described above, the former

leading rather to deterrence by cruel physical punishments, the latter

leading rather to more and longer prison sentences. The rise of democracy

during the 19th century was generally followed not only by a market

decline, or even the abolition, of capital punishment, but also, as ignatieff

(1978:212) concluded, by the simultaneous, massive increase in the use of

total(itarian) institutions, symbolizing more intolerance towards deviants of

— 195 —

all sorts. From these trends, one may say that non-democratic governments

prefer the ‘‘terror model”, whereas democracies with a lot of economic

inequality tend to prefer the ‘‘discipline model”. Whatever the psychological

differences underlying these two control models may be, it seems feasible

that democratic governments are somewhat more restricted in their force

choice of control strategies, since the use of brutal violence in defense of

the status quo can easily destroy the consensual appearance by which such

governments tend to be legitimized (cf. Luhmann, 1975:69). This restriction

in the range of available means of control may account for the ‘“economic-

ally irrational”’ reluctance to return to massive execution rates (Rusche,

1933), as well as for the much lower level of police violence against rioters

and opponents, when compared to crack-downs under many non-demo-

cratic governments. Since using prisons more widely and sentencing of-

fenders to longer prison terms do not seem to be considered illegitimate in

democracies, it is plausible that in these countries an increase in penal

severity is primarily sought in the form of longer sentences and a more con-

servative use of non-incarcerative sanctions. Dictatorships, however, may

depend much less on an image of consensual rule, and this fact allows them

to turn to the cheaper ‘‘terror model” rather easily, i.e. whenever brutal

violence appears to be the mot cost-efficient way of defending the status

quo

2.4. Incarceration rates and unemployment

Unfortunately, unemployment rates could be obtained for only 21

nations for which data on the other independent variables were available.

Thus, the scope of this analysis is very limited. Again, the high multi-

collinearity between per capita national income and the Gini index

(r = —.707), and between the latter and unemployment (r = .640), renders

the use of the simultaneous multiple regression impossible.

TABLE VII

Correlation Matrix (Sample of 21 nations)

l

2

1. Incarceration rate

2. Development (p.c. national income)

-.0—6 2

—

3. Form of government

. ° . . . . . .

116

-.535

—

p

4. Income concentration (Gini index)

399

-.707

219

S. Unemployment rate

. À . . . À ° °

546

-442

.159

640

Analysing the amount of variance explained by each of the independent

variables, one may, again, introduce the indicator of development first, since

unemployment is obviously a result, rather than a cause, of underdevelop-

ment. More difficult, however, is the determination of the causal order be-

tween unemployment and income concentration. On the one hand,

— 196 —

unemployment is not a natural disaster, but rather a consequence of certain

economic policies that are favored by some economically powerful groups.

On the other hand, the income concentration index is directly affected by

the number of unemployed, since they have less income than people with

jobs. To take this probably mutual dependency into account, the analysis

has been conducted both ways, i.e. introducing unemployment before

income concentration into the regression equation, as well as the other way

around.

TABLE VIII

Incarceration rate regressed on 4 independent variables (N = 21) I-

Development, Form of Government, Unemployment, Income Concentration

Independent

R Square

F/p

F/p

variables

Multiple R

R Square

Change

R Square

R Square

Development

(p.c. national

062

004

income) . . .

004

l

n.s

n.s

Form of

government

187

035

031

293 n.s

83 ns.

Unemploy-

ment rate

594

352

317

9.38 .01

8.45 .0S

Income con-

centration

(Gini index)

632

399

047

10.62.01

1.24 n.s.

TABLE IX

Incarceration rate regressed on 4 independent variables (N = 21) II:

Development , Form of Government, Income Concentration, lhemployment

Independent

R Square

F/p

F/p

variables

Multiple R

R Square

Change

R Square

RSQ Change

Development

(p.c. national

income) . . .

062

004

004

1

n.s

1

n.s

Form of

government .

187

035

031

.93ns

83 nss.

Income con-

centration

(Gini index) .

508

259

224

6.88 .05

5.95 .05

Unemploy-

ment rate

632

399

140

10.62.01

3.74ns

A

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l'|

P

‘entratio” -xplau 4 US ue RMGO 1 Of variine” 1

)‘\,

CEF UON

es

;

IysIy |

ves récuik vpmidecnes st the 05

-— 197 —

only when introduced before each other. Besides, unemployment seems to

be a more powerful variable than income concentration in the present

sample.

Before drawing any conclusions regarding the relative importance of

unemployment and income concentration in explaining incarceration rates,

a few warning words are in order. First, it should be kept in mind that the

sample of 21 nations, for which all needed data could be obtained, is heavily

biased in favor of affluent countries, the number of countries with iess than

$ 1000 per capita national income being only 4. Since affluer cuntries

have generally quite similar Gini scores, but range very widely in

-mploy-

ment rates, it is plausible that the latter variable explains morc .xriance

within such a restricted sample. Second, in line with this observa:ion, the

Zero-order correlation between incarceration rate and income concer ‘“ation

is lower (.399) within the sample of 21 nations than within that « 39

nations (.460) which includes 19 developing countries (see tables 4 a: 1

e

/s

respectively). Unemployment, however, is considerably stronger correlated

with incarceration among the 21 nations sample (.546), than if the corre-

lation is computed on the base of 30 nations (.410), i.e. including 9 (mostly

developing) countries for which incarceration and unemployment rates, but

no data on the other variables, were available.

The data presented here do not warrant any definitive conclusions

regarding the overall relevance of unemployment and income concentration

in explaining incarceration rates. One may suppose, however, that in rela-

tively poor countries with high inequality of income distribution and

endemic high unemployment, the former affects the legitimation of the

rulers much more seriously than the economic misery which, in the third

world, is generally beyond the capacities of those governments to ameliorate

drastically. In more affluent nations where the income distribution is more

even and, at least in general, less a source of interior conflict, high unem-

ployment rates may have a strong delegitimizing effect, since there are

strong expectations that governments have to promote full-employment,

and that, using the appropriate economic policies, they could do so. These

differences in delegitimizing effects of unemployment and income concen-

tration might, then, account for their differential power in explaining

incarceration rates, depending on what nations are included into the sample.

In the present context, however, this inference should be considered as

tentative at best.

DISCUSSION

This analysis has yielded a number of empirical relationships. Some of

them are in line with the hypothese presented above, while other findings

ask for theoretical integration. Such an integration may be achieved by the

following hypothetical model:

— 198 —

CHART I

Proposed Theoretical Integration

Social structure:

Social crisis/conflict:

Developmental level

Form of government:

High power concentration:

High dissatisfaction with

— dictatorship and/or

the social system's per-

— very inequal income

distribution

formance (e.g., high

unemployment rate)

High (resources are

Democratic (legitima-

easily available)

tion through consensus

precludes use of too

much violence)

RR d

Low (scarcity of

Legitimation

resources)

Non-democratic (use of

becomes problematic

violence is rather

(legitimation crisis)

unproblematic

“’Discinline”’

model

Increase in

penal severity

‘“Terror’’

model

Higher incarceration

More and crueler physical

rate (locking up more

people for longer times)

punishments (death penalty,

eventually corporal punishment)

This model suggests that the different developmental levels of society

affect the model of punishment used and the actual punishment imposed.

Societies with scarcer resources, developing countries, are more likely to

employ the terror model and apply physical punishments to criminals while

more affluent industrialized societies which can afford to discipline their

members employ incarceration more frequently. But all societies no matter

their level of economic development, when suffering a legitimation crisis,

become more vindictive towards their criminal population employing either

physical punishment or deprivation of freedom with more severity.

The lack of specificity of the concept of legitimation makes it difficult

to operationalize the concept of legitimation crisis wit in the model with

any greater precision. But such crises do seem to be linked with high in-

equality and political crises, as well as in capitalist societies, with increasing

rates of unemployment. The concept of legitimation crisis allows to inte-

grate these variables in a more general way. It allows for cross-sectional as

well as temporal variations in penal severity that other models fail to

explain.

— 200 —

FOOTNOTES

(

Checking the subject indexes of the Criminology and Penology

Abstracts, volumes 18-20 (1978-1980), the author found more than

120 references concerning publications on alternatives to imprison

ment

such as non-incarcerative measures

fines

and community

treatment programs, but only about 15 references concerning the

incarceration rates and the continued use of imprisonment

(2)

This article appeared first in Annee Sociologique 4(1900): 65-95 but

did not appear in English until 1969, which may explain why English

speaking scholars ignored it.

(3)

Although it seems unlikely that Durkhe1m did not know this refer-

ence, he does not quote Montesquieu’s statement on the impact of

tyrannical” forms of government on penal severity

(4)

This assumption of dissent even regarding such basic crime concepts is

a typical feature of culture conflict theory and is not supported by

empirical evidence (see on this the literature review of Kornhauser

1978

216-226)

Interestingly, Sorokin himself expresses doubts

regarding the feasibility of this assumption, and he criticizes some

sociologists for having overstated the relativity of serious crimes

(Sorokin, 1937/1962: 577)

(5)

Melossi and Pavarini (1979: 246) express the alternative character of

prison and factory in these words

La fabbrica è per l’operaio come

un carcére

il carcere per l’internato è come una fabbrica

(‘“‘For

the worker, the factory is like a prison, and for the prisoner, the

prison is like a factory”)

(6)

The American unemployment rate is calculated on the basis of those

who report having actively looked for work during the recent past

and thus excludes from the work force those who have given up

looking for a job. It may be a more valid indicator of fluctuations

over time than of cross-sectional differences, because the number of

people who have given up looking for work may be particularly high

in areas and among groups with chronically high unemployment. This

differential validity of the measure of unemployment may account for

the paradox that the latter is strongly correlated with imprisonment

but not in Garofalo’s cross-sectional

rates in time-series analyses

study

(7)

The figures given in this context are usually exponentially overstated

or are based on extremely unreliable sources. The often cited figure

of 72-80,000 thieves executed under Henry VIII (see, e.g., Rusche and

Kirchheimer

1939) were simply a fantastic invention of a very

dubious individual (for details see Aydelotte, 1913: 5). The same is

true of the 20-30,000 dealth sentences which Benedictus Carpzovius

a famous 17th century judge and criminal law professor in Leipzig

was often said to have pronounced; as the careful examination of the

201 —

contemporaty records by Boehm (1940-42) revealed, the real figure

was at least 100 times lower, and Leipzig had a particularly low

execution rate during Carpzovius’ office, namely about .35 per

10,000 population during the period of 1652-1668. The figures given

by Steinert and Treiber (1978) and calculations by the author reveal

that the execution rates did normally not exceed 2.0 per 10,000 in

any of the cities considered, even during the periods of the most

extensive use of capital punishment (usually at the end of the 16th

century). This rate is considerably lower than, e.g., America’s present

State and Federal prison admission rate of about 7.0 per 10,000

population (Hindelang et al., 1981: table 6.20). Assuming that only

serious offenders were executed, just as today only serious offenders

tend to be sent to State and Federal prisons, one sees from these

figures that capital punishment never could be conceived of as a

means to exterminate serious crime, even if one whishes to presume

that past times were characterized by unusually low crime rates.

(8)

Luhmann’s work on power is also available in English: Niklas Luhmann,

Trust and Power, New York: Wiley, 1979.

(9)

This second hypothesis is supported at the micro-level by social

psychological studies that found positive correlations between the

power distance and the devaluating and punitive attitudes among the

powerful towards their subordinates (Mulder, 1960; Kipnis, 1972).

Power seems, therefore, to be associated with a lack of sympathy for

and consideration of subordinates, as Ross (1901/1959: 12-13)

observed a long time ago, and this, in turn, may facilitate the ration-

alization of the use of cruel, “inhuman” forms of punishment.

(10)

Sorokin’s study, e.g., was based on a comparative and historical

analysis of five societies (Russia, Germany, Austria, France, Italy).

More recently, Ted R. Gurr et al., The Politics of Crime and Conflict :

A Comparative History of Four Cities, Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publi-

cations, 1977,used a very similar research design.

(11)

Although justified as a warning against inferences based on invalid

data, Udy’s (1965) apodictical objections against cross-sectional tests

of dynamical hypotheses seems unwarranted. Interestingly enough,

many social scientists have reservations against using nations as

research units, and insist on their individuality. Would they ever

reject the method of surveying individuals on the same grounds?

(12)

Of course, the relative severity of different sanctions may overlap at

the lower and the upper ends, respectively, as in the case of very short

imprisonment and very high fines. Besides, it may be difficult to

assess in a generally valid way the rank of some minor and subsidiary

sanctions, such as withdrawal of driver’s licence, or, to cite an histori-

cal example, the temporary exclusion from the sacraments which,

according to Carpzovius (1652: pars II, quaestio 69, n° 55), was con

sidered in contemporaty Saxonia a more severe punishment than a

— 202 —

short prison sentence. Overall, however, there is no doubt that death

is generally considered the most severe category of punishment,

followed by imprisonment and non-incarcerative sanctions.

(13)

The median time served in American State prisons was 17.3 months in

1977 (Characteristics of the Parole Population 1978, San Francisco:

NCCD, 1980). In some states, however, this time is considerably

longer, as in California, where the median time served was 34 months

in 1976 for men, and 25 months for women, respectively (Brewer et

al., 1981). In contrast, the corresponding figure for the Netherlands

is about ! month, for Sweden 3 months (Doleschal, 1979), and for

Switzerland about 3 months (Strafurteile in der Schweiz 1979, Con-

victions in Switzerland, ed. by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office,

Berne 1981). In interpreting these figures, on should keep in mind

that the American figures do not include the far shorter sentences

served in jails, on the other hand, the European countries seem to

restrict the use of imprisonment considerably more than the American

states (Clinard, 1978: 116-117; Gillespie, 1980). It is not possible to

determine to what degree these differences in the meaning of figures

on time served in prisons affect their comparability, but it would

seem that the exclusion of jails from the American data and the more

conservative use of imprisonment in European countries tend to com-

pensate each other.

(14)

Using time-series, Biles (1979) and Bowker (1981) found rather con-

tradictory results concerning the relationship between crime rates and

rates of imprisonment in State and Federal prisons. Using ordinal

data, Nagel (1977) found a correlation (r) of only .214 between rates

of incarceration in State and Federal prisons and crime rates across

the 50 states. Garofalo (1979), using a more comprehensive measure

of incarceration which included jails and juvenile institutions, found

correlations of .24 for property crime and .61 for violent crime rates.

Using a similar measure of incarceration, the author found that total

crime rates in 1971 and 1977 accounted for only 10 per cent of the

total variation in incarceration rates in 1972 and 1978, respectively,

across the 50 states.

(15)

Unfortunately, the report published by the United Nations on this

survey (Crime Prevention and Control, Report of the Secretary-

General, 32nd session of the Assembly General, A/32/199, 22

September 1977) contains only aggregated data. For any meaningful

analysis, crime and offender data should, however, be available at the

level of countries rather than continents.

(16)

Similarly, Greenberg (1977) found in a time-series analysis on Canada

no correlation (r = .01) between conviction rate and prison admission

rate.

(17) As, e.g., the one developed by Bollen (1979).

(18) For a detailed description of the Gini index see Bronfenbrenner (1971).

— 203 —

(19)

United Nations Working Paper by the Secretariat, Fifth United

Nations Congress on Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders

(Toronto, Canada, September 1-12, 1975), The Treatment of the

Offender in Custody and the Community, with special reference to

the application of the standard minimum rules for the treatment of

prisoners adopted by the United Nations, Annex A/Conf. 56/6 (1975).

(20)

These sources are:

— USSR, Indonesia, Hong Kong, South Africa:

Eugene Doleschal and Anne Newton, International Rates of Im-

prisonment, Hackensack, N.J.: NCCD, 1981 (unpublished)

— Poland: Greenberg 1980

— German Democratic Republic: Kaiser, 1976: 39

— Yugoslavia: F. Brinc, ‘“‘Uporaba prostostnih kazni v Francij in

Jugoslaviji” (Use of Prison Sentences in France and Yugoslavia),

Revija za Kriminalistiko in Kriminologijo 31 (7# 2, 1980): 102-112;

quoted from Abstracts on Criminology and Penology 20 (1980):

JF 2909.

— Switzerland: unpublished survey conducted by the author in 1973.

(21)

International surveys on capital punishment:

— United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs,

Capital Punishment, New York: United Nations, 1967

— United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Capital Punishment,

New York: United Nations, 1973

— Amnesty International, The Death Penalty, London: Amnesty

International Publ., 1979

— Manuel Lôpez Rey (1980).

92

A good example of a rather theoretical provision for the death penalty

is the offence of genocide which, according to the Netherlands Penal

Code, is punishable by death.

(23)

The World Almanac and Book of Facts (issues 1972-1981), New

York: Newspaper Enterprise Association: Fisher Weltalmanach (issues

1972-1981), Frankfut/Main, FRG: Fischer Verlag.

(24)

Most of these data have been republished in Volker Bornschier and

Than-Huyen Ballmer-Cao, ‘‘Income Inequality: A Cross-National

Survey of the Relationship between MNC-Penetration, Dimensions of

the Power Structure and Income Distribution”’, American Sociological

Review 44 (June, 1979): 487-506.

(25)

See. e.g., the U.S. time-series analysis by Reynolds and Smolensky.,

1977.

(26)

New York: United Nations, 1979, table 22.

(27)

U.N. Statistical Yearbook, issues 1975, 1977, 1978, New York:

United Nations, 1976, 1978, and 1979, respectively (tables 192, 194,

and 193, respectively).

(28)

Note that in this paragraph recent developments, such as the abolition

of capital punishment in France and in Spain, were taken into account.

Therefore, the form of government refers to the present situation,

— 204 -

whereas in table l it was assessed for the year which incarceration

data were used. Thus, countries such as Portugal and Spain, are

counted here as democratic, but as non-democratic in connection with

incarceration rates. Accordingly, the latest available data on per capita

national income have been used here.

(

9)

The following countries not listed in table 1 have been included

— Nations with at least

— Nations with less than $ 1000

$ 1000 per capita national

per capita national income (in

income (in 1977):

1977):

a) without capital punish-

a) without capital punishment

ment

1. Brazil

| . Dominican Republic

b) with capital punishment

b) with capital punishment

Bulgaria

1. Algeria

CSSR

2. Angola

Greece

3. Bangladesh

Hungary

4. Burma

Iran

S. Cameroon

Romania

6. China (Taiwan)

V 0 Uv Æ 0 0tU

Saudi Arabia

7. China, PR

8. Cuba

9. Egypt

10.

Ethiopia

]1.

Ghana

12.

Guatemala

13.

Guinea

14

Haiti

15

Madagascar

16

Malawi

17

Mali

18

Mozambique

19

Niger

20

Pakistan

21

Peru

22

Senegal

23

South Korea

24

Sudan

25

Tanzania

26

Turkey

27

Uganda

28

Upper Volta

29

Vietnam

30

Zaire

31

Zambia

32

Zimbabwe

— 205 —

(30) To prevent tiny nations from getting an overproportionate weight,

only nations with at least S millions population have been included.

Among those that meet this criterion, four could not be included

(Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nepal, North Korea).

31)

The following countries not listed in table 1 have been included:

— Nations without capital

— Nations with capital punishment:

punishment:

1. Brazil

nd

Bulgaria

nd

nd

2. Costa Rica d

CSSR

3. Uruguay

nd

Greece

d

nd

Hungary

Iran

nd

Kuwait

nd

Libya

nd

Romania

nd

O 0< QO U Æ UtHW -—

Saudi À.

nd

(32)

To prevent the sample form becoming too small, once control for

development is introduced, also nations having less than 5 but more

>

»

with the

than ! million population have been inciuded :n table

exception of Singapore.

(33)

One may question whethe: @razit and Uruguay can rtally be con-

sidered abolitionist countriés, in view of the subsian*::! number of

PR

non-judicial execuinis Gecurming there (Lôpez-Rey, 1955 Amnesty

Internaiic :al, 1979: 143-146). Not to overstate the cu:è. and to

prevent the association from becoming perfect, they werè counted

here as abolitionist.

13

£

Since among the wealthy nations, mainly communist ones do retain

capital punishment, and since data on the income concentration there

can not reasonably be used for the present analysis, the variation in

the dependent variable is, when Gini index data are used, insufficient

among third as well as among first world countries. Over all, i.e. with-

out controlling for development, the association (Gamma) between

income concentration (Gini index < .40, 40-.50, > .50) and abolition

vs. retention of capital punishment is .77 (z = 3.15,p < .001,N = 35),

but given the strong impact development has on both of these vari-

ables, any analysis that does not control for it is not very meaningful.

Besides, Gamma is inflated due to one extreme cell frequency.

(35)

As one may see from table !, a few countries have extremely high

incarceration and unemployment rates. Therefore, the analysis has

also been conducted without these outlyers. Since this only increased

the correlations between incarceration rate on one hand and Gini

index and unemployment on the other hand, but not to any substan-

tial degree, they have been left in the sample.

(36)

Since the correlation between development and form of government is

only -.442, the simultaneous introduction of these two independent

variables into the regression equation is not precluded.

— 206 -—

(37) Incarceration rates have been categorized as follows: < 55 (N = 17),

56-110 (N = 19), and > 110 (N = 15). Gamma (.26) is not significant

(z=.78,N=51).

(38) Incarceration rates have been categorized as follows: < 55 (N = 17),

56-110 (N = 21), and > 110 (N = 17). Gamma is not significant

(z=.47,N =55).

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423: 152-161.

YEAGER, M.G. (1979), ‘“Unemployment and Imprisonment”, Journal of

Criminal Law and Criminology 70 (4): 586-588.

SUMMARY

The different theoretical perspectives concerning the severity of punish-

ment are presented (Durkheim, Sorokin, Rusche and Kirchheimer) and

discussed in the light of a comparative analysis of 55 nations. It indicates

that social structural variables as well as the level of socio-economic devel-

opment and the form of government (democratic or dictatorial) have a very

clear impact on the type of punishments used and the law (notably as

concerns the death penalty). Conversely, social inequality and unemploy

ment have a strong influence on the level of imprisonment in a country. It

seems that political and economic crises cause a rapid increase in the

severity of the penal system. The concept of a legitimation crisis of the

established order (Weber, Heintz) seems the most suitable interpretation for

the variations in penal severity across societies and historical periods.

RÉSUMÉ

Les différentes perspectives théoriques concernant la sévérité des peines

sont présentées (Durkheim, Sorokin, Rusche et Kirchheimer) et discutées à

la lumière d’une analyse comparative portant sur 55 nations. Il s’avère que

les variables structurelles telles que le niveau du développement socio-éco-

nomique et la forme du gouvernement (démocratique ou dictatoriale) ont

une répercussion très nette sur le genre des peines retenues par la loi (notam-

ment en ce qui concerne la peine de mort). En revanche, l’inégalité sociale et

le chômage ont une forte influence sur le taux d’emprisonnement d’un pays.

Il paraît en outre que les crises politiques et économiques causent une

— 210 -

augmentation rapide de la sévérité du système pénal. Le concept de crise de

légitimité de l’ordre établi (Weber, Heintz) semble le mieux adapté à l’inter-

prétation des variations de la sévérité du système pénal dans le temps

et dans l'espace.

211

CROSS-NATIONAL EFFECTS

OF DEVELOPMENTAL, DISTRIBUTIONAL,

AND DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES ON CRIME:

A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

Gary D. LaFree*

Edward L. Kick**

Recently, quantitative studies in comparative criminology have at-

tempted to identify cross-national relationships between crime rates (par-

ticularly murder) and a variety of developmental, distributional, and demo-

graphic variables. Most of these studies are either atheoretical or adopt the

theoretical position that the variables which cause crime exert effects that

are uniform across crime categories (e.g., murder, theft). However, both our

review of these studies, and our own multiple-regression analysis of murder

and theft in 47 countries, suggest that development, wealth distribution,

and national demographic characteristics affect murder and theft rates

differently. This conclusion suggests the need for a new theoretical inter-

pretation. Case studies of crime in individual nations and comparative crimi-

nology essays are promising sources for such an interpretation. We draw on

these sources to construct a preliminary theoretical explanation of the

results from recent comparative analyses of murder and theft. Our dis-

cussion contrasts the opportunities and incentives for murder and theft in

industrial-developed and non-industrial-developing nations.

THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS IN CROSS-NATIONAL

STUDIES OF CRIME

Table | summarizes ten quantitative, comparative studies of crime.

Several of these studies are atheoretical (Wolf. 1971 ; Wellford, 1974) or

l-argely so (Quinn'ey, 1965; Krohn, 1976). Nonetheless, the variables they

* Associate Professor, Department of Sociology. The University of New

Mexico.

** Associate Professor, Department of Sociology. The University of Utah.

Revision of a paper presented at the annual meetings of the American

Sociological Association, Detroit, 1983. This research was partially supported

by the University of New Mexico's Research Allocation Committee and by

University of Utah Research Grant N° 6-41554. We wish to thank Lee

Churgin for her help with data preparation and several anonymous reviewers

for their comments.

213 —

TABLE 1

Summary Information on Quantitative, Cross-National Studies of Crime

Crime Data

Relationship

Study

Sample

Type Analysis

Dependent (1) and

to homicide

Relationship

Source

Size

Independent (2) Variables

murder

to theft

Quinney

United

48

Tabular

Homicide and suicide

(1965)

Nations

(measures of

Urbanism

central tendency)

Industrialization

Wolf

INTERPOL

37

Tabular

ur

Murder/larceny ratio (a)

(d971)

classifications

+)

—

High infant mortality

High percentage of labor

force in agriculture

+9

Low urbanization

+9

Low telephones per capita

+9

Low GNP per capita

+9

Low adult literacy rate

+9

+9

Low newspaper per capita

î:

Non-westernized countries

+»

Wellford

INTERPOL

75(b)

Bivariate; OLS

l

Murder, major larceny and total

(1974)

regression

crime rates

t

Population size

— ?

GNP per capita

+9

Political orientation

McDonald

INTERPOL(c)

40

OLS regression

l

Juvenile crimes, thefts, property

(1976)

with combinations

offences, murders and total

of 2 and 3 variable

offences

models

GNP per capita

+ *

Intersectoral inequality

+ *

Land inequality

Unemployment

Labor force participation

Radios per capita

++

Burcaucracy

Higher education

Police force

Data collection index

+*

Literacy

School enrollment

Family size

Urbanism

+‘+<

#*

Population increase

Religious heterogeneity

H*

Linguistic heterogeneity

Racial heterogeneity

Constitutional status

Government stability

hx

} xecutive stability

Voting proportion

Political representation and fran-

chise index

Newspaper per capita

Krohn

INTERPOL

24

Bivariate:

Homicide. property and total

(1976)

stepwise

crime rates

muiltiple

Inequality

+° |()d)

+ )

regression

GNP per capita

Percent unemployed

+ )

+ Ù

Energy consumption per capita

Krohn

INTH.RPOL

33

OLS regression

Homicide, property and total

(1978)

crime rates

Total population

Urbanism

:

Energy consumption per capita

Division of labor

—"

î

……

Systematic frustration

Table | continued

Crime Data

Sample

Relationship

Study

Type Analysis

Dependent (1) and

to homicide

Relationship

Source

Size

Independent (2) Variables

murder

to theft

Krohn (e)

INTERPOL

59

Bivariate;

Homicide, property and total

and Wellford

OLS regression

crime rates

(977)

Population

GNP per capita

+9

Political orientation

— 9

+9

32

Change (196045) in

Homicide, property and total

crime rates

+9

+9

Population change

GNP per capita change

+9

+9

Messner

INTERPOL

39

OLS regression

Murder rate (log)

(1980)

Gross domestic product per capita

Population size

Population density

Urbanism

Inequality

—;*

Hansmann

United

58/40(f) | OLS regression

Homicide rate

and Quigley

Nations

Religious heterogeneity

(1982)

Linguistic heterogeneity

Ethnic heterogeneity

Inequality

Î—*î

Population density

Urbanism

GNP per capita

Youth

+*

Messner

INTERPOL

50

OLS regression

1. Murder rate

(1982)

2. Gross domestic product

per capita (log)

Percent population protestant

Secondary school enroliment

Social equality

Population size

Population density

Urbanism

Population growth

+ *

Signifies that no tests of statistical significance for individual coefficients were provided.

Signifies p < .05 for those studies which employed significance tests.

Wolfs “dependent”’ variable, the ratio of murders to larcenies. is not strictly comparable to those employed in the other studies listed.

However, Wolfs results (1970: 110-117) show that high values on development indicators (e.g., higher GNP per capita) tend to co-occur

with high values on larceny but low values on murder.

Wellford uses 1967 and 1968 data for a total of 150 cases; although he performs a stepwise multiple regression analysis, he presents no

regression coefficients or significance tests.

McDonald also reports data on juvenile crime for 31 countries from United Nations sources.

Signs are based on zero-order correlations, since Krohn’s regression results include model estimates that are suspect (e.g… betas excecding

unity).

Krohn and Wellford estimate "’static’’ (N = 59) and ‘“dynamic” (i.e., change: N = 32) regression models.

Hansmann and Quigley estimate six models with different variable combinations: asterisk (*) indicates significance in any model.

analyse include developmental, distributional and/or demographic variables

that are roughly comparable to those used in more theoretically-inclined

treatments (i.e., McDonalé, 1976; Krohn, 1978; Hansmann and Quigley,

1982; Messner, 1982). For the most part, these variables are explicitly

(Quinney ; McDonald; Krohn, 1978; Hansmann and Quigley ; Messner, 1982)

or implicitly drawn from Durkheim’s (1964) ‘““consensus” or ‘“‘conflict’’

formulations, or from conflict interpretations derived from theorists such as

Owen (1813), Engels (1845), and Bonger (1916).

Durkheim’s consensus perspective generally assumes that as societies

develop and rates of social change increase, societal consensus deteriorates

and rates of deviance and crime are correspondingly heightened. For

example, Webb (1972: 644) (1) interprets Durkheim as arguing that when

communities grow in complexity, size, and density, their dominant

mode of integration evolves from the mechanical to the organic type. With

increases in organic interdependence and corresponding declines in the

‘“collective conscience”’, the hallmark of collective control over individuals

under conditions of mechanical solidarity, individual variation, deviance,

and crime are exacerbated (Webb, 1972:644, n° 2). Similar interpretations

of Durkheim are provided by Krohn (1978), who considers direct and

indirect links between population size, urbanism, industrialization, the

division of labor, anomie, and increasing crime rates, and by Quinney,

McDonald (1976: 74-75), and Hansmann and Quigley.

An alternative, conflict-oriented view of Durkheim is provided by

Messner (1982) (2). According to Messner, in addition to developmental and

demographic variables, Durkheim was concerned with the effects of in-

equality on crime and deviance. Messner (1982: 228-29) contends that

implicit in Durkheim’s formulation is the understanding that egalitarian

changes in the structure of societies normally accompany development.

These egalitarian conditions permit the formation of organic bonds of inter-

dependence, which counterbalance the potential for increased criminality

otherwise associated with the weakening of mechanical solidarity.

Our purpose here is not to adjudicate these competing interpretations

of Durkheim, but rather to emphasize that regardless of the interpretation

applied, these studies assume that the crime-inducing effects of develop-

ment and demographic change, or the crime-counteracing effects of egali-

tarian social-structural arrangements, operate uniformly across all forms of

criminal behavior (c.f., Krohn, 1976: 304; Krohn, 1978: 656; McDonald,

1976: 144-154; Hansmann and Quigley, 1982: 210; Messner, 1982: 229).

À similar assumption is evident in the one study reviewed in Table 1

(McDonald) that explicitly tests conflict arguments. McDonald examines

Owen’s thesis that the poor become criminal out of necessity — h>cause of

inadequate education and moral training. McDonald also tests ‘ #76: 55)

— 218 —

si£nilar themes from Engels and Bonger, including their argument that in

advanced capitalism, poverty, inequality, and lack of access to education

increase crime when compared to what be in non-industrial or communistic

societies. These conflict perspectives differ from the Durkheimian ap-

proaches, but again, they all assume that the effects identified are uniform

cross crime categories (McDonald, 1976: 144-154).

In general, much of the research summarized in Table 1 proceeds on the

assumption that crime may be monolithically treated (3). However, while

methodological limitations in many of these studies (subsequently dis-

cussed) make definitive conclusions premature, a review of the collective

evidence generally provides support for crime-specific interpretations.

EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS

Societal development. Table 1 shows that most prior empirical studies

of cross-national crime include one or more measures of societal develop-

ment: gross national (or domestic) product per capita, per capita energy

consumption, percentage of literate adults, secondary school enrollment

ratio, percentage of the work force in agriculture, telephones per capita, and

radios per capita. Theoretical justification for the inclusion of these

measures is not always provided (e.g., Wolf, 1971; Wellford, 1974), but

when it is, it usually entails reference to development-crime links specified

in Durkheimian (e.g., Krohn, 1978; Messner, 1982) or conflict (McDonald,

1976: 148-154) models. Conclusions about the relationship between societal

development and crime vary widely. For example, Quinney”s (1965) tabular

analysis and Krohn and Wellford’s (1977) multivariate regression analysis

suggest that murder declines with societal development (measured by

Quinney as the percentage of males engaged in agriculture, and by Krohn

and Wellford as per capita GNP). By contrast, other multivariate studies

using comparable development measures (secondary school enrollment

ratios — Messner, 1982; and per capita GNP — Hansmann and Quigley,

1982), report no effect of societal development on murder.

Studies that focus on both murder and property crime provide less

ambiguous results. Wolf (1971), who includes several measures of societal

development (see Table 1), concludes that development is associated with

low murder but high theft rates. Similarly, Krohn’s (1976) bivariate analysis

and later (1978) regression results, show that per capita energy consumption

is related to lower murder and higher property crime rates (theft. fraud,

counterfeiting). Comparable multivariate results are reported by Krohn and

Wellford (1977). McDonald (1975) also substantiates positive GNP per

capita, litcracy, and sec-mndarv schoo! enrol!ment effects on the’t, and on

Droperiv crime as a vholc t renuid. nicçativ* ottects f devalopraien:

GNV rer capits)

“ Qui .'

Finally Weil >—<éd ; 371}) shows tha

è

à

4î(;

GNP per capita is positively associated with theft and negatively associated

with murder, both effects are relatively weak.

Income inequality. More difinite conclusions may be drawn from

reported relationships between the distribution of societal benefits and

crime. Of the ten studies summarized in Table 1, five include a measure

of income inequality (Krohn, 1976; McDonald, 1976; Messner, 1980,

1982; Hansmann and Quigley, 1982). The inclusion of inequality measures

is warranted on the basis of Durkheimian (Messner, 1982) or conventional

conflict (Krohn, 1976; McDonald; Messner, 1980; Hansmann and Quigley,

1982: 219) models. Krohn (1976) documents bivariate associations between

income inequality (measured with the Gini index) and higher murder, but

lower property crime rates. McDonald (1976) and Messner (1982) also show

positive income inequality-murder links. Hansmann and Quigley find similar

patterns for their ‘“reduced” regression models, but when they include other

variables (e.g., GNP per capita, urbanization, urban density, and percentage

of the population aged 15-24), inequality effects on murder are not statisti-

cally significant.

The bulk of the evidence available, then, suggests that nations with

geater inequality have higher murder rates. Krohn’s (1976) treatment is the

only cross-national crime analysis that also identifies negative relationships

between income inequality and property crime. Combined with the con-

clusions from the other studies, his findings may at least weakly support the

utility of a crime theory that distinguishes murder and property crime.

Demographic variables. With one exception (Krohn, 1976), the studies

reviewed in Table 1 also consider linkages between demographic variables

and crime. For the most part, the demographic variables examined reflect

population dynamics, particularly urbanism, and population growth or size.

Often the inclusion of population characteristics is not justified theoreti-

cally (Wolf, 1971; Wellford, 1974), or is only ambiguously warranted

(McDonald, 1976: 249-151). In other cases, it is substantiated either on the

argument that population dynamics have been employed in prior intra-

national studies of crime, or on the supposition that their inclusion is

necessary for purposes of statistical control (Messner, 1982; Hansmann and

Quigley, 1982). In contrast, Krohn (1978) justifies his use of measures of

urbanism (percentage of the population in cities over 100,000), and total

population, on the grounds that they tap Durkheim’s concept of ‘‘moral

density”. Similarly, Quinney’s use of urbanism is Durkheim-inspired, though

he employs urbanism as a proxy measure for economic development.

The evidence for links between urbanism and crime is ambiguous. The

tabular presentations of Quinney (1965) and Wolf (1971), and Krohn’s

(1978) regression analyses, show negative relationships between urbanism

and murder rates. Wolf, Krohn (1978), and McDonald also find opposite

— 220 —

(ie., positive) associations between urbanism and theft. However, the re-

gression analyses reported in Messner (1982) and in Hansmann and Quigley,

which do not include theft, indicate no effect of urbanism on murder.

Somewhat greater uniformity is apparent for findings on the effects of

population size and growth on crime. The results of the multivariate studies

that consider population size suggest that it has no impact on murder

(Wellford; Krohn and Wellford; Krohn, 1978; Messner, 1982) or on theft

rates (Wellford: Krohn and Wellford; Krohn, 1978). In contrast, both

McDonald and Messner (1982) show that population growth increases

murder rates, and McDonald’s results additionally indicate that population

growth has no effect on theit.

On balance, the collective evidence for the effects of demographic

variables on crime suggests that population size has no effect on crime,

while urbanism and possibly population growth, have different effects on

murder and theft. Here too, there is at least some support for crime-specific

theoretical interpretations.

Implications. In contrast to the theoretical perspectives assumed in

recent quantitative cross-national analyses of crime, available evidence

indicates that societal development, inequality, and population dynamics

may be related differently to murder and theft. However, this conclusion

must be treated as somewhat tentative because conceptual and method-

ological differences between, and shortcomings in, prior studies make com-

parisons of the findings reported difficult. For example, all of the studies

reviewed in Table ! include murder as a dependent variable, but only six

provide what for our purposes is a necessary analysis of theft and/or pro-

perty crime. Five of these six (all but Wolf) employ analytic strategies that

in principle permit the drawing of causal inferences, but two of these

(Krohn, 1976, 1978) use very circumscribed samples (Ns of 24 and 33

countries), and two others (Wellford: Krohn and Wellford) use an overly

restrictive set of regressors, omitting any measures of inequality and popu-

lation dynamics. In the remaining study (McDonald), the methodological

approach used, different samples of countries for different regression

equations, makes it difficult to draw global inferences with any certainty.

Thus, while prior research leads us to question the assumption that devel-

ompental, distributional and demographic variables have the same effects

on murder as they do on theft, there is enough ambiguity in the collective

evidence from prior studies that we consider it useful to present results from

a new analysis of murder and theft rates in 47 countries.

V ARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES

Murder and Theft Measures

Of the ten studies summarized in Table !, eight used INTERPOL data

and two used United Nations data. Our analysis is based on a third comparative

ÜÛ]

crime data set, collected by Archer and Gartner (1977; 1984) through

l ) correspondence with national and metropolitan governmental sources,

2) examination of documents and annual reports,

3) correspondence with official record-keeping agencies (4).

As in prior research, our dependent variables are constructed as crime rates;

that is, we use as measures the number of reported occurrences of murder

and theft per 100,000 population. However, to minimize problems associ-

ated with yearly fluctuations, we compute five-year mean murder and theft

rates for circa 1970 crime (5). Because the distributions of murder and theft

rates are sxewed, we use log transformations of both variables in the analysis.

Independent Variables

Prior studies have focused on developmental measures that tap econ-

omic (e.g., per capita GNP), infrastructural/‘‘’moral density” (e.g., tele-

phones or radios per capita), or human capital components (e.g., adult

literacy). These components may be conceptually distinct, but they are

highly intercorrelated and their joint inclusion in multivariate models poten-

tially raises estimation difficulties (see Krohn, 1976 ;Hansmann and Quigley).

In fact, the correlations between seven of these measures (circa 1960) for

the 47 nations in our sample are positive and significant at p < .001 (see

Appendix A). À factor analysis of these development measures (last panel in

Appendix A) showed that their underlying structure was unidimensional.

We include the resulting development index in our analysis. Nations ranked

highest on development are the United States, Sweden, Canada, Denmark,

and West Germany. Pakistan, Tanzania, Benin, and India are lowest on the

development scale.

The distributional variable we employ is the one most commonly used

in prior cross-national studies, the Gini index of income inequality. The

empirical research on cross-national crime that includes income inequality

does so on the supposition that, for varying reasons (e.g., “poverty”, “feel-

ings of injustice”, ‘‘relative deprivation” — see Messner, 1980, 1982) in-

equality is crime-generating (circa 1967 Gini scores are from Bornschier and

Heintz, 1979).

We include three of the demographic variables that have received the

most attention in cross-national crime analyses: population growth, ur-

banism, and total population size. Population growth is rarely warranted on

theoretical grounds in prior research, although its positive relationship to

murder rates is documented (McDonald; Messner, 1982). The population

growth variable we use measures 1960-70 population change (from the

World Bank). Urbanism, too, is often theoretically unjustified in prior

research, but we include it on theoretical grounds (Clinard and Abbntt,

1973; Shelley, 1981), and because of the empirca! firdtinp (Wedf; Froin,

1978; McDonald) that urbanism is associated witi: 1# - ‘het” ha: ce m

— 222 —

murder rates (we use the 1960 percentage of total population in cities over

100,000, from Bornschier and Heintz, 1979). Finally, we include popu-

lation size as a control variable and log transform population scores (from

the United Nations Demographic Yearbook) because their distribution is

highly slewed (6). Bivariate associations, means, and standard deviations for

the variables are shown in Appendix B.

RESULTS

In general, the results from our multiple-regression analysis confirm the

overall conclusionss we reached in our review of prior research. With all five

variables in the equation (panels 1, 4), population growth has a strong

positive effect on murder and a strong negative effect on theft. Although

only population growth significantly affects both murder and theft rates,

the independent variables are highly correlated (see Appendix B). We there-

fore include alternative estimates by sequentially dropping the variable that

in the previous model is identified as statistically significant. For example,

in models | and 4, population growth is a significant predictor of murder

and theft rates, thus, models 2 and 5 estimate murder and theft rates with-

out population growth. We continue dropping variables one at a time until

there are no significant variables in the equation. Table 2 shows that in-

equality has a positive effect on murder (panel 2), but a negative effect on

theft (panel 6); development has a negative effect on murder (panel 3), but

a positive effect on theft (panel S); and urbanism has a positive effect on

theft (panel 7) and no effect on murder. In short, contrary to the predomi-

nant theoretical explanations in recent quantitative cross-national analyses

of crime, measures of development, inequality, and population growth

generally have opposite effects on murder and theft rates.

DISCUSSION

The main purpose of this paper has been to evaluate the assumption

that developmental, distributional, and demographic variables each have

similar effects on different crime types. Our review and results show that at

least for murder and theft, they do not. Consequently, our results challenge

Durkheimian

““consensus’”’

interpretations

(McDonald; Krohn,

1978;

Hansmann and Quigley), which emphasize that ‘‘modernization’” and the

breakdown of the collective conscience generate increased criminal activity

across al crime types (i.e., for our purposes, theft and murder). They also

challenge the Durkheimian ‘“conflict’”’ interpretation (Messner, 1982) that

the more equitable wealth distribution that accompanies modernization

partially offsets the pernicious effects of development on crime, and uni-

formly reduces all forms of criminal activity. Moreover, they challenge the

— 223 —

TABLE H

Unstandardized and standardized coefficients for the effects of developmental,

distributional and demographic variables on murder and theft rates

(N = 47)a

Murder Rates (log)

Theft Rates (log)

5

b

65*

69

Population growth

- 91*

°052

Inequality

1.84

21

3.47*

39

- 42

-.02

-2.71

-.16

-5.95*

-.36

Development. . .

13

16

- .26*+

-.34

- 41*

--52

40

27

96*

65

Urbanism

° . . . .

00

10

00

26

00

23

- .00

-.05

01

17

01

20

02*

35

Total population

(log)

02

04

- .00

-.01

- 05

-.08

15

14

11

--10

10

-.09

- Q1

-.01

-1.05

Intercept

- 32

1.72

8.78*

7.76*

8.27*

4.35*

R2

. ° ° ° ° ° ° . .

45*

27*

17*

51*

41*

22*

12*

*

p«<.05.

+ 05<p<.10

a Countries included are:

Argentina, Australia, Benin, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, England, France, West Germany, Hong Kong,

India, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria,

Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Senegal, Sierre Leone, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand,

Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, U.S.A., Venezuela, Zambia.

‘‘conflict” interpretations of Owen, Engels and Bonger (McDonald) that

anticipate consistently exacerbating effects of inequality and poverty on

both property-related and violent personal offenses.

Of particular interest in our results is the unexpected importance of

population growth for predicting murder and theft rates. Indeed, it is the

only statistically significant predictor of both crimes when all our indepen-

dent variables are included in the regression analysis. Using the same

measure of population growth, Messner (1982) reports similar results for

INTERPOL data on murder. Indeed population growth effects were larger

than the effects of the variables included in the theoretical model he was

testing. Messner’s explanation for this finding (pp. 236-37) is that rapid

population growth is ‘‘inherently destabilizing” or ‘‘implies the presence of

a relatively large population of young people”. The problem with these

explanations is obvious in an analysis which includes both murder and theft

rates: if the effect of population growth is due to ‘“destabilization” or a

high proportion of young people, why is it positively related to murder but

negatively related to theft? That is, it seems reasonable to assume that the

effect of rapid social change and a young population would be at least as

important, and in the same direction, for theft as for murder.

Although we find the theoretical assumptions presented in many recent

quantitative, cross-national analyses of crime to be problematic, there exists

à rich set of pertinent theoretical obserbations on murder and theft in case

studies (e.g., Clinard and Abbott, 1973; Clifford, 1974; Shelley, 1980),

comparative historical analyses (e.g., Zehr, 1974; Gurr, 1976), and critical

reviews (e.g., Shelley, 1981). In the following discussion, we briefly apply

some of these theoretical observations to the empirical results just identified.

We argue that variations in the social-structural factors associated with crime

rates - especially dynamics tapped by our population growth measure —

provide different opportunities and incentives for murder and theft. In

particular, societies characterized by frequent and intense interaction

between primary group members have many opportunities and incentives

for murder, but because of more effective surveillance, few opportunities

and incentives for theft. Furthermore, because for the most part these

characteristics distinguish Western-industrial from Third-world agricultural

countries, our discussion focuses on differences in opportunities and incen-

tives for theft and murder in ‘’developed” versus ‘developing’ countries.

Theft in Developed and Developing Countries

Our review and results show that slow population growth, low income

inequality, high societal development, and urbanism are associated with high

theft rates. Case studies of crime within nations (e.g., Repetto, 1974:

Clifford, 1974; Cohen and Felson, 1979) and critical reviews of comparative

criminology (Shelley, 1981) are consistent with the argument that slow

225 —

population growth (reflected in small family size), economic development,

and the comparatively high levels of equality that characterize developed

countries increase the material possessions of much of a country’s popu-

lation, and thereby augment opportunities for theft. The frequency of theft

is further increased by the non-agricultural work requirements of developed

societies, which daily remove employees from their homes for long periods

of time and reduce the possibility of their direct home guardianship (Cohen

and Felson, 1979: 593-94). Theft rates may also be exacerbated by the

diminished surveillance that accompanies small family size, and by edu-

cational opportunities and requirements that pull men, and increasingly

women and children away from the home (Kobrin, 1976 ; Cohen and Felson,

1979: 598-99; Steinmetz, 1982: 63-67), and by highly advanced infra-

structures (e.g., highways, airports) that facilitate leisure activity, including

travel, away from the home (Cohen and Felson, 1979: 598). Moreover,

similar processes in adjoining households further reduce the effectiveness

of community surveillance (Newman, 1972; Scarr, 1972; Repetto, 1974).

By contrast, for developing countries, limited pools of societal wealth

and high levels of inequality in the social distribution of this wealth, reduce

opportunities for theft (Bayley, 1969; Jeffery, 1971). Indeed, the bulk of

the population in developing nations either own few commodities that are

worth stealing, or own desired goods (e.g., livestock) that are difficult for

thieves to transport and resell (Clifford, 1974: 137; Zehr, 1976: 142;

Shelley, 1981: 35). Also, because of economic underdevelopment, labor

force requirements are disproportionately (relative to developed countries)

agricultural. Thus, the economic activity of males is commonly centered on

the home or farm. Furthermore, the reduced need for human capital outside

of agricultural spheres results in comparatively lower levels of female

participation in the non-agricultural work force, larger family size, and

lower levels of schooling requirements and opportunities for children and

adults (Newman, 1976: 81-85). When combined with the infrastructural

weaknesses of developing countries, which reduce geographical movement

for work or leisure, these conditions encourage a rural-centered and highly

personal environment in which large numbers of family members, by virtue

of more intensive surveillance, reduce opportunities and incentives for

property theft by outsiders (Zehr, 1974; Cohen and Felson, 1979; Shelley,

1981).

Murder in Developed and Developing Countries

Our review and analysis show that murder rates are positively related

to population growth and inequality, but negatively related to societal

development. We argue that these variables are in turn associated with

opportunity and incentive structures that either encourage or discourage

murder.

- 226 —

Opportunities and incentives for murder 1n developed nations are

diminished by demographic and developmental factors that reduce daily

contact among family and community members. Low population growth, as

reflected in smaller family size, decreases the number of contacts among the

individuals who are most apt, through opportunity (i.e., propinquity) and

willingness (i.e., higly emotional bonds) to kill one another (Wolfgang,

1966: Ch. 10; Lundsgaarde, 1977: 237; Taylor, 1979: 83-90; Shelley, 1981 :

43-44; Birkbeck, 1982: 183-84, 188-89). Similarly, the structure of work,

schooling, and leisure in developed countries daily draws individuals away

from home and neighborhood settings and diminishes the points of inter-

personal contact that may generate violent interpersonal struggles leading to

murder. This dispersion is further increased in developing nations by greater

geographic mobility which not only reduces the frequency of contact

among family and friends, but also permits rapid physicall relocation, and

thus, the possibility of escape from intra and inter-family violence (Black-

Michaud, 1975; Black, 1983: 34-38).

By contrast, rapid population growth in developing countries substan-

tially increases the number of household members, which in conjunction

with home-centered daily activities, increases inter-personal contacts and

enhances opportunities for violence. Less geographic mobility in developing

countries further reduces the ability of persons to escape violent intra-

family encounters and the internecine feuds among rival local groups that

.

often characterize developing societies (Tanner, 1970; Black-Michaud, 1975

b

Ne wman, 1976: 103-108).

CONCLUSION

The recent literature on comparative crime may be divided into two

categories:

1 ) quantitative cross-national analyses that are largely atheoretical or

that in one way or another depend on classical criminological theories that

appear (at least as presently formulated) to be inapplicable to certain forms

of crime, and

2) a diverse collection of case studies and review essays that offer rich

theroretical leads, but no systematic cross-national data analysis.

One of our tasks in this paper was to determine as conclusively as possible

whether developmental, distributional, and demographic variables do in fact

have different effects on murder and theft — a conclusion tacitly accepted

in much of the case-study literature, but to our knowledge, never explicitly

tested in the empirical, quantitative literature. Both our review of prior

quantitative research on INTERPOL and United Nations data, and our

analysis of murder and theft rates in 47 countries from Archer and Gartner’s

data, support an ‘‘oppositeeffects”’ conclusion and suggest the need for

crime-specific interpretations.

_ 227 _

t d

We argue that the most promising theoretical explanation for this —

and one that is consistent with case studies of crime within nations — is that

social-structural variables differentially affect the opportunities and incen-

tives for murder and theft. These differential effects are apparent in com-

parisons of the characteristics of developed and developing countries.

Future research should more precisely specify and test these mechanisms,

and should determine whether they hold for other crimes and across

countries and time periods not examined here. Such research may ulti-

mately provide explanations of crime which differ greatly from the classical

theoretical perspectives so often adqpted in comparative research on crime.

— 228 —

NOTES

(1)

We exclude Webb (1972) from Table 1 because his study is not cross-

national.

(2)

For a detailed discussion of Durkheim’s contributions to a conflict

theory of crime, see Taylor, Walton and Young (1973).

(3)

In fairness, when confronted with anomalous results (i.e., different

effects of a key independent variable on different types of crime),

some authors (e.g., Krohn, 1978: 663) ultimately recognize the

probable utility of theories aimed at explaining specific crimes. How-

ever, most offer no, or only sparse, comment on the issue (e.g.,

Messner, 1982: 233).

(4)

Archer and Gartner’s data are not totally distinct from INTERPOL

data. The researchers used INTERPOL data for those cases in which

no other crime data could be obtained; 13 of the 47 countries in our

sample (for a full description, see Archer and Gartner, 1984). More-

over, Archer and Gartner’s data include a variety of crime measures

besides ‘offences known to police”, the measure used by INTERPOL.

To allow comparisons, we substituted INTERPOL crime data for four

countries in which data on offences known were unavailable. The fact

that official cross-national crime data may misrepresent the true

extent, distribution, and nature of crime is well known (e.g., Clinard,

1964; Wolfgang, 1967; Vetere and Newman, 1977; Vigderhous, 1978),

as is the fact that the definition and classification of acts as ‘’criminal”’

varies across cultures (e.g., Wolfgang, 1967; Vetere and Newman,

1977). It is mainly because of these difficulties that comparative

crime studies have relied on murder and theft rates, crimes that are

universally recognized and outlawed.

(5)

We selected consecutive years from circa 1970 to calculate crime

averages (e.g., 1968, 69, 70, 71, 72). We used no data before 1967 and

no data after 1974, in order to ensure reasonably high levels of com

parability across countries in the time interval chosen.

(6)

The population size scores reported in our source are for individual

(and sometimes different) years in the 1960-1970 period.

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-

BAYLE“

OH. (196*, The P " an

Frîîxîu'

__

*

& MDevelopment ir lridia.

Prn:+1000 Priventon TUne

“ 1v Prese.

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— 232 —

APPENDIX A

Bivariate Associations, Means, Standard deviations and Factor scores for Developmental Measures

(N = 47)

Bivariate Associations

Developmental measures“

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(S)

(6)

(7)

X

s.D

Factor

b

« . « ». e . . À

(1) GNP per capita (1963)

89

79

95

90

73

80

975.52

1145.73

979

(2) Energy consumption per capita

(1960)

° ° . . . ° ° ° . . . . . . .

74

84

92

64

66

1295.16

1722.26

896

(3) Percentage of labor force non-

agricultural (1960)

. . . Û . ° . .

74

70

7

T7

52.51

26.31

846

(4) Telephone/100 (1960)

87

68

79

10.12

14.75

935

(S) Radios/100 (1960)

64

61

125.16

162.12

882

(6) Percentage of

literate adults

(1960)

. . Û ° . . ° . . ° . Q ° « ».

81

60.95

32.61

793

(7) Secondary

school

enrollment

ratio (1960)

26.0

22.22

829

All bivariate associations statistically significant at p <.001

Eigen value = 5.44

Data sources for these measures are: per capita GNP — World Bank (1977); per capita energy consumption — World Bank (1976); per-

centage of work force in agriculture — World Bank (1980); telephones/100 — American Telephone and Telegraph Company (1970);

radios/1000 — World Bank (1976); percentage of literate adults, and secondary school enrollment ratio-Bornschier and Heintz (1979).

APPENDIX B

Bivariate Associations, Means and Standard Deviations for Independent and Dependent Variables

(N = 47)

Bivariate Associations

Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(S)

(6)

(7)

s.D

(1) Development

* . . . ° L ° e À ® * . À ° . .

-.54*

-.70*

70*

17

-.40*

54*

00

1.00

(2) Inequality

° ° . . . . . ° ° ° * . . . ° ° °

60*

-42*

27*

52*

-.35*

46

09

(3) Population Growth

-.40*

-.23

66*

-.60*

2.10

85

(4) Urbanism

° . ° . . . . ° * . * ° . À . . . °

13

-.19

29*

40.99

23.57

(S) Total Population (log)

-.11

10

9.37

1.31

(6) Homicide Rates (log)

. . . ° ° ° . . ° . .

-.20

1.56

90

* . . ° ° . . . . . . e

(7) Theft Rates (log)

4.98

1.38

* p<.05.

SUMMARY

This paper examines an apparent contradiction in recent comparative

research on crime. Most quantitative studies assume that social-structural

variables which cause crime operate uniformly across different crime types

— for example, income inequality increases both murder and theft rates.

However, our review of this research, and our own multivariate analysis of

murder and theft rates in 47 countries, suggest that social-structural

variables have opposite effects on murder and theft rates. The most import-

ant predictor of both murder and theft in our analysis is population growth.

Drawing on case studies and comparative essays, we offer a preliminary

theoretical explanation for the opposite effects of social-structural variables

— especially population growth — on murder and theft. This explanation is

based on variations in the opportunities and incentives for murder and theft

in developing and developed countries. We suspect that population growth

measures the strength of primary group relations; that societies character-

ized by frequent and intense interaction between primary group members

provide many opportunities for murder, but because of effective surveil-

lance, few opportunities for theft.

RÉSUMÉ

REVUE ET ANALYSE DES EFFETS TRANSNATIONAUX

DES VARIABLES DU CRIME

QUE SONT LE DÉVELOPPEMENT, LA DISTRIBUTION

DES RESSOURCES ET LA DÉMOGRAPHIE

Cette étude examine les conclusions apparemment contradictoires

d’une récente recherche comparative sur la criminalité. La plupart des

études qualitatives suppose que les variables socio-culturelles qui sont à

l’origine du crime jouent de manière identique sur les différents types de

crimes — par exemple l’inégalité des revenus provoque à la fois l’augmenta-

tion des meurtres et des vols — Cependant notre lecture de cette recherche

ainsi que notre propre analyse pluridimmensionnelle sur les taux des meur-

tres et des vols dans 47 pays aboutissent à la constatation d’effets opposés

de ces variables sur le nombre de meurtres et de vols.. Dans notre analyse

le meilleur indicateur des variations de ces taux est l’accroissement de la

population. À partir d’études de cas et d’analyses comparatives, nous abou-

tissont à une première explication théorique des effets differenciels des

variables socio-culturelles — en particulier l’accroissement de la popula-

tion — sur le meurtre et le vol. Cette explication se fonde sur la variabilité

des opportunités et des mobiles du crime et du vol dans les pays développés

et en voie de développement. Nous pensons que la croissance de la popula-

tion mesure la force des relations du groupe initial ; que les sociétés caracté-

risées par de fréquentes et intenses interactions entre les membres du groupe

initial connaissent d’avantage d’occasions de meurtres mais, en raison de la

surveillance effective, moins d’opportunités de vols.

— 235 —

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CRIME:

À CASE OF BURGLARY

Satyanshu K. Mukherjee*

INTRODUCTION

Discussions on the relationship between economic development and

crime generally tend to centre around the levels of crime vis-a-vis property

vs prosperity. À most common method of exploring such a relationship is to

examine levels of criminality in countries at different stages of economic

development, including the least developed countries of Africa, Asia and

Latin America to the most developed nations of North America and Europe.

Such comparative assessment undoubtedly serves some purpose and this is

of substantial academic interest. However, often the examination of such

relationships is based on national and highly aggregated data and therefore

offered limited utility. À major limitation of such analysis is that they fail

to take into account the process of economic development, which besides

providing data on economic development also enables us to observe fluctu-

ations in the economy and its relationship with crime within a country and

over time.

There exists, on the other hand, a substantial body of knowledge on the

relationship between economic conditions and crime. Among theories with

group orientation, explanations based on economic factors and their influ-

ences on criminality are one of the oldest. Such explanations gain support

from the idea that the economy plays a fundamental role in shaping the

nature and form of human relations. For an excellent survey of literature

examining the relationship between criminality and economic conditions up

to the Great Depression, see Sellin (1937). Since the late 1930s several new

research reports have appeared, some of which have analysed this relation-

ship with the help of advanced statistical techniques. À review of the

literature in this field reveals that researchers have used a variety of indices

of economic conditions and of criminality. Wholesale prices, business

indicators, poverty levels, wage payments, retail trade, consumer price

index, gross domestic product, automobiles registered, income and unem-

ployment have been used as indices of economic conditions. As indices of

crimrinality, data on such variables as commitments to prison, convictions

in various courts, prosecutions in various courts, charges before magistrates

courts, arrests and offences known to the police, have been used. À few of

* Senior Criminologist, Australian Institute of Criminology.

— 237 —

the recent studies need to be described briefly to set the stage for a descrip-

tion of the present study.

In a widely quoted study, Fleisher (1966) obtained a positive relation-

ship between unemployment and delinquency. His findings led him to

conclude:

That a 1 per cent increase in unemployment rate is associated, on the

average, with an approximate .15 per cent increase in the rate of delin-

quency (arrest rate) (1966: 84).

Such findings, based on time series and cross sectional data, also prompts

him to make causal inference in that the ‘examination of delinquency rates

by age adds further to the hypothesis that increases in unemployment cause

increases in delinquency”. (Fleisher, 1966: 85).

Several years later, analysis based on post Second World War time series

data Brenner arrives at similar conclusions:

Thus a one percent increase in the unemployment rate sustained over

a period of six years has been associated {durirg ihe past three decades)

with increases of approximately… 648 homicides and 3340 state prison

admissions (1976: 5-6).

Unemployment is bui one aspect of economic condiiions. Brenner

(1976) used three economic indicators — gross domestic product, unem-

ployment and consumer price index and found positive association between

these sud homicide and imprisonment rates. Fox (1978) found an associ-

ation between the consumer price index and property crimes and suggeste d

that economic factors of crime may be alleviated by reducing the effects of

income inequality.

Mukherjee (1981) analyzed charges before magistrates courts in

Australia and their relationship with a host of socio-economic variables

including population, standardized gross domestic product per capita,

unemployment, number of cars registered and police and prison expenditure

for almost eight decades. For the entire period, total property and petty

offences charged before magistrates courts showed strong positive associa-

tion with each of the socioeconomic variables listed above except unem-

ployment. When the period of 1900 to 1976 was divided into several seg-

ments, these relationships changed significantly,(Mukherjee, 1981:119-135).

Scanning of the findings of various researches in this area points to at

least two possibilities. Firstly, time series data used to examine the relation-

ship between criminality and other variables have to contain a large number

of data points. That is to say that if annual data are used as the time series

data points, then the researcher would be well advised to present data for a

number of years. The length of the data span, to a large extent, would be

dictated by the purpose of the study. However, since changes in economic

— 238 —

conditions and in other aspects in a country may also be instigated by

certain ‘unforeseen’ or ‘unusual’ circumstances, it is useful to extend the

time span to incorporate as many ‘unusual’ circumstances as possible. And

secondly, a longer time span enables the researcher to examine sergments of

the data set in the light of the prevailing socio-economic climate. Historical

analysis of trends must take into account special characteristics of different

periods. Study of a data set spanning over several decades, without consider-

ing detailed characteristics of various segments of this time span, tends to

mask the importance of ‘unusual’ circumstances. À clear example of this

situation was obtained in a study in Australia which analyzed the relation-

ship between unemployment rate and property crime, (Mukherjee, 1981).

In that study, the overall relationship between unemployment and property

crimes charged before magistrates courts for the period 1900-1976 was

found to be weak but negative. When discriminant analysis, using a number

of variables, divided these 77 years into seven time periods or environmental

sets, the relationship between unemployment and property crimes changed

to positive in each period but the first.

Such differences in findings also highlight a major limitation in the

analysis. Especially in the case of the above example, most researchers tend

to consider the unemployment and property crime relationship as uni-

directional and some have imputed such relationships to be causal. Thornberry

and Christenson have very effectively demonstrated the fallacy of this

stance and suggest :

That such a perspective is too limited to model the causal processes

actually at work. A more accurate reflection of these processes is a recipro-

cal one in which criminal involvement and a variety of other process

variables mutually influence one another over time ( 1984: 408).

The present study:

In this paper my main aim is to examine economic conditions and the

offence of burglary in Australia. The two indices of economic conditions

that will be used are gross domestic product and unemployment rate. I have

selected the offence of burglary for several reasons:

a) it is the sharpest growing serious crime in Australia since the Second

World War:

b) during the last two decades private dwellings have become increasing

targets of burglary. Currently, of all the burglaries reported or becoming

known to the police over 58 per cent involve private dwellings. This also

means that burglary affects directly a large segment of the Australian

population. Also, although predominantly an offence against property,

burglary creates a significant amount of fear among the community.

c) existing studies tend to show that burglary is a crime of opportunity

and the network of such opportunity is facilitated as well as expanded by

— 239 —

changes in life styles brought about by economic growth and resulting

technological developments; and finally.

d) it is an offence in which juvenile involvement is shown to be dispro-

portionately high.

The findings of the present paper are based on charges before magis-

trates courts, which are the courts of first instance, for the present century.

Before analysing the data on burglary it may be of interest to present briefly

the trends in the three major categories of offences charged before magis-

trates courts and their relationship with the two economic variables of gross

domestic product per capita and unemployment rate. The three categories

are: offences against the person, offences against property, and offences

against good order. Besides presenting raw rate figures for these offence

categories, 1 shall also present relative movements in the trends with the

help of polynomial curves. Polynomials smooth the rough edges of the

basic curves by removing erratic perturbations, thereby emphasizing the

more fundamental movements in the data. The order of polynomials was

decided on the basis of F-ratio of regression and explained variance. The

rates of offences charged are shown in Figure 1. The results of the poly-

nomials for each of the three offence categories are presented in Table 1 and

the slopes of the curves produced in Figure 2.

Data in Figure 1 is quite clear and appear to offer two distinct trends.

One relates to the offences against the person which shows a decline in

rates up to the late 1930s and an increase thereafter. The second trend

reflects inverse patterns of increases and decreases in rates between property

and good order offences. That is to say that when charges rates for property

offences declined, charges rates for good order offences increased and vice

Versa.

During the first few years of this century charges for property crimes

declined, at the same time good order offences increased. À reverse pattern

is seen during the Depression, and a very sharp pattern is obtained since the

post Second World War economic growth began.

Changes in the volume of the three offence categories in Figure 1 can

now be examined in terms of relative movement — not only increases and

decreases in a group of years but also the pace of increase or decrease. Data

in Table 1l show that the F-ratios for offences against the person and prop-

erty are very high and their explained variance are 0.94 and 0.96 respect-

ively. For good order offences, although the F-ratio is relatively low, it is

still significant at the 0.001 level. Besides good fit, the polynomial station-

ary points present some interesting insights. The stationary points represent

the times when the slopes of the curves are zero.

— 240 —

FIGURE I

Offences charged before magistrates’ courts per 100 000 population

aged 10 years and over, Australia 1900 to 1976

4 000

‘

3 000

2 000

Offences

against

good order

Offences per 100 000 population

1 000

Offences

against

property

—

ps

0

1

|

Î

|

J

l

Î

l

À

Î

1

l

1

1

À

|

1900

1910

1920

1930

1940

1950

1960

1970

1980

From Figure 2 it is apparent that property and good order offences

show an almost perfect inverse phase relationship. The turning points for

these two offence categories coincide within five to six years of each other

and during the entire century they have moved opposite to each other. The

slope of the offences against the person curve shows only one turning point,

in 1937, before which these offences always declined and afterwards always

increased.

The reading of the curves in Figure 2 in conjunction with those in

Figure 1 helps in identifying the general tendencies clearly. Thus considering

the property offences curve it is noted that the first directional change takes

place in 1913, when the rates of property offences began to increase.

Furthermore, it can be shown that between 1900 and 1912 the angle of the

slope or the rate of decline was maximum in 1906 after which the rate

— 241 —

TABLE I

Measures of the goodness of fit and polynomial stationary points

for offences charged in magistrates’ courts, Australia 1900 to 1976

F-ratio of

Polynomial

regression

Order

stationary

Offence category

FG!]

of f (t)

points: f’(t)

df,

Year

2

Offences against the person

556.532

0.93766

1937

7

6

Offences against property

325.164

0.96536

1913

1936

1948

1973

Offences against good order

32.076

5

0.69315

1908

1

1932

1955

1975

Note :

df, and df, are the degrees of freedom of the regression and residuals respect-

ively. All the F-ratios are significant at less than 0.001.

FIGURE II

Slopes of the polynomial curves (value of f’ (t)) for major

offence categories, Australia 1900 to 1976

300

—2 =— — ——

offences against the person

….

offences against property

offences against good order

200

100

—

Value of tan (t)

ê

Ë

_

#

1910

Ê

— — —> — =.

—

. . —— —; —

—

,

—L pn p

——

d S

œr

— —-—

— —— — —

N

‘\

:100L

Offences against the person

Offences against good order

f' (t) =0.2492.t — 9.1582

f (t) = 3.1195E — 4.1* — 5.2215E—2.t°

T 288331" _ 57.7381.+ F 285.3512

Offences against property

f' (t) = -4.0322E — 6.t° * 6.7678E

— 4.

— 3.8658E — 2.t" + 8.5875E

—1.t

— 5.4238.t — 7.2780

— 242 —

began to fall. Similarly, between 1948 -and 1972 charges for property

offences increased, and the rate of increase was maximum in 1965. The

curve for good order offences can also be dissected in a similar way.

The polynomials and their stationary points made it possible to offer

certain general statements. These indicate that whatever is responsible for

such movements does not have similar effects on all the offence categories.

Furthermore, the opposite directional changes in property and good order

offences show that events during the specific periods have opposite effects

on these two offence types.

This exercise led to the examination of the present century in relation

to structural, technological and socioeconomic changes. With the help of

a host of exogenous variables and the technique of discriminant analysis the

period between 1900 and 1976 was divided into seven time segments (for

detail methodology and resuits see Mukherjee, 1981 : 119-135). These time

segments were:

1900 - 1907

1908 - 1912

1913 - 1927

1928 - 1937

1938 - 1949

1950 - 1965

_) O Yu R UN —

1966 - 1976

Since the focus of this paper is on the relationship between economic

conditions and crime I shall briefly describe the changes in the two econ-

omic variables of gross domestic product per capita and unemployment and

the three offence categories during the seven time segments. These changes

are shown in Table 2. The difference in the values of gross domestic product

per capita (Gdp) from time segment 1 to 2, 2 to 3 and 3 to 4 were not

significant, but the increase in Gdp from 4 to 5, S to 6 and 6 to 7 were

highly significant. The pattern in unemployment rate is vastly different

from the above.

There was a significant drop in the unemployment rate from time

segment l to 2, a significant increase from 3 to 4, and a significant drop

from 4 to 5. Economic logic would find these patterns perfectly in order.

What changes took place in the crime rates? Changes in the rates of

offences against the person are hard to explain. The significant fall in

offence rate from time segment 2 to 3 and 3 to 4 corresponds with virtually

no change in Gdp and rise in unemployment rate. In other words, when the

economy did not grow at all and when the unemployment rate increased

there was a significant fall in chares for offences against the person. Does

this, therefore, suggest that when the economy improves and the unemploy-

ment rate falls, offences against the person would increase? Well, some such

— 243 —

TABLE II

Characteristics of time segments: average values of selected variables

Variable

GDP +

. . . * ° . . À * ° e À . » ° . . . . ° .

789

981

991

965

1228*

1525*

2200*

Unemployed

6.71

3.06*

4.56

12.75*

3.63*

1.97

2.13

Offences against #the person

271.6

213.7

170.7*

127.0*

137.8

191.6*

271.1*

Offences against Property

. Q ° . . . . . .

490.1

408.7*

434.1

641.8*

550.4*

7704*

1238.4*

Offences against Good Order

2626.9

29814*

2234.1*

1555.1*

1888.7

2348.0

1717.1*

Burglary

° ° . . . . À L . . . « . ° ° . ». ° .

21.0

19.8

50.0*

112.8*

104.8

126.7

243.1*

#

7 r dtes the t values between time segments being significant at 0.001 level.

— Figu-e- : zare to rate per 100,000 population aged 10 years and over.

-

P =

A

€

scenario does emerge when the changes from time segment 5 to 6 and 6 to 7

are examined. There was significant growth in the economy and the levels

of unemployment were very low; offences against the person increased

significantly.

Property offences rates, on the other hand, show patterns in some ways

different from and in other ways similar to those shown by offences against

the person. From ! to 2 time segment there was a significant decline in

property offences. This coincided with a significant fall in the unemploy-

ment rate and a substantial rise in the Gdp. From time segment 3 to 4

property crime rates increased significantly, the unemployment rate rose at

an unusually high level, and the Gdp showed a decline in real terms. This

pattern reverses, as can be seen from changes, from time segment 5 to 6 and

6 to 7. In these two situations, property crime rates showed sharp increases

in spite of significant growth in the economy and a substantial lowering of

unemployment rates. Good order offences show erratic movements and the

most pronounced drop in the rates is observed during significant economic

progress in the seventh time segment.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND BURGLARY

In examining the relationship between economic conditions and bur-

glary 1 shall first present data on burglary charges before magistrates courts

and then examine the rates of burglaries reported/becoming known to the

police for the recent two decades. Figure 3 presents the standardized rates

of burglary charges, the unemployment rate and the gross domestic product

per capita. The standardized rates are calculated so that maximum value of

each of the three variables during the entire century is 100 and the mini-

mum value in the scale of O to 100 adjusted accordingly. Except for about

a period of two decades between the mid 1920s and early 1940s burglary

rates and gross domestic product have moved hand in hand and the synchron-

ization between the fluctuations of these two variables have been near

perfect since the mid 1950s. It is needless to point out that the period

1920s to early 1940s included two of the most turbulent episodes of the

present century — the great Depression and the Second World War. In

Australia the post-war economic development began in the mid 1950s.

The relationship between unemployment rate and burglary, as ex-

pected, is quite the opposite. During the mid 1920s to the mid 1930s the

unemployment rate was the highest recorded this century, gross domestic

product was the lowest, and the highest burglary rate in the first six dec-

ades. If it can be argued that the high burglary rate during the above period

was due to a serious downturn in the economy and committing burglaries

was a means to survive for at least some, then one must find some con-

vincing explanation for the sharp rise in burglaries during the economic

— 245 —

FIGURE III

Standardised rates of burglary, gross domestic product

and unemployment 1900-1976

100 — Standardised rate

&

°

.

P

1/

E

v

!

)

”

\\,

:':

—

::|:

\\\\l.“‘\

\

\\

\l

:'l

'::

H

.

J\'\

e d

"°«l

A

h -

.'i

——œ—_ ——nF

-

e

:I

-

II\

« e--

.

L T d

Ï

1950

1960

1970

1980

1900

1910

1920

1930

1940

Year

Key

Burglary

Gross domestic product

Unemployment

boom. since the mid 1950s. Increases in burglaries during economic de-

pression and economic boom can be explained in terms of necessity vs

opportunity. The necessity principle can be supported with the help of

court disposition data. During the Depression of the 1930s the conviction

rate for burglary charges dropped very significantly. It could be possible

that the charges during this period increased because of the prevailing econ-

omic distress, some acts which otherwise would have been ignored were

brought to the courts’ attention. The infrequent use of ‘conviction dispo-

sition* by the magistrates demonstrated attitudes and concerns which

reflected the realities of the times. This explanation appears plausible when

— 246 —

the data on discharges are examined. During the Depression years not only

did the conviction rates for burglary drop but also the discharge rates were

higher than at any other period in this century. At the peak of the De-

pression, 1933, only about one in ten burglaries charged resulted in a con-

viction whereas seven out of ten resulted in discharges. Reading through

some of the case files of the 1930s reveals that the magistrates paid greater

attention to economic conditions during the Depression than in other times.

Therefore, the inference that the necessity principle operated during econ-

omic distress is a reasonable one.

On the opportunity principle there exist numerous studies which tend

to show that the number of burglaries increase in direct proportion to

growth in the opportunity structure (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960; Scarr, 1973;

Sparks, et al, 1977; Maguire, 1982; Clarke, 1984).

Economic development since the mid 1950s has made profound

changes in life styles. This can be looked at from at least three perspectives

which point to the creation and enlargement of the opportunity structure

for crime, especially burglary.

a) There has been a phenomenal growth in the number and variety of

consumer goods. The attractiveness of these products is that they are

becoming gradually lighter and their life is relatively short. That is to say

that goods like stereo-systems, colour TV, video cassette recorders, home

computers etc. are gradually becoming more compact and that these are not

so durable because swift changes in models in relation to appearance as well

as performance make the earlier models somewhat obsolete and out of

fashion. Of course, there are numerous other products, including small

transistor radios, bicycles to expensive jewellery and watches which also are

stolen in large numbers.

b) With economic development and population growth there has been

a substantial increase in the number and variety of establishments such as

shops, service stations, office buildings, warehouses, schools, factories, show

rooms etc. Unlike structures of earlier days most present structures, includ-

ing private dwellings, use glass, plasterboard and single brick walls, and

although a large majority of commercial business and office premises are

insured as well as under surveillance during nights and week-ends, the

would-be burglar somehow manages to enter such premises; indeed some

burglars seem to operate in a very professional way.

c) The post Second World War economic boom has also drawn a large

number of women out of home to work places. Both husband and wife in

employment means that an increasing number of houses being left empty

during the day are tempting targets for would-be burglars. The dual income

family has given rise to the new problem of a large number of school chil-

dren being left unsupervised for a few hours every day between the time

they finish school and parents finish work. Also, double income has provided

families with the opportunity to enjoy longer vacations and leisure time.

— 247 —

I shall return to this discussion momentarity with statistics on the

reported incidents of burglary. For now, I shall present a brief look at the

trend of burglary charges. An attempt was made to subject the burglary data

to a polynomial fit, similar to the one shwon in Figure 2. Such an exercise

revealed the curve of best fit was the fifth-order polynomial with only one

stationary point. The overall trend in burglaries during this century was that

of increase.

The long term burglary data were subjected to two other tests to

ascertain whether (a) there existed any lagged correlations between burglary

and gross domestic product and burglary and unemployment rate, and (b)

whether the burglary data showed any periodic or cyclical movement.

In order to test the hypotheses that burglary and gross domestic

product are causally connected, these two variables were entered into an

analysis which systematically calculates lagged correlations for lags up to

20 years either way. This analysis revealed that the correlation between the

variables was maximized when the lag was zero, and hence does not support

the notion of lagged causal relationship. À similar result was obtained for

the test between burglary and unemployment.

As regards the second test, visual inspection of the burglary data, see

Figure 3, does not indicate the existence of any cyclical movement. Never-

theless, with the help of spectral analysis, the possibility of periodicity in

the burglary data was examined and the results are presented in Figure 4

and 5. In this case, as shown in Figure 4, lags of up to 25 years showed a

monotonic decline in the autocorrelation coefficients. Figure 5 shows a

single significant partial autocorrelation, with a lag of one year. These

indicate that burglary trends are not influenced significantly by previous

years other than the immediately preceding years, and therefore burglary

occurrences can only be predicted from year to year. There is, therefore, no

reason to believe that burglary data of this century presented any regu-

larities in fluctuations.

CONCLUSION

Historical data presented above show that burglary and the economy

in Australia have tended to move hand in hand and that the occurrences of

burglary increase at times of economic depression as well as boom. Fortu-

nately, the spectre of a 1930s-style unemployment level does not seem

likely at the present moment. Since the mid 1970s, however, the unemploy-

ment rate in Australia has increased sharply, reaching for the first time since

the Depression a double-digit figure in 1982. The reported rate of burglaries

has also shown the sharpest increase since the mid 1970s. However, the

most noticeable and interesting change in the pattern of burglary in recent

— 248 —

FIGURE IV

Autocorrelation function: burglary

1.00,

80 4

Î

Q

Ÿ

60 47

LF

e

40-

Û

20-

00

ÏÎÎÎÎÎÏ…

20-

LAG

404

60-

80-

-1.00-

FIGURE V

Partial autocorrelation function: burglary

1.00 —

80

60

40 —

20 _

R 2

00

$ &

v

+

LAÊ

20 -

40 -

60 -

80 -

-1.00 -

— 249 —

years has been in the change in the scene. Undoubtedly, the economy seems

to have played a significant role.

Consider the data in Figure 6. Since 1964-65 there has been a consist-

ent drift away from the shops to private dwellings. Thus, in 1964-65 a little

over two out of five burglaries reported to the police took place in private

dwellings. In 1982-83 this ratio increased to almost three out of five.

Burglaries of shops, which constituted over one-third of all burglaries in

1964-65 declined to a mere 14 per cent in 1982-83. Looked at in another

way, the chances of a burglary of a dwelling was one in 206 in 1964-65; in

1982-83 this ratio was one in 40. The role of the economy can hardly be

ignored in this shift of venue. Production of consumer goods, changes in

consumption habits, a general increase in purchasing power also through

such financial schemes as lay-bys, hire-purchase, instalment payment and

personal loans are some of the blessings of economic development. The

financial schemes help the population acquire goods and a large majority

of househol

FIGURE VI

Break, enter and steal (burglary) reported to police

by type of premises (proportion) Australia, 1964-65 to 1982-83

............

...............................

-_-—-

...........

1964-65

» ...

.............

oooooooooooo

............

... ..

_ 41% "

...........

...........

. s00060606

...........

ooooooooo

…. L

24%

e. .A ........... 35°/g

- A -L Le =

1969-70

...

............

……

..................................................

.....

OOOOOOO

….

.................

.............................

................

avavava ue

°

e ….

.......

0152915

48%

.................

28% ......

82.0000

]

24%

1974-75

OOOOOO

........

.........

......

.............

e »

..................

oooooooooooo

.....

......

-

—. . ...

.......

.....

..................

a.….-.ca.…..a.uaaussea

oooooo

19%

30%

ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo

1979-80

...........

...........

.. e0.00000

L

°

°

...................

...........

...................

e

.................

.......

31%

:+e.00.00066% 00006

52%

17%

ä

........................................

.....

................................

......

................

-----------

e

ooooooooooo

.......

1982-83

............

............

...

...........

L

58%

......... ........O...O........ . 0000006

p OO DOc DOOOOO0X ..

.. ..00<.

..

14%

28%

Key

m Dwellings

Shops

D Other

Source:

Australian Bureau of Statisiics, Year Book of Australia.

Annual Reports of the Police Departments of New South Wales, Victnria

Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia, Tasmania and Nor” ‘ +rn

Territory and of the Austratian Federal Police.

—,250 —

of households in Australia own the products. Changes in life style — work

habits and leisure which result in most dwellings being empty during the day

time — combined with sophisticated electronic and other surveillance

systems installed to protect shops — thereby making shops a riskier target,

have resulted in a higher incidence of burglary of dwellings.

Although the economic growth has made a significant impact on

Australian society, it is important to point out that since the oil crisis of late

1973, growth in the economy in most industrialized nations has slowed

down significantly and as a result there has been a sharp increase in the

unemployment rate. Currently in Australia, it is a belief in most circles

that sharp increases in burglaries in recent years have occurred as a result of

two factors — a high unemployment rate in general and higher still among

those 16 to 19 years old and that Australia currently faces a serious drug

problem and increases in burglaries are by addicts to maintain their drug

habits.

Examination of these relationships in itself constitutes a larger research

project. The emphasis in this paper has been on presenting trends in econ-

omic conditions and burglary, based on aggregate data. Therefore, it was not

possible to examine as to who commits burglaries. And even if it can be

shown that a substantial proportion of burglars are unemployed this still

leaves two questions wide open — (a) why only some of the unemployed

commit burglaries, and not others, and (b) is unemployment a cause of

burglary? At this stage it is not possible to answer these questions, but in

light of the current situation it is useful to differentiate between the high

burglary rates during the Depression and in recent years.

During the economic crisis of the 1930s survival for some was a para-

mount issue. At that time Australia did not have an unemployment benefit

scheme; of course to help the population food coupons and other types of

ad hoc assistance were made available by the government. Since the 1940s,

the government has spent millions of dollars on unemployment benefit.

Unlike schemes in the United States and Canada, an Australian receives

government assistance as long as he/she remains unemployed. Although one

cannot maintain a respectable life style, the current unemployment benefits

make survival easier than during the Depression. The opportunity structure

created by the changes in the economy and life style makes it possible to

live a faster life through illegitimate means.

The historical data analysed above tend to show that predominating

characteristics of a time period need not have similar effects on all types of

crimes. Data on the three major offence categories — against the person,

property, and good order - demonstrate entirely different movemerits. Ît

may, however, be possiblc tiya.

specifir offence, say assaul?*. may show

move;ents similar to fhos uhserves Lor nffences against fhe person.

- 251

The trends of burglary charges, in general, appear similar to those of

offences against property (see Figures 3 and 1). However, this apparent

similarity may be because of intrinsically different reasons. Two major

research projects, soon to be completed (Mukherjee, et al forthcoming

1985 and Mukherjee, forthcoming 1985) lend support in this direction.

Firstly, property offences in general showed a declining trend in the early

years of this century. Data for the last century indicate that this declining

trend began in the late 188Os. Burglary offences, on the other hand, did

not show such a trend. And secondly, unlike some property nfence, viz,

larceny, shoplifting, motor vehicle theft, etc, the offence of bu , ‘;ry shows

a distinct and continuous shift in targets, both in terms of types 0. premises

broken into and type of goods stolen. It appears that the offenc ©° bur-

blary is very much influenced by the changes in life style.

REFERENCES

BRENNER, M. Harvey (1976), Estimating the Social Costs of National

Economic Policy: Implications for Mental and Physical Health, and

Criminal Aggression, study prepared for the use of the Joint Economic

Committee, Congress of the United States, Paper N° 5, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C.

CLARKE, Ronald V. (1984), “Opportunity-based Criminal Rates”, British

Journal of Criminology, 24: 74-83.

CLOWARD, Richard A. and LLOYD E. Ohlin, (1960), Delinquency and

Opportunity. New York: The Free Press.

FLEISHER, Belton M. (1966), The Economics of Delinquency Chicago:

Quadrangle Books.

FOX, James A. (1978), Forecasting Crime Data: An Econometric Analysis.

Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books.

MAGUIRE, Mike, (1982), Burglary in a Dwelling. London: Heinemann.

MUKHERJEE, Satyanshu K. (1981), Crime Trends in Twentieth Century

Australia. Sydney: George Allen & Unwin.

MUKHERJEE, Satyanshu K., forthcoming (1985), Burglary in a City.

Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology.

MUKHERIEE, Satyanshu K., John R. Walker and Evelyn N. Jacobsen,

Crime in the Colonies (Historical Statistics Monograph) Sydney:

Australia 1788 — 1988: A Bicentennial History, University of New

South Wales, forthcoming 1985).

SCARR, Harvey A. (1973), Patterns of Burglary. Washington, D.C.: USS.

Government Printing Office.

SELLIN, Thorsten, (1937), Research Memorandum on Crime in the De

pression. New York: Social Science Research Council.

SPARKS, Richard F., Hazel G. Genn and David J. Dodd, (1977), Surveying

Victims: À Study of the Measurement of Criminal Victimization. New

York: John Wiley & Sons.

— 252 —

THORNBERRY, Terence P. and R.L. Christenson, (1984), ‘“Unemployment

and Criminal Involvement: An Investigation of Reciprocal Causal

Structures”, American Sociological Review, 49:398-411.

ABSTRACT

Using longitudinal data, the paper examines the relationships between

economic conditions and crime in Australia. The gross domestic product per

capita and the unemployment rate have been used as the two indicators of

the economy, and offences charged before magistrate’s courts and burglaries

reported to police, were used as indicators of crimes. The analysis, both of

major categories of offences and burglary, show that different periods in the

present century have had a varied impact on types of crimes. À major

finding suggests that property crimes increase sharply in situations when the

economy received a major set back like the great Depression, as well as

when it is growing at a very fast rate. Also the study reveals that the increase

in burglaries is closely linked with the growth in the economy and the

production of, and accessibility to ever increasing consumer goods, have led

to a shift in the targets of burglary, both in terms of the types of premises

broken into and kinds of goods stolen. And finally, the burglary data for

the present century do not show the existence of any cycles or regularities,

nor does the present data show any lags.

RÉSUMÉ

DÉVELOPPEMENT ÉCONOMIQUE ET CRIMINALITEÉ :

UN CAS DE CAMBRIOLAGE

À partir de données longitudinales cet article examine les relations de

cause à effet entre condition économique et criminalité en Australie. Le

pouvoir d’achat brut par habitant et le taux de chômage ont été utilisés

comme indicateurs du niveau économique, le nombre de délits faisant

l’objet d’une audience devant le tribunal ainsi que les cambriolages déclarés

à la police ont quant à eux servis d’indicateurs de la criminalité. L’analyse,

pour les catégories principales de délits et de cambriolages, montre que les

différentes époques de notre siècle ont eu un impact variable selon les types

de crime. L’un des principaux résultats de l’étude montre que les crimes

contre la propriété augmentent brusquement aussi bien dans les périodes où

le niveau économique est sévèrement touché, comme par exemple pendant

la grande Dépression, que lorsque celui-ci connait un accroissement rapide.

L’étude révèle également que l’augmentation des cambriolages est étroite-

ment liée à la croissance de l’économie et production et accessibilité de

biens de consommation sans cesse plus nombreux, ont conduit à un

— 253 —

changement dans les mobiles des cambriolages à la fois quant aux types de

lieux fracturés et quant aux types de biens dérobés.

En conclusion, les statistiques sur les cambriolages pour le 20ème siècle

ne révèlent aucun cycle ou période répétitive ni même aucun décalage.

— 254 —

VIOLENCE AND THE ECONOMY:

A Modest Hypothesis On Inequality,

Unemployment, and Crime (1)

Dane Archer*

and

Rosemary Gartner**

INTRODUCTION

Researchers have long been curious about the impact of economic

fluctuations on crime rates. This question reflects a longstanding suspicion

that private ‘“deviant”’ behavior has public roots in the economic condition

of the wider society. In its most broad form, the ‘“economic hypothesis”

suggests that the violent or criminal acts of individuals are influenced — at

least in part — by their economic condition and recent history and, more

generally, by economic forces at work in the society in which they live.

The concrete implications of this general economic hypothesis are that

researchers should include among other potential ‘’causes’’ of crime those

economic conditions and changes most likely to alter the probability that

an individual will commit crime or violence. Although a large number of

economic variables deserve examination, those of perhaps most conspicuous

interest involve measures of change in individual well-bieng. Unemployment

is one such measure, although its impact falls heavily on a few rather than

on citizens generally. Economic events such as inflation, changes in per

capita income, and changing interest rates are more general in their impact,

although perhaps not as devastating for individuals as is unemployment.

The basic premise behind research in this area is that some economic

changes greatly exacerbate the conditions of daily life. Increases in prices

This paper is part of a cross-national study of homicide and other of-

fences. The crime statistics used in this paper are from a just-published

| 10-nation archive of comparative crime data (D. Archer and R. Gartner,

Violence and Crime in Cross-National Perspective, Yale University Press,

1984). This research was supported in part by a Guggenheim Fellowship

and a German Marshall Fund Fellowship to the first author. The authors

wish to thank Tom Phelan and Marc Lieberman for assistance and advice.

Professor of Sociology Stevenson College, University of California,

Santa-Cruz, CA 95064.

** Research, University of Wisconsin.

— 255 —

and a decline or disappearance of income involve obvious material con-

sequences. Presumably, economic changes also can alter significant aspects

of psychological and emotional life for affected individuals and their

families. It is theoretically conceivable, at least, that these material and non-

material changes accumulate to increase the probabilities of crime and

violence.

Although the general economic hypothesis seems to invite an empirical

test, the question can be approached in different ways and with various

premises. For example, one researcher might assume that chronic economic

hardship such as long-term unemployment is most conducive to crime.

Another might argue that acute economic deterioration such as recent

unemployment is much more devastating. À third might assume that general

deprivation such as an economic depression is less criminogenic than the

relative deprivation caused by isolated cases of hardship in otherwise pros-

perous times. Finally, the null hypothesis is of course that violence and the

economy are unrelated — that the engines driving the former are uncorrelated

with economic variables.

Apart from these differences in theoretical premises, empirical assess-

ment of the economic hypothesis encounters additional obstacles. Measures

of economic well-being remain disputed, and conventional economic indi-

cators tend to omit preciseiy those data one would most like to have. For

example, official unemployment figures may not include the chronic unem-

ployed or those who despair of finding work. In addition, economic series

data often are characterized by periodic cycles, seasonal fluctuations, multi-

colinearity, and even indicator changes - making econometric analyses of

the effects of changes in a given indicator far from unambiguous.

In addition to these potentially thorny measurement problems. using

aggregate data to search for a link between violence and the economy runs

a strong risk of the classic ‘’ecological fallacy”’. Even if a researcher does

obtain a strong correlation between aggregate data on unemployment and

aggregate data on offence rates, it cannot be assumed that the individuals

involved in offences are themselves unemployed. Without data on individ-

uals, aggregate data alone can do no more than describe what happens at the

societal level -- e.g., what happens to a society's crime rate during periods

of high unemployment. While such aggregate relations may make for useful

predictions and lead to further research, they cannot by themselves tell us

anything about the employment histories of individuals committing crime

and violence.

For all these reasons, and although economic hypotheses about crime

are of considerable interest, these hypotheses do not admit to simple or

definitive resolution. The history of research in this area dates from pion-

eering work by Bonger (1916) which examined crime records during the

256

1800s and concluded that crimes of theft burgeoned during depressions.

Other early and influential work on economic effects was by Ogburn and

Thomas (1922), Thomas (1927), Sellin (1937), and Henry and Short

(1954). This literature is diverse, and research on different facets of the

general economic hypothesis is summarized by Braithwaite (1979). Even

though many researchers have shared an interest in the general economic

hypothesis, individual studies frequently have examined very dissimilar

questions.

Some of this work has centered on industrialization and other aspects

of national economic development. For example, Zehr (1976) examined the

apparent effects of industrialization on offence rates in France and Germany

between 1830 and 1920. Combined with other research on economic devel-

opment (Wolf, 1971; Wellford, 1974; Shelley, 1981), this body of work

suggests that violent crime is relatively unaffected by these broad historical

changes. Other researchers have used increasingly sophisticated techniques

to examine the effects of fluctuations in indicators of national economic

health. One of the best known of such efforts is the five-nation analysis by

Brenner (1976a and 1976b). This work examined the period 1900-1970 and

is unique in its effort to control for possible artifacts like changes in the age

structure of the population (1). This work produced the interesting con-

clusion that relationships between offences and economic conditions have

changed qualitatively over time. In the case of violent crimes, Brenner found

that the effects of economic fluctuations became more pronounced over

time and that in recent decades these offences have increased during periods

of high unemployment.

À more fine-grained question has focused not on national economic

well-being as a whole but instead on the effects of inequality. Much of this

research has examined national measures of inequality — for example, the

Gini Index or other measures of the degree to which income, wealth, or land

are unequally distributed throughout a population. When these indicators

are compared with national offence rates, an inverse relationship is generally

found. Nations with the least inequality also tend to have the lowest rates of

violent crime (Krohn, 1976; Braithwaite, 1979). Some of this research has

shared the general weaknesses of cross-sectional research in that the extrac-

tion of causal inferences about the observed relationship is problematic.

Some longitudinal work on this question has been done, however, and this

work supports the general conclusion that violent crime appears to be

related to measures of economic inequality. One statement from this body

of work summarizes the ‘‘inequality hypothesis”:

… the most common progression of events that generates social violence

is an unequal distribution of resources that creates asymmetric social

relations that, in turn, create latent conflict that, if conditions are ripe, will

be come violent conflict (Ball-Rokeach, 1980, p. 53).

— 257 —

[t is not surprising that much research on the effects of economic con-

ditions and changes has been limited in scope. Western societies, and par-

ticularly the United States and England, have dominated empirical studies in

this area. In the absence of longitudinal data for a large sample of societies,

it has not been possible to investigate the possible effects of different types

of economic systems. It seems to us that there are theoretical reasons to

suspect that the effects of economic variables are mediated by the economic

structure of individual societies.

It seems reasonable to hypothesize, for example, that the effects of

increased unemployment will be mitigated in some economic systems more

than in others. In societies with high chronic unemployment, losing a job

may be experienced as a more serious and therefore desperate state of

affairs. Such societies tend to have inequality and conspicuous poverty, and

the newly unemployed individual may foresee and dread the prospect of

imminent downward mobility. Conversely, unemployment may be less

devastating in societies with high levels of social services and benefits for

the unemployed. This conception implies a contextual hypothesis: that the

type of a nation’s economic system determines whether or not changing

economic conditions will affect rates of violent crime.

METHODS

As a preliminary and admittedly modest test of this contextual hypoth-

esis, we have used a number of procedures to try to gauge the effect of

unemployment on national homicide rates. Data on homicide rates were

obtained from the Comparative Crime Data File (CCDF). These data have

just been published (Archer and Gartner, 1984) and provide offence rate

data for homicide and four other offences in 110 nations and 44 major

international cities for roughly the period 1900-1973. Previous applications

of these cross-national data have included studies of the effects of wars

(Archer and Gartner, 1976), urban violence (Archer, Gartner, Akert, and

Lockwood, 1977), and deterrence theory as it relates to capital punishment

(Archer, Gartner, and Beittel, 1983). Data on unemployment rates were

obtained using national yearbooks, statistical annuals, labor and manpower

statistics, and the United Nations Statistical Yearbook. Fhe overlap between

these two sources of data produced 16 cases for analysis, including two

separate cases (because two independent homicide indicators were available)

for the United States.

The relationship between unemployment rates and homicide rates can

be approached in several different ways. The procedures used in this analysis

involved the use of lagged correlations to search for any evidence that these

two variables are related. This procedure includes ‘forward” lags in which

the homicide rate in year n iSs compared with unemployment rates in years

Wç8

(n - 1) or (n - 2). For example, the (n - 1) lagged correlation would compare

the homicide rates in 1960 and 1961 with, respectively, the unemployment

rates in 1959 and 1960. This is a forward lag in that the hypothesized causal

sequence calls for unemployment changes to occur first and then lead to

homicide rate changes. This hypothesis seems plausible, and a number of

researchers have speculated that the effects of economic changes would in

fact occur after a year’s delay or more (Radzinowiez, 1971, p. 433).

As a control procedure, we included a “backward” lag in the analysis.

This correlation ran contrary to our hypothesis, and compared homicide

rates with subsequent unemployment rates. It seems unlikely that homicide

is sufficiently widespread to make a serious dent in the number of the

unemployed, and this ‘‘backward’”’ lag therefore serves as a control pro-

cedure. If the causal sequence is as hypothesized — that is, that changes in

unemployment affect homicide rates — then the magnitude of the forward

lagged correlations will be greater than the backward or control correlations.

Because most existing studies have used unlagged correlations — that is,

simultaneous comparisons of the two indicators — these were included as

well. In summary, the homicide rate in year n was correlated with the

unemployment rate in year: n (an unlagged correlation), n - 1 (a one-year

forward lag), n - 2 (a two-year forward lag) and n + 1 (a control, backward

lag) ( 2).

The results of these comparisons are shown in Table 1. The nations

with positive correlations in this table have a positive relationship between

the two variables — that is, homicide rates are high in times of high unem-

ployment. Conversely, nations with negative correlations in Table 1 have

relatively low homicide rates in times of high unemployment. These data

show that both outcomes occur, and the two groups of nations are listed

separately in Table |.

From a theoretical perspective, it is highly interesting that both

empirical outcomes are found in the cases in Table 1. These data indicate

that relationships among variables may not be invariant across different

societies and, in fact, even can reverse. This suggests that nation states

provide a powerful context that governs the nature of the economy<rime

relationship, even when the variables involved are nominally the same in the

societies examined. Based on the range of outcomes in Table 1, it seems

increasingly imperative for researchers to assess their hypotheses and models

using comparative evidence from a range of societies rather than one alone.

This perspective is, indeed, the premise for the growing interest in cross-

national research on crime and violence:

Without a reasonably large sample of nations, it is impossible to dis-

cover whether certain variables may mediate the effects of a social change.

For example, worsening unemployment might increase homicide rates in

one type of economic system but not in another. ÀÂs a result, individual case

- 259 —

TABLE 1

Unemployment and Homicide Rates: Zero-order Lagged Correlations

Positive Correiations

Homicide in year n |Homicide in year -

Homicide in year n

Country

with unemploy-

vith unemploy-

Same year

with unemploy-

Median

ment in year n - 2 | ment in year n - :

!

(unlagged)

ment inyear n +1l

-2

-

+1l

° ° ° . ° . À ° . ».

73

79

86

91

83

Switzerland (19)1

e ® à e » ° . .… . . . . . .

55

66

%

73

81

70

U.S.é (40

57

44

32

51

Italy (29)

62

48

47

51

48

U.S

(43)

47

44

47

Austria (20)

. . * . »À « . . e »* ° L .

59

48

46

38

Japan (31)

39

37

43

26

Germany (20)

. ° ° ° ° ° ° . .… À . °

49

40

32

23

36

Netherlands (26)

. » . ° . ° . . À . .

-.23

-.01

22

27

!

Ireland (34)

-.11

02

17

19

10

49

48

4<

32

Median

° ° » . . » . . ° ° ° . ° ° . °

Negative Correlations

Canada (36)

. . ° * . ° . . * . ° . .

-.07

-.05

04

-.01

° e » ° . . . ° e À ° ° .

12

19

:

>

-.37

-.05

Norway (30)

. . » L e À ° . . . . . À

-.33

-.25

20

-.14

Belgium (25)

-.53

-.33

1s

08

24

Australia (18)

. . . ° . . . . ° . . À

-.24

-.26

-.25

-.26

England (41)

. . ® . . . . .… À . . . À

-.27

-45

-.52

Denmark (35S)

-.58

-.53

-.49

-.53

-.58

Sweden (43)

. »À . ® ° * . »* . . ° . »

-.62

-.39

-.56

Median

° . - . À . . À . e Àe . * . . .

-.33

25

-.26

-.25

1 Number of years upon which correlation is based

2 Homicide

3 Murder

studies may appear (perhaps incorrectly) to contradict one another. Without

a large sample of societies, a general pattern that explains or orders these

different outcomes will never be seen. (Archer and Gartner, 1984, p. 6).

In addition to the general finding of two different types of outcomes in

Tables 1, these data suggest that the unemployment homicide relationship is

stronger in absolute terms for the first group of nations. In this group of

nations, unemployment is positively associated with homicide rates and the

absolute size of the relationships is larger. The effects of unemployment in

the second group of nations are negative and of smaller magnitude. This

indicates that the relationship between unemployment and homicide is not

uniform, and suggests that these nations are differentiated by one or more

contextual variables that mediate the effects of unemployment.

This finding implies the existence of differences between these two

groups of nations, although the nature of these differences remains specu-

lative. For a variety of reasons, unemployment may be less devasting for

citizens in the second group of nations in Table 1. On a purely impression-

istic basis, it does seem to be the case that nations in the second group more

‘“redistributive”’ economic systems and more extensive policies designed to

mitigate the effects of poverty and unemployment. In these societies, there-

fore, unemployment may prove to be less destructive in all respects, includ-

ing those factors that might otherwise increase the probability of violent

crime.

Nations in the first group, on the other hand, may have more vivid

inequalities, more extensive poverty, chronic unemployment, inadequate

benefits for the jobless, or other policies and conditions that exarcerbate the

effects of unemployment. If this is the case, unemployment may be more

devastating, materially and perhaps psychologically, in the first group of

nations in Table 1. In these societies, one suspects that loss of a job caries

with it, in addition to obvious short — term hardship, the spectre of perma-

nent loss of income in the context of minimal social services.

The lagged correlations in Table 1 provide a crude test of the degree to

which unemployment rates ‘‘lead”’ homicide rates, rather than the other

way around. In general, this analysis suggests that the unemployment-

homicide relationship is in the hypothesized direction. In the first group of

nations in Table 1, the forward correlations (in which homicide rates lag

behind unemployment rates) increase the size of the correlation. The

control or backward correlation (in which unemployment is lagged behind

homicide) decrease the size of the correlation. À similar though much less

strong pattern obtains for the second group of nations in the table. The

results of this analysis provide indirect support for the idea that the relation-

ship between unemployment and homicide includes causal elements rather

than correlation alone (3).

— 261 —

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

Although far from a definitive analysis of economic effects on crime,

this result illustrates an advantage of inulti-case comparative research. While

the reason for the differences in Table ! remains speculative, the existence

of these differences suggests that national characteristics can determine

whether or not an offence rate (Y) and its suspected cause (X) are related.

In many comparative research designs, therefore, a researcher may wish to

search both for general XY relationships and also for contextual differences.

In some societies, XY may be found to be both positive and strong; in

others, this relationship may be negative or absent.

This theoretical approach is, of course, less simplistic than the search

for universal patterns and invariant correlations. At the same time, this loss

in simplicity is hopefully offset by increased theoretical fidelity to the com-

plexities of a diverse world. As just a single example, it seems to us that the

very concept of ‘‘unemployment’’ may be culturally variable, and may not

have similar consequences (or even ‘‘mean” the same thing) in different

societies. For example, loss of a job seems certain to be devastating in any

society filled with stark inequality, grinding poverty, and chronic unemploy-

ment. Similarly, loss of a job may have particularly powerful psychological

costs in any society that places strong emphases on upward mobility and

material consumption. Finally, loss of a job may carry with it powerful

social stigma in any society emphasizing achievement and personal responsi-

bility for one’s economic circumstances. In any society in which one or

more of these contextual conditions obtain, one might expect a priori the

effects of unemployment to be unusually pathological.

It is not difficult, conversely, to imagine societies or social policies that

could rob job loss of a least some of its potential devastation. Societies or

policies that reduce inequality also reduce the economic distance the unem-

ployed individual fears to fall. Societies or policies that reduce chronic or

even multi-generational joblessness also reduce the unemployed person’s

concern that work and income will never be possible again. Societies or

policies that recognize collective responsibility for vanishing occupations,

economic transformations, and widespread joblessness also reduce the

personal stigma and subjective failure borne by the unemployed person.

In the present study, national differences appear to mediate the relation

ship between violence and the economy. In one group of nations, increased

unemployment is associated with increases in the violent crime of homicide.

In a second group of nations, however, the link between violence and the

economy is much more tenuous, and increased unemployment is not

paralleled by increases in violence. An impressionistic reading of this dif-

ference suggests that the key contextual variable reflects aspects of national

economic organization and, specifically, the degree to which a society’s

— 262 -

economic policies redistribute income, reduce inequality, and otherwise

mitigate the loss of jobs and income. The present study suggests the in-

triguing possibility that some societies escape the potentially violent effects

of unemployment by ameliorating the social and psychological costs of lost

jobs and income.

Much of this, of course, remains surmise at present. The current study

suggests merely that the effects of economic fluctuations on violent crime

are not invariant and, further, that cross-national evidence can help unravel

this apparent contradiction. In the present analysis, it appears to be the case

that societies with policies that mitigate the effects of job loss, inequality,

and poverty are less likely to experience increases in violence after increases

in unemployment. Further research is needed to examine the criminal

experiences of recently unemployed individuals, and the nature and effects

of ameliorative social policies.

— 263 —

NOTES

(1)

A number of these studies apply regression, econometric methods and

statistical techniques like spectral analysis to longitudinal crime data.

It should be noted that these methods require certain assumptions

and, as a result, the most appropriate statistical procedures remain a

matter of some disagreement (for example, Vigderhous, 1978).

It is clear that more complicated procedures can and should be used

to explore this relationship. For example, the correlations reported

here are all zero-order — that is, uncontrolled for third variables like

age structure. This analysis is also simplified in that the data are used

undetrended. An alternate approach, one we have not attempted,

involves detrending the two time series and then correlating the

residuals. Each of these approaches has merit and deserves further

attention.

(3)

It should be emphasized that some other methodological problems

are not eliminated by this comparison. This analysis does not elimin-

ate the effects of secular trends, periodicity, and other complicating

features of time series data. The use of lagged correlations does, how-

ever, provide some support for the hypothesized relationship between

unemployment and homicide. In addition, as already indicated,

relationships between aggregate indicators cannot eliminate the possi-

bility of an ecological fallacy. Even if unemployment rates precede

and are strongly related to homicide rates, it is conceivable that no

unemployed individuals commit a violent crime. This ecological

problem is insoluble with aggregate data but could be addressed with

individual-level data such as job history interviews with arrested

suspects.

REFERENCES

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ARCHER, D., GARTNER, and BEITTEL, M. Homcide and the death

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BALL-ROKEACH, S. Normative and deviant violence from a conflict per-

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— 265 —

ABSTRACT

Cross-national data are examined for possible relationships between

violent crime and economic fluctuations. Sixteen cases are examined from

a new archive of international data on homicide and four other offences for

110 nations and 44 major international cities for the period 1900-1972. A

simple contextual hypothesis is proposed: that a nation’s type of economic

system determines whether or not changing economic system determines

whether or not changing economic conditions will affect rates of violent

crime. Preliminary analyses provide support for this hypothesis and suggest

that the relationship between violence and the economy is not invariant

but is instead contingent on qualitative features of a nation’s economic

system. Specifically, nations with more redistributive economic systems and

policies designed to mitigate poverty and unemployment are less likely to

experience increases in violence when unemployment increases.

RÉSUMÉ

UNE HYPOTHESE MODESTE SUR L’INÉGALITÉ,

LE CHOMAGE ET LA CRIMINALITÉ

Les statistiques de nations diverses sont étudiées ici pour permettre

l’analyse des liens entre criminalité violente et variation économique. Nous

avons étudiés, sur une période allant de 1900 à 1972, 16 cas de meurtres

choisis dans les nouvelles archives internationales sur l’homicide et 4 autres

types de délits à travers 110 pays et 44 grandes villes du monde.

Une hypothèse simplement contextuelle est proposée: c’est le type

de système économique d’une nation qui détermine si les changements de

condition économique affecteront où pas le taux de criminalité violente. Les

premières analyses étayent cette hypothèse et suggèrent que la relation entre

violence et économie n’est pas invariable mais dépend au contraire des carac

téristiques qualitatives du système économique national considéré. Et en

particulier ce sont les nations qui ont un système économique plus redistri-

butif et des politiques axées sur la lutte contre le chômage et la pauvreté qui

sont le moins susceptibles de connaître une augmentation de la violence

lorsque leur taux de chômage croît.

— 266 —

IMPRIMERIE ADMINISTRATIVE DE MELUN

3124 -

1986