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 Annales internationales de criminologie, 24 ANNALES INTERNATIONALES DE CRIMINOLOGIE INTERNATIONAL ANNALS OF CRIMINOLOGY ANALES INTERNACIONALES DE CRIMINOLOGIA ANNÉE 1986 (volume 24 - n° | et 2) sÇ \ 33 GQN cu v C N 0/( //.) 4 z«… /æ/z e ./tW. ;\T 21 NOTE DE LA RÉDACTION Un certain nombre de modifications ont été décidées par le Comité Exécutif dans sa réunion du 30-31 mai 1986, s'agissant de la rédaction des Annales Internationales de Criminologie. A la suite de son élection au Secrétariat Général, M. Georges PICCA a demandé d'être déchargé des fonctions de rédacteur en chef. C'est notre ami Georges KELLENS secrétaire général adjoint, qui a bien voulu accepter d'assurer cette responsabilité. Qu'il en soit ici remercié. Il sera assisté de quatre rédacteurs associés, qui représentent quatre régions du monde dans lesquelles la Société est implantée. Nous espérons que cette restructuration du Comité de Ré- daction permettra aux Annales Internationales de Criminologie de prendre un nouvel essor en vue de favoriser la liaison entre nos membres et, de contribuer au développement scientifique de la criminologie. LETTRE DU PRÉSIDENT Après un an de présidence de la Société Internationale de Criminologie, depuis février 1985, je m'adresse à tous les membres de notre Société pour exprimer une série de sentiments, que je sens en moi-même, et qui vont d'une émotion profonde à un sen- timent de gratitude pour la confiance qu'on a démontré pour ma personne. J'exprime notamment un remerciement et un souvenir ami- cal au Président qui m'a précédé, le Professeur Denis Szabo de Montréal. Je suis profondément ému et honoré par cette désignation, comme Italien, comme médecin et comme criminologue. En tant qu'Italien, mes sentiments s'adressent avant tout en direction du passé, à l'origine de notre Société et à la grande fi- gure inoubliable de notre grand maître, Benigno Di Tullio, fon- dateur et Premier Président de la S.I.C. En tant que médecin, et notamment médecin légiste psychia- tre et criminologue, je constate que dans l'histoire de notre Socié- té cette présidence a été confiée à des criminologues qui repré- sentent l'interdisciplinarité de notre science (dans le domaine socio!og:que, juridique et clinique) et, pour ce qui concerne la médecine, à des figures illustres de la science médicale, telles que Benigno Di Tullio, Denis Carrol et Trevor Gibbens. Ces noms représentent pour moi un héritage inoubliable qui sera le guide de mon activité future. En tant que criminologue je suis orienté vers l'avenir, sui- vant une perspective interdisciplinaire qui est à l'origine de notre science ; jai toujours cultivée suivant les une perspective que enseignements fondamentaux des Présidents qui m'ont précédé. Je me rapporte particulièrement aux Présidents Thornsten Sellin, Jean Pinatel et Denis Szabo, trois symboles pour moi d'une « fra- ternité » « humaine » dans le domaine du interdisciplinaire et droit, de la sociologie et de la clinique. Je remercie de tout mon cœur, dans l'esprit d'une fraternité scientifique et humaniste, les Présidents Sellin, Pinatel et Szabo, avec la certitude qu'ils représentent et représenteront, par leur présence active parmi nous, un exemple à suivre pour bien opérer dans l'avenir au profit d'un développement efficace des activités de notre Société. Après un an de présidence je suis en mesure de vous présen- ter un bilan synthétique des activités de la S.IC. en 1985. Notre Société a participé officiellement en mars 85, au Col- loque Inter-Associations (avec les trois grandes associations sœurs A.ID.P., F.IP.P. et S.I.D.S.) tenu en Italie, à Saint-Vincent, sous l'égide de l'O.N.U., et dédié à l'étude des dimensions nouvelles de la criminalité et de la prévention du crime dans le contexte du développement. Au mois d'août 85, notre Société a participé au VII® Congrès des Nations Unies pour la Prévention du Crime et le traitement des Délinquants, tenu à Milan. Notre participation s'est concréti- sée soit au sein des réunions des O.N.G. qui se sont déroulées à cette occasion, telles que la réunion sur les « femmes victimes de la loi» avec la collaboration de M"* Barbara Price (John Jay introductif de M"" College of Criminal Justice) et un rapport L. Shahani, Secrétaire Général du Congrès ; soit dans le cadre spécifique de l'organisation d'une réunion Inter-Associations (A.I.- D.P., F.1P.P., S.IC., S.ID.S.), dédiée aux problèmes de la « protec- tion des victimes du crime ». Notre délégation officielle au Congrès était composée par moi-même, M"* C. Sommerhausen, M. U. Gatti (rapporteur), Mrs T. Bandini, P. Lejins, G. Picca, D. Szabo et M"* A. Marangopoulos. En septembre 85, un Cours international de criminologie a été organisé, sous l'égide de notre Société, à Belem (Brésil), dé- dié aux problèmes de la politique criminelle rapporteurs M J. Vérin, le président M. Ancel et le professeur De Figueiredo Dias. En septembre 85, notre Société a participé au Colloque Inter- national du 25° anniversaire de la fondation de Montréal. M. D. Szabo en tant que Président du Colloque, moi-même en tant que rapporteur et président d'un « panel », À. Reiss en tant que prêé- sident de la Commission Scientifiquç de notre Société. En octobre 85, nous avons organisé à l'Université Catholique d'Amérique à Washington, la 1" Conférence Aquinas de Crimi- nologie sur la responsabilité civique. J'ai présenté le rapport introductif, ensuite M. M. Novak a exposé son rapport fondamen- tal sur le sujet « Character and Crime an inquiry into the causes of the virtue of nations », suivi par un commentaire de M. Â. Reiss. Les actes de cette conférence internationale sont en cours de presse. Etaient présents pour notre Société le Père Mailloux et M. P. Lejins. En novembre 85, la S.I.C. a été représentée à Strasbourg, au- près du Conseil de l'Europe, au VII* Colloque Criminologique que j'ai organisé et présidé sur le sujet « Etudes sur la responsabilité pénale et le traitement des délinquants malades mentaux ». Plu- sieurs membres de notre Société étaient présents Mrs H. Kerner et Ferracuti en tant que rapporteurs. Enfin notre Société a été représentée, en novembre 85, au Sé- minaire International du 50° anniversaire de l'Ecole de Crimino- logie de l'Université de Bruxelles. Plusieurs membres de notre So- ciété étaient présents en tant que rapporteurs, M. D. Szabo était rapporteur de synthèse. La revue de notre Société, les Annales Internationales de Cri- minologie, a finalement normalisé le rythme de ses parutions sous l'impulsion de son rédacteur en chef M. G. Picca, par la publica- tion d'un volume double (1985) dédié aux Actes du Congrès Inter- national de Vienne. Les problèmes financiers soulevés par l'organisation de ce Congrès concernant les fonds que notre Société a dù avancer pour régler la dette de 5.000 Dollars à « Interconvention » de Vienne, ont été résorbés par une première contribution obtenue au printemps 85 et par une deuxième et définitive contribution en 86 qui nous permettra de rentrer dans nos fonds. Encore une fois notre Socié- té doit exprimer sa gratitude à M. H. Kerner, dont l'intervention u été décisive pour la ÿsolution de ce problème. Les travaux de nos deux Centres Internationaux, à Montréal et Gênes, sont actuellement comme dans le passé, dans une phase d'activité dynamique. Nos remerciements et nos félicitations s'a- dressent particulèrement aux chercheurs et aux Conseils de Direc- tion des Centres pour leur activité, notamment au Président du Centre International de Criminologie Clinique M. M. Colin et M. D. Szabo Président du CIC C. (Montréal). Au cours de l'année 85, une réurion spéciale a eu lieu à Paris pour la constitution de la nouvelle Commission Scientifique qui actuellement est présisi” ‘ par M le Professeur A Reiss de ‘’Univer- -n sité de Ya!l- Son v:. « urés Tent e=t € q. Kerner, M le Praifesseur sY r> * #. B ‘+ 11 À }> Sasert t4 4 So Les activités que nous avons réalisées au cours de l’année 85 sont le résultat d'une coopération fondamentale, dont j'ai bien apprécié l'efficacité, soit au sein de la Commission Scientifique. scit au sein du Conseil de Direction, par l'œuvre des quatre vice- présidents : Mrmes I. Anttila et L. Aniyar de Castro, MM. P. Lejins et Hall Williams, du tresorier M. Y. Roumajon. Un remerciement tout à fait particulier s'adresse au Secrétariat Général, à M. J. Vérin, et après sa démission au cours de l'anné 85 au nouveau Secrétaire Général élu M. G. Picca, dont la collaboration très efficace au ser- vice de la criminologie et de notre Société s'est manifestée et conti- nue de se manifester d'une façon magistrale et très fidèle. Sur la base de ces prémisses, et dans le cadre de cette collabo- ration remarquable, je vais continuer mon activité au service de la Société et de la criminologie mondiale, c'est-à-dire d'une crimi- nologie sans frontière, dans la perspective de réaliser une action finalisée à la formation de l'homme et au développement de sa personnalité. Giacomo Canepa Directeur de ('Institut de Médecine Légale de l'Université de Gênes Président de la S.I.C. LETTER FROM PRESIDENT | was elected as President of the International Society of Cri- minology one year ago, in february 1985, and presently ! would like to express to all the members of our Society my profound emo- tion and my gratitude for the confidence you have given to me. I would like to particularly thank the former President, Mr Denis Szabo from Montreal. | feel very touched and greatly honoured by this nomination, as an Îtalian, as a Medical Doctor and as a Criminologist. As an ÎItalian first, ! am thinking about the past of our Socie- ty and the great figure of our master Begnigno Di Tullio, founder and first President of the S.I.C. As a Medical Doctor, that means forensic psychiatrist and criminologist, I notice in the history of our Society that presiden- cy was granted to criminologists representing the multi-discipli- nary of our science (sociological, juridical and clinical fields) ; and, in the medical field, ! am thinking about great figures of medical science as Begnigno Di Tullio, Denis Carrol and Trevor Gibbens, names which represent for me an unforgettable heritage and guide my acts. As a criminologist, ! am in favour of an interdisciplinary view- point, according to the basic lessons from presidents who preceded me. l am particularly thinking about Presidents Thornsten Sellin Jean Pinatel and Denis Szabo, three symbols of an « interdiscipli- in and narity and human Dbrotherhood » juridical, sociological clinical fields. 1 thank from the heart, in a spirit of scientifical and humanis- tic brotherhood, Presidents Sellin, Pinatel and Szabo, and ! am certain they are and will be, their active presence among us, an example to follow in order to permit the effective development of our Society activities. Aîter a year of presidency, ! am able to submit to you a syn- thetic assessment of the activities of the Society during 1985. Our Society took an official part, in March 1985, in the Inter- Association Symposium (with the three Major Associations I.A.P.L. [.P.P.F., I.S.S.D.) held in Saint Vincent (Italy) under the United Nations aegis, and devoted to « the new aspects of criminality and crime prevention in the context of development ». In august 1985, our Society took part in the 7 th. United Na- tions Congress for Crime Prevention and Treatment of Offenders, held in Milan (Italy). More precisely we took part on the one hand in meetings of N.G.O. as the one about « women victims of law », with the collaboration of Mrs Barbara Price (John Jay College of Criminal Justice), and an introductory paper by Mrs Shahani General Secretary of the Congress then on the other hand in specific inter-association meetings (I.A.P.L., IP.P.F., IS.C., I.S.S.D.) devoted to « the protection of victims of crime ». Our official dele- gation was made up of myself, Mrs Colette Somerhausen, Mr Uberto Gatti (rapporteur), Mr Tullio Bandini, Mr Peter Lejins, Mrs Alice Marangopoulos, Mr Georges Picca and Mr Denis Szabo. In september 1985, our Society organized an International Course of Criminology in Belem (Brasil) devoted to problems of criminal policy. The recorders were Mr Verin, President Marc Ancel and Professor Figueiredo Dias. In september 1985, our Society took part in the International Symposium for the 25 th. Anniversary of the School of Criminology, University of Montreal : Mr Denis Szabo as Chairman of the Sym- posium, myself as recorder and Chairman of a « panel », and Mr Albert Reiss as Chairman of the Scientific Committee of our Society were present. In october 1985, we organized at the American Catholic Uni- versity, Washington (USA), the «First Aquinas International Conference in Criminology on Responsible Citizenship ». I presen- ted the introductory paper, then Mr Michael Novak expounded his report about « Character and crime an inquiry into the cau- ses of the virtue of nations », followed by Mr Albert Reisss com- mentary. The proceedings of this conference are in the process of publication. Also Father Noël Mailloux and Mr Peter Lejins, emi- nent members of our Society, took part in the Conference. In november 1985, the Society was represented to Council of Europe in Strasbourg (France) for the 7 th. Symposium in Crimi- nology organized and chaired by myseif, about « Studies on penal responsibility and treatment for the psychopatic offenders ». Several U 45 members of our Society took part in it. iMr Hans Kerner Franco Ferracuti as recorders. At last, our Society took part in the International Seminar for the Jubelee of the School of Criminology, University of Brux- elles (Belgium) in november 1985. Several members of our Society partcipated in it and Mr Denis Szabo was in charge of final sum- mary report. The review of the Society, ie. the International Annals of Criminology, has at last regulated the rate of its publication through the impetus given by Mr Georges Picca, Chief Editor, by the publication of a special double-issue (1985), devoted to the proceedings of the International Congress of Vienna. The financial problems brought up by the organization of this Congress, relating to the debt of 5.000 settled up by the Society to « Inter-convention » of Vienna, were solved by two grants, the first one in Spring of 1985 then in 1986. One more time the Society has to express its thanks to Mr Kerner whose intercession was decisive to solve this problem. The works of our two International Centers, in Montreal (Ca- nada) and Genoa (Italy) are, as usual, particularly dynamic. We especially thank researchers and Boards of Directors for their activities, and in particular, Mr Denis Szabo, President of the Inter- national Center for Comparative Criminology and M. Marcel COLIN Président of the International Center for Clinical Criminology. During 1985, a special meeting held in Paris for constituting the new Scientific Committee, actually composed of Professor Albert from the University of Yale as President, Mr Hans Kerner as Vice President and Mr Pierre-Henri Bolle as Executive Secretary. All these activities carried out during 1985 are the result of a fundamental cooperation, of which I have appreciated the effi- ciency, both of the Scientific Committee, and of the Board of Direc- Mrs Inkeri tors, through the works of the four Vice presidents Anttila, Mrs Lolita Aniyar de Castro, Mr Peter Lejins, Mr John Eryl Hall Williams, and of Mr Yves Roumajon, Treasurer. 1 have to express a special thank to former General Secretary Jacques Verin who resigned in 1985, and to the new one Mr Georges Picca, whose precious collaboration on criminology and to our Society never ceased being effective. On the basic of these premises and in the scope of this remar- kable cooperation, ! am going to continue my work to serve our Society and world criminology, that means a criminology without two borders, from the global viewpoint of the education of man and the development of his personality. ANNALES INTERNATIONALES DE CRIMINOLOGIE organe officiel de la Société Internationale de Criminologie Président : M. Giacomo CANEPA (Italie) Secrétaire général : M. Georges PICCA (France) COMITÉ DE RÉDACTION DES ANNALES Président : M. Albert J.R. REISS Jr. (U.S.A.) Président de la Commission Scientifique Secrétaire : M. Pierre-Henri BOLLE (Suisse) Secrétgire de la Commission Scientifique Rédacteur en chef : M. Georges KELLENS (Belgique) Rédacteurs associés Mmes Lolita ANIYAR DE CASTRO (Amérique Latine), Louise SHELLEY (Amé rique du Nord), MM. Alphonse BONI| (Afrique), HIRANO (Asie). ÉDITORIAL Ce numéro des ANNALES INTERNATIONALES DE CRIMINOLOGIE est entièrement consacré aux relations pouvant exister entre le développement économique et la criminalité. S'il ne s'agit pas d’un thème nouveau, il se trou- vera néanmoins enrichi par les diverses contributions réunies dans cette publi- cation. C’est à notre Collèque et amie Louise SHELLEY, Associate professor à l’'Américan University de Washington (U.S.A.), que revient le mérite d'avoir rassemblé les différentes études que nous publions aujourd'hui et, d'en avoir assuré la présentation. Nous l’en remercions vivement. Ainsi qu'on pourra en juger, le thème général qui sert de fil conducteur à ce numéro des ANNALES a été traité suivant des approches variées. En outre, si dans leur grande majorité les contributions retenues sont de langue anglaise, leurs auteurs viennent d’horizons différents. Afin de faciliter la lec- ture des articles, ceux-ci ont été suivis d'’un bref résumé en français et en anglais, ainsi que nous nous proposions de le faire dans les précédents numéros du bulletin. * * * Comme le souligne Louise SHELLEY, dans sa présentation, si le dévelop- pement économique a des incidences certaines sur la criminalité, les traditions culturelles et politiques n'’en conservent pas moins un rôle important dans l'explication des formes nouvelles de délinquance. À cet égard, les recherches de Yves BRILLON, sur la situation en Afrique, et le témoignage de Luis SALAS sur une société en mutation profonde comme CUBA, sont exemplaires. Le développement économique, ou le changement politique ont certes contri- bué à transformer le droit, mais aussi, parfois à réduire l'importance de formes traditionnelles de contrôle social, plus efficaces que celles qui s'‘y sont substi- tuées. Martin KILLIAS analyse, pour sa part, plus particulièrement, au plan méthodologique, le rôle de diverses variables structurelles, tant sur la crimina- lité que sur les procédures de répression. Gary LA FREE et Edward KICK ont également situé leur démarche dans une perspective évaluative. Quant à Théodor N. FERDINAND, S. MUKHERJEE, Dane ARCHER, Rosemary GARTNER et Clayton HARTJEN, ils nous présentent des études plus loca- lisées mais, qui n’en offrent pas moins autant d'illustrations au thème général. C'est en revanche un aspect particulier, celui de la criminalité féminine dans ses relations avec le contexte économique et social, qui est traité, d’une part, dans l’article de Maria LOS et, d'autre part, dans celui de Cathy SPATZ et Abigail STEWART. Enfin Slavomir REDO souligne dans sa contribution l'intérêt des analyses transnationales que permettent, notamment dans le domaine considéré, les réseaux de correspondants de l’Organisation des Nations Unies. # * * Les ANNALES INTERNATIONALES DE CRIMINOLOGIE remercient tous ceux qui ont, par leur contribution, permis la réalisation de ce numéro et souhaitent que celui-ci suscite auprès des lecteurs l’intérêt espéré. Georges PICCA TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE DES MATIERES Introduction: Crime and Modernization Reexamined Louise e e —- —s » e e »e & e . » . e e e . À e . . e Shelley, American University Les Incidences du développement sur la criminalité Africaine . e e —. e =. e < +e +e ® —. +e =e e . À 23 Yves Brillon, Université de Montreal Crime and Development: Some Observations on Women and 39 Children in India Clayton A. Hartjen, Rutgers University . . . Crime in Post-Revolutionary Cuba Luis Salas, Florida Inter- 83 national University A Brief History of Juvenile Delinquency in Boston and a Comparative Interpretation Theodore N. Ferdinand, Northeastern University . e e « —e. e e e e = ® e e e » e e . À e . e e e » 59 Social Change and Female Crime Under Communism: A Study of the USSR and Poland Mario Los, University of Ottawa . . « e - . - À ° . . . . À . e ». Àe . À. . À . . . À e . »s e +e e . e =* — 111 Female Criminality and the Status of Women Cathy Spatz Widom, Indiana University and Abigail Stewart, Boston University - . —+e. +e %* e e =c =e = % . e À . © - . . À . - e e e e . . À . . À . À 137 The United Nations Crime Trend Surveys: Comparative Criminology in the Global Context Slawomir Redo, United Nations ° . - À . . À . . À . . À . « e e e . . e e © e .… À e e . . À . . À . À. 163 Power Concentfation, Legitimation Crisis and Penal Severity : A Comparative Perspective Martin Killias, Université de Lausanne ° . À . . . À . . . - . . À . . À . . À C . . . - . - . . … . … « e 181 10 Cross-National Effects of Developmental, Distributional and Demographic Variables on Crime: A Review and Analysis Gary La Free, University of New Mexico and Edward Kick, University of Utah . . . . . . . À . . . . . - e . . . À ° . e - . . . - À 213 11l Economic Development and Crime: À Case of Burglary 237 S. Mukherjee, Australian Institute of Criminology 12 Violence and Economy' À Modest Hypothesis on Inequality, Unemplcymert an* <mc ane AÆirker, University of ‘ alifc.r'a-Sane Ci r “ Jsétidfy Gartrer … vers ty o! VISCOOSiaI . . . . . Q . . .- . 255 CRIME AND MODERNIZATION REEXAMINED* Louise I. Shelley** RÉSUMÉ Cet essai introductif conclut à l’existence de relations d’interdépen- dance complexes entre le processus de développement économique et la cri- minalité. Après examen des effets du développement dans les états socia- listes, notamment sur la population délinquante et sur les modes de répres- sion du crime, il apparaît que l’influence de l’industrialisation et de l’urbani- sation sur la criminalité n’est pas identique pour toutes les sociétés. Bien que pour beaucoup d’entre elles, industrialisation et urbanisation aient été à l’origine de profonds changements dans la typologie de la criminalité, comme le démontre «Crime et Modernization », les traditions historiques, culturelles et politiques gardent une place importante dans l’explication de ces nouvelles structures criminelles. D’ailleurs certaines recherches démon- trent que les modifications sociales ponctuelles peuvent être plus précieuses pour expliquer l’étiologie du crime que ne l’est le processus global du déve- loppement. Cependant, saisir l’impact des grandes forces socio-économiques sur le crime est d’une importance cruciale pour comprendre l’évolution de la criminalité depuis deux siècles. SUMMARY This introductory essay concludes that a complex relationship exists between the process of economic development and crime. After examining the effect of development on developing and socialist societies, offender populations and the punitive response to crime, it is apparent that indus- trialization and urbanization have no consistent effect on crime across all societies. While industrialization and urbanization have resulted in import- ant changes in crime patterns in many societies, as Crime and Modernization suggested, historical, cultural and political traditions are still of great im- portance in explaining observed crime patterns. Furthermore, certain research suggests that more limited societal changes may be more valuable in explaining crime causation than the overall process of development. But the understanding of the impact of larger social developments on crime is of critical importance to our understanding of the evolution of crime in the past two hundred years. * The Research for this article was done white the author was on a John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Fellowship. ** Associate Professor Schools of Justice and International Service American University. _7 - INTRODUCTION Criminological theory originated in nineteenth century Europe. Major scholars, like Marx and Durkheim, theorized why crime had become an increasingly pervasive phenomenon in society. From divergent perspectives they considered the impact of economic conditions and social structure on crime. But as criminological theorizing shifted to the United States in the twentieth century, a new more pragmatic focus developed. In a departure from its historical roots — criminologists focused on the interaction of individuals and social groups to explain the etiology of crime. Criminology in the past fifty years has been dominated by such indi- vidualistic and group theories as anomie, differential association and culture conflict. But there has been a growing dissatisfaction with the limited explanatory power of these theories. Consequently, a new research trend is emerging. Many scholars, like those included in this volume, are returning to the major questions posed by the nineteenth century criminological theoreticians, exploring the relationship between larger social and economic forces and crime. Contemporary researchers on crime and development assume divergent approaches. While adherents of the conflict. My thanks to Christopher Birkbeck, James Hackler, Gary LaFree and Rita Simon for their helpful comments on this essay. Perspective focus primarily on the relationship between crime patterns and economic structure, other scholars choose to emphasize a combination of economic and social variables in their crimino- logical analysis. Domestic crime patterns shaped the formulation of individual and group crime theories. But to study the impact of social and economic forces on crime, scholars must abandon their ethnocentric biases and develop research that is implicitly or explicitly comparative. Consequently, much recent criminological research addressing major theoretical questions, as exemplified by the volume’s essays, uses crime data from several countries. These scholars are returning to a research tradition established by nine- teenth century European scholars. The research style of contemporary scholars may mask inherent simi- larities with their nineteenth century predecessors. Whereas criminological analyses then were primarily qualitative, incorporating only some illustrative statistics, contemporary social science research has become more method- ologically sophisticated. Theoretical questions are now often addressed using advanced quantitative methods and field research techniques, as illustrated by many of the essays included in this collection. But while the increasing complexity of the research methods may at times overshadow the theoretical implications, these new analytical tools help clarify the complex relationship between economic development, social conditions and crimi- nality. -_-8— The contributors to this collection have not avoided the difficult questions posed by criminology. They have used all available research tools to address the relationship between crime, the developmental process and other social and economic forces which might influence crime commission. Using diverse analytical techniques and analyzing crime patterns on all continents, they reach divergent conclusions. There is no apparent consen- sus as to the relative importance of industrialization, urbanization, social and political structure in determining national and international crime patterns. Indigenous historical, cultural and social factors are deemed very influential. The absence of unifying trends challenges the analysis of Crime and Modernization (1981) in which I suggested that the forces of industri- alization and urbanization were the major explanatory forces of the trans- formation of criminality in the past two hundred years. This essay, using the volume’s articles as illustrative material, allows me to reexamine the book’s analysis and address some of its weaknesses. Crime and Modernization (1981) synthesized numerous national and comparative studies addressing the relationship among industrialization, urbanization and crime. Taking a historical perspective, the book analyzed crime patterns in undeveloped capitalist countries, in developed capitalist societies and in socialist societies. The same units of analysis used by most of the research studies included in this collection. Examining the changes in crime rates, commission patterns and offender populations in these diver- gent nations, it ascertained whether there were any common trends in crimi- nality across nations since the onset of the industrial revolution. The book’s principle conclusion is that there is nothing haphazard about observed crime patterns, they are a logical response to changing social conditions. Furthermore, the nineteenth century developmental process established a model for the future relationship between crime and develop- ment followed first by the developing countries. Moreover, it concluded that the course of economic development selected by a nation affects its crime patterns. While socialist countries have different crimes and a distinct geographical distribution of offenses, the impact of the form of societal development followed is subordinate to the general forces of socio-econ- omic development. Ît also concluded that industrialization and urbanization alter fundamentally the relationship between property and violent crime. They also change the nature of the offender population causing more women and juveniles to be perpetrators. Furthermore, in most societies the punitive response to the crime problem has been generally ineffective in controlling crime. The essays of this volume pinpoint several areas of weakness in Crime and Modernization (1981) by illustrating the complexity of the relationship between economic development and crime. First, they indicate that devel- oping countries are not now following the criminal evolutionary model established by the industrializing nations in the nineteenth century. Second, -_9_ the impact of socialism may not be as strong in the developing nations as in the countries already partially industrialized. Furthermore, the impact of socialism may not be subordinated to socioeconomic development but rather to hisorical and cultural traditions. Third, changes in commission patterns for violent and property offences are not explained solely by the processes of urbanization and industrialization. Fourth, development has not had a consistent impact on the offender population in all societies. Lastly, the societal response to crime is affected not only by a society’s resources and level of development but also by its historical and legal traditions. The rest of the essay will analyse the five previously mentioned areas of inquiry that challenge and expand the findings of Crime and Modernization (1981). The authors’ divergent views help expand our understanding of the relationship between larger socioeconomic forces and crime. CRIME AND DEVELOPMENT IN DEVELOPING NATIONS In many third world nations the relationship between development and crime is currently a heated question as these countries try to avoid the high crime rates that have accompanied industrialization and urbanization in other societies. As they search for desired developmental models, many question whether existing criminological theory is applicable to the Latin American, African or Asian experience. (Birkbeck, forthcoming; Clinard, 1983; Cohen, 1982; Sumner, 1982). While many scholars assert that devel- oping countries are not replicating the patterns established in a previous century (Sumner, 1982; Zaffaroni, 1982), neither can they generalize with certainly about the impact of economic development on crime in a particu- lar region. In nineteeth century Europe, rising crime rates were one of the greatest costs of industrialization and urbanization (Blackwelder, 1984:335). But in the twentieth century, crime rates while alarming, are not necessarily the most threatening problem faced by many of the developing nations. Ques- tions of personal survival and political strife often overshadow the concern for crime. In many African countries faced with famine and political insta- bility, the evolution of the crime problem is a minor concern. Moreover, in many other industrializing nations, the crimes of individual citizens rep- resent only a small share of total crime commission. The state is often responsible for more violent acts against individtal citizens than the ordi- nary criminal (Archer and Gartner, 1984:15-16) as numerous assaults against the citizenry are carried out by death squads or the nation’s security police ensuring compliance and submission to the established political and econ- omic order. À paucity of research, available statistics and the politicization of crime hinders and understanding of the extent and nature of the crime problem in many developing nations. For this reason the case studies included here of — 10 — crime in Black Africa, India and Cuba are important because they illustrate the diverse relationship between crime and development on the three devel- oping continents. While the authors all suggest that the nature of the crime problem has changed recently in the region studied, the extent and reasons for the change vary. In India, Hartjen found little change in crime rates and the offender population as the traditional way of life, particularly in rural areas, has been preserved. Salas indicates that it is the advent of socialism rather than the process of economic development that has led to the trans- formation in criminality. Only Brillon suggests that the breakdown in traditional society and the developmental process have been responsible for the exacerbation of the crime problem. AIl the authors emphasize that strong cultural, historical and political forces determine and individualize the character of crime in these diverse societies. Many developing countries have neither modernized, industrialized nor urbanized. Brillon points cout that African development has not led to large scale urbanization as a greater proportion of the African population still resides in rural areas than on other continents. In Latin America, urban- ization has proceeded rapidly but there has not been massive industrial- ization and urbanization proceeding simultaneously. Development has very different meanings on these diverse continents. Nineteenth century European industrialization and urbanization led to such tangible signs of modernization as increased educational levels, im- proved medical care and a higher standard of living. But while life expect- ancy has increased in many developing countries, other signs of modern- ization are absent. Furthermore, there is little likelihood that the developing nations will ever achieve the standards of the now developed nations as the technological and economic gap between the industrializing and industrial- ized nations widens annually. Moreover, the highly stratified political and economic structures of many developing nations ensures that many indi- viduals will continue to live an extremely precarious existence. The tensions of daily life and day to day survival take their toll on individuals. For some. crime becomes an outlet or even a solution to the problems of their daily existence. Crime is a viable alternative for the many individuals who lack any means of financial support. But financial necessity is not always the primary explanation for crime commission. As Brillon points out, the breakdown of traditional African society has left a vacuum in many lives leading to increasingly frequent crime commission. This fate is shared by many other developing societies where the traditional way of life has been disrupted without the substitution of the social benefits of developed society. But Hartjen suggests that in India where village life has frequently been preserved, the surrounding development has not had criminogenic consequences for many members of society. Many historians of eighteenth and nineteenth century crime have confined their analysis to continental Europe. Though most of these _ 11 — countries had colonies, little scholarly attention has been paid to the inter- action of the more developed European nations with their colonies. The colonies were discussed primarily as repositories for the criminals exiled from England and France. But contemporary scholars can not study the crime patterns of either the developed or developing nations in isolation. The increasing interdependence of the world and the large scale population migrations force consideration of the impact of the developing and indus- trialized nations on each other. The three cases studies published here are of developing nations and regions which have all spent years under colonial rule. For some nations the legacy of the colonial period is of paramount importance in explaining contemporary crime problems. For colonialism, carried out by both capi- talist and socialist countries, may result in the destruction of indigneous cultures. As Brillon suggests, the destruction of African tribal life as a consequence of years of colonial rule is a major explanation for the growth of contemporary African crime. But in other nations post-colonial political and economic developments have more explanatory value. Many of the developments, however, link the developing nations with those of the indus- trialing world. New found wealth has disrupted the established way of life in many developing countries, often leading to increased crime. The discovery and exportation of oil as well as the development of international drug trade have led to suddenly increased wealth. But unlike oil money, the proceeds of drug trade are often received by individuals rather than by the state. International drug trade, often itself illegal, is also criminogenic. As the growth of organized crime and increased judicial corruption have resulted in many developing countries. Many developing countries have been enriched by oil and drug traffic, but other governments have incurred large economic debts to the developed nations. These debts, particularly in Latin America, have profoundly affec- ted these societies. The increased financial hardship, particularly of mem- bers of the lower socio-economic classes, has aggravated the already existing crime problem. Even socialist Cuba is not economically independent. While it has escaped economic indebtedness to the capitalist industrialized nations, Luis Salas points out that it relies on extensive foreign aid from the Soviet Union. Developing countries today lack the financial autonomy known to the first industrializing nations. The diverse social, economic and political conditions of the developing countries ensure diverse crime problems but a common inability among many to cope with increased crime. Crime rates have risen in most of the developing world, but some societies have suffered extremely precipitous growth whereas others have experienced more moderate increases. The —12— African and Indian studies included here provide contrasting examples. In some countries recorded rates for property crime have escalated dramati- cally while in others, violence is more prominent (Gurr, 1980; Radzinowicz and King, 1977). In still others, rates of violent crime are severely under- reported as much violence is legitimated by the repressive political structure. But in many societies, crime often has a consistent and unfortunate impact. It is a major destabilizing force in society. Whole total crime rates may be lower in the developing nations thanin the industrialized countries (United Nations, 1977), the effect of the crime problem may be greater because the societies are ill-equipped to deal with the costs of crime. As the social services needed by members of society are often either unaffordable, inaccessible or poorly distributed. Furthermore, the corrupt and inefficient law enforcement and judicial agencies are often incapable of dealing with an increasingly complex crime problem. Hartjen and Salas provide contrasting examples of societal crime control. In India, adherence to the traditional way of life provides a bulwark against increasing crime rates. While Salas details the interventionist policy followed in socialist Cuba. There increasing social control over all aspects of personal life lessens the opportunity for crime commission. As these two studies suggest, the possibility of crime commission can be reduced if social control is achieved either through community means or state intervention. CRIME AND SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT Crime and Modernization indicated that the ideological expectation that crime would wither away under socialism has not been fulfilled. The advent of socialism has not led to the elimination of criminality. Instead, development in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union has led to many of the same crime patterns observed in the developed capitalist societies. In both types of societies increased rates of property crime, a reduction of violent crimes relative to those committed against property, and an increase in criminality among juveniles and females has been observed. Despite these apparent similarities between crime patterns in both socialist and capitalist societies, it should not be suggested that the two diverse forms of development have produced the same crime patterns. Great differences prevail in the crime rates, forms of crime committed and the geographical distribution of crime in developed socialist and capitalist societies. The observed differences in crime patterns in the economically diverse societies is explained both by the advent of a socialist economy as well as by the level of social control necessitated by a centralized planned economy. The most direct impact of the socialization of the means of production has been the creation and elimination of certain categories of crime. Most — 13 _ pronounced of these new offenses are those concerning the prohibition of capitalist activity. The advent of socialism has shaped more than the definition of crime. Controls over population movement have affected the process of urban- ization and the internal distribution of criminality. Many major cities in the USSR and Eastern Europe, favored by demographic policies that authorize the expulsion of serious offenders and the restricted entry of youthful males, have lower rates of criminality than secondary cities which have no control over their populations (Shelley, 1980). Furthermore, by means of ideological exhortation and coercion, socialist authorities have been able to closely involve the ordinary citizen in crime control at the workplace, the place of residence and as auxiliaries to law enforcement authorities. Not all social and economic planning have helped reduce crime rates. While extensive measures of population control have helped suppress levels of generally recognized forms of crime commission, the failures of the central planning process have led to the growth of certain categories of economic crime. Shortages have led to a large illicit market in needed goods and services (Grossman, 1977). The state “ndividual is often KOe … 1s steal socia. * the victim of property crimes «- rty because they can not acquire r A “ ,ds segally. Los and sa scribe the 1 pervasiveness c° ‘ -n in both the industrially develar À nations of Polan” 7 hie ceveloping Cuba. tocuses on th: involvement of the Polish and Soviet female pon: ! economic «rimes. The significant participation of women in ‘ner sector cf the economy where much theft of socialist property . -x3, ensures that many women are deliberately or inadvertently drawn . O crime. Ît is hardly then surprising that women formerly employed in cv es account for half of the female population. Female offenders are irequently prosecuted not only because theft from stores is easily detected but because most women lack the immunity from prosecution often pro- vided well placed males by their Party membership. Again it is shown that the dynamics of the socialist system differentiate the crime patterns of socialist and capitalist societies. While women are responsible for approxi- mately the same proportion of total offenses as in other developed nations, women in Poland and the USSR are convicted primarily for private entrepreneurial activity and theft of state goods while in capitalist societies female property crimes are directed against individuals. Los’ essay affirms the conclusions of Crime and Modernization, sug- gesting that socialism has a strong and consistent impact on the develop- ment of crime patterns in diverse nations. In the Polish and Soviet cases she describes, the structure of the economic system is decisive in determining much of female criminality. Historical, cultural and religious differences are _ 14 _ subordinated to the overwhelming impact of socialism and the requirements of a planned economy. Salas, after examining the crime patterns of socialist Cuba, concludes that while the advent of socialism has had a profound impact on the defi- nition and prosecution of crime, strong historical and cultural traditions continue to influence the dynamics of Cuban criminality. He asserts that Cuba shares some of the distinctive criminal characteristics of the devel- oping countries of Latin America while maintaining many similarities with the socialist countries of Fastern Europe and the USSR. Los’ essay and Crime and Modernization concur that when socialism is introduced in societies already partially or fully industrialized, centrally planned develop- ment is a greater determinant of the nature of crime patterns than national or cultural differences. But Salas goes beyond the analysis of developed socialist societies, exploring the relationship between socialism, the develop- ment process and crime in Cuba. Sala’s work in Cuba raises interesting questions for the future analysis of the relationship between crime and development in now industrializing socialist countries. His work implies that the impact of socialism may be less pronounced in a developing socialist country than in nations that have already industrialized. For if socialism is not the primary determinan of crime patterns in Cuba, one of the few developing countries to have been consistently socialist for twenty years, then the impact of the socialist system on criminality may be even less pronounced in some Asian societies which have only recently become socialist or in some African societies which fluctuate between socialism and other governmental systems. Scholars studying civil law in developing socialist societies have reached similar conclusions. They have found that indigenous historical and cultural tra- ditions may shape the nature and enforcement of civil law as much as the advent of socialism (Crespi Reghizzi, 1984; Ginsburgs, 1984). But little research has examined the relationship of criminal law to criminality in developing socialist nations (Sumner, 1982). Clearly, Salas has indicated an important direction for future criminological research. DEVELOPMENT AND THE OFFENDER POPULATION The diverse studies included here, analysing the relationship between the developmental process and offender populations reach no definitive conclusions. But this is consistent with the analyses of the previous sections. For a complex relationship exists between the processes of indutrialization, urbanization and crime. While Crime and Modernization suggested that societal development results in increased female and juvenile participation in crime, this volume’s essays suggest that it is the form rather than the frequency of participation which as changed. In many of the countries studied, women and youth while not committing more crime, are per- petrating more varied and more serious offences. — 15 — AIl the studies concur that offender patterns are affected not only by development but also by the political, social and cultural structure of society. In some societies, particularly the industrialized nations, there has been a significant increase in the female and juvenile contribution to crime commission (Simon, 1976). But this change has not been observed through- out the world, particularly in many developing countries. There the pro- portional contribution of women and youths to total criminality remains small though often it has increased from insignificant levels. Restraining the criminal involvement of the two groups are the endurance of traditional social controls as well as restricted opportunities to commit offenses. the Indian cases examined by Hartjen (1984) provides evidence that the con- tinuation of established village life may restrict female and youthful involve- ment in crime. Even though India has urbanized, no major changes have been observed in the age and sex of the urban offender population. Indian criminals are now, as in the past, almost always adult male offenders. Crime rates may not be the best measure of the impact of development. Ferdinand, Widom and Los all cite noticeable changes in offender patterns that they ascribe, in part, to the developmental process. Ferdinand, while concurring that juveniles are responsible for only a negligible share of total crime commission in some developing countries, believes that the telling effect of industrialization is a dramatic change in the character of urban delinquency. Originally, youths were responsible for relatively minor offenses. But as urban communities attempt to control their behavior, delinquent youths respond scornfully and their behavior becomes more threatening to the community. Ferdinand contends that a common evol- utionary pattern exists. Juvenile delinquency progresses through three stages — wayward, incorrigible and contracultural — as society becomes increasingly industrialized. While Ferdinand’s thesis needs more testing, it suggests that since development does not necessarily have a consistent effect throughout a society, very different juvenile commission patterns can coexist in the urban and rural areas of a single country. While youth crime may threaten the urban community, tratitional social controls may diminish its impact in village society. The studies on female crime concur that development has no consistent effect on women’s rates of criminality. Development in some societies may affect female crime patterns. But in other countries the social, political and biological changes that accompany the developmental process have pro- foundly influenced the types of female crime commission. In India, Hartjen reports no significant increase in female criminality has occurred despite increasing urbanization and industrialization. When the traditional way of life endures, the motivation as well as the opportunity for much female crime commission is diminished. But when women do have greater chances — 16 — to commit crime, female crime rates often rise in new areas of crime com- mission. But often the increase is confined to only limited crime categories. Focusing on socialist Poland and the USSR, Los concludes that in these societies the increase in female crime is confined primarily to economic offenses against the state. Increased female involvement in the labor force mandated by the socialist development process provides only a partial explanation for this growth. Rather pervasive shortages resulting from deficiencies in the central planning process, make those with access to needed goods particularly vulnerable to criminal involvement. Neither development nor the socialist system separately explain the growth in female participation in economic crime. Instead the observed growth is a result of the complex interaction of the developmental process and existing social and political conditions. Widom reaches a similar conclusion after examining a large body of quantitative data from 43 developing and industrialized nations around the world. Increases in female crime are confined to only a limited number of offenses. Growth in these categories is explained not by increased female involvement in the labor force, a primary measure of development but rather by the social, political and reproductive changes that acompany the developmental process. But these changes in female status do not have consistent effects; some produce increases in certain categories of crime commission while reducing criminality in others. While Widom’s results require further testing with additional years of data, they provide a provocative conclusion. Specific political, social and biological changes accompanying development may explain more about the dynamics of criminality than the overall process of development. Further support for this idea is provided by other contributors to this volume whose works will be discussed in a later section. DEVELOPMENT AND THE RESPONSE TO CRIME The preceding discussion of crime patterns in developing and socialist nations and of criminal offenders suggests that few generalizations can be made about the relationship between crime and development. When the development process does have explanatory value, its impact must be con- sidered in conjunction with domestic, political, social and economic con- ditions. If such a tenuous link is drawn between the dynamics of criminality and development, can anything more concrete be said about the relationship between development and the way society treats its criminals? For while crime is usually an individual act, the punitive response to crime is a collec- tive act that refiects the historical, cultural and religious traditions of a society. -_17 — Killias suggests that a relationship exists between societal development and punishment challenging other research (Carranza, 1983) suggesting that legal heritage has more explanatory value. Supporting Foucault’s assertion (1977) that the emregence of the prison coincided with the development of industrialized society, Killias concludes that developed nations which can afford to maintain a prisoner population apply less physicl punishments than developing nations. Killias, like the other contributors to this volume however, concludes that development alone does not provide a complete explanations. Whereas overall trends in punishment may be explained by larger social and economic forces, domestic political affairs and periodic crises influence the punitive response. While the financial resources of a society help determine the punishments selected, crises of domestic political authority lead to noticeably increased incarceration rates. CRIME AND DEVELOPMENT : ALTERNATIVE DIRECTIONS The contributors to this collection have studied crime patterns in many diverse nations. Their conclusions suggest that Crime and Modernization overemphasized the impact of industrialization and urbanization on crime. While these two major social and economic forces influenced crime signifi- cantly, these studies suggest that other social, economic and political con- ditions may explain more about the evolution of crime rates. But how can one find more satisfactory explanations with the paucity of research data necessary for the testing of research hypotheses? The analysis of international crime data is extremely problematic (Vigderhous, 1978). Differences of legal definitions, lack of sophistication of personnel charged with collecting and assembling data, and the pol- iticization of the crime problem compound the problems of using inter- national data (Archer and Gartner, 1984:29). But several of the contributors discuss data bases that may partially overcome some of the enumerated obstacles to comparative research. Redo suggests that the United Nations, by means of increasingly sophis- ticated surveys, is collecting data that should make it possible to probe more fully the relationship between development, social forces and crime. But as Archer and Gartner (1984:20) have pointed out the results of these surveys are unavailable to individual scholars who may choose to test their own hypotheses about crime causation. They, therefore, developed their own historical data archive assembling criminal statistics on several major of- fences and 110 nations and 44 major international cities. These data are used by Archer and Gartner and LaFree and Kick in testing alternative explanations for the dynamics of criminality. Archer and Gartner examine the relationship between unemployment and rates of violence. They find that different homicide rates are observed — 18 — in countries with diverse social policies. Countries with more redistributive policies that shelter their citizens from some of the more disorienting effects of unemployment, may reduce the upward swings in violence that often accompany increasing unemployment rates. According to this hy- pothesis, social policies may affect rates of violence. But the adoption of redistributive measures is only possible in more economically developed societies that possess both the financial resources and trained personnel necessary to administer such programs. Thus while the process of economic development is linked to cycles of violence, social welfare policies that accompany development may be of greater explanatory value. Further testing of this hypothesis, particularly in relation to the socialist societies that provide full employment for their citizens, will help ascertain whether forms of economic development affect rates of violent crime commission. While Archer and Gartner examine the impact of unemployment rates on homicide, Mukherjee examines its effect along with that of domestic product per capita on burglary rates in Australia. His research shows that during different periods in the present century, these economic indicators have had a varied impact on crime. But economic effects on property crime are most noticeable during times of pronounced change as in the depression and periods of rapid economic expansion. But burglaries, in particular, are linked to economic growth, increasingly available goods and changes in lifestyle. It would be useful to test this observation by performing longi- tudinal analyses in other industrialized nations. The Archer and Gartner and Mukherjee studies together suggest that economic changes to influence crime. Increased unemployment may result in more homicide and property crime but less burglary. But Archer and Gartner suggest that the societal response to transitory economic develop- ments may help determine the costs of unemployment to a nation. LaFree and Kick conclude that population growth, a demographic change resulting from development, explains trends in murder and violence better than indicators of industrialization. According to their analysis, declining population growth rates have an opposing effect on the two divergent forms of crime commission. Theft rates rise and murder rates decline. Their explanation for this phenomenon is rooted in the Durkheimian analysis of social structure (Durkheim, 1964). Suggesting decline in popu- lation growth often reflects decreasing social cohesion. Murder, which frequently results from interpersonal conflicts, consequently declines when human relations become less intimate. But theft, requiring anonymity, increases when social controls are reduced in an increasingly impersonal society. The three essays suggest alternative directions for exploring the relation- ship between social and economic forces and crime rates. While they do not deny that the process of development affects crime, they suggest that more — 19 _ limited developments may be important in explaining crime causation and evolution. Social policies and demographic trends reveal fundamental values and underlying changes in society. Understanding the impact of these forces may be crucial to an enhanced appreciation of the relationship between crime and development in the past 200 years. REFERENCES ARCHER, D. and GARTNER R. (1984). Violence and Crime in Cross- National Perspective. New Haven: Yale University Press. BIRKBECK, C. H. Forth — ‘‘Understanding Crime and Social Control Elsewhere: coming À Geographical Perspective on Theory in Crimi- nology'. Research in Law, Crime and Deviance. BLACKWELDER, J. K. (1984). ‘’Crime, Policing and the Dangerous Classes’’. Journal of Urban History 10:329-38. CARRANZA, L. E. (1983). El preso sin condena en America Latina y el Caribe: estudio comparativo estadistico y legal de treinta paises y propuestas para reducir el fenomeno. San Jose, Costa Rica: ILANUD. CLINARD, Marshall B. (1983), ‘‘The Influence of Modernization in Com- parative Criminology ”. Michigan Law Review 81:1016-28. COHEN, S. (1982), ‘‘“Western Crime Control Models in the Third World: Benign or Malignant?’”’ Research in Law, Crime and Deviance 4:85-121. CRESPI REGHIZZI, G. (1984), ‘“Communist Party and the Law in Somalia” Paper presented at a conference on Ruling Communist Parties and their Status Under Law, Kiel, Germany. DURKHEIM, E. (1964), The Division of Labor in Society. New York: Free Press. FOUCAULT, M. (1977), Discipline and Punish. New York: Pantheon. GINSBURGS, G. (1984), ‘‘Membership in the Mongolian People’s Revol utionary Party: The Statutory Setting’. Paper presented at conference on Ruling Communist Parties and their Status Under Law, Kiel, Germany. GROSSMAN, G. (1977), “The Second Economy of the USSR”. Problems of Communism 26:25-40. GURR, T.R. (1980), ‘’On history of violent crime in Europe and America”. Pp. 411-32 in Egon Bittner and Sheldon L. Messinger (eds.) Crimi nology Review Yearbook. Beverly Hills: Sage. HARTJEN, C. A. and PRIYADARSINI S. (1984), Delinquency in India: À Comparative Analysis. New Brunswick, N. i.: Rutgers University F: :s: RADZINOWICZ, Sir L. and KING J. (1977), the T- 1 Of Crime. Tw York: Basic Books. — 20 — SHELLEY, L. (1980) ‘““The Geography of Soviet Criminality”. American Sociological Review 45:111-122. (1981) Crime and Modernization. Carbondale, Il.: Southern Illinois University Press. SIMON, RJ. (1976), ““American Women and Crime”. Annals of the American Academy of Political and social Science 423:3146. SUMNER, C. (ed.) (1982), Crime, Justice and Development. London: Heinemann. UNITED NATIONS, (1977), Report of the Secretary General. Crime Prevention and control. Sept. 22. VIGDERHOUS, G. (1978), ‘“Methodological Problems Confronting Cross Cultural Criminological Resarch Using Official Data”. Human Re lations 31:229-247. ZAFFARONI, E.R. (1982), ‘‘Criminalidad y Desarollo en Latinoamerica”. ILANUD 13-14:32-49. — 21 — LES INCIDENCES DU DÉVELOPPEMENT SUR LA CRIMINALITÉ AFRICAINE Yves Brillon, Ph.D.* L’Afrique noire reste, encore aujourd’hui, un contifient négligé par les criminologues. Les recherches, bien que de plus en plus nombreuses, y sont — pour la plupart — ponctuelles et d’uné désolante superficialité. De plus, elles sont teintées de mimétisme et d’ethnocentrisme ; ce qui fait que l’on ne perçoit guère la «spécificité » de la criminalité africaine ni celle des réactions sociales, formelles ou informelles, qu’elle provoque. Cela peut provenir du fait que le processus de modernisation a trans- formé l’ordre ancien, a détruit les institutions traditionnelles et a criminalisé certains comportements ancestraux. Les lois modernes furent érigées en dehors des communautés indigènes sans tenir compte des structures de leurs relations sociales. Ce qui fait que des comportements criminels « furent constitués» juridiquement «hors contexte», c’est-à-dire en ignorant que ces comportements tiraient leur origine ou bien de croyances religieuses, ou bien de l’organisation coutumière de la famille, ou bien des lois régulant la sexualité, la production, le travail, les échanges et les successions… Il en fut ainsi de la criminalisation de la sorcellerie, de la dot, de la polygamie, des dépenses somptuaires accompagnant les mariages, les funérailles et les initiations… Selon Sumner (1982), cette «réification» de comportements criminels se consolida peu à peu jusqu’à devenir des choses allant de soi pour les systèmes légaux modernes de même que pour les analyses crimino- logiques. Ces dernières, pour la plupart, oublient le contexte historique et occultent la dynamique qui confronte le droit nouveau aux droits coutu- miers des populations autochtones. A cause de cela, les chercheurs, en considérant l’évolution des États africains, ont tendance à considérer celle-ci selon le schème des sociétés occidentales et président — en se référant à l’example de la Révolution Industrielle, en Europe — une augmentation rapide de la criminalité. Cette augmentation sérait directement reliée au développement économique et à .ses conséquences, c’est-à-dire, plus spécialement, à l’urbanisation et à l’industrialisation: phénomènes qui provoquent l’exode rural, l’effondre- ment des structures sociales traditionnelles ainsi que les conflits de cultures et de valeurs. Pour beaucoup d’auteurs, ce sont là les coûts -sociaux du progrès, les offrandes sacrificielles que les pays sous-développés doivent * Chercheur agrégé Centre International de Criminologie Comparée. _ 23 _ immoler à cet insatiable Moloch occidental, dieu de la « Civilisation », en vue d’accéder au mirage paradisiaque de la modernité. Mais cette façon de voir et de penser s’avère sans doute trop ethnocentrique pour permettre de déceler les composantes typiques de la genèse, de la nature et de l’évolution de la criminalité africaine. LE MYTHE MESSIANIQUE DE LA COLONISATION Le développement et les bienfaits de la civilisation européenne ne furent pas choisis par les populations autochtones mais imposées par les puissances coloniales. En Afrique noire, la colonisation a représenté, à maints égards, une sorte de cataclysme, de déflagration culturelle qui, en se propageant de proche en proche, a fortement ébranlé les cosmogonies anciennes et à, par le fait même, miné, sapé, et érodé les équilibres des sociétés traditionnelles. L’arrivée et la domination de l’homme blanc ont plongé l’Africain dans un profond désarroi. Ce dernier s’est retrouvé désem- paré par la découverte soudaine et par l’emprise d’un autre monde qui, par le seul fait d’exister, lui révélait l’extrême vulnérabilité de son propre univers. L’introduction d’une économie monétaire, l’implantation d’industries et l’importation d’une technologie nouvelle furent les principaux éléments qui s’échappèrent de cette boite de Pandore, que constituait la civilisation occidentale, et qui furent causes de changements radicaux dans la mesure où ces innovations suscitèrent un décloisonnement des entités ethniques, une redéfinition des rapports sociaux et une réorganisation des moyens de pro- duction et des échanges économiques et commerciaux. Les caprices de l’histoire ont voulu que, par la colonisation, soient mis en confrontation des sociétés capitalistes, hautement industrialisées, à idéologie individualiste, avec des sociétés de type collectiviste, exclusivement agricole, sans grande technologie et dont l’économie était largement orientée vers l’autarcie. Il s’en est suivi, pour ces dernières une corrosion des institutions de base, un saccage des croyances et des valeurs qui se sont apparentés à un lent et insi- dieux génocide culturel. Convaincus de la supériorité de leur culture et de l’aspect civilisateur de leur mission, les colonisateurs conçurent le droit comme un instrument de promotion collective, comme une source d’évolution devant servir à faciliter l’unification politique et le développement économique. En conséquence, dès que les colons, commerçants missionnaires, administrateurs et militaires s’installèrent en Afrique, les règles juridiques et les systèmes pénaux des métropoles furent automatiquement implantés afin d’assurer «l’ordre colonial » . Ainsi, le droit pénal, en Afrique, est-il loin d’être l’expression codifiée des valeurs d’un ordre social établi. Il est l’outil que l’on utilise pour la création même de cet ordre (Costa, 1969). Il a pour objet de transformer les — 24 _ traditions et les mœurs. En cela, il reflète la volonté d’une élite «occiden- = talisée» d’imposer des normes de «type européen » à une majorité popu- laire, largement agricole, considérée comme inculte et comme n’étant pas encore suffisamment évoluée socialement. Le droit a donc un caractère « pédagogique » , voire même « prophétique » , dans la mesure où il annonce la société de consommation et d’abondance de demain. Pour assurer cette action «civilisatrice», «salvatrice», il doit s’opposer à la survivance des multiples droits coutumiers, «archaïques» et «barbares». Droits primitifs, droit tribaux, donc multiples, divers et aux frontières étroites; droits qui vont à l’encontre même de la «civilisation» et, surtout, de «l’unification nationale». Aux yeux des autorités gouvernementales, il faut donc à tout prix supprimer ces ilots de régionalisme qui assurent la survie d’une Afrique ancienne et dépassée. Pour cette raison, les droits coutumiers, à toutes fins pratiques, furent mis « hors la loi». Il en a résulté une anomie due à la superposition d’une justice moderne, souvent mal comprise de l’ensemble des citoyens, à des structures juridico-administratives pré-coloniales et familières, jadis bien intégrées dans les communautés villageoises, et qui continuent, sous l’arbre à palabre, à fonctionner dans la clandestinité. L’ACCULTURATION PAR LE DROIT Il est évident, comme le dit Sumner (1982), que le droit pénal, imposé par les colonisateurs et repris par les gouvernements autochtones, avait pour objectifs tout autant de contrôler la sorcellerie et la polygamie que de détruire ou de neutraliser, en les incorporant, les structures politiques indi- gènes. On a ainsi éroder le pouvoir des autorités claniques légitimes. Ce qui a eu des conséquences profondes sur l’ensemble des conditions de vie et de pensée des communautés tribales. En étranglant le pouvoir des chefs tra- ditionnels, on a condamné à mort les anciennes civilisations africaines puisque celles-ci ne peuvent survivre qu’en fonction du passé, c’est-à-dire des coutumes (héritées des ancêtres) dont les Anciens et les chefs sont les véritables dépositaires. Encore aujourd’hui, dans les États africains, les lois sont souvent direc- tement orientées de manière à forcer le changement de certaines coutumes, normes et mentalités que l’on considère comme « primitives » . Les études de Coissy (1974), de Costa-Lascoux (1975), de Mélone (1975), de Rives (1975) et de Sumner (1982) identifient cette volonté des gouvernements de faire jouer au droit pénal une fonction de protection des intérêts politiques et économiques de l’État en luttant contre le tribalisme et les particularismes ethniques. Cela se traduit par deux types de mesures législatives, les unes incriminant des comportements admis par la coutume mais qui s’avèrent contraires au concept de «Nations», les autres sanctionnant des pratiques qui vont à l’encontre du développement économique. — 25 _ Dans la première catégorie, on a criminalisé la constitution d’asso- ciations amicales régionales (comme dans l’Empire centrafricain, en Haute- Volta et au Tchad), les signes d’identification tribale, tels que les sacrifica- tions et autres marques corporelles propres aux diverses ethnies (Côte d’Ivoire, République Populaire du Congo, Empire centrafricain). « Le droit pénal, comme l’affirme Costa-Lascoux, ici pour mission de culpabiliser et d’éliminer . définitivement des comportements particularistes en favorisant une morale collective » (1975, p. 105). Morale collective, faut-il s’empresser d’ajouter, étroitement calquée sur la morale occidentale. Dans la seconde catégorie, la mise en œuvre d’une politique de dévelop- pement justifie la répression contre tout ce qui est de nature à compromet- tre le progrès. Ainsi les dépenses somptuaires et ostentatoires que provo- quent les funérailles, les mariages, les cérémonies religieuses et communau- taires sont souvent interdites (Sénégal, Cameroun, Dahomey). Il en va de même de la dot que l’on a supprimée (Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire, Empire centra- fricain) ou réglementée (Mali, Cameroun, Guinée). Dans le même sens Alliot (1965-1966) et Coissy (1974) notent que la majorité des gouvernements africains répriment de façon particulière certains phénomènes socio-écono- miques comme l’oisiveté, le vagabondage, la mendicité, l’usage d’alcool, l’absentéisme scolaire… Cela, parce que les comportements antisociaux apparaîssent comme directement responsables du sous-développement. De nombreux législateurs, en réprimant ainsi les infractions liées à l’oisiveté, s’attaquent moins à la dangerosité potentiel de l’acte (le vagabondage étant de nature à favoriser la commission de délits) qu’à l’infraction économique (le travail étant conçu comme une obligation, un devoir, une nécessité collective pour accéder à la modernisation). Ainsi, le vagabondage, comme le remarque Mélone (1975), est moins envisagé comme un état criminogène que comme une attitude faisant obstacle au développement de l’économie nationale. Beaucoup d’incrirhinations visént avant tout, comme le dit avec euphé- misme Rives, «à éliminer certains facteurs criminogènes et notamment l’absence de propension à l’épargne qui caractérisent une grande partie de la population et qui est la cause d’un certain nombre d’infractions pertuba- trices de la vie économique» (1975, p. 186). On ne saurait, avec plus de subtilité faire apparaître — en voulant le déguiser — le sens de la politique criminelle de beaucoup d’États d’Afrique qui consiste à changer certaines habitudes de vie d’«une grande partie de la population » parce qu’elles ne sont pas conformes au dessein économique dont les perturbations sont désormais stigmatisées comme des «crimes» contre le «développement». L’acculturation par le droit provient du fait que l’appareil jurîdique, par les sanctions pénales, cherche à renforcer des normes qui ne correspondent pas toutes à celles des populatior:s (condamnation de la dot, des ord:‘ies, de la sorcellerie, de l’infanticide d’enfants-tabous, de la pblygzmî*: …). Le — 26 — législateur, par l’intermédiaire des tribunaux, force l’implantation d’un ordre nouveau, l’imposition de règles de conduite « plus civilisées » et, en cela, il va à l’encontre de certaines normes traditionnelles qui ont été intériorisées tout au long du processus de socialisation. Et pour bousculer le changement, les administrations se servent de peines, et ce faisant — aux yeux des citoyens — elles en viennent institutionnaliser un certain nombre d’injustices dans la mesure où elles transgressent les coutumes ancestrales LA LOI DES VILLES ET LA LOI DES CHAMPS En 1965. à Vavoua, en Côte d’Ivoire, une femme accusée de sorcellerie demanda, pour prouver son innocence, à subir — selon la coutume — l’épreuve du poison, c’est-à-dire une ordalie. Aussitôt après avoir avalé la décoction néfaste, elle mourût. La chose parvint à la gendarmerie et le chef du village fut arrété, comme responsable de cet homicide. Il fut jugé, par les tribunaux étatiques, et condamné. Devant une telle situation, comment peut-on faire comprendre aux villageois que la fidélité aux coutumes peut être un acte condamnable ? Pour eux, il n’y avait pas de doute : si la femme était morte c’est qu’elle était-vraiment une sorcière. Telle était la croyance de la tribu, tel était la coutume immuable. Pourquoi alors leur chef, repré- sentant des ancêtres, représentant des lois, de ce qui est bien et de ce qui est mal, est-il devenu un accusé, un malfaiteur et a-t-il été condamné ? Ou se trouve la justice ? La différence dans les normes légales conduit donc les groupements tra- ditionnels s’isoler, à se replier sut eux-même, à mépriser un système judi- ciaire qui protège les coupables (les sorciers) et qui condamne les innocents (ceux qui rendent la justice des Anciens). L’existence de ces deux corps de lois et de ces deux types de juridictions encouragent les gens à garder dans la clandestinité les aspects de leur vie sociale et de leurs croyances qui entrent en contradiction avec le mode de vie et de pensée des «blancs» et de leurs imitateurs, les « élites» africaines des grandes villes. À cause de cela les villageois ne feront appel au parquet que lorsqu’ils n’auront aucune autre alternative (parce que la chose s’est rendue aux oreilles d’un policier ou d’un gendarme…) ou que lorsqu’ils pourront en tirer profit (lorsque le jugement traditionnel ne satisfait pas la victime ou, comme c’est plus souvent le cas, l’accusé…). Ce qui prouve que l’on ne change pas des mentalités et des croyances avec des lois ou des règlements. Lle témoignage de Kouassigan, sur la réalité juridique, telle qu’il la vit à l’heure actuelle est, à cet égard for instructif : « La vie politique africaine écrit-il, témoigne de l'échec constant de la règle de droit que l'on tente de légitimer par le prétexte de stabilité politique nécessaire au développement économ1que et social» (*974 p. 13). Au Nigéria, la voix de Karaoi-Whyte directeur je rechu Lh0 au 1,13‘“f" e la < istice. à Fort-Harco. <1 s'élève d\ € » ‘ JIn 2s ue Ccumine V1 (U RE % 4 3>eise-t-1,rorr» un instrument de la politique coloniale, dans le but de réaliser l’unité terri- toriale et de remplacer les coutumes barbares et la moralité primitive par la moralité supérieure du droit commun» (1982, p. 343). Il remarque que méme pour ce qui est des offenses criminelles coutumières reconnues, le code apparaît comme une négation des concepts traditionnels et comme, par conséquent, la promotion de ce que le gouvernement colonial considé- rait être nécessaire au maintien de la paix et d’un gouvernement stable. Par le droit, il s’agissait — avant tout — d’établir la « pax britannica » ou la «pax gallica». Et dans ce processus, il n’y eut aucun effort, ou si peu, pour comprendre les notions ancestrales de droit; notions que les gouverne- ments autochtones rejettent aujourd’hui. La preuve de cela réside, par exemple, dans les lois qui punissent le recours aux mécanismes de conci- liation et d’arbitrage pour les crimes graves, qui banissent l’usage des ordalies, qui condamnent les formes traditionnelles de mariage. Et, en ce qui concerne cette dernière institution, Karabi-Whyte remarque que le code criminel nigé- rian a témoigné de la façon la plus convainquante son indifférence et son mépris face aux valeurs culturelles de la communauté quant aux dispositions régissant le mariage selon la coutume; mariage polygame de droit. De cette inadéquation des lois découle leur inapplication, surtout dans les régions rurales. Le pluralisme juridique débouche sur un opportunisme quant à la voie à suivre pour régler un litige. Cela peut provenir du fait, comme le dit Alliot (1965-66), que «la conception actuelle du droit pénal créateur de l’avenir s’oppose à la conception traditionnelle et à la conception coloniale, toutes deux tournées vers la défense d’un ordre établi» (p. 220). Ainsi, pris dans le tourbillon extrémement rapide du développement, le droit pénal joue une part active dans un processus d’acculturation, voulu et prémédité qui risque de créer un fossé, à la fois culturel et idéologique, entre les milieux urbains « civilisés» et les milieux ruraux « primitifs». Nous ne pouvons que regretter que les philosophies pénales africaines, entièrement orientées vers le rétablissement de l’harmonie entre les divers segments de la communauté, aient été remplacées au profit d’une philoso- phie «punitive» axée sur le châtiment du coupable; philosophie rétributive qui ne tient souvent même pas compte de la victime. Or, chez les Africains, il ne peut y avoir de justice sans que l’on apporte réparation aux torts cau- sés à la partie lésée. L’ironie du sort veut que, à l’heure actuelle, dans nos sociétés dites « civilisées» , beaucoup d’auteurs, dont Neils Christie et Louk Hulsman, décrient le recours aux peines et aux châtiments et préconisent la mise sur pied de procédure conciliatoires et arbitrales qui donneraient une place centrale aux «droits» des victimes. L’on peut s’étonner que ces pen- seurs, dans leurs élaborations théoriques, ne se soient pas davantage penchés, pour y prendre exemple, sur les anciens modèles africains de justice. En effet, la justice coutumière cherchait en premier lieu à réparer les préjudices et à effacer les sentiments de haine et de vengeance qu’avait fait — 28 — naître, entre deux individus, deux familles ou deux clans, la commission d’un délit ou d’un crime. Les parties opposées recherchaient, avec l’aide des Anciens ou des chefs, une solution compensatoire qui assurait une répara- tion à la victime. Cette préparation permettait de réconcilier les personnes ou les groupes en litige et de ramener la paix au sein de la communauté. Îl est dommage que le développement ait « officiellement » presque totalement effacé cette justice, empreinté de respect pour les individus et leurs proches, et qu’il l’ait remplacer par des procédures de confrontation et de coercition. DÉVELOPPEMENT ÉCONOMIQUE ET STRATIFICATION SOCIALE Le développement a provoqué des mutations autant au niveau des structu- res de pouvoir qu’à celui des valeurs et des activités sociales et économiques. L’accroissement de l’industrialisation et l’instauration d’une agriculture inten- sive, basée sur la monoculture régionale (café, cacao, arachide…) a permis un clivage social entre la nouvelle classe dirigeante et la masse ,entre les nouveaux riches et la paysannerie traditionnelle. Les villes se sont développées, symboles de la richesse et de la modernisation, et ont provoqué un exode rural sans pré- cédent. Or cette migration vers les villes est, comme le dit Sumner (1982), davantage le fruit de forces répulsives du milieu agricole, consécutives à sa des- tructuration, que de forces attractives des grandes agglomérations. Selon lui, l’exode rural donne l’«opportunité», aux individus, de passer du sous-emploi rural au non-emploi urbain; ce que l’on pourrait traduire comme étant, pour la population paysanne, le passage d’une pauvreté excessive à une pauvreté relative.Il s’agirait,en quelque sorte, d’une promotionau niveau de la pauvreté. Une des conséquences les plus criardes du développement réside dans l’établissement d’une nouvelle stratification sociale, basée sur le pouvoir, le prestige et l’argent. Stratification qui sépare l’élite du reste de la population. Les inégalités sociales entre une minorité privilégiée et le prolétariat sont d’autant plus évidentes qu’elles sont outrancières. Lors des Indépendances, le départ des fonctionnaires européens a créé un vide qui a été comblé par les citoyens indigènes. Les emplois supérieurs s’accompagnaient de bénéfices et d’avantages considérables puisqu’ils comportaient des indemnités pour les européens expatriés, en plus d’être rémunérés selon les normes salariales en vigueur dans les métropoles occidentales. La succession se fit sans réamé- nagements qui tiendraient compte des ressources des anciennes colonies. Au Nigéria, pour prendre l’exemple de Kayode (1983), les hauts fonctionnaires recevaient une maison, entourée d’un terrain d’un demi-hectare, située dans un quartier chic de la ville appelé «Government Reservation Area», une domesticité appropriée, une voiture achetée avec un prétdu gouvernement, de généraux frais mensuels pour la faire marcher, des allocations d’entretien pour chaque enfant et des vacances payées chaque année. Voilà quelques un des privilèges qui étaient octroyés à la nouvelle bourgeoisie africaine. Et cela se retrouvait, plus ou moins prononcé ou exagéré, dans tous les — 29 _ États africains nouvellement indépendants. Ces inégalités scandaleuses se « sont établies selon deux axes, a savoir entre, d’une part, une poignée de personnes riches et la masse populaire et, d’autre part, entre les villes et les villages. Kayode (1983) montre que, au Nigéria, 5% de la population contrôlent environ 40 % des revenus bruts. Cette disparité dans les revenus se traduit en une distinction, concrète et hautement évidente. entre ceux «qui ont » et ceux «qui n'ont pas » Un des facteurs qui a joué un rôle important dans cette différenciation sociale est l’éducation. Celle-ci a créé une classe de bureaucrates bien nantis de chefs d’entreprises, de professionnels et de techniciens. En instruisant l’école a divisé. Comme le système éducatif véhicule un contenu plus litté- raire et théorique que manuel et pratique, il a élargit le fossé culturel entre les générations et a déraciné l’enfant de son milieu. Les jeunes, plus instruits que leurs aînés et plus perméables aux idées et aux aspirations que colpor- tent les sociétés occidentales, supportent moins bien l’autorité des chefs coutumiers et rejettent une partie de leur culture qui apparaît, à leurs yeux trop conservatrice et léthargique. Bien que n’ayant reçu qu’un début de scolarisation, les adolescents se refusent de plus en plus à tout travail manuel ou agricole et préfèrent quitter le village pour la ville plutôt que d’assumer une fonction subalterne au sein de la communauté. On rejoint là ce que Dumont, en 196 écrivait déjà «Pour la plupart des gosses des villes et des campagnes, l'école repré- sente d'abord le moyen d'accéder à la caste privilégiée de la fonction publi- que. L'enfant de paysant, poussé par ses parents, en déduit vitel’impossibi- lité d'une réelle promotion à l’intérieur de la profession agricole, le seul moyen de s'élever est donc d'en sortir» (p. 72) Or, l’école constitue pour bon nombre de jeunes Africains un miroir aux alouettes. Békombo (1969) décrit assez bien ce mirage «Grace aux techniques nouvelles de communication de masse, le jeune villageois imagine les lumières de la ville, les emplois qui foisonnent, les portes grandes ouvertes qui conduisent vers l’apogée sociale Le désir de ces jeunes est d’'abandonner la pénible culture des champs, un père autoritaire et pauvre, un milieu familial régi par la magie et qui ne fait qu’entretenir un espoir jamais réalisé» (p. 30). Dans toutes les grandes villes africaines, on assiste donc à l’arrivée massive de jeunes scolarisé qui arpentent les rues à la recher- che d’un emploi de cadre ou de fonctionnaire. N’étant pas assez instruits ils rejoignent vite les rangs des chômeurs et des insatisfaits. Une recherche faite au Niger (Poitou, 1978) montre que l’inadaptation de l’enseignement que la déperdition scolaire qui en résulte ainsi que la mauvaise intégration sociale des jeunes en milieu urbain constituent des problèmes graves qui peu vent avoir des incidences criminogènes. « L'enfant noir scolarisé, écriteile, devient véritablement un meétis culturel qui doit se confox mer simiita n ment à plusieurs systèmes normatifs, plus o*! rrs c atiiaiosg y “ — 30 — Métis culturel, à la fois déracinés de son milieu et à la fois incapable de s’in- tégrer dans le circuit économique moderne, faute de quahficat10n adé- quates et faute de débouchés suffisants. LA CRIMINALITÉ AFRICAINE UN PHÉNOMENE DIFFICILE A DÉTECTER Les taux de criminalité,en Afrique, défient en quelque sorte les modèles criminogènes classiques, puisqu’ils sont parmi les plus bas au monde. Par exemple, au Nigéria, le taux de criminalité se situait, en 1976 339 pour 100.000 habitants contre, par exemple, 6000 en Allemagne de l’Ouest et 5900 aux États-Unis. Or, la pauvreté, l’exode rural, le chômage, les conflits de cultures, l’urbanisation sauvage et rapide tout semblerait concourir à un développement spectaculaire de la criminalité. Jusqu’à maintenant, il n’en est rien. Du moins, en apparence. Et ceci s’explique par deux raisons fondamentales la première est la persistance des structures sociales tradi- tionnelles; la seconde est la faiblesse des organismes de contrôle étatique. Il convient donc d’examiner l’incidence de ces deux facteurs sur le phenomene criminel africain. Persistance des structures sociales traditionnelles Dans la plupart des États africains, près des trois quarts de la population vivent encore dans les régions rurales. Il est évident que, dans les villages l’implantation d’une économie monétaire et, surtout, l’introduction d’un caractère individualiste dans les relations sociales, ont porté un dur coup à certaines coûtumes et à certaines façons d’agir et de pensée. Mais il n’en demeure pas moins que la famille élargie et les structures lignagères et clani- ques, contmuent à se maintenir tout en évoluant. Ces structures, autoritaires et coercitives, freinent ainsi au maximum l’agir délinquant parce qu’elles reposent sur des tabouts et des croyances religieuses très ancrés dans les mentalités des gens. À cause de cela, il est indéniable que la criminalité rurale est, et de loin, beaucoup plus faible que la criminalité urbaine. Cela a été longuement démontré ailleurs (Vanderlinden 1983; Brillon, 1980; Poitou, 1978). Il est encore indéniable que la solidarité ethnique pousse les villageois à préserver la bonne entente entre les clans en reglant entre eux, bon nombre d’affaires criminelles. Si la criminalité rurale s’avère moins abondante que celles des agglomeratmns urbaine, elle est aussi plus cachée. En effet, quand un délit ou un crime est commis, s’il n’est pas «trop grave» ou «trop visible » , les villageois préféreront souvent régler le litige au sein de la communauté de façon à maintenir la paix au village. Pour y parve- nir, on procédera selon le droit traditionnel en vue de réinsérer dans le — 31 — groupe la personne fautive tout en évitant, en compensant la victime, le pro- cessus de vengeance. On optera alors pour des procédures de conciliation, d’arbitrage et d’indemnisation. Une enquête faite à Abidjan, en 1974, auprès de 1000 Africains (500 Ivoiriens et 500 étrangers) montre que 62 % de l’échantillon étaient d’accord avec l’énoncé suivant : « Quelle que soit la gravité de l'acte commis par un membre d’un même village, il vaut mieux d’abord essayer de régler l’affaire à l’amiable entre les familles plutôt que de faire intervenir la police ou la gendarmerie». Selon le même échantillon (Brillon, 1980), 79,6 % des Africains se disaient en faveur du recours, en milieu villageois, à des procédures conciliatoires pour mettre fin à un litige soulevé par la commission de délits et de crimes. Si le phénomène criminel, en Afrique, affiche des taux si bas s’est donc, en premier lieu, parce que la criminalité, en zone rurale, est beaucoup mieux contrôlée par les interdictions coutumières et c’est aussi, en second lieu, parce que la justice traditionnelle absorbe une grande partie des différents; ce qui fait qu’une part non négligeable de la criminalité reste cachée aux organismes officiels de défense sociale. Faiblesse des agences pénales modernes Kayode (1983) constate que, au Nigéria, la majorité des informations criminelles qui arrivent à la police proviennent d’une mince fraction de la population. Une large portion du territoire, géographiquement parlant, échappe à toute fin pratique, à la surveillance policière : environ 75 % des forces de l’ordre nigériannes sont stationnées dans les capitales régionales et dans les autres centres urbains où ne vivent, au total, que 25 % des Nigérians. Pour l’ensemble de la population, on ne compte qu’un policier pour 1.800 habitants. Nous avons pu constater le même phénomène en Côte d’Ivoire (1980), où les forces publiques se concentrent dans les grandes villes (un policier pour 835 habitants) alors que, dans les régions rurales, elles sont très clairsemées (un gendarme pour 3.652 habitants). Ceci explique le fait que les trois plus grandes villes ivoiriennes, qui ne renfermaient que 17 % de la population nationale, en 1970, n’en regroupaient pas moins de 56 % des citadins et, sur le plan de la criminalité connue des tribunaux, elles totali- saient 47 % de toutes les affaires pénales. De ces données, on peut déduire que dans les villes, où la promiscuité ethnique rend plus ardue la survivance des procédures et des droits coutu- miers, il est plus aisé de faire admettre une nouvelle conception juridique et d’amener les populations à recourir aux agents gouvernementaux de contrôle social. C’est en milieu urbain, creuset où se heurtent et se transmuent les anciennes institutions, où l’occidentalisation des modes de vie et de pensée secrète une société de masse et de consommation caractérisée par l’anony- mat, la multiplicité des cultures et des valeurs, que se fait le plus intensément sentir l’anomie. Toutes ces conditions facilitent le passage à l’acte, cela — 32 — d’autant plus que les villes mettent cruellement en relief les inégalités socia- les entre les riches et les pauvres. De plus, une forte proportion de riches vivent dans l’opulence et la corruption. Dans de nombreuses administra- tions, il n’y a pas de doute, comme l’affirment Kayode, pour le Nigéria (1983), et Nortey, pour le Ghana (1983), qu’il y a une quantité énorme de pots-de-vin, de fraudes, de détournements de fonds publics, d’escroqueries et de contrebande. L’agissement et l’impunité des «puissants» ne sont pas de nature à frei- ner la criminalité des plus pauvres. La criminalité de ces derniers est, le plus souvent, de peu de gravité et même, parfois, de nécessité. Dans l’apparition des conduites délictueuses ou criminelles, on peut donc inclure, comme le fait Poitou (1981-83) les explications qui résultent d’un effet d’imitation ou d’un processus de «tantalisation». «En effet, la ville — théâtre privilé- gié des changements sociaux — est aussi le lieu priviliégié où se développent divers processus — désintégration des normes, occidentalisation, frustra- tion — qui interviennent dans l’étiologie de la délinquance ouest-africaine » (p. 114). Les nouvelles « valeurs citadines» de la «libre entreprise » balayent tout devant elles. Le sérieux de la vie familiale est jeté par-dessus bord, «les vieilles respectabilités étant abandonnées avec les vieilles servitudes » (Davidson, 1969). Les enfants sontles premières victimes de ces change- ments sociaux. L’effondrement des interdits qui étaient à la base de l’éduca- tion tribale, l’émiettement de la solidarité clanique qui garantissait une pré- sence affective, font que — dans certaines familles urbaines — les enfants manquent d’encadrement éducatif. La délinquance juvénile trouve, dans ces conditions, un terrain favorable à son épanouissement. CRIMINALITÉ ET DÉVELOPPEMENT : UN LIEN AMBIGU Le développement économique postule l’élévation du niveau de vie et l’amélioration des conditions d’existence. Il se réalise par une rationalisation progressive et de plus en plus poussée de l’exploitation des matières pre- mières, et par la production massive des biens de consommation; ces mesures étant pilotées par des entreprises multinationales dont les objectifs essentiels sont de rendre concurrentiel l’écoulement des produits sur les marchés national et mondial. Généralement, l’industrialisation, qui est le moteur de l’essor économique, a pour conséquence immédiate un accroîsse- ment urbain important. Les industries ont besoin, en effet, pour prospérer, d’une concentration de main-d’œuvre et d’une infrastructure de services de tous ordres devant assurer la commercialisation et la vente de leur produc- tion. Ces services se centralisent, dans la plupart des cas, dans les grandes villes. Ce développement économique ne s’accompagne pas toujours, loin de là, de l’amélioration de la qualité de la vie parce qu’il s’amorce souvent sans planification et au mépris des réalités existantes, des motivations des popu- lations, de leurs valeurs, des structures politiques économiques et religieuses. — 33 — La technologie ainsi introduite répond avant tout aux besoins des investis- seurs étrangers qui ne se préoccupent guère de faire éclater, par leurs acti- vités, la cohésion des architectures sociales préexistantes Face à cette édification d’une économie de marché, fondée sur la mobi- lité et l’innovation, face l’urbanisation rapide, les sociétés traditionnelles se sont vues obligées d’évoluer pour survivre et pour s’introduire dans les nouveaux circuits d’échanges commerciaux. Ce qui est devenu, pour elles une nécessité vitale dès que les économies autarciques ont été détruites au profit des cultures spécialisées. Face à ces modifications structurelles, elles sont, toutefois, paralysées par des coutumes et par un système de valeurs et de croyances qui furent érigés, avant tout, pour maintenir la stabilité et l’ordre à l’intérieur du clan, de la tribu et du groupe ethnique. Cette situ- ation qui oppose modernisme et traditionalisme bouscule les communautés agricoles et déclenche ce que Balandier (1971) appelle le processus de «dé-structuration et de re-structuration ». Ce processus complexe aboutit à des transformations notables qui touchent la plupart des institutions tradi- tionnelles. Il se produ1t alors des changements à un rythme accéléré; ce qui, faute d’avoir été prévu et endigué, donne naissance à des problèmes de pathologie sociale. Il est certain que le dévelappement de l’Afrique par les capitaux étran- gers ont forcé des mutations sociales et économiques. La plupart des États africains sont devenus dépendants dès fluctuations qui secouent les marchés internationaux. Ce qui a entrainé une instabilité fondamentale de l’écono- mie de ces pays qui, d’une part, sont sensibles aux modifications soudaines qui touchent le prix de leurs produits et qui, d’autre part, connaîssent des poussées inflationistes répétitives qui font monter en flèche le coût de la vie En conséquence de cette fragilité économique, on observe, avec Mandel (1968), les phénomènes suivants des périodes cycliques et prolongées de chômage; de sérieuses perturbations dans l’écologie générale à la suite de l’érosion des sols; une surexploitation des terres qui provoque leur stérilité une sous-alimentation de la population qui découle de l’expansion excessive de la monoculture qui a des effets désastreux sur la fertilité des champs C’est ce qui fait dire à Sumner (1982) que «la criminalité n’est pas seule- ment le résultat du développement mais qu'’il en est la cause » (p. 30). Cette spoliation des terres agricoles provoquent l’exode rural, de développement des bidonvilles et, dans les agglomérations urbaines, la dégénérescence des cultures africaines traditionnelles Dans le contexte d’une économie de libre échange, avec une migration non contrôlée vers les villes, où les différences de revenus entre les diverses classes sociales sont de plus en plus visibles, il apparaît assez clair que les facteurs, liés au développement, deviennent criminogènes. Selon Kayode (1983), ces facteurs favorisent chez les moins bien nantis, le recours au vol comme étant une «redistribution », bien qu’illégale, des biens. Par ailleurs — 34 _ les conditions économiques ajoutent à l’instabilité politique de ces régions, dans la mesure où elles débouchent sur un chômage massif de la population. La guerre civile au Nigéria, de 1966 à 1970, les coups d’États au Ghana, en Ouganda, en République centrafricaine… se sont accompagnés d’une flambée de la criminalité de violence. Au Nigéria, après la guerre du Biafra, les soldats libérés se sont mis à piller, à rançonner les gens et à tuer pour vivre. Ce qui amena, en 1970,le gouvernement à instaurer la peine de mort. Au Ghana, au milieu des années 60, les vols à main armée se multiplièrent à la suite du premier changement de régime; cela parce que la junte amnistia des criminels politiques et de droit commun sans procès (Nortey, 1983). Plus tard, entre 1966 et 1972, avec le développement prodigieux de la contrebande, les voleurs à main armée s’attaquèrent aux camions qui trans- portaient les marchandises. Comme la police concentrait tous ses efforts sur le maintien de la sécurité politiques, les vols de banque, les saccages de villa- ges devinrent d’autant plus fréquents, selon Nortey, que les criminels jouis- saient d’une certaine impunité à cause de l’insuffisance des forces policières. En Ouganda, avant le règne d’Idi Amine Dada,la population perdit confiance dans les institutions étatiques et prirent, parfois, la justice entre ses mains. La politique et la criminalité étaient interreliées du fait qu’un grand nombre de jeunes, sans emploi, fromentèrent des troubles et des manifestations dans les villes (Clifford, 1983). Les vols à main armée prirent, là aussi, un essor inquiétant. CONCLUSION Il faut reconnaître qu’il y a une certaine ambiguité dans le lien qui existe entre développement et criminalité. Il est indéniable que les condi- tions économiques ont des incidences sur la sécurité publique et sur la stabi- lité politique. Le processus de développement est la conséquence de forces et de dynamisme internes et externes. Il est, en partie, orienté de l’extérieur par les pays industrialisés qui influent, par là-même, sur la dé-struturation des sociétés africaines. Celles-ci, dépendant de leur vigueur et de leur capa- cité d'adoptation et de re-structuration, réagissent plus ou moins positive- ment aux influences externes. Or, c'est dans cette phase de transformation sociale que la criminalité a le plus tendance à se développer. Pour l’instant, l’influence encore efficace des anciennes structures sociales et familiales freine une désorganisation qui pourrait devenir périlleuse. Seuls un dévelop- pement plus harmonieux et une évaluation générale du niveau de vie des populations pourraient être en mesure de contenir, dans l’avenir, un accrois- sement désordonné des conduites criminelles. Les inégalités sociales entre les Africains riches et les pauvres, tout comme celles qui séparent les pays industrialisés de ceux du «tiers monde », sont si criantes d’injustice que l’on peut s'étonner de voir à quel point les structures traditionnelles parviennent à contrôler la déviance et la criminalité. Avec leur disparition… le pire serait du domaine du possible… — 35 — Un autre aspect des incidences du développement sur la criminalité, en « Afrique, est le fait qu’il a donné naissance a un conflit de «droits», qui découle directement du processus d’acculturation. Il est évident que le droit nouveau et les institutions administratives nécessaires à son fonctionnement répondent davantage aux conditions de vie urbaine qu’à celles de la majorité rurale de la population africaine. Cependant, même dans les villes, où la cohabitation d’ethnies diverses et multiples rend pratiquement obligatoire l’existence d’un «droit commun», qui soit au-dessus des droits particuliers à chaque groupement, le système pénal insuffisamment développé pour être efficace semble lui-même contribuer à une «régression » vers une justice pri- mitive. Sanogho (1976) constate que, depuis très récemment, au Mali, des fusillades qui ont fait des victimes parmi les voleurs, «ont marqué la ten- dance des habitants à l’autodéfense devant les carences administratives. De plus en plus, des cas de lynchage sont relevés» (p. 95). Le même phénomène se retrouve à Abidjan à Lagos, à Kampala ou à Kinshasa. Ce qui laisse supposer que la justice moderne est non seulement inadap- tée à la pensée traditionnelle mais que, en plus, elle est incapable de juguler la nouvelle criminalité qu’engendre les villes. Certes, ce n’est pas là un trait spécifique à l’Afrique noire. Au contraire, cela est commun à tous les sys- tèmes pénaux des sociétés industrielles et, particulièrement, des plus déve- loppées. La différence réside dans le fait que les groupes ethniques parve- naient à contrôler leur criminalité et que, aux yeux de la population indi- gène, le système des blancs, présenté comme «supérieur», ne fait pas la preuve de sa supériorité. Où peuvent conduire ces réactions en spirale qui accentuent de plus en plus la dysfonction des institutions pénales ? Peut- être, à plus ou moins long terme, à une «africanisation » de la justice crimi- nelle, qui s’inscrira dans la sagesse des traditions et des coutumes africaines… Du moins est-il permis de l’espérer. RÉFÉRENCES ALLIOT, M. (1965-1966), Institutions privées africaines et malgaches. Paris : Les cours de droit. BALANDIER, G. (1971), Sens et puissance. Paris : P.U.F. BÉKOMBO, M. (1969), Vie familiale et délinquance en Afrique noire. Fédération Internationale des Écoles de Parents et d’Éducateurs : Paris. . BRILLON, Y. (1980), Éthnocriminologie de l’Afrique Noire, Paris : J. Vrin > Montréal : P.UM. CLIFFORD, W. (1983), Criminology in Developping Nations — African and Asian, Examples. in E. H. Johnson (Ed.): International Handbook of Contemporary Developments in Criminology. General Issues and the Americas. London : Greenwood Press. COISSY, D. M. (1974), La politique criminelle des États d’Afrique noire. Genève : Éditions Médecine et Hygiène. — 36 — COSTA, J. (1969), Penal Policy and Underdevelopment in French Africa, in A. Milner (ed.) African Penal Systems. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. COSTA-LASCOUX, J. (1975), Le droit pénal, l’unité nationale et le déve- loppement économique. In Archives de Politique Criminelle, N° 1. Édi- tions À. Pédone : Paris. DAVIDSON, B. (1969), Les Africains, introduction à l’histoire d’une culture. Paris : Éditions du Seuil. DUMONT, R.(1962), L'afrique noire est mal partie. Paris : Seuil. KARABI-WHYTE, A. G.(1982), Le pluralisme culturel et la formulation de la politique criminelle. In Rev. Int. de Crim. et de Pol. Tecn., Vol. XXXV, N° 4. Oct.-Dec. 1982. KAYODE, O. (1983), Nigeria. in E. H. Johnson (ed.) International Hand- book of Contemporary Developments in Criminology. Europe, Africa, The Middle East and Asia. London : Greenwood Press. KOUASSIGAN, G. A. (1974), Quelle est ma loi ? Tradition et modernisme dans le droit privé de la famille en Afrique noire francophone. Paris : A Pédone. MANDEL, E. (1968), Marxist Economic Theory. London : Merlin Press. MELONE, S. (1975), Les grandes orientations actuelles de la législation pénale en Afrique : le cas du Cameroun. in Archives de politique cri- minelle, N° 1. Paris : Éditions A. Pédone. NORTEY, D. N. A. (1983), Ghana. in E. H. Johnson (ed.) International Handbook of Contemporary Developments in Criminology. Europe, Africa, The Middle East and Asia. London : Greenwood Press. POITOU, D. (1981-1983), Délinquance juvénile et urbanisation au Niger et au Nigéria. in Cahiers d’Études Africaines, XXI-1-3, pp. 111-127. POITOU, D. (1978), La délinquance juvénile au Niger. Études Nigériennes, N° 41. Institut de Recherche en Sciences Humaines : NIAMFY. RIVES, G. (1975), Les problèmes de l’évolution de la politique criminelle au Sénégal depuis l’Indépendance . in Archives de politique criminelle, N° 1. Paris : Éditions A. Pédone. SUMNER, C. (1982), Crime, Justice and Underdevelopment : Beyond Modernisation Theory. in C. Sumner (ed.), Crime, Justice and Under- development . London : Heinemann. VANDERLINDEN, J. (1983), Les systèmes juridiques africains. Que sais- je ? N° 2103. Paris : P.U.F. 35 SUMMARY ' Development in Africa has affected criminality in two ways: the firSt is through the transformation of law, the second is by the erosion of tra- ditional forms of social control, that are more effective than the new. With colonisation, and the ‘establishment of independent governments, the criminal codes were introduced with the goal of unifying the multi-ethnic states. With this national unity, the traditional forms of political and legal power were swept away. As 75 % of the population remain rural. 20 îypes of the of law coexist: that of the cities, inspired by the west; anu countryside, loyal to tradition. The. Africans remain in a state ipomie. This has consequences for the criminality as well as for the p« nsti- tutions of the state. With the development of a market economy nd an educational system, an unprecedented rural exodus has occurred. l: sC the population has been forced to adapt to a modern life. They hav. zen their traditional social structures, founded on taboos and religious t. iefs dissolved. This has reduced family and clan contracts, destroying the family and leading to the development of delinquency and crime. RÉSUMÉ LES INCIDENCES DU DÉVELOPPEMENT SUR LA CRIMINALITE AFRICAINE Le dévéloppement, en Afrique, a eu des incidences sur la criminalité à deux niveaux : le premier est celui de la transformation du droit et le deuxième, celui de l’érosion des anciennes formes de contrôle social, beau- coup plus efficaces que les nouvelles. Avec la colonisation, puis avec la mise en place des gouvernements autchtones, des codes pénaux ont été promul- gués dans le but d’unifer, à l’intérieur de chaque État, les multiples ethnies. Par cette unification nationale, on a balayé les. formes traditionnelles de pouvoir, à la fois politique et juridique. Comme les populations africaines sont, à 75 %, agricoles et rurales, on a vu se superposer deux types de droit : celui des villes, d’inspiration occidentale, et celui des campagnes, fidèle aux traditions. Par là même, les Africains se sont trouvés en situation d’anomie. Ce qui a eu des conséquences à la fois sur la genèse de la criminalité et à la fois sur une sous-utilisation des institutions pénales étatiques. Par ailleurs, le — 38 — CRIME AND DEVELOPMENT : SOME OBSERVATIONS ON WOMENAND CHILDREN IN INDIA (1) Clayton A. Hartjen* CRIME ET DÉVELOPPEMENT : QUELQUES OBSERVATIONS SUR LES FEMMES ET LES ENFANTS EN INDE La fréquence et la répartition des arrestations pour 9 types de crimes graves répertoriés dans les statistiques officielles des États Unis et de l’Inde, sont analysées ici afin d’évaluer de quelle manière le développement écono- mique peut être associé aux différents facteurs considérés comme influan- çant directement les taux de criminalité et de dangerosité. Comparée aux données Américaines la proportion d’arrestations de femmes et de mineurs en Inde est extrémement basse. En fait, les femmes Indiennes diffèrent substanciellement des femmes Américaines en ce qui concerne la réparti- tion des arrestations entre les 9 types de délits étudiés, alors que le schéma d’arrestations de mineurs est pratiquement identique. Il a été avancé que ces différences entre la proportion et la répartition n’étaient que le reflet des différences de comportement et de réaction sociale au crime des femmes et des mineurs existant actuellement entre ces deux pays. Dans cette opti- que on peut dire que la fréquence des arrestations de femmes et de mineurs en Inde est inférieure car, comparativement avec les États Unis, ils ont moins d’opportunité ou de raison de sombrer dans la déviance, et s’ils le font, leur comportement est traité de manière informelle et officieuse. Dans la mesure où ces considérations sociales et interractionnistes se retrouvent au niveau du développement économique du pays, les variations des taux de criminalité à travers les sociétés peuvent être finalement expliquées par l’influence des formes économiques et des stades de développement. ABSTRACT The arrest frequencies and distributions for nine serious crimes reported in official statistics in the United States and India are analyzed to assess how economic development may be associated with various factors that are believed to directly influence rates of criminality and criminalization. Com- pared to Americans, the arrest proportions of women and juveniles in India are extremely low. In addition, Indian women differ substantially from * Associate Professor of Sociology Rutgers University — Newark. — 39 _ u American women in terms of the distribution of arrests accross the nine offenses while the arrest patterns of juveniles were quite similar. It is argued that these differences in arrest proportions and patterns reflect actual differences in behavior and societal (official) reaction to the criminality of women and juveniles in the two countries. In this regard, the arrest fre- quencies of women and juveniles in India are low because they have com- paratively fewer opportunities or reasons to deviate and, even if they do their behavior is likely to be treated in an informal, unofficial manner. To he extent that these socio-interactional dimensions are related to a country’s level of economic development, variations in crime rates across societies ultimately may be explained by the influence of economic forms and levels of development INTRODUCTION Variations in crime rates among societies are likely to occur to the extent that they differ in economic development, insofar as economic development is related to and influences political organization, urbanization, family structure, participation of women and children in the labor force, patterns of interpersonal relationships, and status and identity sources. These differences in ratés would include (1) absolute levels of criminality and criminalization, (2) the frequency with which specific fôrms of behavior occur Or are counted as crimes, and (3) the relative frequency with which particular categories of people are engaged in crimes or are labeled as criminal offenders. Ît is the last of these three p0551b111t1es that is of central concern in this paper. ‘ The sparse, highly unreliable, and frequently incomparable data on feMnale criminality in various countries universally suggests oñ thing — rates of arrest for women are lower (often dramatically so) than are rates for men (e.g., Adler, 1981; Adler & Simon, 1979; Bowker, 1981 ; Jones; Marshall 1982 1983). But other than this observation, few conclusive statements can be made regarding the relative criminality of women and men in so- cieties throughout the world. Similar statements can be made regarding crime rates for juveniles, except that youth in most developed societies have disproportionately high crime rates compared to adults (e.g., Friday, 1980) The most common way of comparing male/female or adult/juvenile crime rates is to compare rates of arrest, usually in terms of a percentage or ratio analysis. Variability in these rates exists of course. But, since arrest rates are most directly a measure of criminalization rather than criminality, it is by no means clear whether this variability is a reflection of actual differences in criminal behavior, variations in societal reaction to female for youthful offenders, or both (Alder, 1984; Austin, 1982; Curran, 1984 Empey, 1979; Hartnagel, 1982; Hill & Harris, 1981; Klein & Kress, 1976 — 40 — Phillips & DeFleur, 1982; Schwartz, et. al., 1984; Visher, 1983). Whatever its source, variance in the crime rates of women and juveniles is ultimately related to the effects of socio-economic and cultural differences among countries on the status and role women and young people occupy and play in societies. Even given the above limitations, on the bases of available data, it does seem reasonable to assume that in most countries women are less likely than adult males and children are less likely than adults generally to experience overt legal control in the form of criminal arrest. Moreover, the extent to which authorities rely on criminal law to control or suppress certain activities differs both in absolute use and relative use vis a vis various cat- egories of people from society to society. Thus, by treating ‘“legal control” (in the form of arrest and other rates) as a phenomenon to be explained in its own right, it might be argued that any explanation of its relative use is a consequence of those factors which (1) generate differences in behavior (frequency and type) deemed worthy of such control as well as (2) those that influence the perceptions of authorities as to the need for or desir- ability of invoking the criminal law in specific instances. The likelihood that the members of particular groups will be involved in criminality, or criminality of specific types, and the chances group members have of being criminalized for this involvement, depend upon the location of groups within the society’s socio-power structure (Black, 1976, 1980; Turk, 1972). To the extent that the composition of a society’s socio- power structure, and the location of various groups within it, is related to the society’s level of economic development, the relative occurrence of illegal behavior and its control by means of criminal law would ultimately differ from society to society in terms of level of development. The impli- cations of this idea for enhancing our understanding of criminal epidemi- ology can be illustrated by analyses of specific countries. The situation of women and youth in India provides an opportunity for one such analysis. ARREST RATES AND DISTRIBUTIONS : Some Comparisons Table I presents the percentages of women and juveniles (persons below age 18) arrested during 1974 for comparable crimes in India and the United States (2). In spite of the limited number of offenses included in this comparison, the most dramatic thing revealed by these figures is the enor- mous differences in the relative frequency with which women and juveniles are arrested in India compared to the United States. Indeed, for Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.) offenses women equalled only ! .7 percent of all persons arrested in 1974. In contrast, for Index crimes in the United States, women comprised 19 percent of the persons arrested in that year. Similarly, about —- 4] — 3 -percent of the persons arrested for I.P.C. crimes in India were juveniles, whereas over 45 percent of the persons arrested for Index crimes in the United States were of the same age category. TABLE I Arrests of Women and Juveniles as Percentages of Total Arrests in India and the Unitçd States, 1974* Women - Juveniles _ Offense U.S.A India U.S.A. India Murder . . ° . . . . À . . . . - 14.6 2.1 10.1 0.9 Manslaughter - ° . À- . À . À . … 12.4 1.3 10.0 0.3 Rape 0.0 0.9 19.4 2.3 Robbery . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.8 0.5 32.6 0.9 Burglary . L e . . . . ». . . . 5.4 1.2 53.3 3.6 Theft . ° . . . . . . . ». . . . . 30.7 2.0 48.9 3.8 Embezzlement 263 0.6 7.1 0.5 Fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32.6 l.1 5.2 0.4 Forgery & Counterfeiting. . . 28.6 0.0 13.3 0.0 —— * Sôurce: Computed from, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in America, 1974 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), pp., 188-189, Bureau of Police Research & Developmeat, Crime in India, 1974 (New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs, 1977), pp., 54 & 77. Besides the generally extreme differences in relative percenfages of arrests, considerable variation exists in the types of crimes for which women and children are arrested vis a vis men and adults in the two countries. The most striking of these is the large discrepancy between the percentages of American and Indian women arrested for the property offenses of theft, embezzlement, fraud and counterfeiting. Almost 30 percent of the persons arrested for these offenses in the United States are women, about double their contribution to overall arrest figures. By contrast, in India women make up less than one percent of these, less than one-half their overall arrest contribution. Comparatively, juveniles make up 45 percent of the individuals arrested for the common property offenses or robbery, burglary, and theft in the United States but less than 3 percent of those arrested for these offenses in India are juveniles; proportions that are similar to the overall differences in juvenile arrest percentages in the two countries as such. To some extent these figures represent differences in the responses of authorities to the criminality of women and children in the two countries. For example, illegal conduct on the part of women is probably less fre- quently reported (than is that of males) to authorities in both countries, but possibly even less so in India than in the United States. When reported, authorities are also probably less inclined to deal with the criminality of _ 42 _ women in an official manner in India than in the United States, perhaps depending upon the type of behavior in question (3). But differences in societal response alone cannot explain the rather large differences in the percentages reported in offcial arrest statistics. It is also quite likely that men, women, and juveniles violate laws with different frequencies and/or are engaged in different kinds of illegality — differences that for a variety of reasons may themselves influence criminalization efforts or probabilities This is suggested by the percentages reported in Table II When the percentage distributions of the persons arrested for the nine offence are compared by offence type, several observations can be made For one, regardless of country, gender, or age, the individuals arrested for these nine offenses are overwhelmingly arrested for the property crimes of burglary and theft. The arrested women and juveniles in both countries are somewhat more frequently arrested for these offenses than are men or adults generally; averaging about 78, 82 , and 90 percent for men, women and juveniles respectively. But beyond these similarities, the arrest distri- butions are quite varied. Of significance is the comparatively higher frequency with which the arrested women in India are arrested for murder compared to American women. Although the percentages of all ,persons arrested for personal crimes as a category is about ten times higher among American women than Indians (see Table I), a considerably greater proportion of the Indian women are arrested for these crimes. This is similarly, although not as dramatically, true of Indian men compared to American men. For juveniles the arrest percentages for personal crimes (especially murder) are also much higher for Indian youth; otherwise the arrest dlstrlbutlons are almost identical for Indian and American juveniles. Also small proportions of both American and Indian youths are appre- hended for embezzlement, fraud, forgery and counterfeiting. While the percentages for women are higher than those for juveniles in both countries compared to Americans Indian women are unlikely to be arrèsted for these four property crimes. Indeed, as an offense category, the arrest percentages for these offenses are con51derably greater for American women than for any other group. In this regard, except for the generally low frequency with which women and children are arrested in India compared to the United States for those experiencing this fate juveniles in both countries appear to be quite similar. This is true also of men, if to a lesser extent. On the other hand, although the vast majority of the women arrestees in both countries are apprehended for traditional property crimes, women who are arrested in India are about five times more likely to be arrested for personal crimes than are Americans, while American women are about five times more likely to be arrested for forgery and other bourgeois-type property crimes (4) _ 43 _ TABLE III Percentage Distributions of Arrests for Men, Women, and Juveniles, by Offense an Country* Offense Men Women Juveniles India U.S.A India U.S.A India U.S.A Murder . . . « . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3 l.1l 11.6 0.7 2.7 0.2 Manslaughter . . . . . . . . . . . « . 1.0 0.2 0.8 0.9 0.0 0.0 Rape . . . . . . . . . ° . . . . . . . 0.8 l.7 0.4 0.0 0.6 0.6 Robbery .… " . . » . . . . . . . . . . 4.8 9.6 1.6 2.5 1.4 6.0 Burglary . . . . . . . . . . . »À . . Û 25.2 30.6 18.4 6.3 293 30.8 Theft . . ° . . . . . . . . . . . . ° . 53.1 47.9 644 76.0 65.0 60.5 Embezzlement . ° . . . . Û . . . . . 3.1 0.4 l.1 0.5 0.5 0.1 Fraud - . . . . . . . . . . . . ° . . . 2.5 5.8 1.6 10.1 0.3 0.8 Forgery & Counterfeiting . . . . . . 0.1 2.7 0.0 3.9 0.0 1.0 TOTAL** . . . . - . . . . . Û . . . 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . (474,919) (1,054,707) (7,986) (294,789) (14.861) (589,292) * Percentages computed from, Federaly Bureau of Investigation, Crime in America, 1974 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), pp., 188-189 and Bureau of Police Research & Development, Crime in India, 1974 (New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs. 1977), pp…. 54 & 77. ** Totals may not equal 100 because of rounding. The similarities and differences in arrest distributions are highlighted by the figures in Table III which presents the ‘‘“index of dissimilarity” scores for pares of arrest distribution percentages. As suggested by this table, the distribution of arrests for American women is unlike that of any of the other groups. Thus, if gender itself were in some way a significant factor in criminal epidemiology, we would expect the scores of Indian and American women to be closer than they are. As it is, the offense distributions of American women more closely resemble those of Indian men than Indian women. The criminality of Indian women is quite different from that of American men, but their offense distribution is similar to that of Indian men suggesting that region is more significant than gender. The substantial differences in arrests for personal crimes on the part of Indian women and bourgeois-type property crimes on the part of American women probably accounts for these figures. Most similar are American and Indian juveniles, whose score of 6.8 is the lowest in the matrix. TABLE III Index of Dissimilarity Matrix of Arrest Percentages Indian Indian Indian |American|American|American Women Men Juveniles Women Men Juveniles Indian Women - . . . . 247 13.6 28.4 11.8 17.7 Indian Men . . . . . - . —— 33.8 33.9 26.2 28.8 Indian Juveniles . . . . — 16.9 16.1 14.8 American Women — 18.9 12.9 American Men . . . . À _ 6.8 American Juveniles _— Note: These scores are computed from the percentage distributions presented in Table IL. The larger the score the greater the difference (or dissimilarity) in the distributions of arrest percentages for each pare comparison. DISCUSSION Explaining the variations in the crime rates of women and juveniles in India compared to the United States involves answering two questions: (1) Why are arrest rates for women and juveniles (proportionate to men and adults) substantially lower in India than in the United States, and (2) Why (especially with regard to women) are the patterns of arrest for specific crimes so different ” Differential reaction is surely involved. But these variations in overall arrests also reflect some degree of difference in the behavior of people — behavior that is conditioned by opportunity. motiv- ational, and learning structures (5). In turn, these are affected by differences - 45 — in the level of economic development. Specifically, economic development has profound implications for the status of women and young people and the roles they normally play in society; influencing their participation in the out-of-home labor force, their relative power in comparison to men and aduits, societal expectations regarding their behavior, their life course, and the like One”s social position and role definition also influence one’s probability of being perceived as deviant (or a deviant of a particular kind) And these variables are related to the chances that one will engage in conduct with a high probability of being seen and reacted to as criminal Both of these (behaviors and evaluations of them) are ultimately reflected in official crime rates Available research suggests that the relationship between rates of crime and economic development is by no means linear or consistent (Adler 1983), especially when it comes to rates for specific categories of persons such as women within these socœtœs Marshall (1982:35), for example, notes: We know that high crime rates and high arrest rates are, usuallv_related to a high level of economical and technical cesriroment. Surprisingl, though, female arrest rates and female/mule c.. Fu: ‘kv Qs F n:21 consistently related to either the overall crinie 6 : 18 COMNFY, OF fi A ;h ! fecKno logical development Bui Ï fit 4 2OUNC hreci relsted to development, researein h that fema:v crime rates For specific types of crimes (such as fraud anc >neity sI c relates to opportunity contingencies (such as employment ou! Hcusehoid) and that these contingencies are fmienced by economic c opssent. Hartnagel (1982: 486-488) notes that the crimes commitied bv woren are like!y to mirror their traditional role in society and be consistent wih traditional female-role expectations. But Hartnagel also points ouùi that criuniriaiity Is also a reflection of role-determined opportunities to coinmt vertain types of crimes. In this regard, development may generate economic opportunities and economic needs for females within their traditional social roles, even though the actual status of women may be little changed by development. These opportunities and needs not only influence the level of female criminality but also the specific forms such behavior is likely to take. À similar statement applies equally to juveniles (Härtjen & Priyadarsini 1984). In short, level of economic development is significant as far as crime rates are concerned because it shapes opportunity and motivational struc- tures that are immediately related to criminal involvement. In addition, it determines the statuses societal members might occupy and how the behavior of status occupants is perceived and reacted to by societal mem- bers and authorities How might this help explain the crime rates of women and juveniles in India? As a pre-industrial society, India shares many features common to — 46 — other such societies, features that may be related to criminal epidemiology. For one, agrarian/pastoral societies tend to have integrative structures (usually the family or clan) that serve to inhibit the growth of deviant behavior and stimulate conformity to traditional roles and norms (Green- berg, 1978; Newman, 1980; Shelley, 1981). As such, rates of criminality are likely to be low in these societies and lower still among those persons whose social position most clearly requires normative conformity. Secondly, pre-industrial societies have few discretionary resources with which to employ service workers (such as police and judges) to control deviating members. Instead, informal mechanisms of control are relied upon, (e.g., referring the offender to a dominant family member, village elder, or other respected individual). As a result, independent of rates of criminality, rates of criminalization (i.e., formal arrests) are likely to be low, and even lower among those segments of the population seen to be most amenable to informal control — as women and children in India appear to be. Women Legally Indian women a-re probably more ‘’emancipated”’ than American women. But socially Indian women are a subject group dependent on male relatives as chaperones and sources of support throughout their lives (Goldstein, 1972). The world, for the great bulk of Indian women, is the world of home and hearth. While many of them work, few work outside the home or live independent lives as employed individuals. According to ‘the 1971 census of India, 48 percent of the male population are listed as workers, whereas only 13 percent of the women were employed and this ratio appears to have changed very little in the last few decades. Using employment in factories as a measure of “‘outside the home” employment, the ratio of women to men employed in this capacity is and has been low for the past several decades hovering around 11 percent (Central Statistical Organization, 1980: 68-69 & 354) (6). This does not mean that women are not working. Indeed they are. Their labor is essential to the farm, cottage industry, or family business. Rather, these figures reflect the fact that although working, women are not employed in the sense that they are wage or salary earners with inde- pendent incomes. Even then, few employed women in India are indepen- dent in any sense of that word, although they may in fact desire to be. Rather, working women almost universally give much of their salary to father, husband, brother, or son instead of keeping it for themselves and disposing of it as they see fit. Being unmarried and ‘“on one’s own” is practically unheard of. As Goldstein (1972: 152) notes in her study of women college graduates in Bangalore: None see any alternative for the unmarried female but to accept the practice of chaperonage and the need to eventually live with brothers. _ 47 _ They recognize the marriage state and motherhood as the prime status through which women gain recognition — and where in the world is it otherwise” At the same time their desire to work is partially prompted by the wish to be ‘independent’, to have some income and individuality of their OWN In short, even the most educated and liberated of Indian women live sheltered, almost sequestered, lives in the company of relatives and domi- nant males, being of service to the family whether that of one’s father, husband, brothers, or sons. Thus, while they may have the motivation to engage in criminality, few women in India have an opportunity to act in terms of these motives. As a consequence arrest rates for women are likely to be low. And, even then, illegality on their part is likely to be referred to a male family member and treated in an informal manner rather than resulting in an official arrest (7). Indeed, whether from need or greed, Indian women may want ot better their financial situation through illegal ways. But the opportunities to do so are severely limited for them. This is particularly true for the more sophisti- cated bourgeois-type property crimes for which Indian women are rarely arrested. Few Indian women have the skills (literacy, accounting) to commit these crimes besides not being in the position to do so even if they did. Until recently a comparatively small number of Indian women received educations beyond the elementary level and literacy rates remain extremely low for women even today. But even if educated, most women are not put in positions of financial trust, and since checks and other negotiable instru- ments are not extensively used in India, the crime of check forgery that accounts for a substantial proportion of the arrests of American women is uncommon in India. Both in India and the United States the most frequént property crime for which women (and others) are arrested is theft. That arrest rates are lower for Indian women than for Americans reflects the limited role women play even in ‘“ordinary’’ economic matters in India. However, perhaps more in India than in the United States such conduct is a response to survival needs than anything else counterbalancing the limited opportunities Indian women have to commit such crimes. Thus, for example, among the vast impoverished population of Indian women who help support their families by working as domestic servants, petty pilfering from employers is not uncommon — a form of crime that is usually ignored unless it becomes excessive or chronic. Other destitute women may steal food from shops or vendors, filch laundry from clotheslines, raid a neighbor’s crops, or other- wise act in ways that violate laws (e.g., resorting to prostitution or beg- ging) (8). This is especially likely to be true of those women who lack a family or relatives to support them: a situation which, by its very nature, means they are outside the traditional female-role relationship and are thus not as subject to its benefits or control. — 48 _ Murder and manslaughter together constitute a substantial segment of the offenses for which the few Indian women who are arrested are subjected to legal control. Research on women who murder in developed countries indicates that the great bulk o this activity on their part is directed toward lovers or other family members (see Adler and Simon, 1979). To the extent that these findings can be generalized, the proportionately high frequency of arrests for this activity among Indian women is quite understandable given the centrality of the family to their lives and the immense pressures placed on Indian women in this context. This would be particularly true, for example, of the bride in her in-law’s home, the barren woman, or the one whose family did not provide the dowry agreed upon. Similarly, the woman coerced into an undesired marriage, prevented from gaining the education she seeks, or who is simply exploited and degraded by relatives may have strong motivations to rid herself of the cause of her plight. In this regard, while opportunities to commit property crimes, or property crimes of specific types, may be more or less available to various people, such opportunities are not as restricted where personal offenses like murder are concerned. Rather, the motivations to commit the act may be more or less varied and/or the chances of escaping from situations producing these motivations may be more or less available. Thus, for example, whereas an American woman caught in an intolerable marriage can legitimately (legally and socially) escape by separation or divorce, an Indian woman in a similar situation has little recourse but to rid herself of the husband. Although it is legal, for the bulk of Indians divorce is simply unthinkable. It is quite possible, therefore, that murder would come to be seen as more tenable (9). In short, women in India are immersed in a social status and role position which tightly incorporates them into the central institutions (namely family) of the society. Although their status is low (varying by age and rank in the family) compared to men, they have a central place within the larger society. Even for those who may yearn for ‘‘liberation”’, few expect to depart much from traditional relationships. In contrast to American women Indian women are indeed a sheltered and shackled lot. What little crime they apparently commit, therefore, is largely directed against members of, or is committed on behalf of, the family. Even then, few women are placed in a position to engage in illegal activity anyway, especially those of a more sophisticated property kind, so that rates of crime generally are low among Indian women. Juveniles In a number of ways, a similar situation explains the relatively low arrest rates for juveniles in India. In the United States the high rates of juvenile delinquency found throughout the youth population have been attributed to the influences of the youth subculture and its associated — 49 _ ‘“’generation gap”, as well as the widespread opportunities for deviance provided by a post-industrial economy (see Friday, 1980; Friday & Hage, 1976; Greenberg, 1978; Toby, 1963). According to this view, the emphasis placed on one’s work-role in industrialized and post-industrial societies, and the widespread exclusion of young people from participation in the labor force, has made adolescence an extended life stage and heightened, if not actually generated, a sense of alienation among young people. Thus, being excluded from the dominant reward and normative system of the society, young people are not likely to have any strong commitment to it or its norms. Moreover, being isolated from the dominant world of adults, young people develop a separate normative and reward structure, one that can be antagonistic to that of adults. This exclusion and alienation of young people thought to be fostered by the requirements of economic development are considered responsible for the high rates of crime and delinquency exhibited by young people throughout much of the developed world. In addition, high rates of criminalization for juveniles in these countries reflect the fact that social control has become increasingly specialized and professionalized — handed over to official agencies such as the police and the courts. Especially for groups viewed as outside, antagonistic to, or threatening of the dominant society (as youth are often seen in developed societies), reliance on formal control agents increases the probability that relatively large numbers of the members of such groups will be subjected to formal control, thereby increasing their rates of arrest; something which can itself be used to justify the need for formal intervention in the first place as well as its expansion. Post-industrial economy, in short, not only provides young people ample opportunities to commit illegal acts, it also stimulates illegal behavior on their part while simultaneously increasing the likelihood that such conduc will be subjected to formal legal control. The economic situation of countries like India has just the opposite impact on juvenile behavior and its control (Hartjen & Priyadarsini, 1984). Like Indians generally, young people are emersed in an extensive network of interpersonal relationships, obligations, and ties (largely associated with the extended family and other kin). And young people in India are also provided status and sources of identify (such as jati or subcaste member- ship) quite apart from their labor-force participation. One’s work does not define the essence of one’s life nor determine one’s social and personal sense of self to the extent this is true in most developed countries. Conse quently, Indian young people not actively participating in the labor force do not experience the alienating and isolating effects that seem to exist among unemployed young people (and others) in the United States. Indeed, even though they may not be employed in the renumerative sense, Indian children and young people are essential to the nation’s economy and the well being of the family in a way that is inconceivable for youth in devel- oped countries. For one, many Indian youth do work — normally in' some — 50 — unskilled and menial capacity such as ‘’rag pickers# or eow herders, or as laborers in the family ‘’cottage”’ industry or farm. The labor and earnings of children may be all that keeps family members from starvation. In addition, children who are not employed in some renumerative capacity are of econ- omic value in pre-industrial societies. For instance, the numerous tasks involved in simply running a household in India require the active partici- pation of all family members. Thus, caring for younger siblings, collecting cow dung or wood for the fire, and fetching water are only a few of the chores routinely performed by children; tasks that make them not only members of the family but also active participants in it. And in societies that lack old-age and retirement programs children are essential to the future economic well being, indeed survival, of parents. Perhaps reflecting their economic role, children are socially integrated into the very fabric of the society — rather than being a marginal and alienated group of affiliates found in developed societies. Children are normally included in almost all social activities, an “hanging out” with peers away from the view of adults is rare. This integration of young people in Indian society helps to explainfheir low arrest rates to the extent that it reduces their motivations or oppor- tunities to deviate. Being a part of the society young people in India develop a ‘“‘stake in conformity” and a commitment to its dominant norms. They are less likely therefore to flaunt or violate those norms by acting in illegal ways. But, as with women, Indian juveniles have few opportunities to commit criminal acts, even if they want to. Being almost perpetually in the company of adults and other relatives, the privacy to deviate is rare and much deviant behavior is prevented by the simple presence of others. Thus, both because of few reasons and limited opportunities to violate criminal laws on the part of juveniles, the occasions for invoking the law are relatively few and, therefore, arrest rates are l'ow. As in the United States (and elsewhere) arrest statistics in India imply that juvenile criminality is largely a lower-class phenomenon in sofar as about three-fourths of those arrested are listed as comeing from impov- erished economic circumstances whereas only a minute percentage could be called affluent (Bureau of Police Research and Development, 1977: 86). Self report research (Hartjen and Priyadarsini, 1984) also suggests that serious forms of theft are more frequently reported by lower-SES juveniles. Nevertheless the incidence of such conduct is relatively low. Status and petty crime is found thoughout the juvenile population in India. However, while delinquency among the more affluent does occur, there is no evidence of widespread misconduct among higher-status youth. A small amount of cocane and other drug useage may be found among affluent Indian youth, but this apparently is rare and, indeed, given the rather sheltered lives of well-to-do Indian childœn undetected conduct of this kind would be nearly _ Sj _ impossible. Those young people who are arrested as offenders appear to be those who, for one reason or another, have lost a family network or sup- portive kin (Hartjen and Privadarsini, 1984). Predominant among these are homeless or orphaned youth who turn to various forms of theft to survive. Their apprehension and possible incarceration appear to reflect a social service effort whereby destitute children are provided care and education as much as a concern with preventing and punishing crime. Besides having relatively little reason to invoke criminal laws to control the behavior of young people in India, the general proclivity to treat of- fenses in an informal, unofficial, manner also insures that rates of arrests for juveniles will be low. More so than adults, children are subject to a host of control agents that do not involve the police or courts. Older family mem- bers, village and community leaders, school teachers, and adults generally can all be called upon or feel free to intervene in the case of ‘“delinquent’’ youth. Moreover because they are part of the dominant society young people are not as readily perceived as threatening, therefore they are not perceived as requiring repressive reaction to the extent that this is true of youth in developed societies. And, because of their economic participation, youth'in India have a degree of power unavailable to American juveniles. In this regard, they have a greater ability to avoid, or not be subjected to, formal control. As a consequence, their official rates of crime are low. CONCLUSION Criminality rates are likely to be comparatively low in those societies (or among the members of groups within them) that have the fewest op- portunities to commit criminal acts and/or whose members feel themselves to be meaningful participants in the larger social system and, as a conse- quence, see few reasons for violating laws or other social norms — even when they can. Given these possibilities, an understanding of criminal epidemiology requires that criminologists investigate the factors that influence opportunity structures and integrative mechanisms. Cross-national and international research implies that these factors are ultimately affected by political-economic structures. As suggested here, crime rates among women and young people in India are relatively low, in part, because these persons have little chance to break the law and/or few reasons to do so. To some extent, these contingencies reflect the features of pre-industrial economic development as it exists in India. Much more extensive research would be necessary to detail just how India’s economic characteristics, or the features of economic pre-development as such, operate to shape op- portunity and integrative mechanisms. Similarly, regardless of criminality rates, :ates cf maminaluat } 1 likely to be relatively low in those societies p "9 ainong — 52 — members of those groups within them for whom) alternative, informal, mechanisms of control are most available. In this context, women and children are not subjected to legal control in India only because they are less criminal, but because they are more subject to other forms of control and this subjugation is surely a reflection of the pre-industrial economy of India. Informal control can, of course, simply constitute a form of social, as opposed to legal, repression and could in many cases be more inconsistent, arbitrary, and severe than criminal law. Indeed, in many respects, one could argue that this is the case in India, although forces appear to operate that mediate if not block extensive abuse in this regard. But to what extent informal control is a necessary correlate of pre-industrial, and legal control of industrial development, is not known. However, it does appear to be true that economic development produces social conditions that foster the use of formal controls while pre-industrial development produces circumstances that impede their use. How this occurs is yet to be investigated to any great extent. The, admittedly limited, analysis presented in this paper is only sugges- tive of the need for much more extensive research (and theory) concerning the relationship between economic systems and the factors associated with criminal epidemiology. Studies based on aggregate statistical data can only be suggestive in this regard. They cannot demonstrate how social arrange- ments operate to inhibit or promote criminal behavior or legal control. What are needed are case studies, research based on alternative data sources (Such as self-reported criminality studies), and extensive investigations of the police and other lawenforcement agencies regarding their selection and processing of persons as criminal offenders. Research in these areas has, of course, begun. Much more of it is needed. _ 53 _ NOTES (1) My thanks to S. Priyadarsini for ther comments on this paper (2) Unfortunately, as is the common problem with using available data for comparative analyses in criminology, comparisons based on an extensive list of offenses were not possible. Fither official data in one country does not include offenses listed by another, or even when offenses are comparable breakdowns by sex, age, or other relevant variables may not be made. Thus, while they are commonly used in comparative research, the offenses included here are highly unrepre- sentative of the crimes for which people can be arrested in both India and the United States. This should be kept in mind throughout the discussion (3) That the relationship between gender and societal reaction may be quite complicated is only now becoming clear. For example, in one recent study of discrepancies in the judicial treatment of men and women, Curran (1983) found that not only were women processed differently from men but that the differences in treatment also varied by processing stage and type of behavior (4) The term bourgeois seems to nicely reflect the nature of these of fenses as a class of crimes in that they all require some degree of skill commonly associated with white-collar, middle-class, or educated persons (5) Interestingly, within India regional differences do not appear to exist in either female or juvenile arrest rates as far as relative percentages are concerned. Exceptionally high or low proportions are, of course found occasionally. But this is unusual. Thus, for example, the mean I.P.C. arrest percentage for women by state was 2.40 in 1974 with a small standard deviation of only 2.04. For juveniles the mean was 5.63 with a standard deviation of 4.64 (6) When the percentages of women employed in factories was correlated with the arrest percentages by state, only a small (pearson F 09) correlation was found. In part, the apparent lack of a strong associ ation between out-of-home economic activity and arrest rates reflects a lack of variability in arrest percentages as well as factory employ- ment percentages across states so that alternative, but not avaflable measures may produce other results. (7) While this is generally also true for men in India, given the status of women (and children) as ‘“dependent persons it is more likely that they would be accorded informal treatment than would men, except in the case of serious deviance (e.g., see Visher, 1983). Indeed, in one instance the author observed a young wife who had run away from her husband being kept locked up in a woman’s jail apart from regular inmates until her husband and in-laws could come to fetch her. Some indications of the differences in orientation people might have toward _ 54 _ offenders on the bases of their gender is included in Hartjen and Priyadarsini (1984: 139-164) but from a comparative perspective this is an issue that requires further research. (8) Available data on prostitution or related offenses in India is at best sketchy and highly unreliable. Such conduct is prohibited by the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Children Act. Offenses regarding this law are listed as ‘“special and local” law offenses rather than Indian Penal Code violations and are recorded by states and territories without gender breakdowns. However, according to the Indian officials I and Priyadarsini interviewed most of the women who are apprehended for crimes or are incarcerated as offenders have been accused as prostitutes. (9) As in the United States, highly unusual and bizarre offenders are likely to receive media attention. 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(1982), ‘“Modernization, Female Social Roles, and Female Crime: À Cross-National Investigation”, The Sociological Quarterly 23:477-490. HILL, Gary D. & Anthony R. Harris (1981), “Changes in the Gender Patterning of Crime, 1953-77: Opportunity vs. Identity”, Social Science Quarterly 62 # 4: 658-671. JONES, Howard (1981), Crime, Race and Culture (New York: John Wiley & Sons). KLFIN, Dorie & June Kress (1976), “Any Woman°s Blues: A Critical Overview of Women, Crime and the Criminal Justice System) Crime and Social Justice 5: 34-46. MARSHALL, Ineke Haen (1982)‘‘Women Work and Crime: An International Test of the Emancipation Hypothesis International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 6 #1 : 25-38. (1983)‘’The Women’s Movement and Female Criminality in the Netherlands’’, in Israel L. BaraK-Glantz & Elmer H. Johnson (eds.) Comparative Criminology, pp., 87-102 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage). NEWMAN, Graeme R. (ed.) (1980), Crime and Deviance: A Comparative Perspective (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage). PHILLIPS, Dretha M. & Lois B. DeFleur (1982), “Gender Ascription and the Stereotyping of Deviants”, Criminology 20 #3-4: 431-448. SCHWARTZ, Ira M., Marilyn Jackson-Beeck, & Roger Anderson (1984), ‘“The ‘Hidden’ System of Juvenile Control”, Crime & Delinquency 30 #3:371-385. — 56 — SHELLEY, Louise E. (1981), Crime and Modernization: The Impact of Industrialisation and Urbanisation on Crime (Carbondale & Edwardsville, [Il.: Southern Illinois University Press). TURK, Austin T. (1969), Criminality and Legal Order (Chicago: Rand McNally). TOBY, Jackson (1963), ‘“’The Prospects of Reducing Delinquency Rates in Industria Societies”’, Federal Probation 27: 23-25. VISHER, Christy A. (1983) ‘“Gender, Police Arrest Decisions, and Notions of Chivalry”, Criminology 21 #1 : 5-28. — 57 _ A BRIEF HISTORY OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN BOSTON AND À COMPARATIVE INTERPRETATION Theodore N. Ferdinand* More comparative research is badly needed in delinquency studies. Most of the current theories are based on research done in western nations at a post-industrial level of development: the United States, England, West Germany, and Sweden. Despite their obvious cultural differences, Western nations all seem to exhibit a very advanced form of delinquency, i.e., a form that expresses contracultural themes, that is rooted in well defined adolescent social groups, and that signifies solidarity with the values and ideals of these groups (Ferdinand: 285-292). To be sure other forms of delinquency abound in these nations as well: delinquency stemming from impulsive behavioral disorders; delinquency reflecting an absence of proper guidance and supervision for youths interested in adventure and pleasure; or delinquency arising from a lack of opportunity, to name a few. But these forms are found in pre-industrial and industrial societies as well. Contractural delinquency is peculiar to post- industrial societies. Comparative research can offer a perspective that research focusing on developed, Western nations alone can never reveal. It permits a develop- mental perspective, i.e., a perspective that indicates which forms of delin- quency tend to fall together into an historical pattern. ! want to suggest that we can discern three stages in the development of delinquency in the United States — wayward, incorrigible, and contracultural delinquency — and probably in other Western cities as well, and that other nations at less advanced levels of development display less advanced forms of delinquency. These stages appear in the industrializing community as the sources of criminogenic pressures shift. In the first stage the vast urban migrations that accompany the early stages of industrial development prompt a rather disorganized form of crime and delinquency. As the industrial center invents social mechanisms for integrating urban migrants, resistance to these methods springs up among some groups and sponsors new forms of crime and delinquency. And, finally, as these new forms are institutionalized, delinquency assumes a third pattern. The model presented here assumes a changing community stimulating new forms of deviancy, which in turn follow a distinctiYe path of socio-cultural change in their own right. ;"Pr0fecsnr Collage c‘ Crmina! ‘ustiice Fortheastern Universit- Bostnr :4A 021 : > CL) WAYWARD DELINQUENCY In the United States, shortly after the American Revolution juvenile crime was minimal in the pre-industrial towns of the Eastern seaboard and Wwas treated for the most part as adult crime. With industrialization, how- ever, juvenile crime grew rapidly and within a few decades had forced separate court processing and custodial institutions for juveniles. Their crimes focused largely on property, and those juveniles that were arrested were treated with leniency even when their offenses were relatively serious. In Boston the crime rate for juveniles (see Figure 1) was stable at a very low level through the 1820s and early 30s. In the mid-1830s, however, it began to rise, and by the mid-1840s it was the fastest growing component in antebellum Boston’s crime problem. Juvenile crime in Boston was directed primarily against property. Although juveniles had made a negligible contribution to property crime before 1834, by 1840 they accounted for 71.9 percent of the burglaries brought before Boston’s Municipal Court, and 36.0 percent of other property offenses. These two offense categories embraced 87 percent of their crimes in the Municipal Court in 1840. Many unattached men and boys with limited resources were among the early arrivals to the city (thus giving it a very high sex ratio) as well as whole families still oriented to the village and its pre-industrial ways (1). These people were seeking a better life, and they brought with them willingness and hope. But they were ill-equipped for urban life and often found a smooth adjustment difficult. Deviancy by default was a common result. During the first stage of industrialization, therefore, large numbers of homeless children together with children whose families have only rcently left the hinterland and can provide only limited guidance are typically drawn to the city. These children are neither employed nor enrolled in schools, and they spend much of their time roaming the city streets in search of excitement and criminal opportunities (Ferdinand: 281-283). They were an important factor in the crime wave that gripped Boston in the late 1830s and 1840s, and they are prominent in the delinquency problems of developing nations today. Âs juvenile crime mounts in the industrializing city, paradoxically, it remains as low as ever in the villages of the hinterland. The contrast in this regard between the industrial city and the pre-industrial countryside is never sharper than during this early period (Cavan and Cavan: 43-62; Toby: 122-124). The rapid escalation of juvenile crime in nineteenth century Boston alarmed city officials, and their explanations all seemed to focus on the lack — 60 — of proper parental supervision. Rather typical were the comments in 1845 of Samuel D. Parker, the District Attorney of Suffolk County. more minors have been convicted within the last eighteen months than during the five or six preceding years. The employment of so many boys in peddling small articles, such as matches, soap, fruit, etc., was one cause — the neglect of their parents to keep their children at home evenings, another — of this alarming state of morals among the young (Boston Eve- ning Journal: 1845). Their crimes though numerous and predatory were largely petty. The biggest problems these children posed were: what to do with them after they had been apprehended, and how to prevent their becoming criminals in adulthood? Their delinquency reflected the fact that neither families nor urban social institutions were shaping them for adulthood. These deficiencies meant that many children were left to their own resources both in filling their time and in preparing for the future. Many of them found companionship with other ‘“‘street arabs” and indulged in a variety of minor, utilitarian crimes. They became wayward delinquents. INCORRIGIBLE DELINQUENCY Shortly after industrialization took hold in America’s eastern cities, i.e., in the 1830s in Boston, institutions began to emerge — for example, the public schools, Sunday Schools, employment bureaus, penal institutions, YMCAs, and finally the Boy Scouts — that promised to orient these young people more effectively to industrial society. These institutions offered them basic skills that were essential to industrial careers; they fostered discipline, diligence, and dependability; and they exposed them to the logical, technical perspective of industrial society. The children who flocked with their families to the cities were absorbed into these ‘‘culture factories” (Schultz: 1973), and their free time was occupied with instruction during the day, homework at night, and recreation or religion on the weekends. The problem of juvenile waywardness seemed to be solved. But from the very beginning many children found it difficult to perform satisfactorily in the new schools. The personal discipline, the intellectual rigor, the submission to school authority and routine all proved serious challenges to some, and some of them experienced humiliation and even degradation in these new social institutions. Many of them resented this whole experience. What had seemed a solution to juvenile waywardness only induced a new form of juvenile deviance — incorrigibility. As these delinquents vented their resentment against the institutions that proved their undoing, truancy and school vandalism became chronic problems in — 61 — industrial society. These children were also defiant toward parents who pressured them to accept the discipline and goals of the schools. In short, they fought society’s best efforts to curb their childish impulses and became in the eyes of society incorrigible. The bulk of them were lower class youngsters, but a few from middle and even upper class families also found their way into incorrigibility. Another factor here was the emergence in the city of multiproblem, disorganized families that were ill prepared to socialize their children to urban life. If the mother raised the children alone, she was often thoroughly demoralized. Her own prospects were very poor; she lived from hand-to- mouth; and she could give only superficial attention to her older children and their well-being. They were unlikely to continue in school, once they reached an age to decide for themselves, but they were truant from school more through ennui and lack of interest than an inability to succeed. Their incorrigibility reflected not so much defiance of school authorities as a failure to accept educational objectives. These families reflected the rigors of urban life, especially as they bore down upon single mothers with meager resources. Unlike the migrant families that crowded into urban centers as industrialization was just getting underway, they typically reflected a long experience of urban living. The migrant families of the early industrial period were poorly prepared for urban life and could offer little guidance to their children, but they saw urban life as an opportunity. The disorganized families of mature industrial cities were demoralized and cared little for the institutions or ideals of urban society. Children as well as parents focused on the immediate and had little hope of realizing long-range goals. Like the migrant families they were almost exclusively lower class, but unlike them they were the end result of several generations of maladjustment to urban life. In Boston the juvenile crime rate as measured by police arrests reached a peak just as the Civil War began and declined steadily to one-third that level by the end of the century (see Figure 2). Incorrigibility in the form of stubborn children hit a high in the 1860s but then fell to about fifty percent its earlier level by the 1900s. Truancy also grew sharply during the 1860s and reached its peak in 1869, after which it, too, declined to the turn of the century (see Figure 3). Runaway children, however, grew slowly through- out the nineteenth century to a high point in the first decades of the Juvenile Court during World War I (see Figure 4). There is some indication, therefore, that Boston’s juvenile problem peaked around the Civil War, and much of the difficulty seemed to center on the family. As with delinquency suicide among young people also reached new highs around the Civil War (Figure War (Figure 6). Mor over, since suicides were roughly comparable among bors »11 girls durine ‘his period, the causes seem to have been rooted in t} - ‘ar:i:y whèere vos- an — 62 — girls suffered_in roughly equal proportions. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, however, boys outdistanced girls, and the problems of adolescents began to extend beyond the family — to the school. Around this time the schools themselves were also running into dif- ficulties. In the 1850°s a heated controversy erupted regarding the style of instruction and discipline to be used in the schools. Traditional educators preferred an ascetic approach to education in which children learned obedience, self-discipline, and restraint, whereas reformers favored cul- tivating the natural interests and talents of children so that learning could be a pleasurable experience and the schools could produce pupils who thought for themselves (Katz: 121, 132-142). There was no suggestion in this debate that the schools were alienating their pupils, but the ‘‘soft-line” educators were successful in imposing their philosophy on the schools of Boston and presumably the children were exposed to a less arduous experience. Criticism was not stilled, however, and in the 1880’s complaints began again: Grave fears have been entertained that such a system of high pressure as is believed to prevail at some of our high class female institutions will break down of its own folly... Everybody is going crazy from overwork and a large percentage of this trouble can be traced to the habits of school life… An intelligent person cannot spend a half a day in most of public schools in this city without remarking the bad ventilation, the Overworked teachers, the restive and strained appearance of the pupils; and when you follow these children to their houses, note the continued grinding of the daily lessons upon sensitive organizations… and see what a blight it is upon boyhood and girlhood… (Boston Sunday Herald, 1885 ). The author of this editorial was concerned that the schools and their regimen were breaking down the health of their pupils. He was not con- cerned with delinquency but with the physical and emotional well-being of the children. The point is clear, nevertheless, that there was something amiss in the schools and that it was having a destructive effect upon the children. CONTRACULTURAL DELINQUENCY These new institutions — but particularly the schools — also laid the foundation for a third form of deviance: contracultural delinquency (Cohen). In addition to the new pressures, the schools also brought troubled adolescents together where they might devise a social solution to their individual problems. The result was a new form of delinquency embracing primarily children who rejected the legitimacy of the school and its values; who chose instead a contracultural view of the world: and who often held _ 63 — little hope or desire for a conventional life in adulthood. It embraced children from a broad range of social and economic backgrounds, and the crimes they committed ranged widely — from serious violent crimes to drug abuse to minor property crimes. It was rooted in youth culture, and it represented a reaction against the dominant values of middle class society. Post-industrial society, in other words, spawned a third form: contracultural delinquency, that took shape as a symbolic statement against the new institutions of industrial society. Like the incorrigible children of an earlier era, these adolescents were defiant toward parents and school authorities and scornful of traditional values. But unlike their incorrigible predecessors contracultural delinquents established a cultural base in peer groups sympathetic with their iconoclasm. As this youth culture gathered momentum, it embraced a much broader swath of young people than just those who were at odds with adult auth- ority. It also sponsored both a much higher level and a much wider variety of deviance. The newcomers to delinquéncy included many middle class teenagers and girls who readily learned the iconoclasm of their peers. But their deviancy followed their encounter with contracultural ideas; it was not spontaneous so much as it was learned from peers. The evidence for these contracultural delinquent gangs is largley anecdotal, but it is abundant. The work of Walter Miller in Boston; Short, Lincoln, and Spergel in Chicago; Klein in Los Angeles; and Fyvel in London all point to the wide-spread existence of such gangs in Western cities. These gangs all fit a common pattern — they are iconoclastic and anti-social, narcissistic and stylish in dress. Although they are readily identifiable, they do not appear clearly in official crime data, and their impact on delinquency is difficult to pin-down with precision. They resemble only superficially the gangs of the ninetheenth century of of Thrasher’s Chicago. It is possible, therefore, to identify three distinct periods in American urban history, each with its own characteristic form of delinquency. During the early industrial period social institutions were embryonic, and urban migrants were left to their own resources. Gangs of youths gathered in the city streets, and their idleness together with the anonymity of city-life led to a sudden, burst of juvenile crime in the form of wayward delinquency. As industrial society emerged its early structural weaknesses were corrected, and the bulk of the children and adolescents were absorbed into the schools. The early form of juvenile deviance — waywardness — subsided, but only to be replaced with a new form — incorrigibility — that signaled serious problems among some children in adapting to the routines and disciplines of the schools. These children represented two distinct streams of maladjustment. Many of them were deeply demoralized by their failures in school. They — 64 _ repudiaded school authorities and rejected their values. Others were the products of long-term ineffective urban families in which the parents were dismal failures in facing the challenges of urban life. Where the children emerged of sound mind and body (and they often didn’t), they were allowed free reign, which usually meant that they ran with other kids and rejected the constraints of school. Juvenile incorrigibility could only have arisen after adolescence as a status and the appropriate social institutions had emerged. It also depended upon the appearance of an urban pattern of living with the immense re- sponsibilities it threw upon the individual. Under the weight of these pressures, many parents proved ineffective and their children often rejected the very institutions that were designed to help them mature into the adult world. Incorrigibility, therefore, was basically a defiant reaction against the urban institutions that had arisen to relieve the problems of an earlier era. The evidence for the first phase of delinquency, waywardness, and its links with an early stage of urban-industrial development is relatively strong. Nineteenth century observers commented repeatedly on the gangs of home- less, nomadic children to be found in America’s major cities and their con- nection with minor property crime (Hawes: 91; Picket: 109-115). This tradition can even be traced into the 1920s and Frederic Thrasher’s work (1927: Part II) in Chicago. The second phase, incorrigibility, is less well documented. The late nineteenth century has been inadequately studied as far as delinquency is concerned, but as we have already seen, there is some evidence regarding delinquency in general and incorrigibility in particular in Boston during this period. The third phase, contracultural delinquency, and its relationship with post-industrial society have been carefully explored in the work of Cohen, Cloward and Ohlin, Greenberg, Ferdinand, and others, though there is still some controversy surrouning its causes (Kornhauser: Chapter S). DELINQUENCY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD These three historical periods with their specific forms of delinquency clearly represent a sequence. Each period exhibits its characteristic form of delinquency, and as the institutions of the period develop, the form and substance of delinquency changes accordingly. Interestingly enough, this schema also throws light on the delinquency in the developing nations of the world. — 65 — LATIN AMERICA AND AFRICA Many of the nations of Latin America and Africa are in an early indus- trial period of development with many rootless, poverty-stricken migrants crowding into their burgeoning cities and producing among other things a heightened level of crime and delinquency. Most of the children are neither employed nor enrolled in school; and they roam freely through the com- mercial areas of their cities, catching odd jobs, stealing, and in general ° > exploiting whatever opportunities come their way (Clifford, 1974: 149-180 Clinard and Abbott: Chapter 5 ; DeFleur: 81-146). In Buenos Aires large numbers of rural migrants have gathered in suburban shanty towns and fostered several serious problems for the city including high levels of unemployment, crime, and delinquency (Germani). Disorganized families have appeared in these shanty towns in significant numbers and contributed in their own way to the severity of these problems. À limiting factor, however, has been the ‘barriadas’ that helped to establish new arrivals in the social patterns of the migrant community and in this way facilitated their adjustment to the city. These barriadas recreated the stability and personal quality of village life in the urban neighborhood, and where they appeared, the transition from the rural area to the metro- polis was eased for the migrants (Mar). In contrast to many developing cities in Latin America, San Juan, Puerto Rico, however, seems to have advanced to the stage of incorrigibility. Public education is well developed in the city, and delinquency involves mainly school dropouts from impoverished urban areas (Kupperstein and Toro). Juvenile migrants are less likely to be delinquent than youths from long-term urban poor families (Ferracuti et al.: Chapter 6), and gang delin quency is almost nonexistent (1). Delinquents in San Juan with a history of rebellion against formal education have not yet formed themselves into organized gangs. Incor rigibility is the primary factor in their delinquency, but it is directed more against the school than the family. Contracultural delinquency has not yet become a problem. THE ORIENT Some nations of the Orient — most notably India and Japan — seem to have by-passed the first phase, waywardness. Although their cities have swelled to immense proportions, their urban migrations have not involved long distances, and the unity and stability of village life has been success fully transplanted to the cities. Close communal bonds have been preserved — 66 — (Wagatsuma and DeVos: Chapters ! and 2); few homeless men or boys have ever appeared; and little delinquency developed in either India or Japan during the early stages of urban-industrial growth. In Japan urban neighborhoods are organized into informal, local associations, han, that have responsibility for the well being of the neighbor- hood (Bayley: 92-94). They organize 20 to 30 families in the immediate neighborhood into effective units furthering local initiatives, and in the process they strengthen mutual dependency and solidarity. The Japanese urban family is also unusually strong, and as a consequence the national divorce rate has actually declined as the population has become more urban (Kwashima and Steiner). Until 1968 delinquency remained relatively low, too (see Figure S). In India the picture is not so clear, but here too there is evidence that delinquency is not as prominent as in other developing countries (Cavan and Cavan: 90-95). Wayward delinquency is not uncommon in the largest cities, but the combined effects of caste and community immerse urban Indian families in a close web of control that frustrates many criminal tendencies. The Indian urban family is further strengthened by the prevalence of cottage industry, which unites all members into a whole devoted to the family’s needs. Indian juveniles rarely form cliques or gangs with other juveniles as is common in other countries. Their focus is the family and its collective goals (Hartjen and Priyadarsini: 77-82). China has also encouraged close neighborhood structures in her major cities via the neighborhood committees. These committees weave the city districts into closely knit communities. But chronic political strife and particularly the Cultural Revolution have taken their toll, and these com- mittees lack to some extent the impact of the Japanese han on family life. Though no published crime data are-available, China seems to be experi- encing mounting crime and delinquency in her major urban centers, and she IS reacting aggressively against them both with public executions and public campaigns directed to the youth (Boston Globe, 1983, 1984; South China Morning Post: p. 7). As industrialization took hold, stratification in terms of social class began to emerge in Japanese cities along side the pre-industrial caste system, and the lower classes began to show a heightened degree of family disor- ganization and pathology (Wagatsuma and DeVos: Chapter 4). Even though this family pathology was only a pale shadow of that found in the west, it Wwas responsible for small but significant amounts of crime and delinquency in major Japanese cities. In addition Japan began to assemble a modern education system, and after World War IT it was able to provide its citizens a comprehensive, com- pulsory educational system that compares favorably today with many _ 67 — Western systems. It is intensely competitive particularly at the early levels, and the emphasis it places on excellence imposes a heavy strain upon Japanese students. Those who fail experience serious stress, and suicides are not uncommon (New York Times, 1984a; 1984b Rohlen: 330-332). A national debate is underway, not unlike the controversy that surrounded Boston’s schools in the 1850°s, as to whether too much pressure in placed on children in secondary schools to excell. Though limited data are available (DeVos and Mizushima, 1962;), it seems likely that some juveniles who are sifted out of the competition for honorific careers have become alienated from traditional values and hostile toward Japanese institutions. The rise in delinquency rates in Japan since 1969 (while adults rates have declined slightly) suggests that indeed, school alienation may be culminating in delinquency among many Japanese youths (see Figure 5). There are also reports of extensive peer group formations — both delinquent and non-delinquent — among Japanese youth. The radicalization of Japanese college students stretches back to the post-war period (Krauss: Chapters 1 and 3), and motorcycle gangs (Clifford, 1976: 117) as well as delinquent gangs of school dropouts have appeared in several Japanese cities (Fenwick: 125-126; Wagatsuma and DeVos: 51-54). Adult gangs occupy an important tradition in Japanese history, and criminal gangs — both adult and juvenile — continue it into the modern era (DeVos and Mitzushima, 1967). Youthful alienation could well combine with this long tradition and aggravate Japan’s already serious problem with organized crime and gang delinquency. Japan is rapidly approaching its post-industrial phase and is beginning to show many signs of contracultural delinquency. China and India have yet to develop comprehensive public school systems and are, perhaps, decades away from the delinquency problems that industrial and post-industrial societies often encounter. SOME CONCLUSIONS My argument, as presented here, suggests that delinquency along with industrializing society shows a regular developmental pattern. In the beginning stage as migrants flood the urban centers, they overwhelm existing urban institutions, and many are left with little economic or social support. But as these rootless poor cumulate in the city, they pose a growing crime and delinquency problem. Industrializing cities meet these problems, insofar as they can, by creating associations and structures to help integrate the rootless poor into a stable, urban life. For the most part these — 68 — efforts are successful. They provide for a much smoother integration of newcomers into the urban social structure; they help prepare juveniles for industrial careers; and in general they foster the ideals, habits, and skills that are needed in urban industrial society. But these new structures contain their own problems. The social rigors of urban life prove too much for some newcomers; they lapse into a variety of personal pathologies and abandon any pretense at conventional urban life. Along with these adult casualties, many juveniles face their own troubles in the schools where a significant portion are forced to abandon their quest for honor and self-esteem and instead opt for a pattern of defiance and deviance. Moreover, these adult and juvenile outcasts reinforce one another. Children of disorganized families are often crippled in the social and academic competition they face in schools, and school drop-outs are handi- capped in the quest for an honorable adult career. An intractable lower class emerges that resists all attempts to relieve the problem. The best efforts of urban society to solve the poverty problem has instead created another: the alienated, defiant problem. Finally, as the alienated and defiant find one another in the schools and correctional centers of the city, they recognize their common plight and find social recognition with one another. They form informal groups and pursue their common goals. They institutionalize alienation and defiance. There is an inexorability to this progression, just as there is to the stages of industrialization. The third stage depends to a large extent upon the second, although the sequence is by no means inevitable, as we have seen. Moreover, the movement from one phase of crime and delinquency to the next, does not in any way eliminate the earlier one, Juvenile crime was so high in Boston during the 1860s, because not only were large numbers of young Irish migrants committing property crimes, but also a growing number of other young lads were being arrested for stubborness, truancy, and running away. Instead of succeeding one another, the phases simply merged. This way of viewing delinquency and social structure suggests that comparisons of delinquency among different cities or societies must as a first step take account of their respective levels of development. A com- parison of delinquents in Los Angeles with those in Mexico City is likely to find that violent offenses in Los Angeles are l:rgely a problem of gangs while minor property crimes are more ofter committed by individuals. In Mexico Ciiv, on the othes hand, juct the opposite is lile!y to b: the case. DMiforent taciers #re u work in “he vw0 —tues, differ uf pattercs of deha- à cuercy devetez, Lad 0. Trrentrer 1 sar nesr 4 — f3 - Cross-cultural comparisons of crime or delinquency require both a theoretical model that integrates different patterns of delinquency into a single paradigm and an indication of where the cities that are being com- pared fit into the paradigm. Otherwise, comparisons of different cities and their crime problems represent little more than idle curiosity and specu- lation This way of viewing delinquency and social structure also suggests that our efforts to cope with the problem must be adapted to its ever changing nature. The wayward Irish delinquents of antebellum New Y vere not the same as New York’s gang delinquents of the 1970s. The : !‘>r were much more cynical and anti-social than their predecessors in ti 1840s. Programs pushing pro-social skills, careers, and goals would have becn much more appropriate and would have had much more impact in the 1840s than in the 1970s. The War on Poverty of the Johnson administratio:: was certainly a disappointment as far as delmquency prevention was conce ned (Hackler, 1966; Posten, 1971). No one society presents just a single pattern of delinquency during a given epoch. But as a society develops, the complexity of its delinquency problem increases such that post-industrial societies generally exhibit all the forms of delinquency of previous eras as well as the pattern charac- teristic of its own era. Modern remedies must reflect this fact. They must anticipate several different patterns of delinquency Similarly, the institutions of juvenile justice must also be responsive to the changing forms of delinquency. The parens patriae policies of the early juvenile court were nicely designed for the wayward child of the late nine- teenth century. But they were less effective with the incorrigible child, and they seem of little value with the contracultural delinquent Our juvenile justice system is slowly adapting itself to the variegated needs of wayward, incorrigible and contracultural delinquents. Îts bifur- cated jurisdiction — status offenders and delinquents — is a clear reaction to the growing sophistication of a segment of today’s delinquents. The atten- tion given the family in the early juvenile court also reflects its attempts to deal with wayward and incorrigible delinquents In short the theoretical model outlined here offers a paradigm for understanding and comparing delinquency in societies at very different levels of socio-economic development. It suggests preventive measures as well as procedural reforms as the juvenile system attempts to cope with delinquency. It offers answers to several of the crucial problems confronting criminologists and juvenile justice professionals today It points the direction that we must go in comparative research — 70 — FOOTNOTES (1) Females outnumbered males throughout the pre-industrial period in Boston, and the ratio of males to females was still only 0.897 males to 1.000 female in 1830. By 1840, however, the ratio had switched to 1.116 males for every female, as industrialization in New England gathered momentum. (2) Criminality also by-passed first generation young people in American cities during the early part of the twentieth century (Wood: 1947 Shulman: 196-213). BIBLIOGRAPHY BAYLEY, David H. (1976), Forces of Order. Berkeley: University of California. BOSTON EVENING JOURNAL (1845), ‘“Increase in Juvenile Depravity”, February 17,p. 1. BOSTON GLOBE (1983) ‘Chinese execute 5000 since start of crime crackdown”, November 24 p. A42. (1984) ‘‘In China, juvenile delinquents are redirected with a soft touch”, March 14, p.3. BOSTON SUNDAY Herald (1885), ‘Children in Danger’, January 11, p. 12. CAVAN, Ruth Shonle and Jordan T. Cavan (1968), Delinquency and Crime: Cross Cultural Perspectives. New York: J.B. Lippincott. CLIFFORD, William (1974) An Introduction to African Criminology. Nairobi: Oxford University Press. (1976) Crime Control in Japan. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. CLINARD, Marshall and Daniel J. Abbott (1973), Crime in Developing Countries: À Comparative Perspective. New York: John Wiley & Sons. CLOWARD, Richard A. and Lloyd E. Ohlin (1960), Delinquency and Opportunity. New York: Free Press. COHEN, Albert K.(1955), Delinquent Boys. New York: Free Press. DEFLEUR, Lois (1970), Delinquency in Argentina. Pullman, Wash.: Washington State University Press. DEVOS, George A. and Keiichi Mitzushima (1962)‘‘The School and Delinquency: Perspectives from Japan”, Teachers College Record, Vol. 63, N° 8: 626-638. (1967) ‘“Organization and Social Functions of Japanese Gangs: Histori- cal Developments and Modern Parallels”, in Aspects of Social Change in Modern Japan, R.P. Dore, ed., Princeton: Princeton University Press. —71 — FENWICK, Charles (1983) ‘’The Juvenile Delinquency Problem in Japan: Application of a Role Relationship Model”, International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, vol. 7, N° 1, 119-128. FERDINAND, Theodore N. (1980), “Delinquency in Developing and Developed Societies” in Critical Issues in Juvenile Delinquency. David Shichor and Delos H. Kelly, eds., Lexington, MA: Lexington, Books. FERRACUTI, Franco, Simon Dinitz, and Esperanza de Brenes (1975), Delinquents and Nondelinquents in the Puerto Rican Slum Culture. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. GERMANI, Gino (1961), “Inquiry into the Social Effects of Urbanization in Working-Class Sector of Greater Buenos Aires”, in Urbanization in Latin America, Philip M. Hauser, ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961, pp. 206-233. GREENBERG, David F. (1977) ‘’Delinquency and the Age Structure of Society””, Contemporary Crises, Vol. 1, N° 2, Summer. Hackler, James HACKLER, James (1966) ‘‘Boys, Blisters, and Behavior”’, Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency. Vol. 3, July, pp. 155-164. HARTIEN, Clayton À. and S. Priyadarsini (1984), Delinquency in India. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. HAWES, Joseph (1971), Children in Urban Society. New York: Oxford University Press. KATZ, Michael B. (1968), The Irony of Early School Reform. Cambridege : Harvard University Press. KORNHAUSER, Ruth R. (1978), Social Sources of Delinquency. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. KRAUSS, Ellis S. (1974) Japanese Radicals Revisited. Berkeley: University of California Press. KUPPERSTEIN, L. R. and J. Toro-Calder (1969), A Socio-Cultural and Socio-Legal Analysis of Juvenile Delinquency in Puerto Rico. Rio Piedras: University of Puerto Rico, Social Science Research Center. KWASHIMA, Takeyoshi and Kurt Steiner (1960), ‘“Modernization and Divorce Rate Trends in Japan”. Economic Development and Cultural Change. Vol. IX: i, pt. 2, 213-239. LEWIS, Oscar (1966), La Vida: :: A Puerto Rican Family in the Culture of Poverty. New York: Random House. MAR, Jose Matos (1961), ‘‘Migration and Urbanization”, in Urbanization in Latin America, Philip M. Hauser, ed., New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, pp. 170-190. NEW YORK SUNDAY TIMES (1984a) ‘‘Japan’s Youth Seem Old Before Their Time”, March 11, p.22E. (1984b) ‘‘Japan Acts to Revise School System”, August 12, p. 3 PICKETT, Robert S. (1969), House of Refuge. Syracuse: Syracuse Univer- sity Press. POSTEN, Richard W. (1971), The Gang and the Establishment. New York: Harper & Row. _ 79 _ ROHLEN, Thomas P. (1983), Japan’s High Schools. Berkeley: University of California Press. SCHULTZ, Stanley K. (1973), The Culture Factory — Boston Public Schools, 1789-1860. New York: Oxford University Press. SHULMAN, Harry Manuel (1961), Juvenile Delinquency in American Society. New York: Harper & Row. SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (1981), “A tightening of discipline”, May 24, p./ TOBY, Jackson (1979), ‘Delinquency in Cross-Cultural Perspective”, in Juvenile Justice the Progressive Legacy and Current Reforms, LaMar T. Empey, Ed., Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, pp. 105-149. WAGATSUMA, Hiroshi and George DeVos (1984), Heritage of Endurance, Family patterns and Delinquency Formation in Urban Japan. Berkeley : University of California Press. WOOD, Arthur L. (1947), ‘“Minority Group Criminality and Cultural Integration”, Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol.: 498-510. _ 73 — 300 27 240 -10 180 cases per 10,000 children 10-15 years 1D 120 30 EO 30 — / —- 0N B E ( 7 0 L C mt c œ > {:‘“l'î"T7—rîl—î PR TT N (9e) GU VTC O D 07€ Source : The Municipal Court Records FIGURE 1 Juvenile Defendants (per 10,000 children 10-1 5 years) Before Boston’s Municipal Court : 1814-1850 — 74 _ 2950 2655 ‘ | 2360 2Ç65 1770 arrests _ — 1 4. à / d \A V / \ 1149 E#s € 3 :" ï ITITTITIUTITTITITITO III TUTITTTTTOTTTTTITIT T1 111 îTî‘î ! ! [ Loattrs KEÎUÎÜ H C pe '.—l \] t Ë ë e Ê O6ET 006 GT615 Source: Annual Reports Boston Police Department FIGURE 2 Juvenile Arrests (per 10,000 children 10-1 5 years) in Boston 1849-1921 _ 75 — © 135 » 20 105 9f\ arrests per 10,ÔÔO truancy children 10-15 yrs 75 cO 435 stubborn children 13 q T t TT TT Tt IERARASERR CIR CVR T e '—-À '—‘ p \J OO 611 0S8TI J9ET © ë ë 006T Ê — Û L Source: Annual Reports Boston Police Department. FIGURE 3 Stubborn Children and Truancy Arrests (per 10.000 children 10-1S years) in Boston: 1849-1921 — 76 — 90 81 72 635 34 irrests 45 36 27 18 Y v " Ct t 10111111 tai h 11 1000 e> ’_J pe M - GC 6T GIBT CLET 0661 , D CTAT Q( ‘>I Source: Annual Reports Boston Police Department. FIGURE 4 Arrests for Running Away (per 10,000 children 10-15 years) in Boston: 1840-1921 _77 — Cn arrests e =.m0 . âtn e 20000s É E rn Réte en À. À. Aa 0 N res) jocs voRn 1965 jara 1975 1ore Source: Fenwick: 120, and Ministry of Justice, Summary White Papers on Crime, Government of Japan, 1981 . FÏGURE 5 Juvenile Arrests per 1,000 youths 1+19 years in Japan: 1951-1979 — 78 — 10.93-=- 9 9 — nales n f/ » — rate per / C - 100, OOQ Î\ \ J \/. females } M- E ] / Ï'ÏlTÏ'ÏTTÏTÏTDTÏÏ'Ï'Ï'ÏTTLÏTÏTÜTÏTÆTTÏΑH l'lTJÏTÏ'ÏTT TTLÎÏTTÏ TH ÏD'TT TT co œœ e œo cCo d Qe Un O O O - O e2) O O ve O O '-—-‘ O Source: Massachusetts Department of Health. Annual Reports of Vital Statistics: 1843-1920. Note: Since no long-term data on suicides in Boston are available, I have utilized Massachusetts data, which closely reflect the trends of Boston — the single largest community in the state. FIGURE 6 The Suicide Rate Among Young People, 15-19 years in Massachusetts — 79 _ ABSTRACT Historical research in Boston suggests that developing cities exhibit a regular progression from wayward delinquency through incorrigible delin- quency to contracultural delinquency, as they develop from an early industrial, to a mature industrial, to a post-industrial stage. Wayward Delinquency is committed by youthful migrants to devel- oping cities who have no established roots. They wander the city com- miting minor crimes, and as the city develops their numbers grow rapidly. Incorrigible delinquency arises when the city institutes compulsory edu- cation and other mechanisms for socializing children to industrial society. Many children cannot accept the discipline of these new structures and rebel against them. In addition pathologic families begin to appear as the rigors of urban individualism overwhelm a small portion of the city’s inhabitants. Their children in turn often display a pattern of delinquency that reflects their pathogenic origins. Contracultural delinquency emerges when these rebellious and defiant children coalesce into iconoclastic gangs scornful of conventional values and careers. The major cities of China and India are developing some symptoms of wayward delinquency, but much of Latin America and Africa seem to be midway between wayward and incorrigible delinquency. Japan is moving rapidly toward contracultural delinquency, and many cities of the West are already there. RÉSUMÉ «BREF» APERÇU HISTORIQUE DE LA DÉLINQUANCE A BOSTON ET INTERPRÉTATION COMPARATIVE l’étude historique de la ville de Boston montre que les cités pendant leur croissance connaissent une évolution inévitable qui les fait passer d’une délinquance rebelle à une délinquance incoercible pour aboutir à une délin- quance de contre-culture, et cela en même temps qu’elles traversent les trois stades de l’évolution industrielle : archaïsme, maturité et post-industrialisa- tion. La délinquance «rebelle» est le fait de jeunes qui migrent vers les cités en croissance et qui sont sans véritable racine. Ils vont de villes en villes, commettant de petits larcins et leur nombre augmente rapidement avec le développement de la cité. La délinquance «incoercible» apparaît au moment où le milieu urbain industrialisé instaure des mécanismes de socialisation à l’égard des enfants, comme la scolarisation obligatoire. Beaucoup d’entre- eux n’acceptent pas la discipline de ces nouvelles structures et se rebellent — 80 - contre elles. De plus des familles pathogènes apparaissent pendant que les rigueurs de l’individualisme urbain submergent un petit nombre de citadins. Par voie de conséquence leurs enfants adoptent un type de délinquance qui reflète leurs origines pathogènes. La délinquance de «contre-culture» quant à elle, prend naissance au moment où ces enfants rebelles et provocateurs se rassemblent en groupes iconoclastes, méprisant les valeurs et les carrières conventionnelles. Les principales villes Chinoises et Indiennes sont en train de développer des symptômes de délinquance «rebelle», alors que beaucoup de cités d’Amérique Latine et d’Afrique semblent être à mi-chemin entre ce type de déviance et la délinquance dit «incoercible». Le Japon quant à lui est en train d’évoluer rapidement vers une délinquance de contre-culture alors que beaucoup de villes Occidentales ont déjà atteind ce stade. _ 81 — CRIME IN POSTREVOLUTIONARY CUBA Luis Salas* INTRODUCTION While some scholars have attempted to link crime to development (Clinnard and Abbott, 1973) and modernization (Shelley, 1981), these attempts have come under severe criticism, especially by Third World scholars who challenge comparability of development strategies (Zaffaroni, 1982) and argue for development theories which are unique to regional or continental concerns. Latin American criminologists have argued that economic development models which were applicable to industrialized societies during the 19th century are not transferable to modern Latin America (Zaffaroni, 1982). This is due to a variety of factors unique to the region: 1) the scope and type of dependency relationship which exists between Latin America and capitalist industrialized societies; 2) the unequal distribution of the national wealth, a factor which is closely associated with colonial antecedents and the current dependency relationship; 3) the fact that many forms of Latin American crime and/or violence are institutional responses to growing societal pressures for reform; 4) the growing inequality between debtor nations and capitalist lenders (Zaffaroni, 1982). Shelley, on the other hand, focuses her review of crime and develop- ment on modernization issues and thus seeks to avoids many of the pitfalls encountered by Clinard and Abbott (1973) (Shelley, 1981). Zaffaroni (1982: 39) counters that it is fruitless to speak of modernization in a region In which ‘…if we began to speak of development in terms of growth, we would have to conclude that our countries are commencing a process of atrophy ” if not actual decline. For analytical purposes, she groups the countries of the world into developing, developed and socialist countries. Zaffaroni (1982), likewise makes this distinction, and when he speaks of Latin America excludes socialist countries. Grouping of these countries on this basis inevitably leads to suspect conclusions. Socialist writers have supported this grouping concept since it follows neatly their argument that development, and the resulting socially dislocating factors, are not in themselves criminogenic (Viktorov, 1974). * Director, Assocta * Director, Associate Professor Criminal Justice Department Florida Inter- national University. — 83 _ Rather, the capitalist criminologist, uses development as a convenient scapegoat and fails to recognize the causal link between crime and capi- talism. If socialist countries were all industrialized European countries, follow- ing an identical political process, this grouping might make sense but they are not. To compare the Cuban economic situation, cultural background and erratic political course with that of the Soviet Union would be like com- paring the United States with Haiti on the basis that they are both capitalist countries. We will not try to group Cuba with any other country. Were we to do so, we would group it with Spanish speaking Latin American countries with large black populations but this ignores a unique cultural and political tradition which would make even this grouping questionable. This article will examine the problem of crime in postrevolutionary Cuba, placing special emphasis on those acts which have been criminalized, claims of declining crime rates, control mechanisms and Cuban explanations for the existence of crime in a socialist society. We will not focus on the individual offender but will review the effect of conditions associated with the revolutionary process on criminalization and repression decisions. Space limitations and lack of reliable data do not permit a full discussion of all crimes so that we will identify the crimi- nalization of conduct due to: 1) the new distribution of goods and the means of production; 2) the need to maintain systemic legitimacy and political stability; 3) economic development measures; 4) and, repudiation of conduct associated with capitalist corruption. BACKGROUND A persistent notion has been voiced, encouraged by Cuban officials, that prerevolutionary Cuba was an economic shambles and ‘“.…one of the most crime-ridden societies on the planet” (Brady, 1983: S). This ignores the reality of this island nation. Pre-Castro Cuba did not fit the mold of typical Third World underdevelopment. Life expectancy at birth, for example, was over 60 years, a rate surpassed only by Argentina, Uruguay, Puerto Rico and Jamaica. By any criteria, per capita income, gross national product, number of students, number of cars, telephones, etc. Cuba equalled or surpassed most of her Latin American neighbors (Luxenburg, (1981). Even though Cuba had achieved a relatively advanced level of modern- ization, there was unequal distribution of the economic success, wiih à disproportionate share of the national wealth being concentrated in .5risar, areas to the detriment of the rural population. The suecess of the k evoit..isi _ 84 _ lay in the radical transformation of this economic model into a socialist model devoted to equalizing national distribution and rural development. Unlike other socialist countries which have adopted somewhat fixed development strategies, Cuba has undergone radical shifts in their economic and political models. The first major period of reform occurred immediately after the Revolution and was characterized by radicalization of the Cuban economy and concern over the very survival of the Revolution. By 1961 Cuba had adopted a Soviet model which resulted in a loss of at least 7 % in total growth (Mesa Lago, 1981a). Some growth was perceived during the period of 1964-1965 but was followed by a period of radicalization, 1966- 1970, under Guevarist concepts which resembled the development model proposed by Mao. The economic consquences of this experiment proved to be disastrous and it was finally abandoned in 1970. The institutionalization stage which followed, along traditional Marxist economic paths, produced some growth during its initial stages which has been curtailed due to recent recessions (Mesa Lago, 1981 a). Cuba’s economic dependency on the United States disappeared during the first years of the Revolution but was substituted with Soviet depen- dency. This new dependency model is unlike the prior US-Cuban relation- ship (1). Cuba remains a monoculture economy with little prospects for industrialization or diversification and has incurred a large foreign debt with socialist and market economies. The Soviets, however, do not have direct investments in Cuba and thus have not transferred capital from the island. Additionally, the Soviets have been very lenient in their economic treatment of Cuba and while ‘“Cuba remains heavily dependent on the USSR by most criteria…, the Soviets do not seem to exploit the island economically” (Mesa Lago, 1981b: 27). PAUCITY AND RELIABILITY OF DATA AND SOURCES Great care must be exercised in the analysis of quantitative criminal justice data derived from Cuban sources. Unlike other societies, data do not appear as a compilation to be found in a spécialized journal or report. Rather, this information may be discovered in a variety of sources, ranging from official reports of the Ministry of the Interior to speeches by major political figures (Salas, 1980). The same dangers faced by US criminologists is encountered by those interpreting Cuban data. Arrest rates, for example, may merely represent a shift in enforcement or definitional patterns (Salas, 1979a). This is com- plicated by the political nature of crime statistics. The political usage of crime figures is illustrated by the fact that most information presented to the Cuban public on,national crime problems is _ 85 — compared with similar offenses in the United States or prerevolutionary Cuba (Salas, 1980). These figures, in turn, have been relied on by Cuban and foreign observers to reach conclusions on revolutionary achievements (Brady, 1983; Wald, 1978) or to analyse the political culture and measure the development of the ‘“New Man” (Dominguez, 1978). One of the most difficult problems in analyzing foreign crime statistics is the variety of legal definitions of crimes, both those which we consider to be universally defined and those that are unique to the society under study. Table 1 presents a breakdown of all property crimes which took place from 1959 to 1977 (some years were excluded due to lack of information). TABLE 1 Crimes Against Property in Cuba Year Property Crimes per 100,000 | Percentage of total Amount Population of Reported Crime 1959 543.1 18.70 1960 482.7 18.17 196 1 4616 20.37 1962 4894 20.00 1963 2326 9.59 1964 133.2 6.55 1965 372.2 17.80 1966 317.0 19.35 196 7 335.2 26.40 1968 3414 28.96 1969 203.8 33.00 1977 608.3 36.64 Sources: Jorge 1. Dominguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution (cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1978): As Servants of the People We Have Been Able to Achieve an Even Greater Understanding”, Granma, May 11, 1969., pp. 7-9: ‘Dictamen sobre el informe de rendicion de cuentas del Tribunal Supremo, leido por Julia Meceda. Granma, July 1. 1978. À cursory review of these figures would indicate that there has been a dramatic reduction in these offenses. Brady, in reviewing these statistics from 1959 to 1968, concluded that: ‘“(t) hese statistics, taken together with available journalists, travellers, and scholars’ accounts confirm my own first hand impression from studies in Cuban cities: that Cuba has broken the back of its serious crime problem” (Brady, 1983: 7). More detailed review leads to other conclusions. — 86 — The most dramatic decrease in these offenses occurred during the period 1963-1964. This dramatic reduction has been attributed by Cuban officials to a draconian law which reclassified robberies of inhabited dwell- ings as political rather than common crimes. The modification also included robberies in which the perpetrator impersonated a police or military official or participated with a minor (Salas, 1979a). The fact that the death penalty could be imposed in these cases was seen by Cuban officials as a deterrent which produced these reductions (Granma Weekly Review, 1979). When one takes into account the fact that these crimes were not reported as property offenses during this period, the conclusion, of declining rates, is suspect. By 1965, the tourts began to treat offenses as common crimes once again and the rates begaq to climb back to their original levels. Another danger in examining statistics which reflect the overall crime rate or specific crime families is the lack of information as to which crimes are being counted and which are ignored. For example, the Cuban govern- ment released a graph that purported to show the ‘’General Total of Crimes During the Period 1959-1968” (Granma Weekly Review, 1969: 7). The graph indicates a steady decline in the overall crime rate, but there is no information anywhere as to which crimes are included and which are excluded. Ignorance of these factors makes this data questionable. That these figures are among the most popular among foreign observers is per- plexing. Their widespread use results in the proliferation of inaccurate statistical analysis. (Brady, 1983; Dominguez, 1978; Wald, 1978). Research reviewing Cuban data face many of the same difficulties inherent in criminal justice statistics: incompleteness of definitional infor- mation, unreliability of data and manipulation of the content and presen- tation of such data. These limitations, so long as they are realized, do not foreclose analysis. Reported data may be pieced together with noncriminal sources to give us an idea of the way crime is perceived in Cuban society. DEFINITIONS OF CRIME The Cuban definitions of crime have fluctuated during different periods of revolutionary rule. Unlike U.S. criminal codes which tend to group offenses according to the punishment imposed, the Cuban codes group crime into crime families according to the similarity of the activity being regulated. In reviewing crime it is impossible to separate this phenomenom from the stages of revolutionary development which have determined the course of this political movement. Immediately after the revolutionary triumph, Cuban crimina! law underwent a radical transformation with a widespread reshifting of common crimes to the political crime category (Sänchez, 1974). _ 87 _— Most of these were economic offenses, which were prioritized during the initial nationalization period. An emphasis was also placed on the repression of morally offensive behavior, such as pimping and prostitution, which the revolutionaries decried as evidence of capitalist corruption. The manipulation of criminal definitions in Cuba was a result of politi- cal, social and economic events and trends. Enactment of Læw 1098 in 1963 is illustrative (Ley 1098, 1963). During this time Cuba was under economic siege and facing severe hardships. Economic measures were taken which demanded that much of the population be mobilized to agricultural areas and many homes were left unattended. Burglaries became a serious problem. The new law prescribed severe penalties, leading to the dealth penalty, for burglars, those impersonating public officials and those using minors in the commission of crimes. It also redefined such crimes as political offenses, allowing the defendant to be tried by revolutionary courts instead of ordinary courts. Revolutionary couts had been established for trials of political cases and were characterized by reduced standards of proof and a lack of procedural rights for the accused. This redefinition resulted from very practical considerations. If workers who had been mobilized to the countryside had to continually worry about the safety of their family and possessions their productivity and volun- teerism would be affected. Likewise, for a system which had as its basis the overthrow of a corrupt regime, even the semblance of official participation in petty crime was intolerable. The definition of juvenile delinquency is also illustrative of the way in which criminal definitions are modified to fit societal needs. Cuba°s flir- tations with Guevarist concepts of egalitarianism and the building of com- munism without intermediate developmental steps resulted in massive strains accompanied by rising delinquency rates (Bernardo, 1971; Mesa Lago, 1981a). During this period traditional institutions were ignored or purged, mobilizations of large numbers of young persons from urban to rural areas became commonplace, and moral incentives to increase worker productivity replaced material ones. Many changes took place during this stage which struck at the heart of Cuban culture. The role of the male was downgraded and the emancipation of women was legislated. Even basic institutions such as the family were affected by new legislation which mandated a redefinition of sexual roles within the family structure (Côdigo de Familia, 1975). The uncertainty of this period was accompanied by a great deal of social disharmony and rising delinquency rates. In 1967 minors had participated in 41 % of all crimes committed in Cuba; by 1971 the rate had risen to 50 % (Salas, 1979b). The economic and societal reforms also produced other results which in turn affected crime rates and patterns. The demographic changes which occurred during the period of revolutionary rule are illustrative. _ 88 _ Cuba is probably one of the first developing countries to have experi- enced a baby boom and declining birth rates similar to the experience of industrialized countries after World War II (Diaz Brisquet and Pérez, 1981). While one may attribute increases in crime to social and econgmic con- ditions, it is important to consider the rapid increase in the 15-19 year old age group since it is this population which is traditionally rmmost prone to criminality. In light of these distressing figures, the government amended its laws in 1973 and lowered the age of criminal responsibility from eighteen years of age to sixteen years of age (Ley 1249, 1973). While this reduced official delinquency figures, by 1977, the problem of juvenile crime remained serious, as the postrevolutionary baby boom came of age, and Castro called for a war against delinquency characterized by the adoption of more repressive legislation (Salas, 1979b). After much discussion, a new criminal code, which reclassified common crimes into their traditional categories, was adopted in 1979. The criminal code proposes twelve categories of offenses. Ten of these crime categories fit into any criminal classification scheme in Latin America while two of these: state security and economic crimes are new offenses attributable to political and economic considerations. Both of these crime categories seek to control conduct detrimental to the governmental monopolization of the means of production or challenge the political supremacy of the Party. CUBAN EXPLANATIONS OF CRIME The flight into exile of much of the Cuban legal profession effectively depleted the ranks of criminologists and penologists. A trademark of the first years of postrevolutionary rule was the equation of crime with counter- revolutionary activity and the convergence of the common and political crime categories. Convocation of the National Forum of Internal Order in 1969 was the first attempt to bring together experts in the area of order maintenance to discuss problems of crime and delinquency (Salas, 1979a). Two important resuits of this meeting were the decisions to revise all legal codes, leading to unifermity of the judicial system, and the selection of psychology as the dominant social science in the criminological and treatment fields. Cuban criminology has been deeply influenced by Soviet thought (2). The Cuban theories of criminality, like their Soviet counterparts, presup- pose the malleability and perfectability of human beings and the social causation of deviant behavior. Capitalism is at the core of all criminality. Crime is a function of capitalist society which tries ‘““to maintain some level of delinquency, within determined limits…”’ Hernändez de Armas, 1977:295). _ 89 _ The abolishment of capitalism is the first stage toward the eventual elimination of crime. Cuban explanations for the persistence of crime in socialist society can be characterized as political and nonpolitical. Political explanations tend to place blame on capitalist influences. Nonpolitical explanations may be divided into psychological and functional explantions. The primary cause of delinquency is the class conflict inherent in capitalist society. Socialism is merely a preliminary stage in the building of a communist society and during this period there will be remnants of capitalism which persist and influence criminal behavior (Viera, 1977). These remnants express themselves as negative ideals such as individualism and selfishness which are transmitted among subcultural groups (Hernändez de Armas, 1977). In addition to these innate conditions, negative values may also be transmitted as part of a capitalist conspiracy to corrupt Cuban society ; especially its youth, who are the target of publicity campaigns aimed at encouraging the development of such values as hedonism and individuality. Institutional failure is also responsible for the persistence of criminality. Institutions serve two primary functions in the struggle against crime: they are instrumental in the development of socialist consciousness, and; create the proper environment for the suppression of criminal activity (Salas, 1979b). Primary emphasis is placed on the family and the school as the principal agents of socialization. The family bears the principal responsibility for childrearing and formation of the “New Man”. Much of the commentary regarding errors in childrearing have centered around discipline and methods of parental control. Campaigns have been carried out to educate parents in positive and nonpunitive methods of discipline (Salas, 1979b). These efforts to reform patterns of discipline are geared at changing traditional familial roles in which the father played a dominant and authoritarian role. The government has recognized that modification of these family patterns has turned out to be a more difficult task than expected (Martinez Alier and Martinez Alier, 1974). Recent changes in the economic system demanding greater skills, required for a planned economy, have also given rise to other concerns. Foremost is the fear that selection of the most promising students for special schools may result in the creation of an elite class. Fidel Castro, referred to this when he encouraged adult family members to control the emergence of elitist feelings among their children (Castro, 1978). Other institutional failures also contribute to the existence of criminal activity. The order maintenance apparatus is blameworthy since it is charged with reducing criminal opportunities. In addition to these orcrational — 90 _— deficiencies, there are certain social and economic conditions which allow criminal behavior. Some of the most identifiable faults are lack of consumer goods, bureaucratism, lack of professionalism among State workers, and inordinate emphasis on moral incentives. Another assumption of Cuban criminology is the negation of crime as a necessary social condition. Cubans have stressed, for example, that modern- ization and development do not lead to increased criminality. The fault is not with modernization but rather with capitalist development models (Sanchez Garcia, 1976). Psychologists have been influential in the development of Cuban criminal policies. Âs early as 1963, Cuban psychologists were arguing for the primacy of their science in dealing with offenders since these people were, after all, mentally sick (Salas, 1979a). Recent governmental reforms indicate that greater importance will be devoted to the scientific study of crime but future reforms will be carried out in accordance with historical legal notions. Adoption of the criminal code signifies a belief in the deterrent effect of penal sanctions that have, in general, been made harsher. The fact that recidivists have been singled out for especially harsh sentences may signify a conclusion that certain criminals may be beyond rehabilitation. Reclassification of prostitution as a crime may also signal a retrenchment from the treatment model advocated earlier. The premise behind the code is a return to legal methods of dealing with offenders under the concept of social defense. Comments by Fidel Castro (1980) at the National Assembly confirm the prioritization of criminal sentences as the primary tool in combatting crime. At that meeting, Castro criticized the leniency of penal provisions in the Code, and argued for greater severity and an increase in the maximum penal terms available for serious crimes and recidivists. The return to legal means of social control is primarily due to the resurgence of the legal profession. The rehabilitation of this profession, whose status had been downgraded during the Guevarist period, is a direct resuit of the planning model adopted in 1970 and has led it to assume a position of leadership in the determination of criminal policy (Salas, 1983). PRIORITIZATION OF CRIMES AGAINST THE STATE AND THE ECONOMY In outlining the differences between socialist and capitalist criminal policy, the President of the Cuban Supreme Court recently justified the harsher ‘reatment of oftenses vhich challvige the economic premises of the collecitve “ystem and natiorai owrership of }e ‘zeans 67 production. T:, < — 34 - behavior, be explained, which threatens the survival of the economic and political system is thus akin to counterrevolutionary activity (Varona Duque, 1983). Many of the crimes defined as undermining the national economic policy were first classified as counterrevolutionary crimes but have since been redefined as economic crimes. Some of the behavior prohibed by this section includes failure to meet economic, production or safety goals, abuse of power by officials, revelation of economic secrets, consumer fraud, hoarding and speculation, squatting, illegal sale of goods and currency trafficking (Salas, 1979a). Cuban officials point with pride to the elimination of official corrup- tion, an integral part of prerevolutionary history. After independence from Spain, corruption became endemic in government. Even though most governments entered with promises of ending corruption, they soon suc- cumbed to the same practices. One of the first acts of the revolutionary government was the enact- ment of legislation which upgraded the sanctions in cases of graft (Salas, 1979a). In addition, these offenses were redefined as counterrevolutionary crimes, placing the defendants under the jurisdiction of revolutionary courts. There is very little information on the number of corruption cases since the revolutionary takeover and much of this information is misleading since any theft from state enterprises is now considered to be public graft. In 1963 there were 422 cases of misappropriation, and by 1968 the figure had reached 3,022 cases (Granma Weekly Review, 1969). By 1977, thefts by public officials accounted for over $ 1.7 million during a six month period, while a similarly high figure was recorded during 1978 (Granma, 1978b). While prevolutionary corruption was based on individual greed and the acquisition of material wealth, postrevolutionary corruption is characterized by the enhancement of power and status. Dominguez (1978: 231), in his study of Cuban politics, points out that ‘“(c)orruption in revolutionary Cuba primarily, but not exclusively, takes the form of using power to obtain access to other things; it does not often involve money, not necessarily out of revolutionary virtue but because of structural change-money no longer mediates power and the goals of corruption... Power itself became the currency of corruption”. Abuse of power takes many forms. Efigenio Amejeiras, a prominent guerilla leader and subsequently a Central Committee member and chief of police was accused in 1966 of using his position for immoral purposes (Salas, 1979a). He recanted publicly, escaped prosecution and is now hailed as a revolutionary hero. — 92 — The desire to maintain power has also led to violations. Andrés Castellanos, general secretary of the Communist Party in a municipality altered the records of sugar cane cutters to aggrandize their production figures. Although he was fired from his post, he was not charged with any crime and maintained his party membership (Dominguez, 1978). Abuse of official positions to maintain and exercise power does not evoke as strong public reaction as the acquisition of material wealth. Most of the latter cases involve misappropriations. The description of such an offender is reminiscent of the description of white collar criminals in capitalist countries: in general, the personality of one who commiits it is different from that of the habitual criminal, the thief, the marijuana smoker, for example. He is always a worker- since in order to misappropriate he must be a worker. In general he never commits the crime again (Granma Weekly Review, 1969: 9). Thefts from state enterprise may range from petty appropriations to large scale organized rings. For example, in a 1980 case, a theft, by adminis- trators and employees of more than 25000 sacks of detergent worth $ 1.3 million pesos was reported. The participants, as well as superiors, who had taken bribes or were found negligent, received harsh prison sentences (Bohemia, 1980). Misappropriations are treated very harshly. The harshness of the penal sanction is underscored by the fact that most sentences carry caveats that bar future State employment. In a system in which the State is not only the principal employer, but oftentimes the only employer, this sanction may be akin to banishment. One of the primary economic crimes faced by the leadership is black marketeering. Since 1961 there has been a continuous increase in the demand for consumer goods without a proportionate rise in their avail- ability. This has been accompanied by a greater supply of income to the population without a corresponding increase of goods on which to spend it. In order to control the distribution of goods, the government intro- duced rationing in 1962. The black market became a pervasive element of Cuban economic life almost from the inception of rationing. It spread across all commodites and involved, both as sellers and buyers, a large proportion of the population (Lewis, Lewis and Rigdon, 1977a). Even state agencies Wwere not exempt from participation in the black market. One case, for example, involved a state pharmaceutical firm which was purchasing goods on the black market to meet production goals and raising prices illegally to appear to be cost effective. The organizational goal appeared to be adminis- trative survival, not personal corruption, and the black market was the most viable source of goods needed to meet production targets (Salas, 1979a). — 93 _ Illicit sale of consumer goods was associated with small businesses (3) while illegal sale of agricultural products was primarily carried out by smalil farmers. In addition to these small merchants, organized gangs have also been involved in the black market. One group of forty-four persons, for example, was arrested in possession of enough rice to fill the monthly needs of 7,650 consumers (Salas, 1979a). The government has been selective in its repression of this crime. In the case of small businesses it waited until 1968 to act decisively in curtailing their activity. Farmers, on the other hand, have largely been left untouched. Most criminal legislation penalized the purchaser of black market agricul- tural products, leaving the farmer unregulated (Salas, 1979a). This was apparently due to the favoritism which the government accorded to rural areas and its inhabitants. While the government has attempted to regulate this conduct by criminalization, legal enforcement does not appear to have had much success. The most successful attempt to curb this activity is the legalization of much of this conduct by lifting of economic restrictions and decrimi- nalizing the behavior. Another area of economic regulation encompasses crimes against state property. The largest percentage of these are classified as property crimes. For reporting purposes all thefts of property, private and public, are re- ported as property crimes. As late as 1977 and 1978, these crimes consti- tuted approximately 36.34 % of all crimes prosecuted by the Cuban ju- diciary (Salas, 1979a). Property crimes have been characterized as presenting some of the most serious threats to the socialist well being since they are the most ‘“typical reminiscences of the capitalist mentality” (Castro, 1977). They also affect development targets. Mobilization of workers in production tasks facilitates the commission of many of these crimes and economic plans could be affected if workers felt leary about leaving their homes. Overrepresentation of juveniles, over 41 % of these crimes involved minors, is viewed as a failure of those institutions in which there has been the greatest investment to develop the ‘“New Man”. (Salas, 1979a). Lastly, they involve much of the population (4). All of the figures reported by the national government indicate theft, both from private and public entities, to be a serious problem. They have increased from 379.33 per 100,000 in 1960 to 559.42 per 100,000 in 1977 (Salas, 1979a). Of these, the majority are minor thefts, with 51.72 % being thefts of property worth less than 25 pesos (Granma, 1978a). State concern over this problem is also justified due to the high nro- portion of juvenile participation. In 1967, for example, minors acconnted for 27 % of all thefts (Con la Guardia en Alto, 1©49). — 94 — Robbery is the most serious property crime since it involves not only the taking of property but also the placing of someone in physical jeop- ardy (5). Robbery rates have ranged, during different periods, from 25 % of all property crimes to 11 % (Salas, 1979a). As in thefts, minors are also heavily involved in robberies. Up to 12 % of all robberies in 1968 involved minors, acting alone or as members of groups (Salas, 1979a) (6). One of the most unusual aspects of this crime is the existence of organized rings operating in both the taking of property and its distribution. Oscar Lewis, for example, reports an incident in which seventy-two army personnel were arrested for stealing materials from state warehouses (Lewis, Lewis and Rigdon, 1978). | The centrally planned economy of Cuba required laws to regulate the labor force. Penal law has also been used to control worker conduct and productivity. The first legislation sanctioning worker conduct was passed in 1962. This law imposed monetary sanctions for lateness, early departure from work and unjustified absences (Mesa-Lago, 1963). In addition, the Ministry of Industries established a work camp for the rehabilitation of supervisors and employees who had committed serious faults in carrying out their duties (Salas, 1979a). Consolidation of labor control mechanisms was a primary motivation behind the enactment of the ‘‘Law on Labor Justice”. Violations of the law included tardiness, absenteeism, disobedience, negligence, lack of respect to superiors, damage to equipment, fraud and robbery (Mesa-Lago and Hernändez, 1971). The primary sanctions were monetary fines and loss of Wages to be administered by new labor courts. These new measures were ineffective in increasing worker productivity demonstrating the failure of the Guevarist notions of nonmaterial worker incentives. By 1970, Castro complained that 20 % of the labor force was absent from their work site daily (Dominguez, 1978). This led to a redefi- nition of the role of labor unions, economic reforms and the enactment of the ‘“Law Against Loafing” (Kennedy, 1973). One of the most interesting aspects of the law against loafing was the Way it was presented to the Cuban people. À draft of the new legislation Was published in all the major newspapers and a massive discussion of the new law took place, with some three million persons participating (Kennedy, 1973). At these assemblies, participants were encouraged to condemn the evils of loafing and to engage in demonstrations against loafers. In some of these meetings effigies of loafers were burned (Salas, 1979a). The three primary targets of the legislation were: those who were physically able to work but remained unemployed, those who had aban- doned their work place for more than fifteen days without authorization — 95 — and those who had been punished by work councils repeatedly. When there are no aggravating circumstances, the loafer may be sent to a work camp or subjected to house arrest for a period not greater than a year. Those with aggravating circumstances, such as repeaters, may be sentenced to a rehabili- tation center for a period not to exceed a year. One of the most unusual aspects of the law is the transfer of essentially penal jurisdiction from the traditional court system to the labor courts. ÀA special concern of the drafters was the coverage of the new law. While the law presumes that all men from 17 through 60 and all women from 17 through 55 are physically able to work, it exempts women and farmers from its coverage. The decision to exclude women was only reached after a great deal of debate. Labor Minister Risquet explained this dilemma: There are men and there are women. The problem isn't the same for both. Women have the job of reproducing as well as producing… Politically, our people wouldn't understand if we were to treat men and women alike (Granma Weekly Review, 1970). The short-term effect of the legislation was positive, with many of the previously unemployed being incorporated into the work force. All indi- cations are that the courts were lenient with the cases presented and that few cases actually resulted in the application of severe sanctions. The success of the law may be attributed to the deterrent effect which it had as well as the peer pressure which was brought to bear by workers (Salas, 1979a). The recent downturn of the Cuban economy has brought renewed complaints from the leadership about worker laxity and lack of produc- tivity and has resulted in new labor legislation which facilitates the impo- sition of sanctions by local labor organisms. Again penal law has been used as a tool of behavior modification. TRADITIONAL CRIMES While economic crimes are a clear byproduct of the new socialist political model, the majority of crimes are common to most cultures and existed prior to the revolutionary takeover. Yet even in these cases, the political model affects the way in which these crimes are repressed and viewed. We have selected traffic offenses for in depth examination of their relationship with modernization, the scarcity of goods in Cuba and the universality of the offense. Traffic violations are viewed by many as not being important enough to be considered as crimes even though driver behavior is primarily regulated by police. — 96 — By United States standards, Cuba should not have very many traffic accidents. There are a relatively small number of vehicles on the roads due to decreased importation of vehicles, high gasoline prices and a shortage of replacement parts. The scarcity of cars and parts has led to a variety of illegal practices designed to satisfy consumer demands. The State, in turn, has responded by enacting legislation regulating the sale, disposition and repair of automobiles (7). While traffic violations are decriminalized and downplayed in import- ance in the United States, discussions of traffic accidents have occupied the vast majority of space in publications devoted to criminal matters as well as speeches by major political figures (Salas, 1979a). The importance of this behavior to the Cuban government is largely due to the economic con- sequences of their political actions. Because of the scarcity of vehicles and the lack of production facilities, most new machinery has been imported from socialist or capitalist countries Willing to extend credits to Cuba. This has resulted in large expenditures of foreign currency on these items (8). Losses due to accidents represent prohibitive costs to Cuba?s strained economy (9). Salas (1979a) reviewed traffic accident figures for the period 1963- 1971 and concluded that while the total amount of traffic accidents decreased during certain periods of time, the severity did not, as shown by the rising rate of deaths per accident. This trend continues today (Castro, 1980: 48). While urban areas were overrepresented in the number of total accidents, due to the amount of vehicles in those areas, the rate of death in rural areas was higher. This was probably due to the condition and nature of rural highways. If one reviews the rise and fall of rates throughout the years, one finds that they correspond to development efforts taing place at the time. During periods in which there was a high degree of mobilization of volunteer labor to rural areas, the rates seem to increase, while they are reduced as the emphasis on mobilization decreases. Cuba, like other societies has faced the problem of a lack of stigmatiz- ation and popular condemnation of vehicular deviance. This has been attri- buted, as elsewhere, to the newness of traffic legislation and the universality of the conduct. Castro (1971) (10), emphasized this when he complained that: AIl crimes are not the same. Sometimes we see people of whom we have a good concept. Sometimes we even see Party militants in jail. What did he do? Well he violated the traffic laws. We do not consider the traffic violator as a criminal, but he is a potential criminal because of irresponsibility (Castro, 1977). -_97 _ Traffic offenses in Cuba, for the most part'have been de facto decrimi- nalized, with only the most severe offenders receiving penal sanctions (Salas, 1979a). Since Cubans have concluded that harsh sanctions are not effective or practical, they have relied on massive educational campaigns aimed at curbing driver negligence. Traffic law violations are not normally thought of as crimes either by legislators or criminologists. Yet they involve a serious threat to the physical well being of citizens and a great economic hardship to the State. In a society such as Cuba where these losses are a serious impediment to develop- ment efforts, the seriousness of the offense takes on larger proportions. OFFENSES ATTRIBUTED TO CAPITALIST CORRUPTION Certain offenses, such as prostitution and gambling were defined by the postrevolutionary government as generated by the corruptive elements of capitalism. Substantial efforts were devoted to their eradication. The elimination of prostitution is one of the achievements that the Cuban government is proudest of. Brady, in his review of Cuban criminal policy, praises these efforts and quotes” …several scholars (who) estimated that prostitution was, for women, the third leading form of employment” (Brady, 1983: 6) (11). While there are no reliable figures, everyone agrees that it was a serious problem. Approximately three months after the revolutionary victory, raids took place in some parts of Havana and prostitutes were detained, fingerprinted and photographed. They were advised to have periodic medical certificates that had to be updated weekly (Lewis, Lewis and Rigdon, 1977b). In 1960 the government took some steps, resembling prerevolutionary efforts at restricting areas of employment, by establishing tolerance zones, usually located in areas contiguous to residential areas. These efforts were not aimed at eliminating prostitution, but rather at facilitating its control, especially in medical terms (Randall, 1974). The first concrete move against the trade came in 1961 with the enact- ment of legislation which declared pimping, along with alcoholism and drug addiction, to be precriminal behavior. This change allowed police to detain pimps without resorting to the traditional court system and to transfer them to ‘‘rehabilitation’’ camps (Randall, 1974). Prostitutes were also rounded up and encouraged to enter rehabilitation programs. Those who refused were harrassed and barred from working for specified periods of time, usually fifteen days (Rojas, 1973 ). Upon completion of training they were given housing, employment, counseling and were supervised to prevent a reoccur- rence (Salas, 1979a). These measures were continued and by 1966 organized prostitution was effectively eliminated. - 98 _ There is some prostitution in Cuba today, although not organized and involving girls working part-time in order to obtain material goods from tourists and sailors visiting the island. Castro complained of this as he warned that the government would not allow a resurgence of prostitution with the increased tourism (Castro, 1977). To many observers of the Cuban efforts to eradicate prostitution, one of the most unique features has been the systematic may in which the problem was attacked and the contradiction of allowing recalcitrant prosti- tutes to continue to work almost under government sponnsorship as late as 1966. Lockwood (1969), in an interview with Castro, expressed his perplex- ity that ‘‘posadas’” were allowed to continue, albeit under State control, as centers for sexual encounters. Castro explained: aturally these centers to which you refer have been in operation because they satisfy a social need. Closing them makes no sense. There have not, of course, been resources to augment them. But what has been fought differently is prostitution. That is a vicious, corrupt, cruel thing that gener- ally affects women of humble origins who, for an infinite number of economic and social reasons, wind up in that life. The Revolution has been eliminating it, not in an abrupt, radical and drastic way, but progressively, trying to give employment and educational skills to the women so that they might learn other skills that would permit them to work and earn a living in a different manner (Lockwood, 1969). Recent enforcement drives indicate that a hasher position has been adopted. Prosecutors are compelled to seek incarceration, for not less than a year, in every prostitution case. In 1978. reeducation measures were felt to be inadequate to cope with the dramatic increases and the behavior was declared a crime. Gambling in Cuba has a long and varied history. The most interesting feature of most forms of gambling is that they were institutionalized and controlled by the government. The large amount of money involved in- evitably led to corruption and the involvement of organized crime. The Revolution led to a massive flight of organized crime figures who ran the of casinos in Havana but gambling continued unimpeded. One of the greatest anomalies of this early period was the coexistence of revolutionary fervor alongside the opulence of casinos. Thomas (1971: 873) explains this con- tradiction by ‘‘the reluctance to increase unemployment by dismissing the croupiers. But it also served to keep some counterrevolutionaries from other temptations’’. By 1961 all casinos had been closed. The most prevalent form of gambling was the national lottery which Was operated by the government and had provided one of the primary mechanisms for corruption among government officials. The lottery was restructured in 1959 and continued in operation during the early years of — 99 _ revolutionary rule. In 1968, Cuba’s own ‘‘cultural revolution” took place with the nationalization of small businesses and closing of bars. In this atmosphere of socialist puritanism, the existence of a state operated lottery was contradictory and it was formally abolished (Salas, 1979a). Most forms of gambling were barred during the early revolutionary years, except for cockfighting. The government explained its reluctance in the following way: “(n)aturally some of these forms of gambling are so ingrained that they are not easy to eradicate. We have, for example, the case fo the cockfight which is a form of gambling entrenched in our rural areas. This explains why the Revolution has not taken steps to abolish it’’ (Castro, 1961: 45). The Cuban example presents the contradiction of a revolutionary government maintaining gambling, albeit temporarily, as an official insti- tution. The reasons were varied. À very practical reason was that this sector employed many persons who could not be absorbed easily into the econ- omy. Gambling provided sorely needed funds to the government and retired from circulation money that might otherwise have entered the black market or been used in courterrevolutionary activities. Social functions were also served by the maintenance of this activity. Cockfighting, for example, provided lower class men a traditional form of entertainment as well as a mechanism for the relief of frustration. To a large extent, many of the measures adopted by the system have been aimed at creating new activities that contain many of the characteristics found in gambling. CONCLUSION The Cuban development process illustrates the futility of grouping countries Or assigning direct linkages between crime and modernization. Cuba lies between the socialist model and that of the developing countries of the Third World. The Cuban Revolution occurred in one of the most advanced nations in the hemisphere but by all international standards of development Cuba was still a developing country. The gains of modernization were however unequally distributed among the population with the greatest imbalance in the rural-urban distribution. The new government moved quickly to abolish class distinctions, among their some major achievements. The most notable gains of the revolutionary government have been a dramatic decrease in the rate of illiteracy, expansion of educational opportunities at all levels, improvements in health care (life expectancy, for example, is 72 years) and attempts at reforming cultural traditions of sexism and racism. These gains however, have generated severe strains in the Cuban social fabric. — 100 — Cuban officials have claimed that one of the greatest achievements of their regime has been a radical decrease in criminality which, in their view, was directly linked to the capitalist model. Foreign observers have been quick to accept these claims yet all the evidence points to the fact that Cuban officials consider this to be a major societal problem which shows no signs of disappearing. Cuban officials ascribe criminogenic conditions to the capitalist model yet refuse to consider that their economic model may also display crimi- nogenic factors. Crime is a factor of legal definitions and these in turn are deeply affected by cultural, economic and political conditions. Definitional shifts occurred throughout the criminal spectrum. Burglary was redefined due to its effect on mobilization efforts while the delinquency age was lowered, assumedly because of the new role which youngsters were to play in Cuban society. Myriad economic acts were criminalized due to the threat they presented to the new economic order. In dealing with radicalized social systems, the tendency is often to forget that all societies have a past and that past has substantial impact on the course of future events and criminalization decisions. Women, for example, were exempted from the law on loafing due to the historical role of women in Cuban culture. Cockfighting was never outlawed because of its rural roots. Traffic is a crime category which illustrates the difficulty of crimi- nalizing conduct which is not socially sanctioned. Cuban leaders, for example, recently admitted that imposing greater penalties on drunk drivers was impractical since the offense did not carry a serious stigma and neither judges nor the population would be willing to impose severe penalties on this crime. While political and systems are influenced by many concrete factors, they are also motivated by abstract principles, primarily ideology. This is particularly true in the case of Cuba during the Guevarist period. One of the main ideals of the Cuban Revolution was ruralism and the negation of urban life. While the city was a parasitic growth, the countryside was seen as a depository of the values of the ‘“New Man”. Crime was a product of the urban environment and would not be found in rural areas. Adherence to the rural ideal led to differential treatment of problems. The regime demonstrated a reluctance to move against farmers even when they were in violation of the law. The most concrete example was the black market in which sanctions were addressed primarily at the consumer rather than the perpetrair:r. While the lottery was abolished, the govern- ment f3 : to move ugainst cu.kfighting. This ‘eniency was based on Puiiticai vor:1ders-ions and ‘h - “lew ot 1ie peasant ©3 à vctun of hs en- Virorment 1J the oppic:sun . " f the hande c£ oapiralist lancCow.u cS. 101 This tolerance was also demonstrated in the treatment of prostitutes who were viewed as victims of capitalist exploitation. Criminalization serves a variety of purposes and in a revolutionary process one of the main ones is a symbolic rejection of capitalist inmorality. Corruption thus became one of the primary targers of the revolutionaries. Offenders were treated differently, with the harshest sanctions being applied to those officials who acted out of materialistic motives and leniency expressed toward those who acted to acquire or enhance their power. The elimination of gambling and prostitution are also illustrative of t!’ :henom- ENOM. Adoption of the new economic model resulted in the greates: “umber of new offenses added to the criminal code. Economic crimes are perceived - by the leadership as presenting the most serious threat to the existe O1 the new political and economic order. Property crimes committed ag-iust State enterprises now become economic crimes against the State. The na:ure of corruption changes and embezzlement from enterprises is perceived as more serious. The greatest difficulty in dealing with Cuban issues is the radical shifts which occurred in the economic and political models adopted during the revolutionary process. During the Guevarist period there was an emphasis on political considerations at the expense of economic planning and a resort to treatment modalities and peer pressure as means of social control. Since economic sanction and reward mechanisms were absent, worker conduct could only be regulated by resort to public condemnation and legal repression. Institutionalization has brought about a rebirth of legalism. Nonlegal penalties have been abandoned in favor of traditional legal sanctions and there is a new emphasis on the deterrent, not rehabilitative, function of criminal law. On the other hand, there has been a reduction in the amount of conduct which is criminally regulated since there are now economic reward mechanisms. The government, for example, has realized that certain forms of black market activity cannot be controlled through law and has moved to expand the availability of consumer goods and to allow a certain degree of private enterprise. Crime is not a product of any one factor but a consequence of a variety of forces and trends. Delinquency rates, for example, have risen in accord- ance with the demographic composition of the population. Birth rates, on the other hand, have been affected by government policies. During the period of greatest mobilization, for example, Cuba displayed a very low bith rate. Increased longevity, while a lofty goal, places new strains on an economy which is unsuited to care for a large elderly population. Expansion of educational opportunity creates a large group of young people with greater training than the economy can satisfy. Prioritization of rural — 102 — development may create a disenfranchised urban lower class who may become disenchanted with unmet promises. The Mariel boatlift is illustrative of the effect which nonlegal and non- developmental events can have on criminality. The year following the exodus, crime decreased in most areas of Cuba. The Cubans have recognized that the exodus had some effect on this decrease. This may be due to the following factors: 1) the amount of serious recidivists who were exiled; 2) the disproportionate representation of young males among the entrants; 3) the decrease in the demand for services which the exiles had represented ; and, 4) the elimination of thousands of dissatisfied citizens. Cuba’s history of socialist development illustrates the difficulty of grouping countries into camps in accordance with economic, political or cultural variables. Shelley (1981) and Zaffaroni (1982) chose to group the countries of the world into developed, underdeveloped and socialist camps. Under this scheme Cuba would be grouped with such diverse coun- tries as China and the Soviet Union yet this ignores the course of Cuban history, those forces which influenced it and its current economic reality. While Cuba is undeniably a socialist state it is at least as influenced by its Latin American roots and economic dependency as it is by its ideology. As such it continues to be an underdeveloped country with many of the characteristics of its capitalist Latin neighbors. To group it solely on the basis of broad political principles and then to make broad comparisons leads to erroneous conclusions as to Cuba and the groups used for analysis. — 103 — NOTES (1) Soviet economic assistance, excluding military aid, has quadrupled since 1974, reaching about three billion dollars in 1979. This increase was the result of falling sugar prices and rising costs of petroleum products. This three billion equaled about one quarter of Cuba’s GNP for that year. This did not include purchases of 72% of Cuba’s exports as well as selling to Cuba about 75 % of Cuban imports (Theriot, 1982). 2) The clearest example is the work of Margarita Viera (1977) who has published the only Cuban textbook on criminology and refers primar- ily to Soviet authors and experiences. (3) After the revolutionary takeover, Castro moved to nationalize the majority of large businesses and those owned by persons who field the island. Small businesses continued to be operated privately since they provided the system with a variety of political and economic benefits. By 1968, in the midst of radicalization of the economy, Castro moved to close down these businesses, singling them out as one of the primary causes for a black market economy (Salas, 1979a). Beyond the immediate goal of curbing illegal activity, this drive also served to shift blame for many of the economic failures of the regime, a factor which cannot be discounted in criminalization or enforce- ment drives in the area of economic crimes. (4) Unlike other offenses in which urban areas are overrepresented in national crime figures, these crimes seem to be spread throughout the national territory (Salas, 1979a). (5) Cuba has followed traditional Latin American differenciation between theft and robbery based on the threat which it poses to the victim rather than the value of the articles stolen. Theft is a taking of pro- perty without a threat of violence while robbery includes that possi- bility as an essential element. (6) In one article, the government warned shoppers to be wary of young- sters riding bicycles. In many cases women had had their pocketbooks stolen while awaiting buses (Bohemia, 1967). (7) See, for example, Ley No 1096 (1963), which compelled the sale of vehicles to the Ministry of Transportation, prohibited the salvage of automobiles and the sale of replacement parts. The measure was backed by criminal penalties and the threat of impoundment. (8) Figures released by the Cuban government, reveal an average of $ 5,628,571 in annual losses with total costs due to traffic accidents, over 14 years of $ 78,628,521 (Salas, 1979a: 58). (9) In addition to replacement costs, these accidents also represent expenditures in other fields. One of those fields most affected is the public health sector. During one period of time, for example, the average length of stay in a hospital for a victim of an accident was — 104 — 18 days, with more than 500,000 day/beds being used in the treat ment of these patients (Castro, 1971) (10) The importance of this problem to Cuban officials, is emphasized by the amount of times in which Castro has personally incorporated the problem of traffic accidents in major addresses (11) I have never seen this claim substantiated by any serious scholar who has examined any reliable data. Even the largest Cuban figures do not approach these levels. The official in the government in charge of rehabilitation programs for prostitutes, gave figures of 10,000 prosti tutes working in Havana and 30,000 to 40,000 employed in all of Cuba (Lewis, Lewis and Rigdon, 1977b). Others, including Castro have placed the figure at 100,000 even though there are no adequate figures to support any of these claims (Castro 1977). Cardenal reported a figure of 25,000 houses of prostitution in Havana after interviewing a former prostitute (Cardenal 1976). This claim is possibly the most outrageous of all BIBLIOGRAPHY BERNARDO, Robert M. (1971), The Theory of Moral Incentives in Cuba Birmingham, Ala.: University of Alabama Press BOHEMIA (1967) ‘“Aniquilemos a los ladrones”, Bohemia, April 14, pp. 78-79 (1980) “Caso Aval”, February 1, pp. 6-9. BRADY, James P. (1983), ‘“Crime, Justice and Commumty in Socialist Cuba”. International Annals of Criminology 20: 5-32. CARDENAL, Ernesto (1976), En Cuba. Mexico: Serie Popular ERA CASTRO, Fidel (1961)‘“‘Speech at the First National Meeting of INDER”. Obra Revolucionaria. 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N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons CODIGO DE FAMILIA (1975), Cédigo de Familia, Ley N° 1289, Gaceta Oficial de la Repûblica de Cuba, February 15 — 105 — CON LA GUARDIA EN ALTO (1969) ‘E] Forum de Orden Interior Informa”, Con la Guardia en Alto, May, pp. 10-17 DIAZ BRISQUET, Sergio and Pérez, Lisandro (1981), ‘The Demography of Revolution” pp. 331-366, in Irving Louis Horowitz, Cuban Com munism, Sth ed.. New Brunswick, N J .: Transaction. DOMINGUEZ JORGE (1978), Cuba: Order and Revolution. Boston, Mass Belknap GRANMA (1978a) ‘‘Dictatem sobre el informe de Rendicion de Cuentas del Tribunal Supremo Popular, leido por Julia Meceda”, Granma July 1,1978,p (1978b) ‘Sintesis sobre la actividad delictia y su enfrentamiento durante al periôdo nov. 1977 a abril 1978, leido por el General de Brigada Enio Leyva”, July 1,p. 2 GRANMA, Weekly Review (1969) ‘‘As Servants of the People we have been able to achieve an even greater understanding'”. 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VIKTOROV, Boris (1974), “Some aspects of organizational problems in re lation to crime prevention and measures taken against criminality in in dustrially developed regions of the USSR”, pp. 30-45 in Crime and In dustrialization. Finland: Scandinavian Research Council for Criminology. - 107 — ZAFFARONI, Eugenio Raul (1982), ‘’Criminalidad y Desarrollo en Latino- america (ensayo critico motivado en ‘Crime and Modernization’ de Louise Shelley)”. ILANUD al Dia S: 32-49. SUMMARY One of the primary problems facing comparative criminologists is the determination of the critical by which countries will be grouped for study. Some researchers have chosen to focus their study on development and modernization and have used these criteria to place countries among developed, underdeveloped and socialist countries. The Cuban development process illustrates the difficulty of grouping countries or assigning direct linkages between crime and modernization. Cuba lies between the socialist model and that of the developing countries of the Third World. While Cuba is undeniably a socialist state it is at least as influenced by its Latin American roots and economic dependency as it is by its ideology. This, in turn, is reflected in the way crime is perceived and defined. The purpose of this article is to review the effect of conditions associ- ated with the revolutionary process on criminalization and repression decisions. Space limitations and the unreliability of much of the data do not permit a discussion of all crimes so that we will focus on selected offenses and the impact which the new socialist system have had on their crimi- nalization. The following factors shall be considered: 1) the new distribution of goods and the means of production; 2) the need to maintain systemic legitimacy and political stability; 3) economic development measures; 4) repudiation of conduct associated with capitalist corruption. This analysis shall also take into account the effect of Cuban culture on these decisions. RÉSUMÉ « LE CRIME DANS LA SOCIÉTÉ CUBAINE POST-RÉVOLUTIONNAIRE » L’un des principaux problèmes auxquels se heurtent les chercheurs en matière de criminologie comparée est l’établissement de critères de diffé- renciation qui leur permettront de catégoriser les pays étudiés. Certains d’entre eux ont choisi de mener leurs travaux à partir des notions de déve- loppement et de modernisation, notions qui leur ont permis de répartir les pays en trois groupes distincts : pays développés, pays sous-développés et pays socialistes. — 108 — La manière dont Cuba s’est développée illustre la difficulté qu’il y a à vouloir regrouper entreeux certains pays ou à établir des liens de relations directes entre criminalité et modernisation. Cuba est issue à la fois du modèle socialiste et des pays en voie de développement du tiers-monde. Bien qu’il soit incontestablement socialiste, l’État Cubain est influencé autant par ses racines latino-américaines et sa dépendance économique que par son idéologie. Ce qui ne manque pas de se refléter dans la manière dont la criminalité est perçue et définie. Le but de cet article est d’examiner les effets des conditions du crime liées au procès révolutionnaire de la criminalisation et de la répression. Des impératifs de place ainsi que le peu de fiabilité de la plupart des données statistiques n’ont pas permis de prendre en considération tous les types de crimes. Nous en avons donc sélectionnés certains et avons centré notre étude sur le rôle que le nouveau système socialiste a joué quant à leur criminalisa- tion. Les facteurs suivant seront considérés : 1 ) la redistribution des biens et les moyens de production 2) la nécéssité de maintenir la légitimité du système et la stabilité poli- tique 3) les mesures de développement économique 4) répudiation des conduites liées à la corruption capitaliste. Cette étude prendra également en considération l’influence de la culture Cubaine sur les décisions politiques. — 109 — SOCIAL CHANGE AND FEMALE CRIME UNDER COMMUNISM: À STUDY OF THE USSR AND POLAND Maria Los* COMMUNIST TRANSFORMATIONS AND THE CHANGING STATUS OF WOMEN The Soviet Union and Poland offer an interesting case of the impact of social change on female crime, as women and men in these two countries have very similar levels of both education and involvement outside the home. However, despite this apparent equalization of male and female status, little is known and published about crimes committed by women and the punishments meted out to them. Similarly, a serious analysis of the unique place of women in the social structure is virtually absent. Super- ficial political declarations regarding full equality and emancipation of women are substituted for more reliable and realistic research and analysis. Some may ask whether the Polish and Soviet situations confirm or disprove those theories which predict significant increases of female crimi- nality with the process of ‘liberation’ of women and their incorporation into the official organized structure of society. Yet there are so many possible interpretations that there can be no one clear answer as to the emancipation of Polish and Soviet women. Developments in both countries prove that communist style emancipation is not a smooth or necessarily beneficial pro- cess. À female journalist recently made the following observation in a Polish weekly: Ît is truly sad to look at them in the streets: gray and tired, burdened with bags, not a trace of glamour and coquetry… Today they do not even understand any more why their predecessors so badly wanted to be equal to men ( Starczak-Kozlowska, 1982: 4; this author’s translation from Polish). Polish women are employed outside the home almost as frequently as men. They account for 46 percent of the workforce ; 75-80 percent of women between 25 and 40 years of age who have one child hold regular jobs outside the home as do 58 percent of those with four children (Plenska. 1980: 465). Women constituted 51 percent of the Soviet labour force in 1978 (Barry and Barner-Barry, 1982: 199). These high levels of employment * University of Ottawa C111— have not been achieved, however, through fundamental change in the gender structure. Rather, the intensive industrialization of the Stalinist years and the post-World War II period in Poland required the mobilization of all able- bodied citizens. Mnay women were concerned int the labour force by two major mechanisms. First, the state-controlled wage structure necessitated the full-time employement of both parents. Secondly, Soviet anti-parasite legislations has mandated the employment of all unmarried women. While many women do enjoy their work, they have not achieved full economic, social and political equality as a consequence of their broad admission to the work force. À strong division between male and female occupations remains. Men predominate in the relatively well paid engineer- ing, industrial and construction jobs while women are more often employed in the poorly paid fields of education, health care and social services, administration and the criminal justice system and retail trade (1). In 1984 Polish women earned about 73 percent of the salaries earned by men (Lésnicka, 1984: 3; see also Coser, 1980). Women have not only lower incomes but they are also excluded from positions of power. They are virtually absent from the executive bodies of the Communist Party (the first towan was introduced to the Politburo in 1981) and are grossly under- representated in the Diet, where they constitute 23 percent of all deputies (Maly Rocznik.…, 1983: 16). Soviet women share the fate of their Polish counterparts. They are also greatly underrepresentated in management and supervisiory positions. Their participation in the government and the party is minimal. In recent years, they have made up approximately 30 percent of all deputies to the Supreme Soviet ( a ‘rubber stamp’ body with no real power), their participation in other political bodies has been much less pronounced. For example, in 1981, there were 17 female members (or 3.6 percent) among 470 members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, nine of whom were only candidate members (Barry and Barner-Barry, 1982: 136). There are cur- rently no women in the Politburo, the body in which the real power is con- centrated. There are no women in the 109-member USSR Council of Ministers (Barry and Barner-Barry, 1982: 90). The power structure of these societies continues to evolve along the traditional gender lines despite women’s high educational and vocational involvement. Men assume positions of authority both at work and at home. The failure of men to assume familial responsibilities, has prevented women from moving into more responsible positions. Consequently, women have remained in a state of ‘semi-liberation’. THE ESSENCE OF WOMEN”’S SOCIAL ROLE Life is extremely difficult for Polish and Soviet Women. Not only is little done to either encourage men to participate more actively in family — 112 — responsibilities but also little effort is made to provide adequate child care or support for women’s house-keeping chores. The stress on heavy industry and military production has resulted in severe shortages of such consumer goods as household appliances, baby items, clothing and automobiles. Moreover, agricultural mismanagement has led to chronic food shortages and to the well known long lines at stores. The difficulties of daily. living increase and facilitate political control over women because they lack both time and energy to fight for a greater share of power or for the liberalization of the overall political system. Family planning is a problem in both societies. In the absence of adequate birth control programs, abortion remains the main way of regu- lating the family size. In the USSR, the average woman undergoes six to eight abortions (Zeldes, 1981 : xi; Johnson, 1981: 5). In large cities, 80 per- cent of pregnancies are terminated voluntarily (Stern, 1980: 135-140). Infants are born in overcrowded hospitals and subjected to infections, resulting in a high rate of infant death (see e.g., Field, 1983: 13-16). In their rented rooms, tiny apartments or crowded accommodations shared with relatives, young parents do not have the benefit of disposable diapers, instant baby formulas, convenient baby clothing, utensils, and appliances, which make western mothers’ lives so much easier. They might purchase some of these articles in hard currency stores, provided they have the currency, or on the black market if they are wealthy enough. After spending their paid maternity leave at home, mothers return to work, and hence, have to plan for their young children. In 1980, only 8.5 percent of all Polish children under three years of age were placed in state nurseries, which are essentially baby storages whereby one nurse cares for 15 to 25 children (Mankiewicz, 1981b: 4-5). Desperate mothers can try to force their parents, grandparents or any other retired relatives to care for their babies and this is, in fact, the most frequent solution. If they have relatively well paid jobs, they may try instead to hire a ‘woman’. The costs often outweigh their worth, however; they are often unreliable and tend to disappear after a few days, weeks or months taking with them whatever valuable objects they can steal. In essence, since ‘servants’ are considered a capitalistic luxury, dom- estic and babysitting services are neither organized nor subject to any controls. Working mothers, who somehow manage to solve the problem of baby- care during their working hours still have to stand in lines every day in order to buy family groceries after work (the lack of a car, freezer or large re- frigerator, necessitates this daily shopping). They then have to cook, clean, wash (automatic washers are very rare, drying machines are practically nonexistent, and laundromats unknown), and mend socks, stockings and baby clothes (items very rarely available in stores). These are but a few activities typcially performed by women, and research findings indicate that, on average, a Polish mother with two children spends a seven hour day — 113 — seven days a week working at home in addition to her forty six hour work week. It must be noted that this estimate does not include time spent shopping (Starczak-Kozlowska, 1982: 4). The situation among Soviet women is not different. À Soviet expert determined that a husband’s work week (including housework) is about 50 hours, while that of the working wife is 80 hours (see Barry and Barner- Barry, 1982: 199). Lining up for food and other necessities is equally or even more prevalent in the Soviet Union. À recent article in the weekly Nedelya stated that on average, women spent 5.8 hours a week in lines and only 4.5 hours with their children. Moreover, the goods they buy after having waited so long are often spoiled or faulty (‘“‘Soviet Women…”, 1983). Children theoretically become eligible for placement in child centres on their third birthday. In reality, however, many such applications are not even considered due to chronic overcrowding and the inadequate number of facilities (2) (Mankiewicz, 1981a: 3). According to the official statistics, the total number of three to six year old children attending child centres in Poland in 1979 amounted to approximately 34 percent of all children in this age group (Rocznik.…., 1980;415). These few examples of the problems which the majority of women experience daily are cited in order to expose this side of women’s life which appears to be largely unaffected, or rather negatively affected, by their social emancipation which is partial and one-sided. Due to the needs of the economy, women have been effectively forced to handle two full-time jobs in place of the one which they traditionally held. Their inclusion into the workforce was also dictated by the desire of the new communist autho rities to subject them, as society’s major socialization agents, to compre hensive ideological indoctrination which, in turn, can be more easily con ducted in the workplace than in the isolated world of their private homes While women have accepted the importance of their work as an indi- cator of their status, they are fully aware that they are simultaneously evaluated in terms of the quality of their performance as mothers and homemakers. This, of course, means that they are constantly subjected to the stressful consequences of this acute role conflict, split identity and troubled conscience, regardless of their individual style and adaptation with respect to these opposing pressures. This also means that they are still under the influence of traditional cultural patterns of expectations and social controls, which promote different moral standards and virtues for men and women. In essence, the paramount responsibility for the upbringing and moral education of their children strengthens their ties with the Church and traditional community values which are generally perceived as being threatened by the opportunistic and hypocritical political culture imposed on children through the schools and the mass media. — 114 — By introducing their chi.ldr.en to the national cultural tradition, women hope to strengthen their integrity and moral convictions in the current world of new alien values and massive attempts to construct a ‘new socialist man’. Historically, in Poland, this tradition has included a model of the Polish Mother who sacrifies herself to the family, insofar as caring for, educating, and instilling patriotic values in her children, as well as remaining faithful to her husband when he goes to endless wars to defend the home- land against its enemies. She is infinitely brave, patient, dutiful and virtuous, a person in her own right, but choosing inevitably to live for others. À delicate creature, she can, however, be both a tender mother and a resource- ful provider for her children bereaved by their heroic father fallen on the battlefield. The combination of these two roles and the attempt to perfect their performance in both is not new for Polish women, as history has forced them again and again to fill the places left empty by their men called through their patriotic duty into the services of the fatherland. The same is true for Soviet women, as they too, during many wars and recently during the years of communist economic mobilization, have been forced to carry the double burden of these two demanding and often conflicting tasks, the burden of a ‘double working day’ as they often call it. It must be noted, however, that any spontaneous feminist organizations or attempts to create a women’s liberation movement are banned in these countries, just as are any other types of grass-roots organizations. À women’s group, organized in the Soviet Union in the late 1970s, which even began publishing a samizdat feminist journal entitled Women in the USSR, was soon brutally suppressed and most of its leaders forced into exile abroad. SOCIAL CHANGE AND TRADITIONAL FEMALE DEVIANCE A number of studies in Poland (most of them conducted by M. Jasinska (3); see 1967, 1976 and 1982) inquired into the plight of women involved in prostitution. Despite the noncriminal status of prostitution in Poland, it is by no means a trade free of criminal stigma. There exist special morality squads whose main task consists of controlling prostitutes and their criminal connections. In effect, prostitutes are very often arrested on charges of disturbing order and stealing personal property from drunken clients. In recent years, they have also been frequently arrested and con victed by the petty offence boards for failing to have a valid medical certifi- cate (4). In comparison to the 1950s, however, the actual criminal involve ment of contemporary prostitutes appears to be far less serious and wide spread. Two large-scale studies conducted by Jasiñska in the late 1950s and 1970s provide interesting insights into the changes of the size, structure and demographice composition of the population of young prostitutes. The — 115 — number of women under 25 years of age involved in prostitution has in- creased considerably during the twenty years between the two studies. Previously, street prostitution was more prevalent, but the more recent research shows an overwhelming preference for more discrete forms of solicitation in such establishments as restaurants and hotels, where the staff act willingly as intermediaries between the prostitutes and potential clients. Taxi drivers also constitute another group heavily involved in such procur- ing, an offence punishable by a maximum of ten years’ imprisonment. Only about twenty percent of the interviewed women appeared to be working for pimps. Over sixty percent of the young prostitutes interviewed during the end of the 1970s and beginning of the next decade, came from ‘blue collar’ backgrounds. The earlier research, on the other hand, showed a higher percentage of ‘underclass’ prostitutes and found that 72 percent of their parents had never completed elementary education. Similar to the earlier study, however, the recent data indicate that the family background of young women involved in prostitution is extremely unstable. Over 50 per- cent were not raised in a two parent family as a result of one parent’s death, parental divorce or an unknown father. Forty five percent were brought up at least partially during their childhood by people other than natural parents. Over 50 percent lived for some time under the same roof with an alcoholic. In 30 percent of the cases, mothers or fathers of the prostitutes changed partners very frequently and several fathers or step-fathers maintained sexual relationships with their daughters. Approximately half of the interviewed women ran away from home during their chilhood or adolescent years. Most of them dropped out of school quite early. Approximately 25 percent of the interviewed women began working as prostitutes between the ages of 16-17 years, about 40 per- cent between 18-19 years, while the remaining 35 percent became involved in prostitution when they were at least 20 years old. Practically one third of the interviewed prostitutes drank heavily, most had long histories of ve- nereal diseases and gynaecologial problems. Thirty percent had children residing with relatives or in orphanages (Jasiñska, 1982: 85-88). In sum, it appears that, just as in other countries, prostitution becomes a viable choice for women coming from problem families, who leave home early to escape abuse or hardship and who do not have any competing pro- fessional options due to the lack of qualifications and generally lower legitimate financial opportunities for women. It is, however, striking that no effort is made to open some other avenues for these women, and the only services extended to them are venereal disease tests and ‘rehabilitation’ efforts by the police. Contrary to the claims of the Soviet authnrities as well as some west-rn experts (e.g. Mandel, 1975), prostitution is quite cor*-ce in the "ISSK z well. There again, economic aspects play an impo ‘“n. 77 — 116 - What are the real reasons that women became prostitutes in the Soviet Union? Apart from the boredom of daily existence, which is particularly acute in the USSR, it is mostly a question of material incentives, even though Soviet propaganda still asserts that the material conditions that con- tribute to prostitution have long since disappeared. The governement maintains that a subsistence level income is ninety-two rubles, sixty-five rubles a month. Thus a prostitute can take on only a handful of customers a month and still get by (Stern, 1980: 195). As in Poland, prostitution is not a crime in the Soviet Union. Never- theless, Soviet prostitutes are subject to anti-parasite laws which lead to their frequent arrests and exiles from large cities. For this reason, many of them secure some type of employment for the sake of appearance. As in Poland, overt soliciting is not prevalent in the USSR. While it does exist, especially at railroad or subway stations, it has been largely replaced by the active involvement in procuring by employees of restaurants and hotels, shoeshine boys and, above all, taxi drivers. The punishment for procuring is five years of hard labour followed by internal exile. The level of education of Soviet prostitutes is very low, alcoholism rampant and health problems numerous. In the absence of adequate health care services and modern con- traceptives, Soviet prostitutes ‘often contract and transmit venereal disease, and illegal abortion is the standard method of contraception — either performed by helpful friends or self — administered’ (Stern, 1980: 195). Ît appears, therefore, that neither Polish nor Soviet authorities have succeeded in their efforts to eradicate prostitution, which they have de- clared to be just another relic of the capitalist past. The hope that the new conditions as well as the severe penalties for those who exploit prostitutes will liberate women and remove any need on their part to engage in this old trade has clearly not been fulfilled. SOCIAL CHANGE AND FEMALE INVOLVEMENT IN CRIME Ît has been noted by Adler (1977) and Pleñska (1980) that the ratio of female to male crime rates increased somewhat in the post Second World War period in Poland, when women were integrated en masse into the socio- economic mainstream, but decreased after approximately one decade. Adler believes that normative controls over women, exercised by the Church and state, have continued to operate and that the emancipation of women transcended them only temporarily. In other words, a vocational upgrading has not, in fact been followed by a psychological and moral liberation of Women. Plenska seems to share these views. She goes beyond them to claim that the upswing in the number of convictions of women in the period of —117— intensive industrialization after the Second World War was due to the in- crease in opportunities to commit crimes against state property. According to the statistics, economic offenses did indeed account, to a great extent, for the increase in female criminality in Poland. Pleñska attributes the sub- sequent diminution in female conviction rates in part to the legislative changes of 1953, which decriminalized minor crimes against state property. She aslo notes that, while the penal law in Poland has been traditionally oriented towards controlling male deviance, prostitution and other ‘moral delinquences’ have not been criminalized, and thus increases in these types of deviance may go unnoticed. This initial increase in recorded female criminality relative to that of males cannot be, however, explained simply in terms of female emanci- pation implies a process in itself, a struggle for fuller participation and liberation. The rapid increase of women’s employment and involvement in traditionally male roles in Poland, however, was necessitated by various external, objective factors. The magnitude of male casualities of the war and communist take-over explains, to some extent, the necessity for the maximum involvement of women in the reordering of the country and its economy. As well, it high- lights the purely demographic aspects of the higher proportion of women found in official crime statistics. Indeed, it may well be, that if the numeri- cal changes in the proportions of both sexes in the total population were properly accounted for, the significance of the shift in the conviction ratio would actually disappear. Similarly, the unusually high ratio of female to male convictions (2:1) in 1946 in the Soviet Union could be explained by the vast reduction in the male population as a result of the war and Stalin’s policy of genocide (Zeldes, 1981 : 77). In any event, it must be noted that increased occupational activisation of women was but one process among many interrelated, traumatic social and economic transformations experienced by Poland after the Second World War. Intensive industrialization and collectivization of agriculture patterned on the Stalinist model, meant a total subordination of individual needs and values to the requirements of the economy and ideology. The massive population exodus out of the countryside and into the cities and new industrial centres led to the destruction of community ties and tra- ditional controls (5). These uprooted, predominantly young migrants proved to be particularly crime prone. Moreover, many female migrants, unable to find jobs within the underdeveloped services and unwilling to perform heavy construction tasks, eventually turned to prostitution. The post-war change of the Polish borders necessitated yet another significant shift of large numbers of the population, mainly from the eastern parts of Poland taken over bey the Soviet Union, to the newly recovered — 118 — western territories (6). Statistically speaking, the drastic increase in crime in this part of Poland had a significant impact on the national crime rates and delinquency during that period (see, e.g., Maroszek, 1963, 1975; Kobus, 1975 and Kryczka, 1978). These developments also affected considerably the general picture of female delinquency especially as usual controls and traditional values lost importance under the conditions of cultural conflict and anomie. Similar increases in female crime were noted in the Soviet Union in the early period of the Bolshevik rule. According to Louise Shelley, ‘the female contribution to crime increased steadily between 1922 and 1928, and at the end of the first decade of the Soviet rule women were responsible for twice as much of the total crime rate as they were at the onset of World War (Shelley, 1982: 266). She explains that this increase resulted from general social disorganization and a climate of violence caused by the turmoils of revolution and war, rather than from any significant enhancement of female socioeconomic status. The war left many women on their own and forced them to provide for their families under general conditions of want or even famine. As a result, many women had to resort to theft to save their chil- dren from starvation. Moreover, their greater involvement in work outside the home meant also greater opportunities to commit economic crimes, while their mass migration from rural to urban areas in search of work led to multitude of adjustment problems and family disorganization. In ad- dition to these obvious problems caused by any major social upheaval or à war, Shelley points to criminal consequences of some, more specific, deliberate changes introduced by Soviet authorities into the lives of Soviet Women. Social legislation was introduced throughout the USSR that challenged the sanctity of marriage, legalized abortions, and provided for ready divorce. These fundamental changes in family life and parental responsibility, as well as accompanying legislation that encouraged female entry into the labour force, precipitated a dramatic change in the lifestyle of women and the Way women viewed themselves. The disruption of traditional patterns of female behaviour, particularly in cities, while advantageous for many more educated and sophisticated women, had criminogenic consequences for many others (Shelley, 1982: 284 ). These processes were especially dramatic in the Central Asia republics where communist authorities attempted to ‘use women to break up Moslem traditional societies’ (Massell, 1979: 259) and ‘to undermine the kinship System and the village community — revolving around clanloyalties, and ties of family and custom — …by encouraging and sponsoring divorces initiated y women and by involving them in massive and dramatic violations of traditional taboos’ (Massell, 1979: 260). — 119 — In sum, it would seem rather inappropriate to link any of the tempor- ary post-war increases in the proportions of female criminality, whether real or spurious, to the women’s social emancipation without considering the very complex circumstances and social transformations of that tumultu- ous period in both the Soviet and Polish history. In fact, the present ratio of male to female convictions in these countries indicates that, in the long run, the broad admission of women to the work force has had a very limited impact on the traditional gender differences in the degree of criminal involvement. According to the official Polish statistics, in 1981 there were 13,000 adult female convictions compared to 116,000 adult male convictions, a ratio of 1:9. This ratio did not vary significantly during the last decade, and was approximately 1:8 in 1980. It was, however, relatively higher in the 1960s when it ranged from 1:5 to 1:8, and it exhibited its highest level in the 1950s when it ranged from 1:3 to 1:4 (Maly Rocznik…, 1983: 288; Los, 1983a: 49). Soviet data for the 1960s indicate that the ratio of male to female convictions fluctuated between 1:4.5 to 1:7, and was not much different in the 1920s when it ranged from 1:6 to 1:7 (Zeldes, 1981 : 77-78). The proportion of women in the pre-revolutionary criminal statistics was much smaller, however, and the ratio of female to male convictions was approximately 1:13 (see data in Shelley, 1982: 265). It should be noted that while some general statistical information on convictions of women in Poland is periodically published, this is not the case in the Soviet Union. What follows is a detailed analysis of the nature and dynamics of female convictions in Poland, supplemented whenever possible by Soviet data. In 1979, 11.2 percent (17,406 cases) of all adult convictions in Poland involved women. As illustrated in tables | and 1 A, the types of offences common among convicted men and women were quite different. While female convictions accounted for 6.5 .percent of all convictions for crimes against life and liberty (13.3 percent of convictions for homi cide), 2.9 percent of all convictions for crimes against public safety and the safety of land, water and air traffic and 2.8 percent of convictions for offences against family and guardianship, the female share of convictions for economic crimes was a staggering 61.4 percent, for fiscal offences 28.8 percent and for offenses against public order 20.8 percent. In order to understand the legal and social meanings of these data, the specific types of offences in which women seem to be relatively over- represented must be examined. For example, despite the rather low overall representation of women in convictions for crimes against state property (10.6 percent), their share in crimes involving simple usurpation of state property, usurpation of property of great value and property for which — 120 — TABLE I Valid Convictions by the Courts in 1979 in Poland (Men and Women) Total Men Women Type of Offence Ratio Men NO % NO % NO % to Women Against state property 43,270 27.8 38,688 27.9 4,582 26.3 8.4:1 Economic offences 5,811 3.7 2,245 1.6 3,566 20.5 1:1.6 Fiscal offences. .. .. ... 21 2 .« 3,144 2.0 2,238 1.6 906 5.2 2.5:1 (Against state property, economic and fiscal offences together) ° . . . . ° . . . . (S2,225) (33.5) (43,171) (31.2) (9,054) (S2.0) (4.8:1) Against private property 39,231 25.2 35,690 25.8 3,541 20.3 10:1 15,426 9.9 14,418 10.4 5.8 14.3:1 Against life and health (including rape). . 1,008 Against family and guardianship (non- payment of alimonies, bigamy, chitd abduction and abuse, etc.) 20,641 13.2 20,065 14.5 576 3.3 34.8:1 Against public safety and the safety of land, water and air traffic 9,046 5.8 8,780 6.3 266 1.6 33.1 state institutions and func- Against tionnaries (including the police) 6,025 3.9 5,325 3.8 700 4.0 7.6:1 Against honour and personal inviolability 2.4 (false allegations, insults, etc.) .. .. . .. 3,701 2,899 2.1 802 4.6 3.6:1 Against criminal justice system and against documents . ° . . . . . * . e . ° ° . 5,111 3.3 4,383 3.2 728 4.2 6:1 Against public order 1,161 0.7 919 0.7 242 1.4 3.8:1 Other . ° . . . . ° . ° . . . . ° * ° ° . . ° . 3,309 2.1 2,820 2.1 489 2.8 5.8:1 TOTAL . . . . . ° . . . . . . . . . ° ° . . ° 155,876 100.0 138,470 100.0 17,406 100.0 8:1 Source : This table has been constructed on the basis of tables 16 (773) and 19 (776) in Rocznik…., 1980: 483 and 484). TABLE IA Valid Convictions by the Courts in 1979 in Poland (Men and Women) Men Women Total Types of Offence NO NO % % NO Ÿ Against state property . L ° . . Q . ° ® . Q ® Q . . ». * ° ° 38,688 89.4 4,582 10.6 43,270 100.0 Economic offences ° . * L . ® ° ° * ° . . ° . ° ° . » . . . 2,245 38.6 3,566 61.4 100.0 5,811 Fiscal offences L L . . » . . ® ° ° ° . ® . ® ® . L * * . » ® ° 2,238 71.2 906 28.8 3,144 100.0 (Against state property economic and fiscal offences . » L . . . à ° ° . ° . ° . * « ° . ® Q . . ® . . ° . together) (43,171) (82.7) (9,054) (17.7) (S2,225) (100.0) Against private property . . . . . . » ° . . . . ° . ° . . * 35,690 91.0 3,541 9.0 39,231 100.0 . . . L . . ° . . * 93.5 6.5 100.0 Against life and health (including rape) 14,418 1,008 15,426 (Homicide) . ° . . ° * ° * . . . ° . . L . À ° ° ° ° ° . ° . ° (273) (86.7) (42) (13.3) (315) (100.0) Against family and guardianship (non-payment of alimonies, bigamy, child abduction and abuse, etc.). . . 20,065 97.2 576 2.8 20,641 100.0 Against public safety and the safety of land, water and air traffic . . À. . ° . . . . . . . . . . . ° . . . » . . ° 8,780 97.1 266 2.9 9.046 100.0 Against state institutions and functionnaries (including the police) . . . . » ® ° Q . . . . » ° . ° ° . . . . . À . Q ° 5,325 88.4 700 11.6 6,025 100.0 Against honour and personal inviolability (false alle- gation, insults, etc.). ... ... 2144 41 4 1110 2,899 78.3 802 21.7 3,701 100.0 Against criminal justice system and against documents. 4,383 85.2 728 14.2 5,111 100.0 . ° . . Û . . . ° . ° ° . . ° L . + ° Q L 919 79.2 242 20.8 1,161 100.0 Îggiï5t public order « - Q . Q * ° . . ° . Q e Q . . ° . . . . . . . . Q ° . 2,820 85.2 489 14.8 3,309 100.0 OTAL ° ° ° . . * ° Q ° . . . ° ° Q ° . ° ° * . . . . . . . À 88.2 11.2 138,470 17,406 155,876 100.0 Source : This table has been constructed on the basis of tables 16 (773) and 19 (776) in Rocznik…, 1980: 483 and 484. one is responsible,k as well as usurpation of property in collaboration with other persons, is significantly higher (13.4 percent). It appears that it is crimes against state property which involve the use of force or violence for which women are particularly rarely convicted; they represent only two per- cent of all convictions of this type (7). The statistical distribution of female convictions differs considerably from that of male convictions. What is particularly striking about the female contribution to the criminal convictions for various types of crime is the fact that women accounted for 61.4 percent of convictions for economic offences. According to the Polish criminal code, these offences are com- mitted by the employees of the state economy who contribute to the destruction or improper use of the state property or cause a shortage as well as by those who acquire with the purpose of reselling at a profit or who actually sell goods without authorization. Convictions for these crimes constitued 20.5 percent of all female convictions, but only 1.6 percent of male convictions. Moreover, the share of economic crimes, fiscal offences and crimes against state property was a full 52 percent of all female con- victions as compared to 31.2 percent of all male convictions. These data indicate clearly that convicted women are much more likely than men to be sentenced for offences related to the communist economic order, while men tend to be more frequently convicted for more traditional crimes involving violence, neglect of family and guardianship responsibilities and violation of private property. This tendency seems to be consistent with Soviet data. For instance, the Soviet press quotes many more examples of women convicted for speculation, bribery and economic crimes than for more conventional types of crime (e.g. Cherepanov, 1980: 6; Kurasov, 1980: 6; Kapelyushny, 1983: 2; Troyan, 1983: 6; Kazikhanov, 1983: 6; Inoveli, 1983: 4). According to Zeldes, in 1923, the proportion of women among those convicted for em- bezzlement stood at 14 percent… by 1967 it reached 36 percent… For Speculation and black-marketeering the percentage is almost 60 percent, and, for fraud and deception of consumers by sales personnel, it is greater than 70 percent (Zeldes, 1981: 78-80; see also Juviler, 1976: 151) (8). Both economic crimes and crimes against state property are extremely Wwidespread in all communist countries (see e.g. Los, 1980, 1982, 1983b). Most of them are never prosecuted, either because of their uncontrollable, epidemic proportions or the perpetrator’s political importance, and there- fore, impunity. It must be noted that law enforcement in the area of econ- Omic crimes is very selective and subject to manipulation. As well, it is subjected to much more political interference, and especiallv by the local party elites, than law enforcement in the area of conventional criminality. Official statistics C” economic « rve ar: not an “ccurste measure of the purvasiven(:ss tfo the :nenomeénun. - 123- The peculiarly high share of Polish female convictions for improper performance of one’s administrative duties in the state economy, for illegal use of state property under their management and for usurpation of state property of considerable value (9) cannot be explained by women’s employ- ment patterns. People who occupy managerial positions can cause more damage to the economy than rank and file employees. But women are only rarely appointed to these higher positions. It ssems that women are not able to avoid prosecution as can more powerful male managers. Women are also vulnerable to prosecution as accomplies in crime. Polish law does not differentiate criminal responsibility by extent of participation in con- spiracy cases (see Podemski, 1981). Since women often work as cashiers or accountants, they are more likely to be aware of and therefore included in operations of criminal conspiracies, but their actual role may be limited. Nevertheless, they are quite obvious targets. As investigations rarely probe above the subordinate employees, women are particularly vulnerable. Another type of economic crime for which women are disproportion- ally convicted is that of causing, even unintentionally, a shortage in the state economy (10). Women accounted for 66 percent of those found guilty of this offence. Crimes such as these can only be committed by persons who occupy positions of responsibility or who are members of the management group for their economic unit. Those familiar with the organization of the Polish or Soviet economy know that many disturbances and losses in pro- duction output are caused by faculty central planning and a lack of syn- chronization in the functioning of various economic units (see, for example, Besançon 1981). Such aspects of the organization of the economy cannot, however, be criminalized. Blaming low-level managers or functionaries for economic faisires is part of the routine political process which promotes scapegoating and ritualistic purifications of the system. In Poland, 68 percent of female convictions for economic crimes fall into the category of speculation: the accumulation of goods with the intent of resale at a profit, an offence punished by deprivation of liberty for up to three years. À full 60 percent of those convicted for petty speculation in 1979 were women. To understand the nature of this kind of crime, it must be remembered that, in Poland as in the Soviet Union, there are chronic shortages of foodstuffs and consumer products. The prosperity of black market and other forms of illegal redistribution of goods is thus an inevi- table consequence of a centralized and too rigidly planned state economy. It must be noted that there are various types of speculation which may involve women in rather different ways. The most common and visible type of speculation in both Poland and the USSR consists of buying rare goods in state stores, from peasants, or from employees of state enterprises, and reselling them at higher prices on street corners, at private markets or through other black market channels. It does not require much organization — 124 — or any special skills, and is relatively easily detected since the offender is directly involved in all the transactions (illegal purchases, illegal sales, etc.). This kind of speculation is clearly numerically dominated by women, many of whom work in the retail trade (see ‘:Ukrywanie…’, 1983: 4 for some typical examples). Women are well familiar with the operation of the market, the nature of shortages, and the mentality of buyers, because they themselves are the providers for their families and the frustrations caused by constant shortage are part of their daily experience. In addition to these petty speculators in everyday consumers items (food, clothing, cosmetics, flowers, etc.), there also exists a much better organized network of wholesale dealers who trade in large amounts of stolen state property (for example, with private businessmen), art (usually smuggled abroad), apartments, cars, agricultural machinery, construction materials, or any other products, whose open sales are restricted by some political regulations. In order to secure the release of large quantities of these goods to black market, such networks have to include very high regional or even central functionaries, whose cooperation is crucial for their successful operation and relative impunity. Due to the ineffective law enforcement and assured political protection of this kind of speculation, it is difficult to determine to what extent, and in what role, women are actually involved. There can be no doubt, however, that this kind of specu- lation is much more detrimental to the economy and more profitable to the participants than the highly ‘feminized’, and criminalized, street corner speculation in stockings of flowers. Another previously mentioned category of crime for which women are likely to be prosecuted is that of fiscal offences. Among these, trading in foreign currency is by far the most frequently penalized. In 1979, women accounted for almost 29 percent of these convictions in Poland. It should be noted that ‘hard’ currency has a special, almost magic, power within com- munist countries, especially since citizens are not officially allowed to purchase western currencies despite the fact that many consumers goods (foodstuffs, cosmetics, clothing, cars, coal, building materials, apartments, etc.) which are in short supply on the open market, are readily available in ‘hard currency stores’ operated by the state. What has resulted, therefore, is the existence of a developed double currency system. While the state is desperate for foreign currency in order to import goods and to service foreign debts, the citizens are as desperate to obtain needed goods. As a resuilt, the whole complex world of illegal middlemen and middlewomen (currency speculators and blackmarketeers) has emerged to service these unsatisfied needs and facilitate the desired circulation of money. Hard Currency is provided by foreign tourists, smugglers, corrupt foreign trade Officials, and various other deals and exchanges. Much of it ends up in the State’s possession through the network of special stores, a fact which Suggests that the enforcement of the law in this area may be somewhat — 125 — selective. It is well known that more successful currency dealers operate with the blessing of the authorities and buy their immunity by ‘paying off special commissions from their spoils. Some offenders have to be singled out for prosecution, however, to counter any public suspicion regarding the total corruption of the police or its outright indolence. Women seem to be clearly overrepresented in this group. They are often prostitutes working in expensive hotels and restaurants which attract many foreign visitors. Not only do they demand payment for their services in foreign currency, but they are also ‘employed’, by their pimps of currency speculators themselves, to make illegal exchanges of money for their clients. Yet another type of crime in which women are overrepresented is the illegal sale of alcoho!l. Women, according to 1977 statistics, accounted for 58.7 percent of all cases (see Los, 1983a: 52). Alcoholism is among the most acute social problems in both Poland and the USSR and the demand for alcohol is always great. The legal purchase of spirits is, however, difficult at night, on Saturdays, or in cases of already intoxicated or juvenile cus- tomers since the state prohibits the sale of alcohol in all these instances. Hence, there is a high enough demand for illegal alcohol to support large- scale networks of underground dealers whose supplies come in part from moonshining, in part from ordinary stores, and partially from hard currency stores where alcohol prices are relatively competitive despite the need to purchase currency on the black market. Needless to say, the state economy profits from these alcohol purchases made by traffickers in hard currency stores since they inevitably channel large amounts of black market foreign money into the state’s purse. Bootlegging is the domain of older destitute women in both Polish and Soviet society. Rural women in the Soviet Union turn to this form of illegal activity to supplement their meager pensions (Shelley, 1980: 216). Women involved in alcoho! sales and moonshining in Poland are frequently ex-prostitutes, whose age and state of health do not allow them to continue in their trade, but who do not have any legitimate place in society. They can usually rely on their former clients and friends to spread information about their new ‘business’ and to secure sufficient numbers of customers. Convictions of these women interrupt their criminal activities during the period of their imprisonment, but they usually return to their trade as soon as they can in the absence of any legal opportunities, reference groups or viable economic alternatives. Thus, their occasional imprisonment does not disturb the balance of the neatly designed system of mutual services and profits in the highly integrated system of illicit and licit markets. In sum, official statistics, which indicate the relatively high involvement of women in nonconventional, economic offences, have to be treated with caution. While there is no doubt that womer da participate quite actively in various types of economic and fiscal offezces, it 15 r“vessary 12 ve tT7a « — 126 — of the highly selective and biased functioning of the criminal justice system. It should be noted that prosecution for economic and fiscal offences is a purely political matter and that no legal action may be initiated against a party member without a clearance from the appropriate party committee. Nonetheless, it appears that women’s involvement in these crimes is actually considerably greater than their participation in conventional offences, and especially those crimes which involve violence. SOVIET ACCOUNTS OF FEMALE CRIME Neither the Soviet nor Polish criminological literature offers any explanation for the obvious discrepancy in officially recorded female delinquency rates in the more traditional areas of crime and these related to the communist economy. In fact, the nature of female crime and the patterns of its prosecution have been totally neglected by Polish crimi- nologists. Among the Soviet authors, M.N. Golodniuk displays the most con- sistent interest in the female offender. One of the studies, conducted by Golodniuk in the 1970s, looked at female recidivists serving time in a Soviet labour colony of ordinary regimen. According to this study, it is the dif- ference in male and female personalities which can explain the differences in rates of criminality between the sexes (Golodniuk, 1975). Golodniuk found that female recidivists were most frequently con- victed for: theft of personal property, hooliganism, theft of socialist pro- perty, theft in connection with vagrancy, refusal to take jobs (parasitism), violations of internal passport regulations and illegal abortions. The partici- pation of women in both crimes against persons and crimes with violence was very low. When committed, such crimes were as a rule, triggered by difficult personal relationships with victims, who were usually relatives or acquaintances. Approximately fifty percent of the women studied were intoxicated that traumatic personal relationships, family disorganization, economic hardship and alcoholism had considerable influence on the criminal involvement of these women. Moreover, Golodniuk claimed that many of these convicted women had no faith in themselves and nurtured dreams of finding a strong man who would provide leadership and protection In a more recent publication by the same author (Golodniuk, 1980), far less attention is paid to the alleged criminal personality of female offenders and much more to social and economic conditions. As well, the analysis is more directly focused on offences committed by working women against state property. The author claims that a considerable proportion of women convicted of crimes for gain related to their jobs were engaged in physically heavy, unskilled labour (in industry, warehouses, etc.). Such crimes are — 127 — also frequently committed by women working in food stores where they have many opportunities to deceive customers. These types of work pro- duce fatigue, irritability and disillusionment with respect to the occupation. While they are physically demanding and involve financial responsibility, they are very low-paid. Golodniuk stresses that the use of equal standards for men and women at jobs requiring considerable physical effort places women in disadvantageous conditions. Female responsibility for home- making and child-rearing inhibits their professional careers, limits skills- upgrading and causes excessive physical and nervous stress. According to Golodniuk, this ‘double burden’ of work and home responsibilities, the official indifference to the needs of working women, the increasing rate of family breakdown, the alcoholism of husbands, the psychological trauma of divorce and the financial difficulties of divorced women left with children, all contribute to the incidences of female crime. She suggests that the prevention of such crime requires the implementation of a set of a measures, socioeconomic, political and ideological in nature, aimed at improving the social position of women (Golodniuk, 1980: 41). À POSSIBLE EXPLANATION OF THE PECULAR PATTERN OF FEMALE CRIME While the post-war increases in the overall female crime rates were clearly of a temporary nature, the persistence of women’s overrepresen- tation in convictions for unconventional, economic offences and their underrepresentation in the area of conventional crime calls for some ex- planation. It follows logically from the earlier argument regarding the social position of women and the nature of their emancipation that they con- tinue to be subjected to traditional controls to a much greater extent than men. The role of mother imposes upon women the exceedingly difficult task of the preservation and intergenerational transmission of the threatened values of their national cultural traditions and religious (either Christian or Moslem) moral norms. The informal infrastructure of these societies which secures the survival of traditions depends to a great extent upon the preser- vation of the traditional model of the patriotic and selfless mother. The importance of the men’s status, on the other hand, seems to decrease as the employment of women weakens their role as economic providers for the family, and their involvement in the upbringing of children still carries a stigma of feminity, a threat to their masculine egos in many social strata. In fact, while the female feeling of both economic and moral responsibility for the family grows, the male sense of responsibility and purpose seems to dwindle. The lack of opportunities for grass roots, social — 128 — and political involvement (with-the exception of the period of the Solidarity movement in Poland) and the high levels of political and economic alien- ation in countries ruled by one party in a fully centralized manner, adds to the insecurity and relative futility of their social position. An understanding of these culturally and politically conditioned status differences of women and men in communist countries helps to explain and interpret the lack of increase of female involvement in conventional crime compared with the rates of this type of crime among men. These arguments do not explain, however, the relatively high female conviction rates for nonconventional economic and fiscal offences. It is possible that there does exist a systematic anti-female bias within law en- forcement towards this type of crime. While Western societies have a double standard that may shield women from the harshness of the justice system, women in these societies, who lack the political clout to protect themselves may be subject to reverse discrimination, suffering disproportionately for their involvement in this area. The discriminative prosecution notwithstanding, there are also some plausible explanations was to why women are actually quite actively in- volved in the illegal economic activities. Radical transformations in econ- omic organization and property relations in Poland and the Soviet Union, with the accompaning criminalization of many new areas of economy- related activities, have not been paralleled by corresponding changes in social consciousness and the informal normative culture of these societies. The lack of economic efficiency and impact of party control as well as the overtly aetheist ideology of the new order have prevented a natural fusion of old and new values. It seems quite probable that, while women continue to obey the traditional mores and norms which apply to more conventional crimes, they may not feel so restrained in new areas where no authoritative guidance is provided by tradition. Moreover, these new areas are detached from the home environment and do not seem to have any immediate relevance to women’s performance in their cultural role as mother. This role is regulated by the coherent and familiar morality of face-to-face relationships aimed at the protection of human life and health, family, and private property. While this disjunction between the new and old morality can be found among both men and women, the latter ssem to be more bound by the traditional morality due to their different upbringing and more intense involvement in the moral education of children. — 129 — NOTES . (1) In Poland 1981 women constituted 76 percent of-those employed in education, 81 percent of all employees in health care and social services, 61 percent in administration and criminal justice system, and 70 percent in retail trade. On the other hand, women constituted only 37 percent of all employees in industry, 19 percent in constructions, 27 percent in agriculture and 26 percent in transport (Maly Rocznik…, 1983: 45). The respective figures for the Soviet Union appear to be very similar (Barry and Barner-Barry, 1982: 199). The same journalist suggests elsewhere that child care facilities have been in the early 1980s limited in order to force mothers to stay at home, an act which is expected to help alleviate the problem of surplus manpower (Mankiewicz, 1981 b: 4). (3) Magdalena Jasinska, who teaches at the University of Warsaw, has conducted two major studies on young prostitutes in the Warsaw area. The first study took place in the late 1950s, the second one in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Fach project involved in-depth inter- views with 100 prostitutes as well as interviews with their families, policemen, doctors, restaurant and hotel staff. While the prostitutes in the first study were identified by variety of methods, the women in the second project were identified and approached during their dermatological check-ups. Both projects were conducted with a great care to preserve the anonymity of the respondents and to gain their trust. (4) Prostitutes caught without a valid certificate from a dermatological clinic are often prosecuted under the petty offence code. Such actions violate, however, the United Nations convention on human trade and exploitation of prostitution, ratified by Poland in 1952. (5) In the period between 1946 and 1955, 3.5 million people moved from the countryside to the cities (Dyoniziak et al., 1978: 57). (6) According to the official statistics, 4.5 million people had settled in the western territories by 1950. Almost three million came from other parts of Poland while 1.5 million were repatriated from the Soviet Union (Dyoniziak at al., 1978:55). (7) More specific data available for 1977 show that convictions of women constituted as much as 32.3 percent (1,970 cases) of all convictions in 1977 for illegal use of state property which they were employed to manage, protect or supervise. (This crime is punishable by deprivation of liberty for one to ten years). Additionally, women accounted for 20.2 percent (82 cases) of all convictions for the usurpation of social property of considerable value. This is considered a very serious crime and carries a penalty of five to 25 years of deprivation of liberty. Moreover, female convictions constituted 18.6 percent (283 cases) of — 130 — convictions for the usurpation of state property committed in agree- ment with another person(s), an offence involving penalties for one to 25 years of deprivation of freedom. (8) According to Zeldes, theft of personal property accounts for approxi- mately 40 percent of all Soviet female convictions, embezzlement of state property for 18 percent, fraud and deception of consumers by sales personnel for 12 percent, speculating and black-marketeering for 10 percent, vandalism and disorderly behaviour for 6 percent, murder for 4 percent, robbery for 3 percent and other crimes for 7 percent. 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(1981a) ‘“Duzo sie teraz robi dla dobra dziecka” (Much is being done for children), Kobieta i Zycie (Warsaw), n° 35, 6 September: 23. (1981b) “Tajemnica cudownego rozmnozenia po polsku” (The secret of miraculous multiplication à la polonaise), Kobieta i Zycie (Warsaw), n° 40, 4 October: 4-5. R MAROSZEK, B. (1963) Wiez Spoleczna a Przestepczosé Mlodziezy. Gdansk. (1975) ‘‘Délinquance juvénile et développement socio-économique en Pologne” in I. Chirol, B. Maroszek et al., Délinquance juvé- nile et développement socio-économique. La Hague: Mouton. MASSEL, G J. (1979), “Engineering Change”, pp. 258-266 in C. Campbell and P. Wiles (eds.) Law and Society. Oxford: Martin Robertson. THE PENAL CODE OF THE POLISH PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC (1973), The American Series of Foreign Penal Codes. South Hackensack, N.Y.: Fred B. Rothman & Co. London: Sweet & Maxwell. PLENSKA, D. (1980), ‘‘La criminalité féminine en Pologne”, Canadian Journal of Criminology, 22(4): 464-475. PODEMSKI, St. (1981), ‘“‘“Amnestia bez schematôéw” (About amnesty unconventionally), Polityka (Warsaw), 15(21), 23 May: 3. ROCZNIK Statystyezny (1980), (Statistical Yearbook). Warszawa: GUS (The Main Statistical Office). SHELLEY, L. (1980) ‘‘Crime and Delinquency in the Soviet Union”, pp. 208-226 in J.G. Pankhurst and M.P. Sacks (eds.) Contemporary Soviet Society: Sociological Perspective. New York: Praeger. (1982) “Female Criminality in the 1920s: A Consequence of Inad- vertent and Deliberate Change”, Russian History, 9: 265-284. “SOVIET WOMEN SPEND MORE TIME LINING UP THAN WITH THEIR KIDS” (1983), The “ Hizen (OQttawa), 16 April. STARCK-KOZLOWSKA K- :V82), “ Zycie w galonie” (Life in à galle;» 244 343 5 — 133 STERN, M. (with A. Stern) (1980) Sex in the USSR. New York, N.Y.: The New York Times Co. Troyan,S. (1983) ‘‘Face to Face with the Law: Moral Degradation”, Izvestia, 11 January: 6. Condensed in CDSP, 35(2), 9 February: 19. “UKRYWANIE TOWAROW” (1983), (Hiding of Goods), Zycie Warszawy, 21 November: 4. ZELDES, I. (1981), The Problems of Crime in the USSR. Springtield, IIl Charles C. Thomas. ABSTRACT The present article examines the participation of women in thre: forms of crime and deviance: traditional female deviance (e.g. prostitution,. on- ventional crime (e.g. against private property or violent crime) and on conventional crime, specific to the organization of the economy in these countries (e.g. speculation, appropriation of state property, etc.). Using the existing statistical data and research findings, it is shown that, despite radical social change, Polish and Soviet women continue to be grossly under- represented in convictions for so-called conventional crime. Their share in convictions for nonconventional crime, however, appears to be unusually high. To understand these findings it is necessary to realize that, despite their occupational and educational liberation, women still remain both the primary socialization agents and homemakers. This double burden imposed by family and occupational roles as well as their responsibility to transmit moral and patriotic values make women less susceptible to violations of traditional ethnical codes and religion-based mores. As well as being too in- volved in life’s responsibilities, social controls such as the Church and informal control systems monitor them too closely to allow for overt involvement in criminal life styles. Yet, unconventional economic crime presents women with new criminal opportunities, free of conventional criminal stigma and consistent with their occupational roles. Employment provides women the opportunity to engage in economic and fiscal offences which are not regulated by the traditional ethics and, therefore, do not openly conflict with their traditional role as socialization agents. RÉSUMÉ CHANGEMENTS SOCIAUX ET CRIMINALITÉ FÉMININE SOUS LE COMMUNISME : ÉTUDE DE L’URSS ET DE LA POLOGNE L’article examine la criminalité féminine sous trois formes de crime et déviance: la criminalité traditionnelle féminine (ex. prostitution), la — 134 — criminalité traditionnelle (ex. délits contre la propriété ou crimes violents), et la criminalité non-traditionnelle, spécifique à l’organisation de l’économie dans ces pays communistes (ex. spéculation, appropriation de la propriété de l’État, etc.). Selon les données statistiques et les résultats de recherche, les femmes polonaises et soviétiques continuent d’être exagérément sous- représentées dans les condamnations du crime soit-disant traditionnelles, malgré des changements sociaux radicaux. Cependant, leur part dans les condamnations de criminalité non-traditionnelle paraît être très élevée. Pour comprendre ces conclusions, il est nécessaire de réaliser que, malgré leur libération professionnelle et éducative, les femmes sont encore aussi bien agents primaires de socialisation que maîtresses de maison. Ce double far- deau imposé par leur rôle familial et professionnel, ainsi que leur responsa- bilité de transmettre des valeurs morales et patriotiques, rend les femmes moins susceptibles aux violations des codes traditionnels éthiques et reli- gieux. En plus d’être responsables des tâches quotidiennes, les contrôles sociaux, tel que l’Église et les systèmes informels, empéchent les femmes de s’engager ouvertement dans la criminalité traditionnelle. Cependant, la criminalité économique et non-traditionnelle offre des nouvelles opportu- nités criminelles aux femmes, sans stigmate et compatibles avec leur rôle professionnel. L’emploi fournit aux femmes la chance de s’engager dans des délits économiques et fiscaux qui ne sont pas réglés par les éthiques tra- ditionnelles et, par conséquent, qui ne sont pas en contradiction avec leur rôle comme agents de socialisation. — 135 — FEMALE CRIMINALITY AND THE STATUS OF WOMEN* Cathy Spatz Widom** and Abigail J. Stewart*** INTRODUCTION Over the last fifteen years, popular and scholarly interest in female criminality has been heightened, with the result that we have seen an explosion of research and theorizing. While there has been much debate about the rate of increase of female crime verus male crime and the distri- bution of crimes committed by females (Simon, 1975; Smart, 1977; Weis, 1976; Steffensmeier, 1982), little consensus has been achieved. Regardless, a strong commitment to further understanding of female crime remains. Major theories about the causes or correlates of crime have generally been directed at explanations of lower-class male criminal behavior. In the past, these ‘‘mainstream’’ theories were not applied to female criminal behavior, rather theories and popular conceptions about female crime were based on stereotypical assumptions about women. As a result, gender identity or expectations about appropriate sex role identity have played a major role in popular explanations of female crime (Widom, 1984), which have tended to involve biological or psychological factors rather than social and economic causes. Recently, with the increased attention and publicity that has been given to notorious female criminals and the apparent increases in female crime rates, there has been much speculation about the role of the ‘women’s movement”. Fluctuations in the rate and patterns of female crime have been attributed to factors such as women’s ‘’emancipation” and their increased equality vis-à-vis men. * Requests f0r' reprints should be addressed to Cathy Spatz Widom, Department of Forensic Studies, Indiana University, 302 Sycamore Hall. Bloomington, Indiana 47405. This is a revised version of a paper origin- ally presented at the 1977 annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology. The authors wish to thank David G. Winter and Michael Sokol for assistance with the computer analyses and Wesley G. Skogan, Michael G. Maxfield, Philip Parnell, and Ruth Colker for comments on %% an earlier draft of the manuscript. Indiana University, Professor, Department of Forensic Studies. *** Boston University, Assistant Professor, Department of Psychology. - 137 — The present paper is an attempt to empirically examine the relationship between female crime rates and certain variables reflecting the status of women across a variety of nations. As a framework for this analysis, we draw upon major theories that have been advanced to explain female crime, as well as relevant general theories, and to place these in the conctext of development. We consider both traditional explanations — heretofore limited to male crime — as well as a variety of sex-role-related theories and include variables reflecting the social, economic, and political status of women, as well as general societal factors typically included in explanations of male crime rates. By assessing relationships across a number of different nations, we hope to understand the correlates of female crime in the widest possible variety of settings (levels of industrialization, political systems, and so on). Future research might examine the evolution of women’s role in conjunction with female crime rates over time. There are two mays of measuring the dependent variable (1) : Level Female arrests = Females arrested as a percentage of Females total female population at risk. Distribution Female arrests = Females arrested as a percentage of all Total arrests arrests (male and female). The first is a measure of the number of arrests relative to population at risx, while the second is a measure of the relative distribution of arrests across sex. In principle, the two could be completely uncorrelated: the first indicates level, while the second measures distribution. The first measure reflects level, and may or may not go up and down with male rates. The second measure controls for the amount or rate of crime and can reflects its full range of values, regardless of amount. For example, women and men could be arrested in equal numbers in a particular country, but because there is very little crime in that country, the level of arrests for women woulb be very small. However, the distribution of female arrests (number of females arrested divided by the total number of arrests for males and females) would be quite high. Some of the theories we examine attempt to explain level, while others address distribution. A brief description of each theory is followed by hypotheses derived from each. These hypotheses then form the basis of analysis and discussion of resuits. THEORIES OF FEMALE CRIME Some theorists assume that there is an association between industrial- ization and women’s growing crime and many assume a relation;hip — 138 — between the ‘“women’s movement” and increases in female crime. However, as Smart (1977) points out, it is problematic to attribute changes in the behavior of women and girls to the influence of the women’s liberation movement. Social movements are themselves the outcome of economic, social and political changes and processes and, although such movements may instigate change, they are also the result of existing changes. Thus, criminal women and delinquent girls may be dissatisfied with the restric- tions and limited opportunities associated with the traditional feminine role, but the changes in their consciousness are as likely to be caused by changing material conditions as by the principles of the women’s liberation move- ment. ‘’Those theorists who assume that a simple causal relationship exists between the Movement and increases in the rate of female criminality ignore the material and structural changes that are taking place in the lives of women and girls which are to some extent independent of demands for equality of the sexes” (Smart, 1977, p. 74). In any case, the women’s movement, to the extent that it is perceived as relevant to female criminality, is best understood as having its effects indirectly by modifying either the absolute or relative status of women. Another pervasive assumption is common to what we will loosely refer to as equality theory. Equality theory is an attempt to explain changes over time in female criminal activity, and cultural differences in male: female privileges, they also become their equals in crime (Nettler, 1974). There are several variants of equality theory, with each emphasizing what it considers to be critical factors. In addition , these theories refer to one or other of the dependent variables discussed above. The general form of equality theory states that female crime increases as a function of the increasing equality of women. Âs males and females approach equality, female arrest rates should increase for both level and distribution (that is, relative to males). In this simplest form, equality theory leads to the prediction that one of the consequences of the emancipation of women is an increase in female criminality. The emancipation hypothesis is an old argument, which has persisted throughout the century. In the early 1900's Lombroso (1903) warned of the dangers of educating women and removing the constraints of domesticity and maternity. As recently as 1969, there was a widespread belief in a direct causal relationship between female emancipation and female crime. We note in the staff report submitted to the National Com- mission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence: ‘’It is also the case that the ‘‘emancipation’’ of females in our society over recent decades has decreased the differences in delinquency and criminality between boys and girls, men and women, as cultural differences between them have narrowed (Mulvihill et al., 1969, p. 425). We use emancipation here in the narrow sense to refer to legal emancipation and operationalize it in terms of number of years that women have had the full vote. — 139 - Another form of equality theory emphasizes the status of women. The status of women hypothesis predicts that as the status of women increases, the participation of women in all forms of crime will also increase. Thus, this hypothesis predicts to level of female arrests, not to the distribution of female arrests relative to arrests for males. Hacker (1941) observed that the female crime rate tended to converge with the male rate in countries where females had the greatest equality with males (such as in Western Europe, Australia, and the United States), and to be most divergent in countries where females had lower relative status. Bertrand (1973) found that in societies where women were restricted to the traditional female role in the home (e.g., Venezuela), little crime was committed by women. Sutherland and Cressey (1974) noted that in war years, when women take over the occupations of men and in other ways approach social equality, the female crime rate increases. ‘“The significant difference is in the social position of the girls and women as compared with boys and men, and the difference in social position either determines the frequency and intensity of the delin- quency and anti-delinquency patterns which impinge upon them or deter- mines the frequency of opportunities for crimes which are available to them” (p.130). What we have labelled the sex-role differentiation hypothesis locates the source of variation in female crime rates on the extent of sex role differentiation in a society. As women’s roles change and they experience more opportunity and more tension and frustration, women will be more likely to engage in crime (Smart, 1977). For example, Houchon (1967) calculated sex ratios in crime for nine regions in Africa and found that the rates for men exceeded those for women by differences ranging from 900 to 1l to more than 20,000 to 1. These regional differences were attributed to work-role and privilege differences between men and women. Thus, this theory predicts that the more distinct and different the sex roles, the greater the reported differences between the sexes in crime rates. As sex roles become more similar, the differences between the sexes in crime rates should also decrease. Thus, this theory addresses relationships about the distribution of females arrested, relative to total arrests. Opportunity theory is based on the assumption that women occupy and perform roles in the criminal world which are defined by their sex- determined lack of opportunity (Weis, 1976). According to Simon (1975), as women increase their participation in the labor force, the opportunity to commit certain kinds of crime will also increase. Countries in which women are represented in the commercial labor force in large members are likely to have the highest levels of female white collar crime (e.g., fraud and minor larceny), since it is in these countries that women will have the greatest opportunity to commit them. Às Wwomen are provided with opportunities traditionally reserved for males, their attempts to gain equal status will encompass criminal as well as civil behaviors. As others have pointed out - 140 — (e.g. Miller (1976)), this theory is based on the notion that the typical female offender is a white collar criminal involved in embezzlement or some other form of corporate fraud, whereas in reality the perpetrators of these offences are infrequently represented in the records of the criminal justice system and rarely come to the attention of the courts. The economic theory of crime causation suggests that crime is a “rational’’ response to a situation of economic deprivation (Nettler, 1974). Adler (1975) argued that liberated female criminals are chiefly interested in improving their financial circumstances and only secondarily in com- mitting acts of violence. Thus, the motivation for female crime is economic and females with lower levels of economic well-being should have higher rates of crime. Female crime is viewed as a preferred livelihood, especially for specific crimes, such as prostitution. The relationship between economic level and violent crime is less clear. In contrast to the predictions of economic theory, Simon (1975) found that high overall crime and arrest rates were associated with higher levels of economic development and technological advancement. However, Simon found little relationship between the rate of female crime and level of economic development. Clearly, these theories of female criminality direct researchers’ atten- tion to different issues, and in some cases lead to opposite predictions. Thus, for example, ‘“cpportunity” theory predicts that crime will increase as a function of economic development, whereas ‘’economic” theory predicts that it will decrease with economic development. Although not generally included in discussions of female criminality, social disorganization theories of crime causation predict a relationship between disruptive social conditions (familial, marital, economic, environ- mental, and educational) and delinquency and criminality (Bloom, 1969). According to Sutherland and Cressey (1974), ‘‘’one of the best expla- nations… is that a high crime rate is due to social disorganization” (p.77). Turner (1969) found that areas in Philadeiphia high in resident offenders were characterized by low income and low occupational status, high den- sity, high proportion of blacks, and a high proportion of unrelated individ- uals living in households and contributing to their income. Archer and Gartner (1976) discussed the effects of wars in disrupting the social order of societies and included in these disruptions property losses, rapid indus- trialization, changes in the labor force, sudden population migrations, breaking up of families, and so on. Although high levels ot disorganization are thought to relate to increases in arrest rates, the theory should apply equally to males and females. Thus, hypotheses based on disorganization are directed toward the level of female arrests, not toward the distribution of arrests between males and females. — 141 — The purpose of this study is to examine these various theories simul- taneously in an attempt to understand the correlates of female arrest rates across a variety of nations. General hypotheses derived from the theories and variations on some of the hypotheses follow. HYPOTHESES Equality Theory As women and men approach equality, female arrests should increase. A As women become emancipated, female arrest rates should in- crease. (EMANCIPATION) B As sex roles become more similar, differences between the sexes in arrest rates should decrease. (SEX-ROLE DIFFERENTIATION) C As the status of women increases, the participation of women in all forms of crime will also increase. (STATUS OF WOMEN) Opportunity Theory As women become more economically active, there will be an increase in the level of women arrested. As the particinat:>n of women in the labor force increases thvre <vill !*c an increase in fcimnales arrested for white-collar crimes. A. As levet où iecsanc yucal development increases, there wil! be an ncicase in the tove! of female arrests. 1. Fhe associalion between level of technological development and increases in female arrest rates wil] be restricted to white-col!ar crimes. Economic Theory Lower levels of economic participation of women will be ussociated with increases in the level of female arrests. A. Specifically, lower levels of economic participation of women will be associated with increases in female arrests for property, prosti- tution and related crimes, but unrelated to arrests for violent Crimes. Social Disorganization Theory High levels of social disorganization and disruption will be associated with increased levels of female arrests. METHOD Female arrest statistics collected by the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) and published in International Criminal Statistics — 142 - for .l971-1972 were used to assess female criminality in different countries. Each volume contains the number of offences and offenders known to the police per year, the types of crimes for which the arrests were made, and classification by offender sex. Status of women data were taken from standard objective sources such as the United Nations Demographic Yearbook and the United Nations Statistical Yearbook (see Stewart and Winter, 1977). Included in the analy- ses are only those countries for which both sets of data (female arrests and status of women) were available. As can be seen in Table 1, a reasonable array of nations from around the world are included. Since these analyses are not restricted to highly industrialized nations, they are valuable in providing an important comparative perspective in which to examine theories of female crime. TABLE I List of Nations Included Asia Europe Africa Ceylon Austria Fgypt Indonesia Denmark Kenya Iraq Finland Libya Israel France Mauritius Japan Greece Morocco Malaysia Ireland Nigeria Pakistan Netherlands Tunisia Phillipines Noway Saudi Arabia Portugal Syria Romania Thailand Spain Turkey Sweden United Kingdom (a) West Germany North America South America Oceania Canada Argentina Australia Dominican Republic Chile New Zealand Netherlands Antilles Colombia United States Peru a) England and Wales only. Several caveats should be mentioned. Unfortunately, official crime statistics are probably the most unreliable and difficult of all social statistics. Data on the status of women probably runs a close second. Ît is well known that arrest rates vary with differences in police activity and arrest practices (Sutherland and Cressey, 1974). In addition, the problems associated with general arrest statistics are magnified in regard to females because of the — 143 — potential for differential handling of female offenders by the criminal justice system and for changes over time that might have influenced these rates (Nagel and Weitzman, 1972; Widom, 1978; Ekstrand and Eckert, 1978). Furthermore, arrest rates may be confounded with better record- keeping in the more technologically advanced countries. In addition, even though the total sample is 43, the number of countries used in calculating specific correlation coefficients may be much smaller because of the data were unavailable. Nation-states are the units of analysis. Independant variables have been chosen to operationalize specific predictions from the theories described above, but theorists have used the concept of ‘“status of women” to refer to a variety of things. In addition, there is a problem in separating the effects of one independent variable (extent of female participation in the labor force) from the effects of other variables which may be closely related (e.g. amount of manufacturing, level of technology, or level of education). The Appendix provides a detailed description of the names, definitions, and sources for the variables included in these analyses. In cases where male and female data are directly compared (rates, ages, and so on), the variable is always coded so that a high score indicates lower status of women (for example, male minus female percent economically active). In cases where comparison is implicit (e.g. female level I students as a percentage of all level I students), a high score would indicate greater opportunity, higher status or greater equality for women. Most of the variables are straightforward, but those referring to ‘’econ- omic differentiation” require further comment. These variables indicate how sex segregated is a nation’s work force. Differentiation in the work force can be classified into five categories of status, ten of occupation, and nine of industry. Thus, for example, one can determine whether women, relative to men, are concentrated in the status category of employer (versus employee), or in the occupation category of administrative/clerical (versus professional/technical, sales, production, etc.) or in the industry category of commerce (versus agriculture, mining, manufacturing, etc.). The overall index of differentiation reflects the segregation by sex of the work force across the particular series of categories (status, occupation, and industry). Ît is calculated by summing, across all categories of the series, the absolute differences between the percent of economically active males in the category and the percent of economically active females in the category, and dividing this sum by two. This measure reflects differentiation or segregation, and is independent of sex differences in the propensity to be economically active overall. Table 2 indicates which specific variables are utilized to test the various hypotheses, and the predicted relationship of the independent variables with — 144 — both dependent variables. Although there is some overlap, each hypothesis is tested with a different variable or set of variables. Pearson product- moment correlations are used to assess the extent of association between the independent variables and arrest rates. We discuss these analyses in terms of associations or relationships since the data for the indepenent and de- pendent variables were drawn from the same approximate time period. Strictly speaking, we should use multiple regression techniques to establish the independent, unique association of each predictor variable with the female arrest rates, with the effects of the other variables statistically con- trolled. This is impossible in the present cases because of the small (and fluctuating) numbers of cases for many variables. Thus, any interpretation of the results presented here should be tempered with the caution that since the independent variables are in many cases highly correlated, some of the correlations with arrest rates may well be spurious. RESULTS Table 3 presents the correlations between educational, economic, legal, technological and social disorganization variables and level of female arrests (percentage of females arrested/female population) across a variety of nations. Table 4 presents correlations for the same variables and the distri- bution of female arrests (percentage of females arrested/total arrests). In each of these tables, correlations are reported for total arrests and the specific offences of murder, sex crimes, major larceny, minor larceny, total larceny, counterfeiting, fraud, and drugs. Table S summarizes the results in terms of hypotheses and specific predictions. Predictions associated with the hypotheses. Several versions of equality theory received strong support and specific indicators of social disorganization were related to individual offences. On the other hand, sex role differentiation and economic theory received little support. In its form linking opportunity to technological development, opportunity theory received some support; however, in its more restricted form which focused on white collar crimes, the results were disappointing. As women achieve equality with males in certain spheres (that is, the smaller the difference between males and females in legal age of marriage, infant mortality rate, and suicide rate), the level of female arrests decreases. On the other hand, greater equality between the sexes in other respects (illiteracy, economic activity, economic differentiation, and life expectancy at 1 year) is associated with higher rates of arrests. Emancipation, as measured by the number of years women have had the full vote, was significantly related to the level and distribution of female arrests. For level, total arrest rates as well as major, minor, and total larceny) were significant. For distribution, significant correlations were found for these same crimes plus murder, counterfeiting, and fraud. Female arrests for sex crimes were not to this legal status variable. — 145 — TABLE II Summary of Differential Predictions of the Hypotheses [Predicted Direction of Relationship (+ or —)] Variables Level Distribution Hypothesis 1.EQUALITY: Male-female legal age of marriage . . À . - . À ° . Female-male illiteracy rate - . À- e . ° . À . . À e À . ° . À - . À ° % Male-female economically active Economic differentiation in: - status ° ° . À . ° . . À ° ° . . . À ° . . e À e » ° . - industry ° e À . . ° ° . ° . À e À- . . e » . e » ° . » - occupation . . ° . . .… À . . . À e À . À . À « . - . Male-female suicide rate . . . À. . À . . À . . » . À L ° . . . . Male-female life expectancy at 1 year Female-male infant mortality rate : - 1-6 days . . . e À . ° . . . À. . . . . À - . e . . . . - 7-27 days - 28-364 days . ° . . . À . ». ° ° . ° ° . . À . . ». À lA. Emancipation: years women have had full vote 1B Sex-Role Differentiation : . . À . - . . - Male-female legal of marriage- Economic differentiation in: - status . . À . À . . . . e e e ° e » ° . . . . À - industry . . ° ° . . . . . ° . - . . . ° . . . À - occupation . . ° . . À ° ° . ° . À ° . e … . ° +++ 1C Status of Women: of years women have had full vote + Male-female legal age of marriage ° . e À . À Median years education for females . e À . À + ! Female illiteracy . ° . À . e . . Àe . À. ° . * . % Female level I students . . e - . L ° . . % Female level II students . . . À . . . . ° . . ° - . À . . - ° % Female level II students % Females economically active ° ° . ° . À- . % Married females economically active +++++ OPPORTUNITY : % Females economically active + 2A. Level of technological development : % Workers agriculture . . Û ° ° . ° . ° . . . % Workers manufacturing Kwh per capita ° . . . ° ° . . . . . ° . » . ° GDP per capita ° . ° ° . À ° . À. ° . À ° . . e +++i 3.ECONOMIC: . . . À ° ° . ° . % Females economically active 3A. % Females economically active: - for property crimes ° . À . . . . ° . . . . - — - for prostitution and related crimes - for violent crimes . ° . » - . e » ° . À. ° . À No rclai.ionship 44.SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION : % Illegitimate births . . . . . À e - . ° ° ° . À . . Divorce rate Unemployment . . . . . ° . . ° . À ° ° ° . À. . .… . Months at war ° ° ° . e . . . . ° . . ° ° ° ° . ° . À . . . . . - . À ° . À . . À . À . Child/woman ratio Female illiteracy . . ° . ° . ° ° ° ° ° ° . . . * . . ++++++ — 146 — TABLE II Correlations Between Educational, Economic, Legal, Technological and Social Disorganization Variables and Level of Female Arrests (females arrested/total females) Across a Variety of Nations Major Minor Total Counter- Total Murder Sex Larceny | Larceny | Larceny feiting Fraud Drugs EDUCATION: - Median years education females . . . . ° ° . 117 259 139 793 751l 153 643 581 404 E S % X * X%* * * - Total-Female Median years education -184 138 -145 073 -357 -194 -203 -174 -3*63 - Female Illiteracy ° . . . . À Q . . . . . . ° . . -362 -289 197 -195 -371 -358 -666 -401 À% % À -4*68 - Female-male Illiteracy . ° . . . ° * . . Û ° . -203 -341 -014 -023 -271 -262 -586 -407 % 447 - % Female Level I Students . . . . . - ° . . . 214 -004 -338 253 243 160 3*83 3*66 3Î7 - % Female Level II Students . . ° ° ° . ° ° . . 218 074 -357 129 3Z4 3;13 294 179 4*25 - % Female Level III Students . . . . » . » . ° 149 009 -198 051 160 124 234 218 264 - % 1° and 2° Students . . . . . . ° ° . ° . . . 382 -145 -218 341 646 652 372 378 %%* % % % 3Z4 ECONOMIC : - % Female Economically active 233 -207 -141 051 204 195 190 189 111 -O11 -094 -087 -124 -135 -152 - % Male-Female Economically active -257 -O11 011 - Married Female Economically active 109 -174 -137 233 392 402 372 206 290 - Economic differentiation - occupation -087 -207 -162 266 251 269 228 -018 143 - Economic differentiation - industry . . . . . -109 168 -061 198 090 105 -074 -013 121 279 -295 -367 -117 -212 -292 - Economic differentiation - status -028 -207 - 3*74 TABLE III (continued) LE : - #years.full vote . e À . ° . ». ° ° « . . . . . . 648 -257 e sf x -119 u ( s, 220 276 290 - Male-Female legal age of marriage 287 107 018 373 363 303 -090 352 082 TECHNOLOGY: - % workers agriculture . . À ° ° . . ° . » .… © ° -242 -121 189 639 -654 -331 -275 32 % %x % * * —4*62 - % workers manufacturing ° ° ° . . À . . . . À 213 040 -237 664 674 193 509 * ** # % * 499 3Ë9 - 1971 KWH per capita e . . . ° . . . ° . . ° . 222 -157 149 299 186 e 50e 2 50s - 1963 GDP per capita . À. . ° . . . . * . e . . 475 022 763 761 610 719 —138 e * d k À Àe k æ * % * % % * DISORGANIZATION: - Male-Female Suicide rate . . ° ° ° . ° * . ° * 134 -220 156 359 358 388 065 287 e - % illegitimate births . . » . » L ° . . ® . À ° ° 152 -025 -195 — -101 -192 -134 -086 -028 - Divorce rate * . . À . » ° ° . . ® . . ». ° . e À . 190 -071 303 073 242 270 106 373 4*12 - Male-Female life expectancy at 1 year -232 265 -246 -3*99 -180 -315 -4ZS 45 —4*30 - ?çmak-Male Infant Mortality Rate: à - & r - . ° . À ° ® L . ». L . ° . ° e »* ° ° ° 227 -316 076 236 264 273 117 162 104 /-2 ; v2YS » . . . . ® L . . . ° ° * L ° e À ° . 029 059 086 491 504 205 174 237 —3Ë9 # * % - 22-364 days . . . . . ° ° ° ° . À . * . . . ° . 095 -291 -043 094 153 010 043 3*85 3*95 -nemployment . . . ». « » . . À . . » . À . . . -148 459 184 -290 -461 -359 159 057 -4*70 1NS si War . . * * . ° . e ». . ° . . . e + . 188 -102 145 190 473 4*51 # %* 761 184 202 rh‘!fi; » _an Ratio * ° . . . ° . . . . . ° . . -137 3]9 330 -264 45 45 E -207 -159 — —— ——{ten—2.—2m0"" e TABLE IV Correlations Beween Educational, Economic, Legal, Technological and Social Disorganization Variables and Distribution of Females Arrests (Females arrested/total arrests) Across a Variety of Nations. Total Murder Sex Major Minor Total Counter- Fraud Drugs Larceny | Larceny | Larceny feiging EDUCATION : - Median years education Females . . . . . ° . 4*61 199 -118 -005 % %% 695 # % % 721 %%* 711l 552 183 - Total - Female Median years education -193 -180 -170 -078 -348 -333 -204 -290 009 - Female illiteracy . . . ° ° ° . . ° . . . . . ° . 091 030 296 043 -378 -305 -567 -561 « #% - Female - Male Illiteracy -094 -074 379 -026 -257 -209 -271 -231 5s - % Female Level I Students . ° . . ° . . . . . 191 097 -018 547 330 575 553 —3*67 # % Àk sQ %%% « À% * - % Female Level II Students 198 057 -134 530 266 584 E % % % s00 ‘76 % & % . ° . ° . . * . ° - % Female Level III Students 161 -095 344 -059 277 257 3*65 %%* 508 % > À 596 - % 1° and 2° Students . À « . ° . ° . ° ° . ° ° 238 161 —3*74 047 * #% * 722 % % * 710 425 %%% 514 p ECONOMIC: - % Female economically active . . . ° . ° . . 292 075 093 -261 260 262 180 5 3:}4 - % Male-Female economically active -229 -047 -276 192 -035 -033 -245 -050 -493 -091 408 014 345 266 074 - % Married Female economically active -239 5i)5 ® - Economic differentiation - occupation -112 -017 -377 224 293 108 -373 345 4*67 - Economic differentiation - industry -136 031 -159 -025 142 002 -207 226 007 - Economic differentiation - status 151 -205 539 -042 -327 -224 -140 -361 -369 % * TABLE IV (continued) LEGAL: - # years full vote ° . . ° . . ° . . . . ° . . . . 4*11 020 -212 015 652 48 317 p 4*16 - Male-Female legal age of marriage . ° . . - . 287 107 018 373 363 303 -090 352 082 TECHNOLOGY : - % workers agriculture -050 -226 3*61 -137 -682 % À À -586 * X * -220 E -219 - % workers manufacturing . . . . . . . . . . . 119 277 -366 184 793 713 212 618 % À% % % % % % x çoa - 1971 KWH per capita . . . . . . . . Û . . . . 216 148 -190 092 640 536 068 # k % % %% e 3f3 - 1963 GDP per capita . . . ° . ° . . . . . . ° 303 260 -204 163 745 718 344 641 * #xŒ æ % % LE S M DISORGANIZATION: - Male-Female Suicide rate 096 106 360 498 -076 347 S 536 2 - % Illegitimate births . . . . . . . . . . . . . ° 211 071 -001 242 -288 -271 -156 -000 653 *x* - Divorce rate . . . . . . . . . ° . . . . . . . . . 063 037 066 186 279 308 -073 163 ça - Male-Female life expectancy at 1 year -389 -408 248 635 -650 -237 -318 -4*36 * # * # #X -4*2 l - Female-Male I.M.R. : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Û -1-6 days 378 231 074 157 4*38 4*2 9 311 217 001 -7-27 days ° . . . . . . . . . . ° . . Û . . . . . -083 146 -072 -065 53s 4;17 163 194 -261 - 28-364 days . . . . . . . * . . . . . . . . . . -027 -090 -126 -091 349 -115 053 -158 4£)1 Unemployment . . . . . Û . . * * . . . . . . ° -409 -064 044 059 030 5;10 2 < -5*95 - Months at war ° . . . . ° . . . . . . - ° . . . 204 353 011 366 489 371 138 433 595 - Child/Woman ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -194 -149 052 -717 -717 3*84 % % % X % -3*61 = = TABLE V Summary of Results Significant Correlations Only Hypothesis Variables Level Distribution 1.EQUALITY: TL Male-female legal age of marriage J Female-male illiteracy rate -CTF, -F % Male-female economically active ° . . . . . . . -CTF Economic differentiation in: -status .. .. .. 22210 44244 4 44 4 1 1 20 -L - industry . . À . À . À . À . À . . ° . - . . . . . - . - occupation ° ° . . À . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . - D9 u to Male-female suicide rate - . À- . . - . - . . - . . . CFT U Male-female life expectancy at 1 year -L, -CFT -M, r -— T Female-male infant mortality rate : - 1-6 days . . . . ° . . . . . - . . . - . - * . . . - . - 7-27days. .. ... 221112111111 2 20 L,-M - 28-364 days oeoe lA. Emancipation: ycars women have had full vote e » . . . . T,L T,M,L,C,F 1B Sex-Role Differentiation: Male-female legal of marriage . . . . . . . . TL Economic differentiation in: - Status . L . L . À . ». . . . . . - . . . . . . -L - industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ° . . . - Occupation . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . ° - 1C Status of Women: of years women have had full vote T,M,L,C,F Male-female legal age of marriage . . . . . . [ Median years education for females Ê ’F’ T,L,C,F Female illiteracy -C,-F -C,-F,-D % Female level i students % Female level II students. .. .. .. ... $ LD % Female level IH students . e - . . . . . . ë ë % Females economically active . . - . . . . (Ë: Ë % Married females economically active. 2.0CPPORTUNITY : % Females economically active . . . . . . . . . ° C, 2A. Level of technological development: % Workers agriculture . . . . . . - . . . . -L % Workers manufacturing F Kwh per capita . - ° . Û . . . . - . . Û . . ° . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . T,C, Ë Ê Ë ,D IË ë GDP per capita 3.ECONOMIC: % Females economically active C,F 4.SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . % Illegitimate births Divorce rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ° . . . . . . D Unemployment . . À . . Û . . . . . . . . ° . . . . S,-L,- Months at war ° . . - . . * . . . . . . . . . . . . . Child/Wwoman ratio . . ° . . . . . ° . - . . . . . . M) D SL L -C Sa' 9571 » L,-C,-F,-D F‘emale illiteracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . À . . - _C, F -C-F- —s Offense Key: T = total, L = larceny, CFT = counterfciting, F = fraud, D = drugs, M — murder, and S = sex. — 151 — Of the four independent variables selected as a direct test of the sex- role differentiation hypothesis, only two showed significant correlations (economic differential in status with sex crimes and economic differential in occupation with drugs). Our findings indicate that as the status of women increased, the level of female total arrests and arrests for larceny, fraud, and drugs also increased. Conversely, there was a decrease in females arrested for sex crimes. Let us examine in more detail the education variables as illustrative of the relationship between the status of women and arrest patterns. Generally the higher the level of education for females in a society, the higher the rates of arrest. (Relationships with illiteracy follow the same pattern, only lower levels of female illiteracy were associated with higher rates of counter- feiting, fraud, and drugs). In contrast, the level and distribution of females arrested for sex crimes is negatively related to education. Thus, the more educated females are across these societies, the lower the level and distri- bution of female arrests for sex crimes. Thus, we found that equality, emancipation, and status of women theories were generally supported. The results in 3, 4 and 5 suggest limited and weak associations between economic variables and female arrest rates. Those relationships which were significant influence the distribution rather than the level of arrests. In contrast to predictions, economic participation of women (% females economically active) was not related to levels of females arrested for all or individual offences. According to opportunity theory, as women become more economic- ally active, they should be more involved in crime and arrested more often. Furthermore, the more technologically developed a nation (assuming that women will share in the level of the development of their country), the higher the level of females arrested. We have already seen that the percent- age of females economically active did not correlate significantly with levels of arrest. However, level of technology was positively related to the level and distribution of female arrests for larceny, fraud, and drugs. That is, measures of industrialization such as percent workers in manufacturing, KWH per capita, or GDP per capita, were all strongly associated with in- creases in these crimes. In contrast, higher rates of females (relative to males) arrested for sex crimes were found in the more agricultural countries. While level of technological development was related to the distribution of females arrested for white-collar crimes relative to total arrests, the limited version of opportunity theory limiting its predictions to white-collar crime did not receive support — since its predictions were addressed to level, not distribution. The results in Table 3, 4 and 5 indicate that a number of social disor- ganization and disruption indicators were significantly related to female — 152 — arrests, for level and distribution. The percentage of illegitimate biths was associated with the level of females arrested for murder and drugs, and divorce rate was with level of arrests for drugs. Interestingly, as unemploy- ment goes up, the distribution of arrests of females (relative to males) for sex crimes also goes up, but for larceny and drugs it goes down. Murder and Sex Crimes. Female arrest rates for murder and sex crimes generally did not reveal the same pattern of relationships as arrests for other crimes. For example, the level and distribution of arrests for murder were not related to educational, economic, or technological conditions; whereas they were related to a number of social disorganization variables (% illegit- imate biths, infant mortality rates, and child/woman ratio). Similarly, the level and distribution of females arrests for sex crimes were not related to median years education female, but were negatively related to the extent to which females were in primary and secondary schools (% females in primary and secondary schools and college). That is, the higher the pro- portion of females in school, the lower the level and rate of females arrested for sex crimes, relative to men. Females arrests were higher, relative to male arrests, in countries with higher rates of workers in agriculture, higher rates of unemployment in the years 1964-66, a higher child/woman ratio, and a larger economic status differential. DISCUSSION While theories of crime have generally become more sophisticated and complex, there has been a tendency to reduce the phenomenon of female criminality to rather simplistic causes. From the biological theories of female criminality of the early 1900’s, there has been a shift in emphasis to the consequences of women’ emancipation. However, the concepts of equality, emancipation, or status of women refer to complex constructs which have complex relationships with female crime. What do we conclude from these findings? The most definitive con- clusion is that the problem of female crime is neither unidimensional nor simple. It is somewhat difficult to separate the effects of equality from opportunity, and each of these from the overall effects of modernization. Each of the theories examined in this paper received some support, whereas none was completely successful in predicting level or distribution of female arrests. Using concurrent data, we have seen how female arrest rates are related to variations in the legal and actual status of women, as well as to variations in general non-status related factors. Legal emancipation proved be a strong correlate of level of female arrests (total and larceny) and distribution (relative to males) for a broader range of crimes (total, murder, larceny, counterfeiting, and fraud). Thus, — 153 — the longer women have had the vote, the more likely they are to be rep- resentend in arrested statistics. Higher levels of societal disruption and disorganization were associated with lower arrest rates for larceny, fraud, and counterfeiting, but higher levels or arrests for murder. This relationship would be even more meaning- fully pursued using longitudinal cross-cultural data. Opportunity theory received only partial support from these results. Female economic activity per se was not related to arrest rates for females. Rather, we found the general level of opportunity in a society were strongly related to arrests. Specifically, countries with higher levels of industrial- ization, technological development, and education had higher rates of female arrests. On the other hand, countries with more traditional social orientations (a large agricultural component and lower levels of education) had higher rates of female arrests for sex crimes. The sex-role differentiation hypothesis received very limited support from these data. Although sex segregation by status was associated with higher rates of women (relative to men) arrested for sex crimes and segre- gation by occupation with higher rates of arrests for drugs, these differen- tiation variables may be better understood as indicating a lack of oppor- tunity, rather than inequality. In all cases economic differentiation by sex also isolates women from opportunity. Contrary to expectations, the simple form of economic theory tested here was not supported by our findings, although this may be an artifact of poor nations keeping less accurate arrest statistics. For example, the positive correlation between Gross Domestic Product per capita and larceny may indicate only that richer countries make and record arrests for larceny, while poorer countries cannot afford to do so. Or, in some countries, larceny may not be treated as criminal. Regardless, it is surprising that arrests for sex crimes were not associated with any of the economic vari- ables reflecting the participation of women in the labor force. Ît is clear from these results that we need more complex models, larger data sets to permit more control over multicollinearity, and data drawn from different time preriods to make further progress in understanding patterns of female arrests and criminal behavior. In almost all human societies females have higher life expectancy rates. However, as the discrepancy between male and female life expectancy rates decreases (that is, as biological conditions improve for males or deteriorate for females), the rate of female arrested for larceny, counterfeiting, fraud, and murder increases. This may reflect improved medical conditions associ- ated with increasingly industrialized nations. Another possibility is that as women participate more fully in society, the stresses associated wth such — 154 — activities result in increasing medical and/or physical problems for women (Platt, 1984), decreasing their biological advantage. Social, political, and biological equality affect female arrest rates dif- ferently. Increases in social equality are related to increases in property crimes (larceny, fraud, counterfeiting), but to decreases in sex crimes. Increases in political equality are related to increases in property crimes and increases in biological equality to increases in arrests for murder. In some cases, equality and crime vary inversely. For example, higher education among women is associated with lower arrests for sex crimes. The relationship between variables reflecting equality and female arrests for murder are both more subtle and more intriguing. Female arrests for murder increase with advances in equality — political and biological. For women, then, equality represents a tripleedged sword. Early prophets of doom may have been correct in arguing that do emancipate women — to educate them, to give them equality, and to in- crease their general status in society — is also to lead them to the paths of criminal behavior. What these prophets did not foresee was the complexity of the relationships. - 155 — FOOTNOTE () This distinction was suggested by Wes Skogan (personal communi- cation). REFERENCES ADLER, Frieda (1975), Sisters in Crime. New York: McGraw-Hill. ARCHER, Dane and Richard Gartner (1976),‘‘Violent acts and violent times: a comparative approach to postwar homicide rates’’. American Sociological Review 41 :937-963. BERTRAND, M.A. Unpub- ‘“The insignificance of female criminality in the light of the lished hegemonic conceptions of sexual roles and the privatization of women”. Paper presented at the First Conference of the European Group for the Study of Deviance and Social Control, Florence, Italy, 1973. BLOOM, B.L. (1966), “A census track analysis of socially deviant be- haviors’’. Multivariate Behavioral Research 1:307-320. DUNCAN, O.D. and Duncan, B. (1955), ““‘Residential distribution and occupational stratification”. American Journal of Sociology 60:493- 503. EKSTRAND, Laurie E. and William A. Eckert (1978), ‘“Defendant’s sex as a factor in sentencing”’. Experimental Study of Politics 6:90-112. HACKER, E. (1941), Kriminal statistische und Kriminalactiologische Berichte. Miskole, Hungary : Ludwig. HOUCHON, G. (1967), ‘“Les mecanismes criminogenes dans une Société Urbaine Africaine’’. Revue Internationale de Criminologie et de Police Technique 21: 271-292. LOMBROSO, Ceasare (1903) The Female Offender. Tr. New York: Appleton. (1920) MILLER, Patricia Y. (1976), Book review of Sisters in Crime (Adler) and Women and Crime (Simon). Sex Roles 2: 407410. MULVIHILL, D., M. Tumin, and L. Curtis (1969), Crimes of Violence. Volume 12. Washington, D.C.: US. Government Printing Office. NAGEL, Stuart and Lenore J. Weitzman (1972), “Double standard of American justice”. Society 9: 18-25, 6243. NETTLER, Gwynn (1974), Explaining Crime. New York: McGraw-Hill. SIMON, Rita J. (1975), The Contemporary Woman and Crime. Rockville, Maryland: National Institute of Mental Health. SMART, Carol (1977), Women, Crime and Criminology: A Feminist Critique. London : Routledge and Kegan Paul. STEFFENSMEIER, Darrell J. (1982), ‘“Trends in Female crime: its, still a man’s world”. Pp. 117-129 in B.P. Price and N.J. Sokoloff (eds.) The Criminal Justice System and Women. New York: Boardman. — 156 — STEWART, Abigail J. and David G. Winter (1977) ‘’The nature and causes of female suppression”. Signs 2: 531-553. SUTHERLAND, Edwin H. and Donald R. Cressey (1974) Criminology. Philadelphia: Lippincott. TURNER, S. (1969), “The ecology of delinquency”. In T. Sellin and M.F. Wolfgang (eds.) Delinquency: Selected Studies. New York: Wiley. WEIS, Joseph G. (1976), ‘“Liberation and crime: the invention of the new female criminal”. Crime and Social Justice 6:17-27. WIDOM, Cathy Spatz (1978)‘‘Toward an understanding of female criminality”. In B.A. Maher (ed.) Progress in Experimental Personality Research. Volume 8. New York: Academic Press. (1984) “Sex roles, criminality, and psychopathology”. In C.S. Widom (ed.) Sex Roles and Psychopathology. New York: Plenum. — 157 — APPENDIX Names, definitions, and sources for independent variables Name Definition Source EDUCATION: Median years education for females Median years education for women UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1972 age 25-34 table 1.5. Overall median years education minus Median years education for the entire UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1972 female median population age 25-34 minus median years table 1.5. education for women age 25-34. Female illiteracy rate UNDY 1970, table 11. Female - male illiteracy rate Calculated from the separate rates for UNDY 1970, table 11. each sex. Female % level I pupils Percent of total pupils enrolled at level I UNESCO Statistical YearBook 1972, (primary) who are female table 3.2. Female % level II pupils Percent of total pupils enrolled at level II UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1972, (secondary) who are female table 3.4. Female % level III pupils Percent of total pupils enrolled at level III UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1972, (tertiary, i.e., collegeplus) who are female table 4.1. Percent zrimary/secondary students Primary and secondary students as percent UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1972, of the population age 5-19. table 1.5. 7CONOMIC: “e Fertaiz economically active UNDY 1970, table 12. & 4- - ferrale % economically active Calculated from separate percent for each sex UNDY 1970, table 12. À -rzic{ vomen % Percent of married women who are econ- acc:iomically active UNDY 1968, table 9. with data on number of married women omically active (with consensually married if so reported). in population. . -vnomic differentiation in status Index of differentiationâä by sex Calculated from UNDY 1964, table 11. in work status. - *crne-ic differentiation < Index of differentiationä by sex Calculated from UNDY 1964, table 10. Le 1N in occupation. N . 6. - Giffereritiation Index of differentiationä by sex Calculated from UNDY 1964, table 9. 14 INQUsizV in industry. ——neus MD 0m LEGAL: Years women have had full vote Number of years women have had full vote United Nations, Constitutions, Electoral (can vote in all elections and can hold office) Laws and Other Legal Instruments Relating to the Political Rights of Women, (1968), table 4. Male - female legal age of marriage Calculated from legal ages for each sex. UNDY 1968, table 28. TECHNOLOGY: Percent workers in agriculture Workers in agriculture as percent of econ- UNDY 1964, table 9. omically active population. Percent workers in manufacturing Workers in manufacturing as perctent of UNDY 1964, table 9. economically active population. Kwh. per capita Kilowatt hours electricity consumed per Electricity: UNSY 1972, table 142:; capita (latest figures). Population: UNSY 1972, table 19. GDP per capita Gross domestic product in US $ per capita UNSY 1972, table 187. for the year 1963. SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION : Male - female suicide rate Calculated from the separate rates UNDY 1967, table 24 (BE49 category for each sex. of death cause). Percent illegitimate births Illegitimate births as percent ofall births UNDY 1969, table 21, moving average of (with consensual marriages counted as latest 3 years. marriage). Divorce rate Divorces per 1000 married couples UNDY 1968, table 35. Male - female life expectancy Calculated from the separate figures UNDY 1971, table 34. at l year for each sex at age 1. Female - male infant mortality rate, Calculated from the separate rates for UNDY 1971, table 29. age 1-6 days each sex. Female - male I.M.R,, age 7-27 days Calculated from the separate rates for each sex Same as above. Female - male I.M.R., age 28-364 days Calculated from the separate rates for each sex UNDY 1971, table 29. UNEMPLOYED 1964-66: Months at war 1931-1965 Number of months the nation was at was J.D. Singer and M. Small, The Wages of War 1816-1965: A Statistical Handbook during 1931-196S inclusive. (New York, 1972), table 11.1. Child/woman ratio Number of children age S or less per UNDY 1969, table 8. 1000 women age 15-49. Note: UNSY = United Nations Statistical Yearbook, UNDY = United Nations Demographic Yearbook. ABSTRACT The relationship between female crime rates and the status of women is examined using information from 43 nations around the world. Hypotheses derived from four major theories — equality, opportunity, economic, and social disorganization — are tested, as well as variations of equality theory (emancipation, sex-role differentiation, and status of women) which lead to different predictions. Correlations are computed for variables reflecting the status of women and general levels of development and disorganization across these nations and two dependent measures of female arrest rates — level and distribution. Caveats concerning the quality of the data are dis- cussed and the difficulty in separating the effects of equality from oppor- tunity and each from the overall effects of modernization is noted. Relationships to male crime are neither unidimensional nor simple. While equality, emancipation, and status of women theories received sup- port, economic theory focusing on the participation of women in the labor force did not. Moreover, social, political and biological equality affect female arrest rates differently. Increases in social equality are related to increases in property crimes (larceny, fraud, and counterfeiting), but to decreases in sex crimes. Increases in political equality are related to increases in property crimes and increases in biological equality to increases in female arrests for murder. RÉSUMÉ CRIMINALITÉ FÉMININE ET STATUT DE LA FEMME Le lien causal entre le taux de criminalité féminine et le statut de la femme est étudié ici grâce aux renseignements recueuillis à travers 43 pays différents. Les hypothèses issues des 4 théories principales — égalité, oppor- tunité, désorganisation économique et sociale — sont réexaminées au même titre que le sont les variables qui composent la théorie de l’égalité (émanci- pation, différentiation des rôles selon le sexe et statut de la femme), théorie qui a conduit à l’établissement de prédictions diverses. À travers ces pays les corrélations de prédictions diverses variables reflétant le statut de la femme et les niveaux globaux de développement et de désorganisation ont été évaluées, ainsi que les deux composantes du taux d’arrestation des femmes — niveau et distribution —. Des mises en garde concernant la fiabilité des données statistiques sont mentionnées et la diffi- culté qu’il y a à différencier les effets de l’égalité de ceux de l’opportunité puis, pour chacun de ces principes des effets généraux de la modernisation, est notée. — 160 — Les liens de cause à effet concernant la criminalité féminine ne sont ni unidimensionnels ni simples. Alors même que les théories sur l’égalité, l’émancipation et le statut des femmes recevaient approbation, la théorie économique fondée sur la participation des femmes aux forces productives était négligée. De plus les principes d’égalité sociale, politique et biologique affectent différemment le taux d’arrestation des femmes. La généralisation de l’égalité sociale est liée à la fois à l’accroissement des crimes sur les biens (larcins, fraudes, contrefaçons) et à la diminution des crimes sexuels. La généralisation de l’égalité politique est reliée à l’augmentation de la crimina- lité axée sur la propriété, et l’égalité biologique influence l’accroissement des arrestations de femmes pour meurtres. — 161 — THE UNITED NATIONS CRIME TRENDS SURVEYS: COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT* Slawomir M. Redo** “The International Statistical Institute in 1946 deced that ‘‘a ma- terial comparison of national criminal statistics (has) been judged impossible from the begining because of the diversitv of penal law and of the statistical-technical methods of the various countries…!', Not- withstandin… “The United Nations, from the early days of its establis- ment… selected criminal statistics as one of its main areas of concern in social defense…’’ Wich of these two prestigious organizations is correct’… Is it possible that both organizations are right, despite the apparent complete opposition of the views expressed in these quo- tation ”” Wilkins 1980:23 INTRODUCTION There is a growing awareness in the criminological literature of the importance of comparative research on criminality. Criminologists express the opinion time and over again that in view of this importance ‘‘compara- tive criminology should… develop concepts and generalizations at a level that distinguishes between universals applicable to all societies and unique characteristics representative of one or a small set of societies’”’ (Clinard and Abbot 1973:2), for — as other author states “thinking without com- parison is unthinkable. And in the absence of comparison, so is all scientific thought and scientific research” (Swanson 1971:145). It is evident that the United Nations with its global corerage and, there- f0re, possibility of requesting crime related data from all Member States has * The author wofild like to thank his colleagues from the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch, Minoru shikita, Irene Melup, Robin W. Burnham and Rodrigo Paris-Steffens for helpful comments on an earlier draft. However, responsibility for the views expressed herein rests with the author alone. These views do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations Secretariat. ** United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch, Social Affairs Officer, Vienna International Center, A-1400, P.O. Box 600, Austria. — 163 — been in a quite unique position to carry out comparative projects. This article will describe the lengthy and complicated process of developing the three United Nations crime trends surveys, starking from the early compara- tive studies in the late 1940’s to the latest Survey of Crime Trends, Oper- ations of Criminal Justice Systems, and Crime Prevention Strategies under- taken in 1982, all of which have remained rather unnoticed in the crimino- logical literature (1). The present article will examine both the substantive and methodological aspects of these surveys and, consequently, will trace the changing emphasis of these surveys from a principally one-dimensional, legalistic undertaking, to multidimensional, ‘*developmental’’ analyses. [. THE GLOBAL STUDY OF 1950 Awareness of the need for comparative studies in the field of crimi- nality was first generated in the United Nations at the end of 1940°s. In fact, in vew of the earlier cross-national comparisons of prison populations made before World War II for the League of Nations (1938), and other comparisons made by individual researchers (Anonymous 1932, Verkko 1937), this need had been recognized by the Organization as early as 1948 when the Statistical Commission, a subsidiary body of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), drafted a recommendation that the United Nations Secretary General should ‘‘take the initiative in arranging for adequate programmes of development of the various branches of social statistics’’. This recommendation was subsequently adopted by ECOSOC (UN Secretariat 1950 b) which at about the same time also adopted another draft resolution originated by another of its subsidiary bodies namely, the Social Commission (now the Social Development Commission), in which it expressed inter alia the need to deal ‘’with immediate necessities in the field of crime prevention and control”’, such as the study of “‘criminal statistics Wwith a view to report on the state of crime” (UN ECOSOC 1953; UN Secretariat 1952). Such a study was prepared by the Secretariat in 1950 and covered the decade 1937-1946, the period chosen ‘“because it represented the most recent decade on which criminal statistics could be obtained”, and because ‘“it was seen that there would be the natural advantage of having a period in which the impact of world war II on the criminality of the individual country might be reflected” (UN Secretariat 1950 a). It contained, inter alia the data made available by 31 Member States on offences known to the police, persons found guilty or convicted in one of the following offence categories: a) offences against persons (homicide, assault, rape) b) offences against property (larceny, burglary, robbery, arson) c) offences against the family (desertion, non-support, cruelty and neglect) — 164 — d) offences against public health and order (drunkenness, gambling, disorderly conduct) e) offences against the State (treason, espionage, collaboration with the enemy). Another measurement base, namely, prison statistics, was used to deter- mine the incidence of these crimes types only in a supplementary way, as the Secretariat felt that this was the least satisfactory kind of measurement (UN Secretariat 1950a:10). These studies found that, in the surveyed countries, the number of offences known to the police had increased after the beginning of World War II in four out of seven (Belgium, Denmark, France, Iraq) providing this kind of data. In two others (Finland and the Union of South Africa) an increase took place toward the end of the war, and in the remaining country (Canada) no great changes occurred. These equivocal findings were deemed not to “‘provide a basis for conclusions as to the possible causes of the variations among the different nations” (UN Secretariat 1950a:18). However, when the category of belligerant nations was considered, separately it was observed that, in these countries, the rates increased during the ten-year period under investigation. “Of the countries reported on, approximately one half experienced some increase in the number of offences known to the police, persons convicted, persons charged, etc.” (UN Secretariat 1950a). Aside from crime trends data, the study contained information on the demographic characteristics of the criminal population and on recidivism rates. Both the scope of the areas covered and the number of Member States which made available their data for this early study, place it among the first truly widely comparative and yet relatively unknown undertakings in criminology. That study revealed also many inticate problems relating to com- parisons of criminality in a cross-national perspective. Since the request of the Secretary-General for submission of crime data did not contain any suggestion for some explanation of the terms used to denote specific crime types, included in the replies, the data provided reflected national legal definitions which were, however, not known by the Secretariat. Moreover, the data could not be considered reliable due to the varying extent of the dark figure of unreported criminality among Member States. In effect it was concluded that ‘‘national systems for the collection and publication of criminal statistics are now so diverse as to preclude the possibility of sound international comparisons” (UN Secretary General 19S1:1). il. STANDARL CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCES 4 « k 0* in‘ab, Ctc nau cr c. ased 4 153 diversity ‘wos er ‘Fs Ü 5hae ereas f ut ;untionaii CCepne s0 Xpa GÉAne à 195 - honorary capacity as an advisory body to the Secretary General and the Social Commission” established under the afore-mentioned ECOSOC resolution 155 C (VIII) (Clifford 1978; UN ECOSOC 1952). After a review of the results of the study, the group offered a series of observations and recommendations with regard to the preparation of ‘“a standard classification of offences… referring to three major offences, namely criminal homicide, aggravated assault and theft without violence (robbery and burglary)”. (UN Secretariat 1959:7) After further reflexion, the group, which was by then renamed the Ad-Hoc Advisorv “ «mimittee 3 broad of Experts, worked out more precise recommendations, includ. rationale on how to prepare such a standard classification of offe‘1es (2). The Committee recommended, inter-alia, that a study should be cor:-:ucted by the Secretary-General on the penal code of each coun‘ry, with " view to nothing all the offences which could in practice be grouped under e: .1 of those three headings. On this basis, one would be able to draw u; for each country a model schedule of selected types of offences which would meet the conditions for cross national ‘‘static’ equivalence comparisons. Specifically, the model schedule would a limine include or exclude certain forms of behaviours prohibited in national legislations so as to reduce the above-mentioned ‘“‘difficulties relating to terminology, definitions and classi- fications… (and), at the same time, the process of inclusion and exclusion… would make it perhaps possible, through the delimitation of its scope, to formulate agreed definitions of the three offences” (Ibid.: 9). This complex task was completed by the Secretariat in 1959, in the form of a report, based on information provided earler by Member States in the course of the preparation of the above report (3): by the afore mentioned expert group, by national correspondents and by non-govern- mental organizations. After reviewing the penal legislation of seventy seven States (4), some of them federated, very precise schedules of inclusion and exclusion were worked out for each country, in the above three cat- egories. This meticulous report revealed the enormous complexity of the problem and offered equally complex solutions to the theoretical legal questions which it posed. In this sense, there is no doubt that the report could be classified as piece of extremely thorough research on crime trends. Yet this very fact, reveals at the same time a fundamental weakness of absolutistic comparisons, i.e., their impracticability. This conclusion pre- vailed among the experts and organizations to whom the standard classi- fication of offences was sent for comments, but it was not shared by the Secretariat itself, at least in the beginning. À representative illustration of this view is found in the position taken by INTERPOL, which argued that the introduction of the standard classi- fication of offences into national statistics raised more questions than it solved. It held that, if international statistics are ‘“extracts” from previously existing national criminal statistics, what purpose is there in endeavouring to — 166 — establish universally valid definitions? Since each country gives a legal description of a punishable act in accordance with its own conceptions of the social order, the international statistics should merely show side by side and virtually intact those cases of homicide, assault and theft which are regarded as such by the reporting countries. Secondly, the introduction of standard classification of offences would cause a partial duplication of statistics with the already existing ones. In addition to this difficulty, some types of crime related data would require not only the involvement of the central statistical offices of governments, but for instance as in the case of convictions — also the involvement of lower and higher courts which would have to analyse their every judgement against the definitions recommended in the standard classification. Moreover, ‘“there are many countries… which may not have any centralized system for judicial cases and which today are not even in a position to carry out a project of centralization based on specifically national and clearly established data” (UN Secretariat 1959/III: 53). Consequently, in view of these ‘“practically insurmountable obstacles”, INTERPOL expressed the belief that ‘‘it is necessary on account of the difficulties to limit one’s objectives and be very modest in drawing con- clusions as there will always be a considerable margin of error and appreci- ation’”. Instead, it was suggested that the Secretariat could consider possi- bility of, inter-alia, a ‘’comparison of the total figures of existing national criminal statistics’’ (UN Secretariat 1953/IIT:54). Although, as indicated, the Secretariat did not in the beginning accept this advice and was of the opinion that the model schedules drafted did provide an appropriate basis for the establishment of international criminal statistics, nevertheless no further concrete efforts were made to this end after the issuance of the 1959 report. That year also represented the end of the kind of methodological approach adopted by the United Nations in drafting the questionnaires for the global crime trend studies. This approach, it can be said, relied essentially upon strict legal definitions of offences and was not concerned with practical ways of their introduction into national crime statistics. In this context, it took no account of the on-going impact of socio-economic and cultural changes which over time affect national definitions of these offence types and would, in turn, create the need for re-adjustment of the already ‘‘agreed definitions”” of criminal homicide, aggravated assault and theft without violence to their perspective and yet periodically alterable national counterparts. IIT. ANOTHER APPROACH: SOCIAL CHANGE AND CRIME TRENDS Despite the serious methodological problems which the Secretariat ran into while drafting the standard classification of offences for the crime - 167 - trend study, this work was not discontinued, but only interrupted. Available United Nations documentation does not reveal, however, under what particular circumstances this temporary deadlock took place. One reason could be that a rigid legalistic approach to the compar- ability of offence categories finally fell in the Secretariat into complete disfavour under heavy criticism from the outside. If similar projects were to continue, some other approach would have to be adopted. Whether this was really the case, it is difficult to say now since, six years later after publi- cation of the standard classification, the Third United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (Stockholm, 1965) reiterated that ‘’in making comparative approaches of crime and delin- quency (..) extreme caution must be exercised because of the differences in the reliability of the statistics, the degree to which statistical data are generally available, the degree of enforcement of laws, and whether or not laws are identical and comparable”’, (UN Congress 1965:12) which reflects the main thrust of the standard classification of offences project. Yet, the same Congress introduced the notion of ‘‘social change”, stressing that the laws do not always keep up with the social changes occuring in the society”. The Fourth United Nations Congress, held in Kyoto in 1970, added, that ‘“the relationship between changes in a country’s economic and social structure and people’s attitudes and modes of behaviour was not yet ad- equately traced nor properly understood””, and that ‘‘the relationship between development and crime… became both the vantage point for reviewing (emphasis added) and co-ordinating past endeavours and the venue for formulating practical principles for policy and for divisiong imaginative programmes for action’’ (UN Congress 1971 :8). One could infer from these statements that, in view of the importance of comparative studies, which should continue to be methodologically rigorous, never- theless some greater flexibility should be allowed in the course of their preparation. Such an approach which abandons impractical strict legalistic comparisons, would take due account of the inevitability of various external changes affecting the definitions of offence categories and subsequent variations in their processing, as well as in the processing of the offenders through the criminal justice system. Speculative as this interpretation may be, it nevertheless provides some clues to the understanding of why the next global crime trends projects, conducted in 1977, did not draw on the model schedules but adopted a much less rigid approach. [V. UNITED NATIONS CRIME TRENDS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SURVEY OF 1977 With this newly introduced emphasis on the socioeconomic aspect of the crime phenomenon, work on the crime trends survey reveived a strong — 168 — impetus in the United Nations. In General Assembly resolution 3021 (XXVIT) of 18 December 1972 Member States were invited to inform the Secretary-General of the situation concerning crime prevention and control in their respective countries and the measures being taken ‘’so that a final report, based on such information, could be submitted to the Assembly…” Such a report covering the period 1970-1975 was prepared by the Secretary- General and submitted to the thirty second session of the General Assembly in 1977 (UN Secretary General 1977) (5). From a methodological point of view its main feature was that instead of static equivalence kind of com- parisons, the preparatory suvey allowing for the collection of data for the report was based on the broad and dynamic equivalence type of com- parability of offence categories. The survey, apart from other issues, in- volved the question on the dynamics of particular types of crime without, however, defining their meaning even roughly. These offence categories consisted of: non-negligent homicide, assault, sexual offences, kidnapping, robbery, theft, including burglary and housebreaking, fraud and other types of white-collar crimes, illegal traffic in drugs and substance abuse — all of them, belonging, despite the impossibility of drawing up a definitive and universal list of crimes, to ‘‘the common core of acts defined as criminal in practically all countries’”’. (UN Secretary-General 1977:6-7) As expected, such a broad and inevitably vague categorization of offences could allow only for a very tentative analysis of world crime trends (due to the lack of definitions). In this connexion, the Secretary-General’s report noted that ‘“the very nature of crime and its manifold expression make it difficult to translate the general practice of criminality in the world into reliable com- parable and quantifiable data.… Moreover, not all parts of the world docu- ment crime events adequately and, even where they try to do so, lack of uniformity in legal systems in statistical classifications and recording pro- cedures, in police rnethods or geographical spread may render comparison misleading…’’ (UN Secretary-General). Taking into account these limitations, already noted in the global survey of 1950, the report of the Secretary-General, pointed out that the world rate of reported intentional homicide had increased over the six years period under investigation by 20 per cent, theft by 46 per cent, robbery by 179 per cent, and drug abuse by 114 percent. À more detailed breakdown, for developing and developed countries, revealed that the over- all rate of criminal offenders in the developing countries for the period 1970-1975 was approximately 800 per 100,000 population, and that the number of offenders increased at an annual rate of approximately 25 per cent. On the other hand, the over all rate of criminal offenders in the developed countries was at that period approximately 1.000 per 100,000 population and the number of offenders had increased steadily at an annual rate of | per cent. Às far as crime rates were concerned, in the developing countries intentional homicide increased by only 4.6 per cent over the six year period, but theft and robbery increased by 43 and 42 per cent, — 169 — respectively. In the developed countries, it was noted that ‘‘crimes of intentional homicide, kidnapping and illegal traffic in drugs have compara- tively low rates, but crimes of theft, fraud and assault are by far predomi- nant crimes in the developed countries”. (UN Secretary-General 1977: 9 et seq.) The notion of ‘“developing’’ and ‘‘developed” countries, although to some extent political, implies also that the survey was extended to include an analysis of crime related data against socioeconomic variables. Indeed, these data were correlated with the data on the proportion of the work force in agriculture, infant mortality rate, school attendance ratio, gross domestic product per capita, and illiteracy rate. These correlations produced some surprising results. For instance, it was ‘‘tentatively” observed that ‘“some countries which have high rates of illiteracy also have low rates of juvenile crime” (UN Secretary-General). Even more surprising was the finding that ‘‘countries with a low proportion of the work force in agri- culture tended also to have low rates of drug crime” (UN Secretary-General 1977). The same variables were used against criminal justice resources data — a pioneering part of the survey, where it was found that ‘‘“generally”, gross domestic product was strongly related to personnel levels; inter-alia, the countries with high gross domestic product per capita tended also to have a higher ratio of judges, prosecutors and correctional staff, but the opposite was the case for law enforcement agencies. This seems to suggest that economically less developed countries put appreciably more resources into the police force than into other criminal justice agencies” (UN Secretary- General 1977). Although much could be said about the methodological side of this survey, which lends itself to some criticism (lack of definition of crime types, choice of socio-economic variables which could contribute to the above mentioned ‘“‘surprising’’ results etc.) it nevertheless constituted a very serious, and pioneering in some areas, effort to cover the crime situ- ation in the global perspective. Consequently, the General Assembly, to which the report of the Secretary-General containing the results of the survey was submitted, noted it with satisfaction in its resolution 32/60 of 3 January 1978. With the appearance of this report, the departure from uni-dimensional legalistic patterns of cross-national comparisons in the United Nations became evident. A new generation of global crime trends surveys was born (6). V. THE SECOND UNITED NATIONS SURVEY OF CRIME TRENDS, OPERATIONS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS AND CRIME PREVENTION STRATEGIES The Sixth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (Caracas, 25 August-5 September 1980), after - 170 - discussing the agenda item on ‘’Crime Trends and Crime Prevention Strat- egies”’ (UN Congress 1981:5-6, 23-27) has adopted a resolution in which it requested the Secretary-General ‘‘to intensify efforts to co-ordinate the collection of comparable cross-national statistics on crime and justice in each of the Member States…” At the same time the Congress in its major document, the Caracas Declaration, stressed that all activity of the Member States in the criminological area ‘‘should be considered in the context of economic development, political systems, social and cultural values and social change…’’ These two concerns were duly taken into account by the Secretariat while drafting the questionnaire for the Second Survey of Crime Trends, Operations of Criminal Justice Systems and Crime Prevention Strategies, covering the period 1975-1980. The questionnaire was finalized after lengthy consultations and dis- cussion with experts, various United Nations offices and the United Nations regional institutes on crime prevention and the treatment of offenders. It contained 37 questions, of which many were subdivided. As its title illus- trates, it pertained to statistical and policy questions on the incidence of criminality, internal and external functioning of criminal justice systems and crime prevention activities, both at the national and the largest city levels. The questions on crime trends considered both the dynamics of crime and the number of offenders (adult and juveniles) processed through the entire criminal justice system. The following crime categories were selected for this purpose: intentional and non-intentional homicide, assault, drug crimes, rape, kidnapping, robbery, theft, fraud including embezzlement, bribery and corruption. These crime categories, including attempts, where applicable, have been broadly explained in the technical notes with a request, in cases where they do not correspond to the national terminology, to provide data corresponding as closely as possible and to indicate the differences (UN Secretariat 1982). The following explanations of ‘“‘broad categories of crimes’”’ were given: ‘“Intentional homicide refers to death purposely inflicted by another person, including infanticide. Non-intentional homicide refers to death not purposely inflicted by another persons, including manslaughter but excluding traffic accidents resulting in death. Assault refers to a physical attack against the body of another person, including battery but excluding indecent assault. Drug crimes refer to intentional acts that may involve cultivation, production, manufacture, extraction, preparation, possession, offering for sale, distribution, purchase, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, broker- age, dispatch, dispatch in transit, transport, importation and exportation of drugs and psychotropic substances. Some countries may wish to refer to the provisions of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 and other — 171— regulations adopted in pursuance of the provisions under the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971 Rape refers to sexual intercourse without valid consent. Kidnapping refers to the abduction and seclusion of a person by deceit, force or threat of force, with or without ransom demands. Robbery refers to the taking away of property from a person over- coming resistance by force or threat of force. Theft refers to the stealthy taking away of property without the owner’s consent, including burglary and housebreaking. It includes theft of a motor vehicle, and both simple and aggravated theft as defined by the criminal law of each country. Shoplifting and other minor offences, e.g. pilfering and petty theft may or may not be included according to the usual practice of each country. Fraud and embezzlement refer to, respectively, the acquisition of property of another by deception or the wrongful appropriation of the property of another which is already in one’s prossession. Bribery and corruption refer to requesting and/or accepting a material or personal benefit, or a promise there of, in connection with the perform- ance of a public function, for an action which may or may not be a viol- ation of law, promising as well as giving material or personal benefit to a public officer in exchange for a requested favour”’. Care was taken of assuring that the data on incarceration rates would be requested, since as Leslie Wilkins, one of the commentators on the draft questionnaire put it — ‘‘incarceration rates, are, perhaps, the only com- parable data we can hope for” (Wilkins 1982; but Schumann 1983). The questions on the operations of criminal justice systems related inter-alia, to the size, breakdown, selection and training of personnel. They are, in some instances, put as pertinent to both, the whole country and the largest city. Where applicable, they cover 1975-1980 period or, where not, they refer to the situation as of the end of 1980. Also, where applicable, the specific subquestions pertained to implementation of the United Nations instruments in the field or crime prevention and the treatment of offenders, such as the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, adopted by the General Assembly resolution 34/169, and the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. Apart from these, the following major questions pertained to the: 1l ) Age of criminal responsibility, 2) Prosecutors’ role in the context of ‘’opportunity” or ‘“legality” principles, 3) Community courts, 4) Non-custodial sanctions for adult offenders, S) Alternative sources of data, including victimization studies, _172— 6) Role of volunteers in correctional work, 7) Allocation of budgetary resources, in local currency, to criminal justice activities. The questions on crime prevention strategies were perhaps method- ologically the most difficult to formulate since, as a rule, there is no central crime prevention agency which could answer them in an exhausive way. Even if such an agency exists, the area in question does not easily lend itself to comprehensive and comparative classification or quantitication. ÀÂs was rightly noted in the latter connexion, since the ‘‘real causes”’ of crime have not been unequivocally identified, it is unclear what should be defined as ‘“‘crime prevention strategy” (Ad-Hoc Meeting 1981:12). Therefore, whatever question is asked in this regard, there cannot be a ‘‘satisfactory” answer. Aware of this problem, the Secretariat nevertheless felt that in order to arrive at some preliminary results describing the state of the art in this field in the global perspective, there should be four major questions. The first pertained to the types and frequency (if such data are available) of crime prevention activities sponsored by government agencies during the period 1975-1980 in the whole country. An illustrative inventory of these types was given. It was subdivided into two kinds of activities: those aimed at improvement of the quality of life of the offenders and potential of- fenders, and those aimed at decreasing physical opportunities for the commission of crime. The second major question was of an open-ended character, and asked about any other types of crime prevention activities that do not fit the types mentioned earlier. The third question was also of that character and related to ‘“‘crime prevention in the largest city”, and the fourth one is about criminal justice planning and evaluation of crime prevention strategies. The part on evaluation contain asking about the methods, used to assess the effectiveness of crime prevention activities and their relative frequency of application. As can be seen from the above, the questionnaire approached the area of crime prevention and control in a systemic way. This approach was particularly important for the section of the questionnaire dealing with “the operations of the criminal justice system”. The crime related data obtained from responding Member States are expected to allow to analyse the dynamics of the flow of cases/persons through the entire criminal justice system and to make comparisons of the ‘‘branch ratios”, i.e. pro- portion of the total offenders population or/and total number of registered criminality being processed and taken action on by the relevant criminal justice agencies. There are, of course, numerous other opportunities to utilize these data, and, therefore, finding out the ‘‘branch ratios”’ merely an example of one of them. Many of the crime data obtained will serve next as the variables to be correlated with the social indicators, especially at the country level. It is -173— hoped that both their choice and degree of robustness will allow for more conclusive results than those of the first survey. VI. SOME PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE SECOND SURVEY Whereas the Member States’ replies are still being received by the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch, the analysis of those already com- puterized (63 altogether including 2 narrative) has been underway for some- time (7). Preliminary results of this analysis were considered at a special advisory meeting held in Fall 1983 in the USA (UN Secretariat 1983) and were next presented to the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control (UN Secretary-General 1984:5). This analysis revealed inter-alia, that some countries report as few as 0.2 prosecutors per 100 police officers, while others report 4 or 5 prosecutors respectively. With regard to judges, such ratios to police officers range from 0.2 to 8.5. Correctional personnel ratio to police officers ranges even more dramatically from 1 to 46. Further, it was found out that in Scandinavian countries, which were relatively socio- economically and culturally homogenic, these di!ferences still persisted. Furthermore, in Norway there is almost twice as many prosecutors per 100 police personnel as in Denmark and three times as manv idges. rHlowever, the first country had rovc"!'y ore fifth less correctionai p«r::nnci, Finland has comparatively more ; vs ihan either Denmark or Norway, büt rela. tively fewer correcticnat rersonnel. À more complete analysis of the Second Survey' “csults will be presented to the Seventh United Nations C'orgress on tèe Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders {Ital; , M::45, 26 Aupust - 6 September). Abundance of data made it possible to aliaca:: par'; Of an overall analysis to the United Nations regional institutes at Hicisinki (HEUNI 1984) and Fuchu (UNAFEI) which on their behalf plan to p:esent to the Seventh Congress their own reports including horizontal icrOss-national) and vertical (country criminal justice profiles) analyses fo: “uropean and Asia and Pacific countries, respectively. In the course of these analyses proposals are made to the Secretariat on the structure of the Third United Nations Survey (1980-1985). Many of the crime data obtained from the Second Survey will serve next as the variables to be correlated with other social indicators, especially at the country level. It is hoped that both their choice and degree of robust ness will allow for more conclusive results than those of the first survey. VII. METHODOLOGY AND SUBSTANCE RECONSIDERED: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON THE UNITED NATIONS CRIME TRENDS SURVEYS Conflicting with the view quoted in the introduction to this article is the opinion that ‘’building universal theories of deviance… means that one — 174 — must usually move to such a high level of abstraction to encompass all cases of the object of study that the result is often banal”’ (Mankoff 1980:146; Beirne 1983). In fact, time and over again serious doubts are expressed on the utility of such comparative analyses and, as the numerous United Nations resol- utions show, Member States’ interest in conducting them is renewed with the same frequency. Who then is right’. It is then not my intention to judge who has more convincing argu- ments although by the very fact of being in the service of the international organization [ may be denounced as a supporter of such comparisons. The arguments formulated by the critics of comparative analyses, however, have often been convincing, especially when it is argued that official recordings of the incidence of crime at the national level may be of questionable value, which may be even more true when it comes to cross-national comparisons. Sufficient evidence was collected here to show that the United Nations crime trends surveys both methodologically and substantively fall short of the required rigor and reliability of results. Yet, noting these obvious short- comings Î wish to emphasize the need for and value of the surveys. Their need stems from the fact that ‘‘universal and absolute uniformity among people is utterly impossible” (Durkheim 1968:69) hence thinking without comparison is unthinkable. However, to arrive at such a trivial con- clusion it is not necessary to conduct international comparative surveys. One can safely argue without any, even preliminary, analysis that the crime rate of country À is different from that of country B. For this it would be enough to note that spatially coexisting ‘‘contemporary” societies differ nevertheless among themselves in their location on the ‘‘time table” of development. After all, there are not event two societies which are exactly alike and there are only few which could be defined as static, but no doubt in a varying sense. Hence, they must have different crime rates. The need for these surveys stems rather from the assumption that the data allowing for formulation of a picture of criminality in one country, when related to socio-economic and cultural factors, may also allow to draw some, at least tentative, conclusions, (— and this is far better than educated guesses —) on the possible, yet avoidable, developments in criminality in another country. Existing data, whether more or less reliable, when collected, show also what classes of data are most frequently used to diagnose the extent of crime and, by the same token, which data are not available, but could have been help- ful for a better diagnosis of this phenomenon. The last survey adopts a systemic approach to criminality and its control and prevention in view of which an inventory of gaps in data base has a special significance. “At this point it needs to be emphasized that the results of the Second Survey made it possible not only to prepare a set of reports, but also to — 175 — initiate preparation of the ‘‘“Manual on Collection and Analysis of Criminal Justice Data”. This technical publication which probably will be available at the time of the Seventh United Nations Congress provides practical advice for those who are in charge of generation and gathering of crime related data on ways of improving the substance of national data bases and means for their processing. This publication is intended for a wide destribution among member states with a view to show how an informed analysis of the crime data may assist in better decision making in the criminal justice system. The systemic approach adopted in the Second Survey was, no doubt, very helpful in making comprehensive observations in this regard in the Manual. Methodologically, this is an improvement in comparative analysis available so far. But the increased methodological vaule by itself is not here a point, nor another advantage of obtaining largest city data, as suggested independently by some researchers (Archer and Gartner, 1983). Any kind of data, if they are to serve useful purposes, must be made mean- ingful nationality and this implies that any comparative analysis must go beyond a narrow treatment of crime, and should account for relevant socio- economic and cultural factors influencing it. As has been shown, this is the approach gradually adopted over time in the United Nations surveys; these changes may make them also more reliable substantively. The degree of reliability of these surveys has also to do with the ways in which the national crime rates are produced. For the consensus oriented criminologist the policy adopted in the United Nations crime trends surveys is, probably, acceptable. Data received from Member States are used as sent, indirectly confirming the consensual view that crime is defined and recorded as incidences that infringe on collective or community ‘‘sentiments”. For the conflict oriented criminologist, however, who stresses the role of interest groups in definitions and recording of crime, such an approach is too simple, if not inappropriate. Furthermore, the approach used by the United Nations does not allow for cultural variations in definitions and perceptions of crime. But conflict criminologists fail to acknowledge that a common core of acts are regarded cross-nationally as criminal. The definition of crime and its dynamics are but one point here to mention. If we consider that the United Nations crime trend survey have been gradually extended to include the role of various socioeconomic factors, it would be hard to argue that they adopt a truely straighforward consensual attitude. The questions of criminality in the wake of economic crisis Or rapid modernization gives rise to several possible interpretations, where both conflict and consensus, two sides of one coin, pay their pro- portionate roles. — 176 — FOOTNOTES (1) See, however, Shelly 1981 , Vetere and Neuman 1977, Viccica 1977. (2) Report by the Secretariat, p.7. These recommendations were later considered by the Social Commission to which the body of experts reported and, finally, by the Economic and Social Council. The Council in its resolution requested inter alia the Secretary General to conduct a study on ‘‘the achievement of agreed definitions” of these offence types ‘‘in order to determine the practicability of an ultimate compilation of comparable international statistics” (UNECOSOC 1957). (3) The major compilatory and analytical work was done by the con- sultant Professor Albert Hess from the U.S.A. (4) In addition to the criminal legislation of the 32 countries participating in the 1937-1946 United Nations study of crime trends, legislation of the following 45 countries was examined: Afghanistan, Albania, Austria, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burma, Combodia (Kampuchean Demo- cratic Republic), Ceylon, Chile, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Ghana, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Morocco, Monaco, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Romnania, Spain, Sudan, Switzerland, Thailand, USSR, United Arab Republic (Egypt), Uruguay, Yugoslavia. (5) There is a special reason for this pathetic statement. The 1970-1975 Crime Trends and Criminal Justice Survey, although second of this kind in the United Nations history, became — mostly, ! think, because of a long interval between it and 1937-1946 Study — to be called ‘“The First United Nations Survey”. However, it could also well be true that its “developmental”’ character made it really first among the surveys concerned. (6) The following countries responded to the questionnaire: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bolivia, Barbados, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Guyana, Indonesia, Iran, Irag, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Maldives, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Quatar, Pakistan, Poland, Peru, San Marino, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Yugoslavia. Seventeen other countries submitted a non-quantifable information. (7) By 30 September 1984 the following countries responded: Argentina, Austria, Australia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia\, Denmark, Ecuador, Germany, Federal Republic of, —177— Fiji, Finland, France, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Madagascar, Mauritius, Nepal, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Rumania, Saint- Lucia, Senegal, Seychelles, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Syria, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvaly, United Arab Emirites, United Kingdom, USA, Yugoslavia, Zimbabawe. SUMMARY This article describes the lengthy and complicated process of developing the three Unided Nations crime trends surveys, starting from the early com- parative studies in the late 1940°s to the later survey of crime trends, oper- ations of criminal justice systems and crime prevention strategies under- taken in 1982, all of which have remained rather unnoted in the crimino- logical literature. Both the substantive and methodological aspects of these surveys are discussed in order to trace the changing emphasis of these surveys from a principally one-dimensional, legalistic undertaking to multi- dimensional, ‘“developmental”’’ analyses. Let it be emphasized that these recurrent surveys meet an oft-expressed request by Member States for broad cross-national analyses of crime trends and have become over time more encompassing, illustrative and systemic. Some of the major results of these surveys are presented here. Finally, the author suggests that despite specific shortcomings which exist in cross-national analyses of crime trends and operations of criminal justice systems, such analyses are nonetheless very useful in selecting particular policies. To this end, the results of the Second United Nations Survey (1975-1980) will be submitted for consideration and action to the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders to be held in Milan, Italy, 26 August - 6 September 1985. RÉSUMÉ «LES ANALYSES MENTORIELLES DES TENDANCES DU CRIME PAR LES NATIONS UNIES: CRIMINOLOGIE COMPARATIVE DANS LE CONTEXTE GLOBAL» Cet article décrit la procédure longue et compliquée destiné à dévelop- per les trois rapports des Nations Unies sur les tendances du crime, depuis les premières études comparées des années 40 jusqu’à la dernière recherche sur les tendances du crime, les systèmes de justice pénale et les stratégies de prévention entreprise en 1982, toutes celles-ci étant passées plutôt inapper- çues dans la littérature criminologique. —- 178 — L’aspect substanciel ainsi que méthodologique de ces études a été étudié afin de souligner l’évolution des centres d’intérêt qui sont passés d’une entreprise légaliste et principalement unidimensionnelle à des analyses multidimensionnelles et de développement. Insistons sur le fait que ces études périodiques répondent à la demande, maintes fois exprimée par les États membres, de larges analyses transnationales sur les tendances du crime, et sont devenues avec le temps plus fournies, illustratives et systémiques. Quelques uns des principaux résultats de ces études sont présentés ici. En conclusion, l’auteur déclare qu’en dépit de leurs défauts, les analyses trans- nationales restent néanmoins très utiles pour établir des choix de politiques particulières. Dans cette optique les résultats du second bilan des Nations Unies (1975-1980) sera soumis pour étude et pour l’établissement d’un pro- gramme d’action au 7ème congrès des Nations Unies pour la prévention du crime et le traitement des délinquants qui se tiendra à Milan en Italie du 26 Août au 6 Septembre 1985. — 179 — POWER CONCENTRATION, LEGITIMATION CRISIS AND PENAL SEVERITY: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE* Martin Killias* * I. INTRODUCTION In the past ten years, criminal justice research on sanctions has dwelt on alternatives to imprisonment (1) and theories on the stable level of punish- ment in a given society (e.g., Blumstein and Cohen, 1983). Despite available alternatives and the ‘’homeostasis’” theories to the contrary, the incarcer- ation rates of many countries continue to increase; the American rate of sentenced prisoners in State and Federal institutions rose between 1972 and 1979 by about 45 percent (Hindelang et al., 1981 : table 6.16), reaching its highest level in history (Cahalan, 1979). These rates should provoke more interest in the research of variations in the levels of punishment, and, con- comitantly, in theories that explain variations in, rather than the stability of, punishment. Such theories could also be used to address the question of the enormous cross-national differences in incarceration rates — a phenom- enon largely ignored in stability of punishment theories, although some cross-sectional research has been conducted on fluctuations of incarceration rates (e.g., Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin, 1977; Blumstein and Moitra, 1979). [I. THFORETICAL FRAMEWORK The theories that explain variations in the level of punishment fall into two basic, if simplistic, classifications: those that emphasize social structural variables, such as modernization and power concentration, and those that Point to the amount of social conflict, measured by indicators of social * This paper wa.s written while the author was a visiting scholar at the School of Criminal Justice, State University of New York at Albany. He wishes to express his thanks to many teachers and students who gave him unvaluable insights into many aspects of the present topic. Particular thanks are due to Professors Robert H. Hardt for numerous helpful sug- gestions concerning the analysis, Graeme R. Newman for help with data gathering, and Beverly A. Smith for smoothing the paper’s English style. Outside Albany, the author is indebted to Eugene Doleschal, Director, NCCD, for data on incarceration rates and the median time served by prisoners. ** Professeur de Criminologie, Université de Lausanne-Dorigny. — 181 — crisis, such as unemployment rates. These theories can be briefly sum- marized in the following way. 1. The social structural perspective In a largely ignored article entitled ‘Two Laws of Penal Evolution” (2), Durkheim presented these hypotheses on variations in penal severity. First, penal severity decreases with development, since crime in primitive societies offended religious commands rather than individual, secular interests. Second, imprisonment would become the dominant form of punishment in modern societies, because they, in contrast to primitive societies, have the resources at hand to construct and operate penetentiaries. Third, penal severity reaches a peak every time the form of government becomes ‘‘absol- ute””, i.e. whenever power is highly concentrated within a society. Whether religion per se is really the key variable in explaining penal severity, or whether the key is that religious authority was assumed by absolutist government to legitimize extreme degrees of power concentration, does not have to bother us since power concentration in itself might be a sufficient cause of an increase in penal severity. This was also the position of Montesquieu, who had advanced an almost identical hypothesis 150 years before Durkheim (Montesquieu, 1748/1977: book VI, ch. 6 and 13) (3). 2. The conflict perspective Sorokin (1937/1962:599-606), one of the first writers on penal severity, explained variations in punitiveness by the amount of conflict within a given society. To illustrate his point, Sorokin presented figures from France and Russia that reveal very high numbers of executions in times of serious civil disorder and revolution. Sorokin ascribed these variations to a lack of consensus on basic cultural values. Although his evidence does indicate that penal severity increased in times of social crisis, it seems that in these instances the power structure, rather than society’s basic values, were in trouble. It hardly seems feasible that dissent on basic crimes such as robbery, theft, murder and rape could have rapidly reached such dramatic dimensions and then as rapidly ebbed when the climax had passed (4). Theories, there- fore, that explain social crises in terms of strain within the social structure may account better for such peaks of penal severity. Following the Marxian tradition, Rusche and Kirchheimer (1939) claimed that the punishments used to control the lower classes are deter- mined by criteria of economic rationality. In societies with a large surplus of manpower, capital and corporate punishments are used ; whereas, impris- onment and forced labor are dominant whenever there is a scarcity of man- power. Rusche and Kirchheimer assumed that the increased power of lower class individuals and organizations made a widespread return to capital punishment unlikely. Modern authors such as Quinney (1977) and Melossi - 182— and Pavarini (1979) again emphasize the role of the labor market, con- sidering imprisonment as a means to reduce unemployment. In seeing the factory and the prison as complementary institutions to control the lower class (5), they base their reasoning on an implicit incapacitation model. The empirical evidence on the labor market hypothesis has been mixed. À number of studies suggest that the unemployment rate had a significant impact on the use of imprisonment in capitalist societies (cf., e.g. Jankovic, 1977; Greenberg, 1977; Yeager, 1979) although this relationship did not hold during the Great Depression (Jankovic, 1977) and in a cross-sectional study of the American states (Garofalo, 1979) (6). Available historical data on execution rates (‘7) indicates that the death penalty has never been used to control the labor market (Steinert and Treiber, 1978). Rather, the elite maintains the social order by threatening capital punishment rather than by large-scale executions (Hay, 1975), which mght or might not have been economically rational. In modern industrialized societies, government is expected to promote the citizens’ welfare as well as reduce unemployment. Incarceration more people for longer periods of time could be a governmental response to the perceived of unemployment, rather than an effort to ease labor market over- supply. One could then expect incarceration rates to rise whenever the social order undergoes a period of crisis, whether this crisis is due to high unemployment rates or to political factors. Greenberg’s (1980) study of Poland’s highly fluctuating imprisonment rates suggests that the changes in the incarceration rate seemed to be closely related to political events, especially the political crises Poland underwent in 1956 and again in 1968 rather than to labor market forces. Studying incarceration rates in terms of political and social crises helps overcome the ‘’economic reductionism’” (Greenberg, 1980) of many Marxist criminologists. Considering unemploy- ment as a crisis factor, makes it possible to integrate the labor market approach with Sorokin’s version of the conflict hypothesis. 3. Legitimation Crisis and penal severity Max Weber stated sixty years ago (Weber, 1925/1954:335) that any power has a certain need for self-justification. Rulers can induce their subjects to believe that the power gap between them is in their best interest. Or they can settle issues that previously had seemed insoluble. Or they can base their authority on a long standing tradition. Finally, they can empha- size their expertise or that of their staffs. Such justifications of power can be identified both at the macro- sociological level, but also in social psychological studies on power legit- imation in smaller groups (Wallster et al., 1973). For example, power positions in the work place tend to be legitimized by reference to some status such as education, seniority or expertise. At the societal level, Heintz — 183 — (1972:140) hypothesizes that the legitimation of power becomes more difficult the more the power gap between the ruler and the subordinates grows. The chance of a legitimation crisis increases proportionately with the extent of power concentration. If power is conceived of as a phenomenon of interaction rather than as a consequence of material resources (Luhmann, 1975:9 (8); Schneider, 1978:35), then power is more often created and maintained by the threat of force rather than by its actual use (Luhmann, 1975:60-69). The steps through which a legitimation crisis is transformed into an increase in penal severity (not only in the law codes, but also in practice) needs, however, more clarification. If the deligitimation of the existing power structure leads to an open challenge of the rules, then the actual use of force including that of the criminal justice system will increase. Thus the violent response of the ruler to the violence of his opponents is reflected in peaks of executions, es- pecially those of political prisoners. But why should any regime answer to a general legitimation crisis by emphasizing some ‘‘war on crime” which, as Wilkins (1976) noted, notoriously boils down to a ‘’war on criminals?” Does non-political street crime threaten any government? As Taylor (1980) noted in an analysis of electoral campaigns in Britain and Canada, the conservative parties’ law and order stances may be understood as an attempt to reduce the legitimation crisis of the given social order, since focusing on street crime deflects the public’s attention away from potentially delegitimizing issues. Given the wide agreement on the undesirability of (street) crime, law and order policies are a way to increase consensus within a society, just as going to war against neighbors may be an efficient way to reduce interior dissent. Whenever politicians make crime an electoral or a general political issue, they may be motivated by a search for legitimation rather than by a fear of the crime. The increase in penal severity emanating from law and order policies may thus be a side-<ffect of a search for consensus rather than an end in itself. How can we predict that a legitimation crisis will arise, to be followed by an increase in penal severity? We may expect that the probability of a legitimation crisis and, concomitantly, of a rise in penal severity, increases: — the less the rulers succeed in meeting the standards which emanate from their own self-justification, and/or — the larger the power gap between the rulers and their subordinates grows, i.e. the more power is concentrated among a few (9). These two hypotheses are derived from the proposition that legit- imation crises lead to increases in penal severity. And since the first one integrates earlier research from the conflict perspective, whereas the second one restates Durkheim’s and Montesquieu’s power concentration hypoth- esis, one may conclude that the concept of legitimation crisis makes possible the integration of these two seemingly contradictory perspectives. — 184 — III. RESEARCH DESIGN 1 . Cross-national analysis Most of the research on penal severity has been based on historical and time-series analyses of criminal justice policies within one or, in some cases, a very few societies (10). Such research designs permit the consideration of a large number of independent variables and help avoid the problem of the unknown validity of the indicators used. On the other hand, being directed toward interpreting and explaining rather than predicting development, such studies tend to be less conclusive, and inferences regarding other societies remain rather speculative. Of course, it is not very meaningful to argue for or against the superiority of any of these two approaches, since they both serve an important function in the development of social science (11). Given the present preponderance of time-series and historical studies on penal severity, the present study has been designed to analyse this topic using a sample of as many nations as possible. 2. The dependent variable Penal severity can be operationalized in two different ways: first, we can look at the forms of punishments the judiciary has at its disposal, and compare different nations by using an underlying scale of penal severity ; second, we can consider the severity within a given form of punishment, e.g. by looking at the length of imprisonment or the amount of fines. Both of these operationalizations have to cope with Christie’s (1968) version of the stability of punishment hypothesis. According to Christie, the change in punishments over the past 200 years can not be attributed to humanitari- anism, nor a decrease in society’s punitiveness, but to a shift in the under- lying scale of penal values. In other words, what once may have been ‘“worth” the death penalty may, according to modern standards, only deserve five years in prison, and what once may have deserved imprison- ment, may today be equivalent to a fine. Christie explains this shift in penal values by an increase in susceptibility, so that our (supposedly more lenient) punishments cause the same amount of suffering as did the more cruel ones of the past. There seems to exist an immanent rank ordering of different forms of punishment which is valid across historical periods and national boundaries. The relative severity of different forms of punishment can be assessed in a generally valid way by using their position within the process of par- doning, i.e. by looking at which form of punishment is commuted to what. In all the societies and in all the periods on which we are sufficiently in- formed, there is a consistent pattern: qualified forms of capital punishment are commuted into ‘‘simple”’ forms of the death penalty, imprisonment is used as a substitute for executing the offender, long imprisonment terms are — 185 — reduced to shorter ones, and prison sentences tend to be commuted to non- incarcerative sanctions, such as fines (12). It seems, therefore, warranted to say that societies whose laws provide for the death penalty are characterized by more penal severity than abolitionist ones, and that societies using longer prison terms for the same kind of offenses are more punitive than others. Regarding the use of imprisonment, penal severity is, in the absence of more adequate data, usually measured by comparing incarceration rates. This way of operationalizing penal severity has to cope, however, with the objection that these data reflect nothing more than different levels of crime. Although it would be an overstatement to say that crime rates do not have any impact on incarceration rates, the availble evidence, nevertheless, supports Wilkins (1965:85) assumption that this impact is not too large. For example, there is some indication that Eastern European countries have lower crime rates than Western Europe (Kaiser, 1976; Shelley, 1981), but at the same time they have some of the highest incarceration rates in the world. In a number of studies (e.g., Doleschal 1979) the median time served by prisoners in different countries was compared with the incarceration rates of these nations, and there seems to be a strong tendency that countries with high incarceration rates punish their criminals with much longer prison terms (13). Besides, studies on the incarceration rate in America consistently find a weak or, at best, a moderate correlation be- tween incarceration and crime rates (14). The best way, of course, to assess the validity of incarceration rates as measures of penal severity would be to use crime rates as a control variable. For most of the countries that figure in our sample, the United Nations has gathered data on the number of offenses reported to the police and of iden- tified offenders during the years 1970-1975. Unfortunately, these data are not published and could not be obtained for the present analysis (15). In an unpublished analysis of these data, however, Newman and Vetere (1978) found a correlation (r) between the rate of adult offenders recorded by the police and the incarceration rate of only .08, a finding that is the more remarkable since offender as well as prisoner rates are based on persons (16). Newman and Vetere suggest, interpreting this finding, that some countries may process and record a high number of offenders, yet punish them with non-incarcerative sanctions or short prison sentences, thereby keeping the incarceration rate at a relatively low level. Other countries, in contrast, may process far fewer people, but punish them very harshly which, in turn, in- creases the incarceration rates. In sum, this finding strongly supports Wilkins (1974) statement that incarceration rates reflect penal severity rather than crime rates. Since the rate of offenders, being a control variable in the present context, would have to be introduced into the regression equation before the other independent variables, the fact that it accounts for less than 1 percent of variation in prisoner rates means that the ignor- ance of these data does not affect the results seriously, at least not if stepwise regression is used. — 186 — 3. The independent variables The legitimation crisis in the form of a failure of the government to meet expectations emanating from its own self-justification has, in the present study, been operationalized by the unemployment rate. As men- tioned above, this indicator has been used by many other writers on incar- ceration and penal severity, too, although as a part of a different theoretical framework. But to the author’s knowledge no attempt has been made so far to analyse its impact in a cross-national study. As indicators of power concentration, whose relevance in the present context has been explained above, two different measures were used. First, the degree of power concentration at the governmental level has been assessed by distinguishing between countries having democratic and those with non-democratic forms of government. The criterion for this classifi- cation has been whether the executive and/or the parliament have been elected in a free, open vote, i.e.according to the one-man-one-vote principle, in which the candidates number more than the available seats. Consequently, military governments, one-party regimes, and absolute monarchies have been classified as non-democratic. One may criticize this criterion on the grounds that it is rather crude; on the other hand, it seems closer to the concept of power concentration than indexes which include also several civil liberties (17), and it seems to imply to a lesser degree a moral distinction between ‘‘good’”’ and ‘‘bad” governments. Second, power concentration within a society has also been measured by Corrado Gini’s index of income concentration. This index can assume values between .0, indicating a per- fectly equal income distribution, and 1.0, indicating concentration of all income at the top (18). In Western societies, the Gini index is generally con- sidered a very valid measure of power concentration, given the high corre- lation between wealth and power in capitalist countries. In communist nations, however, power may be associated with bureaucratic (dispositional) competences rather than with possession (Djilas, 1957: 44-66), and even chances to acquire consumer goods may be less a function of income than in capitalist countries (Weede, 1981). With income distribution not being a valid measure of power concentration under the communist system and in line with recent research in this field (Weede, 1981), no data on income distribution from communist countries have been analyzed in the present study. Since both the form of government and the income concentration are highly correlated with social development (Bollen, 1979; Bornschier, 1978), the annual per capita national income has been introduced as a control variable. This measure is generally considered a more valid single indicator of development than the gross national product, the percent of work force in agriculture, the percent o£ population illiterate, etc.. because it is based G a nation’s wealih patiier uan On liarau terts‘ics oi its population cr 187 production. This indicator allows also to take into account Durkheim’s main hypothesis, that penal severity decreases with modernization. Among the most serious problems cross-national research has to cope with is missing data. Due to a lack of available data, the size of the sample is reduced every time a new variable is taken into account. This precludes the study of several possibly influential independent variables the inclusion of unemployment, e.g., reduced the number of nations for which all other data have been available to merely 21, down from an original sample of 55. To prevent the sample from becoming even smaller, only the variables mentioned here have been analyzed. In an attempt to compromise between sample size and availability of data, each independent variable has also been analyzed using al those nations for which it was available, but for which other data were missing. 4. The data Data on incarceration rates of 47 nations were taken from a survey con- ducted by the United Nations in 1975 (19). On eight more countries, data were taken from various sources (20). As far as possible, data for 1972 were used in order to make the sample as homogenous as possible. Whenever data for 1972 were not available, the year for which they could be obtained is indicated in table 1. Information on whether a country retains capital punishment or not was taken from the Penal Codes of 23 nations and from a number of inter- national surveys (21). In partial disagreement with some observers (e.g.. Lopez-Rey, 1980) who even consider a country as retentionist when its laws provide for the dealth penalty only in times of war, only countries that retain it for formal times and for crimes that are of some relevance during such times (22) were counted as retentionist. No attention was given to whether the death penalty has not been used over a long period of time, as in Belgium, or whether executions are quite frequent. The United States, Mexico, and Australia, were not included because some of their federal states do retain capital punishment, while the majority of them do not. Regarding the form of government, the necessary information was gathered from the pertinent volumes of the World Almanac (23) and the usually more inclusive Fisher Weltalmanach (23). Gini index data were taken from an international survey by Bornschier (1978) (24). Since the income distribution within a given nation is ex- tremely stable over even extended periods of time (25), the data used in the present analysis can be considered valid indicators of income concentration in the year for which the incarceration data were obtained. However, to prevent large gaps between incarceration and Gini index data, the analysis has been restricted to countries where the latter are not more than 10 years older than the former. — 188 — Data on unemployment rates were taken from the U.N. Statistical Yearbook 1978 (26). Wherever possible, data for the year preceding the one for which incarceration rates were available have been gathered. Data on the per capita national income in 1972, respectively in the year for which incarceration rates were known, have been taken from the perti- nent volumes of the U.N. Statistical Yearbook (27). Since changes in per capita national income are affected by fluctuations of exchange rates, and since most incarceration rates were from 19"2, all figures were adjusted for dollar rates in 1972. (See table 1 next page). IV. RESULTS 1. Capital punishment As table 2 illustrates (29), there is a very strong negative association between development (per capita national income) and the retention of capital punishment (30): TABLE Il Capital punishment and development (Nations with a least 5,000,000 population only) (30) per capita national income low (X $ 1000) high $ 1000) N capital punishment Abolished ° . . . . À . . . . . * . . . 6 % 45 % 17 Retained . . * . . . . - L . . . . . . 94 % 55 % 61 78 100 % 100 % (47) (31) G =-.85* Chi2? =16.37 p <.001 * Note that Gamma should be interpreted with caution, since its amount is due only to the lack of abolitionist countries among the less developed nations. Among the devel- oped ones, there is no parallel tendency. Even stronger is, as table 3 reveals (31), the association between form of government and retention of the death penalty among the developed nations (32), i.e. if the level of development is controlled (33). — 189 — TABLE I Raw Data Prisoners Income con- Form of cap Per capita % unemplo yed per 100,000 pun * * naticnal income centration (Gini (in 1971) government (in 1972)* (in 1972) Index) (in 1972) Argentina * . . ° » . 109 1016 nd Australia . - . + . «* » 89 3485 3198 (1967/68) Au st_ria . ° . . À. . . . 109 2427 3693 (1967) à Belgium ° ° . . . ° . 3345 Benin 55 (1974) nd (1974) Canada 98 (1974) 3828 (1969) Chile 108 587 4949 (1968) Ëî9 Colombia . . ° ° . À . 186 337 5436 (1970) . ® . . ° ° ° L 31 1210 Denmark Cyprus . . [ . . ° ® 69 3795 î i . . . . . » . 58 3648 (1966) (1973) Ecuador 260 5300 (1969) E!ÙSalvador ° ° . . . ® 175 1E +1 T4 289 5387 (1965) oeo Fiji 124 (1974) 4687 (1968) (1974) Finland 02 918 (1974) 4633 (1967) 2.3 prrm baré e puneé ph pueet France * * . . + » . L 61 3349 4214 (1970) FR Gerr:iany 86 3765 3918 (1970) Ç:crman DR . ° . . . 262 2475 (1974) 3:0o0.00O353500O0.0O0O.8O. & pouen ve =4N Cn m UU D H— O \O 090 <3 ON Un B U D —— fong Kong » . » ° . 112 (1980) se 1855 (1975) 4249 (1971) 4.5 (1977) {- ija 36 (1974) 136 (1974) 4697 (1967/68) 1974) A e sia 289 (1977) 4438 (1971) p fN 1980) Æ e * - " . . Q * ° . Û . 48 (1980) 425 (1973) en ÊÎei.:pd . * ° ° . . . . 35 1723 23 es ( E 134 2215 raly 51 1998 3967 (1969) ä er orv Coast * . . . . 130 391 5242 (1970) cf aica . ° Û * Q . . . 121 816 anpan . . ® * Q . Û . 46 2418 4125 (1971) 11 (1973) î 165 148 e? - Ê 2 . . . ° ° . ° 6076 (1969) 120 rr FFFHHHHI 01 AHHHH10001 786 * . . . . . . 25 343 5057 (1970) Qaezsopno.non.no.asooe 31 Mexico 83 632 (1970) 5680 (1969) d 32 Morocco 96 + 241 5080 (1965) nd 33 Netherlands 21 3139 3925 (1967) 1.6 d 34 New Zealand . . . À . 85 2880 3530 (1971/72) nd (1974) 35 Nigeria . ° ° . ° . ° . 42 (1974) + | 211 (1973) nd 36 Norway 39 (1974) | 3863 (1974) 3609 (1970) (1973) 37 Panama 120 152 4881 (1969) nd 38 53 (1974) nd Philippines ° . . . . ° . ° 339 (1974) 4840 (1971) (1973) 39 Poland 191 (1971) 1800 (1974) nd 40 Portugal 44 (1974) 1337 (1974) 1.8 (1974) nd (1974) 41 Sierra Leone 88 (1974) se 202 (1974) 5672 (1968) d (1974) 42 South Africa . . . . 400 (1975) 1302 (1975) 5652 (1965) nd 43 Spain 40 1240 3907 (1964/65) 1.5 nd (1972) 44 Sri Lanka 64 167 LHI 451 #HI 3536 (1973) 45 Sweden ° . . ° ® ° ° . 54 4649 3495 (1972) 2.5 46 Switzerland . . . . » 42 4252 4009 (1968) 47 Syrian Arab.R.. . . 35 314 7.5 nd 48 Thailand ° ® . . ° ° ° 124 184 5029 (1962) nd 49 Trinidad & T 106 732 (1970) 5340 (1965) 12.6 50 Tunesia ° . . ° . ° ° Q 103 403 4937 (1970) nd 51 USSR . . ° ® L ° Q . ° 391 (1975) 1809 (1974) nd 52 United Kingdom 75 (1974) 3116 (1974) 3461 (1973) 2.7 (1973) 53 United States 189 21 A4H+H+HH1 4984 4090 (1972) 5.9 54 Venezuela 127 1104 6005 (1971) 6.0 SS Yugoslavia 101 (1977) + ! 11.4 (1976) nd Note: * VWith the exception of Poland, these figures include sentenced as well as unsentenced prisoners, both in local jails and in nationally operated prisons. Poland’s rate is based on the number of sentenced inmates only. ** A “+” sign stands for retaining, a “_,9 sign for having abolished capital punishment. Countries with ( ) sign have not been included in the analysis presented in tables 2 and 3, either because they have less than 1 million population, or, if their population is between 1 and S millions, because they have a per capita national income of less than $ 1000 (in 1977); Hong Kong has been excluded because it is 665s ° not formally indepçndent. A sign means that the situation regarding capital punishment is unclear or unknown. TABLE III Capital punishment and form of government (Nations with at least $ 1000 per capita national income in 1977 and 1,000,000 population only) (32) form of government democratic non-democratic capital punishment Abolished ° ° . - . . . . . . . . . . À 76 % 17 % 22 Retained . . . . ° . . . . . ° . ° . . 24 % 83 % 21 100 % 100 % 43 . . . . .… —… . . ° . . . . . . . ° . ° (25) (18) 88 Chi? = 14.74 p <.001 If no such control is introduced, the association is almost perfect (G — .93), since there are extremely few poor countries with non-demo- cratic forms of government that have abolished capital punishment. The lack of abolitionist countries among developing nations, no matter what the form of government, i.e. the lack of variation in the dependent variable, makes a parallel analysis of the association between form of government and retention vs. abolition of capital punishment among third world nations impossible. This lack of variation in the dependent variable, once the level of development is taken into account, makes it also impossible to analyse the impact of income concentration on whether the death penalty is abolished or retained (34). 2. Incarceration rates (35) 2.1. Incarceration rates and development Although the signs of the zero-order correlation between per capita national income and incarceration rates are in the direction predicted by Durkheim, they are nevertheless very low (r & —.15) and far from being significant. For the 54 nations on which data on per capita national income and incarceration could be obtained, the zero-order correlation is only —.028. When incarceration rates in these 54 nations is regressed, using per capita national income and form of government simultaneously as indepen- dent variables (36), the b-coefficient of the former is far from being signifi- cant (t = .90). This finding contrasts sharply with the strong impact that the same indicator of development was found to have on whether capital punishment is retained or abolished (see table 2). Since Newman and Vetere — — (1978) found a relatively strong correlation (r 55) between gross — 192 — domestic product and the number of correctional personnel (per 100,000 population), one might suspect that the reason for this paradox is that developed and developing countries differ in their control strategies. As prisons are expensive to operate, it seems feasible that countries suffering from scarcity of resources incarcerate fewer people for shorter periods of time than developed nations, and compensate for this lack of deterrence with the use of cheaper, but crueler, punishments, such as the death pen- alty. Indeed, there is a surprisingly weak association (G = .26) between capital punishment and incarceration rates (37). Penal severity, therefore, cannot be regarded as a one-dimensional concept. Rather, one should differentiate between two control models that do not necessarily go along with each other, namely a ‘‘terror model”, aimed at deterrence by cruel punishments, and a ‘“discipline model” that is based on incarcerating more people for longer periods of time. This interpretation can be based on an inversion of Beccaria’s famous statement that not the cruelty, but the certainty of punishment works as a deterrent, and it is in line with modern research on the (inverse) relationship between these two variables (cf. Pepinsky, 1980: 82). Taken together, the relationships found between development on the one hand and capital punishment and incarceration on the other support Durkheim’s two laws of penal evolution if they are refined in the following way ]l) Durkheim’s hypothesis that penal severity decreases with develop- ment, if the dependent variable is operationalized by the shift in the forms of punishment, i.e. from capital and corporal to non-physical sanctions, rather than by the severity in sentencing within a given form of punishment; and 2) Durkheim’s prediction that imprisonment will become the dominant form of punishment, if it is restated that with development the use of physical forms of punishment will decrease. By this rerinement, Durkheim°s two laws are actually reduced to one. 2.2. Incarceration rates and form of government The zero-order correlation between incarceration rate and form of government is .307 (N = 54), and the association coefficient (Gamma) is .16 (38). When the incarceration rate is regressed, using per capita national income and form government as independent variables (36), the latter’s (but not the former’s) regression coefficient is significant at the .02 level (t = 2.48). In the analysis of variance, form of government explains 11 per- cent of variation in incarceration rates (N = 54) when introduced after the indicator of development. This finding is in the line with the result of table 3, although the impact of the form of government on incarceration rates is much smaller than on capital punishment. In line with what has been said above on the impact of development on crime control strategies, it — 193 — seems that dictatorships are indeed more punitive than other forms of government, for they tend to punish more cruelly, instead of incarcerating more people for longer periods of time. This interpretation conforms with Luhmann°s (1975:9) hypothesis that not the use, but rather the threat, of force works as a means to maintain power. Ît also is supported by historical studies on the interaction between terror, i.e. threat with cruel responses, and selective sanctioning practices under the Hanoverian kings (Hay, 1975). 2.3. Incarceration rates and income concentration TABLE IV Correlation Matrix (Sample of 39 nations) . Incarceration rate ° ° - . ° . . . . * . À « À ° -.152 . Development (p.c. national income). . . _— . Form of government . À . ° “ . . . . . À ° . 332 463 —A U tiv — . Income concentration (Gini index) . . . 460 127 417 Among the three independent variables presented in table 4, the Gini index is most strongly correlated with incarceration rates (r = .460). Be- cause of the multicollinearity between this variable and per capita national income (r = —.727), a simultaneous multiple regression analysis is not warranted. Stepwise multiple regression, however, is more appropriate whenever an intrinsic causal order among the independent variables can be assumed (Nie et al., 1975:339). In assessing the causal order among the three independent variables, we can presume that high income concen- tration and non-democratic forms of government do not cause under- development, but rather that these forms of power concentration are likely to occur at certain stages of development (Bollen, 1979; Bornschier, 1978). Therefore, it is in order to introduce per capita national income into the regression equation first. To determine whether form of government or income concentration should be introduced second is somewhat difficult. as highly privileged elites tend to defend the status quo by using dictatorial forms of government; on the other hand, all governments, and non-demo- cratic ones probably even more, try to influence the income distribution by adopting certain economic policies. To avoid any problematic decision in this regard, the analysis has been conducted in both ways, displayed in tables 5 and 6. — 194 — TABLE V Incarceration rate regressed on 3 independent variables (N = 39) I: Development, Income Concentration, Form of Government Independent R Square F/p F/p variables Multiple R R Square Change R Square R Square 1. Development (p.c. national income) . . . 152 023 023 1.22 ns. 1.22 ns 2. Formof government . 332 110 087 5.82 .05 4.60 .05 3. Income con- centration (Gini index) . 580 336 226 17.71 .001 11.89 .O1 TABLE VI Incarceration rate regressed on 3 independent variables (N = 39) II: Development, Form of Government, Income Concentration Independent R Square F/p F/p variables Multiple R R Square Change R Square R Square Development (p.c. national income) . . . 152 023 023 1.22 nss. 1.22 nss. tV Form of government . 332 110 087 5.82 .05 4.60 .05 Income con- centration (Gini index) . 580 336 226 17.71 .001 11.89 .O1 As tables 5 and 6 reveal, development, once more, does not contribute any substantial fraction to the total amount of variation explained. Besides, income concentration is clearly a more powerful explanatory variable than form of government, no matter which one is introduced first. Since form of government is, as has been discussed above, very strongly associated with retention vs. abolition of capital punishment (see table 3), whereas income concentration is less strongly associated with the said dependent variable (34), the result of tables 5 and 6 is somewhat puzzling. It ssems that non- democratic forms of government and high income inequality go along with the two different crime control strategies described above, the former leading rather to deterrence by cruel physical punishments, the latter leading rather to more and longer prison sentences. The rise of democracy during the 19th century was generally followed not only by a market decline, or even the abolition, of capital punishment, but also, as ignatieff (1978:212) concluded, by the simultaneous, massive increase in the use of total(itarian) institutions, symbolizing more intolerance towards deviants of — 195 — all sorts. From these trends, one may say that non-democratic governments prefer the ‘‘terror model”, whereas democracies with a lot of economic inequality tend to prefer the ‘‘discipline model”. Whatever the psychological differences underlying these two control models may be, it seems feasible that democratic governments are somewhat more restricted in their force choice of control strategies, since the use of brutal violence in defense of the status quo can easily destroy the consensual appearance by which such governments tend to be legitimized (cf. Luhmann, 1975:69). This restriction in the range of available means of control may account for the ‘“economic- ally irrational”’ reluctance to return to massive execution rates (Rusche, 1933), as well as for the much lower level of police violence against rioters and opponents, when compared to crack-downs under many non-demo- cratic governments. Since using prisons more widely and sentencing of- fenders to longer prison terms do not seem to be considered illegitimate in democracies, it is plausible that in these countries an increase in penal severity is primarily sought in the form of longer sentences and a more con- servative use of non-incarcerative sanctions. Dictatorships, however, may depend much less on an image of consensual rule, and this fact allows them to turn to the cheaper ‘‘terror model” rather easily, i.e. whenever brutal violence appears to be the mot cost-efficient way of defending the status quo 2.4. Incarceration rates and unemployment Unfortunately, unemployment rates could be obtained for only 21 nations for which data on the other independent variables were available. Thus, the scope of this analysis is very limited. Again, the high multi- collinearity between per capita national income and the Gini index (r = —.707), and between the latter and unemployment (r = .640), renders the use of the simultaneous multiple regression impossible. TABLE VII Correlation Matrix (Sample of 21 nations) l 2 1. Incarceration rate 2. Development (p.c. national income) -.0—6 2 — 3. Form of government . ° . . . . . . 116 -.535 — p 4. Income concentration (Gini index) 399 -.707 219 S. Unemployment rate . À . . . À ° ° 546 -442 .159 640 Analysing the amount of variance explained by each of the independent variables, one may, again, introduce the indicator of development first, since unemployment is obviously a result, rather than a cause, of underdevelop- ment. More difficult, however, is the determination of the causal order be- tween unemployment and income concentration. On the one hand, — 196 — unemployment is not a natural disaster, but rather a consequence of certain economic policies that are favored by some economically powerful groups. On the other hand, the income concentration index is directly affected by the number of unemployed, since they have less income than people with jobs. To take this probably mutual dependency into account, the analysis has been conducted both ways, i.e. introducing unemployment before income concentration into the regression equation, as well as the other way around. TABLE VIII Incarceration rate regressed on 4 independent variables (N = 21) I- Development, Form of Government, Unemployment, Income Concentration Independent R Square F/p F/p variables Multiple R R Square Change R Square R Square Development (p.c. national 062 004 income) . . . 004 l n.s n.s Form of government 187 035 031 293 n.s 83 ns. Unemploy- ment rate 594 352 317 9.38 .01 8.45 .0S Income con- centration (Gini index) 632 399 047 10.62.01 1.24 n.s. TABLE IX Incarceration rate regressed on 4 independent variables (N = 21) II: Development , Form of Government, Income Concentration, lhemployment Independent R Square F/p F/p variables Multiple R R Square Change R Square RSQ Change Development (p.c. national income) . . . 062 004 004 1 n.s 1 n.s Form of government . 187 035 031 .93ns 83 nss. Income con- centration (Gini index) . 508 259 224 6.88 .05 5.95 .05 Unemploy- ment rate 632 399 140 10.62.01 3.74ns A One may see ircn & tables & 2ux 9, unemployment as well as LS 2960 ; € ÿ [ l'| P ‘entratio” -xplau 4 US ue RMGO 1 Of variine” 1 )‘\, CEF UON es ; IysIy | ves récuik vpmidecnes st the 05 -— 197 — only when introduced before each other. Besides, unemployment seems to be a more powerful variable than income concentration in the present sample. Before drawing any conclusions regarding the relative importance of unemployment and income concentration in explaining incarceration rates, a few warning words are in order. First, it should be kept in mind that the sample of 21 nations, for which all needed data could be obtained, is heavily biased in favor of affluent countries, the number of countries with iess than $ 1000 per capita national income being only 4. Since affluer cuntries have generally quite similar Gini scores, but range very widely in -mploy- ment rates, it is plausible that the latter variable explains morc .xriance within such a restricted sample. Second, in line with this observa:ion, the Zero-order correlation between incarceration rate and income concer ‘“ation is lower (.399) within the sample of 21 nations than within that « 39 nations (.460) which includes 19 developing countries (see tables 4 a: 1 e /s respectively). Unemployment, however, is considerably stronger correlated with incarceration among the 21 nations sample (.546), than if the corre- lation is computed on the base of 30 nations (.410), i.e. including 9 (mostly developing) countries for which incarceration and unemployment rates, but no data on the other variables, were available. The data presented here do not warrant any definitive conclusions regarding the overall relevance of unemployment and income concentration in explaining incarceration rates. One may suppose, however, that in rela- tively poor countries with high inequality of income distribution and endemic high unemployment, the former affects the legitimation of the rulers much more seriously than the economic misery which, in the third world, is generally beyond the capacities of those governments to ameliorate drastically. In more affluent nations where the income distribution is more even and, at least in general, less a source of interior conflict, high unem- ployment rates may have a strong delegitimizing effect, since there are strong expectations that governments have to promote full-employment, and that, using the appropriate economic policies, they could do so. These differences in delegitimizing effects of unemployment and income concen- tration might, then, account for their differential power in explaining incarceration rates, depending on what nations are included into the sample. In the present context, however, this inference should be considered as tentative at best. DISCUSSION This analysis has yielded a number of empirical relationships. Some of them are in line with the hypothese presented above, while other findings ask for theoretical integration. Such an integration may be achieved by the following hypothetical model: — 198 — CHART I Proposed Theoretical Integration Social structure: Social crisis/conflict: Developmental level Form of government: High power concentration: High dissatisfaction with — dictatorship and/or the social system's per- — very inequal income distribution formance (e.g., high unemployment rate) High (resources are Democratic (legitima- easily available) tion through consensus precludes use of too much violence) RR d Low (scarcity of Legitimation resources) Non-democratic (use of becomes problematic violence is rather (legitimation crisis) unproblematic “’Discinline”’ model Increase in penal severity ‘“Terror’’ model Higher incarceration More and crueler physical rate (locking up more people for longer times) punishments (death penalty, eventually corporal punishment) This model suggests that the different developmental levels of society affect the model of punishment used and the actual punishment imposed. Societies with scarcer resources, developing countries, are more likely to employ the terror model and apply physical punishments to criminals while more affluent industrialized societies which can afford to discipline their members employ incarceration more frequently. But all societies no matter their level of economic development, when suffering a legitimation crisis, become more vindictive towards their criminal population employing either physical punishment or deprivation of freedom with more severity. The lack of specificity of the concept of legitimation makes it difficult to operationalize the concept of legitimation crisis wit in the model with any greater precision. But such crises do seem to be linked with high in- equality and political crises, as well as in capitalist societies, with increasing rates of unemployment. The concept of legitimation crisis allows to inte- grate these variables in a more general way. It allows for cross-sectional as well as temporal variations in penal severity that other models fail to explain. — 200 — FOOTNOTES ( Checking the subject indexes of the Criminology and Penology Abstracts, volumes 18-20 (1978-1980), the author found more than 120 references concerning publications on alternatives to imprison ment such as non-incarcerative measures fines and community treatment programs, but only about 15 references concerning the incarceration rates and the continued use of imprisonment (2) This article appeared first in Annee Sociologique 4(1900): 65-95 but did not appear in English until 1969, which may explain why English speaking scholars ignored it. (3) Although it seems unlikely that Durkhe1m did not know this refer- ence, he does not quote Montesquieu’s statement on the impact of tyrannical” forms of government on penal severity (4) This assumption of dissent even regarding such basic crime concepts is a typical feature of culture conflict theory and is not supported by empirical evidence (see on this the literature review of Kornhauser 1978 216-226) Interestingly, Sorokin himself expresses doubts regarding the feasibility of this assumption, and he criticizes some sociologists for having overstated the relativity of serious crimes (Sorokin, 1937/1962: 577) (5) Melossi and Pavarini (1979: 246) express the alternative character of prison and factory in these words La fabbrica è per l’operaio come un carcére il carcere per l’internato è come una fabbrica (‘“‘For the worker, the factory is like a prison, and for the prisoner, the prison is like a factory”) (6) The American unemployment rate is calculated on the basis of those who report having actively looked for work during the recent past and thus excludes from the work force those who have given up looking for a job. It may be a more valid indicator of fluctuations over time than of cross-sectional differences, because the number of people who have given up looking for work may be particularly high in areas and among groups with chronically high unemployment. This differential validity of the measure of unemployment may account for the paradox that the latter is strongly correlated with imprisonment but not in Garofalo’s cross-sectional rates in time-series analyses study (7) The figures given in this context are usually exponentially overstated or are based on extremely unreliable sources. The often cited figure of 72-80,000 thieves executed under Henry VIII (see, e.g., Rusche and Kirchheimer 1939) were simply a fantastic invention of a very dubious individual (for details see Aydelotte, 1913: 5). The same is true of the 20-30,000 dealth sentences which Benedictus Carpzovius a famous 17th century judge and criminal law professor in Leipzig was often said to have pronounced; as the careful examination of the 201 — contemporaty records by Boehm (1940-42) revealed, the real figure was at least 100 times lower, and Leipzig had a particularly low execution rate during Carpzovius’ office, namely about .35 per 10,000 population during the period of 1652-1668. The figures given by Steinert and Treiber (1978) and calculations by the author reveal that the execution rates did normally not exceed 2.0 per 10,000 in any of the cities considered, even during the periods of the most extensive use of capital punishment (usually at the end of the 16th century). This rate is considerably lower than, e.g., America’s present State and Federal prison admission rate of about 7.0 per 10,000 population (Hindelang et al., 1981: table 6.20). Assuming that only serious offenders were executed, just as today only serious offenders tend to be sent to State and Federal prisons, one sees from these figures that capital punishment never could be conceived of as a means to exterminate serious crime, even if one whishes to presume that past times were characterized by unusually low crime rates. (8) Luhmann’s work on power is also available in English: Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power, New York: Wiley, 1979. (9) This second hypothesis is supported at the micro-level by social psychological studies that found positive correlations between the power distance and the devaluating and punitive attitudes among the powerful towards their subordinates (Mulder, 1960; Kipnis, 1972). Power seems, therefore, to be associated with a lack of sympathy for and consideration of subordinates, as Ross (1901/1959: 12-13) observed a long time ago, and this, in turn, may facilitate the ration- alization of the use of cruel, “inhuman” forms of punishment. (10) Sorokin’s study, e.g., was based on a comparative and historical analysis of five societies (Russia, Germany, Austria, France, Italy). More recently, Ted R. Gurr et al., The Politics of Crime and Conflict : A Comparative History of Four Cities, Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publi- cations, 1977,used a very similar research design. (11) Although justified as a warning against inferences based on invalid data, Udy’s (1965) apodictical objections against cross-sectional tests of dynamical hypotheses seems unwarranted. Interestingly enough, many social scientists have reservations against using nations as research units, and insist on their individuality. Would they ever reject the method of surveying individuals on the same grounds? (12) Of course, the relative severity of different sanctions may overlap at the lower and the upper ends, respectively, as in the case of very short imprisonment and very high fines. Besides, it may be difficult to assess in a generally valid way the rank of some minor and subsidiary sanctions, such as withdrawal of driver’s licence, or, to cite an histori- cal example, the temporary exclusion from the sacraments which, according to Carpzovius (1652: pars II, quaestio 69, n° 55), was con sidered in contemporaty Saxonia a more severe punishment than a — 202 — short prison sentence. Overall, however, there is no doubt that death is generally considered the most severe category of punishment, followed by imprisonment and non-incarcerative sanctions. (13) The median time served in American State prisons was 17.3 months in 1977 (Characteristics of the Parole Population 1978, San Francisco: NCCD, 1980). In some states, however, this time is considerably longer, as in California, where the median time served was 34 months in 1976 for men, and 25 months for women, respectively (Brewer et al., 1981). In contrast, the corresponding figure for the Netherlands is about ! month, for Sweden 3 months (Doleschal, 1979), and for Switzerland about 3 months (Strafurteile in der Schweiz 1979, Con- victions in Switzerland, ed. by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office, Berne 1981). In interpreting these figures, on should keep in mind that the American figures do not include the far shorter sentences served in jails, on the other hand, the European countries seem to restrict the use of imprisonment considerably more than the American states (Clinard, 1978: 116-117; Gillespie, 1980). It is not possible to determine to what degree these differences in the meaning of figures on time served in prisons affect their comparability, but it would seem that the exclusion of jails from the American data and the more conservative use of imprisonment in European countries tend to com- pensate each other. (14) Using time-series, Biles (1979) and Bowker (1981) found rather con- tradictory results concerning the relationship between crime rates and rates of imprisonment in State and Federal prisons. Using ordinal data, Nagel (1977) found a correlation (r) of only .214 between rates of incarceration in State and Federal prisons and crime rates across the 50 states. Garofalo (1979), using a more comprehensive measure of incarceration which included jails and juvenile institutions, found correlations of .24 for property crime and .61 for violent crime rates. Using a similar measure of incarceration, the author found that total crime rates in 1971 and 1977 accounted for only 10 per cent of the total variation in incarceration rates in 1972 and 1978, respectively, across the 50 states. (15) Unfortunately, the report published by the United Nations on this survey (Crime Prevention and Control, Report of the Secretary- General, 32nd session of the Assembly General, A/32/199, 22 September 1977) contains only aggregated data. For any meaningful analysis, crime and offender data should, however, be available at the level of countries rather than continents. (16) Similarly, Greenberg (1977) found in a time-series analysis on Canada no correlation (r = .01) between conviction rate and prison admission rate. (17) As, e.g., the one developed by Bollen (1979). (18) For a detailed description of the Gini index see Bronfenbrenner (1971). — 203 — (19) United Nations Working Paper by the Secretariat, Fifth United Nations Congress on Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders (Toronto, Canada, September 1-12, 1975), The Treatment of the Offender in Custody and the Community, with special reference to the application of the standard minimum rules for the treatment of prisoners adopted by the United Nations, Annex A/Conf. 56/6 (1975). (20) These sources are: — USSR, Indonesia, Hong Kong, South Africa: Eugene Doleschal and Anne Newton, International Rates of Im- prisonment, Hackensack, N.J.: NCCD, 1981 (unpublished) — Poland: Greenberg 1980 — German Democratic Republic: Kaiser, 1976: 39 — Yugoslavia: F. Brinc, ‘“‘Uporaba prostostnih kazni v Francij in Jugoslaviji” (Use of Prison Sentences in France and Yugoslavia), Revija za Kriminalistiko in Kriminologijo 31 (7# 2, 1980): 102-112; quoted from Abstracts on Criminology and Penology 20 (1980): JF 2909. — Switzerland: unpublished survey conducted by the author in 1973. (21) International surveys on capital punishment: — United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Capital Punishment, New York: United Nations, 1967 — United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Capital Punishment, New York: United Nations, 1973 — Amnesty International, The Death Penalty, London: Amnesty International Publ., 1979 — Manuel Lôpez Rey (1980). 92 A good example of a rather theoretical provision for the death penalty is the offence of genocide which, according to the Netherlands Penal Code, is punishable by death. (23) The World Almanac and Book of Facts (issues 1972-1981), New York: Newspaper Enterprise Association: Fisher Weltalmanach (issues 1972-1981), Frankfut/Main, FRG: Fischer Verlag. (24) Most of these data have been republished in Volker Bornschier and Than-Huyen Ballmer-Cao, ‘‘Income Inequality: A Cross-National Survey of the Relationship between MNC-Penetration, Dimensions of the Power Structure and Income Distribution”’, American Sociological Review 44 (June, 1979): 487-506. (25) See. e.g., the U.S. time-series analysis by Reynolds and Smolensky., 1977. (26) New York: United Nations, 1979, table 22. (27) U.N. Statistical Yearbook, issues 1975, 1977, 1978, New York: United Nations, 1976, 1978, and 1979, respectively (tables 192, 194, and 193, respectively). (28) Note that in this paragraph recent developments, such as the abolition of capital punishment in France and in Spain, were taken into account. Therefore, the form of government refers to the present situation, — 204 - whereas in table l it was assessed for the year which incarceration data were used. Thus, countries such as Portugal and Spain, are counted here as democratic, but as non-democratic in connection with incarceration rates. Accordingly, the latest available data on per capita national income have been used here. ( 9) The following countries not listed in table 1 have been included — Nations with at least — Nations with less than $ 1000 $ 1000 per capita national per capita national income (in income (in 1977): 1977): a) without capital punish- a) without capital punishment ment 1. Brazil | . Dominican Republic b) with capital punishment b) with capital punishment Bulgaria 1. Algeria CSSR 2. Angola Greece 3. Bangladesh Hungary 4. Burma Iran S. Cameroon Romania 6. China (Taiwan) V 0 Uv Æ 0 0tU Saudi Arabia 7. China, PR 8. Cuba 9. Egypt 10. Ethiopia ]1. Ghana 12. Guatemala 13. Guinea 14 Haiti 15 Madagascar 16 Malawi 17 Mali 18 Mozambique 19 Niger 20 Pakistan 21 Peru 22 Senegal 23 South Korea 24 Sudan 25 Tanzania 26 Turkey 27 Uganda 28 Upper Volta 29 Vietnam 30 Zaire 31 Zambia 32 Zimbabwe — 205 — (30) To prevent tiny nations from getting an overproportionate weight, only nations with at least S millions population have been included. Among those that meet this criterion, four could not be included (Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nepal, North Korea). 31) The following countries not listed in table 1 have been included: — Nations without capital — Nations with capital punishment: punishment: 1. Brazil nd Bulgaria nd nd 2. Costa Rica d CSSR 3. Uruguay nd Greece d nd Hungary Iran nd Kuwait nd Libya nd Romania nd O 0< QO U Æ UtHW -— Saudi À. nd (32) To prevent the sample form becoming too small, once control for development is introduced, also nations having less than 5 but more > » with the than ! million population have been inciuded :n table exception of Singapore. (33) One may question whethe: @razit and Uruguay can rtally be con- sidered abolitionist countriés, in view of the subsian*::! number of PR non-judicial execuinis Gecurming there (Lôpez-Rey, 1955 Amnesty Internaiic :al, 1979: 143-146). Not to overstate the cu:è. and to prevent the association from becoming perfect, they werè counted here as abolitionist. 13 £ Since among the wealthy nations, mainly communist ones do retain capital punishment, and since data on the income concentration there can not reasonably be used for the present analysis, the variation in the dependent variable is, when Gini index data are used, insufficient among third as well as among first world countries. Over all, i.e. with- out controlling for development, the association (Gamma) between income concentration (Gini index < .40, 40-.50, > .50) and abolition vs. retention of capital punishment is .77 (z = 3.15,p < .001,N = 35), but given the strong impact development has on both of these vari- ables, any analysis that does not control for it is not very meaningful. Besides, Gamma is inflated due to one extreme cell frequency. (35) As one may see from table !, a few countries have extremely high incarceration and unemployment rates. Therefore, the analysis has also been conducted without these outlyers. Since this only increased the correlations between incarceration rate on one hand and Gini index and unemployment on the other hand, but not to any substan- tial degree, they have been left in the sample. 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SUMMARY The different theoretical perspectives concerning the severity of punish- ment are presented (Durkheim, Sorokin, Rusche and Kirchheimer) and discussed in the light of a comparative analysis of 55 nations. It indicates that social structural variables as well as the level of socio-economic devel- opment and the form of government (democratic or dictatorial) have a very clear impact on the type of punishments used and the law (notably as concerns the death penalty). Conversely, social inequality and unemploy ment have a strong influence on the level of imprisonment in a country. It seems that political and economic crises cause a rapid increase in the severity of the penal system. The concept of a legitimation crisis of the established order (Weber, Heintz) seems the most suitable interpretation for the variations in penal severity across societies and historical periods. RÉSUMÉ Les différentes perspectives théoriques concernant la sévérité des peines sont présentées (Durkheim, Sorokin, Rusche et Kirchheimer) et discutées à la lumière d’une analyse comparative portant sur 55 nations. Il s’avère que les variables structurelles telles que le niveau du développement socio-éco- nomique et la forme du gouvernement (démocratique ou dictatoriale) ont une répercussion très nette sur le genre des peines retenues par la loi (notam- ment en ce qui concerne la peine de mort). En revanche, l’inégalité sociale et le chômage ont une forte influence sur le taux d’emprisonnement d’un pays. Il paraît en outre que les crises politiques et économiques causent une — 210 - augmentation rapide de la sévérité du système pénal. Le concept de crise de légitimité de l’ordre établi (Weber, Heintz) semble le mieux adapté à l’inter- prétation des variations de la sévérité du système pénal dans le temps et dans l'espace. 211 CROSS-NATIONAL EFFECTS OF DEVELOPMENTAL, DISTRIBUTIONAL, AND DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES ON CRIME: A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS Gary D. LaFree* Edward L. Kick** Recently, quantitative studies in comparative criminology have at- tempted to identify cross-national relationships between crime rates (par- ticularly murder) and a variety of developmental, distributional, and demo- graphic variables. Most of these studies are either atheoretical or adopt the theoretical position that the variables which cause crime exert effects that are uniform across crime categories (e.g., murder, theft). However, both our review of these studies, and our own multiple-regression analysis of murder and theft in 47 countries, suggest that development, wealth distribution, and national demographic characteristics affect murder and theft rates differently. This conclusion suggests the need for a new theoretical inter- pretation. Case studies of crime in individual nations and comparative crimi- nology essays are promising sources for such an interpretation. We draw on these sources to construct a preliminary theoretical explanation of the results from recent comparative analyses of murder and theft. Our dis- cussion contrasts the opportunities and incentives for murder and theft in industrial-developed and non-industrial-developing nations. THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS IN CROSS-NATIONAL STUDIES OF CRIME Table | summarizes ten quantitative, comparative studies of crime. Several of these studies are atheoretical (Wolf. 1971 ; Wellford, 1974) or l-argely so (Quinn'ey, 1965; Krohn, 1976). Nonetheless, the variables they * Associate Professor, Department of Sociology. The University of New Mexico. ** Associate Professor, Department of Sociology. The University of Utah. Revision of a paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, Detroit, 1983. This research was partially supported by the University of New Mexico's Research Allocation Committee and by University of Utah Research Grant N° 6-41554. We wish to thank Lee Churgin for her help with data preparation and several anonymous reviewers for their comments. 213 — TABLE 1 Summary Information on Quantitative, Cross-National Studies of Crime Crime Data Relationship Study Sample Type Analysis Dependent (1) and to homicide Relationship Source Size Independent (2) Variables murder to theft Quinney United 48 Tabular Homicide and suicide (1965) Nations (measures of Urbanism central tendency) Industrialization Wolf INTERPOL 37 Tabular ur Murder/larceny ratio (a) (d971) classifications +) — High infant mortality High percentage of labor force in agriculture +9 Low urbanization +9 Low telephones per capita +9 Low GNP per capita +9 Low adult literacy rate +9 +9 Low newspaper per capita î: Non-westernized countries +» Wellford INTERPOL 75(b) Bivariate; OLS l Murder, major larceny and total (1974) regression crime rates t Population size — ? GNP per capita +9 Political orientation McDonald INTERPOL(c) 40 OLS regression l Juvenile crimes, thefts, property (1976) with combinations offences, murders and total of 2 and 3 variable offences models GNP per capita + * Intersectoral inequality + * Land inequality Unemployment Labor force participation Radios per capita ++ Burcaucracy Higher education Police force Data collection index +* Literacy School enrollment Family size Urbanism +‘+< #* Population increase Religious heterogeneity H* Linguistic heterogeneity Racial heterogeneity Constitutional status Government stability hx } xecutive stability Voting proportion Political representation and fran- chise index Newspaper per capita Krohn INTERPOL 24 Bivariate: Homicide. property and total (1976) stepwise crime rates muiltiple Inequality +° |()d) + ) regression GNP per capita Percent unemployed + ) + Ù Energy consumption per capita Krohn INTH.RPOL 33 OLS regression Homicide, property and total (1978) crime rates Total population Urbanism : Energy consumption per capita Division of labor —" î …… Systematic frustration Table | continued Crime Data Sample Relationship Study Type Analysis Dependent (1) and to homicide Relationship Source Size Independent (2) Variables murder to theft Krohn (e) INTERPOL 59 Bivariate; Homicide, property and total and Wellford OLS regression crime rates (977) Population GNP per capita +9 Political orientation — 9 +9 32 Change (196045) in Homicide, property and total crime rates +9 +9 Population change GNP per capita change +9 +9 Messner INTERPOL 39 OLS regression Murder rate (log) (1980) Gross domestic product per capita Population size Population density Urbanism Inequality —;* Hansmann United 58/40(f) | OLS regression Homicide rate and Quigley Nations Religious heterogeneity (1982) Linguistic heterogeneity Ethnic heterogeneity Inequality Η*î Population density Urbanism GNP per capita Youth +* Messner INTERPOL 50 OLS regression 1. Murder rate (1982) 2. Gross domestic product per capita (log) Percent population protestant Secondary school enroliment Social equality Population size Population density Urbanism Population growth + * Signifies that no tests of statistical significance for individual coefficients were provided. Signifies p < .05 for those studies which employed significance tests. Wolfs “dependent”’ variable, the ratio of murders to larcenies. is not strictly comparable to those employed in the other studies listed. However, Wolfs results (1970: 110-117) show that high values on development indicators (e.g., higher GNP per capita) tend to co-occur with high values on larceny but low values on murder. Wellford uses 1967 and 1968 data for a total of 150 cases; although he performs a stepwise multiple regression analysis, he presents no regression coefficients or significance tests. McDonald also reports data on juvenile crime for 31 countries from United Nations sources. Signs are based on zero-order correlations, since Krohn’s regression results include model estimates that are suspect (e.g… betas excecding unity). Krohn and Wellford estimate "’static’’ (N = 59) and ‘“dynamic” (i.e., change: N = 32) regression models. Hansmann and Quigley estimate six models with different variable combinations: asterisk (*) indicates significance in any model. analyse include developmental, distributional and/or demographic variables that are roughly comparable to those used in more theoretically-inclined treatments (i.e., McDonalé, 1976; Krohn, 1978; Hansmann and Quigley, 1982; Messner, 1982). For the most part, these variables are explicitly (Quinney ; McDonald; Krohn, 1978; Hansmann and Quigley ; Messner, 1982) or implicitly drawn from Durkheim’s (1964) ‘““consensus” or ‘“‘conflict’’ formulations, or from conflict interpretations derived from theorists such as Owen (1813), Engels (1845), and Bonger (1916). Durkheim’s consensus perspective generally assumes that as societies develop and rates of social change increase, societal consensus deteriorates and rates of deviance and crime are correspondingly heightened. For example, Webb (1972: 644) (1) interprets Durkheim as arguing that when communities grow in complexity, size, and density, their dominant mode of integration evolves from the mechanical to the organic type. With increases in organic interdependence and corresponding declines in the ‘“collective conscience”’, the hallmark of collective control over individuals under conditions of mechanical solidarity, individual variation, deviance, and crime are exacerbated (Webb, 1972:644, n° 2). Similar interpretations of Durkheim are provided by Krohn (1978), who considers direct and indirect links between population size, urbanism, industrialization, the division of labor, anomie, and increasing crime rates, and by Quinney, McDonald (1976: 74-75), and Hansmann and Quigley. An alternative, conflict-oriented view of Durkheim is provided by Messner (1982) (2). According to Messner, in addition to developmental and demographic variables, Durkheim was concerned with the effects of in- equality on crime and deviance. Messner (1982: 228-29) contends that implicit in Durkheim’s formulation is the understanding that egalitarian changes in the structure of societies normally accompany development. These egalitarian conditions permit the formation of organic bonds of inter- dependence, which counterbalance the potential for increased criminality otherwise associated with the weakening of mechanical solidarity. Our purpose here is not to adjudicate these competing interpretations of Durkheim, but rather to emphasize that regardless of the interpretation applied, these studies assume that the crime-inducing effects of develop- ment and demographic change, or the crime-counteracing effects of egali- tarian social-structural arrangements, operate uniformly across all forms of criminal behavior (c.f., Krohn, 1976: 304; Krohn, 1978: 656; McDonald, 1976: 144-154; Hansmann and Quigley, 1982: 210; Messner, 1982: 229). À similar assumption is evident in the one study reviewed in Table 1 (McDonald) that explicitly tests conflict arguments. McDonald examines Owen’s thesis that the poor become criminal out of necessity — h>cause of inadequate education and moral training. McDonald also tests ‘ #76: 55) — 218 — si£nilar themes from Engels and Bonger, including their argument that in advanced capitalism, poverty, inequality, and lack of access to education increase crime when compared to what be in non-industrial or communistic societies. These conflict perspectives differ from the Durkheimian ap- proaches, but again, they all assume that the effects identified are uniform cross crime categories (McDonald, 1976: 144-154). In general, much of the research summarized in Table 1 proceeds on the assumption that crime may be monolithically treated (3). However, while methodological limitations in many of these studies (subsequently dis- cussed) make definitive conclusions premature, a review of the collective evidence generally provides support for crime-specific interpretations. EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS Societal development. Table 1 shows that most prior empirical studies of cross-national crime include one or more measures of societal develop- ment: gross national (or domestic) product per capita, per capita energy consumption, percentage of literate adults, secondary school enrollment ratio, percentage of the work force in agriculture, telephones per capita, and radios per capita. Theoretical justification for the inclusion of these measures is not always provided (e.g., Wolf, 1971; Wellford, 1974), but when it is, it usually entails reference to development-crime links specified in Durkheimian (e.g., Krohn, 1978; Messner, 1982) or conflict (McDonald, 1976: 148-154) models. Conclusions about the relationship between societal development and crime vary widely. For example, Quinney”s (1965) tabular analysis and Krohn and Wellford’s (1977) multivariate regression analysis suggest that murder declines with societal development (measured by Quinney as the percentage of males engaged in agriculture, and by Krohn and Wellford as per capita GNP). By contrast, other multivariate studies using comparable development measures (secondary school enrollment ratios — Messner, 1982; and per capita GNP — Hansmann and Quigley, 1982), report no effect of societal development on murder. Studies that focus on both murder and property crime provide less ambiguous results. Wolf (1971), who includes several measures of societal development (see Table 1), concludes that development is associated with low murder but high theft rates. Similarly, Krohn’s (1976) bivariate analysis and later (1978) regression results, show that per capita energy consumption is related to lower murder and higher property crime rates (theft. fraud, counterfeiting). Comparable multivariate results are reported by Krohn and Wellford (1977). McDonald (1975) also substantiates positive GNP per capita, litcracy, and sec-mndarv schoo! enrol!ment effects on the’t, and on Droperiv crime as a vholc t renuid. nicçativ* ottects f devalopraien: GNV rer capits) “ Qui .' Finally Weil >—<éd ; 371}) shows tha è à 4î(; GNP per capita is positively associated with theft and negatively associated with murder, both effects are relatively weak. Income inequality. More difinite conclusions may be drawn from reported relationships between the distribution of societal benefits and crime. Of the ten studies summarized in Table 1, five include a measure of income inequality (Krohn, 1976; McDonald, 1976; Messner, 1980, 1982; Hansmann and Quigley, 1982). The inclusion of inequality measures is warranted on the basis of Durkheimian (Messner, 1982) or conventional conflict (Krohn, 1976; McDonald; Messner, 1980; Hansmann and Quigley, 1982: 219) models. Krohn (1976) documents bivariate associations between income inequality (measured with the Gini index) and higher murder, but lower property crime rates. McDonald (1976) and Messner (1982) also show positive income inequality-murder links. Hansmann and Quigley find similar patterns for their ‘“reduced” regression models, but when they include other variables (e.g., GNP per capita, urbanization, urban density, and percentage of the population aged 15-24), inequality effects on murder are not statisti- cally significant. The bulk of the evidence available, then, suggests that nations with geater inequality have higher murder rates. Krohn’s (1976) treatment is the only cross-national crime analysis that also identifies negative relationships between income inequality and property crime. Combined with the con- clusions from the other studies, his findings may at least weakly support the utility of a crime theory that distinguishes murder and property crime. Demographic variables. With one exception (Krohn, 1976), the studies reviewed in Table 1 also consider linkages between demographic variables and crime. For the most part, the demographic variables examined reflect population dynamics, particularly urbanism, and population growth or size. Often the inclusion of population characteristics is not justified theoreti- cally (Wolf, 1971; Wellford, 1974), or is only ambiguously warranted (McDonald, 1976: 249-151). In other cases, it is substantiated either on the argument that population dynamics have been employed in prior intra- national studies of crime, or on the supposition that their inclusion is necessary for purposes of statistical control (Messner, 1982; Hansmann and Quigley, 1982). In contrast, Krohn (1978) justifies his use of measures of urbanism (percentage of the population in cities over 100,000), and total population, on the grounds that they tap Durkheim’s concept of ‘‘moral density”. Similarly, Quinney’s use of urbanism is Durkheim-inspired, though he employs urbanism as a proxy measure for economic development. The evidence for links between urbanism and crime is ambiguous. The tabular presentations of Quinney (1965) and Wolf (1971), and Krohn’s (1978) regression analyses, show negative relationships between urbanism and murder rates. Wolf, Krohn (1978), and McDonald also find opposite — 220 — (ie., positive) associations between urbanism and theft. However, the re- gression analyses reported in Messner (1982) and in Hansmann and Quigley, which do not include theft, indicate no effect of urbanism on murder. Somewhat greater uniformity is apparent for findings on the effects of population size and growth on crime. The results of the multivariate studies that consider population size suggest that it has no impact on murder (Wellford; Krohn and Wellford; Krohn, 1978; Messner, 1982) or on theft rates (Wellford: Krohn and Wellford; Krohn, 1978). In contrast, both McDonald and Messner (1982) show that population growth increases murder rates, and McDonald’s results additionally indicate that population growth has no effect on theit. On balance, the collective evidence for the effects of demographic variables on crime suggests that population size has no effect on crime, while urbanism and possibly population growth, have different effects on murder and theft. Here too, there is at least some support for crime-specific theoretical interpretations. Implications. In contrast to the theoretical perspectives assumed in recent quantitative cross-national analyses of crime, available evidence indicates that societal development, inequality, and population dynamics may be related differently to murder and theft. However, this conclusion must be treated as somewhat tentative because conceptual and method- ological differences between, and shortcomings in, prior studies make com- parisons of the findings reported difficult. For example, all of the studies reviewed in Table ! include murder as a dependent variable, but only six provide what for our purposes is a necessary analysis of theft and/or pro- perty crime. Five of these six (all but Wolf) employ analytic strategies that in principle permit the drawing of causal inferences, but two of these (Krohn, 1976, 1978) use very circumscribed samples (Ns of 24 and 33 countries), and two others (Wellford: Krohn and Wellford) use an overly restrictive set of regressors, omitting any measures of inequality and popu- lation dynamics. In the remaining study (McDonald), the methodological approach used, different samples of countries for different regression equations, makes it difficult to draw global inferences with any certainty. Thus, while prior research leads us to question the assumption that devel- ompental, distributional and demographic variables have the same effects on murder as they do on theft, there is enough ambiguity in the collective evidence from prior studies that we consider it useful to present results from a new analysis of murder and theft rates in 47 countries. V ARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES Murder and Theft Measures Of the ten studies summarized in Table !, eight used INTERPOL data and two used United Nations data. Our analysis is based on a third comparative ÜÛ] crime data set, collected by Archer and Gartner (1977; 1984) through l ) correspondence with national and metropolitan governmental sources, 2) examination of documents and annual reports, 3) correspondence with official record-keeping agencies (4). As in prior research, our dependent variables are constructed as crime rates; that is, we use as measures the number of reported occurrences of murder and theft per 100,000 population. However, to minimize problems associ- ated with yearly fluctuations, we compute five-year mean murder and theft rates for circa 1970 crime (5). Because the distributions of murder and theft rates are sxewed, we use log transformations of both variables in the analysis. Independent Variables Prior studies have focused on developmental measures that tap econ- omic (e.g., per capita GNP), infrastructural/‘‘’moral density” (e.g., tele- phones or radios per capita), or human capital components (e.g., adult literacy). These components may be conceptually distinct, but they are highly intercorrelated and their joint inclusion in multivariate models poten- tially raises estimation difficulties (see Krohn, 1976 ;Hansmann and Quigley). In fact, the correlations between seven of these measures (circa 1960) for the 47 nations in our sample are positive and significant at p < .001 (see Appendix A). À factor analysis of these development measures (last panel in Appendix A) showed that their underlying structure was unidimensional. We include the resulting development index in our analysis. Nations ranked highest on development are the United States, Sweden, Canada, Denmark, and West Germany. Pakistan, Tanzania, Benin, and India are lowest on the development scale. The distributional variable we employ is the one most commonly used in prior cross-national studies, the Gini index of income inequality. The empirical research on cross-national crime that includes income inequality does so on the supposition that, for varying reasons (e.g., “poverty”, “feel- ings of injustice”, ‘‘relative deprivation” — see Messner, 1980, 1982) in- equality is crime-generating (circa 1967 Gini scores are from Bornschier and Heintz, 1979). We include three of the demographic variables that have received the most attention in cross-national crime analyses: population growth, ur- banism, and total population size. Population growth is rarely warranted on theoretical grounds in prior research, although its positive relationship to murder rates is documented (McDonald; Messner, 1982). The population growth variable we use measures 1960-70 population change (from the World Bank). Urbanism, too, is often theoretically unjustified in prior research, but we include it on theoretical grounds (Clinard and Abbntt, 1973; Shelley, 1981), and because of the empirca! firdtinp (Wedf; Froin, 1978; McDonald) that urbanism is associated witi: 1# - ‘het” ha: ce m — 222 — murder rates (we use the 1960 percentage of total population in cities over 100,000, from Bornschier and Heintz, 1979). Finally, we include popu- lation size as a control variable and log transform population scores (from the United Nations Demographic Yearbook) because their distribution is highly slewed (6). Bivariate associations, means, and standard deviations for the variables are shown in Appendix B. RESULTS In general, the results from our multiple-regression analysis confirm the overall conclusionss we reached in our review of prior research. With all five variables in the equation (panels 1, 4), population growth has a strong positive effect on murder and a strong negative effect on theft. Although only population growth significantly affects both murder and theft rates, the independent variables are highly correlated (see Appendix B). We there- fore include alternative estimates by sequentially dropping the variable that in the previous model is identified as statistically significant. For example, in models | and 4, population growth is a significant predictor of murder and theft rates, thus, models 2 and 5 estimate murder and theft rates with- out population growth. We continue dropping variables one at a time until there are no significant variables in the equation. Table 2 shows that in- equality has a positive effect on murder (panel 2), but a negative effect on theft (panel 6); development has a negative effect on murder (panel 3), but a positive effect on theft (panel S); and urbanism has a positive effect on theft (panel 7) and no effect on murder. In short, contrary to the predomi- nant theoretical explanations in recent quantitative cross-national analyses of crime, measures of development, inequality, and population growth generally have opposite effects on murder and theft rates. DISCUSSION The main purpose of this paper has been to evaluate the assumption that developmental, distributional, and demographic variables each have similar effects on different crime types. Our review and results show that at least for murder and theft, they do not. Consequently, our results challenge Durkheimian ““consensus’”’ interpretations (McDonald; Krohn, 1978; Hansmann and Quigley), which emphasize that ‘‘modernization’” and the breakdown of the collective conscience generate increased criminal activity across al crime types (i.e., for our purposes, theft and murder). They also challenge the Durkheimian ‘“conflict’”’ interpretation (Messner, 1982) that the more equitable wealth distribution that accompanies modernization partially offsets the pernicious effects of development on crime, and uni- formly reduces all forms of criminal activity. Moreover, they challenge the — 223 — TABLE H Unstandardized and standardized coefficients for the effects of developmental, distributional and demographic variables on murder and theft rates (N = 47)a Murder Rates (log) Theft Rates (log) 5 b 65* 69 Population growth - 91* °052 Inequality 1.84 21 3.47* 39 - 42 -.02 -2.71 -.16 -5.95* -.36 Development. . . 13 16 - .26*+ -.34 - 41* --52 40 27 96* 65 Urbanism ° . . . . 00 10 00 26 00 23 - .00 -.05 01 17 01 20 02* 35 Total population (log) 02 04 - .00 -.01 - 05 -.08 15 14 11 --10 10 -.09 - Q1 -.01 -1.05 Intercept - 32 1.72 8.78* 7.76* 8.27* 4.35* R2 . ° ° ° ° ° ° . . 45* 27* 17* 51* 41* 22* 12* * p«<.05. + 05<p<.10 a Countries included are: Argentina, Australia, Benin, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, England, France, West Germany, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Senegal, Sierre Leone, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, U.S.A., Venezuela, Zambia. ‘‘conflict” interpretations of Owen, Engels and Bonger (McDonald) that anticipate consistently exacerbating effects of inequality and poverty on both property-related and violent personal offenses. Of particular interest in our results is the unexpected importance of population growth for predicting murder and theft rates. Indeed, it is the only statistically significant predictor of both crimes when all our indepen- dent variables are included in the regression analysis. Using the same measure of population growth, Messner (1982) reports similar results for INTERPOL data on murder. Indeed population growth effects were larger than the effects of the variables included in the theoretical model he was testing. Messner’s explanation for this finding (pp. 236-37) is that rapid population growth is ‘‘inherently destabilizing” or ‘‘implies the presence of a relatively large population of young people”. The problem with these explanations is obvious in an analysis which includes both murder and theft rates: if the effect of population growth is due to ‘“destabilization” or a high proportion of young people, why is it positively related to murder but negatively related to theft? That is, it seems reasonable to assume that the effect of rapid social change and a young population would be at least as important, and in the same direction, for theft as for murder. Although we find the theoretical assumptions presented in many recent quantitative, cross-national analyses of crime to be problematic, there exists à rich set of pertinent theoretical obserbations on murder and theft in case studies (e.g., Clinard and Abbott, 1973; Clifford, 1974; Shelley, 1980), comparative historical analyses (e.g., Zehr, 1974; Gurr, 1976), and critical reviews (e.g., Shelley, 1981). In the following discussion, we briefly apply some of these theoretical observations to the empirical results just identified. We argue that variations in the social-structural factors associated with crime rates - especially dynamics tapped by our population growth measure — provide different opportunities and incentives for murder and theft. In particular, societies characterized by frequent and intense interaction between primary group members have many opportunities and incentives for murder, but because of more effective surveillance, few opportunities and incentives for theft. Furthermore, because for the most part these characteristics distinguish Western-industrial from Third-world agricultural countries, our discussion focuses on differences in opportunities and incen- tives for theft and murder in ‘’developed” versus ‘developing’ countries. Theft in Developed and Developing Countries Our review and results show that slow population growth, low income inequality, high societal development, and urbanism are associated with high theft rates. Case studies of crime within nations (e.g., Repetto, 1974: Clifford, 1974; Cohen and Felson, 1979) and critical reviews of comparative criminology (Shelley, 1981) are consistent with the argument that slow 225 — population growth (reflected in small family size), economic development, and the comparatively high levels of equality that characterize developed countries increase the material possessions of much of a country’s popu- lation, and thereby augment opportunities for theft. The frequency of theft is further increased by the non-agricultural work requirements of developed societies, which daily remove employees from their homes for long periods of time and reduce the possibility of their direct home guardianship (Cohen and Felson, 1979: 593-94). Theft rates may also be exacerbated by the diminished surveillance that accompanies small family size, and by edu- cational opportunities and requirements that pull men, and increasingly women and children away from the home (Kobrin, 1976 ; Cohen and Felson, 1979: 598-99; Steinmetz, 1982: 63-67), and by highly advanced infra- structures (e.g., highways, airports) that facilitate leisure activity, including travel, away from the home (Cohen and Felson, 1979: 598). Moreover, similar processes in adjoining households further reduce the effectiveness of community surveillance (Newman, 1972; Scarr, 1972; Repetto, 1974). By contrast, for developing countries, limited pools of societal wealth and high levels of inequality in the social distribution of this wealth, reduce opportunities for theft (Bayley, 1969; Jeffery, 1971). Indeed, the bulk of the population in developing nations either own few commodities that are worth stealing, or own desired goods (e.g., livestock) that are difficult for thieves to transport and resell (Clifford, 1974: 137; Zehr, 1976: 142; Shelley, 1981: 35). Also, because of economic underdevelopment, labor force requirements are disproportionately (relative to developed countries) agricultural. Thus, the economic activity of males is commonly centered on the home or farm. Furthermore, the reduced need for human capital outside of agricultural spheres results in comparatively lower levels of female participation in the non-agricultural work force, larger family size, and lower levels of schooling requirements and opportunities for children and adults (Newman, 1976: 81-85). When combined with the infrastructural weaknesses of developing countries, which reduce geographical movement for work or leisure, these conditions encourage a rural-centered and highly personal environment in which large numbers of family members, by virtue of more intensive surveillance, reduce opportunities and incentives for property theft by outsiders (Zehr, 1974; Cohen and Felson, 1979; Shelley, 1981). Murder in Developed and Developing Countries Our review and analysis show that murder rates are positively related to population growth and inequality, but negatively related to societal development. We argue that these variables are in turn associated with opportunity and incentive structures that either encourage or discourage murder. - 226 — Opportunities and incentives for murder 1n developed nations are diminished by demographic and developmental factors that reduce daily contact among family and community members. Low population growth, as reflected in smaller family size, decreases the number of contacts among the individuals who are most apt, through opportunity (i.e., propinquity) and willingness (i.e., higly emotional bonds) to kill one another (Wolfgang, 1966: Ch. 10; Lundsgaarde, 1977: 237; Taylor, 1979: 83-90; Shelley, 1981 : 43-44; Birkbeck, 1982: 183-84, 188-89). Similarly, the structure of work, schooling, and leisure in developed countries daily draws individuals away from home and neighborhood settings and diminishes the points of inter- personal contact that may generate violent interpersonal struggles leading to murder. This dispersion is further increased in developing nations by greater geographic mobility which not only reduces the frequency of contact among family and friends, but also permits rapid physicall relocation, and thus, the possibility of escape from intra and inter-family violence (Black- Michaud, 1975; Black, 1983: 34-38). By contrast, rapid population growth in developing countries substan- tially increases the number of household members, which in conjunction with home-centered daily activities, increases inter-personal contacts and enhances opportunities for violence. Less geographic mobility in developing countries further reduces the ability of persons to escape violent intra- family encounters and the internecine feuds among rival local groups that . often characterize developing societies (Tanner, 1970; Black-Michaud, 1975 b Ne wman, 1976: 103-108). CONCLUSION The recent literature on comparative crime may be divided into two categories: 1 ) quantitative cross-national analyses that are largely atheoretical or that in one way or another depend on classical criminological theories that appear (at least as presently formulated) to be inapplicable to certain forms of crime, and 2) a diverse collection of case studies and review essays that offer rich theroretical leads, but no systematic cross-national data analysis. One of our tasks in this paper was to determine as conclusively as possible whether developmental, distributional, and demographic variables do in fact have different effects on murder and theft — a conclusion tacitly accepted in much of the case-study literature, but to our knowledge, never explicitly tested in the empirical, quantitative literature. Both our review of prior quantitative research on INTERPOL and United Nations data, and our analysis of murder and theft rates in 47 countries from Archer and Gartner’s data, support an ‘‘oppositeeffects”’ conclusion and suggest the need for crime-specific interpretations. _ 227 _ t d We argue that the most promising theoretical explanation for this — and one that is consistent with case studies of crime within nations — is that social-structural variables differentially affect the opportunities and incen- tives for murder and theft. These differential effects are apparent in com- parisons of the characteristics of developed and developing countries. Future research should more precisely specify and test these mechanisms, and should determine whether they hold for other crimes and across countries and time periods not examined here. Such research may ulti- mately provide explanations of crime which differ greatly from the classical theoretical perspectives so often adqpted in comparative research on crime. — 228 — NOTES (1) We exclude Webb (1972) from Table 1 because his study is not cross- national. (2) For a detailed discussion of Durkheim’s contributions to a conflict theory of crime, see Taylor, Walton and Young (1973). (3) In fairness, when confronted with anomalous results (i.e., different effects of a key independent variable on different types of crime), some authors (e.g., Krohn, 1978: 663) ultimately recognize the probable utility of theories aimed at explaining specific crimes. How- ever, most offer no, or only sparse, comment on the issue (e.g., Messner, 1982: 233). (4) Archer and Gartner’s data are not totally distinct from INTERPOL data. The researchers used INTERPOL data for those cases in which no other crime data could be obtained; 13 of the 47 countries in our sample (for a full description, see Archer and Gartner, 1984). More- over, Archer and Gartner’s data include a variety of crime measures besides ‘offences known to police”, the measure used by INTERPOL. To allow comparisons, we substituted INTERPOL crime data for four countries in which data on offences known were unavailable. The fact that official cross-national crime data may misrepresent the true extent, distribution, and nature of crime is well known (e.g., Clinard, 1964; Wolfgang, 1967; Vetere and Newman, 1977; Vigderhous, 1978), as is the fact that the definition and classification of acts as ‘’criminal”’ varies across cultures (e.g., Wolfgang, 1967; Vetere and Newman, 1977). It is mainly because of these difficulties that comparative crime studies have relied on murder and theft rates, crimes that are universally recognized and outlawed. (5) We selected consecutive years from circa 1970 to calculate crime averages (e.g., 1968, 69, 70, 71, 72). We used no data before 1967 and no data after 1974, in order to ensure reasonably high levels of com parability across countries in the time interval chosen. (6) The population size scores reported in our source are for individual (and sometimes different) years in the 1960-1970 period. REFERENCES ARCHER, D. and GARTNER, R. (1977) ‘““Homicide in 110 nations: the development of the comparative crime data file”. International Annals of Criminology 16:109-139 (1984) Violence and Crime in Cross-National Perspective. New Haven: Yale Universi:+ Press. - BAYLE“ OH. (196*, The P " an Frîîxîu' __ * & MDevelopment ir lridia. Prn:+1000 Priventon TUne “ 1v Prese. 229 — BIRKBECK, C. (1982), ‘“Property-crime and the poor: some evidence from Cali, Colombia”. Pp. 162-191 in C. Sumner (ed.) Crime, Justice and Development. London: Heinemann. BLACK-MICHAUD, J. (1975), Cohesive Force. 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ZEHR, H. (1976), Crime and the Development of Modern Society: Patterns of Criminality in 19th Century Germany and France. Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield. — 232 — APPENDIX A Bivariate Associations, Means, Standard deviations and Factor scores for Developmental Measures (N = 47) Bivariate Associations Developmental measures“ (1) (2) (3) (4) (S) (6) (7) X s.D Factor b « . « ». e . . À (1) GNP per capita (1963) 89 79 95 90 73 80 975.52 1145.73 979 (2) Energy consumption per capita (1960) ° ° . . . ° ° ° . . . . . . . 74 84 92 64 66 1295.16 1722.26 896 (3) Percentage of labor force non- agricultural (1960) . . . Û . ° . . 74 70 7 T7 52.51 26.31 846 (4) Telephone/100 (1960) 87 68 79 10.12 14.75 935 (S) Radios/100 (1960) 64 61 125.16 162.12 882 (6) Percentage of literate adults (1960) . . Û ° . . ° . . ° . Q ° « ». 81 60.95 32.61 793 (7) Secondary school enrollment ratio (1960) 26.0 22.22 829 All bivariate associations statistically significant at p <.001 Eigen value = 5.44 Data sources for these measures are: per capita GNP — World Bank (1977); per capita energy consumption — World Bank (1976); per- centage of work force in agriculture — World Bank (1980); telephones/100 — American Telephone and Telegraph Company (1970); radios/1000 — World Bank (1976); percentage of literate adults, and secondary school enrollment ratio-Bornschier and Heintz (1979). APPENDIX B Bivariate Associations, Means and Standard Deviations for Independent and Dependent Variables (N = 47) Bivariate Associations Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (S) (6) (7) s.D (1) Development * . . . ° L ° e À ® * . À ° . . -.54* -.70* 70* 17 -.40* 54* 00 1.00 (2) Inequality ° ° . . . . . ° ° ° * . . . ° ° ° 60* -42* 27* 52* -.35* 46 09 (3) Population Growth -.40* -.23 66* -.60* 2.10 85 (4) Urbanism ° . ° . . . . ° * . * ° . À . . . ° 13 -.19 29* 40.99 23.57 (S) Total Population (log) -.11 10 9.37 1.31 (6) Homicide Rates (log) . . . ° ° ° . . ° . . -.20 1.56 90 * . . ° ° . . . . . . e (7) Theft Rates (log) 4.98 1.38 * p<.05. SUMMARY This paper examines an apparent contradiction in recent comparative research on crime. Most quantitative studies assume that social-structural variables which cause crime operate uniformly across different crime types — for example, income inequality increases both murder and theft rates. However, our review of this research, and our own multivariate analysis of murder and theft rates in 47 countries, suggest that social-structural variables have opposite effects on murder and theft rates. The most import- ant predictor of both murder and theft in our analysis is population growth. Drawing on case studies and comparative essays, we offer a preliminary theoretical explanation for the opposite effects of social-structural variables — especially population growth — on murder and theft. This explanation is based on variations in the opportunities and incentives for murder and theft in developing and developed countries. We suspect that population growth measures the strength of primary group relations; that societies character- ized by frequent and intense interaction between primary group members provide many opportunities for murder, but because of effective surveil- lance, few opportunities for theft. RÉSUMÉ REVUE ET ANALYSE DES EFFETS TRANSNATIONAUX DES VARIABLES DU CRIME QUE SONT LE DÉVELOPPEMENT, LA DISTRIBUTION DES RESSOURCES ET LA DÉMOGRAPHIE Cette étude examine les conclusions apparemment contradictoires d’une récente recherche comparative sur la criminalité. La plupart des études qualitatives suppose que les variables socio-culturelles qui sont à l’origine du crime jouent de manière identique sur les différents types de crimes — par exemple l’inégalité des revenus provoque à la fois l’augmenta- tion des meurtres et des vols — Cependant notre lecture de cette recherche ainsi que notre propre analyse pluridimmensionnelle sur les taux des meur- tres et des vols dans 47 pays aboutissent à la constatation d’effets opposés de ces variables sur le nombre de meurtres et de vols.. Dans notre analyse le meilleur indicateur des variations de ces taux est l’accroissement de la population. À partir d’études de cas et d’analyses comparatives, nous abou- tissont à une première explication théorique des effets differenciels des variables socio-culturelles — en particulier l’accroissement de la popula- tion — sur le meurtre et le vol. Cette explication se fonde sur la variabilité des opportunités et des mobiles du crime et du vol dans les pays développés et en voie de développement. Nous pensons que la croissance de la popula- tion mesure la force des relations du groupe initial ; que les sociétés caracté- risées par de fréquentes et intenses interactions entre les membres du groupe initial connaissent d’avantage d’occasions de meurtres mais, en raison de la surveillance effective, moins d’opportunités de vols. — 235 — ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CRIME: À CASE OF BURGLARY Satyanshu K. Mukherjee* INTRODUCTION Discussions on the relationship between economic development and crime generally tend to centre around the levels of crime vis-a-vis property vs prosperity. À most common method of exploring such a relationship is to examine levels of criminality in countries at different stages of economic development, including the least developed countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America to the most developed nations of North America and Europe. Such comparative assessment undoubtedly serves some purpose and this is of substantial academic interest. However, often the examination of such relationships is based on national and highly aggregated data and therefore offered limited utility. À major limitation of such analysis is that they fail to take into account the process of economic development, which besides providing data on economic development also enables us to observe fluctu- ations in the economy and its relationship with crime within a country and over time. There exists, on the other hand, a substantial body of knowledge on the relationship between economic conditions and crime. Among theories with group orientation, explanations based on economic factors and their influ- ences on criminality are one of the oldest. Such explanations gain support from the idea that the economy plays a fundamental role in shaping the nature and form of human relations. For an excellent survey of literature examining the relationship between criminality and economic conditions up to the Great Depression, see Sellin (1937). Since the late 1930s several new research reports have appeared, some of which have analysed this relation- ship with the help of advanced statistical techniques. À review of the literature in this field reveals that researchers have used a variety of indices of economic conditions and of criminality. Wholesale prices, business indicators, poverty levels, wage payments, retail trade, consumer price index, gross domestic product, automobiles registered, income and unem- ployment have been used as indices of economic conditions. As indices of crimrinality, data on such variables as commitments to prison, convictions in various courts, prosecutions in various courts, charges before magistrates courts, arrests and offences known to the police, have been used. À few of * Senior Criminologist, Australian Institute of Criminology. — 237 — the recent studies need to be described briefly to set the stage for a descrip- tion of the present study. In a widely quoted study, Fleisher (1966) obtained a positive relation- ship between unemployment and delinquency. His findings led him to conclude: That a 1 per cent increase in unemployment rate is associated, on the average, with an approximate .15 per cent increase in the rate of delin- quency (arrest rate) (1966: 84). Such findings, based on time series and cross sectional data, also prompts him to make causal inference in that the ‘examination of delinquency rates by age adds further to the hypothesis that increases in unemployment cause increases in delinquency”. (Fleisher, 1966: 85). Several years later, analysis based on post Second World War time series data Brenner arrives at similar conclusions: Thus a one percent increase in the unemployment rate sustained over a period of six years has been associated {durirg ihe past three decades) with increases of approximately… 648 homicides and 3340 state prison admissions (1976: 5-6). Unemployment is bui one aspect of economic condiiions. Brenner (1976) used three economic indicators — gross domestic product, unem- ployment and consumer price index and found positive association between these sud homicide and imprisonment rates. Fox (1978) found an associ- ation between the consumer price index and property crimes and suggeste d that economic factors of crime may be alleviated by reducing the effects of income inequality. Mukherjee (1981) analyzed charges before magistrates courts in Australia and their relationship with a host of socio-economic variables including population, standardized gross domestic product per capita, unemployment, number of cars registered and police and prison expenditure for almost eight decades. For the entire period, total property and petty offences charged before magistrates courts showed strong positive associa- tion with each of the socioeconomic variables listed above except unem- ployment. When the period of 1900 to 1976 was divided into several seg- ments, these relationships changed significantly,(Mukherjee, 1981:119-135). Scanning of the findings of various researches in this area points to at least two possibilities. Firstly, time series data used to examine the relation- ship between criminality and other variables have to contain a large number of data points. That is to say that if annual data are used as the time series data points, then the researcher would be well advised to present data for a number of years. The length of the data span, to a large extent, would be dictated by the purpose of the study. However, since changes in economic — 238 — conditions and in other aspects in a country may also be instigated by certain ‘unforeseen’ or ‘unusual’ circumstances, it is useful to extend the time span to incorporate as many ‘unusual’ circumstances as possible. And secondly, a longer time span enables the researcher to examine sergments of the data set in the light of the prevailing socio-economic climate. Historical analysis of trends must take into account special characteristics of different periods. Study of a data set spanning over several decades, without consider- ing detailed characteristics of various segments of this time span, tends to mask the importance of ‘unusual’ circumstances. À clear example of this situation was obtained in a study in Australia which analyzed the relation- ship between unemployment rate and property crime, (Mukherjee, 1981). In that study, the overall relationship between unemployment and property crimes charged before magistrates courts for the period 1900-1976 was found to be weak but negative. When discriminant analysis, using a number of variables, divided these 77 years into seven time periods or environmental sets, the relationship between unemployment and property crimes changed to positive in each period but the first. Such differences in findings also highlight a major limitation in the analysis. Especially in the case of the above example, most researchers tend to consider the unemployment and property crime relationship as uni- directional and some have imputed such relationships to be causal. Thornberry and Christenson have very effectively demonstrated the fallacy of this stance and suggest : That such a perspective is too limited to model the causal processes actually at work. A more accurate reflection of these processes is a recipro- cal one in which criminal involvement and a variety of other process variables mutually influence one another over time ( 1984: 408). The present study: In this paper my main aim is to examine economic conditions and the offence of burglary in Australia. The two indices of economic conditions that will be used are gross domestic product and unemployment rate. I have selected the offence of burglary for several reasons: a) it is the sharpest growing serious crime in Australia since the Second World War: b) during the last two decades private dwellings have become increasing targets of burglary. Currently, of all the burglaries reported or becoming known to the police over 58 per cent involve private dwellings. This also means that burglary affects directly a large segment of the Australian population. Also, although predominantly an offence against property, burglary creates a significant amount of fear among the community. c) existing studies tend to show that burglary is a crime of opportunity and the network of such opportunity is facilitated as well as expanded by — 239 — changes in life styles brought about by economic growth and resulting technological developments; and finally. d) it is an offence in which juvenile involvement is shown to be dispro- portionately high. The findings of the present paper are based on charges before magis- trates courts, which are the courts of first instance, for the present century. Before analysing the data on burglary it may be of interest to present briefly the trends in the three major categories of offences charged before magis- trates courts and their relationship with the two economic variables of gross domestic product per capita and unemployment rate. The three categories are: offences against the person, offences against property, and offences against good order. Besides presenting raw rate figures for these offence categories, 1 shall also present relative movements in the trends with the help of polynomial curves. Polynomials smooth the rough edges of the basic curves by removing erratic perturbations, thereby emphasizing the more fundamental movements in the data. The order of polynomials was decided on the basis of F-ratio of regression and explained variance. The rates of offences charged are shown in Figure 1. The results of the poly- nomials for each of the three offence categories are presented in Table 1 and the slopes of the curves produced in Figure 2. Data in Figure 1 is quite clear and appear to offer two distinct trends. One relates to the offences against the person which shows a decline in rates up to the late 1930s and an increase thereafter. The second trend reflects inverse patterns of increases and decreases in rates between property and good order offences. That is to say that when charges rates for property offences declined, charges rates for good order offences increased and vice Versa. During the first few years of this century charges for property crimes declined, at the same time good order offences increased. À reverse pattern is seen during the Depression, and a very sharp pattern is obtained since the post Second World War economic growth began. Changes in the volume of the three offence categories in Figure 1 can now be examined in terms of relative movement — not only increases and decreases in a group of years but also the pace of increase or decrease. Data in Table 1l show that the F-ratios for offences against the person and prop- erty are very high and their explained variance are 0.94 and 0.96 respect- ively. For good order offences, although the F-ratio is relatively low, it is still significant at the 0.001 level. Besides good fit, the polynomial station- ary points present some interesting insights. The stationary points represent the times when the slopes of the curves are zero. — 240 — FIGURE I Offences charged before magistrates’ courts per 100 000 population aged 10 years and over, Australia 1900 to 1976 4 000 ‘ 3 000 2 000 Offences against good order Offences per 100 000 population 1 000 Offences against property — ps 0 1 | Î | J l Î l À Î 1 l 1 1 À | 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 From Figure 2 it is apparent that property and good order offences show an almost perfect inverse phase relationship. The turning points for these two offence categories coincide within five to six years of each other and during the entire century they have moved opposite to each other. The slope of the offences against the person curve shows only one turning point, in 1937, before which these offences always declined and afterwards always increased. The reading of the curves in Figure 2 in conjunction with those in Figure 1 helps in identifying the general tendencies clearly. Thus considering the property offences curve it is noted that the first directional change takes place in 1913, when the rates of property offences began to increase. Furthermore, it can be shown that between 1900 and 1912 the angle of the slope or the rate of decline was maximum in 1906 after which the rate — 241 — TABLE I Measures of the goodness of fit and polynomial stationary points for offences charged in magistrates’ courts, Australia 1900 to 1976 F-ratio of Polynomial regression Order stationary Offence category FG!] of f (t) points: f’(t) df, Year 2 Offences against the person 556.532 0.93766 1937 7 6 Offences against property 325.164 0.96536 1913 1936 1948 1973 Offences against good order 32.076 5 0.69315 1908 1 1932 1955 1975 Note : df, and df, are the degrees of freedom of the regression and residuals respect- ively. All the F-ratios are significant at less than 0.001. FIGURE II Slopes of the polynomial curves (value of f’ (t)) for major offence categories, Australia 1900 to 1976 300 —2 =— — —— offences against the person …. offences against property offences against good order 200 100 — Value of tan (t) ê Ë _ # 1910 Ê — — —> — =. — . . —— —; — — , —L pn p —— d S œr — —-— — —— — — N ‘\ :100L Offences against the person Offences against good order f' (t) =0.2492.t — 9.1582 f (t) = 3.1195E — 4.1* — 5.2215E—2.t° T 288331" _ 57.7381.+ F 285.3512 Offences against property f' (t) = -4.0322E — 6.t° * 6.7678E — 4. — 3.8658E — 2.t" + 8.5875E —1.t — 5.4238.t — 7.2780 — 242 — began to fall. Similarly, between 1948 -and 1972 charges for property offences increased, and the rate of increase was maximum in 1965. The curve for good order offences can also be dissected in a similar way. The polynomials and their stationary points made it possible to offer certain general statements. These indicate that whatever is responsible for such movements does not have similar effects on all the offence categories. Furthermore, the opposite directional changes in property and good order offences show that events during the specific periods have opposite effects on these two offence types. This exercise led to the examination of the present century in relation to structural, technological and socioeconomic changes. With the help of a host of exogenous variables and the technique of discriminant analysis the period between 1900 and 1976 was divided into seven time segments (for detail methodology and resuits see Mukherjee, 1981 : 119-135). These time segments were: 1900 - 1907 1908 - 1912 1913 - 1927 1928 - 1937 1938 - 1949 1950 - 1965 _) O Yu R UN — 1966 - 1976 Since the focus of this paper is on the relationship between economic conditions and crime I shall briefly describe the changes in the two econ- omic variables of gross domestic product per capita and unemployment and the three offence categories during the seven time segments. These changes are shown in Table 2. The difference in the values of gross domestic product per capita (Gdp) from time segment 1 to 2, 2 to 3 and 3 to 4 were not significant, but the increase in Gdp from 4 to 5, S to 6 and 6 to 7 were highly significant. The pattern in unemployment rate is vastly different from the above. There was a significant drop in the unemployment rate from time segment l to 2, a significant increase from 3 to 4, and a significant drop from 4 to 5. Economic logic would find these patterns perfectly in order. What changes took place in the crime rates? Changes in the rates of offences against the person are hard to explain. The significant fall in offence rate from time segment 2 to 3 and 3 to 4 corresponds with virtually no change in Gdp and rise in unemployment rate. In other words, when the economy did not grow at all and when the unemployment rate increased there was a significant fall in chares for offences against the person. Does this, therefore, suggest that when the economy improves and the unemploy- ment rate falls, offences against the person would increase? Well, some such — 243 — TABLE II Characteristics of time segments: average values of selected variables Variable GDP + . . . * ° . . À * ° e À . » ° . . . . ° . 789 981 991 965 1228* 1525* 2200* Unemployed 6.71 3.06* 4.56 12.75* 3.63* 1.97 2.13 Offences against #the person 271.6 213.7 170.7* 127.0* 137.8 191.6* 271.1* Offences against Property . Q ° . . . . . . 490.1 408.7* 434.1 641.8* 550.4* 7704* 1238.4* Offences against Good Order 2626.9 29814* 2234.1* 1555.1* 1888.7 2348.0 1717.1* Burglary ° ° . . . . À L . . . « . ° ° . ». ° . 21.0 19.8 50.0* 112.8* 104.8 126.7 243.1* # 7 r dtes the t values between time segments being significant at 0.001 level. — Figu-e- : zare to rate per 100,000 population aged 10 years and over. - P = A € scenario does emerge when the changes from time segment 5 to 6 and 6 to 7 are examined. There was significant growth in the economy and the levels of unemployment were very low; offences against the person increased significantly. Property offences rates, on the other hand, show patterns in some ways different from and in other ways similar to those shown by offences against the person. From ! to 2 time segment there was a significant decline in property offences. This coincided with a significant fall in the unemploy- ment rate and a substantial rise in the Gdp. From time segment 3 to 4 property crime rates increased significantly, the unemployment rate rose at an unusually high level, and the Gdp showed a decline in real terms. This pattern reverses, as can be seen from changes, from time segment 5 to 6 and 6 to 7. In these two situations, property crime rates showed sharp increases in spite of significant growth in the economy and a substantial lowering of unemployment rates. Good order offences show erratic movements and the most pronounced drop in the rates is observed during significant economic progress in the seventh time segment. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND BURGLARY In examining the relationship between economic conditions and bur- glary 1 shall first present data on burglary charges before magistrates courts and then examine the rates of burglaries reported/becoming known to the police for the recent two decades. Figure 3 presents the standardized rates of burglary charges, the unemployment rate and the gross domestic product per capita. The standardized rates are calculated so that maximum value of each of the three variables during the entire century is 100 and the mini- mum value in the scale of O to 100 adjusted accordingly. Except for about a period of two decades between the mid 1920s and early 1940s burglary rates and gross domestic product have moved hand in hand and the synchron- ization between the fluctuations of these two variables have been near perfect since the mid 1950s. It is needless to point out that the period 1920s to early 1940s included two of the most turbulent episodes of the present century — the great Depression and the Second World War. In Australia the post-war economic development began in the mid 1950s. The relationship between unemployment rate and burglary, as ex- pected, is quite the opposite. During the mid 1920s to the mid 1930s the unemployment rate was the highest recorded this century, gross domestic product was the lowest, and the highest burglary rate in the first six dec- ades. If it can be argued that the high burglary rate during the above period was due to a serious downturn in the economy and committing burglaries was a means to survive for at least some, then one must find some con- vincing explanation for the sharp rise in burglaries during the economic — 245 — FIGURE III Standardised rates of burglary, gross domestic product and unemployment 1900-1976 100 — Standardised rate & ° . P 1/ E v ! ) ” \\, :': — ::|: \\\\l.“‘\ \ \\ \l :'l ':: H . J\'\ e d "°«l A h - .'i ——œ—_ ——nF - e :I - II\ « e-- . L T d Ï 1950 1960 1970 1980 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 Year Key Burglary Gross domestic product Unemployment boom. since the mid 1950s. Increases in burglaries during economic de- pression and economic boom can be explained in terms of necessity vs opportunity. The necessity principle can be supported with the help of court disposition data. During the Depression of the 1930s the conviction rate for burglary charges dropped very significantly. It could be possible that the charges during this period increased because of the prevailing econ- omic distress, some acts which otherwise would have been ignored were brought to the courts’ attention. The infrequent use of ‘conviction dispo- sition* by the magistrates demonstrated attitudes and concerns which reflected the realities of the times. This explanation appears plausible when — 246 — the data on discharges are examined. During the Depression years not only did the conviction rates for burglary drop but also the discharge rates were higher than at any other period in this century. At the peak of the De- pression, 1933, only about one in ten burglaries charged resulted in a con- viction whereas seven out of ten resulted in discharges. Reading through some of the case files of the 1930s reveals that the magistrates paid greater attention to economic conditions during the Depression than in other times. Therefore, the inference that the necessity principle operated during econ- omic distress is a reasonable one. On the opportunity principle there exist numerous studies which tend to show that the number of burglaries increase in direct proportion to growth in the opportunity structure (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960; Scarr, 1973; Sparks, et al, 1977; Maguire, 1982; Clarke, 1984). Economic development since the mid 1950s has made profound changes in life styles. This can be looked at from at least three perspectives which point to the creation and enlargement of the opportunity structure for crime, especially burglary. a) There has been a phenomenal growth in the number and variety of consumer goods. The attractiveness of these products is that they are becoming gradually lighter and their life is relatively short. That is to say that goods like stereo-systems, colour TV, video cassette recorders, home computers etc. are gradually becoming more compact and that these are not so durable because swift changes in models in relation to appearance as well as performance make the earlier models somewhat obsolete and out of fashion. Of course, there are numerous other products, including small transistor radios, bicycles to expensive jewellery and watches which also are stolen in large numbers. b) With economic development and population growth there has been a substantial increase in the number and variety of establishments such as shops, service stations, office buildings, warehouses, schools, factories, show rooms etc. Unlike structures of earlier days most present structures, includ- ing private dwellings, use glass, plasterboard and single brick walls, and although a large majority of commercial business and office premises are insured as well as under surveillance during nights and week-ends, the would-be burglar somehow manages to enter such premises; indeed some burglars seem to operate in a very professional way. c) The post Second World War economic boom has also drawn a large number of women out of home to work places. Both husband and wife in employment means that an increasing number of houses being left empty during the day are tempting targets for would-be burglars. The dual income family has given rise to the new problem of a large number of school chil- dren being left unsupervised for a few hours every day between the time they finish school and parents finish work. Also, double income has provided families with the opportunity to enjoy longer vacations and leisure time. — 247 — I shall return to this discussion momentarity with statistics on the reported incidents of burglary. For now, I shall present a brief look at the trend of burglary charges. An attempt was made to subject the burglary data to a polynomial fit, similar to the one shwon in Figure 2. Such an exercise revealed the curve of best fit was the fifth-order polynomial with only one stationary point. The overall trend in burglaries during this century was that of increase. The long term burglary data were subjected to two other tests to ascertain whether (a) there existed any lagged correlations between burglary and gross domestic product and burglary and unemployment rate, and (b) whether the burglary data showed any periodic or cyclical movement. In order to test the hypotheses that burglary and gross domestic product are causally connected, these two variables were entered into an analysis which systematically calculates lagged correlations for lags up to 20 years either way. This analysis revealed that the correlation between the variables was maximized when the lag was zero, and hence does not support the notion of lagged causal relationship. À similar result was obtained for the test between burglary and unemployment. As regards the second test, visual inspection of the burglary data, see Figure 3, does not indicate the existence of any cyclical movement. Never- theless, with the help of spectral analysis, the possibility of periodicity in the burglary data was examined and the results are presented in Figure 4 and 5. In this case, as shown in Figure 4, lags of up to 25 years showed a monotonic decline in the autocorrelation coefficients. Figure 5 shows a single significant partial autocorrelation, with a lag of one year. These indicate that burglary trends are not influenced significantly by previous years other than the immediately preceding years, and therefore burglary occurrences can only be predicted from year to year. There is, therefore, no reason to believe that burglary data of this century presented any regu- larities in fluctuations. CONCLUSION Historical data presented above show that burglary and the economy in Australia have tended to move hand in hand and that the occurrences of burglary increase at times of economic depression as well as boom. Fortu- nately, the spectre of a 1930s-style unemployment level does not seem likely at the present moment. Since the mid 1970s, however, the unemploy- ment rate in Australia has increased sharply, reaching for the first time since the Depression a double-digit figure in 1982. The reported rate of burglaries has also shown the sharpest increase since the mid 1970s. However, the most noticeable and interesting change in the pattern of burglary in recent — 248 — FIGURE IV Autocorrelation function: burglary 1.00, 80 4 Î Q Ÿ 60 47 LF e 40- Û 20- 00 ÏÎÎÎÎÎÏ… 20- LAG 404 60- 80- -1.00- FIGURE V Partial autocorrelation function: burglary 1.00 — 80 60 40 — 20 _ R 2 00 $ & v + LAÊ 20 - 40 - 60 - 80 - -1.00 - — 249 — years has been in the change in the scene. Undoubtedly, the economy seems to have played a significant role. Consider the data in Figure 6. Since 1964-65 there has been a consist- ent drift away from the shops to private dwellings. Thus, in 1964-65 a little over two out of five burglaries reported to the police took place in private dwellings. In 1982-83 this ratio increased to almost three out of five. Burglaries of shops, which constituted over one-third of all burglaries in 1964-65 declined to a mere 14 per cent in 1982-83. Looked at in another way, the chances of a burglary of a dwelling was one in 206 in 1964-65; in 1982-83 this ratio was one in 40. The role of the economy can hardly be ignored in this shift of venue. Production of consumer goods, changes in consumption habits, a general increase in purchasing power also through such financial schemes as lay-bys, hire-purchase, instalment payment and personal loans are some of the blessings of economic development. The financial schemes help the population acquire goods and a large majority of househol FIGURE VI Break, enter and steal (burglary) reported to police by type of premises (proportion) Australia, 1964-65 to 1982-83 ............ ............................... -_-—- ........... 1964-65 » ... ............. oooooooooooo ............ ... .. _ 41% " ........... ........... . s00060606 ........... ooooooooo …. L 24% e. .A ........... 35°/g - A -L Le = 1969-70 ... ............ …… .................................................. ..... OOOOOOO …. ................. ............................. ................ avavava ue ° e …. ....... 0152915 48% ................. 28% ...... 82.0000 ] 24% 1974-75 OOOOOO ........ ......... ...... ............. e » .................. oooooooooooo ..... ...... - —. . ... ....... ..... .................. a.….-.ca.…..a.uaaussea oooooo 19% 30% ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo 1979-80 ........... ........... .. e0.00000 L ° ° ................... ........... ................... e ................. ....... 31% :+e.00.00066% 00006 52% 17% ä ........................................ ..... ................................ ...... ................ ----------- e ooooooooooo ....... 1982-83 ............ ............ ... ........... L 58% ......... ........O...O........ . 0000006 p OO DOc DOOOOO0X .. .. ..00<. .. 14% 28% Key m Dwellings Shops D Other Source: Australian Bureau of Statisiics, Year Book of Australia. Annual Reports of the Police Departments of New South Wales, Victnria Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia, Tasmania and Nor” ‘ +rn Territory and of the Austratian Federal Police. —,250 — of households in Australia own the products. Changes in life style — work habits and leisure which result in most dwellings being empty during the day time — combined with sophisticated electronic and other surveillance systems installed to protect shops — thereby making shops a riskier target, have resulted in a higher incidence of burglary of dwellings. Although the economic growth has made a significant impact on Australian society, it is important to point out that since the oil crisis of late 1973, growth in the economy in most industrialized nations has slowed down significantly and as a result there has been a sharp increase in the unemployment rate. Currently in Australia, it is a belief in most circles that sharp increases in burglaries in recent years have occurred as a result of two factors — a high unemployment rate in general and higher still among those 16 to 19 years old and that Australia currently faces a serious drug problem and increases in burglaries are by addicts to maintain their drug habits. Examination of these relationships in itself constitutes a larger research project. The emphasis in this paper has been on presenting trends in econ- omic conditions and burglary, based on aggregate data. Therefore, it was not possible to examine as to who commits burglaries. And even if it can be shown that a substantial proportion of burglars are unemployed this still leaves two questions wide open — (a) why only some of the unemployed commit burglaries, and not others, and (b) is unemployment a cause of burglary? At this stage it is not possible to answer these questions, but in light of the current situation it is useful to differentiate between the high burglary rates during the Depression and in recent years. During the economic crisis of the 1930s survival for some was a para- mount issue. At that time Australia did not have an unemployment benefit scheme; of course to help the population food coupons and other types of ad hoc assistance were made available by the government. Since the 1940s, the government has spent millions of dollars on unemployment benefit. Unlike schemes in the United States and Canada, an Australian receives government assistance as long as he/she remains unemployed. Although one cannot maintain a respectable life style, the current unemployment benefits make survival easier than during the Depression. The opportunity structure created by the changes in the economy and life style makes it possible to live a faster life through illegitimate means. The historical data analysed above tend to show that predominating characteristics of a time period need not have similar effects on all types of crimes. Data on the three major offence categories — against the person, property, and good order - demonstrate entirely different movemerits. Ît may, however, be possiblc tiya. specifir offence, say assaul?*. may show move;ents similar to fhos uhserves Lor nffences against fhe person. - 251 The trends of burglary charges, in general, appear similar to those of offences against property (see Figures 3 and 1). However, this apparent similarity may be because of intrinsically different reasons. Two major research projects, soon to be completed (Mukherjee, et al forthcoming 1985 and Mukherjee, forthcoming 1985) lend support in this direction. Firstly, property offences in general showed a declining trend in the early years of this century. Data for the last century indicate that this declining trend began in the late 188Os. Burglary offences, on the other hand, did not show such a trend. And secondly, unlike some property nfence, viz, larceny, shoplifting, motor vehicle theft, etc, the offence of bu , ‘;ry shows a distinct and continuous shift in targets, both in terms of types 0. premises broken into and type of goods stolen. It appears that the offenc ©° bur- blary is very much influenced by the changes in life style. REFERENCES BRENNER, M. Harvey (1976), Estimating the Social Costs of National Economic Policy: Implications for Mental and Physical Health, and Criminal Aggression, study prepared for the use of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Paper N° 5, U.S. Govern- ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. CLARKE, Ronald V. (1984), “Opportunity-based Criminal Rates”, British Journal of Criminology, 24: 74-83. CLOWARD, Richard A. and LLOYD E. Ohlin, (1960), Delinquency and Opportunity. New York: The Free Press. FLEISHER, Belton M. (1966), The Economics of Delinquency Chicago: Quadrangle Books. FOX, James A. (1978), Forecasting Crime Data: An Econometric Analysis. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books. MAGUIRE, Mike, (1982), Burglary in a Dwelling. London: Heinemann. MUKHERJEE, Satyanshu K. (1981), Crime Trends in Twentieth Century Australia. Sydney: George Allen & Unwin. MUKHERJEE, Satyanshu K., forthcoming (1985), Burglary in a City. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. MUKHERIEE, Satyanshu K., John R. Walker and Evelyn N. Jacobsen, Crime in the Colonies (Historical Statistics Monograph) Sydney: Australia 1788 — 1988: A Bicentennial History, University of New South Wales, forthcoming 1985). SCARR, Harvey A. (1973), Patterns of Burglary. Washington, D.C.: USS. Government Printing Office. SELLIN, Thorsten, (1937), Research Memorandum on Crime in the De pression. New York: Social Science Research Council. SPARKS, Richard F., Hazel G. Genn and David J. Dodd, (1977), Surveying Victims: À Study of the Measurement of Criminal Victimization. New York: John Wiley & Sons. — 252 — THORNBERRY, Terence P. and R.L. Christenson, (1984), ‘“Unemployment and Criminal Involvement: An Investigation of Reciprocal Causal Structures”, American Sociological Review, 49:398-411. ABSTRACT Using longitudinal data, the paper examines the relationships between economic conditions and crime in Australia. The gross domestic product per capita and the unemployment rate have been used as the two indicators of the economy, and offences charged before magistrate’s courts and burglaries reported to police, were used as indicators of crimes. The analysis, both of major categories of offences and burglary, show that different periods in the present century have had a varied impact on types of crimes. À major finding suggests that property crimes increase sharply in situations when the economy received a major set back like the great Depression, as well as when it is growing at a very fast rate. Also the study reveals that the increase in burglaries is closely linked with the growth in the economy and the production of, and accessibility to ever increasing consumer goods, have led to a shift in the targets of burglary, both in terms of the types of premises broken into and kinds of goods stolen. And finally, the burglary data for the present century do not show the existence of any cycles or regularities, nor does the present data show any lags. RÉSUMÉ DÉVELOPPEMENT ÉCONOMIQUE ET CRIMINALITEÉ : UN CAS DE CAMBRIOLAGE À partir de données longitudinales cet article examine les relations de cause à effet entre condition économique et criminalité en Australie. Le pouvoir d’achat brut par habitant et le taux de chômage ont été utilisés comme indicateurs du niveau économique, le nombre de délits faisant l’objet d’une audience devant le tribunal ainsi que les cambriolages déclarés à la police ont quant à eux servis d’indicateurs de la criminalité. L’analyse, pour les catégories principales de délits et de cambriolages, montre que les différentes époques de notre siècle ont eu un impact variable selon les types de crime. L’un des principaux résultats de l’étude montre que les crimes contre la propriété augmentent brusquement aussi bien dans les périodes où le niveau économique est sévèrement touché, comme par exemple pendant la grande Dépression, que lorsque celui-ci connait un accroissement rapide. L’étude révèle également que l’augmentation des cambriolages est étroite- ment liée à la croissance de l’économie et production et accessibilité de biens de consommation sans cesse plus nombreux, ont conduit à un — 253 — changement dans les mobiles des cambriolages à la fois quant aux types de lieux fracturés et quant aux types de biens dérobés. En conclusion, les statistiques sur les cambriolages pour le 20ème siècle ne révèlent aucun cycle ou période répétitive ni même aucun décalage. — 254 — VIOLENCE AND THE ECONOMY: A Modest Hypothesis On Inequality, Unemployment, and Crime (1) Dane Archer* and Rosemary Gartner** INTRODUCTION Researchers have long been curious about the impact of economic fluctuations on crime rates. This question reflects a longstanding suspicion that private ‘“deviant”’ behavior has public roots in the economic condition of the wider society. In its most broad form, the ‘“economic hypothesis” suggests that the violent or criminal acts of individuals are influenced — at least in part — by their economic condition and recent history and, more generally, by economic forces at work in the society in which they live. The concrete implications of this general economic hypothesis are that researchers should include among other potential ‘’causes’’ of crime those economic conditions and changes most likely to alter the probability that an individual will commit crime or violence. Although a large number of economic variables deserve examination, those of perhaps most conspicuous interest involve measures of change in individual well-bieng. Unemployment is one such measure, although its impact falls heavily on a few rather than on citizens generally. Economic events such as inflation, changes in per capita income, and changing interest rates are more general in their impact, although perhaps not as devastating for individuals as is unemployment. The basic premise behind research in this area is that some economic changes greatly exacerbate the conditions of daily life. Increases in prices This paper is part of a cross-national study of homicide and other of- fences. The crime statistics used in this paper are from a just-published | 10-nation archive of comparative crime data (D. Archer and R. Gartner, Violence and Crime in Cross-National Perspective, Yale University Press, 1984). This research was supported in part by a Guggenheim Fellowship and a German Marshall Fund Fellowship to the first author. The authors wish to thank Tom Phelan and Marc Lieberman for assistance and advice. Professor of Sociology Stevenson College, University of California, Santa-Cruz, CA 95064. ** Research, University of Wisconsin. — 255 — and a decline or disappearance of income involve obvious material con- sequences. Presumably, economic changes also can alter significant aspects of psychological and emotional life for affected individuals and their families. It is theoretically conceivable, at least, that these material and non- material changes accumulate to increase the probabilities of crime and violence. Although the general economic hypothesis seems to invite an empirical test, the question can be approached in different ways and with various premises. For example, one researcher might assume that chronic economic hardship such as long-term unemployment is most conducive to crime. Another might argue that acute economic deterioration such as recent unemployment is much more devastating. À third might assume that general deprivation such as an economic depression is less criminogenic than the relative deprivation caused by isolated cases of hardship in otherwise pros- perous times. Finally, the null hypothesis is of course that violence and the economy are unrelated — that the engines driving the former are uncorrelated with economic variables. Apart from these differences in theoretical premises, empirical assess- ment of the economic hypothesis encounters additional obstacles. Measures of economic well-being remain disputed, and conventional economic indi- cators tend to omit preciseiy those data one would most like to have. For example, official unemployment figures may not include the chronic unem- ployed or those who despair of finding work. In addition, economic series data often are characterized by periodic cycles, seasonal fluctuations, multi- colinearity, and even indicator changes - making econometric analyses of the effects of changes in a given indicator far from unambiguous. In addition to these potentially thorny measurement problems. using aggregate data to search for a link between violence and the economy runs a strong risk of the classic ‘’ecological fallacy”’. Even if a researcher does obtain a strong correlation between aggregate data on unemployment and aggregate data on offence rates, it cannot be assumed that the individuals involved in offences are themselves unemployed. Without data on individ- uals, aggregate data alone can do no more than describe what happens at the societal level -- e.g., what happens to a society's crime rate during periods of high unemployment. While such aggregate relations may make for useful predictions and lead to further research, they cannot by themselves tell us anything about the employment histories of individuals committing crime and violence. For all these reasons, and although economic hypotheses about crime are of considerable interest, these hypotheses do not admit to simple or definitive resolution. The history of research in this area dates from pion- eering work by Bonger (1916) which examined crime records during the 256 1800s and concluded that crimes of theft burgeoned during depressions. Other early and influential work on economic effects was by Ogburn and Thomas (1922), Thomas (1927), Sellin (1937), and Henry and Short (1954). This literature is diverse, and research on different facets of the general economic hypothesis is summarized by Braithwaite (1979). Even though many researchers have shared an interest in the general economic hypothesis, individual studies frequently have examined very dissimilar questions. Some of this work has centered on industrialization and other aspects of national economic development. For example, Zehr (1976) examined the apparent effects of industrialization on offence rates in France and Germany between 1830 and 1920. Combined with other research on economic devel- opment (Wolf, 1971; Wellford, 1974; Shelley, 1981), this body of work suggests that violent crime is relatively unaffected by these broad historical changes. Other researchers have used increasingly sophisticated techniques to examine the effects of fluctuations in indicators of national economic health. One of the best known of such efforts is the five-nation analysis by Brenner (1976a and 1976b). This work examined the period 1900-1970 and is unique in its effort to control for possible artifacts like changes in the age structure of the population (1). This work produced the interesting con- clusion that relationships between offences and economic conditions have changed qualitatively over time. In the case of violent crimes, Brenner found that the effects of economic fluctuations became more pronounced over time and that in recent decades these offences have increased during periods of high unemployment. À more fine-grained question has focused not on national economic well-being as a whole but instead on the effects of inequality. Much of this research has examined national measures of inequality — for example, the Gini Index or other measures of the degree to which income, wealth, or land are unequally distributed throughout a population. When these indicators are compared with national offence rates, an inverse relationship is generally found. Nations with the least inequality also tend to have the lowest rates of violent crime (Krohn, 1976; Braithwaite, 1979). Some of this research has shared the general weaknesses of cross-sectional research in that the extrac- tion of causal inferences about the observed relationship is problematic. Some longitudinal work on this question has been done, however, and this work supports the general conclusion that violent crime appears to be related to measures of economic inequality. One statement from this body of work summarizes the ‘‘inequality hypothesis”: … the most common progression of events that generates social violence is an unequal distribution of resources that creates asymmetric social relations that, in turn, create latent conflict that, if conditions are ripe, will be come violent conflict (Ball-Rokeach, 1980, p. 53). — 257 — [t is not surprising that much research on the effects of economic con- ditions and changes has been limited in scope. Western societies, and par- ticularly the United States and England, have dominated empirical studies in this area. In the absence of longitudinal data for a large sample of societies, it has not been possible to investigate the possible effects of different types of economic systems. It seems to us that there are theoretical reasons to suspect that the effects of economic variables are mediated by the economic structure of individual societies. It seems reasonable to hypothesize, for example, that the effects of increased unemployment will be mitigated in some economic systems more than in others. In societies with high chronic unemployment, losing a job may be experienced as a more serious and therefore desperate state of affairs. Such societies tend to have inequality and conspicuous poverty, and the newly unemployed individual may foresee and dread the prospect of imminent downward mobility. Conversely, unemployment may be less devastating in societies with high levels of social services and benefits for the unemployed. This conception implies a contextual hypothesis: that the type of a nation’s economic system determines whether or not changing economic conditions will affect rates of violent crime. METHODS As a preliminary and admittedly modest test of this contextual hypoth- esis, we have used a number of procedures to try to gauge the effect of unemployment on national homicide rates. Data on homicide rates were obtained from the Comparative Crime Data File (CCDF). These data have just been published (Archer and Gartner, 1984) and provide offence rate data for homicide and four other offences in 110 nations and 44 major international cities for roughly the period 1900-1973. Previous applications of these cross-national data have included studies of the effects of wars (Archer and Gartner, 1976), urban violence (Archer, Gartner, Akert, and Lockwood, 1977), and deterrence theory as it relates to capital punishment (Archer, Gartner, and Beittel, 1983). Data on unemployment rates were obtained using national yearbooks, statistical annuals, labor and manpower statistics, and the United Nations Statistical Yearbook. Fhe overlap between these two sources of data produced 16 cases for analysis, including two separate cases (because two independent homicide indicators were available) for the United States. The relationship between unemployment rates and homicide rates can be approached in several different ways. The procedures used in this analysis involved the use of lagged correlations to search for any evidence that these two variables are related. This procedure includes ‘forward” lags in which the homicide rate in year n iSs compared with unemployment rates in years Wç8 (n - 1) or (n - 2). For example, the (n - 1) lagged correlation would compare the homicide rates in 1960 and 1961 with, respectively, the unemployment rates in 1959 and 1960. This is a forward lag in that the hypothesized causal sequence calls for unemployment changes to occur first and then lead to homicide rate changes. This hypothesis seems plausible, and a number of researchers have speculated that the effects of economic changes would in fact occur after a year’s delay or more (Radzinowiez, 1971, p. 433). As a control procedure, we included a “backward” lag in the analysis. This correlation ran contrary to our hypothesis, and compared homicide rates with subsequent unemployment rates. It seems unlikely that homicide is sufficiently widespread to make a serious dent in the number of the unemployed, and this ‘‘backward’”’ lag therefore serves as a control pro- cedure. If the causal sequence is as hypothesized — that is, that changes in unemployment affect homicide rates — then the magnitude of the forward lagged correlations will be greater than the backward or control correlations. Because most existing studies have used unlagged correlations — that is, simultaneous comparisons of the two indicators — these were included as well. In summary, the homicide rate in year n was correlated with the unemployment rate in year: n (an unlagged correlation), n - 1 (a one-year forward lag), n - 2 (a two-year forward lag) and n + 1 (a control, backward lag) ( 2). The results of these comparisons are shown in Table 1. The nations with positive correlations in this table have a positive relationship between the two variables — that is, homicide rates are high in times of high unem- ployment. Conversely, nations with negative correlations in Table 1 have relatively low homicide rates in times of high unemployment. These data show that both outcomes occur, and the two groups of nations are listed separately in Table |. From a theoretical perspective, it is highly interesting that both empirical outcomes are found in the cases in Table 1. These data indicate that relationships among variables may not be invariant across different societies and, in fact, even can reverse. This suggests that nation states provide a powerful context that governs the nature of the economy<rime relationship, even when the variables involved are nominally the same in the societies examined. Based on the range of outcomes in Table 1, it seems increasingly imperative for researchers to assess their hypotheses and models using comparative evidence from a range of societies rather than one alone. This perspective is, indeed, the premise for the growing interest in cross- national research on crime and violence: Without a reasonably large sample of nations, it is impossible to dis- cover whether certain variables may mediate the effects of a social change. For example, worsening unemployment might increase homicide rates in one type of economic system but not in another. ÀÂs a result, individual case - 259 — TABLE 1 Unemployment and Homicide Rates: Zero-order Lagged Correlations Positive Correiations Homicide in year n |Homicide in year - Homicide in year n Country with unemploy- vith unemploy- Same year with unemploy- Median ment in year n - 2 | ment in year n - : ! (unlagged) ment inyear n +1l -2 - +1l ° ° ° . ° . À ° . ». 73 79 86 91 83 Switzerland (19)1 e ® à e » ° . .… . . . . . . 55 66 % 73 81 70 U.S.é (40 57 44 32 51 Italy (29) 62 48 47 51 48 U.S (43) 47 44 47 Austria (20) . . * . »À « . . e »* ° L . 59 48 46 38 Japan (31) 39 37 43 26 Germany (20) . ° ° ° ° ° ° . .… À . ° 49 40 32 23 36 Netherlands (26) . » . ° . ° . . À . . -.23 -.01 22 27 ! Ireland (34) -.11 02 17 19 10 49 48 4< 32 Median ° ° » . . » . . ° ° ° . ° ° . ° Negative Correlations Canada (36) . . ° * . ° . . * . ° . . -.07 -.05 04 -.01 ° e » ° . . . ° e À ° ° . 12 19 : > -.37 -.05 Norway (30) . . » L e À ° . . . . . À -.33 -.25 20 -.14 Belgium (25) -.53 -.33 1s 08 24 Australia (18) . . . ° . . . . ° . . À -.24 -.26 -.25 -.26 England (41) . . ® . . . . .… À . . . À -.27 -45 -.52 Denmark (35S) -.58 -.53 -.49 -.53 -.58 Sweden (43) . »À . ® ° * . »* . . ° . » -.62 -.39 -.56 Median ° . - . À . . À . e Àe . * . . . -.33 25 -.26 -.25 1 Number of years upon which correlation is based 2 Homicide 3 Murder studies may appear (perhaps incorrectly) to contradict one another. Without a large sample of societies, a general pattern that explains or orders these different outcomes will never be seen. (Archer and Gartner, 1984, p. 6). In addition to the general finding of two different types of outcomes in Tables 1, these data suggest that the unemployment homicide relationship is stronger in absolute terms for the first group of nations. In this group of nations, unemployment is positively associated with homicide rates and the absolute size of the relationships is larger. The effects of unemployment in the second group of nations are negative and of smaller magnitude. This indicates that the relationship between unemployment and homicide is not uniform, and suggests that these nations are differentiated by one or more contextual variables that mediate the effects of unemployment. This finding implies the existence of differences between these two groups of nations, although the nature of these differences remains specu- lative. For a variety of reasons, unemployment may be less devasting for citizens in the second group of nations in Table 1. On a purely impression- istic basis, it does seem to be the case that nations in the second group more ‘“redistributive”’ economic systems and more extensive policies designed to mitigate the effects of poverty and unemployment. In these societies, there- fore, unemployment may prove to be less destructive in all respects, includ- ing those factors that might otherwise increase the probability of violent crime. Nations in the first group, on the other hand, may have more vivid inequalities, more extensive poverty, chronic unemployment, inadequate benefits for the jobless, or other policies and conditions that exarcerbate the effects of unemployment. If this is the case, unemployment may be more devastating, materially and perhaps psychologically, in the first group of nations in Table 1. In these societies, one suspects that loss of a job caries with it, in addition to obvious short — term hardship, the spectre of perma- nent loss of income in the context of minimal social services. The lagged correlations in Table 1 provide a crude test of the degree to which unemployment rates ‘‘lead”’ homicide rates, rather than the other way around. In general, this analysis suggests that the unemployment- homicide relationship is in the hypothesized direction. In the first group of nations in Table 1, the forward correlations (in which homicide rates lag behind unemployment rates) increase the size of the correlation. The control or backward correlation (in which unemployment is lagged behind homicide) decrease the size of the correlation. À similar though much less strong pattern obtains for the second group of nations in the table. The results of this analysis provide indirect support for the idea that the relation- ship between unemployment and homicide includes causal elements rather than correlation alone (3). — 261 — SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION Although far from a definitive analysis of economic effects on crime, this result illustrates an advantage of inulti-case comparative research. While the reason for the differences in Table ! remains speculative, the existence of these differences suggests that national characteristics can determine whether or not an offence rate (Y) and its suspected cause (X) are related. In many comparative research designs, therefore, a researcher may wish to search both for general XY relationships and also for contextual differences. In some societies, XY may be found to be both positive and strong; in others, this relationship may be negative or absent. This theoretical approach is, of course, less simplistic than the search for universal patterns and invariant correlations. At the same time, this loss in simplicity is hopefully offset by increased theoretical fidelity to the com- plexities of a diverse world. As just a single example, it seems to us that the very concept of ‘‘unemployment’’ may be culturally variable, and may not have similar consequences (or even ‘‘mean” the same thing) in different societies. For example, loss of a job seems certain to be devastating in any society filled with stark inequality, grinding poverty, and chronic unemploy- ment. Similarly, loss of a job may have particularly powerful psychological costs in any society that places strong emphases on upward mobility and material consumption. Finally, loss of a job may carry with it powerful social stigma in any society emphasizing achievement and personal responsi- bility for one’s economic circumstances. In any society in which one or more of these contextual conditions obtain, one might expect a priori the effects of unemployment to be unusually pathological. It is not difficult, conversely, to imagine societies or social policies that could rob job loss of a least some of its potential devastation. Societies or policies that reduce inequality also reduce the economic distance the unem- ployed individual fears to fall. Societies or policies that reduce chronic or even multi-generational joblessness also reduce the unemployed person’s concern that work and income will never be possible again. Societies or policies that recognize collective responsibility for vanishing occupations, economic transformations, and widespread joblessness also reduce the personal stigma and subjective failure borne by the unemployed person. In the present study, national differences appear to mediate the relation ship between violence and the economy. In one group of nations, increased unemployment is associated with increases in the violent crime of homicide. In a second group of nations, however, the link between violence and the economy is much more tenuous, and increased unemployment is not paralleled by increases in violence. An impressionistic reading of this dif- ference suggests that the key contextual variable reflects aspects of national economic organization and, specifically, the degree to which a society’s — 262 - economic policies redistribute income, reduce inequality, and otherwise mitigate the loss of jobs and income. The present study suggests the in- triguing possibility that some societies escape the potentially violent effects of unemployment by ameliorating the social and psychological costs of lost jobs and income. Much of this, of course, remains surmise at present. The current study suggests merely that the effects of economic fluctuations on violent crime are not invariant and, further, that cross-national evidence can help unravel this apparent contradiction. In the present analysis, it appears to be the case that societies with policies that mitigate the effects of job loss, inequality, and poverty are less likely to experience increases in violence after increases in unemployment. Further research is needed to examine the criminal experiences of recently unemployed individuals, and the nature and effects of ameliorative social policies. — 263 — NOTES (1) A number of these studies apply regression, econometric methods and statistical techniques like spectral analysis to longitudinal crime data. It should be noted that these methods require certain assumptions and, as a result, the most appropriate statistical procedures remain a matter of some disagreement (for example, Vigderhous, 1978). It is clear that more complicated procedures can and should be used to explore this relationship. For example, the correlations reported here are all zero-order — that is, uncontrolled for third variables like age structure. This analysis is also simplified in that the data are used undetrended. An alternate approach, one we have not attempted, involves detrending the two time series and then correlating the residuals. Each of these approaches has merit and deserves further attention. (3) It should be emphasized that some other methodological problems are not eliminated by this comparison. This analysis does not elimin- ate the effects of secular trends, periodicity, and other complicating features of time series data. The use of lagged correlations does, how- ever, provide some support for the hypothesized relationship between unemployment and homicide. In addition, as already indicated, relationships between aggregate indicators cannot eliminate the possi- bility of an ecological fallacy. Even if unemployment rates precede and are strongly related to homicide rates, it is conceivable that no unemployed individuals commit a violent crime. This ecological problem is insoluble with aggregate data but could be addressed with individual-level data such as job history interviews with arrested suspects. REFERENCES ARCHER, D. and GARTNER,R. — Violent acts and violent times: À comparative approach to postwar homicide rates. American Sociological Review, 1976, 41, 937-962. — Violence and Crime in Cross-National Perspective. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984. ARCHER, D., GARTNER, R., AKERT, R., and LOCKWOOD, T. Cities and homicide: A new look at an old paradox. In R.F. Tomasson (Ed.) Comparative Studies in Sociology (now called Comparative Social Research), 1977,1, 73-95. ARCHER, D., GARTNER, and BEITTEL, M. Homcide and the death penalty: À cross-national test of a deterrence hypothesis. The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 1983, 74, 991-1013. - 264 — BALL-ROKEACH, S. Normative and deviant violence from a conflict per- spective. Social Problems, 1980, 28, 45-62. BONGER, W.A. Criminality and Economic Conditions. Translated by HP. Horton. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1916; Republished by Indiana University Press, 1969. BRAITHWAITE, J. Inequality, Crime and Public Policy. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979. BRENNER, H. — Time-series analysis: Effects of the economy on criminal behavior and the administration of criminal justice. Pp. 2568 in Economic Crises and Crime. Rome: Uniÿed Nations Social Defense Research Institute, 1976 (a). — Effects of the Economy on Criminal Behavior and the Adminis- tration of Criminal Justice in the United States, Canada, England, Wales and Scotland. Rome: United Nations Social Defense Research Institute, 1976 (b). HENRY, A.F. and SHORT, J.F. Suicide and Homicide: Some Economic, Sociological, and Psychological Aspects of Aggression. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1954. KROHN, M. Inequality,unemployment and crime: À cross-national analysis. The Sociological Quarterly, 1976, 17, 303-313. OGBURN, W.F. and Thomas, D.S. The influence of the business cycle on certain social conditions. Quarterly Publication of the American Stat- istical Association, 1922, 18, 324-340. RADZINOWICZ, L. Economic pressures. In L. Radzinowicz and M.E. Wolfgang (Eds.), Crime and Justice, Volume I: The Criminal in Society. New York: Basic Books, 1971, 420-442. SELLIN, T. Research Memorandum on Crime in the Depression New York: Social Science Research Council, 1937. SHELLEY, L.I. Crime and Modernization: The Impact of Industrialization and Urbanization on Crime. Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois Univer- sity Press, 1981. THOMAS, D.S. Social Aspects of the Business Cycle. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927. VIGDERHOUS, G. Methodological problems confronting cross-cultural criminological research using official data. Human Relations, 1978, 31,229-247. WELLFORD, C.F. Crime and dimensions of nations. International Journal of Criminology and Penology, 1974, 2 1-10. WOLF, P. Crime and development: An international comparison of crime rates. Scandinavian Studies in Criminology, 1971, 3, 107-121. ZEHR, H. Crime and the Development of Modern Society: Patterns of Criminality in Nineteenth Century Germany and France. Totowa, N.J.: Rowan and Littlefield, 1976. — 265 — ABSTRACT Cross-national data are examined for possible relationships between violent crime and economic fluctuations. Sixteen cases are examined from a new archive of international data on homicide and four other offences for 110 nations and 44 major international cities for the period 1900-1972. A simple contextual hypothesis is proposed: that a nation’s type of economic system determines whether or not changing economic system determines whether or not changing economic conditions will affect rates of violent crime. Preliminary analyses provide support for this hypothesis and suggest that the relationship between violence and the economy is not invariant but is instead contingent on qualitative features of a nation’s economic system. Specifically, nations with more redistributive economic systems and policies designed to mitigate poverty and unemployment are less likely to experience increases in violence when unemployment increases. RÉSUMÉ UNE HYPOTHESE MODESTE SUR L’INÉGALITÉ, LE CHOMAGE ET LA CRIMINALITÉ Les statistiques de nations diverses sont étudiées ici pour permettre l’analyse des liens entre criminalité violente et variation économique. Nous avons étudiés, sur une période allant de 1900 à 1972, 16 cas de meurtres choisis dans les nouvelles archives internationales sur l’homicide et 4 autres types de délits à travers 110 pays et 44 grandes villes du monde. Une hypothèse simplement contextuelle est proposée: c’est le type de système économique d’une nation qui détermine si les changements de condition économique affecteront où pas le taux de criminalité violente. Les premières analyses étayent cette hypothèse et suggèrent que la relation entre violence et économie n’est pas invariable mais dépend au contraire des carac téristiques qualitatives du système économique national considéré. Et en particulier ce sont les nations qui ont un système économique plus redistri- butif et des politiques axées sur la lutte contre le chômage et la pauvreté qui sont le moins susceptibles de connaître une augmentation de la violence lorsque leur taux de chômage croît. — 266 — IMPRIMERIE ADMINISTRATIVE DE MELUN 3124 - 1986