AIC_1978

ANNALES INTERNATIONALES DE CRIMINOLOGIE

INTERNATIONAL ANNALS OF CRIMINOLOGY

INTERNACIONALES DE CRIMINOLOGIA

ANALES

Année 1978 (volume 17 - n° | et 2)

TSH|GE

1}l

SU

U]

Ge

/

/<

—0 es

E

>aW

E

—‘

;

€

3

Ÿ

“

(:

PaR”

,

H|Ù

-

……

"À

aÀ

;

PC\IŸ

;

…

[;!\

4

—

…

ps

|

.W

N—.

>

W.….oh

t>

L d

@

e

7;

04’

.-\.

Cs

.J\

JAN

m

e

p d

AVERTISSEMENT DU COMITE DE REDACTION

Le Conseil de direction de la Société internationale de criminologie

avait chargé le Centre international de criminologie comparée — que

dirige Denis Szabo — de réaliser un volume spécial des Annales.

Le manuscrit remis par le C.I.C.C. au comité de rédaction dépas-

sait considérablement la taille d’un volume annuel. À vrai dire, il

correspondait plutôt à deux volumes.

Le comité de rédaction n’a pas voulu opérer des coupures — qui

auraient dû être considérables — dans cet ensemble qui forme un tout.

Il a résolu d’en répartir la matière en deux volumes

la première livraison (volume 16) comprenait les deux premières

parties ;

le second (volume 17) réunit les trois dernières parties du manuscrit

mis au point parle C.I.C.C. sous la direction de Denis Szabo.

Pour bien marquer l’unité entre ces deux livraisons, la table des

matières est intégralement incluse dans le présent volume.

— 5—

TABLE DES MATIERES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOLUME 16

SzAaBo (D.), Introduction

. . ». …. e + — e + 6. 8 < < — . 6 — © © » e 6 » % 6 % © 6 © % % ® # ®

I. — COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY :

GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES

FLYNN (S.E.), Issues and Priorities in International Cooperation

in the Field of Criminology

13

GURR (T.R.), Crime Trends in Modern Democracies Since 1945..

41

CLIFFORD (W.), Culture and Crime

. « e » + ». » » e « » « © « © » 6 6 % » 6 % # 6 # &

à7

ARCHER (D.) & GARTNER (R.), Homicide in 110 Nations : The

Development of the Comparative Crime Data File

109

I. — HISTORICAL AND MACRO-CRIMINOLOGICAL STUDIES

Rico (J.), La violence en Amérique latine

143

MIDDENDORFF (W.), Bank Robbers and Their Victims ......….

179

BRILLON (Y.), L’acculturation juridique en Afrique Noire et ses

incidences sur l’administration de la justice criminelle

. e ». « ©

19

Rocx (P.), Law, Order and Power in Late Seventeenth and early

Eighteenth Century England

» e e » » e € « % — % © @ ® © « se à © % % 6 6 ® @ 6 # °

233

SVIRBUL (V.K.), Potentialities of Social Process Regulations of

Crime Prevention

. « « * © 6 e <. » e © + e % % % * ® ® ® * e © ® © % %* ® % 6 » @ » # »

267

—7—

VOLUME 17

II — COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CRIMINAL

JUSTICE SYSTEMS

. e … © e e + »s 6 © e e * s * e 6 © © ® © © % =% % % © % + % © © e 6 ® ® «

9

SZABO (D.), Foreword

ANTTILA (L.), Problems of Comparative Research on the Use of

Discretion in Criminal Justice

° + e »s © %* + + » % +e » 0 + © e e « e » © 6 % ® 6 e

BaiLey (W.C.), The Deterrent Effect of Arrest and Conviction on

Crimes Rates in Indian States and Territories

21

TIEDEMANN (K.), Subjects, Aims and Methods of European

Criminological Research in the Field of Economic and

Business Crime

e e « » e « … e e « » . « * © » © © —… e « . 6 — « « 8 » # + » » % % 6 % ® ®

51

VERIN (J.) & STRASBURG (P.), International Cooperation in Action

G9

Research

A French-American Example

KERNER (H.J.), Fear of Crime and Attitudes Towards Crime

Comparative Criminological Reflections

e …. © » e © » » e % =s © #% e © »%

83

IV. — MICRO-CRIMINOLOGY

GIBBENS (T.N.C.) & SooTHILL (K.L.), The Rape Problem

tO

JEVASSEUR (G.) & CHAMPENOIS-MARNIER (M.P.), L'application

d’un sursis partiel par les tribunaux correctionnels français. .

17

VoporivEc (K.), Restitution to Victims of Criminal Offences

. « e e « e s. » % % © * » 6 © 6 % » ® % » e « e

147

in Slovenia SFR of Yugoslavia

167

MARxX (G.T.) & MORTON (M.), Police and Minorities in England. .

V. — METHODOLOGY

WiIzKINs (L.T.), Decisions Theory and Comparative Criminology.

[O|

GraBosky (P.N.), The Comparative Study of Penal Severity :

Some Methodological Considerations

209

ROBERT (Ph.), Consensus, Conflit et attitudes envers le crime

et la loi pénale

e e e « e à © 6 © % » © » s « < » © …s < © © … * © © 6 » * © * % e © # « © #

—— ——

233

—8—

| FOREWORD

Comparative research in criminology is beginning to take form

sign of a discipline’s vitality. From the time F. & S. Glueck (1964)

appealed to the Hague Conference in 1960 for comparative criminology,

up to the creation of the International Center for Comparative Crimi-

nology in 1969, researchers began to explorc the various “ macro ” as

well as « micro » avenues in criminological research. During the 17th

International Course in Criminology, held in Montreal, in 1967, did

M. Wolfgang not predict the burgeoning of comparative criminology

when he traced the viable future of our discipline to the year 2000 ?

(1968).

In 1976, at the séminar organized by the I.C.C.C. in Santa Mar-

gherita, Italy, about forty researchers examined the thematic and me-

thodological problems and priorities entailed in comparative research.

Finally, in 1977, the Scientific Commitee of the International Society

of Criminologv entrusted me with the task of preparing the present

volume. Given the abundance and quality of the articles sent in answer

to my appeal, this book will be published in two volumes, the second

to come out few months later.

Ît was in the International Annals of Crimiùology (1973), that I

recently explained my concept of comparative criminology ; the present

contribution is an integral part of the research programme I outlined

in that article. The papers presented and the discussions that took place

at the Santa Margherita seminar, and summarized by Edith E. Flynn,

give an idea of the methodological and theoretical attractions and

dangers inherent in the comparative approach. The texts reflect the

direction of the priorities tested by criminologists, all of whom, however,

were from the industrialized European and North American nations.

The problems of developing countries, on the other hand, are

reflected in the contribution of W. Clifford, who through his long

association with the United Nations, is no stranger to these problems.

The chronological method used by T.R. Gurr and P. Rock and the

diachronic method by D. Archer & R. Gartner, are tested respectively.

Among the historical and macro-criminological studies, third world

are amply described by J.M. Rico for Latin America, by Y. Brillon

for Africa, and by W.C. Bailey for India : W. Middendorff, H.J. Kerner

and V.K. Zvirbul describe one particular phenomenon.

Comparative researchers are deeply concerned with the system of

criminal justice : the example of the work done in this domain warns

— 9 —

against premature enthusiasm about the ease of comparing the elements

of the system (legislation, courts, prisons, the police, etc.) even in

culturally homogeneous regions such as Scandinavia, as described by

I. Anttila, or regarding specific offenses such as white collar crime,

described by K. Tiedemann. The transference of socio-legal reforms

presents enormous problems

can the same system be applied in

Paris and London that is used in New York ? Such is the question

asked by J. Vérin & P. Strasburg. Micro-criminology and methodology

are barely touched on in this review of the works in progress : its qua-

lity, however, holds promise that the monographs and thinking in these

fields will undoubtedly produce a richer harvest in the next decade.

The subtle distinctions in T.C.N. Gibbens’ description of phenomena

such as rape, the analyses of the functioning of the mechanisms of

justice administration, such as the use of partial stay of proceedings

in France, by G. Levasseur & M.P. Champenois-Marnier, and the

compensation of victims in Yugoslavia, by K. Vodopivec, are neces-

sary pre-requisites for the comparative approach.

The ambiguities in the role of the police facing problems of law

enforcement among members of ethnic minorities in England are

carefully outlined by G.T. Marx & M. Morton.

With regard to methodology, it is the very substance of the

researcher’s concern with regard to the scientific experience acquired :

intensification of the latter will inevitably stinulate the progress of

the former. The works of L.T. Wilkins, P.N. Grabosky and Ph. Robert

are exemplary in this respect.

I wish to thank all those authors who graciously agreed to contri-

bute to the present volume. Although they are responsible for their own

works, the undersigned alone is responsible for the choice of contri-

butions and their distribution in diverse chapters. Mesdames Jacqueline

DePlaen-Beaudry, in charge of the I.C.C.C.’s documentation centre,

and Andrée Hamam, administrative assistant, have ably assisted me

in the preparation of this manuscript for publication. Finally, I thank

the Scientific Committee of our Society for having generously devoted

two volumes of The Annals to these texts, and also its Deputy Secretary,

Mr. Ph. Robert, for his efficient help with the final arrangements.

GLUECK (E. & S.), Ventures in Criminology, Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard

University Press, (1964).

SZABO (D.), « Criminologie comparée

signification et tâches », Annales

Internationales de Criminologie, Vol. 12, N°1 et 2 (1973).

WOLFGANG (MEÆE.), « The Viable Future of Criminology » in : Crimi-

pages 109-135.

nologie en action, Montréal, Presses de l’Université de Montréal, (1968),

— 10 —

II.- Comparative analysis

of the

criminal justice systems

PROBLEMS OF COMPARATIVE RESEARCH ON

THE USE

OF DISCRETION

IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE

INKERI ANTTILA

Research Institute of Legal Policy

Helsinki - Finland

lntetnatîonal Research on the Criminal Justice System

Criminologists, in common with researchers in general, have strived

for globality. This, of course, has not been easy. The variance in legis-

lation has sometimes seemed to place insurmountable barriers to inter-

national comparisons of crime control systems.

Variations in criminal law, however, have come to be regarded

as something more than just a drawback. Professor Nils Christie

expressed this very well in stating that keeping to the « legal » concept

of offences gives researchers new perspectives. Researchers can study

why systems differ, instead of just trying to eliminate the differences,

or limiting the field of study to one where differences in legislation

possibly will not mean sc much. Comparisons between different systems

may provide researchers with new horizons. This also holds true for

research on the use of discretion.

Problems in Comparaﬁve Research

What points of view should be considered when planning compà-

rative research for example on 4the use of discretion ?

First, a researcher should clarify his ferminology. The terms

used in criminal law can be stabilized when used in one country ;

but the more distant the country or the stranger the culture, the greater

the risk of misunderstanding. For example, the term « preventive

detention » can be understood in two ways. Apparently it is often

the same thing as « detention before trial ». But it has least at times

been used in Europe to refer to incarceration without a time limit, a

« preventive measure for dangerous criminals ».

One must, however, never be satisfied with merely comparing

the content of written legislation, without finding out how the law is

applied: This observation is so self-evident that I had my doubts

about mentioning it : however, we are familiar with the requests from

researchers abroad, asking for information on the contents of written

law - possibly only one statute - at the same time indicating that they

intend to draw far-reaching conclusions on the functioning of the

system.

The next step is to test whether the legislation is linked to other

statutes. Are there possibly parallel statutes that may complete on

the application level ? As an cxample of this we could take the

laws on non-prosecution in Scandinavia

the laws may contain a

general non-prosecution clause, dealing with minor offences committed

by anybody, regardless of age ; but there may also be a special non-

prosecution clause dealing with young offenders. The non-prose-

cution institution as a whole must be taken into consideration.

But comparisons must not be limited to this. Every system not only

contains procedures that go under the same name, but also mechanisms

which can be regarded as competing, with a similar final result. Let

us again think of non-prosecution : the prosecutor may often have to

choose whether or not he will bring the case to court : if he does

prosecute, the court also has several alternatives open. In those concrete

cases where non-prosecution would be possible, it is generally also

possible for the court to dismiss the case or give a conditional sentence.

The prosecutor can predict with a great deal of accuracy what the

result would be if he prosecutes - the offender would receive one of

the two alternative sanctions mentioned, and he would thus anyway

retain his liberty.

In international comparisons there is reason to consider similar

alternatives. For example, it is by no means certain that a country

where a great deal of non-prosecution is applied is a country with

a lenient criminal policy - it may be that this country does not have

any alternatives, such as dismissal in the court, available ! It is also

possible that non-prosecution itself leads to a harsher result than some

others would. This could be 1llustrated by citing the situation in Finland

thirty years ago. If the offender was between 15 and 17 years old,

non-prosecution was possible for petty offenses. The purpose of this

was to pass the case to the child welfare authorities : the prosecutor

was supposed to notify the local child welfare board, which would then

start from the beginning. During those « years of severe sanctions »,

it was possible that a fifteen year old petty thief could be sent to a

juvenile institution for quite a long time. Had the prosecutor chosen to

prosecute, the sentence in court would almost certainly have been

given conditionally.

In comparing criminal justice legislation in different countries, we

look above all at the system of sanctions. However, the system is also

regulated by ofher criminal law norms. For example the prosecutor’s

discretion is in some offences limited by the provision that only the

victim has a finai say upon whether charges will be brought or not.

If the law is changed so that the right to decide whether charges are

brought is given to the prosecutor, this shifting of power also gives him

a new and possibly wider scope of discretion. Such a situation occured a

few years back in Finland in regard to some offences against a minor,

when the prosecutor was given the right to bring charges in cases where

this was previously allowed only to the guardian or the minor himself.

to

One could go even further and pose the following question

what degree is the use of discretion within the criminal justice system

connected with the exfent and intensity of criminalization ? At least

it is clear that decriminalization, a subject of much debate in recent

years, is an alternative to depenalization measures - if an act is no

longer punishable, official discretion is no longer needed.

At times cases may also drop out of the sphere of discretion by

being shifted outside criminal policy or the entire official control policy

system. These are mostly very minor cases. For example in Finland an

individual whose reputation has been assailed by a newspaper can bring

a charge in the ordinary way, or use the alternative of requesting that

the press establishment’s own honour court give the newspaper a war-

ning. There are similar « disciplinary systems » in many other pro-

fessions.

When analysing the system, one must also consider self-regulatory

mechanisms, which operate inside institutions, inside the whole criminal

justice system, and in the relationship between the criminal policy

system and other related systems. If, for example, the criminal law

of a country has an excessively severe minimum sanction for « aggra-

vated theft », courts tend to look for some ways that would enable them

to apply the statute concerning « simple theft ». If the punishment for

drunken driving is made more severe, the minor cases seem to disappear

from the scene

apparently the police are loth notify the prosecutor

of minor cases, when in their opinion the sanction is exceptionally

severe. The same principle works on many different levels. If the

prisons are overcrowded, one looks for and usually also finds ways

of reducing the number of prisoners, either through legislation or the

enforcement of existing legislation. If the police are provided with

good detention facilities, they are more likely to arrest a greater number

of offenders than in a shortage of adequate facilities.

I have so far listed quite a number of difficulties in comparative

research. Even so, I think we should not stop here : 1f one wishes to

compare systems, should not one have a wider knowledge of the legal

culture of the countries being compared ? One knows or at least assu-

mes, for example, that bribery of officials is in some countries, but not

in others, unofficially accepted as part of the culture. This, of course,

— 15

—

must have an immediate effect on the use and actual extent of discre-

tion within the criminal justice system. — It is another matter entirely

that here we are involved in a sector of research on which it is almost

impossible to gather data

How to Lessen Difficulties in Making Comparisons

Aîter all of these reservations it could very well be asked whether

there are no shortcuts open to the researcher

One way might be the following method of planning research

instead of studying a certain institution, and taking into account the

above reservations, one could make the level of research more abstract,

one could study certain principles and ideologies, the law in b00ks

and the law in action brought up to the level of principles.

In this way, one could examine, for example, the following goals

— The use of discretion connected with /he normal application .of

law, especially in sentencing. This means, for example, the use of

discretion over whether the act fulfils the criteria for an offence ;

whether scales based on special mitigating or aggravating circumstances

should be applied, and which sanction should be selected from the

available scale. in manv cases the role of the court becomes similar to

that of the legislator

as the norms require a lot of interpretation

— The use of discretion for the purpose of moderation. This

is needed, for example, when a statute is poorly adaptable to a

special case. At times a « back door » is specificallv left open in

legislation for such cases ; for example, in Finland around 25 years

ago, when the punishment for illegal abortion was a rather heavy one

the court was given the right in exceptional cases to withhold punish-

ment for the woman who has undergone an illegal abortion. À parallel

is offered by those cases where it is felt that the statute has fallen into

disuse, even though it has remamed on the law-books (so-called desue-

tudo).

— Discretion is used very commonly for rationalization. Even

if it is not specifically allowed by law, it could be merely normal

practice in the country to toss minor cases into the wastepapetr

basket ! À times

statute may be drawn up after such discretion has

actually been used in practice for years. This is what happened in

Finland when some years ago it was specifically decreed that the

police had the right to refrain from reporting a minor offence (especially

in traffic) to his superior, andneed only give a warning to the offender

— Apparently one system that is partly for rationalization purposes

and partly to moderate the force of oversevere sanctions is the « plea-

bargaining » system familiar in American criminal procedure

— 16 —

— Discretion used for individualized sanctioning. Such a goal was

very popular in Scandinavia, for example, a couple of decades ago in

the discussion on reforming the crime control system. One could scar-

cely conceive of a choice of individualized sanctions without a wide

provision for discretion, no matter if the case was dealt with by a court

or by some special administrative body. À wide measure of discretion

was also naturally given as part of the procedure during the different

stages of sanction enforcement, since release from an institution was

dependent on how soon the prisoner was « rehabilited ». Actually, the

goal of individualized sanctions demanded the use of discretion all

along the line.

The Role of Latent Goals

In analysing, one must try to find out both manifest and latent

goals influencing decision-making. If, for example, the system in one

country gives the police discretion to decide whether to report a drunk

lying in the street, and therefore have the drunk fined, the policeman

can officially call the fine an appropriate and effective « individual

warning ». In reality, he may clearly be aware of the fact that he

wants most of all to «clean up the street» by carting off drunks

to jail.

Another example would be a decision model from Finnish

criminal policy. Let us suppose that a murderer has been found to

be criminally irresponsible and therefore is not punished. Since he

is diagnosed to be suflering from, say, schizophrenia, he will be

shut up in a mental institution against his will. According to law,

his release must take place solely on the basis of two criteria : his

need for care and his dangerousness, both of which in Finland are

left to the discretion of the medical authorities. However, in practice

the general sense of justice will also carry weight. The offender is not

released as quickly as could be done on the basis of his own impro-

vement and the estimation of his dangerousness

in practice he will

have to spend possibly five years instead of perhaps six months in

an institution.

Another case where the use of discretion also serves to fulfil

latent goals is in the decision to detain before trial by the courts.

It is known that detention before trial, which is meant by law only

to serve criminal procedural needs, is in practice also used as a sanction,

for example, for the unexpressed purpose that one wishes a speedy

counteraction in dealing with an offence.

There are also many examples of how the goals may change

over the years. When the Law on Young Offenders was passed in

Finland 35 years ago, there was a common belief in the efficiency

OË treatment-oriented sanctions. and therefore, using as a model the

— 17 —

system prevailing in many other countries, a special sanction, « juvenile

imprisonment », was included in the law. À young offender sentenced

to imprisonment for at least 6 months could be sent by a decision of

a special body to a juvenile prison, and if this occured, his term was

automatically extended by 1-2 years. On the other hand immates of a

juvenile prison could be released on parole earlier than inmates of

normal prisons. At first, the law was followed quite automatically and

stringently ; during the 1950’s the law was changed so that the exten-

sion was made discretionary ; and at the end of the 1960°s the extensions

were used only for the shorter terms. What is most surprising, however

1s the trend in the 1970°s

Juvenile imprisonment is used only for

those who are seen as needing release on parole at an early stage !

ÀA foreign researcher who does not know of this change would get

completely lost, and think that young offenders sent to juvenile prison

are considered to be in need of care and training there !

Much research work done in recent years has actually been

connected with the use of unofficial discretion and with latent goals.

The research has concentrated on grounds for the use of discretion

that are « outside the system ». Researchers have dealt, for example,

with the problem of discrimination between races or social classes, or

the possible inequality between the sexes ; they have investigated whe-

ther police are most apt to arrest younger people or adults ; they have

discussed the question of whether white-collar offenders or ordinary

thieves are sooner released on parole. One could analyse almost

without end the actual function of the system in many different

respects and on many different levels. What I have tried to do is to

show that international comparisons may actually require comparisons

made on a more general level.

Is Discretion to be Encouraged ?

It is not a habit of the conventional researcher to present

recommendations to decision-makers. However, when he wants to, the

researcher can certainly « go over to a criminal politician’s role »

and present his own opinion.

The final criminal policy goal should be to minimize criminality

and the resultant social cost (property damages, suffering, injury and

harm) so that costs to the victim and to society as well as to the

offender are taken into consideration. Also, the general sense of

justice and legal security are among the decision-making criteria.

In considering his recommendations, the researcher sould try to

answer for example the following questions

—

is the wide use of official discretion advisable ?

— 18 —

is it advisable to differentiate between discretion used in a

mitigating direction from discretion used in a more severe

direction ?

are different officials in a different position, and is the court in

à special position ?

is there a difference in the situation before and after the trial ?

how should one regard systems closely allied to the criminal law

system, for example, disciplinary punishments in school or in

prisons, or disciplinary sanctions for state officials ?

what about compulsory treatment on the basis of an offence,

either an individual act or habitual offences (for example va-

grancy) ?

In summary, therefore, I would like to point out that

in carrying out research on the use of discretion the researcher

should be aware of the function of the entire system in the

country in question ; and

he should attempt to study the manifest goals aimed at in passing

and in applying legislation as well as unconver the latent goals.

— 19 —

THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF ARREST AND CONVICTION

ON CRIME RATES IN INDIAN STATES AND TERRITORIES

WILLIAM C. BAILEY

Department of Sociology

The Cleveland State University

Cleveland, Ohio - U.S.A

The research reported here consists of a multivariate analysis

of the deterrent effect of arrest and conviction on crime rates for

Indian states and federal territories for the period 1967 to 1973. The

deterrent effect of arrest and conviction are examined separately for

six serious offenses with soc1odemographœ factors introduced into

the analysis as control variables.

The last decade has witnessed a number of empirical investi-

gations of the deterrent effect of arrest, conviction, and imprisonment

on major felony rates for states, counties, and cities in the United

States. As hypothesized, and consistent with the deterrence doctrine

these investigations have rather typically revealed a substantial inverse

relationship between the certainty of punishment and offense rates

Contrary to the deterrence hypothesis, however, only a slight negative,

and in some cases a positive, relationship has been found between the

severity of legal sanctions and offense rates. These findings have brought

many American Criminologists- to conclude that no longer can the

threat and application of legal sanctions be dismissed as an important

determinant of crime (Tittle and Rowe, 1974 ; Tittle and Logan, 1973

Sjoquist, 1973

Orsagh, 1973

Phillips and Votey, 1972

Ehrlich

1972). What remains unclear from this line of recent research, however

is the extent to which the results of these studies can be generalized

outside of the United States, for to our knowledge, no comparable

research has been conducted in other countries. Accordingly, we can

only speculate at this point whether similar results would occur if the

deterrent effect of arrest, conviction and imprisonment were exammed

in other than American states and cities.

While it is clearly beyond the scope of the present mvest1gatmn

to provide a conclusive answer to this question, by our examining the

deterrence hypothesis for states and territories of India we hope to shed

some light on this important issue. In addition, it is our hope that

this research will provide the impetus to other investigators to further

— 21 —

explore the deterrence hypothesis in other western and non-western

countries. Only through such efforts will a more clear understanding

of the deterrence hypothesis result.

Before presenting the methodology and results of the present

investigation for India, it would first ssem of value to briefly review

the available evidence for the United States (1).

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Although the deterrent effect of one form of punishment — the

death penalty — for one type of offense — murder — has long been

of concern to American Criminologists, it was not until the late 1960°s

that the deterrent effect of alternative forms of punishment for other

offenses began to receive empirical attention in the criminology

literature (2). The first notable effort in this direction was Gibbs’ (1968)

investigation of the deterrent effect of the certainty and severity of

imprisonment on homicide rates for states of the country. Utilizing

crime and imprisonment figures issued by the Federal Bureaus of

Investigation and Prisons, Gibbs examined the deterrence hypothesis

of an inverse relationship between each measure of imprisonment and

states’ homicide rates (3). As hypothesized, his rather limited chi square-

based analysis showed a negative relationship between offense rates

and the certainty (O —.48) and severity (= —.25) factors. His

findings of a more subtantial inverse relationship for certainty of

imprisonment, Gibbs concludes to be «entirely consistent with the

position taken by practically every advocate of deterrence theory »

(1968, 525).

(1) For a good discussion of deterrence theory and a summary of the available

evidence, see : Zimring and Hawkins (1973), Tittle and Logan (1973), Gibbs

(1975), and Andenaes (1974).

(2) For a good discussion of the theory and empirical research pertaining

to the deterrent effect of the death penalty for murder, see : Sellin (1967), Bedau

(1967), Bailey (1975), and Bedau and Pierce (1976).

(3) Gibbs operationalized his certainty of punishment measure as the number

of persons in each state sent to prison for homicide in 1960, divised by the total

number of homicides reported to the police in that state for 1959-1960. The

severity of punishment was operationalized as « the median number of months

served on a homicide sentence by all persons in prisons on December 31, 1960 ».

The dependent variable was defined as the average annual homicide rate per one

hundred thousand population for each state from 1959-1961. The average

homicide rate for a three-year period was used to allow for sufficient time

for the deterrent effect and to provide greater stability to the rate.

— 22 —

A re-analysis of Gibbs' (1968) data by Gray and Martin (1969)

using a more sophisticated statistical design has led to some modifi-

cations of Gibbs’ findings. These researchers examined Gibbs’ data in

its original ratio scale form rather than simply treating it as nominal

as had Gibbs in his using of a contingency table analysis. They

further examined these data by means of both a rectilinear and

logarithmic (nonlinear) statistical model. The latter correlation model

was utilized because some nonlinearity was apparent in the data.

Using a rectilinear model, Gray and Martin found the correlation

between the severity and certainty of punishment and homicide rate

—

—

—.367 and r

—

—

to be in the hypothesized inverse direction (r

—,281, respectively). The corresponding log correlations were also of

a negative sign and somewhat larger (r = —.506 and r = —.379,

respectively). Where Gibbs found certainty of punishment to be the

more important factor, Gray and Martin found the inverse to be true.

Further, a multiple correlation combining the effects of the severity and

certainty of punishment on offense rates yielded correlations (R = .442

for the linear model, and R =.599 for the logarithmic model) only

slightly larger than the respective largest zero order correlations, thus

only allowing an increment in explained variation of approximately

.6 per cent and .9 per cent, respectively. These findings suggest,

contrary to Gibbs’ (1968) assertion, that the severity and certainty of

punishment are not ac!ditive in their effect on homicide.

Tittle's (1969) deterrence investigation resembles quite closely

the approach taken by Gibbs (1968). Utilizing police and prisoner

statistics in a tabular analysis, he examined the relationship between

the certainty and severity of punishment and offense rates for seven

major felonies (4). The correlation between estimates of the certainty of

punishment and offense rates for all seven offenses combined was

——

—

found to be in the predicted direction (Tau c

— ,45). For the

individual offenses the cœfficients are : sex offenses

——

—

—.17 ; assault

= —.46 ; larceny = —.37 ; robbery — —.36 ; burglary = —.31 ;

homicide — —.17 : and auto theft = —.08. Like the total crime

index, each of these cœfficients is in the hypothesized direction, and

with the exception of those for homicide and auto theft, are highly

SŒtisücally significant (P< .01).

- 000

(4) Tittle operationtally defined the certainty of punishment as the average

number of admission to prison for each of the index offenses in each state,

from 1959 to 1962, divided by the number of index offenses known to the police

in each state, from 1958 to 1962. The severitv of punishment was operationalized

as the mean number of months spent in prison by index crime offenders released

in 1960. Tittle’s « Deviance Index » consisted of the mean annual number of

index offenses reported to the police in each state per 100,000 population from

1959 to 1963.

— 23 —

The relationship between the severity of punishment and offense

rates for all offenses combined was found to be Tau c

——utsetus

—.

.14. For

——

—

the individual offenses the correlations are

sex offenses

26 ;

assault

——

—

18 ; larceny =.14 ; robbery =.05 ; burglary =.14 ;

homicide = .45 ; and auto theft = .04. With the exception of homicide

these findings are quite contrary to what deterrence theory would

predict.

In a more recent investigation, Chiricos and Waldo (1970) provide

a further examination of the hypothesis that rates of crime are

inversely related to the certainty and severity of punishment. Like

Tittle (1969), they examine the deterrence hypothesis for each of the

major index crimes, but for three points in time (5). Further, they

examine the rcelationship between changes in the level of the certainty

and severity of punishment and their effect on offense rates (6). Âs

in Gibbs’ (1968) and T'ittle’s (1969) investigations, official police and

prisoner statistics were used to construct punishment and rate indexes.

Examination of the certainty-rate data revealed that all but one

correlation was in the hypothesized negative direction. The strength

and level of statistical significance of the associations varied greatly by

offense and over time, however. Only for assault were the two variables

consistently and significantly related for all three years. For burglary,

the relationships were found to be statistically significant for two years,

while the remaining correlations were either low or not consistent by

offense (7).

(5) Chiricos and Waldo’s operationalization of the certainty and severity of

punishment is as follows

19XX certainty =— 19XX Admissions to Prison for “ X ” Offenses

—

Mean of “ X ” Crimes Known to Police in 19XX and 19XX

Severity

—

Median Lenght of Sentence Served by State Prisoners Released

mean of 1950, 1951, and 1952 rates ; mean of 1960, 1961, and 1962 rates ;

and mean of 1963, 1964, and 1965 rates.

(6) Chiricos and Waldo calculated changes in the levels of the severity,

certainty and offense rates as follows

19XX-19YY % Change in Certainty = (19YY certainty) — (19XX certainty)

PE

19XX certainty

—

—

19XX-19YY % Change in Severity

(19YY severity) — (19XX severity)

= — srrr

19XX severity

19XX-19YY % Change in Rate

——

—

(19YY rate) — (19XX rate)

—

19XX rate

(7) Chiricos and Waldo report the following phi cœfficients between the

certainty of punishment and crime rates : homicide, .02 (1950), — 46 (1960),

—— -17 (1963) ; robbery, — .26 (1950), — .33 (1960), — .25 (1963) ; assault,

— 35 (1950), — .38 (1960), — .42 (1963) ; burglary, — .09 (1950), — .33 (1960),

— .50 (1963) ; larceny, — .04 (1950), — .17 (1960), — 15 (1963) ; auto theft,

— .16 (1950), — .25 (1960), — .16 (1963).

— 24 —

The severity-rate data also provided no consistent support for the

deterrence hypothesis. With one exception (homicide, 1960), all cor-

relations were either positive or low negative. Moreover, little consis-

tency over time was exhibited within offence categories (8).

Examination of changes in the levels of the severity and certainty

of punishment and their effect on offense rates also produced incon-

sistent findings (9). Only approximately 4 percent of the certainty-rate

correlations were in the hypothesized direction and statistically signi-

ficant, while none of the severity-rate correlations was as hypothesized

and statistically significant. Chiricos and Waldo conclude that their

data provide little evidence of deterrence (10).

Utilizing a multiple regression analysis technique, Ehrlich (1972)

also examined the hypothesis of a negative relationship between the

severity and certainty of punishment and offense rates for the major

index crimes for 1940, 1950, and 1960. Using punishment and rate

indexes quite similar to those of the above investigators, he reports a

consistent negative correlation (r) between severity and rate, averaging

(1940-1960) as follows for each offense

robbery = —.325 ; bur-

glary — —.546 ; larceny = —.287 ; auto theft = —.174 ; murder =

—.214

—

—

—.188

assault

——

—

b

rape

—.389 (11). Similarly, the

association between certainty and rate was also found to be consistently

in the hypothesized direction with cœfficients averaging : robbery =

—.913 ; burglary = —.468 ; larceny — —.298 ; auto theft = — .247 ;

—

—

murder

—

—.466 ; rape

—

—_,578 : assault = —.393.

In addition, Ehrlich also reports that when median family income,

percentage of families below one half of the median family income,

and percentage nonwhite are introduced as control variables (all three

factors are described by Ehrlich as « major theoretical determinants of

(8)

For 1960 and 1964 Chiricos and Waldo report the following phi

correlations between severity of punishment and offense rates : homicide, — .33

(1960), — .03 (1964) ; robbery, .12 (1960), .00 (1964) ; assault, .32 (1960),

— .08 (1964) ; burglary, .25 (1960), .08 (1964) : larceny, .14 (1960), — .09 (1964) ;

auto theft, .13 (1960), .12 (1964).

(9) Due to the complexity and scope of the change analysis, the statistical

results of this analysis will not be reported here. The reader is referred to

pages 209-210 of Chiricos and Waldo’s article.

(10)

Chiricos and Waldo are reluctant.

however,

to suggest that the

severity and certainty of punishment fail to deter crime. Rather, they question

whether deterrence may be adequately addressed through the use of police

and prisoner statistics.

(11) Ehrlich operationalized his certainty of punishment measure as the

number of persons sent to prison in each state for each of the index crimes

(1940, 1950, 1960), divised by the number of index crimes reported to the police

for these years. It is not clear whether Ehrlich uses the mean or median length

Of sentence served by released felons as his measure of severity, for he fails

to reference the source of his prisoner data. He simply describes his severity

measure as the « average » length of prison sentence.

— 25 —

criminal activity »), the relationship between punishment and rate

remains generally unchanged.

In spite of the shortcomings of police and prisoner statistics used

to construct his punishment and rate indexes, and the somewhat

stringent econometric specification of functional relationships required

in the regression model used, Ehrlich (1972, 275) concludes that his

data are « consistent with the hypothesis that law-enforcement acti-

vity has a deterrent effect on offenders ». Furthermore, the fact that

cœfficients for crimes against persons are not on the average lower

than for crimes against property suggests that contrary to common

belief, « law-enforcement activity may not be less effective in combating

crimes of hate and passion than crimes involving material gain » (274).

In an attempt to further explore the deterrent effectiveness of legal

sanctions on crime, Bailey, e al. (1974 and Logan (1972) have provided

additional evidence linking the certainty and severity of imprisonment

to states’ felony rates. Re-analizing Tittle’s (1969) imprisonment and

offense rate data for the period 1958-1962, Logan (1972) found a

consistent inverse relationship between certainty and rates (homicide,

r

—.17 ; robbery, r

——

——

—.17 ; sex offenses, r = —.36 ; assault,

—

—

——

—

—.54 ; burglary, r

—.38 : larceny, r

—.17). In contrast, with the exception of homicide, the severity-

cœfficients were found to be either of a positive sign, or negative

3

less substantial than their certainty-rate counterparts (homicide,

—.37; robbery, r = —.06 ; sex offenses, r = —.26 ; assault,

r

—.14 ; burglary, r

——

—

—.07 : larceny. r

—

—

—.12 ; auto theft,

LIl @@ HH 1

r

—.19). While the results for severity were altered slightly, little

additional support was found for the deterrence hvpothesis when the

severity-rate relationship was examined holding constant (controlling

for) the certainty of imprisonment. These findings lead Logan to con-

clude that «….while certainty of imprisonment seems to have a direct and

independent negative relation to crime rate, severity, if it has a deterrent

effect, does not operate independently of certainty » (1972, 70).

Considering the relationship between severity and certainty of

imprisonment and felony rates for a more extended time period (1950,

1960, 1964) Bailey et al. (1974) reach a very similar conclusion. Like

Logan (1972) and a number of previous investigators, they report a

rather consistent negative relationship for each year between certainty

and offense rates for each of the major felonies, and a less substantial

negative, or positive, association between severity of imprisonment and

offense rates for the major felonies (12). In addition, when both severity

(12) To illustrate, Bailey c al. report the following zero-order r corre-

lations for the severityv and certainty of punishment for 1964 ; homicide, — .165

(sev.), — .228 (cert.) ; robbery, — .068 (sev.), —.338 (cert.) ; assault, .087 (sev.),

— .401 (cert.) ; burglary, .271 (sev.), — .527 (cert.) ; theft, .105 (sev.), — .450

(cert.) ; auto theft, .194 (sev.), — .528 (cert.).

— 26 —

and certainty were fit into a multiple correlation analysis, the results

for each year were nearly identical to that found when only the certainty

variable was considered in the analysis, thus again, suggesting the

general lack of a deterrent effect of the severity of imprisonment (13).

The same pattern of bivariate and multivariate results also generaily

held when a non-linear correlation and regression model was utilized.

While the above studies leave little question as to the probable

importance of at least the certainty of imprisonment as a deterrent to

crime, these investigations leave unaddressed the question of the

deterrent effect of arrest and conviction on crime. In this regard,

it is important to keep in mind that even upon arrest and conviction

for a crime, all offenders are not imprisoned. Rather, many offenders,

including convicted felons, receive jail sentences and/or probation,

or some other form of legal sanction. In addition, as Logan (1975)

has recently argued, arrest (even apart from it resulting in confinement

in jail or prison) has to be looked upon as a form of punishment in

itself. Arrest is inconvenient, typically embarassing and costly if one is

required to provide bail to gain release upon awaiting trial. And, of

course, for those who cannot afford bail, or are charged with a crime

where bail is not permissable, arrest may result in confinement in jail

until trial, regardless of the trial’s outcome.

Recognizing these factors, the last few years have witnessed a

handful of investigations examining the deterrent effect of arrest and

conviction on crime. As with the earlier imprisonment studies, these

investigations have typically examined the deterrence hypothesis of an

inverse relationship between the certainty of arrest and/or conviction

and crime rates.

The first investigation of note of this sort was conducted by

Orsagh (1973) for counties and large cities in California for 1960.

Using both an ordinary least squares (O.L.S.), and a two stage least

squares (T.S.L.S.) regression procedure in order to control for the two-

way association between certainty and crime rates, he examined the

deterrent effect of the certainty of conviction on total per capita felony

rates, controlling for two important factors associated with crime ;

percentage of population 15-30 years of age, and proportion of families

living in poverty (14). The T.S.L.S. results revealed a ten percent

increase in conviction rate (from the observed mean of convictions for

(13) The multipile R correlations, combining the effect of severity and certainty

e

on offense rates for 1964 are

homicide, .288 ; robberv, .372

,

assault, 415 ;

burglary, .529 ; theft, 459 ; auto theft, .532.

(14) Orsagh defines certainty oïË conviction in his study as the number of

persons convicted for all feionies relative to the total number of felonies reported

by the police.

—”—

the counties and cities from 92 and 101 per 1000 felonies) to be

associated with an 18 percent decline in the crime rate (from a mean

offense rate of 10.2 to 8.4 per 1000 population). Less substantial

were the O.L.S. results, with a ten percent increase in the conviction

rate only being associated with a 2.6 percent decrease in total felony

rate. In both analyses, risk of conviction proved to be equal to, or

more important than, either age or poverty as a predictor of crime

rate (15). From these findings, Orsagh concludes conviction rates to

be an important determinant of crime, and a factor that cannot be

ignored by future investigators. By his solely examining total felony

rates, and not individual offenses, however, it remains unclear from his

analysis how risk of conviction influences different crimes.

In a very similar type of investigation, Tittle and Rowe (1974)

examine the deterrent effect of the certainty of arrest on total felony

rates for cities with populations of 2,500 or more and counties in

Florida. Utilizing police figures for arrest clearance rates for 1971 (the

proportion of crimes that the police report to be « solved » by arrest),

they examine the deterrence hypothesis of an inverse relationship

between the probability of conviction and total felony rates (16). Preli-

minary analysis revealed the certainty-rate relationship to be non-

linear for both cities and counties, with certainty becoming a more

important factor after clearance rates exceed 30 percent. To illustrate,

—

the correlation between arrest and rates was found to be r

—

—.65 (P<.05) for counties and r = —.19 (P<.05) for cities. For

counties with clearance rates above 30 percent, however, the correlation

——

Wwas r

—

—.58, with an r value of only —.13 for those below this

level. Similarly, for cities the respective cœfficients for those above and

below the 30 percent level are — .48 and .19. These finding remained

basically unaltered when a number of sociodemographic factors asso-

ciated with crime rates were introduced into the analysis as control

variables

(1) percent male population, (2) percent population 15-24

years of age, (3) percent male population 15-24 years of age, (4) percent

population age 65 and older, (5) size of city, or percent of county

(15) Orsagh’s regression results utilizing the O.L.S. procedure are as follows,

with t values in parentheses

riskx of conviction — — .34 (3.1) ; age 15-30

years — .20 (1.8) ; poverty = .20 (18). The T.S.L.S. results are

risk of

conviction — — 2.30 (2.3) ; age 15-30 years = — .22 (18) ; poverty = 1.22

(2.3). The larger T.S.L.S. cœfficient for convictions lead Orsagh to conclude the

T.S.L.S. Model to be preferable to the O.L.S. Model.

(16) Tittle and Rowe do not use the ratio of total reported crimes to total

arrests as their measure of certainty of arrest, but rather arrest clearance rates

computed by the police. « Arrest clearance means that the police have satis-

fied themselves that they have taken into custody the person who committed

the crime » (1974, 456). As the writers point out, because arrest (and the reported

clearance ratios by the police) is a product of police discretion, arrest data are

subject to some distortion.

— 28 —

living in cities of 20,000 or more, (6) women in the labor force, (7)

percent of population in poverty, (8) percent negro population, (9)

percent non-white population, (10) median education, and (l1) inter-

quartile range of income.

These findings, Tittle and Rowe (1974, 458) conclude, indicate

«that there is a critical level [30 percent] that certainty must reach

before there is a noticeable change in the volume of crime ». They go

on to argue that their data clearly indicate that legal sanctions can no

longer be ignored as deterrents to crime, and that « perhaps the

missing link » in criminology is the « fear of sanctions » (461). With

Tittle and Rowe’s analysis, as with Orsagh’s (1973), however, it still

remains unclear the relationship between the probability of arrest

(and/or conviction) and offense rates for different crimes.

To meet this problem, Bailey (1976) replicated Tittle and Rowe’s

(1974) investigation of Florida cities and counties for 1972, but he

further examined the certainty of arrest-offense rate relationship

individually for the following felonies ; murder, forcible rape, robbery,

assault, breaking and entering, larceny, and auto theft (17). As deter-

rence theory would predict, this analysis showed the arrest-offense rate

relationship to vary by type of offense. For Florida’s counties, the

correlations between arrest rates and offense rates are as follows

—

murder, r = —.201 (P<.05) ; rape, r

—

157 ; robbery, r = .136 ;

assault, r

—

—

—.500 (P< .001) ; breaking and entering, r = —.581

(P<.001) ; larceny, r = —.329 (P<.01) ; total felonies, r = —.631

(P< .001). For Florida’s cities, the certainty-felony rate results are

—

murder, r = .635 (P<.001) ; rape, r

——

.461 (P<.001) ; robbery,

r —

.082 ; assault, r

——

—

—.165 ; breaking and entering, r

—

—

—.165 ; larceny, r

—

—

—.204 (P<.01) ; auto theft, r = —.040 ;

—

— —,

total felonies, r

190 (P<.01).

These findings, like Tittle and Rowe's (1974), lead Bailey to

conclude the importance of certainty of arrest as a deterrent to crime.

Unlike Tittle and Rowe'’s investigation, however, his analysis shows

the deterrent effect of arrest to be far from uniform for all types of

offenses. To the contrary, « for offenses commonly considered to be

“instrumental” in nature, arrest would appear to be a much more

important determinant of the level of crime than for “expressive”

crimes » (Bailey, 1976, 153). In addition, this investigation shows that

the tipping point (the level of certainty at which a substantial deterrent

by the police (arrest clearance ratio) which may be manipulated to better reflect

(17) To avoid the problems inherent in using a measure of arrest supplied

upon police efficiency and performance, Bailey used the ratio of reported crimes

to reported arrests in computing a certainty index for each felony.

effect begins to take affect) varies by type of offense, with Tittle and

Rowe’s (1974) suggested figure of 30 percent only applying for some

offenses.

To further explore the possible differential deterrent effect of

the certainty of arrest on crime rates, Logan (197S) examined this

question for states for the period 1964-1968. Drawing upon unpub-

lished Federal Bureau of Investigation’s data, he intercorrelated average

arrest clearance rates and offense rates for total felonies, as well as

for eight individual crimes that make up the F.B.L’s Index Offense

Category (18). This analysis revealed a low to moderate negative corre-

lation between the certainty of arrest and rates for all but homicide :

homicide., 1

—

——

25 (P<.05) ; rape. r = —.37 (P<.01) ; robbery

r

—— ——_—.

48 (P<.001) ; assault, r = —.09 ; burglary, r = —.32 P

<.05) ; larceny,r = — .45 (P<.01) : auto theft, r = —.64 (P<.001) :

total felonies, r = —.26.

In contrast to Tittle and Rowe (1974) and Bailey’s (1976) findings,

with one exception, Logan’s data did not reveal the certainty-rate

relationship to be curvilinear, with a « tipping effect » occuring at the

30 percent level of certainty. Only for robbery was the relationship

found to be nonlinear, with the deterrent effect of arrest decreasing

beyond the 36 percent certainty level (for this offense, the log r value

is —.64, compared to —.48 for the linear statistical model). Consistent

with earlier investigations, however, Logan did find the certainty of

imprisonment and offense rates to be inversely related for the period

1964-1968 ; homicide,r = —.19 ; rape,r = —.73 (P<.001) ; robbery,

r = —.59 (P<.001) ; assault, r = —.65 (P<.001) ; burglary, r =

—.46 (P<.001) ; larceny, r = — .40 (P<.0I) ; auto theft, r = —.12 ;

total felonies, r = —.50 (P<.001). Comparison of these imprisonment

figures with those for arrest, shows the former correlations to be gene-

rally larger, with the exception of larceny and auto theft. For the remai-

ning offenses, Logan suggests that imprisonment is probably a better de-

terrent than arrest due to its greater severity, while arrest may better

deter larceny and auto theft because of the extremely low certainty

of imprisonment for these two offenses ; a mean probability of impri-

sonment of .02 (2%) for larceny, and .01 (1%) for auto theft.

In sum, the above, as well as a number of additional investigations,

clearly point to the importance of arrest, conviction in court, and

imprisonment as deterrents to crime in the United States. Beginning

with Gibb’s (1968) early and rather elementary investigation of the

(18) Like Tittle and Rowe (1974), Logan used the number of crimes cleared

by arrest divided by the number of crimes known to the police for the period

1964-1968 as a measure of certainty of arrest.

— 30 —

deterrent effect of the severity and certainty of imprisonment on homi-

cide rates, there has been a steady progression of such studies focusing

upon other offenses and types of legal sanctions, and making use

of more sophisticated methodological and statistical analyses. As noted

earlier, however, these studies have been exclusively confined to juris-

dictions (states, cities, counties) within the United States. Because of

this, it thus remains unclear whether the pattern of results summarized

above also hold for other countries. As a first step in addressing this

question, we examine here the deterrent effect of arrest and conviction

for selected serious crimes for states and territories of India.

METHODS AND PROCEDURES

Consistent with the deterrence doctrine and previous investigations,

we hypothesize a substantial inverse relationship between the certainty

of arrest and conviction and offense rates. In order to examine these

questions, measures of the certainty of arrest and conviction and crime

rates were constructed utilizing figures issued by the Indian government

in its annual publication, Crime In India, for the period 1967-1973 (19).

As with previous similar investigations in the United States, cer-

tainty of arrest was operationally defined as the number of arrests for

each type of crime divided by the total number of such crimes reported

by the police. Similarly, certainty of conviction was measured by divi-

ding the total number of convictions for each offense by the total number

of such crimes reported by the police. This procedure resulted in an

arrest and conviction index that can theoretically range from zero (0.0)

to unity (1.00) for each of the following crimes : murder, rape, robbery,

house breaking, and theft. À certainty value of zero would indi-

cate that there were no arrests (or convictions) for the offense in

question, while a value of one would indicate that there were an equal

number of arrests (or convictions) and reported crimes (20). Also,

like in previous deterrence investigations in the United States, crime

rates for states and territories were computed as the number of offenses

per 100,000 population.

(19) Our analysis here is confined to the period 1967-1973 for complete police

and sociodemographic data have yet to be received for earlier and later years.

These data have been requested, but time constraints for this publication do not

permit their inclusion in this investigation.

(20) It should be kept clearly in mind that certainty estimates cannot be

interpreted as the proportion of offenders who are arrested and convicted.

Such data on individual offenders. while prefcrable. are simplv not available.

— 3} —

In addition to police figures for arrest, conviction, and crime rates,

data were gathered for the following socioeconomic factors in order to

introduce them into the analysis as control variables : population, per-

cent urban population, percent illiteracy, and percent unemployment (21)

These data were secured from the annual Indian Government publi-

cation, Statistical Abstracts of India. By considering these factors along

with the measures of arrest and conviction, it will be possible to deter-

mine both the effects of each of these variables on crime rates, as well

as the independent deterrent effects of arrest and conviction on crime

rates controlling for these sociodemographic factors. These control

variables have all been suggested as determinants of crime rates, and

are roughly comparable to control factors utilized in similar investi-

gations in the United States (22).

To determine the deterrent effect of arrest and conviction on crime

rates, both certainty measures, as well as the sociodemographic varia-

bles, were fit into a step-wise multiple regression analysis for each

offense and year. Examination of the unstandardized regression cœffi-

cients resulting from this analysis will allow us to determine the effect

of a unit change (increase or decrease) in the deterrence and socio-

demographic variables on crime rates. Comparison of the standardized

(beta) regression cœfficients will permit an examination of the relative

deterrent effect of arrest and conviction, as well as the relative effect

of the sociodemographic factors, on offense rates. In addition, by

comparing the results for each offense, it will be possible to determine

the possible differential deterrent effect, and the possible differential

effect of the sociodemographic factors, on different types of crimes.

While in many previous deterrence investigations statistical tests

of significance have been used to determine the significance of simple

bivariate and regression cœfficients, such tests will not be used in this

investigation for we examine here complete population data, and not a

random sample of India’s states and territories. In addition, the years

considered in this investigation (1969-1973) were not randomly selected,

but were rather, the only years where relatively complete police and

sociodemographic data were immediately available for analysis.

(21) In the absence of alternative data, the proportion of the states’ (or

territories’) population on the livé registry of employment exchanges was used

as an indicator of unemployment.

(22) The control variables selected for inclusion in this analysis were chosen

due to their similarity to factors used in deterrence investigations in the United

States, and their felt importance to crime as reflected in the criminology litera-

ture on India and other developing countries (Clinard and Abbot, 1973).

— 32 —

Missing and Incomplete Data

While it was our hope initially to examine the deterrent effect of

arrest and conviction on crime rates for eacn state and territory in

India for each year 1967-1973, this ideal had to be compromised due

to problems of missing and incomplete data. Turning first to the

offenses examined, reasonably complete offense rate figures were found

to be available for murder, robbery, house breaking, and theft for each

year. Rape data are only reported in the Crime In India series for 1971-

1973, however. Accordingly, it was not possible to examine this

offense for the earlier four vear ( 1967—1970)peri0d.

In addition to this difficulty, figures required in order to compute

an index of the certainty of conviction are not available in the Crime

In India reports for 1972 and 1973. As a result, for these two years it

was only possible to examine the deterrence hypothesis for the certainty

of arrest. Examination of the conviction variable for the earlier five

year period, however, will allow us to at least speculate about convic-

tions’ deterrent effect for 1972 and 1973.

Finally, in searching for data for the control variables, we found

that population, urbanization, and illiteracy figures were not available

for each of the years considered in the analysis. Data for these variables

are only available for the census years 1961 and 1971. Due to this

problem, figures for the nearest census year were used as an estimate

for these three control factors for cach year, 1967-1973. In contrast,

unemployment figures were found to be available for each year for the

period 1967-1973, with missing data only being somewhat of a problem

for a few federal territories (23).

Possible Spuriousness oË Certainty-Rate Results

Before presenting the results of our analysis, it would seem of value

to at least briefly examine an argument raised by Chiricos and

Waldo (1970) as to the possible spuriousness of findings resulting from

examining the relationship between an independent variable (certainty

OË arrest, and conviction) and a dependent variable (crime rates) that

contain a common term. They argue that since certainty indexes such

as ours (number of arrests/number of crimes, and number of convic-

(23) Due to problems of missing data for one or more of the control

variables, the original N size of 26 to 28 states and territories of India (the

number of states and territories varies by vear) was reduced in some cases as

follows by year

1973 — 24, 1972 — 28, 1971 =— 23, 1970 = 24, 1969 —26,

1968 = 24, 1967 = 22. In almost each case where data were missing, it was

for one of the territories.

— 33 —

tions/number of crimes) have in their denominator the same term that

appears in the numerator of our crime index (number of crimes/

population), correlating such measures will result in a spurious negative

association, even when there is no association between certainty and

offense rate. Because of this problem, Chiricos and Waldo conclude

that their findings of an inverse relationship between the certainty of

imprisonment and crime rates were spuriously produced and do not

provide evidence of deterrence.

As pointed out by Bailey, et al. (1972, 1974) ; Logan (1972, 1975)

and other recent deterrence investigators, the spuriousness problem

that Chiricos and Waldo speak of is only of minor importance, for it

only applies under three conditions that do not hold in most

deterrence investigations

(1) when the number of persons arrested

convicted, or imprisoned equals the number of persons in the popu-

lation, (2) when the number of those arrested, convicted, or imprisoned

and population are constant, or (3) when the number of persons arres-

ted, convicted, or imprisoned and size of the population are unrelated

None of these assumptions hold for either Chiricos and Waldo’s or our

study for

(l) number of arrest, convictions or prison admissions

do not equal population size, (2) arrests, convictions, or imprisonment

and population are not constant in the data examined, and (3) arrests

convictions, imprisonment, and population are positively correlated with

each other, and with the number of crimes, ie., the larger the population,

the more crimes

arrests

convictions

and admissions to prison

(Logan, 1972). In addition, and also contrary to Chiricos and Waldo’s

argument of spuriousness, there would appear to be consensus that

when examining two ratios that are theoretically meaningful as ratios

(in this case crime rates, and certainty rates), and when hypotheses are

stated in terms of the relationship between these ratios, the questions of

indexal artifact due to a common term being in each does not arise

(Logan, 1972 ; Kuh and Meyer, 1955

McNemar, 1969 ; Ragarajan

and Chatterjee, 1969). With this matter addressed, we now turn to the

statistical results of the analysis

FINDINGS

Results for Homicide

Table 1 reports the relationship between certainty of arrest and

conviction (1967-1971 only), the sociodemographic factors and homi-

cides rates by year.

— 34 —

TABLE 1

Relationship between Certainty of Arrest and Conviction, selected

sociodemographic variables, and murder rates for states and territories

of India, by year.

Year

Independent

Simple

Multi-

Beta

Variable

r

pie R2

Cœffi

Cœff.

—0s t —

_—

—

-

1973

Pct. Urban

. « * % + » « © »» © — » e

32

187

— 2.016

448

——

Cert. of Arrest

. . …. ...

195

294

— .505

323

Pct. Illiterate

. * — © © « à © © # e »

337

372

022

327

Population

046

382

— .000

111

Pct. Unemployment

. … . ….

290

392

36.290

103

1972

Pct. Arrest

. . . .. ...

353

124

— .580

341

Pct. Urban

e ». . « e . % % …. < < < — À

245

156

782

185

Pct. Illiterate

. . ..."

148

150

008

171

185

Population

064

000

082

Pct. Unemployment

. ...

012

186

-— 5.409

017

1971

Pct. Illiterate

. . . © … à . % » € % e

510

261

026

469

Cert. of Conviction

e » . ...

365

345

— .034

330

Pct. Unemployment

e … . ...

193

398

— 80.004

209

Cert. of Arrest

e e » * …. ...

056

405

1.078

095

Population

048

405

009

1970

Pct. Illiterate

. « . » . 6 + « 6 . » «

386

149

198

372

Pct. Urban

287

797

6.942

142

Population

. . ... 008.0s%68

221

252

210

Pct. Unemployment

. ...

161

260

— 579.316

134

Cert. of Arrest

» ...

135

271

-— 21.524

182

Cert. of Conviction

. . . ..

047

28

01

123

1969

Pct. Illiterate

. « + * <. © * #% … #% # à

12

045

070

214

Cert. of Arrest

175

079

— 8.009

103

Pct. Urban

200

112

6.861

249

. . ...

102

127

Pct. Unemployment

397.728

178

Cert. of Conviction

— .093

145

— .010

138

Population

«s « . * . « —. s. … © e » e —#

062

146

000

025

1968

Cert. of Conviction

112

013

031

414

Cert. of Arrest

« … - * e « » — € —

— .020

039

— 19.896

335

Pct. Unemployment

e e — » — —

— .075

054

— 468.071

156

Pct. Urban

009

060

— 3.281

099

. » * © e 6 » e — < » « » »

094

062

000

044

Population

Pct. Tlliterate

. . . » …. 0..0..

031

063

013

027

1967

Population

« e » » * …e 8868066006

383

147

456

Pct. Illiterate

141

205

— .005

— .242

Cert. of Conviction

. ...

038

210

— .005

— .079

Pct. Unemployment

031

210

— 3.758

— .025

Pct. Urban

043

210

— .029

— 015

Cert. of Arrest

. . ...

139

210

102

023

— 35

Looking first at the results for arrest, the partial regression cœffi-

cients (b and beta values) show the certainty-rate relationship to fall in

the predicted negative direction for five of the seven years. Only for

1967 and 1971 are the cœfficients positive, with the latter being

somewhat substantial, and the former being very slight. With the excep-

tion of these two years, the regression results show a one percent

increase in the certainty of arrest to be associated with the following

decreases in the number of homicides per 100,000 population : —.51

(1973), —.58 (1972), — 21.52 (1970), — 9.01 (1969), and — 19.90

(1968). Examination of the raw data for arrest and homicide fails to

provide any insight to account for the substantial variation in the

size of the negative cœfficients for these five years, nor why the

cœfficients are positive for 1967 and 1971.

Turning to the findings for certainty of conviction, little apparent

support is provided for the deterrence hypothesis. For the five years

where conviction data are available, the unstandardized (b) regression

results show the conviction-rate relationship to be negative in three

cases (1971, 1969, 1967) and positive in two (1970, 1968). Regardless

of the sign of the cœfficients, however, a one percent increase in the

probability of conviction 1s associated with no more than approximately

a three one hundreds of a person change (increase in 1968, and

decrease in 1971) in the number of homicides per 100,000 population.

For the remaining years, the trade-off between levels of conviction and

homicides is only one third or less than this amount.

Due to arrest, conviction and the sociodemographic factors varying

in their units of measurement, it is not possible to directly compare

the size of the unstandardized (b) regression cœfficients in order to

assess the relative importance of each of these variables on homicide

rates. By standardizing the regression results by the scale of measu-

rement used for cach variable, however, direct comparisons of the effect

of each factor can be made. Such standardized beta cœfficient are

reported in the last column of Table 1.

Looking first to the question of the deterrent effect of arrest vs.

conviction for homicide for the five years where data are available

for both measures, a year-by-year comparison shows the beta values

to be larger for convictions for four years : 1971, 1969, 1968, and 1967.

For 1968, the conviction cœfficient is positive, however. Only for the

two ycars (1967. 1970) where the conviction results are positive are the

arrest cœfficients larger in absolute size.

For the only year (1969) where the arrest and conviction results

are both negative, the beta value 1s larger for the latter factor. Whereas

for this year the unstandardized (b) regression results show a unit

change in the level of arrest to be associated with a larger reduction

— 36 —

in the homicide rate (— 8.01) than a unit change in the certainty of

conviction (— .010), the relative deterrent effect of conviction (—.138)

is slightly greater than that of arrest (—.103).

Further examination of the last column of Table 1 reveals some

additional interesting, and somewhat surprising results. With the excep-

tion of 1968 where the conviction cœfficient is positive (but the arrest

cœfficient is negative), and 1972 where the arrest results are negative, one

or more of the sociodemographic variables proves to be a better predic-

tor of homicide than either of the certainty variables. No single socio-

demographic factor, however, proves to be consistently most strongly

associated with homicide rates. Moreover, the signs of the cœfficients

for these variables vary from year to year, with population, urbanization,

unemployment, and illiteracy sometimes being positively, and some-

times being negatively correlated with homicide. This mixed pattern

of results calls into question the common argument that these socio-

demographic factors exert a positive pressure on crime rates ; at least

for homicide this assumption is not supported.

Results for Rape

Table 2 reports the relationship between certainty of arrest and

conviction (1971 only), the sociodemogaphic factors and rates of

forcible rape for 1971-1973. As noted earlier, rape data are not available

for the earlier period 1967-1970.

TABLE 2

Relationship between certainty of arrest and conviction selected

sociodemographic variables, and forcible rape rates for states and

territories of India, by year.

—

_

Multi

B

Beta

Year

Independent

Simple

Variable

r

ple R

Cœﬁ_î .

Ceffi.

—

1973

Pct. Unemployment

e « … ...

241

058

— 96.968

257

Cert. of Arrest

. s. »* » . e % + # e

021

068

— .303

—

102

Pct. Illiterate

096

074

.004

059

Pct. Urban

098

075

.153

032

Population

e s . …. s. #* + % <. e 6 © © »

089

075

.000

——

029

1972

Pct. Urban

° . . « « o —s « « % — « »#

——

407

166

— 484

423

Cert. of Arrest

. + « e — — 6 © — *

136

194

- .079

212

Pct. Illiterate

030

197

— -001

058

092

200

000

057

Population

e © e « » À

047

201

— 3.522

——

040

Pct. Unemployment

1971

Cert. of Conviction

237

056

— .014

——

525

Pct. Illiterate

. « * » » ». © € 6 ® — —

118

110

— .005

391

. . . . ».

188

181

23.942

252

Pct. Unemployment

208

— .259

218

Pct. Urban

e + © © + © » — © % — e » »

——

047

Population

. e . - — #% 9066 58a06%

107

215

.000

086

Cert. of _êrrest

. … * — « 6 » 6 % à

; 021

——n

21

— .038

—

030

—

— 37 —

Consistent with our hypotheses, the regression results show the

certainty-rate relationship to be negative for both arrest and conviction.

For 1973, the unstandardized (b) cœfficient for arrest shows a one

percent increase in certainty to be associated with a decrease oË .30

rapes per 100,000 population. For the earlier two years, a unit increase

in arrest is only associated with less than a one tenth of a person

reduction in rape rates. Even a less substantial trade-off between

certainty of conviction and rape rates is found for 1971.

Because figures are only available for both arrest and conviction

for 1971, it is only possible to compare the relative deterrent effect

of these two factors for this year. Examination of the beta cœfficients

for this year shows conviction to be more strongly associated with

rape rates than arrest. In fact, the standardized cœfficient for conviction

is Over 15 times as large as its counterpart for arrest. In the absence

of conviction data for the later two years, however, it must remain an

open question whether the same pattern of results would hold for 1972

and 1973. Hopefuily, arrest and conviction data will become available

f£or later years (after 1973) in order to further explore this matter. In

the meanwhile, all that can be done at this point is to tentatively

conclude conviction to be a more important deterrent to rape than arrest.

Further examination of the standardized beta cœfticients reveals a

mixed pattern of results somewhat similar to that found for homicide.

Compared to certainty of arrest, unemployment (1973) and percent

urban population (1972) are found to be twice as good of predictors

of rape rates. Similarly, for 1971, both unemployment and urbanization,

as Well as illiteracy, are much better predictors of rape than arrest.

The signs of the cœfficients for these three sociodemographic factors

(except for unemployment for 1971) are negative, however, which 1s

inconsistent with the common argument that these factors are positi-

vely related to crime rates. To the contrary of this assumption, our

findings for rape show either a mixed pattern (1971), or a predomina-

tely negative association between these variables and offense rates.

Results for Robbery

Table 3 reports the relationship between certainty of arrest and

conviction, the sociodemographic variables, and robbery rates.

TABLE 3

Relationship between certainty of arrest and conviction,

selected sociodemographic variables, and robbery rates for states

and territories of India, by year

——

e 2 e n

Year

Independent

Simple

M ulti-

B

Cm

Variable

Cœffi.

Beta

ple R2

—ecumer ce 00e 0

—— —cames —

1973

Population

e . . ….

218

048

.000

178

Cert.

of Arrest

202

082

— 489

— 160

Pct. Unemployment

145

091

57.144

095

Pct.

Illiterate

e e …. #e0e60s

—

156

094

— 007

060

19'72

Pct.

Illiterate

.. ...

325

106

— .021

295

295

15

.GO9

252

Population

Cert. of Arrest

—

054

175

—.303

206

Pct.

Urban

123

19

— .860

132

Pct. Unemployment

116

194

— 16.342

——

032

i971

Population

« ». . . ...

56

126

.000

392

Pct.

Urban

199

189

2.672

348

Pct. Unemployment

218

81

193.373

322

Cert. of Conviction

191

295

— .0i2

128

Pct.

Illiterate

. ...

031

208

.006

070

Cert. of Arrest

055

302

638

073

1970

Population

. . …. ...

835

697

010

956

Cert.

of Conviction

304

711

-— 1.138

161

Cert. of Arrest

163

724

— 1.693

101

Pct.

Urban

072

730

434.346

078

Pct.

Illiterate

...

107

735

— 4.614

076

Pct. Unemployment

O11

'73\

— 6339 434

013

1969

Population

. . ...

820

672

.007

795

Pct.

Illiterate

»ecec6t:eoes

095

682

— 5.824

092

Pct. Unemployment

058

684

— 18845.716

——

044

Cert. of Conviction

512

685

253

037

Pct.

Urban

« « » #* 06060es666e

127

685

— 91.762

017

Cert. of Arrest

116

685

273

014

1968

Population

« e . …. ...

816

565

.005

542

Cert. of Conviction

705

737

2.682

349

Pct.

Illiterate

. +e %* 006066

363

TM

— 17.891

234

Pct. Unemployment

026

780

— 55869.837

117

Cert. of Arrest

. ….

049

“J

83

1.250

072

Pct.

Urban

« . ...

105

784

—— 238.584

041

1967

Pct.

llliterate

SO1

251

.016

302

Pct. Unemployment

376

307

49.137

136

Population

. * « ». e % — e e%

038

317

009

— 415

Cert.

of Arrest

e ...

356

329

—- 3.209

— .347

Cert. of Conviction

163

376

025

407

Pct.

Urban

009

376

067

014

=— —e Fs

—— es crr e

—0s r

-

— 39 —

Examination oË the results for arrest again only provide partial

support for the deterrence hypothesis. While for 1967, 1970, 1972, and

1973 the cœfficients are in the predicted negative direction, the results

are positive for the remaining three years. In addition, as with homicide,

the unstandardized (b) regression cœfficients are not uniform in size,

with a trade-off between a one percent increase in the arrest rate being

associated with as much as a 3.2 person (1967) reduction, to a 1.7

person (1970) increase in robbery rates.

Similarly, the results for the conviction variable also show a

mixed pattern, with the certainty-rate relationship being in the hypo-

thesized negative direction for two years (1970, 1971) and positive for

three ycars (1967-1969}. Comparison of the unstandardized (b) cæœflfi-

cients also shows them to vary in magnitude, with the result of a unit

increase in the certainty of conviction ranging from a 2.7 (1968) increase

to a 1.1 (1970) decrease in the number of robberies per 100,000 popu-

lation. Again, it remains unclear from our examination of the raw data

why the arrest and conviction results for robbery vary so substantially

by year.

Looking to the question of the relative deterrent effect of arrest vs.

conviction for robbery, the last column in Table 3 shows only one year

(1970) where both of these factors are negatively associated with rate.

Here, conviction proves to be a slightly better predictor of robbery

rates than arrest. For 1971, the negative beta cœfficient is also larger

for conviction than arrest, although the sign for the latter variable 1s

positive. For 1967, the conviction cœfficient is also larger than that for

arrest, but the results for the former variable are positive, and negative

for the latter. Finally, for 1968 and 1969, the results are positive for

both certainty factors, with the cœfficients being larger for convictions.

Also, like the previous findings for homicide and rape, examination

of the relationship between the sociodemographic factors and robbery

rates reveals a mixed pattern. Whereas for some years, population,

urbanization, illiteracy, and unemployment are positively associated

with offense rates, the opposite occurs for other years. Further, even for

the years where the sign of the cœfficients is the same for these variables,

the cœfficients are generally not uniform in size.

Results for House Breaking

Table 4 reports the relationship between certainty of arrest and

conviction, the sociodemographic variables, and rates of house breaking

(burglary).

— 40 --

TABLE 4

Relationship between certainty of arrest and conviction,

selected sociodemographic variables, and rates of house breaking

for states and territories of India, by year

_—

_—

rrrs t cm 08 00

Year

Independent

Simple

Maiti-

B

Cœffi.

Variable

piz R

Cœffi.

Beta

_—

1973

Population

259

067

.000

397

Pct.

Illiterate

e . ...

105

132

155

260

Pct.

Urban

. « »* # eeses

220

176

9.024

225

Cert. of Arrest

040

179

— 1.820

039

082

130

48.936

016

Pct. Unemployment

Pct.

Urban

. . + — « ». » » « à

365

143

13.366

389

1972

212

— 9.719

235

Cert.

of Arrest

227

Population

171

254

.000

——

192

Pct. Unemployment

273

276

— 451.273

170

Pct.

Illiterate

e ». . ...

090

281

— .027

070

1971

Pct.

Urban

310

096

10.975

266

Cert. of Arrest

305

148

— 11.912

——

170

112

163

000

132

Population

078

Pct.

Tiliterate

e . ...

009

166

037

Cert. of Conviction

275

171

—- .068

082

Pct. Unemployment

033

171

— 55.621

017

1970

Population

627

393

008

593

Pct.

Urban

093

433

1833.779

247

155

476

150638.997

229

Pct. Unemployment

372

505

— 1.023

275

Cert.

of Arrest

Pct.

Illiterate

« » < » © » # »

097

542

15.469

191

Cert. of Conviction

119

544

—— .574

058

1969

Population

680

462

.008

648

Cert. of Arrest

. . ...

29°

505

— .643

237

Pct.

Illiterate

088

519

— 8.902

103

Cert. of Conviction

002

522

101

081

063

Pct. Unemployment

025

524

— 36594.713

Pct.

Urban

143

527

— 444.163

061

1968

Population

. . …. ...

594

353

007

479

Pct.

Urban

. » . © —. » « e à

319

460

- 307027.623

442

Cert.

of Arrest

438

604

— 1.753

451

Cert. of Conviction

299

677

2.441

225

031

695

17.183

155

Pct.

Tlliterate

e » » e8%66668

025

Pct.

Urban

« . e « % » % ® » à

018

696

212.572

1967

Cert.

of Arrest

625

391

—- 28.995

382

Population

e e © 6 6 — — e e #

512

519

000

351

Pct. Unemployment

402

581

592.748

212

Pct. Urban

« e » ...

192

594

— 4.729

— 131

Pct.

Illiterate

» .. ...

382

599

098

— .048

.040 A

N

— .068

Cert. of Conviction

—- 485

599

— 4} —

As with rape, but unlike for homicide and robbery, the results for

burglary are quite consistent with what deterrence theory would lead

us to expect. With but two exceptions (convictions, 1968 and 1969), the

certainty-rate results fall in the hypothesized direction for both measures

of sanctions for each year. Turning first to the findings for arrest,

the unstandardized (b) regression cœfficients are generally much larger

than those found for the offenses previously examined, although their

size does vary by year, ranging from a low of — .64 (1969) to a high

of — 29.0 (1967). For the seven year period, the mean unstandardized

cœfficient for arrest is — 7.98, thus indicating on the average a one

percent increase in the certainty of arrest to be associated with about

an eight person reduction in the number of burglaries per 100.000

population. This is only an average estimate, however, with the trade-off

between certainty of arrest and burglary ranging at the extremes from

less than a one person reduction in rates (1969) to about a 29 person

(1967) reduction in burglary rates per a one percent increase in the

probability of arrest.

Examinations of the regression (b) results for conviction again

shows a somewhat mixed pattern, with three of the five cœfficients

being in the hypothesized direction. For 1968 and 1969, the conviction-

offense rate relationship is positive, although the cœfficients for these

years (+ 2.44, +.701) are larger in absolute size than any of the

negative cœfficients. In addition, with the exception of the negative

finding for 1970 — .574), the regression results for the remaining years

show a one unit increase in the certainty of conviction to be associated

with no more than a one tenth of a person decrease in the number of

robberies per 100,000 population.

Comparison of the relative deterrent effect of arrest vs. conviction

for burglary shows the former variable to be generally the more

important of the two. With the exception of 1968, the standardized

beta cœfficients are larger for arrest for the years (1967-1971) where

the effect of the two types of sanctions can be compared. And even for

1968, the beta cœfficients for arrest and conviction are very comparable

in size, with the later only being slightly larger (—.653 vs. —.614).

These findings for burglary provide the most clear cut evidence

in support of the deterrence hypothesis of the offenses yet examined.

In addition, although variation exists for some years for some variables,

the relationship between the sociodemographic factors and burglary

rates fall generally in a positive direction as one might predict.

Results for Thefït

Table 5 reports the relationship between certainty of arrest and

conviction, the sociodemographic factors, and theft rates.

— 42 —

TABLE 5

Relationship between certainty of urrest and conviction,

selected sociodemographic variables, and theft rates for states

and territories of India, by year

——

Year

Mulii

B

Beta

Independeñt

Simple

Variable

ple R2

Ceæffi

Cœffi

——

1973

Cert.

of Arrest

516

266

— 72.552

— .505

Pct.

Illiterate

. .. ...

301

360

595

261

Pct. Urban

. « © * « © » © © —

225

365

8.410

055

Population

010

369

.000

— .066

227

372

-— 725.357

060

Pct. Unemployment

1972

Cert. of Arrest

387

149

— 77.328

433

Pct.

Urban

219

238

35.011

—

255

Pct. Unemployment

267

260

—- 1449.310

137

Pct.

Hliterate

« . ...

079

268

123

081

Population

« e « e + « — = »

081

271

000

058

1971

Cert.

of Arrest

——

412

169

210.496

547

Pct.

Urban

. . .. ...

332

239

44.893

190

Population

149

264

.000

220

Cert. of Conviction

265

276

856

185

Pct.

Illiterate

. ...

171

281

— .184

077

Pct. Unemployment

002

283

-— 1052.104

056

1970

Cert.

of Arrest

474

224

— 826.080

— 1.489

Cert.

of Conviction

262

.366

6.135

068

Population

« e * « * « » 6 % e

205

A86

.000

335

Pct.

Urban

241

510

40.615

133

Pct.

Illiterate

094

522

356

107

——

Pct. Unemployment

091

528

— 2388494

088

i969

Cert.

of Arrest

« . . © » e

——

340

lé0

— 470.810

796

Population

. . ...

212

297

.000

— 439

Cert. of Conviction

233

334

2.068

321

Pct. Unemployment

152

335

— 857.138

— .033

Pct. Illiterate

e e » * % — 8

——

037

336

— .123

-— .032

Pct.

Urban

. ...

162

337

10.092

031

1968

Cert.

of Arrest

508

258

-— 357.573

— 1.539

Cert.

of Conviction

250

387

2.769

1.130

Pct. Urban

» » » ® e — — e o —

276

512

35.796

300

Population

...

081

593

000

— 318

Pct. Unemployment

136

621

— 1682.681

— .172

Pct.

Illiterate

236

622

.056

036

1967

Pct.

Illiterate

. « e © e » — —

432

187

099

123

Population

« » . ». % © % © » e

369

261

000

207

209

265

298.469

055

Pct. Urban

Pct. Unemployment

071

270

7.933

112

Cert. of Conviction

— .077

272

683

537

Cert. of Arrest

...

— .312

305

84.610

—- 632

——

— 43 —

Âs with burglary, the regression results for arrest are consistent

with the deterrence hypothesis for each year. Examination of the

unstandardized (b) cæfficients shows the certainty of arrest-theft rate

relationship to be in the predicted negative direction in each case. The

cœfficients vary somewhat in size, however, ranging from a negative

association of — 72.6 (1973), to a very substantial negative association

for 1970 (— 826.1), 1969 (— 470.8), and 1968 (— 357.6). The mean

unstandardized cœfficient for the entire seven year period is — 299.9,

thus indicating on the average a one percent increase in the certainty

of arrest to be associated with about a 300 person reduction in the theft

rate for the years considered.

In complete contrast, the regression results for certainty of

conviction provide no support for the deterrence hypothesis. To the

contrary, the cœfficients are positive for convictions for each year, thus

indicating increases in the certainty of this factor to be associated with

increases, and not a decrease, in theft rates. For none of the five offenses

examined here, are the results for convictions so contrary to our

hypothesis.

Âs wWith our earlier findings, no consistent pattern is observed

between the sociodemographic variables and theft rates. For some years

these factors are positively associated with oflense rates, while for

other years the signs of the cæœfficients are reversed. Without exception,

however, the beta results for each year show certainty of arrest to be

a better predictor of theft rates than any of the sociodemographic

factors. In short, for no single offense nor year are the findings for

arrest so consistent, but the results for conviction so inconsistent,

with the deterrence argument.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In this investigation we examine the deterrence hypotheses of an

inverse relationship between the certainty of arrest and conviction and

crime rates for states and territories of India, 1967-1973. While recent

years have witnessed a number of similar investigations in the United

States, with some support found for the deterrence thesis, to our

knowledge similar analyses have not been conducted in other countries.

We view this as a very unfortunate situation, for as Durkheim pointed

out many years ago

« One cannot explain a social fact of any complexity (in this

case deterrence) except by following its complete development

through all social species. Comparative sociology is not a

— 44 —

particular branch of sociology ; it is sociology itself, in so

[ar as it ceases to be purely descriptive and aspires to account

for facts ». (Durkheim, 1938, 139).

Reminding us of Durkheim’s word and the current state of

comparative criminology, Clinard and Abbott (1975) conclude that,

American criminologists have been highly ethnocentric in assuming

that the claims they make based upon their work largely in one country

— the United States — are applicable to other countries. Although

comparative sociology has been increasing in recent years, there have

been only limited developments in comparative criminology, with

comparative work in the area of deterrence being a definite case in

point. It is our hope that the investigation reported here will be the

first in what will turn out to be a long line of continuing deterrence

research in other countries.

Like earlier investigations in the United States, the findings pre-

sented above provide some support for the deterrence argument.

Contrary to our hypotheses, however, a substantial inverse relationship

was not found between the certainty of arrest and conviction and

offense rates for each crime. Rather, the analysis revealed substantial

variation in the relationship between the punishment and rate variables.

Consistent with the deterrence hypothesis, the certainty of arrest-

offense rate results were found to be in the predicted negative direction

for each year for rape, theft, and breaking and entering (burglary).

In addition, negative arrest cœfficients were found for five of the seven

(71 percent) years for homicide, and four of the seven (57 percent)

years for robberv. The size of the negative cœfficients was found to

vary substantially. however, both between and within offense categories.

In part, this variation is not all together unexpected for similar

investigations in the United States have also shown certainty of arrest

not to have a uniform deterrent effect on all types of crimes. In addition,

deterrence theory itself suggests that the threat of legal sanctions

Will not have the same etffect on all offenses. To the contrary, early as

well as later proponents of punishment argue that « expressive acts »

like murder, assault, rape, etc., are much less subject to the law than

« instrumental crimes » like theft, robbery, burglary, shoplifting, etc.

Our findings for arrest are generally consistent with this argument,

with the size of the negative cœfficients being generally larger on the

average for theft, burglary, and robbery than for murder and rape.

(Again, however, over half of the results for robbery are positive).

This pattern of findings suggests that in India, as in the United States,

arrest provides a less effective deterrent to crimes against persons than

crimes against property.

— 45 —

The results of the analysis for certainty of conviction reveal a very

different pattern. For theft, where the arrest results are most consistent

with our hypotheses, the certainty of conviction-offense rate rela-

tionship is positive for each year, with the cœfficients being quite

substantial in some cases. Somewhat similarly, for burglary, where the

arrest resuits arc also very consistent with the deterrence hypothesis,

the conviction-rate cœfficients are either positive or low-negative. On the

other hand, for robbery, the arrest and conviction findings are more

comparable, with only two of the conviction cœfficients being negative,

and the positive cæœfficients being on the whole larger in size. Finally,

for murder and rape, the majority of the conviction results are negative,

as is the case with arrest. For each year, however, the negative convic-

tion cœfficients are very slight, thus indicating the certainty of

conviction to only have a very slight deterrent effect on rape and

murder.

These findings for conviction arc in striking contrast to what

deterrence theory would lead us to expect, and the results of previous

investigations in the United States. While deterrence investigations in

the United States have generally not focused upon convictions directly,

but rather upon arrest and imprisonment, our negative findings for

convictions for India is indeed surprising in light of : (1) the rather

consistent results found for arrest — a necessary requirement for con-

viction — for this country, and (2) the rather consistent arrest and

imprisonment results found in studies conducted in the United States.

At least two possible explanations might account for why the

findings for conviction are so inconsistent with the deterrence hypo-

thesis. First, it might be speculated that the level of convictions

for crime in India is not sufficient to achieve a substantial deterrent

effect. As Tittle and Rowe (1974) found in their investigation of arrest

for cities and counties in the state of Florida, certainty levels had to

exceed a 30 percent level before a substantial deterrent effect became

evident. Second, it might also be speculated that certainty of conviction

fails to deter in India because even upon conviction, the sanctions that

result are not severe enough to discourage crime. In this regard, it

must be kept clearly in mind that the certainty and severity of legal

sanctions are not independent factors. To the contrary, sanctions,

regardless of their level of severity, can only result if there is certainty :

i.e, legal sanctions can only be applied upon conviction. Likewise,

regardless of the certainty of conviction, if the sanctions that follow

are not sufficiently severe, the threat of conviction and the law will be

robbed (at least to some degree) of its deterrent effect.

In an attempt to explore the first of these possibilities, average

certainty of conviction levels were computed for each offense by

taking the ratio of reported crimes to convictions for the period 1967-

— 46 —

1971. This analysis resulted in the following percentage conviction

figures : homicide (35.3 percent), rape (23.8 percent), robbery (16.7

percent), burgiary (18.4 percent), theft (22.9 percent). Unfortunately,

comparable estimates cannot be computed for the United States for

these crimes because the F.B.I. only reports in the Uniform Crime

Reports conviction figures for some cities of this country (which include

only about one half of the United States population), and not the

entire nation (24). Nor does Orsagh (1973), in his study of convictions

in California counties and cities, provide us with conviction levels for

the major felonies (25). As a result, it is simply not possible at this time

to compare conviction levels in India and the United States, nor to

address the question oï how levels of conviction in India may not be

sufficieniiy high to adequately deter crime (26). Such an analysis will

have to await conviction data that are currently not available.

In order to explore the second possibility noted above, that upon

conviction the sanctions received may not be severe enough to ade-

quately deter crime, it would be necessary to examine sentencing

patterns for each crime, Here again, such an analysis is not immediately

possible for we have not been able to secure the necessary sentencing

and imprisonment figures in order to explore this possibility. Às a

result, this question too must be left to future investigators. Clinard and

Abbott’s (1973) report that the vast majority (85 percent) of persons

imprisoned in India are released within a minimum of six months, does

however, suggest some promise in this line of inquiry (27).

In addition 10 the possible effect of the above two factors, at least

two more considerations must be taken into account as possible expla-

nations of our generally negative findings for the certainty of conviction.

First, and along theoretical lines, proponents of deterrence argue

that if legal sanctions are to have a substantial deterrent eflect,

punishment must be certain, severe, and prompt. While the former

two dimensions of punishment have received much attention in studies

in the United States, the celerity factor has been ignored in the empirical

literature. Nor have we considered this aspect of punishment in this

(24) Nor it is possible to compile from the F.B.l's report felony figures

for the portion of the United States when conviction data are available in

order to compute convicion rates comparable to those for India.

(25) In addition, there are no nation-wide court statistics that would allow

us to compute a conviction rate like that used for India.

(26) The theoretical literature on deterrence also unfortunately fails to provide

us with much insight in this regard. Discussions of this matter are no more

specific than to suggest that punishment must be « certain » to be an ceffective

deterrent (Zimring and Hawkins, 1973 ; Gibbs, 1975).

(27)

Unfortunatelv, they fail to provide length of imprisonment figures by

type of offense. As a result, it is not possible to compare such figures with

data that are available for states of the United States.

ue AÉ ce

investigation due to the necessary data not being available. As a result,

we can only speculate at this point how our findings for conviction, as

well as arrest, might have been affected by our not incorporating

this variable into the analysis. This question too will have to await

future investigation when the necessary celerity data become available.

Second, and along methodological lines, it might be argued that the

police figures for crime, arrest and conviction used in this analysis are

not sufficiently refined in order to conduct a proper investigation of

deterrence. As noted earlier, Chiricos and Waldo (1970) raise this very

question about using available police and prisoner figures in conduc-

ting deterrence investigations in the United States (28).

Although it is not possible to provide a conclusive answer to

this last question, this possibility must be taken very seriously. As

reported earlier, in examining the hypotheses for arrest and conviction,

we observed substantial ycarly variation in the size, and in many cases

the sign, of thc certainty-offense rate results. This variation may well

reflect error, or noise factors, in the figures being examined, with the

deterrent effect of arrest and conviction being much more substantial

than the data reflect. Future investigations such as our’s for later years,

where police data will likely be less subject to possible error factors,

will hopefully shed some additional light on this question.

In conclusion, we have examined here an important, but neglected

area in comparative criminology ; this being the deterrent effect of

arrest and conviction on crime rates in a country other than the

United States (29)., Due to a number of possible theoretical and

methodological limitations of this investigation, our analysis failed

to provide conclusive support for the deterrence hypothesis. The extent

to which our mixed findings reflect a lack of deterrence, or the

effect of the limitations noted above, however, remains unclear. It

is our hope that future investigators will treat each of the possible

limitations we have noted as questions worthy of further research. Only

through continuing efforts along these lines will we gain a better

understanding of the deterrent effect of legal sanctions.

(28) Compared to other developing countries, Clinard and Abbott (1973)

rank the state of crime statistics in India verv favorably. Their discussions of

this topic is very brief and general, however, and doesn’t allow us to adequately

assess the use India police figures in investigations such as ours.

(29)

It is of interest to note that in Clinard and Abbott’s (1973) recent

survey of comparative criminologv and crime in the developing countries, no

attention is given to the matter of deterrence, nor the void of comparative

investigations in this area.

— 48 —

REFERENCES

Punishment and deterrence, Ann Arbor. The University

ANDENAES (J.),

of Michigan Press, 1974.

BAILEY (W. C.) : « Certainty of Arrest and Crime Rates for Major Felonies

A Research Note », in Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency,

July 1976 (n°

13), pp. 145-154.

« Murder and Capital Punishment : Some Further Evidence» , in American

Journal of Orthopsychiatry, July 1975, (n° 45), pp. 669-688.

« On Punishment and

BAILEY (W.C.), GRAY (L.N.), and MARTIN (J.D.)

Crime (Chiricos and Waldo) : Some Methodological commentary », in

Social Problems, 1972, (n° 19), Fall, pp. 284-289.

BAILEY (W.C.), MARTIN (J.D.), and GRAY (L.N.) : « Crime and deterrence :

A Correlation Analysis », in Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency,

1974, 11, (n° 2), pp. 124-143.

BEDAU (H.A.) : The Death Penalty in America, Revised Edition. New York,

Doubleday-Anchor Books, 1967.

BEDAU (H.A.) and CHESTER (P.) (eds.)

Capital Punishment in the

United States, 1976, New-York, Ams Press Inc. BUREAU OF POLICE

RESEARCH and DEVELOPMENT, MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

Crime In India, 1973. New Delhi, India. 1975.

Crime

In

India, 1972, New

Delhi,

India

1974

In

India

1973

Crime

India, 1971. New

Delhi,

Crime

In

India, 1970. New

Delhi,

India

1972

Crime

In

India, 1969. New

Delhi,

India

1971

Crime

In

India, 1968. New

Delhi,

India

1970

Crime

In

India, 1967. New

Delhi,

India

1969

CHIRICOS (T.) and WALDO (G.) : « Punishment and Crime : An Examination

of some Empirical Evidence», in Social Problems, Fall 1970, (n° 18),

pp. 200-217.

CLINARD (B.) and ABBOTT (D)) : Crime in Developing Countries. New York,

John Wiley and Sons, 1973.

DURKHEIM (E.) : The Rules of Sociological Method. Chicago, University of

Chicago Press. 1938.

EHRLICH (I)

« The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Law Enforcement », in

The Journal of Legal Issues, 1972, 1 (n° 2), pp. 259-276.

GIBBS (J.P.) : Crime, Punishment and Deterrence. New York, Elsevier, 1975.

« Crime, Punishment and Deterrence», in Southwestern Social Science

Quartely, March 1968, (n° 48), pp. 515-530.

GRAY (L.N.) and MARTIN (J.D.) : « Punishment and Deterrence : Another

Analysis of Gibbs’ Data » in Social Science Quarterlv, September 1969,

(n° 49), pp. 289-295.

— 49 —

KUH (E.) and MEYER (JR)

« Correlation and Regression Estimates When

Data Are Ratios », in Econometrica, October 1955, (n° 23), pp. 400-416

LOGAN (C.H,

« Arrest Rates and Deterrence », in Social Science Quarterly,

December 1975, (n° 56), pp. 376-389

« General Deterrent Effect of Imprisonment ». in Social Forces, September

1972, (n

51), pp. 64-73

McNEMAR (Q.), Psychological Statistics

1969, 4th Ed.…. New York, John

Wiley and Sons

MINISTRY OF PLANNING, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

Statistical

Abstract

India

1973

New

Delthi

India

19775

Statistical

Abstract

India

1972

New

Delhi

India

1974

Statistical

Abstract

India

1971

New

Delhi

India

1973

Statistical

Abstract

India

1970

New

Delhi

India

1972

Statistical

Abstract

India

1969

New

Delhi

India

1971

Statistical

Abstract

India

1968

New

Delhi,

India

1970

Statistical

Ahstract

India,

1967.

New

Delhi,

Ïnd1a

1969

ORSAGH (T) :

« Crime, Sanctions and Scœnt1ﬁc Explanation », in Journal of

Criminal Law and Criminology, 1973, 64 (n°

3), pp. 354-361.

« An Economic Analysis of the

PHILLIPS (L.) and VOTEY (HLL. r.

Deterrent Effect of Law Enforcement on Criminal Activity» in Journal

of Criminal Law

Criminology and Police

Science

1972, 63 (n

4)

pp. 330-342.

RANGARAJAN (C.) and CHATTERIEE (S.) :

« À Note on Comparison

Between Correlation Cœfficients of Original and Transformed Variables »

in American Statistician, October 1969, (n°

23), pp. 28-29.

Capital

Punishment

New York. quper and

Row

SELLIN (T.), (ed.)

Publishers, 1967

SJOQUIST (D.

« Property Crime and Economic Behavior

Some Empirical

Results »

in The

American

Economic kReview

June

1973

(n

63)

——

pp. 439-446.

TITTLE (R

« Crime Rates and Legal Sanct10ns ». in Social Problems Spring

1969, (n° 16), pp. 409-423.

TITTLE (R.) and LOGAN (C)

« Sanctions and Deviance

Evidence and

Remaining Questions », in Law and Society Review, Sprmg 1973, (n° 7),

pp. 371-392.

TITTLE (C.) and ROWE (A.R.)

« Certainty of Arrest and Crime Rates

A Further Test of the Deterrence Hypothesis », in Social Forces, June 1974

(n° 52), pp. 455-462

ZIMRING (F.E.) and HAWKINS (G.) : Deterrence : The Legal Threat in Crime

Control, Chicago. The University of Chicago Press, 1973

— -50 —

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION OF RESEARCH AND

LEGAL REFORM WORK IN THE FIELD OF ECONOMIC

AND BUSINESS CRIME*

KLAUS TIEDEMANN

University of Freiburg

Freiburg i. Br.

Federal Republic of Germany.

Public and scientific interest in white collar crime, especially in

economic and business crime, has considerably increased in the last

few years. Certainly, French scholars, for example, have long since

taught « droit pénal des affaires » in their university courses, and

« diritto penale commerciale » or « derecho penal economico » is a well

treated subject of Italian and Spanish speaking scholars (1).

Àlso, periods of economic crisis usually produce a special economic

law in most countries, with some of these legislations surviving the

times of crisis and serving as a base for future legislation and law

enforcement. But it is only in the last several years that a more or

less general interest in the integrity or non-integrity of the whole

world of business has spread all over the western world (2).

(1) As to the French situation, see Delmas-Marty, Droit pénal des affaires

(1973) ; Larguier, Droit pénal des affaires (2nd ed. 1975) ; Dupont-Delestraint,

Droit pénal des affaires (1974) ; for Italy, see Conti, Diritto penale commerciale,

2 vol. (1965‘67) ; Pedrazzi/Da Costa, Tratado de Direito Penal Economico

vol. 1 (1973 - also to Brasilian Law) ; for Spain, cp. Bajo Fernandez, El Derecho

Penal y Ciencias Penales 1973, 91 f£. with further references.

(2) Some examples — for Austria

Liebscher, Die Wirtschaftsdelikte im

Gsterreichischen Strafrecht, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft

1976, 261 ff.

and Tintner, Organisation und Arbeitsweise der Exekutive bei

der Bekämpfung der Wirtschaftskriminalität in Osterreich, in : Schäfer (ed.),

for

Wirtschaftskriminalität/Weisse-Kragen-Kriminalität (1974) pp. 513 fi

9

Belgium

Kellens, Le crime en col blanc

sa place dans une criminologie

économique, Revue de Science Criminelle 1974, 807 ff. ; for France : Cosson,

Les délits en matière de banques et d’établissements financiers, Revue de

Science Criminelle 1973, 1 ff. ; Delmas-Marty, La criminalité d’affaires, Revue

de Science Criminelle 1974, 45 ff. ; Frilloux, La fraude commerciale, Revue

Internationale de Criminologie et de Police Technique 1972, 36 ff. ; for the

Federal Republic of Germany : Kaiser, Kriminologie (3rd ed. 1976) pp. 283 ff. ;

— 51 —

For the United States, Watergate seems to have been a kind of

symbol for a broad inquiry into the behavior of people and institutions

heretofore believed sacrosanct, and the Lockheed affair led to a wide

national interest, especially in corruption and bribery. The Lockheed

and Exxon scandals in Italy, the Netherlands and Japan revealed at

the same time that even outside North and South America politicans

are much more involved in business than it was previously believed

in countries where generally politicians do not become politicans in

order to earn much money.

The intensive activity of the Securities and Exchange Commission

and a remarkable number of civil suits against big corporations then

disclosed large corporate frauds in the U.S., which go side by side

with « traditional » illegal and criminal business patterns such as anti-

trust offenses and tax fraud (3).

In Europe, there were not such particular events like Watergate to

contribute to explanations of or speculations about the increasing

interest in economic and business crime. Nevertheless, the European

press records no fewer business scandals than in the U.S., with the

phenomena of business delinquency being much the same — tax fraud,

anticompetitive behavior, corporate frauds, and, especially, securities

Tiedemann, Erscheinungsformen der Wirtschaftskriminalität und Môglichkeiten

ihrer strafrechtlichen Bekämpfung, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissen-

schaft 1976, 231 ff… and : La criminalité d’affaire dans l’économie moderne,

Revue Internationale de Criminologie et de Police Technique 1975, 147 ff.; for the

Netherlands : Schaffmeister, Das niederländische Wirtschaftsstrafgesetz, Zeits-

chrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 1973, 782 ff. ; for the United

Kingdom

Borell and Cashinella, Crime in Britain Today 1975 pp. 77 ff. ;

Mack, The Crime Industry 1975 pp. 21 ff. ; for Switzerland

Burger,

Wirtschaftskriminalität 1977 ; Graven, L’Economie du Droit Pénal et le Droit

Pénal Economique, Revue de Droit Pénal Suisse 1976, 337 fîf. ; for the United

States of America : Edelhertz, The Nature, Impact and Prosecution of White-

Collar Crime 1970 ; Geis (ed.), White-Collar Criminal (1968), and the articles

forming the symposium in American Criminal Law Review 1973, 817 ff.

(3) See Herlihy/Levine, Corporate Crisis : The Overseas Payment Problem,

Law and Policy in International Business 1976, vol. 8 pp. 547 ff. ; Hermann,

Conspiracy,

The

Business

Enterprise,

White

Collar Crime and Federal

Prosecution, Creighton Law Review 1976 vol. 9 pp. 647 ff. ; Mathews, Criminal

Prosecutions under the Federal Securities Laws and Related Statutes, George

Washington Law Review 1971, vol. 39 pp. 901 ff. ; Annual Report of the

S.E.C. for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1975 (1976) pp. 45 ff., 65 fi. ;

Public Citizen Staff Report : White-collar Crime January 1973-June 1974 (1974)

pp. 8 ff 16 ff. ; Blum/Kaplan/Halleck, Transnational Crime (L.E.A.A.-manu-

script 1976) ; Hey/Kelley, An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies,

Journal of Law and Economics 1974, vol. 17 pp. 13 ff. ; Stone, Where the

Law Ends : The Social Control of Corporate Behavior 1975 ; United States

Department of Justice (ed.). Multinational White-collar Crime 1976, pp. 44 fif.

— 52 —

fraud and corporate embezzlement (4). The activity of multinational

corporations, especially in the Third World countries, has finally

stimulated not only national interest in the Third World, but now has

induced the United Nations to put the « Crimes through Misuse

of Power, especially Economic Power » on their long-term program

and make it a subject for the next Crime Prevention and Criminal

Justice congress in Melbourne 1980.

Until today, scientific research in this field has not corresponded

to this vast public and political interest. Certainly there have been many

articles and theories on the impact of economic and business crime

though mostly these have been based on a small empirical background

and directed toward a very restricted sector of business life. One can

even say that since Sutherland there has been no broad empirical

approach to the subject in the U.S., where the problem of white collar

crime has, until about 10 years ago, been investigated only by socio-

logists. For an outsider it is interesting to see how, in the past a few

big cases — such as the Philadelphia Electrical equipment case or

the Equity Funding Corporation case — have generated a vast literature

which has never made a broad inquiry into the relation of these big

cases to normal business life, and never examined the subtle practices

of circumvention or the empirical effect of sanctions which, in the

form of fines are often paid not by the culprit, but by the firms,

and are subsequently reflected in increased prices, deducted from the

income tax, and so on.

Yet, as understood by European scholars for the last decade or so,

American economists, by focusing on the economics of crime and

punishment, begin to offer a valuable perspective on our subject. One

of the factors responsible for this new found interest is that, in wide-

spread opinion of economists and econometrics criminologists have not

provided a systematic framework for analyzing criminal activity ;

(whereas criminologists may think that economists have not managed

the problems of economy). The choice theoretic model of microecono-

mics, e.g., is believed, by scholars such as Becker (1968), to afford a par-

ticular useful structure for such an analysis (5). The choice to commit a

crime becomes thus a special case of the models of economic choice

(4) Synopsis in Tiedemann, Phenomenology of Economic Crime, in : Council

of Europe (ed.), Criminological Aspects of Economic Crime (1977).

(S) Becker, Crime and Punishment : An Economic Approach, Journal of

Political Economy 1968, vol. 76 pp. 169 ff£. ; see also Becker/Landes (ed.),

Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment (1974). As an example for

tvpical criminological studies in econometrics see

Rose-Ackermann, The

Economics of Corruption, Journal of Public Economics 1975, vol. 4 pp. 187 ff.

A summary concerning the American point of view to that field of research

is given by Hermann, Economic Analysis of Law (Book Reviews), Washington

University Law Quarterly 1974, 354 ff.

theory which hypothesizes that all individuals respond to incentives,

and if the costs and benefits associated with an action change, then the

agent’s choices are also likely to change. In this view, perhaps too

rational in its general approach, the decision to commit offenses is

reached by an egocentric cost-benefit analysis, with the expected benefits

and costs containing both monetary and psychological elements. Noting

just the recent books of Becker and Landes (1974), Posner (1975),

McPheters and Strange (1976) or Kaplan and Kessler (1976), this

literature includes into its economic approach economic and business

delinquency, with the earlier papers of Allingham and Sandmo (1972),

Kolm (1973), and Singh (1973) addressing the very questions of income

tax evasion (6). In Europe, there has been, up to now, no corresponding

approach as far as property and other business crimes are concerned.

Particularly, nearly all German economists do not touch on the dirty

subject of business crime at all (7), and even governmental agencies of

trade and industries, as well as teachers of economic law, seem to consi-

der business crime a neglectable quantity or a phenomenon incompara-

ble with « real » crimes sanctioned with imprisonment. In Europe, mo-

reover, research on the subject has been slight and only very recent, and

most articles, written mainly by lawyers and sociologists, lack the

benefit of practical economic experience, often replacing it with an

ideological slant. The number of relevant articles does demonstrate,

nevertheless, the increased interest of scholars. Thus, to give just one

representative example, one-third of the 1974 volume of the well-

known « Revue de science criminelle et de droit pénal comparé »

(Paris) consisted of articles on economic and business crime.

By the way, French criminological and law enforcement discussion

on the subject was initiated by Professor Cosson’s book on tax fraud

(1971), which demonstrates the techniques of VAT fraud, with its fake

exports, fictitious bills and dummies — a typical modus operandi for

many actual patterns of fraud, e.g., on the level of the Furopean Com-

munity (E.C.) (8).

Income Tax

Evasion

A Theoretical

(6) Allingham/Sandmo,

Analysis.

Journal of Public Economics 1972, vol. 1 pp. 323 ff. ; Kolm, A Note on

Optimum Tax Evasion, Journal of Public Economics 1973 vol. 2 pp. 265 ff. :

Singh. Making Honesty the Best Policy, Journal of Public Economics 1973

vol. 2 pp. 257 ff.

(7) Some of the few exceptions are Molsberger, Wirtschaftskriminalität und

Wirtschaftsordnungen, Wirtschaftspolitische Chronik 1976. vol. 25 pp. 179

ff

and Zybon,

Wirtschaftskriminalität Aals

gesamtwirtschaftliches

Problem

(1972) as well as the authors in number 5 of the review Betriebswirtschaftliche

Forschung und Praxis 1975.

(8) Cosson, Les Industriels de la Fraude Fiscale (1971) ; cf. also Cosson.

L’Etat Victime du Crime Organisé, Revue de Droit Pénal et de Criminologie

1973/74, 237 f.

— 54 —

The E.C. criminality, mainly caused by the economic system of customs

and -subsidies seperating the E.C. member states from the lower world

trade levels, was then studied by a group of scholars appointed by

French government and directed by Professor Delmas-Marty (9), who

also acted as a reporter. on business crime at the National French

Congress on Cnmmology in 1975. (10).

_

There are additional recent studœs like that of Professor Delmas-

Saint-Hilaire’'s Group on business crime in the Bordeaux area (11) or

a new book of Professor Cosson on fraude in the field of banking (12)

In Belgium Professor Kellens pushed economic criminological theo-

ries forward and published a comprehenswe study on bankruptcy,

including experiences of the U.S. in the field of organized (planned)

bankruptcy (13).

In West Germany, both practical and theoretical discussions and

measures were stimulated by the German Lawyers’ Day 1972, which

recommended, on the basis of my own expertise, a thorough analysis

oË the economic and economic criminal law system with regard to

business crime, the reorganization of law enforcement authorities, the

amendment of statistical recording of the types of business crime, and

other activities (14). One of the results of these recommendations

was that in the same year the Federal Ministry of Justice introduced

a Commission for Combatting Business Crime. This commission has,

since then, in view of amending civil law, criminal law and law enfor-

cement, done an outstanding job of research into many subjects of

business life (law of competition, tax and subvention law, usury, bank

ruptcy, credit affairs, bogus firms — and corporate law, computer crime

bribery and corruption, frauds in the building industry, misuse of

insider informations, frauds and abuses concerning securities, cheques

bills, cheque and credit cards

The first recommendations of this Commission led to the so-

called First Law for Combatting Business Crime (1976), introducing

(9) Université de Lille II, Institut de Criminologie et des Sciences Criminelles

(ed:), La Délinquance d’Affaires dans le Cadre des Règles Communautaires -

Rapport Final (1976).

(10) See Revue de Science Criminelle et de Droit Pénal Comparé 1974, 465 f.

(11) Université de Bordeaux I, Institut de Sciences Criminelles (ed.), La

Criminalité des Affaires dans la Région Bordelaise (1975).

(2) La Monnaie des Autres (1977).

(13) Kellens, Banqueroute et Banqueroutiers (1974), see also Kellens, Ten-

dances actuelles du droit de la banqueroute, Revue de Droit Pénal et de

Criminologie 1972, 1047 fif.

14) Verhandlungen des 49. Deutschen Juristentages 1972, vol. 2 pp. M 201 ff

— 55 —

new civil and criminal provisions on usury, bankruptcy, credit fraud,

fraudulent procurement of subsidies to business and industry (14 a). À

drafît of a Second Law is planned for the end of 1977.

In the academic sphere, there have long been come smaller studies,

most of them being doctoral thesis, guided by Professor Geerds on

subjects such as bankruptcy, fraud against insurance companies, falsi-

fication of products (food and wine) (15). A rather broad investigation

into all criminal procedures, handled by the permanent special prose-

cutors for economic criminal affairs, introduced in Germany about six

years ago and imitated in France since 1976, is being run by Professor

Kaiser, of the Freiburg Max Planck Institute ; preliminary reports

of this criminological research have been made public in 1976 and 1977,

based on all economic criminal procedures opened in 1974 and 1975,

and studying the concerned branches of trade and industry, the law

form of the relevant corporations, the material damage and other

aspects (16).

My own studies in this field began with a study, done for the Federal

Ministry of Justice and for the above mentioned Commission, on

fraudulent obtaining of subsidies in all sectors of social and economic

life, fom public welfare to subsidies on the E.E.C. level and to aids for

the developing countries (17). Another study of mine, also done for

the Ministry of Justice, was on criminal policy in the field of antitrust

offenses, including questions of whether to transform the most severe

regulatory offenses into criminal offenses and of what alternatives to

criminal sanctions could reasonably be recommended, also considering

the experiences and practices of the U.S., of France, and of the E.E.C.

(14a) For an Italian translation of this Law see Lanzi, L’Indice Penale 1976,

470 ff.

(15) Landry, Inverkehrbringen und Herstellen gesundheitsschädlicher Gegens-

tände, Dissertation Kiel 1966 ; P. Schmidt, Die trügerische Reklame, Disser-

tation Kiel 1965

Schad, Betrügereien gegen Versicherungen, Dissertation

Kiel 1965 ; Hammerl, Die Bankrottdelikte, Dissertation Frankfurt 1970 :

Sievers, Bestechung und Bestechlichkeit von Angestellten, Dissertation Kiel 1963

(c£. also Geerds, Einzelner und Staatsgewalt im geltenden Strafrecht, 1969,

pp. 64 ff.).

(16) Berckhauer, Forschungsbericht über die Bundesweite Erfassung von

Wirtschaftsstraftaten nach einheitlichen Gesichtspunkten im Jahre 1974 (1976),

Berckhauer/Rada, Forschungsbericht über die Bundesweite Ergassung usw. im

Jahre 1975 (1977) ; see also, Kaiser, Kriminologie loc. cit., p. 301 f.

(17) Tiedemann, Subventionskriminalität in der Bundesrepublik (1974) ; see

also Tiedemann, Kriminologische und kriminalistische Aspekte der Subvention-

serschleichung, in : Schäfer, loc. cit. (footnote 2), pp. 19 ff. ; Tiedemann, La

Fraude dans le Domaine des Subventions : Criminologie et Politique Criminelle,

Revue de Droit Pénal et de Criminologie 1975/76, 129 ff.

— 56 —

Commision (18). Besides a smaller study on credit and bank frauds (19),

I have guided further studies on

the deterrent effect of criminal

sanctions, especially in the field of subsidy and tax frauds (20), on

stock market frauds (21), on computer crime (22), boycott conspiracy

(23) and wine fraud (24).

This short survey on recent and current European research would

be incomplete without mentioning the activities of the Council of

Europe. The Division of Crime Problems organized the 1976 conference

on the criminological aspects of economic crime (25) and a special

subcommittee of the Council is starting a long term program to

stimulate research in the field of economic and business crime, with

the final aim of harmonizing the legislations of member nations against

delinquent business behavior.

I do not intend to give a detailed survey on the results of all

these studies and especially those of my own. These works cover a rather

wide and heterogenic field of subjects, the problems of which can only

partly be compared with phenomena and problems of other countries.

Thus by study on fraudulent procurement of subsidies, based on 850

original court and administrative authorities’ records, focused mainly

on specific deficiencies of the E.C. legislation and of German admin-

istrative and criminal law provisions. Nevertheless we could also make

it clear that the very process of granting, especially of non-reimbursable

subsidies, is a primary criminogenic factor, while the regular and natural

control employed by every business, that is the need to make recom-

pense, is absent. Thus, artificial means of social control have to be

introduced, among which we proposed a licencing system modeled on

parts of German tax legislation. As to macroeconomics, from the point

of view of fighting against crime, it must be regretted that lost contri-

butions are increasingly taking the place of subsidized loans, which

generally are well controlled by banking agencies.

(18) Tiedemann,

Kartellrechtsverstôsse und Strafrecht (1976)

b

cf.

also

Tiedemann, Wettbewerb und Strafrecht (1976) ; Tiedemann, Wirtschaftsstra-

frecht und Wirtschaftskriminalität 1976, vol. 2 pp. 14 ff, 225 f.

(19) Tiedemann/Cosson, Straftaten und Strafrecht im deutschen und fran-

zôsischen Bank - und Kreditwesen (1973).

(20) Breland, Lernen und Verlernen von Kriminalität (1975), and more

detailed

Breland, Präventive Kriminalitätsbekämpfung, Dissertation Giessen

1974 (see also Tiedmann, in : Verhandlungen des 49. Deutschen Juristentages

vol. 1 p. C 40 Îf.).

(21) Scheu, Das Bôrsenstrafrecht und seine Reform, Dissertation Giessen

1974 (see also Tiedemann, Wirtschaftsstrafrecht vol. 2 pp. 137 ff.).

(22) Sieber, Computerkriminalität und Strafrecht (1977) (see also Tiedemnann,

Wirtschaftsstrafrecht vol. 2 pp. 148 ff).

(23) Simmler, Wirtschaftsboykott und Strafrecht, Dissertation Freiburg 1977

(see also Tiedemann, Kartellrechtsversôsse pp. 124 fif. ).

(24) Henssen,

Weinkriminalitäit und Strafrecht,

Dissertation Giessen

1976

(See also Tiedemann, Wirtschaftsstrafrecht vol. 2 pp. 158 ff.).

(25) See footnote 4

— 57 —

Instead of giving further details o my own research work, let me

just give a short survey on those studies which might be the closest

related to the actual international public and scientific discussion on

deterrence, especially in the field of antitrust offenses, and then sum-

marize, and illustrate by examples, my methodological approach

and the aim of my work — especially because I think that I share

the approach and the aim with several other European scholars such

as Cosson and Delmas-Marty, Kellens and Pedrazzi (Italy).

As far as deterrence is concerned, my studies have focused on

general deterrence, which is particularly important regarding law

enforcement, the sense of punishing and the number of undetected

crimes (« dark numbers »). The heavy obstacles to research into general

deterrence result from the fact that general deterrence does not look

at captured, but at potential offenders, so that the relevant data cannot

be found in court or prison records. À study of general deterrence,

then, examines why and by what psychological factors people (business-

men) do not commit (business) crimes. Our research on this question,

more or less a pilot study, financed by the Deutsche Forschungsgemein-

schaft (German National Science Faundation), was, in the footsteps of

Sutherland and Cressey, put into the framework of the developed

learning theory, saying that criminal behavior is mainly learned beha-

vior, the learning process working by experience or by model. Our

rather long and very detailed questionnaire contained projective models,

i.e. cases taken from original court files, asking the businessmen ad-

dresses to hypothetically identify themselves with business crimes, under

a selected choice of variables. The questionnaire, established with the

assistance of a well-reputed German polling firm, considered a multi-

factorial group of adverse factors such as the probability of criminal

prosecution, civil and administrative sanctions, publicity of prosecution

and sentencing, attitudes of the social environs, inner resistance (con-

science), and so on. The criminal sanctions were subdivided into fines of

different levels and imprisonments of different length, with and without

parole. The answers of about 70 % of the addressees led to the simply

put result that, at least in the field of tax fraud and fraudulent pro-

curement of subsidies, only probable criminal prosecution, sentences

of (short term) imprisonment without parole, and closing of the firm

represent effective means of general deterrence.

This study could not strengthen the belief of the German Federal

Cartel Office that making the prosecution and the fining of corpora-

tions public produces a particularly deterrent effect. This caused us,

in our Work on antitrust offenses, to reject the institutionalization of

publicity and — in accordance with the statements of the new head

of the U.S. Justice Department’s antitrust divisions or, more generally,

with the results of Chambliss, Zimring and others, and contrary to

what many American economists think — to recommend short term

—— 58‘ —s

imprisonment: and not only high fines for severe cases of restraint of

trade. For the. Federal Republic of Germany, France, the E.F.C. and

even Austria, we found that the classic concerted pratices concerning

price fixing, the sharing out of production and of marketing patches

and, in particular, inadmissible agreements on public tenders especially

in the building and transport industry as well as in the sector of

electrical equipment still exist, but that an increasing number of these

cartels no longer take the traditional form of written agreements. They

take the form of concerted practices which, however, under German,

French and E.E.C. legislation, are scarcely less criminal than written

provisions. In particular the oligopoly form of market often makes

the express conclusion of agreements superfluous, since the small

number of competitors allows a « community of reaction » to arise.

The result of this is that an individual competitor cannot bring his

fesources into play without considering his fellow competitors. In this

instance, understandings on quality, service, and other competitive

resources can often have greater significance than agreements on prices

and quotes. This led us to recommend a general clause for future

German legislation on criminal restraint of trade, instead of the

description of single forms of restraint of trade which would fit better

into the continental pattern of criminal law-giving. We also found

that the legal possibility of consent decrees (transactions), especially

in French antitrust law. weakens general deterrence and that the many

exceptions in German antitrust provisions make it difficult to prove

subjective fault of the culprit in individual cases at the same time

preventing the general public from becoming aware of the basis

ihjuriousness of limitations on competition.

Before turning to the aims and methods of criminological research

into economic and business crime let me just say a few words to a

most disputed question : the definition of business crime (or economic

crime). This question plays an important role in the discussion since

Sutherland, especially as in the U.S. the notion of business crime

overlaps with the notions of white collar crime, organized crime,

consumer frauds and pollution offenses.

It is astonishing that despite decades of research work in this field,

there is no agreement either about the concept of economic delinquency

or the notion of economic criminal law. The different opinions depend

on different viewpoints of the respective scientists. They chiefly can

be traced back to two different methodological roots

One inclines

towards the empirical sciences and focuses on the criminological

aspects of economic offenses. Another leans towards a normative way

of looking at the topic and stresses its criminal law aspects (26).

(26) More detailed - as well as to the following - Tiedemann, El Concepto

de Delito Economico y de Derecho Penal Economico, Nuevo Pensamiento Penal

1975, 461 ff.

— 59 —

Emphasizing the criminological, and especially the sociological, as-

pects of economic offenses, originates from the work of Sutherland who,

in 1949, described a white collar offense as a crime commited by a

person of respectability and high social status in the course of his

occupation (and. in 1959, as a crime committed by a person with high

socio-economic status who violates the laws designed to regulate his

occupational activities). After Sutherland, Clinard, Quinney and other

American criminologists termed « occupational crime » those offenses

of employees against their employers or of individuals for themselves in

the course of their occupation. They reserved the term « corporate

crime » for offenses committed by corporate officials for the corporation

or by the corporation itself.

Other criminological and especially criminal-scientific researchers

both in the U.S. and in the Federal Republic of Germany stress the

abuse of confidence in economic relationships as the necessary foun-

dation of economic offenses. Some chiefly criminal-scientific orientated

scholars declare that economic delinquency does not represent a sepa-

rate category of offenses at all, but only refers to certain property crimes

which are especially difficult to prove. This definition corresponds

partly to the German law of jurisdiction (Sec. 74 c) and also to the

French concept of criminalité d’affaires, which looks specifically upon

business as an instrument and object of delinquent acts. If part of the

French literature separates bogus firms which have been constituted

with the intention of committing crimes from criminalité d'affaires,

then it seems however to go too far, since even the most dangerous

economic delinquents and serious delinquencies would then be excluded

from the definition.

Different from these criminological and criminal-scientific theories,

the normative way of looking at the topic stresses its criminal law

aspects and looks at the object of the crime more than the criminal.

According to this approach criminal offenses are acts, the effects

of which disturb or endanger economic life or the economic system

above and beyond injury to individual interests. This definition offers

a possibility to differentiate between a narrow and a wide concept of

economic crime and shows that the various definitions of economic

crime do not differ too much in their result.

Both according to criminology and to criminal law, economic

crimes in a narrow sense are beyond all doubt such prohibited acts

which injure or endanger the protected economic interests of the

community. As examples one can cite criminal actions in the domain

of foreign trade law, law of market and of price regulations, law of

competition, tax law and law concerning procurement of subsidies.

Although there are some doubts from the criminological point of

view regarding the respective delinquents, economic crime in this narrow

— 60 —

sense also includes fraud and breach of trust against institutions of

economic life, especially banks and insurance companies. It is also

possible to include the so-called special offenses both from the crimi-

nological and criminal law standpoint. Special offenses, which in

Italian are called with the ferminus technicus « delitti propri » and

in German « Sonderdelikte » are offenses which cannot be performed

by every person but only by persons who are qualified in a special

manner. Thus, professional positions such as businessman, clerk or

founder or member of the supervisory board of a trading compagny are

prerequisites for punishment in a number of legal systems, especially

concerning the criminal law relating to trading compagnies and bank-

ruptcy offenses.

Economic crimes in a wide sense are such prohibited acts which

primarily injure individual interests but which do this by abusing

instruments of economic life and thus consequently damage economic

interest of the community too. Examples of this are offenses concerning

insurance sheets, manipulation of bills and checks, abuse of credit card

facilities and computer crimes.

The ideas P’ve just covered include only the main concepts of

economic crime. Especially in American sociological and crimino-

logical literature, there exists a broad variety of different concepts. In

the American, but also in French literature about white collar or

economic crime, there is much concern about this problem. In contrast

to this, we think the problem of defining the concept of economic

crime is of minor significance. We believe people should take a

provisionary broad workable definition of the concept and turn to a

problem which is more important than delimiting the concept of eco-

nomic crime or arguing if a certain form of crime even belongs within

its given definition. This more important problem 1s : fighting economic

crime.

Hereby we arrive at the first topic I announced before to discuss

here — namely, to define the aim of criminological research in the

field of economic crime. No matter 1if we deal with economic and

business crime as scientists, businessmen or politicians, I think we

do have to agree, that the aim of each activity in the field of economic

crime should be fo fight this form of criminality (27), and this means at

the same time to reform the law system and the activities of law

enforcement agencies.

(27) Cf. Tiedemann, Zièle und Probleme wirtschatskriminologischer Fors-

chung, in

Festschrift für Richard Lange (1976) pp. 541

(544 ff.) with

further references.

— 61 —

This fundamental statement has important consequences. Ît does

not only mean that criminological research shouldn’t be an end in

itself. It implies also that the purpose of criminological research in

the field of economic crime should not primarily be to verify or falsify

certain social or political theories. This probably explains why. most

of the modern criminological theories do not look to be applicable in

the field of economic crime till now

it is not yet perceptible how they

could help fighting economic crime. General sociology and general

psychology are in a similar situation. In my opinion, psychology and

sociology will only gain importance in the field of economic crime, ‘if

they leave their general trend and turn to a direct involvement with

economic and business crime such as special finance psychology in

Europe, which investigates the causes of tax resistance (28), or the

sociological systematic theory which can help to define social damage

caused by economic crime (29).

The consideration that the aim of cr1mmolog1œl research in the

field of economic crime should be to fight economic crime, does not

only show the direction in which criminological research should not go,

but more 1mportant it is able to lead to the methods which should

be applied in criminological research in the field of economic crime.

As to the methods of criminological research in the field of eco-

nomic and business crime, it is evident that they have to be determined

by these just stated aims. In consideration of these aims, criminological

research in the field of economic and business crime primarily has to

explore phenomenology (patterns and forms of delinquent behavior)

and etiology (the causes of this behavior). Let me explain these metho-

dologœal questions through the sequence of cnmmologœal research

works in the field of economic and business crime using some concrete

examples

|. The starting point of criminological research and of reform work

in each scope of economic life is the question, if and to what extent

deviant or delinquent behavior

xists. This primary question only

can be solved by phenomenologic research. The fact that such pheno-

menologic inquiry can lead to surprising results can be illustrated by

two research works

The official reasoning behind the new German law conœrmng

stock exchange states that delinquency in.the area of - stock

Allgemeine Steuerlehre (4th ed

1965)

Schmolders

(28) Cf. Schmolders

Das Irrationale in der ôffentlichen Finanzwirtschaft (1960), Strümpel, Steuer-

Henrion, La

moral und Steuerwiderstand der deutschen Selbständigen (1966)

Fraude Fiscale. Revue de Droit Pénal et de Criminologie 1973/74, 183 (187 ff.)

(29) See Amelung, Rechtsgüterschutz und Schutz der Gesellschaft (1972)

in particular to the sociological role theory see Lange, Das Rätsel Kriminalität

(1972) pp. 112 ff

— 62 —

market does not exist. À phenomenologic search managed by

our staff in 1973 which was especially based on narrow

contacts to insiders of the stock market, showed that although

respective criminal proceedings are very rare, there do exist

a vast variety of delinquent actions, which partly come under

criminal law and partly fail within the so-called grey zone of

criminality. As an important example of stock market crimi-

nality, the exploitation of advanced insider information can

be cited. The misuse of insider information is a crime in

certain countries (like the U.S. or France), but not criminal

in others (such as Germany or Italy) (30).

Another phenomenological inquiry within the area of frau-

dulent subventions stated that about 50 % of all scrap import

subsidies payed under the EFuropean Coal and Steel Com-

munity Treaty to German enterprises were obtained impro-

perly. mearly one third of the scrap not existing at all.

The given examples can also make the main problem of pheno-

menological research in the field of economic and business crime clear,

which is getting the necessary data for study. Às in most cases criminal

statistics only manifest the penal code provisions infringed by the

criminal action and do not describe the action itself, it is very difficult,

for example, to find out cases of computer crimes among other « nor-

mal » cases of embezzlement or fraud. German criminal statistics

however bave been improved in this regard from 1974 on as a

consequence of the German Lawyer Day’s recommendations. Further-

more, as the just given example of delinquency in the field of stock

market shows, analysis of criminal law proceedings is certainly not

sufficient. In addition a scientist in the field of economic crime has

to become and insider in his respective area, mainly by using interview

techniques and by developing personal contacts to real insiders. General

official secrecy and particular secrecy relating for example to tax law

form additional obstacles in getting the necessary material for study.

Phenomenological research with the purpose of answering the

question, if and to what extent and in which forms economic and

business crime exists, should in any case include the attempt to deter-

mine the extent of undetected crimes, the so-called « dark field ».

Traditional criminological methods to investigate the dark field do not

help much in the field of economic and business crime. So new methods

have to be used, taking advantage of the proceedings of the economic

administration, of news of the economic press, and of trade statistics.

Thus we used Austrian foreign trade statistics in order to show that

—

p E

(30) See Will, Gli « Insiderâ» e i‘R'elativi Problemi nell’Attività delle Borse.

Rivista di Diritto Civile 197S, 664 ff.

— 63 —

whole streams of products which had been subventioned by German

authorities because of the pretended export to Austria were sham

transactions and fake exports ; or with the help of the grape collection

statistics of Rhenania-Paletnat being compared with the selling sta-

tistics, we were able to establish approximately the dark number of

producers adding sugar to the wine, which is an offense in the E.E.C.

when exceeding a certain degree and certain modalities (see Art. 16 and

19 Ordonnance n° 816/70 of the E.C. Commission).

2. Aîter having stated deviant or delinquent acts as well as res-

pective data in the field of inquiry specified phenomenologic research

is then necessary to answer the second basic question of each inquiry

in the field of economic and business crime : the question, if the pre-

viously mentioned actions are actually criminal. This question can be

answered by a normative and economic method. Let me explain this

central methodological problem in more detail.

Normative method means that the question if certain actions are

crimes or merit criminal sanctions can only be answered by a judicial-

normative way of looking at the topic. The decisive criteria answering

this question is the social injuriousness of the respective action, that

is to say, the extent of social damage caused by it in a certain system.

This can be 1llustrated with the example of antitrust offenses :

Some cartel agreements, as for example cartels formed to over-

come structural crises or for the purposes of rationalisation

or specialization, are especially wanted by the economic system.

Other cartel agreements, as for example price fixing or

inadmissible agreements on public tenders, on the other hand

affect the economic system and therefore are forbidden in

many states. Nevertheless other states allow cartels to operate

or they exercise a mere control over the abuse of cartels or

provide penalties only for the violation of registration duties.

Thus, the description of cartel delinquency demonstrates the

particularly close dependence and relationship of business

offenses to the political system. The judicial method however

also makes clear that there are considerable difficulties in

describing severe antitrust offenses in material law and in

dividing them from minor or harmless offenses (31).

The economic starting point of method means, that answering this

normative question about social injuriousness of certain actions in the

(31) À comprehensive survey over these questions is given by Pedrazzi,

Odierne Esigenze Economiche e Nuove Fattispeci Penali. Rivista Itiliana di

Diritto e Procedura Penale 1975S. 1099 ff.

— 64 —

field of economic life requires economic standards and substantial

economic knowledge to measure the harm caused by the actions

concerned.

For example it isn’t possible without knowledge of the eco-

nomic system, its connections and of economic cartel law to

distinguish between wanted or detrimental cartel agreements.

Without knowledge of the stock markets mechanism, the

social and economic harm produced bv misuse of insider

information cannot be judged.

3. Exact knowledge of phenomenology further is a basic requi-

rement for finding out causes and criminogenic factors of economic

and business crimes. Especially if one considers the previous stated

aims of criminological research in the field of economic and business

crimes, it becomes obvious that besides the phenomenology just

handled etiology in the sense of classic criminologv has to become

the second point of the main effort.

Causes of economic crime differ very much among the various forms

of economic crime, and can’t be generalized or be generalized only on a

very abstract level. Rather often shortcomings of economic law itself

cause economic delinquency. This leads to the necessity of reforming

z2conomic law regulations — e.g. in the case of bogus firms — or of

reforming substantive criminal law. — The necessity of reforms of

substantive criminal law which has been the first step of European

reform tendency, can be illustrated with the example of computer crime

and German penal law

The most wide-spread form of computer crime in Europe is

presented by the so-called computer manipulations. These

are acts in which computer data is altered on purpose to get

illegal financial benefits. So, for example, an employee of a

German labour office manipulated his employer’s computer

to transfer high amounts of children*s allowances to his

private accounts. The programmer of an American software

firm put an additional programme routine into the programme

of a bank computer. The result was that his own overdrafts

were not registered by the bank. In two German cases

employees doubled their monthly income by manipulating

payroll figures in the data store of the computer. Computer

manipulations were also involved in the collapse of the German

Herstatt-Bank, which led to a damage of more than 200

million Deutsche Mark, and in the spectacular American

Equity Funding case which caused damages of about one

billion dollars.

— 65 —

These manipulations are not grasped in a sufficient way by

German criminal law because the application of the German

provision against fraud supposes the deception of a person

— not a computer — and because accounts are not consi-

dered physical objects in the sense of the German provisions

against theft and embezzlement whereas French and Swiss

criminal jurisdictions consider the money on bank accounts

(« electronical money ») to be a res (or chose) in the sense

of the provisions against embezzlement. The legal provisions

according to the English Theft Act are dubious in this

regard to say the least.

Whether Computer Crime is sufficiently grasped by N orth American

criminal law, is quite uncertain too. À study of the Stanford Research

Institute, prepared for the National Science Foundation, comes to the

preliminary result that the Federal Criminal Code and the existing

state provisions would, by broad interpretation, allow to consider the

unprivileged copying of software, such as computer programs, a

larceny or theft under some state laws (32). In addition 18 U.S.C.

Par. 1001 requires no fraudulent obtaining of a « thing oË value», a

false statement sufficing for this provision. However the meaning of

res is principally restricted to tangible things so that, under common

law, only tangible evidence of a chose in action (e.g, a deed or a

check) can be the subject of larceny and embezzlement (33). Thus

embezzlement or theft of bank account money in the given examples

is not embezzlement or theft under North American law.

As this short example of computer crime shows, the question of

legal reform work of course depends much on the relevant frame

work of national law. Under North American law, but also under

French law criminal provisions generally seem to be sufficient for

combatting economic and business crimes — although there seems

to be only a rather wide-spread quantity of different provisions under

which a perpetrator may be captured e.g. for bribery and corruption.

It seems to me that the necessary reform work in substantive law

of most European countries and of North America should first go

into the direction of decriminalization in the field of economic and

business offenses. Discussion on decriminalization has focused too

much on the so-called victimless crimes in the U.S., whereas in Europe

decriminalization has been discussed and provided for in almost all

(32) Nycum, The Criminal Law Aspects of Computer Abuse (1976).

(33) See for example Loewy, Criminal Law (197S) p

81 with references,

also Kadish/Paulsen, Criminal Law and its Processes (3rd ed. 1975) p. 691 f. ;

for the legal situation in the Federal Republic of Germany, France and

Switzerland, see Tiedemann, Wirtschaftsstrafrecht vol. 2 p. 155 with further

references.

— 66 —

fields of economic and social life. As Packer stated in his outstanding

book on The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, with regard especially

to antitrust offenses, the fact of penalising almost everything weakens

general deterrence and hinders the public’s and the judge's awareness

of many business crimes being socially harmful and morally bad (34).

The necessary process of diminishing the number of criminal offenses

in the future makes it at the same time necessary to create new statu-

tory provisions concentrated on few and really severe offenses. The

Alternative Draft of the German Criminal Code (Special Part, Chapter

2 : Crimes against Business), published in the beginning of 1977,

might be a kind of model for reform work as far as criminal law is

concerned in this field (35).

Of course, law reform and especially reform of criminal law is

not the only means of better fighting white collar crime. Improving the

activities of law enforcement agencies is at least as important. But as

these agencies can only enforce existing law the improvement of subs-

tantive law might be an important step in amending law enforcement

policy in the field of economic crime.

— e

(34) Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1968) pp. 358 ff. ; for the

principles see especially Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal

Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, University of Chicago Law

Review 1963, vol. 30 p. 432 ff.

(3S) Lampe/Lenckner/Stree/Tiedemann/Weber, Alternativ-Entwurf eines Straf-

8esetzbuches, Besonderer Teil, Straftaten geger die Wirtschaft (1977).

— 67 —

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN ACTION RESEARCH

A FRENCH-AMERICAN EXAMPLE

JACQUES VERIN

PAUL STRASBURG

Ministère de la Justice

Paris Office

Paris - France

Vera Institute of Justice

c/o Ministère de la Justice

Paris - France

Modification of pretrial release procedures occupies an important

place on the list of American criminal justice reforms over the past

two decades. Prior to 1961, pretrial release was based almost entirely

on a defendant’s ability to post a bond or cash bail as a guarantee

of his reappearance at trial. In that year, the Vera Institute of Justice

in New York City began the Manhattan Bail Project, offering judges

an alternative to bail as the basis for granting pretrial release. The

alternative, known as « release on own recognizance » (or R.O.R.),

related the likelihood of reappearance at trial not to a defendant’s

ability to raise money but to the strength of his community ties.

Within three years, verified community ties information provided

to arraignment judges by the Manhattan Bail Project produced a

four-fold increase in the rate of pretrial release while lowering the

failure-to-appear rate below that of defendants released on bail. À 1964

National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice, sponsored jointly

by the U.S. Department of Justice and Vera, was a direct outgrowth

of this success. Together, the Conference and the Project helped to

stimulate the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966, the first change in

federal bail law since the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789. Similar projects

have since been developed in hundreds of cities throughout America

and today R.O.R. is a widely accepted alternative to bail (1).

Although money bail is not a central feature of French criminal

justice, how to determine who should be released before trial and how

to assure reappearance at trial are issues of no less significance or

difficulty than in the United States. For that reason, the French

Ministry of Justice is interested in exploring whether the methods

— r

(1) For a brief history of the bail reform movement, see National Center

for States Courts. An Evaluation of Policy Related Research on the Effec-

fiveness of Pretrial Release Programs. Denver, Colorado, 1975.

— 69 —

developed by the Manhattan Bail Project for recommending pretrial

release can be used to increase the efficiency and fairness of pretrial

release in France. The Ministry has invited the Vera Institute to join

French researchers in conducting an experimental pretrial release project

at the fribunal de grande instance of Paris, with funding support

from the French government, the German Marshall Fund of the

United States and the Ford Foundation. This project, now in the

planning stage, offers an example of the possibilities and complexities

of international collaboration in action research.

The Manhattan Bail Project

Bail in the United States is descended from the early English

practice of releasing prisoners to third parties during the long delays

that often occured between an arrest and the arrival in town of

one of the king's travelling magistrates. If the defendant failed to

appear at trial, the third party (or « surety ») would himself be tried

and jailed. Over the centuries, it became the practice for third parties

to provide financial guarantees rather than standing in for defendants,

and in the United States this practice developed further into the posting

of cash bail by the defendant himself or bonds by commercial bail

bondsmen in return for collateral and fees provided by defendants.

Because law and practice established that all defendants except

those facing a possible death penalty were entitled to the opportunity

to post bail, the critical factor determining whether a defendant would

be released became the amount of bail set by the court. Relating the

risk of flight from justice to a particular bail level in individual cases

is a difficult proposition, however. The difficulty is compounded when

arraignment judges also take into account the danger posed by a

defendant to the community, which they often do even though the

legality of this practice under American law is not clear. As a result,

standards for setting bail are vague and bail amounts for similar

offenses vary widely. Moreover, the effectiveness of bail in assuring

return to trial is open to question. Its principal impact, prior to R.O.R.

at least, seems to have been simply to discriminate against poor

defendants (2).

The importance of finding a more equitable basis for pretrial

release than bail was underscored by studies which showed a strong

relationship between a defendant’s pretrial custody status and the ulti-

_—

(2) See for example

Freed (DJ.) and Wald (P.M.), Bail in the United

States

1964. Washington, D.C.

U.S. Department of Justice and Vera

Foundation, Inc… 1964.

—m—

mate outcome of his case. For example, a comparison of case outcomes

for 374 defendants held in detention and 358 released on bail in New

York City in 1962 showed that those in detention were significantly

more likely to be convicted and to receive prison sentences than those

free on bail. This disparity held true even when such factors as prior

record, family integration, and employment stability were controlled (3).

To confront these inequities and hardships, the Manhattan Bail

Project sought an alternative to bail which would be fairer, allow more

people to be released before trial. but not raise the risk of flight from

justice. The method chosen was based on the simple and reasonable

proposition that the stronger a defendant’s social ties to the community

are, the greater the probability is that he will return for trial if released.

Each morning project staff interviewed defendants awaiting arraign-

ment. They collected information on the prisoners’ place of residence,

employment status and history, contacts with family members, prior

criminal record, and. possible character references, and then verified

the information by telephone. Eventually a system of points was devel-

oped and applied to the information so that the sole determinant

of a recommendation for release without bail became the number of

points received.

In order to measure the impact of the Project on pretrial release,

a controlled experiment was established. For half of the defendants

recommended for release, written recommandation forms were pre-

pared and presented to arraignment judges. The other half were put

into a control group ; no recommendations were forwarded for them.

The results were impressive. Fifty-nine percent of submitted recom-

mendations were followed by judges while only 16 percent of the

control group were released without bail. Only 1.6 percent of the

R.O.R. defendants willfully failed to appear in court while 3 percent

of those released on bail failed to appear. Sixty percent of defendants

who were released pending trial were eventually acquitted, compared

to only 23 percent of the control group. And only 16 percent of the

released defendants who were convicted were sent to prison while 96

percent of those convicted in the control group received prison sen-

tences (4).

Sixteen years after the start of the Manhattan Bail Project, pretrial

release based on community ties continues on a large scale throughout

——

1(3) Rankin (A.) « The Effect of Pretrial Detention », New York University

Law Review, Vol. 39 (1964), pp. 641-655. Though such strong associations

between detention and final disposition have been found in several studies,

precise causal relationships have not yet been defined satisfactorily.

(4) Programs in Criminal Justice : Vera Institute of Justice Ten-Year Report,

196]-1971. New York : (1972), Vera Institute, p. 31.

— 71 —

New York City. The Pretrial Services Agency, operated by the Vera

Institute for the City, interviews each month well over 4,000 defendants

arrested on felony or misdemeanor charges other than prostitution.

Like its predecessor, the Agency verifies the information collected,

makes release recommendations to arraignment judges, and, using

sophisticated computer technology, reminds released defendants about

subsequent court appearances through letters and telephone calls.

Pretrial detention in France

French criminal law detines three offense categories

Ccrimes,

délits, and contraventions, in descending order of seriousness. Pretrial

detention is not permitted for contraventions or for délits with a

maximum possible sentence of less than two years in prison ; for

other délits and crimes, it is optional. Responsibility for ordering

detention rests almost exclusively with examining magistrates, who

oversee the preparation of cases for trial. The single exception occurs

in cases of flagrants délits, délits in which the defendant is caught

in the act or in possession of incriminating evidence. Prosecutors

are authorized to order persons charged with flagrants délits detained

for appearance in court the same day or, at the latest, the next day.

If detention for more than 24 hours is necessary, the case must be

handed over to an examining magistrate. À prosecutor’s detention

order may be prolonged by the Tribunal at which the defendant appears,

however, and often is, usually for periods of a week at a time. Thus

prosecutor-ordered detention, though brief, covers a substantial number

of cases and frequently leads to extended detention.

While lacking authority to order detention in non-flagrant cases,

prosecutors nevertheless exercise powers that have an important bear-

ing on detention decisions. The most significant of these is their

discretion to involve an examining magistrate. Cases charged as crimes

must be passed to examining magistrates, but this category applies

to less than two percent of all offenses. With regard to délits, prose-

cutors have the option of proceeding to trial without ordering a pretrial

investigation by an examining magistrate. Since circumventing the

examining magistrate precludes detention, this option gives prosecutors

de facto authority to release.

In 1975, a new law expanded prosecutors’ release powers into the

realm of flagrants délits. Formerly all such offenses had to be tried

within 24 hours or turned over to examining magistrates. The new law

made it possible for prosecutors to remand flagrants délits to a later

court date and release defendants in the interim, a procedure known

— 72 —

as rendez-vous judiciaire. Rendez-vous judiciaire has obvious advan-

tages for the defendant. It permits him to consult with a lawyer,

prepare his defense, and perhaps most important of all appear in

court as a free person who has already demonstrated his reliability

by returning for trial. In its first year, rendez-vous judiciaire was

granted in about ten per cent of cases charged as flagrants délits in

Paris.

À second source of prosecutors’ influence on detention decisions

is their role in setting the initial charge level. Not infrequently, prose-

cutors reduce change levels from crime to délit by choosing to ignore

aggravating circumstances, such as commission of the offense at night,

in groups, with a weapon or by an employee of the victim. This

reduction, known as correctionalisation, not only lowers the maximum

possible sentence on conviction but also lowers the amount of time

that can be spent in pretrial detention. It also makes it possible for the

prosecutor to forego detention altogether, if he desires, by giving him

the option not to involve an examining magistrate.

Prosecutors have considerable influence in the other direction as

well, that is, in imposing detention when they deem it necessary or

desirable. They may issue formal requests for detention when for-

warding cases to examining magistrates, and they may appeal decisions

that do not conform to their requests. Although data are not readily

available, it is commonly believed that in the Paris Tribunal examining

magistrates accept 90 percent of prosecutors’ requests for pretrial

detention. Furthermore, should an examining magistrate wish to free

a defendant held in detention, opposition by the prosecutors automa-

tically prolongs detention until an appellate court rules, usually a

matter of several weeks.

The duration of pretrial detention in France is limited by law.

For délits carrying a possible sentence of two years or more in prison,

the initial term of detention is four months, renewable for additional

four-month terms following review by the examining magistrate.

Defendants charged with délits who have not previously spent at least

three months in prison may not be detained for more than a total of

six months, however. Persons charged with crimes may be detained

indefinitely before trial, up to a period equal to the maximum sen-

tence that could be imposed for the offense on conviction.

The Code of Criminal Procedure creates a presumption in favor

oÏ pretrial release. Detention is justified only when necessary to preserve

evidence

to prevent defendants from tampering with witnesses or

conspiring with accomplices or co-defendants ; to preserve the « public

order » disrupted by offenses ; to protect defendants ; to put an end

to offenses or prevent their renewal ; to guarantee defendants’ return

— 73 —

to court ; and, finally, as a response when defendants willfully break

conditions of pretrial release (5). This list is long enough and the

conditions broad enough to permit considerable discretion. When

questioned about the basis for their detention orders, examining magis-

trates most often cite prior criminal record, the seriousness of the

offense charged, and the strength of the defendant’s community ties —

factors which are also important to American judges. But because

examining magistrates have no objective means of weighing these fac-

tors, their decisions stem largely from a subjective evaluation of

whatever information is on hand.

The role of bail in pretrial release has varied somewhat over

the past 200 years, though in general it has remained minor. Bail made

its first and most legislation granted an absolute right to release on

bail for most offenses. It was a short-lived right, however. The first

Code of Criminal Procedure, promulgated by Napoleon in 1808, abo-

lished the right in favor of mandatory pretrial detention for most

offenses. An exception was permitted for first offenders accused of

délits, but their release was discretionary and required the posting

of bail. In 1865, the Code was liberalized with the result that bail

declined further in importance. First offenders with fixed residences

who were accused of délits carrying prison sentences shorter than two

years were released as a matter of right. Release in other cases was

at the discretion of the examining magistrate, and although bail could

be required, it was infrequently imposed.

On several occasions since 1865, legislation has sought to encou-

rage wider use of bail as a means of expanding pretrial release when

it is not a matter of right. For the most part, these moves have

not succeeded (6). The most recent and most important initiative

occured in 1970 when the legislature authorized examining magistrates

to make use of a variety of intermediate control measures lying between

detention and outright release, during the pretrial period. Bail figures

prominently in the package of permissible measures, known collec-

tively as contrôle judiciaire. Two separate purposes of bail are defined

by this law. One is to assure that the defendant fulfills all his obli-

gations, both before trial and after trial (e.g., conditions of probation).

The second is to cover damages that may be awarded to victims of

the offense, fines, or the costs. of the judicial procedure. At the time

bail is set, the examining magistrate determines the amount, the terms

of payment (period and level of installments) and the proportion that

(5) Code de procédure pénale, Article 144.

(6) See Craig (W.L.) and Dobrovir (W.A.), « The French Experience

with Preventive Detention », American Bar Association Journal, Vol. S7, (June,

1971), pp. 565-569.

— 74 —

is to be used for cach of these two purposes. The part that serves as

a guarantee is returned to the defendant if and when all obligations

are met. The other part is returned in whole if the defendant is

found not guilty, or it may be returned in part if the final judgment

against him imposes a fine or court costs that are less than the

amount of bail required (7).

The uses of bail prescribed by the 1970 law are innovative variations

on Anglo-Saxon practice, but they have remained largely theoretical.

Only a small proportion of defendants released from pretrial detention

are required to post bail (five percent in 1973, the latest year for

which figures are available) (8). Other kinds of pretrial release condi-

tions permitted under contrôle judiciaire (e.g., restrictions on mobility,

periodic reporting requirements, or participation in treatment) are

applied more frequently, although the great majority ofË released

defendants (74 percent in 1973) are still freed without any conditions.

The apparent explanation for French resistance to bail is concern that

it might lead quickly to economic discrimination and a belief that if

detention is not essential, release should be granted outright.

Abuse of bail, one of the issues that inspired the Manhattan

Bail Project, is therefore not a stimulus for reform in France. Yet

there is continuing concern that pretrial detention may be excessive.

According to national figures, in 1973 examining magistrates handlied

70,000 new cases (some involving more than one defendant) and

detained approximatively 54,000 individuals, two-thirds of whom spent

tes

at least a month in detention. In Paris that year, examining l

handled about 11,000 new cases and issued 16,000 detention orders (9).

While precise figures are not available, it appears that virtually all

defendants charged with crimes in Paris are held in pretrial detention

for some period, and that a minimum of two-thirds of persons charged

with non-flagrant délits for which detention is possible are in fact

detained (10). The modal period of detention for all these detainees

is between one and four months (10 bis).

(7) Code de procédure pénale, Articles 138 and 142.

(8) Compte général de l’administration de la justice pour 1973, Paris,

umentation française, 1976, vol. 2, p. 138.

(9) Ibid., pp. 314-317. Cases carried over from 1972 are not included in

these figures.

(10) The detention rate for délits is estimated by dividing the number of

detentions in Paris by the number of charges for detainable délits. This latter

igure was calculated by first increasing the number of délits convictions (op.

cit. (8), Table 31) by 15 percent to account for the hypothesized number of cases

Not resulting in conviction, and then excluding offense categories for which the

Maximum penalty is too low to permit detention.

(10 bis) Op. cit. (8), p. 318.

— 78 —

These figures do not prove that pretrial detention is excessive,

of course, but this and other evidence hints that it may be. While

the total prison population in France declined by 10 percent between

1970 and 1975, the number in pretrial detention rose by 20 percent.

In 1975, pretrial detainees were 44 percent of the prison population

{11), a remarkably high figure in view of the presumption of innocence

on which French criminal justice has been based since the Declaration

of the Rights of Man in 1789. Furthermore, of the 54,000 detention

orders in 1973, only 21,000 (39 percent) were terminated by convic-

tions involving prison sentences. The remaining detainees were either

relcased before trial by examining magistrates who deemed the necessity

‘Vr tor propriety of) detention to have ended (41 percent) ; acquitted or

had their cases dropped before trial (2 percent) ; received non-custodial

sentences on conviction (15 percent) ; or released for other reasons

(3 percent) (12). In short, in a substantial majority of cases detention

was not followed immediately by prison sentences, and in at least

IS to 20 percent of cases no prison sentences resulted at all.

Even these numbers, suggestive though they are, do not provide

convincing evidence of excessive detention. What is required in order

to know whether, in the words of a British commission studying bail,

«those remanded in custody form an irreductible minimum » (13) is

research focusing specifically on this question — research that compares

the characteristics of detained and released defendants, examines judges*

reasons for detaining, and studies behaviour during pretrial release.

Such research might also reveal whether detention discriminates against

certain classes, as it did in América before ROR and whether detained

defendants receive more prison sentences and longer sentences, other

things being equal, than defendants granted pretrial release. The

methods used in the Manhattan Bail Project —— in particular, controlled

experimentation centering on objective measurement of the strength of

community ties — are a useful way to begin addressing these issues.

Applying the Vera System in France

Transferring the Vera methods from the American to the French

context will require their adaptation to accomodate important proce-

dural and structural differences. The role of the prosecutor in detention

__ ns es e r 0 c r

- (M Rapport Général sur l’exercice, 1974. Direction de l’administration

népitentiaire. Paris, Ministère de la Justice, 1974, pp. 5-6.

(12) Op. cit. (8), p. 318.

(13) Bail Procedures in Magistrates’ Couris. Report of the Home Office

Working Party on Bail Procedures in Magistrates’ Courts, London : HLMSS.0.

(1974).

decisions is one significant difference. In New York, all arrested defen-

dants appear before an arraignment judge who makes this decision.

Procecutors often make recommendations on the release question,

and their recommendations generally have an important influence,

but they have no independent release authority of their own. In

France, as noted, prosecutors have an option of relcasing persons char-

ged with délits instead of referring their cases to an examining magis-

trate. The prosecutor, rather than the judge, should therefore be the

first recipient of community ties information collected by the nrojec:.

In addition, since prosecutors’ recommendations to examining magis-

trates carry, if anything, even more weight than prosecutors’ recom-

mendations in the U.S., their cooperation and support are vital to the

success of any pretrial release plan.

Procedural differences will also affect the project’s timing, which

U.S. experience has shown to be an important element in successful

release of large numbers of defendants. The sooner a project is able

to interview a defendant after arrest, the more likely it is to be able

to secure his release (14). In general, early access to defendants has

not been a major problem in America. While defendants are held

in police stations or local jails before arraignment (sometimes as long

as 72 hours), they are allowed to contact lawyers and family or friends.

Because such contacts are routine, project staffs have been able to

conduct interviews during this period without disrupting normal

procedures. In New York City, in fact, stafËf of the Pretrial Services

Agency make the rounds of police stations throughout the night to

interview newly arrested persons so that recommendations will be

available to the court the following morning.

Pre-arraignment procedures in France make early access to

detained defendants more difficult. Police may hold suspects at sta-

tion houses for questioning prior to formal charging during a period

of 24 hours, renewable for another 24 hours on approval by the

prosecutor. The inquiry that takes place during this time, known as

garde à vue, 1s secret

no one except police or prosecutors is per-

mitted to have contact with the detained person, not even lawyers

or relatives. Once the period of garde à vue has ended and the preli-

minary police inquiry has been completed, the law requires that the

detained person either be freed or presented to a prosecutor for formal

charging as soon as possible. At the charge hearing, the initial detention

decision is also made.

In Paris, persons whom police and prosecutors decide must be

held for charging are brought from police stations to a central detention

center (called the Dépôr) in the Palace of Justice where they are kept

—

(14) Op. cit. (1)! pp. 66-69.

— 77 —

until their appearance before a prosecutor or examining magistrate. Of

approximately 40,000 persons subjected to garde à vue each year,

about 13,000 are subsequently brought to the Dépôt. The rest are

either released without being charged or are ordered to appear at court

on their own at a later date. Only thosce brought to the Dépôr would

be interviewed by the project.

The time spent at the Dépôt prior for the first appearance before a

prosecutor or magistrate may range from 15 minutes to 24 hours,

depending on when the defendant arrives and when prosecutors or

magistrates are available. The majority of defendants arrive at the

Dépôt late at night. Before the first appearances begin at 9:00 a.m.

the following morning, booking, fingerprinting and other adminis-

trative procedures must be completed. This leaves little time — in

many cases, less than an hour — for completing interviews and

verifications. The problems this poses will be compounded if, as

anticipated, a large number of defendants are unable to supply veri-

fication contacts who have telephones. In short, not only will the project

be intervening relatively late in the post-arrest period, it will be doing

so under the pressure of a tight deadline.

Another factor which may reduce the project’s impact relative

to the impact of the Manhattan Bail Project is the amount of communi-

ty ties information already available to French judges and prose-

cutors. In New York before the Manhattan Bail Project started,

arraignment judges had little if any information concerning the

community ties and personal characteristics (other than prior records)

of defendants. Police reports were for the most part limited to facts

surrounding the arrest and charges. Thus the Project was able to fill a

large void, which partly accounted for its considerable impact.

In France, on the other hand, police reports routinely include

some information on the accused person’s residence, family and

employment status, obtained during questioning in garde à vue and

sometimes verified during searches of the defendant’s residence. Thus,

because some community ties information is already available, the

information gaps to be filled are smaller than they were in the USS.

Nevertheless, according to some judges and prosecutors, even the

most general background information may be missing or inaccurate

if police have not had enough time to do a thorough investigation.

Furthermore, important kinds of information relevant to a judgement

of a defendant’s stability — such as length of employment or residence

in the community — are not usually obtained, nor is verification of

information with third parties standard practice. Finally, the available

information is by and large not systematically evaluated before deten-

tion decisions are made. One of the early tasks of the project will

— 78 —

be to determine whether filling these information gaps would alter the

practice of pretrial detention sufficiently to justify the creation of a

new court service.

A final distinction to be made is that, at the broadest level, the

goals of the Paris project are different from — in a sense more

modest than — those of the Manhattan Bail Project. In New York, the

challenge was to find a new basis for pretrial release to replace a

bail system whose inadequacies were becoming apparent to all. In

France, where community ties already figure prominently in release

decisions, the objective is simply to learn whether the existing approach

can be made to work more- eﬁectively.

Even so, the project has encountered resistance from parts of

the criminal justice system during its planning phase. To a degree,

resistance is based on skepticism

some people believe that pretrial

release is already operating as well as it can. Certainly the distance

between current reality and the ideal of an « irreducible minimum »

in detention seems shorter in France today than it was in New York

sixteen years ago, if for no other reason than that detention in France

is permitted only for offenses punishable by more than two years

in prison. In addition, current practice has apparently produced low

rates of failure-to-appear (1.4 percent in 1973) and crime-on-release

(1.0 percent) (15).

There are also deeper reasons for resistance, which would themselves

make an interesting comparative study. Mistrust of experimentation

with the criminal justice system in any manner is greater in France

than in the U.S. today. Yet on both sides of the Atlantic, changes,

when they occur, are usually the .result . of legislative initiatives

Which in turn reflect shifts in public opinion. Rarely do social

experiments — especially in criminal justice — precede and encourage

legislative reform. To find a bold experiment of this kind in France,

for example, one has ta return to 1951, when an agreement between

the Ministry of Justice and the Court of Appeals in Toulouse esta-

blished pilot projects in work release and probation without pre-existing

legislative authorization. The experiments worked and eventually resul-

ted in major changes in the law (16).

Concern has also been voiced about the fact that the project would

be staffed at the outset largely by part-time volunteers. Volunteers

have traditionally played a limited role in France in probation work and

—— t

(15) Op. cit. (8), p. 318.

(16) See Marcel Reboul, « Grandeur et misère de l'expérience toulousaine de

la probation », Revue de science criminelle, 1954, pp. 497 et seq.

prison social work, and more recently in contrôle judiciaire. But the

prospect of their presence at the Dépôt and their involvement in deci-

sions about detention has raised new questions of accountability as

well as anxieties about security. For historical and cultural reasons,

resistance to this kind of private initiative and the participation of

private citizens in the administration of a public service may be greater

in France than in Anglo-Saxon countries. To some degree, however, it

is a universal — and understandable — phenomenon.

Resistance to change may be increased if the issue in question has

been made sensitive by earlier disputes, which is certainly the case

with regard to pretrial detention. Controversion have erupted in France

in the past several years over the duration of garde à vue, the procedure

of flagrants délits, the principle of secrecy in pretrial investigations, and

and abuse of pretrial detention. Such sore points have contributed to

an atmosphere of tension in relationships among magistrates, defense

lawyers and the police which, to say the least, works against cooperative

experimental efforts.

It is worth remembering that the people who developed the

Manhattan Bail Project encountered a similar reluctance to accept new

ideas when they began their work in New York, and depended heavily

on support from the Mayor to overcome it. Once under way, however,

the Project helped unite elements of the criminal justice system whose

division had been a principal cause of intertia, by giving them a com-

mon ground for action and reflection. In so doing, it opened the way

for further experimentation and change.

The Paris project’*s research orientation should, in any event,

alleviate some of this concern. The first stage will be devoted to

collecting baseline data without forwarding recommendations to proce-

cutors or examining magistrates. Approximately 600 persons brought

to the Dépôt will be interviewed. Data on community ties, prior criminal

rocord.s current charges. and detention and senencing outcomes will

be obtained. Analysis will center on the relationships between defendant

characteristics, detention decisions and final dispositions. If it appears

that detention rates could be lowered by a more systematic evaluation

of community ties, a point system will be developed and tested during

the second phase of the project.

In the second stage, interviewed defendants will be randomly

assigned to experimental and control groups. Recommendations based

on the point system will be recorded for both groups, but interview

rn and recommendations will be forewarded to prosecutors and

examining magistrates only for the experimental group. The two groups

will be compared in terms of release rates, characteristics of released

and detained defendants, and failure-to-appear and recidivism rates for

defendants released during the pretrial period, Additional comparisons

will be made with defendants interviewed during the first phase of the

project and with those who do not come into contact with the project

at all. The results should reveal whether the project’s recommendations

have any effect in increasing release rates or in standardizing detention

decisions.

-

If it turns out that despite the neutral research orientation of the

project, the various obstacles discussed make intervention prior to the

first appearance unworkable at this time, the focus will be shifted to the

period immediately after initial detention decisions are made. Interviews

will be conducted with defendants on their arrival at detention centers,

not only for the purpose of studying the relationship between defendant

characteristics, detention decisions and subsequent dispositions, but also

to assess whether the provision of services or guarantees beyond those

the defendant can provide himself might tip the balance in favor of a

decision to release. Over time, a point system will be developed, based

on which follow-up recommendations for release will be made to exa-

mining magistrates. In addition to supplementary information and

recommendations, project staff will attempt when necessary to assemble

additional resources (e.g., housing or jobs) or guarantees required by

judges as conditions of release. Resarch would be conducted on this

procedure in much the same manner as envisioned for a project at the

Dépôt.

Eventually, whether the project begins in detention centers or in

the Dépôt, it is hoped that continuity can be established throughout the

decision-making process in order to ensure that information on defen-

dants at risk of detention is collected as soon as possible, that all

relevant parties are given early access to the information, and that all

necessary follow-up steps are taken to secure release whenever it

appears to be warranted. Even if it fails to achieve a substantial decrease

in pretrial detention, the project should serve a useful function by

providing concrete information which French magistrates, researchers

and officials may use to judge for themselves the efficiency and fairness

of pretrial procedures. Its results might also suggest other approaches

to the objective of an « irreducible minimum » in detention.

Conclusion

It is perhaps worth emphasizing that, despite a substantial diversity

in legal, administrative, and social structures, there are important

similarities as well as differences in the problems facing criminal justice

administrators in both France and America. We believe it is entirely

possible that action research projects conducted cooperatively across

National lines may reveal that differences between criminal justice

Systems relate primarily to technical or secondary factors, while on

— 81 —

matters of primary importance they have much in common. Two

objectives of the experiment described here seem to us to be central.

The first is to test whether provision of more complete and more sys-

tematic information to judges can produce a reduction in pretrial

detention. The second is to encourage a more trusting, cooperative

relationship among the various agencies that form the criminal justice

system. The progress of the experiment on these fronts should tell us

something about whether commonalities in the French and American

systems outweigh differences.

FEAR OF CRIME AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS CRIME.

COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS*

HANS-JURGEN KERNER

Institute of Juvenile Law and Youth Welfare

University of Hamburg - Hamburg

Federal Republic of Germany

Introduction :

The fear of becoming victimized, particularly to become the

victim of crimes of violence, seems to be widespread all over the

industrial nations of the Western world today. According to the official

data an increase of the particularly relevant offenses and crimes can

be observed everywhere. The increase differs to some extent from

nation to nation, only in Japan the trend is out of line, if reports about

the past years can be considered to be true. In spite of the increase

at present there is no answer to the question, whether the « objective

security » or the « real state of security » has become decisively worse

for most citizens (outside specific areas, where crime is likely to occur)

compared to former decades.

This difficult problem will be neglected in this essay. À closely

related question will be discussed more detailed, instead. For it is

known that one has to distinguish exactly between the « objective state

of security » and the so called « subjective state of security ». This

last term refers to the feeling of security of the people, i.e. the everyday

knowledge about the reality of crime, which is based on a variety of

partly true, partly false findings, prejudice, attitudes and so on. This

feeling of security of the people is somehow connected to the reality

of crime, but there is not necessarily a close relation between these two

phenomena. In particular cases there might even be an absolute dispa-

rity of the feeling of being in danger and the real danger caused by

crime. There are several reasons for that. One of the obvious ones is

the fact that most people rarely get in contact with crime directly, at

least not with the more threatening kinds, although it has to be taken

into consideration that recent research has found quite an amount of

victimization (e.g. Criminal Victimization 1977).

(*) I am obliged to Michael Alex for valuable help in preparing and discussing

,the material.

This research was supported by a grant from the Bundeskriminalmt.

— 83 —

The few experiences of the people affecting themselves form the

background of the fear of crime together with the various factors of

knowledge from other sources, and also together with relatively stable

stereotypes that are strongly fixed to « common sense ». Just when (and

just because) the dominating attitudes toward crime in general and

toward certain kinds of crime in particular have so little to do with the

immediate observation of oneself, they seem to be so consistent. The

stronger, consistency seems to be the more apart the (questioned)

phenomenon is frora one’s own limited world and daily problems. This

aspect will be investigated more detailed below.

How people estimate the development of crime, what their

attitudes are in generai toward crime and criminals, what fear of crime

means and how great this fear 1s

those questions are becoming more

and more important, because the answers to them (or perhaps the opi-

nions about the possible answers to them) may have a strong impact on

public means concerned with crime and reform programs. Therefore it

is important to improve the knowledge about these problems. There

are several different methods to try and reach this purpose. One of

the most popular ways are public opinion polls among a more or less

representative sample. This method has got its specific problems,

which are presumed to be known and therefore will not be discussed

in this essay. Surveys like this have been made in the United States since

the middle of the 1930s

also in the Federal Republic of Germany

numerous attempts of this kind have been made in the past, especially

after World War II. Sometimes open-ended questions were used refer-

ring to what respondents thought being the most pressing problem

facing the country at the time, for example. Besides, closed questions

were used like, whether respondents felt more or less afraid of crime

compared to some time ago, or whether they believed that crime had

increased, stayed the same, or decreased during the past years. In the

United States also questions of the following type were (and still are)

very popular

«Is there anv area around here — that is, within a

mile —. where you would be afraid to walk alone at night ? ».

In connection with a larger research project about the possibility

to introduce an index-system as a measuring device for crime, a survey

was carried out in fall 1976 in the Federal Republic of Germany among

a representative sample of the total population (N = 2000) to inves-

tigate the evaluation of crime. In addition to questions about the relative

concern about different « classical » and « modern » crimes also several

questions were asked, which permit to make statements about the real

fear of crime and the estimation of the development of crime by the

German people. The answers to these questions and the conclusions will

be discussed below in comparison to previous surveys carried out

in the Federal Republic of Germany and other countries, with

special emphasis on the results obtained in the United States. Among

— 84 —

others the important and so far neglected question — in our view — has

to be answered, whether the results usually obtained by surveys might

possibly depend more on the formulation of questions than on the really

existing fear of crime of the people and their evaluation of crime.

I. — Crime as a General Problem vs. Crime as a Personal Threat

1l) The situation in the United States.

If findings about social problems in the United States may be

trusted, crime has not been regarded as an outstanding problem by

the American people until the 1950s (Lauer 1976, 124). This may be

concluded from the open-ended question, for example, what Americans

thought was the most important problem facing the United States at

the time. Since November 1935, the Gallup Poll has queried Americans

annually on the most important problem facing the country in a more

or less unchanged manner. Crime and delinquency were first identified

as a social problem in 1951. From that time on crime has been repeat-

edly named as the most important problem, however, continuously only

since 1968 (Lauer 1976, 125).

Referring to these results it is particularly remarkable, how much

attention was paid to crime just in 1968. According to Wiedemeyer

(1976, 383) crime was named by 15 % in July ?68, by 29 % in August

°68, by 21 % in September ’68, by 25 % in November ’68, and only by

17 @ of the respondents in March 1969. Only the wietnam war was

identified as the most pressing social problem more frequently at that

time. It would be interesting for further investigation, whether and to

which extent there is a correlation between these results and the

« war on crime », which was particularly declared by the American

Government of that time. Anyway, the frequency of mention decrased

later on and was down at 5 % in August 1975 (Wiedemeyer 1976, 383).

Several Gallup surveys showed similar results, when respondents

were asked, what they were most afraid of to happen at present or in

the future. While crime was not named at all in 1959 and 1964, 6 %

of the adults regarded it as a problem in February 1965, and 5 % in

1971, after all (Erskine, 1973-1974, 140, 142).

Apart from the especially high frequency of mention in 1968 it

may be stated : in open-ended questions Americans used to regard

crime as a minor personal and social problem, whereas the results

changed, when respondents were asked to pick the problem they had

been paying the most attention to lately, from a list of given problems.

Thus, in a national survey conducted by the National Opinion

Research Center (N.O.R.C.) for the President’s Commission on Law

Enforcement and Administration of Justice in 1966 crime was the

second most frequently selected from a list of six major domestic

problems

only race relations were picked by more people (MeIntyre

— 85 —

1976, 36). This is in accordance with the results of a Gallup survey

mentioned in comparison to an Australian study, in which 23 %

the American respondents had named crime as the problem they had

been most concerned about after race relations (32 %

Wilson 1971

224)

The fear to walk alone on the streets at night reveals the same

problem from a slightly different aspect. When people are asked directly

they tend to respond in the affirmative to a high degree. In 1965

34

and in December 1972 even 42 %, of the respondents named such

fear (Erskine 1974, 137)

2) Results from the Federal Republic of Gerinany

The survey carried out by us brought about some results — In so

far in correspondence with other studies done in the Federal Republic

of Germany —, which indicate that the situations cannot be compared

off-hand

First of all respondents were asked an open-ended question on

national problems that deserved more attention (up to 5 answers were

coded) :

Question n° |

« There’s hardly ever everything alright in state and society. One

does not agree to everything. There are quite a few problems

which the public is not concerned about sufficiently at all. Can

you tell me some of the problems that — in your opinion —

deserve more attention ? »

Unemployment, inflation, school-problems were named more fre-

quently than crime and the fight against crime, which were not men-

tioned more often than child — and youth — problems and social

problems in general (see Table 1). The frequency, with which crime

was named (17 %) is relatively high compared to the United States

where only 5 % of the respondents had considered crime to be the

most important problem in August 1975 (Wiedemeyer 1976, 383).

However, the frequency of mention was also higher than in surveys

previously done among the population of the Federal Republic of

Germany

Crime lost its significance completely, however, when a second

open-ended question referring to the fundamental personal problems

was asked. The question was

Question n° 2

« Well, everybody’s got his own personal problems. One person

gets depressed by some event in life, the other one gets upset about

something else. Can you tell me a few problems, which you are

most worried about personally right now ? »

— 86 —

TABLE 1

Responses to. Questions, Fail 1976, F.R.G.

Question n° 1 :

Question n° 2

Question n° 3 :

Problems, which dœewo much

Important personal

Importance of governmental responsabilities

public attention

problems

2000

Basis (N=)

Basis (N=)

Crime/fight against crime/

Little contact to other

sexual offence/terrori

very

Ë

E

;

no

prisons

17 %

people/loneliness

2 %

important

important

important

Ë

answer

« Internal security »

2 %

Security for the people ..

6%

(Youth-) unemployment. .

31 %

keep job

10 %

Fight against

Child-/Youth-problems/

Child-/Youth-

inflation

» .eee8s0esseesstese

63

32

>

education

e e . …. %+%e%0e6es6

17 %

problems

. . - . »0 000e 5se6e

8%

School/College/

Less difference

school-reform

19 %

School/

in income

s....."......

34

41

18

College

. . « 6 « + » e e © 6 % — » 6 À

10 %

Problems of old people/

Equal chances

old-age-pension

e + ». 6806s

Old-age-pension/

in school

39

41

14

ta

retirement needs

. e ® 660586

7%

74

21

2

medical insurance

Medical œre/physicians/

Health

« . . + 6 6 © % à © © 6 © ® » #

12 %

Less unemployment

More support

Pollution

“ e . .. ...

10 %

Worties at work

3 %

for industry

« « . » 6 # . » ® # à #

33

48

13

ta

Inflation/prices/taxes/une-

Inflation

» » » « 0. …. 8008666886s

11 %

More safety

43

43

9

qual distribution of taxes .

20 %

conc. traffic

Home problems

3 %

Home problems

5 %

Better medical care

42

42

11

general econ. problems

10 %

63

29

» RV +

Social problems

« © « 6 © » # à

17 %

Fight against crime

Miscellaneous

. e …. . …. 605e 6 #

11 %

Miscellaneous

« . . ...

6 %

Strengthen efforts

No answer

« « ». … « * s. © » © à e

42 %

for defence and

No answer

. © « © e » © 6 à « » »

— —

18 %

military forces

13

30

37

15

Total (1)

. . » 6 « © © © © #% #% » #

191 %

Total (1)

128 %

Remove pollution

44

44

(1) More than one answer possible.

Again the first 5 answers were coded. As can be seen from Table 1

the answers interesting for our purpose showed so little specification

that they had to be combined with other singular mentions to worries

about « internal security » (ie. state of endangering of life, freedom,

property, etc. within society) at a rate of 2 %. These findings are in

correspondence with the results of an Allensbach-survey from February

1972 (Noelle/Neumann 1974, 139). However, in a comparable survey

done in the United States in 1971, crime was named by 5 % of the

respondents among other worries about the future, whereas it had not

been mentioned at all in earlier surveys (Erskine 1973/74, 140)

This indicates that the Germans are more concerned about crime

as a national problem than the Americans, whereas they feel less

worried about it personally. when open-ended questions are asked

It is very interesting, now, to compare this phenomenon to the

results obtained, when crime has to be selected from a list of given

problems. In the present study this was done both in respect to crime

as a social and a personal problem. For this purpose ten social problems

were written down on a list. Question n° 3 and n° 4 were :

Question n°3

« Everyone of us has to pay taxes to enable government to

fulfill the functions. However, not everything can be done at the

same time, because there’s not enough money to spend. There

may be different opinions about the problems, which are most

pressing. Well, here’s a list of functions. If you were to give

advice to government

which function would you regard as very

important, important, less important, not important at all ? »

Question n° 4

« Well, there are many things one is worried about very much

personally and is afraid they might happen to oneself in the near

future. Can you tell me, whether you are afraid that any of the

following events might happen to you ? Are you afraid of that

all the time, often, sometimes, but sometimes not, rarely, not

at all ? »

As can be seen, the outlook was changed slightly in particular

giving the question referring to general problems a « positive » orien-

tation. Às Table 1 illustrates the fight against crime was selected as an

important or even very important responsibility of government by 92 %

of the respondents, hardly less frequently than the fights against

inflation and unemployment

(each 95 %). At first sight the high

frequency of mention compared to the United States (as mentioned

above) and Australia (35 % :

Wilson 1971, 224) is stnkmg However,

— 88 —

part of the difference may be explained by the fact that in the American

and Australian sample polls respondents had to rate the problems in

order of seriousness, whereas in the present survey the importance of

the given problems was supposed to be evaluated independent from

each other. That means, to every single social problem a unique

significance was to be attributed with regard to a possibly increased

number of governmental responsibilities in the future. Anyway, the

resukt is equivalent to the findings of a survey conducted in the Federal

Republic of Germany in August 1972 in a similar way. In this survey

91 % of the respondents had selected means against the increase of

crime as important or even very important. Only peace, old-age pension

and medical care, measures against rising prices, and pollution had

been considered equally or more important (Noelle/Neumann 1974,

132).

Regarding question n* 4 the fear of victimization was selected

as a permanent or frequent threat by 11 %, of the respondents. However,

significantly more often the loss of relatives (32 %,), severe sickness

(22 %), involvement into a road traffic-accident (17 %), and the loss

of savings (16 %) were mentioned.

The fear to walk alone on the street at night was not examined

directly in the present study. But a survey conducted byv the Max-

Planck-Institute of Freiburg in 1973 may be of considerable help in

this respect. According to that survey among the population of the

metropolis of Stuttgart, only 52 %, of the respondents said they felt

completely or relatively safe (Stephan 1976, 86, 87). This indicates

that the citizens of Stuttgart feel somewhat unsafer at night in their

own neighborhood than North-American respondents previously asked.

However, it has to be taken into consideration that Stuttgart is a densely

populated city of 650 N00 inhabitants, whereas the American surveys

had usually also included suburban and rural areas.

The large difference between responses dependent on the direction

and quality of questions, which were obtained by our special methodo-

logical approach, illustrates fundamental problems in conducting sample

polls. Those problems certainly do exist for American surveys, too,

and therefore they should be carefully taken into consideration in

surveys to come. Whenever people are not hit exactly on a certain

problem, but are asked for their everyday worries or general national

problems, crime obviously does not bother them very much. From

this, it may be concluded that the public concern about crime as it

is suggested by traditional surveying and reported frequently by the

mass media might rather be a function of the method of conducting

the survey than of the real evaluation of the problem by the people.

This aspect was not paid attention to sufficiently in the past, when

surveys were carried out on the perception of crime.

— 89 —

The general risk of getting results biased by response-styles has

already been discussed in detail in the studies on the quality of

interviews as a means of social science. Especially important in this

respect is the social-desirability-response-set. Regarding crime an addi-

tional major effect may be assumed by the social stereotype that crime

Is increasing all the time, which is mediated by the mass media per-

manently, too. It may be stated therefore that obviously the way

of putting the question can lead to an overestimation of the concern

about crime, or — expressed more clearly — that questionnaires

provoke a higher response-tendency in this direction.

A suggestive effect can be noticed, so that respondents not

really being aware of crime as a problem simply are saying to regard

it as an important problem, just because they expect the conductor

of the experiment wants them to (Stephan 1976, 111). Therefore it

is possible that respondents do not mention such problems they are

really most concerned about, but only those. which the scientists

supposed as serious at setting up the list thus confirming the conductor”s

ideology. That this assumption is more than merely a speculation may

be concluded especially from the fact that the respondents in our

survey named problems in the open-ended questions that are very

much plausible according to the present economic and social situation

of the Federal Republic of Germany as well as to their significance

for the personal, everyday life, as there are health, unemployment,

inflation, and school-problems. However it cannot be discussed in this

essay how much the responses do vary in a typical extremely plausible

manner dependent on age, sex, income, education, etc.

3) Fear of Crime and Reality of Crime.

Because of methodological reasons both open-ended and closed

questions concerning the problem were used in the present study

purposely. Also on purpose, the evaluation of the fight against crime

as a general problem of society was separately inquired from the fear

of victimization The results are : as an abstract matter, people tend

to regard the fight against crime as a relatively important problem.

But even as a possible choice from a list the respondents do not consider

crime to be an outstanding personal worry. This permits the conclusion

that the fear or victimization is rather low in the Federal Republic of

Germany, particularly in comparison to the feeling of insecurity in

the United States measured by the impression not to be safe any more

on the streets as an individual (however, again the « suggestive

effect » of the question has to be taken into consideration, of course).

— 90 —

Âs a matter of fact, the probability to become the victim of

certain crimes is considerably larger in the United States than in the

Federal Republic of Germany, as can be seen from Table 2, which

includes only a few selected data — to avoid confusion — obtained

from the official police crime statistics.

TABLE 2

Rates* of certain oftençes in the US.A. and the F.R.G.

Offence

Nation

1971

1972

1973

1974

Murder

…. ....."ee

U.S.A

8.6

8.9

9.3

9.7

F.R.G

4.0

44

4.3

4.3

Robbery

U.S.A

1875

180.3

182.6

208.8

25.3

30.5

29.5

30.6

26.1

Forcible

rape

20.4

22.4

24.4

114

ë

10.7

11.4

11.3

Burglary (1)

1 1564

11339

1 215.1

| 429.0

F

} 130.2

! 4721

| 448.1

! 581.0

Larceny-theft

ËË

21313

| 9004

20582

2 473.0

F.R.G

1 294.3

1 288.4

} 256.0

] 318.1

Sources : Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik 1975 - Uniform Crime Reports 1974.

(*) Number of registered cnmes per 100.000 inhabitants.

——

Since the descriptions of offences partly differ to a high degree

from the United States to the Federal Republic of Germany, only a

cautious comparison is possible. Furthermore, the structure of the

general problem of the evidence of police crime statistics is slightly

different in either of the nations. However, at least the tendency of the

data might be true, which is also illustrated by the findings of the inves-

tigation on the rate of victimization during the past years (Arzt 1976,

32, 33).

Although the research done so far has not proved it yet, never-

theless the assumption is possible at present that the different responses

are due to a really existing difference in the extent of fear, and that

this fear is at least somehow related to the réal problems of each of

the two nations. However, some authors argue that the response to

the question about the fear of crime cannot be regarded as an

indication or even as evidence for a concrete feeling of insecurity at all

(1) Theft under aggravating circumstances is wider, includes motor vehicle

theft, for example (FR.G.).

— 9 —

(e.g. Arzt 1976, 11). It is stated that responses to those questions only

reveal an abstract fear of disaster, and that at best the responses

concerning the fear to walk alone at night on the street in their own

neighborhood may be regarded as an expression of the real feeling of

insecurity.

It must be doubted that the general question about the fear of

victimization is much more « abstract » than the question about the

fear of victimization on the street in the neighborhood. For the general

fear of crime also includes an emotional component. This might well

lead to concrete action, e.g. improving personal safety measures. In

addition, a general question also includes the fear of certain offences

which cannot occur on the street (e.g. burglary). Finally, the fear to

walk alone at night does not necessarily have to depend on a certain

fear of crime only, but possibly on a general feeling of threat, which

might be caused by other factors (Stephan 1976, 97, 103 mentions

the fear of « dissocial figures » and trouble in general, the fear of

foreigners, the fear of drunkards, and the fear of darkness, for example)

The remarkable discrepancy between the concern about personal

worries and the evaluation of the general respectively the national

problems noted in the present study also has been found in other

German studies, although on a completely different level. The closer

people are to the problem inquired, or the more they are familiar

with the subject concerned, the less worried or even « paranoiac » they

respond. This, for example, is illustrated by the results of the « Stuttgart

victimization survey » from 1973. 20 %, of the respondents asked

in that survey supposed an increase of crime in their own ne1ghborhood

, assumed an increase

during the past one or two years, whereas 64 %

for the total city of Stuttgart, and even 83 % thought crime had

increased in the Federal Republic of Germany (Stephan 1976, 126)

Although there seem to be significant objective differences between

the two nations, and although particularly the personal fear of victi-

mization belongs to the repertory of regularly defined problems in

sample polls conducted in the United States, the discrepancy between

personal fear and general concern revealed by German studies has not

been examined systematxcally yet in American studies, at least so far as

we know. The discrepancy is probany and at least partially due to the

followmg two factors :

Some scholars do reter to the 1nfluenœ of the mass media, whmh

are considered to overemphasize spectacular developments and single

cases of crime, hereby deeply influencing (if not distorting) the ideas

that people have about crime outside their own immediate environ-

ment and their limited view of the world (Jubelius/Stein-Hilbers 1977

177

Ludwig Boltzmann Institut für Kriminalsoziologie 1977, esp

— 92 —

15 ff, 46 ff and 77 ff : Feltes/Kerner/Wiebking 1977, 13 ff). Others

additionally point out that the identification with their own neighbor-

hood, which supposedly exists among respondents, may exert some

influence. The identification might support the tendency to defend

their environs, so that they do not want to make negative statements

about their own neighborhood (Stephan 1976, 128 with further refe-

rences ; similar : McIntyre 1976, 38 ; Wilson 1971, 226).

On the basis of his experiences in the United States Arzt clamed

that it is improper to derive the bad influence of sensational reports

from the fact that the estimation of the development of crime in

general is more pessimistic than in respect to the own neighborhood of

the respondents. He would rather suggest the principally correct notice

of the difference between abstract threat of crimes of violence and

concrete danger for oneself as an individual to be responsible for this

effect.

This criticism seems to be confirmed by the results of the present

survey at first sight. For only 43 % of the respondents regarded the

strengthening of the efforts for defence and the military forces as im-

portant or very important, although this subject has always been of

great interest to the mass media, just like crime. When expenditures

for the military forces are regarded as relatively unimportant in spite

of the comparatively broad discussion in the media, this seems to indi-

cate that the concern about the fight against crime as an important

problem is not only or not even primarily a result of « collective

awareness » created by the media, but expresses a real desire of the

people.

However, this explanation does not fit very well to the fact that in

our survey most respondents named the fights against inflation and

unemployment as the most important responsibilities of government.

which are exactly those subjects that were also regarded as the most

worrying personal problems right after the fear of severe sickness. T'his

illustrates that usually the personal worries are also meant to be the

most important government responsibilities, at least as far as their

removal is regarded (supposedly) possible by means of government.

When there is a significant gap between the evaluation of crime as

a social problem on one hand, and as a personal concern on the other,

this probably depends on some intervening variables, after all.

In spite of all doubts and objections, one of those variables might

be the sensational presentation of the news on crime by the media.

The results of the present survey concerning military forces are not in

contrary to that. For reports on military subjects are traditionally not

nearly as occupied by emotion as the ones on crime. In addition great

consensus throughout the population and the political parties of the

Federal Republic of Germany can be assumed in that government will

— 93 —

try hard (enough) to save the « external security» (defence of the

state, etc.) and does not need being forced by the public. However,

this controversial question cannot be answered by referring only to

the surveys conducted so far.

II — The Real an the Estimated Occurence of Crime

From the points stated above,l it may be concluded that open-

ended questions are most suitable to get relatively correct information

about the problems the respondents are really most concerned about.

Under these circumstances it seems quite interesting to see that in our

survey respondents from rural areas identified crime as a problem that

should bepaid more attention to significantly more frequently than other

respondents (21 %). For according to the official data this group of

the population is less likely to get involved into crime itself than the

inhabitants of larger cities, as can be seen from Table 3, which is

a brief review of the data from the United States and the Federal

Republic of Germany.

TABLE 3

Crime Rates according to size of city 1974

Rate®

Population group (I =ﬁF.R.G., Il =_U3A.)

_

—

—

mmms mt

e e e dc e dn en

cities under 20,000 inhabitants

2,540.0

cities, 20,000 to 100,000

4,605.0

cities, 100,000 to 500,000

.. ... ................s

5,939.0

cities over 500,000 (1)

. . à à = + . 6. 6 » © 6 « »* © 6 = 6 6 6 6 . % ® © » —

mts c0c r

7,324.9

TT

3,631 cities under 10,000

. . . .. .. ... ...

3,818.2

1,30M cities, 10.000 to 25,000

. .. ...................

4,4178

519 cities, 25,000 to 50,000

» © e àn 6 %* @ € © 6 e © 6 à « © à © » » = »

5,151.6

253 cities,

50,000 to 100,000

« » » »* —. #% « € » 5 » © % ® e € < e —

5,741.4

107 cities,

100,000 to 250,000

+ . « ». » à % € + € 6 » » »s % » — à °

7,111.0

31 cities,

250,000 to 500,000

. e e #% 9 %% # » « © © » © « @ » % =

7,155.4

21 cities,

500.000 to 1,000,000

e .................

8,029.4

. » . #% % 5 5 < à 5 % 6 © #w « © #% ® 6 à n 6 8 #

6,961.4

——n

6 cities over ; 1,000,000

—emar -

Sources

see Table 2.

(*) Number of crimes per 100,000 inhabitants.

(1) Usually not standard metropolitan statistical area, but core-city.

— 94 —

Interesting for a comparison is only the similar structure in both

countries. The data itself cannot be compared exactly, because the

units chosen differ very much. In addition, there is only a sample

available of cities in the United States, including only 6 cities with

a population of more than 1,000,000 and a total population of

18,541,000, for example.

The enlarged concern about crime in rural areas of the Federal

Republic of Germany is not only in contrary to the crime rate noticed

by the police but also to survey-results from other countries. In the

Australian study mentioned above a positive relation was found between

increasing urbanization and concern for crime, for example, according

to the increase of crime rates (Wilson 1971, 224). Just as well surveys

done in the United States in 1972 showed that the fear to walk alone

at night in the neighborhood was far less distinct in rural areas (24 %

resp. 28 %) than in cities, where 42 % up to 53 % respectively 40 %

up to 51 % of the respondents answered, they were afraid (Hindelang

1975, 9 : Erskine 1973/74, 138).

However, the contrary result of the present study possibly has quite

a realistic background considered the development of crime during the

past years according to official data. For crime rates increased above

average in rural areas from 1974 to 1975, for example ; the increase was

8.8 % compared to 4.3 % in small cities, 1.3 % in larger cities, and

3.1 % in major cities. However, it has to be taken into consideration

that the typical sources of error in sample polls might have influenced

the results of this survey, too. Thus, the major city as a political object

or administration unit sure is something else in the minds of people

than the city as an organized, social environment of their lives they

partially know quite well and are able to identify themselves with.

Finally, as mentioned above, surveys conducted in Germany repeatedly

demonstrated that the evaluation of crime as a social problem is

largely independent from the probability of personal victimization.

Further details, such as the relationship between the officially stated

crime rates and the personal fear of crime depending on age and socio-

economic status cannot be discussed in this essay.

IM. — The Estimation of Crime Trends

In previous surveys on the estimation of the development of

crime respondents usually were asked, whether they felt crime was

increasing. In April 1975, 75 % responded to this question affirma-

tively (Noelle-Neumann 1976, 86). In a survey conducted in Bremen in

1972 even 83 % of the respondents had supposed an increase (Bremen-

Report 1973, review 2). As can be seen from American surveys, in

December 1972 about 51 %, and in October 1973 about 48 %, of the

Americans thought that crime had increased in their neighborhood,

— 95 —

whereas 9 ©/, resp. 7 %expressed the opinion it had decreased (Erskine

1973/74, 132-134). Again, it has to be taken into consideration that

these American surveys refer only to the immediate social environs,

whereas German respondent, were inquired about the development

in the country as a whole.

But even the comparably lower frequency, with which an increase

of crime was supposed by Americans in the quoted polls, leads to the

problem, whether the formulation of the question might have suggested

the response and provoked attitudes artificially. The question, whether

people think crime is increasing, reinforces the social stereotype of the

respondent, his everyday knowledge, and therefore acts as a strong

stimulus, which under certain circumstances might even force him to

respond affirmatively. The survey conducted by us does not prove

this assumption, but makes it appear rather plausible. For in accor-

dance with other recent studies respondents were not asked for the

development of crime in general, but had to state for certain offences,

whether in their opinion these offences had increased during the past

years, had stayed the same, or had decreased. The result was that

respondents suppose an increase significantly less often, when, what

is described as crime in a questionnaire, is somehow concrete and

understandable for them. In the question referring to this, ten different

offences were given, as can be seen from Table 4. The question was :

Question n° 6

« Well, therce are different kinds of crime, and one reads a lot

about crime, or at least hears about it. Therefore you probably

have an impression, what the development was like during the

past years. Here’s a list of several offences. Would you please

tell me, which of these — in your opinion — have increased,

stayed the same, or may be even have decreased during the past

years ».

TABLE 4

Estimation of Crime Trendî F.R.G. 1976

—0 0=

——

—

Off enœ—(1))

“ Responses

increased

C stayed

decreased

« thç same

p OO ——

—n e — 000

Criminal homicïdë

36 %

51 %

10 %

Tax evasion etc.

oooooooooooooo

37 %

52 %

5 %

Rape

42 %

47 %

8 %

Political offences

43 %

41 %

13 %

White collar crime etc.

uuuuuuuu

51 %

40 %

4 %

Driving under influence

53 %

32 %

13 %

Robbery, mugging etc.

. e © » « = « »

53 %

37 %

8 %

Drug offences

© . + # ». à = » * + # + — e « ®

54 %

29 %

16 %

Breaking and entering

(oËf private houses)

54 %

39 %

4 %

Shoplifting etc. ..........240200

67 %

28 %

4 %

(1) Order is different from the list given to réspoÎdents.

— 96 —

The structure of the list put down in Table 4 equals the officially

stated crime trends according to police crime statistics, a result which

was also found to be true for Great Britain in a similar survey (Banks

et al. 1975, 229). Only offences relating to narcotic drugs were rela-

tively often considered to have decreased, although they had increased

the most from 1974 to 1975 according to the official data. Furthermore,

it is striking that offences, which are broadly discussed in the mass

media (in particular political and sexual offences). were relatively often

regarded as not having increased.

An inquiry into single offences therefore seems to be at least

a more suitable procedure than the rather general questions (formerly

asked) to find out the real estimation of crime trends by the people.

It also illustrates that the estimation of these special development is

very much based on subjective factors and, besides, varies largely

dependent on age, sex, socio-economic status, and place of residence

of the respondents. These problems. however. cannot be discussed in

detail in this essay.

Consequently, in surveys to come more attention should be paid

to the fact that the estimation of the development of crime largely

depends on certain interests and that fears concerning crime therefore

can easily be abused for manipulation. This is most important with

regard to possible consequences in matters of criminal policy, espe-

cially in planning new laws.

IV. — The Effects of « Counter-Provoking »

In the present study we have also tried, for methodological reasons,

to make respondents independent from their usual response patterns by

setting up an extreme variation, and to enable them to gain new

categories of thinking respectively responding by provoking inquiring.

Thus, we asked a question, which was contrary to the usual stereo-

type of the « criminal » as somebody completely different from the

« average-citizen ». Furthermore, we set up a strong « counter-sti-

mulus » by another question referring to crime trends

Question n° 5 :

« According to press-reports, a state secretary stated a few days

ago that crime was not increasing any more in the Federal Republic

of Germany, that it might even begin to decrease. What do you

think of this opinion considering your own impression ? Is

it absolutely right, largely right. not so easy to decide, largely

wrong, absolutely wrong ? »

— 97 —

While up to 67 % of the respondents claimed at least certain

crimes had increased (question n° 6), only 40 % were willing to say

the opinion of the secretary was largely or absolutely wrong. That

means 60 % did not stick to the habitual stereotype of the increase

of crime, and were at least not sure, whether there might be some-

thing about the statement given by the secretary.

In summary, therefore, we can say from the results of our survey,

and draw attention to the fact that the evaluation of the state and

the development of crime seems basically resistent to change, but never-

theless can be influenced deeply by external means in its specific

shaping. The opportunities given to methodological research by this

incidence on one hand, the dangers in regard to criminal policy on the

other hand, are obvious.

REFERENCES

ARZT (G.) : Der Ruf nach Recht und Ordnung. Ursachen und Folgen der

Kriminalitätsfurcht in den US.A. und in Deutschland, 1976, Tübingen :

Mohr.

BANKS (C.E.) MALONEY and WILLCOCK (H.D)

« Public Attitudes to

Crime and the Penal System », British Journal of Criminology, 1975.

n° 15, pp. 228-240.

ERSKINE (H.) : « The Pol

Ho

, Fears, and Regrets », The Public

Opinion Quaterly, 1973-1974, n° 37, pp. 132-145.

ERSKINE (H)

« The Pols : Fear of Violence and Crime », The Public

Opinion Quarterly, 1974, n° 38, pp. 131-145.

FELTES (T.), KERNER (H.J.) and WIEBKING (N.) : « Mit Criminal gegen

“ Kriminelle », Psychologie heute, 1977, n° 4, pp. 13-18.

HINDELAND (M.

« Public Opinion Regarding Crime », Criminal Justice

and Related Topics, 1975, Washington, D.C. : G.P.O.

JUBELIUS (W.) and STEIN-HILBERS (M)

« Vermittlung von Informa-

tionen über Kriminalität in Massenmedien.

Uberlegungen zur Erklärung

unterschiedlicher Bewusstseinsinsinhalte », Monatsschrift für Kriminologie

und Strafretsreform, 1977, n° 60, pp. 177-185.

LAUER (R.H)

« Defining Social Problems

Public and Professional

Perspectives », Social Problems, 1976, n° 24, pp. 122-130.

LUDWIG BOLTZMANN INSTITUT FUR KRIMINALSOZIOLOGIE, : ed.

« Kriminalität in der Massenmedien »,Kriminalsoziologische Bibliografie,

1976, n° 4, Heft 11-13.

McINTYRE (J)

«Public Attitudes toward Crime and Law Enforcement »,

The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,

1967, n° 374, pp. 34-46.

— 98 —

NOELLE (E.) und NEUMANN (E.P.), (ed.

Jahrbuch der offentlichen

Meinung 1968-1973. Allensbach und Bonn : Verlag für Demoskopie. 1974.

NOELLE (E.) und NEUMANN (E.P.), (ed.)

Allenbacher Jahrbuch der

Demoskopie 1974-1976, Bd. VI, Wien-München-Zürich : Verlag für Demos-

kopie, 1976.

STEPHAN (E.) : Die Stuttgarter Opferbefragung. Eine kriminologisch, vikti-

mologische Analyse zur Erforschung des Dunkelfeldes unter besonderer

Berücksichtigung der Einstellung der Bevôlkerung zur Kriminalität. 1976.

Wiesbaden : Bundeskriminalamt. Forschungsreihe, Nr. 3

WIEDEMEYER (N..) : « The Polls : Do People Worry About the Future »,

The Public Opinion Quarterly, 1976, (n° 40), pp. 382-391.

WILSON (P.R.)

« Crime and the Public.», The Australian and New

Zealand Journal of Criminology, 1971, n° 4, pp. 223-232.

MAT ERIALS :

Bremen-Report

Innere Sicherheit und Polizeiorganisation. INFAS-Reprä-

sentativerhebung,

Land Bremen 1970-1972, Bremen

not published.

Criminal Victimization in the United States. À comparison of 1974 and 1975

Findings. A National Crime Survey Report. Prepared by : U.S. Department

of Justice Law Enforcement Assistance Administration National Criminal

Justice. Information and Statistics Service. Washington, D.C. : G.P.O., 1977.

Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik 1975 für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Heraus-

gegeben vom Bundeskriminalamt Wiesbaden : Eigenverlag, 1976.

« Crime in the United States

United Crime Reports for the United States

1974 ». Issued by Kelley. C.H. Washington, D.C. : G.P.O., 1975.

— 99 —

IV. - Micro criminology

THE RAPE PROBLEM

T.C.N. GIBBENS

K.L. SOOTHILL

Institute of Psychiatry

Department of Sociology

University of London

Lancaster University

London - United Kingdom Bailrigg, Lancaster - United Kingdom

There is no crime which has attracted so much enquiry, complaint

and controversy in recent years, nationally and internationally, as rape.

Three factors seem to be involved. First, a surprising, and for some

people alarming, increase in complaints of (and convictions for) rape

in many countries. Secondly, the rise of women’s organisations to

relieve the distress of those who have been raped and sometimes to

secure justice for them — such as Rape Crisis centres, Rape Aid, etc.

Thirdly, increasing complaints about the ineffectiveness of the criminal

law and especially its male-orientated bias which tends to treat the

woman victim almost as if she were the offender by implying that she

is making a false accusation or is anyway an immoral woman. It seems

almost certain that these three trends are related to one another,

and that it represents a shift in culture and mores which the criminal

law has to adjust to as best it can.

Apart from this popular interest, rape presents in a narrow

compass a fascinating goup of medico-legal and socio-legal issues.

It is almost the only crime in which the mental state of the offender

and his victim is equally important in deciding not only what sort of

offence has been committed but whether a crime has been committed

at all. In non-sexual violent crime, there are many legal gradations

of oflence, varying according to provocation and what sort of injury

occured. But common to all is the reasonable assumption that no one

wants to be injured, even if he is the assailant. When a woman shows

no sign of bruising or physical resistance to intercourse, there is

nothing to go on except her story, unless there is some corroboration ;

though rape is quite rightly defined in law as having intercourse with

a woman knowing that she does not consent, or being reckless as

to whether she consents or not. Violence is emphatically not an

essential element in the offence though some old police surgeon’s

text-books refer to woman «having to resist to the limit of their

streneth » ! Most modern young women will assume that resistance

beyond a certain point is dangerous, and since virginity is not highly

regarded, there is less incentive to preserve it.

— 103 —

In addition, in non-sexual violence there is some popular estimate

of normal behaviour ; though research has shown that the range of

attitudes to what constitutes violence is surprisingly wide. Aggressive

men define a fight in which they got knocked unconscious as an

«argument » or a « quarrel », and nothing less than an attack by

someone with a knife or a lethal weapon tends to be defined as an

« assault ». In relation to sexual behaviour, however, no one has the

slightest idea of what the normal range of behaviour is or even the

standard deviation of normal behaviour, in spite of Kinsey’s valiant

efforts. At a recent meeting in South Africa the question was raised

whether a white middle class magistrate was a proper person to

consider whether rape had occurred between two coloured people, since

many white people tended to think that this was « normal » behaviour

between blacks. In Amir’s study of rape in Philadelphia (1971) the

great majority of rapes occurred between very young coloured girls and

coloured boys not much older, 27 per cent of the complaints being

made by the girl herself, raises similar issues of cultural interpretation.

Similar cultural issues arise with Anglo-Saxon juries, where there

may be a generation gap between older women on the jury and a young

victim whose fairly ordinary contemporary behaviour may be inter-

preted by them as wanton or promiscuous.

Incidence. To turn to the areas of controversy mentioned earlier,

the increase has been considerable. À recent Australian survey (Newton,

1976) reports increases in several countries. In the U.S.A. Chappell

(Newton, 1976) reported « during the past decade forcible rape rates

have more than doubled, the pace of increase being more rapid since

1967 and in the early 1970s reaching a speed outstripping all the major

categories of violent crime ». Kraus (1976) quotes reports of increasing

incidence of individual and gang rape in Western Germany, the U.S.A.

Czechoslovakia, Japan and England. Kraus found that in New South

Wales from 1956 to 1969, in addition to a general increase, the rates for

pack rape had increased two and a half times faster than the indivi-

dual ones. During this period pack rape increased to no less than 61 per

cent of all rapes. Rapes by adults increased by 192 per cent but by

juveniles by 773 per cent.

In England and Wales (Soothill, Jack and Gibbens, 1976) trials

for rape or attempted rape numbered 119 in 1951, 266 in 1961 and

412 in 1974, doubling everyv ten years. Since 1973 there has been a

falling off, however. Rapes recorded as known to the police and the

number found guilty (in brackets) were in 1973, 998 (331) ; 1974, 1052

(343) :1975, 1040 (336) (1). Stability in statistics is always more baffling

(1) The reference to these figures is Parliamentary Anwser April 7 1977.

than figures which jump up and down, which one would think natural

in real life. There are others even more extraordinary. While waiting

for the subsequent criminal records of 1951 and 1961 rapes (which

were derived from totals prosecuted, so that they included in an

interesting way a follow-up of those acquitted) our team (Soothill,

Jack and Gibbens, 1976) searched the newspapers for those victims

who had been mentioned by name and sometimes also by address.

The proportion in the three decades was respectively 24 per cent, 26

per cent and 25 per cent. Considering the absolute numbers involved

this seemed to indicate a considerable increase in newspaper space

(though in practice it was limited to one or two newspapers). This

raises the question, as the fascinating studies of perception of violence

by the public in Scandinavia suggest (Council of Europe, 1974) to

what extent our anxicties and attitudes are virtually created by the press.

The second, even more surprising, fact was that the proportion of

those prosecuted who were acquitted, in spite of 100 per cent increase

in numbers in each decade, was constant — 19 per cent of 119 cases

in 1951, 22 per cent of 266 in 1961, and 25 per cent of 412 in 1974.

What balance of social perceptions, police practice, sexual mores or

other factors could lead to such constant results ?

The Law. Whatever the real changes have been, the law has felt

a need to adapt itself rather better to the needs of society. There is

little doubt that the process of conviction of a rapist has most unfairly

increased the burdens on the unfortunate victim. As if it were not

enough to be raped, the girl or woman, if she reports it to the police,

finds that she is asked a number of searching questions about what

happened, which easily leave her with the impression that she is not

really being believed, that she is exaggerating or bending the truth. À

certain number of women are sufficiently hurt or annoyed to cease

cooperation at this point. Soon afterwards she has an unpleasantly

detailed physical examination by a police doctor who also takes a

medical history about her physical and gynaecological complaints and

who makes an assessment of how much her statement agrees with her

physical state. She expects to find, in the doctor at least, someone who

will sympathise and help, and she may pour out the confidences of

a life time. These will and must be recorded as well as injuries and

scratches etc. However, unless the official report is limited to strictly

relevant matters, injuries, demeanour, and signs of intercourse, it may,

when handed to the prosecution, be sent on «in fairness » to the

defence as an objective report, and at the trial an unmarried victim

may be asked suddenly whether it is true that some years before she

had had two lovers in succession and an abortion a few years after-

wards etc, information given originally on the assumption that it was

in medical confidence. Very difficult issues of medical ethics are raised

— 105 —

if the report is not carefully limited to objective physical findings

Nevertheless, careful note should be kept of all aspects of the exami-

nat10n for a great deal may depend on them

Durmg the trial she is liable to be questioned about her sexual

behaviour not only with the accused but with others. The more honest

and truthful she is the more likely it is that she can be shocked or

confused into appearing unreliable or untruthful. Worst of all, if the

accused is acquitted, either on the instructions of the judge that the

evidence is not sufficient, or after his warning (which some American

observers have sought to prohibit) that it is unsafe to convict a person

on -uncorroborated testimony, she is made to appear as a liar. Subse-

gently. she will be left to get over it as best she can, a situation which

Rape Aid has strived to improve. It is of some interest that in South

Africa the Rape Aid workers have secured agreement from the police

to attend the initial examination and support the victim throughout

The criticisms or suggestions for reform raised in many coun-

tries therefore include (1) that the processes of trial expose the

victim to embarrassing and traumatic questions about her present and

previous behaviour :

(2) that she receives an unnecessary and damaging

publicity : (3) that the scope of permitted cross-examination makes it

too easy to raise doubts about consent and secure an acquittal :

(4)

that husbands should not be excluded from the ambit of the law ; or,

if they are, that regular cohabitees should be included also : (5) that

clumsy police interrogation could be avoided if specially trained « rape

squads » were formed

(6) that mere lack of consent, or reckless-

ness about it, refers to such a wide range of behaviour in terms of

severity (excluding statutory rape or rape of the mentally disordered)

that the law should define gradations of offence and penalty, reserving

rape for the extreme forms of violence by strangers

Many countries had considered these issues with varying degrees

-of urgency. Much depends upon the particular pattern of the law

whether e.g. guilt is decided by a judge or jury : whether prosecution

1s'decided after private investigation by juge d’instruction, as in France

the extent of the powers of the court to regulate the trial procedure

etc. In Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany and New Zealand

for example there is legal provision, freely used, to exclude the public

from trials or parts of trials, when sensitive evidence is being given

to forbid publication of names or even press reports of any kind

In these countries controversy seems less vociferous. It is mainly in the

Anglo-Saxon countries with common law tradition — Australia

Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom — that discussion has

been most urgent. Would it be true to say that in these countries the

movement for equal rights for women in all respects has been most

strongly urged ?

— 106 —

The circumstances in which rape can be alleged have been so

varied that attempts are sometimes made at very comprehensive defi-

nitions. As Howard (1970) says of. the different states of Australia

«the codes of Queensland and Western Australia have a definition

which is more elaborate because it makes express reference to some

of the difficulties which have arisen at common law in delineating

the limits of the offence »

« Any person who has carnal knowledge

of a woman, or girl, not his wife, without her consent, or with her

consent, if the consent is obtainable by force, or by means of threats

or intimidation of any kind, or by fear of bodily harm, or by means

of false or fraudulent representations as to the nature of the act, or in

the case of a married woman, by impersonating her husband, is guilty

of a crime, which is called rape». Most people will find it rather

extraordinary that a married woman should not be able to recognize

her husband in the dark or that some should innocently think that

sexual intercourse with a doctor is not different from a routine gynae-

cological examination, but there seem to be no limits to the possibilities.

Indeed when the circumstances of rape trials are considered in detail

it is sometimes impossible to formulate a coherent idea of what took

place.

The American Model Penal Code goes even further in trying to

define all the possible varieties of rape in order to achieve some

differentiation of the penalties to be attached to the varieties. They thus

arrive at what are virtually degrees of offence, « Rape by force or

its equivalent » is divided into first degree felony, if there was serious

physical injury to a victim who is not « a voluntary social companion »

and had not « previously permitted him sexual liberties» ; second

degree felony if she was compelled to submit by force or threats of

injury to herself or family, given drugs or drink without her consent,

was unconscious, or was a child under the age of ten ; third degree

felony if « intercourse without legally effective consent », if intimidated,

incapable of understanding the behaviour, unaware of the sexual act

etc. And it 1s a misdemeamour to abuse authority or have intercourse

with false promise of marriage.

The object of this exercice 1s siated explicitly to be the achievement

of uniformity in sentencing in the many American jurisdictions. In

England the Heilbron Committee on the Law of Rape decided against

gradations, for the circumstances are different. England has a cohesive

judiciary with a relatively uniform conception of the sentence appro-

priate to particular types of offence. À very interesting Australian

study of sentencing policy in rape (1976) shows as a comparable study in

England probably would that sentences can be seen to vary according

to the behaviour of the victim, the surroundings of the offence and

the character of the accused. À sliding scale was drawn up as follows :

— 107 —

A COMPOUND GUIDE TO RAPE SENTENCING |

The Offence

r r e rr 0 rr e

p

Ï

—-— —— _—

—— es . r e e rr

—

The F)ﬁender

_—

Violence

Victim°s

Meeting

Co—operation

Circpm_ÿanœs

__

No violence

Unambiguously

Casual hotel meeting

Respectable, no prior

consents initially

convictions

Threats only

Signs interpreted as

Street pick-up

Good reputation, but

consent

specific personal problem

Pushed around

Encourages sexual

Meets victim at social

l — 2 prior convictions

only

intimacy

function, takes her home

Moderate

Provocative, aware

Considerable number of

struggle

of effect

Fraudulent pick-up, but

girl goes willingly

priors

Forcible

Provocative, unaware

Meets victim at social

Extensive delinquency

restraint

of effect

function, lures her away

and/or sexual priors

Violent

Unsuspecting, social

Legitimate, pre-arranged

Full rape prior

struggle

companion

outing

Punching,

Totally non-provoking

Attack without warning

Institutionalised

beating

psychopathic

——

FIGURE I

Almost certainly an added factor in not having « gradations » of

offence is a perception that the criminal law is a very clumsy and often

ineffective means of judging or controlling sexual behaviour. No one

doubts that it must intervene in cases where physical force or inti-

midation is used or for the protection of the young and weak, or to

prevent gross insults to the concept of public decency, but a long list

of lesser punishable offences would lead to a great increase in in-

conclusive litigation, as well as the possibility that whenever a complaint

of any Kkind is made there will be a tendency to convict the offender

of at least a lesser offence rather than to decide that a serious offence

has been committed or not.

The controversy which led to the appointment of the Advisory

Group on the Law of Rape in England (Heilbron Committee) arose

from an apparently recondite but nevertheless very important legal

decision made by the highest court of appeal (the House of Lords)

dealing solely with one question

if an accused maintains that he

thought the woman was consenting, does the jury decide this on the

basis of what a « reasonable » man would have thought or what the

accused actually appears to have believed even if it is unreasonable.

They decided upon the latter criterion, in line with the modern

conception of the guilty mind. This was hailed by some as a « rapists

charter », implying that a man is entitled to be believed however

ridiculous his explanation appeared. The Group’s recommendation on

this and other matters was incorporated quite rapidly in the Sexual

Offences (Amendment) Act of 1976.

This re-defines rape as unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman

who at the time of intercourse does not consent to it ; and, that the

accused knows at the time that she does not consent or is reckless

as to whether she consents to it. It re-affirmed that in deciding whether

a man believed that the woman was consenting the presence or

absence of reasonable grounds for such a belief is a matter to

which the jury is to have regard. in conjunction with any other relevant

matters.

The Act, drafted with exemplary care, also provided that evidence

may not be adduced or questions asked about matters relating to the

sexual experience of a complainant with a person other than the

accused, or her disposition or reputation in sexual matters without

the leave of the court. This will not be granted unless the judge

decides (in the absence of the jury) that the evidence presented to

him is of such relevance that it would be unfair to the defendant to

exclude them, and will onlyv be allowed when the court is satisfied that

there is a «striking relationship » between these matters and the

complainant’s alleged behaviour on the occasion in question.

— 109 —

The Group recommended that the complainant should remain

anonymous, and that the jury should be composed of a statutory pro-

portion of men and women. But Parliament, while accepting the first

added that the accused should also remain anonymous until and unless

convicted (perhaps in deference to recent legislation with regard to the

quality between the sexes) and also rejected the idea of a statutory

balance of sexes on the jury, perhaps because of practœal comphcat10ns

and the very large precedent it would cause.

Criminological. Our own concern has been rather with the question

of what sort of behaviour leads to a prosecution for rape, and especially

whether rapists are often reconvicted subsequently of this sort of

offence, for the long sentences often imposed seem to imply at least

partly that they are viewed as persistently dangerous. Most studies

(e.g. Christiansen) suggest that sex offenders are less often reconvicted

and at longer intervals than property offenders. We, therefore, studied

the previous and subsequent criminal records of all cases prosecuted

for rape in 1951 and 1961 (including therefore those who were

acquitted). So far as types of behaviour were concerned they fell into

three broad groups (1977). About a third (30 per cent) were, rather

surprisingly, pedophiliac rapes of girls under 14. They pleaded, or

were found guilty much more often than others, no doubt because

there was no defence or consent ; moreover such men are often remor-

seful and also know that the sentence may be lessened if they do not

add to the damage by forcing a child to give evidence against them 1n

court. About half of these men were charged with attempted rape

which may not be very clearly defined. À second group of 20 per cent

were «agressive » rapists, with convictions for non-sexual violence

in their record before or after the offence. These include some men

who are generally intolerant of frustration and assault their friends,

enemies or their wives as well as any other girl who refuses them,

and since violent offences usually « mean » heavy drinking probably

included some who became drunken offenders later. About half pleaded

not guilty and they were fairly often found not guilty. It seems possible

that apart from greater criminal sophistication which would lead them

always to plead not guilty, such men have such an aggressive view

of normal sexuality that they do not think they are guilty. We found

one man Who had three times, at considerable intervals, been acquitted

of rape and who said to reporters « [ do not know why these women

to do that you would have to understand how a

said I raped them

woman’s mind works ! ». The third group of 50 per cent were

« others » mainly characterised by men with few if any previous or

subsequent offences apart from very mmor ones. About a third of

these were acquitted.

Hali Williams (l977) has extended these groups from the much

fuller details available in the parole dossiers of 78 cases seen (1970/72)

— 110 —

as a member of the Parole Board (which deals with those sentenced

to 18 months imprisonment or over among the 70 per cent of those

convicted who are sent to prison). He described four groups — 16 per

cent who are pedophiliac offenders, 18 per cent « extremely aggres-

sive», of the most violent and dangerous kind, 47 per cent mildly

aggressive individuals or group rapists, and 18 per cent « sexual attacks

committed by individuals as a means of resoiving personal problems

or as a response to extreme stress or tension ». Problems with drink

or drugs were never less than 43 per cent, in the mildly aggressive

applied to one half of the others, and to 65 per cent of the extremely

aggressive group. Severe personality disorders were present in the vast.

majority and were least (45 per cent) in the mildly aggressive. Over

half (57 per cent) of the « personal stress and tension » group had no

previous convictions but nearly all had had serious personality disor

ders and 57 per cent a problem with drink or drugs. For the whole

sample 23 per cent of the victims were known prevnously to the accused ;

only 10 per cent of the offences were committed in the home e1thcr

of the victim or the accused.

Pack rape, which is exceptionally common in Australia and to a

lesser extent in Germany, applied to 35 individuals or ten of Hall

Williams’ 79 «cases ». In our 1951 and 1961 sample, a charge with

«two or more others » was brought in 17 per cent of aggressives

20 per cent of «others», and a surprising 17 per cent of the

pedophiliac rapes. These latter, however, referred often to rapes of

(presumably) rather forward 13 year old girls by three or four boys

of 16 or 17. It may be difficult to apportion responsibility among

these boys and they would usually not reach prison. Among adults

however, there are a number of cases in which two or three men in

a car, usually the worse for drink, offer a lift to two girls (Who think

that this makes them safe), throw one out and all rape the other

As other studies have shown, rapists tend to have fewer previous

sexual offences than other sex offenders (Ellis and Brancale, 1956

Karpman, 1954 ; Christiansen, 1965) but often a considerable number

of other offences. The large Cambridge study (1957) showed that only

9 per cent of rapists had previous sexual convictions. Amir’s large

Philadelphia study (1971) reported 4 per cent with previous other sex

offences, but « only» 9 pér cent. (which seems astonishingly high)

With a previous « rapè arrest ».‘In oùr two cohorts only 22 pet cent of

pedophiliac or aggressive rapists had no prévious convictions ; previous

sex offences were higher in the pedophiliacs (37 per cent) than m

the aggressives (17 per cent).

Subsequent offences were common in both groups but only 20 per

cent of the 1961 pedophiliac and aggressive offenders had subsequent

sex offences and 15 per cent of.the 1951 group. On the main question

— 111 —

of whether they ever committed rape again, the findings were interesting.

Out of 86 convicted 22 years before five were reconvicted of another

rape at intervals (after release from the previous imprisonment) of

two years, four years, eleven years, and fifteen years after the first

offence and one on two occasions — at three and sixteen years. Of the

200 convicted in 1961 there were four reconvictions for rape or attem-

pted rape, twelve for indecent assault of different sorts. and eight of

indecent exposure.

One of the advantages of studying prosecutions was that we were

able to follow those acquitted (though not of course subsequent

acquittals). Of the 82 acquittals in 1951 and 1961, three were sub-

sequently convicted of rape or attempted rape — a slightly higher

proportion than the five out of 86 convicted in 1951. Subsequent sex

and violent offences were similar in the aoquitted and convicted, which

might support the contention popular with criminologists that apart

from the period of neutralisation in prison there is not much evidence

that the courts affect the behaviour of offenders, even if they affect

non-offenders. Subsequent violent offences needed close examination.

Fairly often men who were rebuffed in a sexual approach to a stranger

snatch the girl’s handbag or punch her. and are thus convicted of

robbery or common assault.

Sociological. There remains the problem of the possible reasons for

increased rape or the increased definition and reporting of rape. Few

can doubt that the changes in women’s self image and conception of

their status has been affected by physical, educational and economic

factors. The physical factor has been the availability of safe contra-

ception which enables women to lead a free sexual life without crippling

consequences. Much has been written about impressions that those girls

who decide for marriage and children tend to marry by the age of

20 to 22, while the career girl decides not to marry till she has reached

the peak of her professional competence at about 30, permitting herself

short term sexual relationships meanwhile, and only marrying when

she decides that it is time to have a family. The traditional male, it is

said, who after some dallying decides he is in an economic position to

settle down and marry at 26 to 28, finds that there are no eligible girls.

The young ones are married, the older not yet interested in marriage,

or even meeting the maladjustment of doubting whether any one male

will really be suitable. Much no doubt depends upon the sex balance

in the population, far too many girls 10 years ago, too few girls now,

and later to be a surplus of girls again.

The educational

factor is related to the economic but since

discrimination still ensures that university or grammar school girls

are more intelligent than men, one has the impression that men in

— 112 —

universities must feel that their physical strength is the only indestruc-

tible advantage that they still possess.

Economically the ever-increasing employment of women, its value

and the resulting abandonment of time consuming domestic tasks

leads to conflict with those men who were brought up in the traditional

view of male dominance, though they do not appear in such traditional

patterns of female employment as fishwives and cotton-spinners. It is

the wife’s earnings that determine, to the exasperation of the male,

whether the family holiday will be in Spain or somewhere else.

Clinically, examples of male irritation and devaluation are quite

apparent if the change takes place rapidly.

In the U.S.A. Kanin (1969) obtained 341 completed questionnaires

from 400 male unmarried undergraduates reporting sexually aggressive

episodes since they had entered the university. To be accepted as

aggressive the man had to affirm having made (1) a « forceful attempt

for coitus to the point of being disagreeable or offensive to the girl »,

and (2) « had to perceive the female responding with offended reac-

tions, e.g. fighting, screaming, crying etc. ». Eighty seven (25.5 per cent)

reported at least one incident — 181 episodes with 142 females. Às

one would suppose, the response of « screaming and fighting » was

commonest with pick-ups and first dates, quarreling and «turning cold»

among occasional dates, crying and pleading with regular dates. In

upper class males the incidents were most often with regular dates,

pick-ups and the first dates with working class men and middle class

intermediate. In middle and upper class males 77 per cent of the

incidents followed fairly regular genital petting on previous occasions,

but this was also in the preliminary of 67 per cent of the less frequent

pick-up and first date situations. There was much indication of cross-sex

communication failure e.g. in the significance of provocative or teasing

behaviour, and even more of cross-class failure of communication in

assessing the significance of behaviour, where aggression tended to be

partly punitive towards what was regarded as gold-digging or provo-

cative behaviour. Males with double standards (e.g. believing that 1t

is wrong for a girl but not for a man to have sexual intercourse before

marriage) described the girl more often as inferior in intelligence and

no more than average in attractiveness while the vast majority of

« single standard » men spoke of the girl as being much above average

in attractiveness and equal in intelligence. The study provided no

surprises but did provide systematic confirmation of what most men

would expect to be the general pattern of relationships.

Schultz and De Savage (1975) obtained questionnaires about the

definition of rape and methods of communication of willingness for

sexual intercourse from 20 men and 30 girls aged 19 to 24 (who were

active daters), and attending «a human sexuality course at a state

— 113 —

university ». The numbers are very small and the self selection and

sampling frame very inadequately described, but the method interesting.

They found very inadequate information about what constituted rape

legally,- but out of 15 (half) of the girls subjected to. aggression four

had been raped,. and 11- considered they had been subjected ‘tô

attempted rape. It was of some interest that four of-the twenty meñ

reported having been hômosexually raped and two- others of violent

homosexual attempts, and none of these had complained to anyone

Among the « assaulted » girls there was a hint that those raped more

often felt they should not or could not resist, seven thought you

ihdicated -consent by'not offering any resistance to increasing intimacy

while the non-aggressed girls- had clear ‘ideas “of how consent was

communiçated and when a man should stop. The popular conception

of male sexuality and how controllable it is clearly confuses the young

and inexperienced. Their reaction to the rape tended to be to consult

the university medical service about pregnancy and V.D. but other-

wnse not to ment10n it.

- Such studies clearly suggest that thé criminal law can intervene

in such incidents‘only with great caution, and suggest that changing

patterns of social life are likely to lead to mcreas…g errors of

commumcatmn

Carol Smart (1976) in her « femm13t cr1t1que » of cnmmology,

emphasises feminine education in passivity and subservience — « the

game that women are.-obliged.to, play and-the circumstances in

which we participate, namely from a-predominantly vulnerable position

with only one valid asset, a basically sexual availability ». It will

probably always be a problem that. a girl. who has been forced or

cajoled into intercourse against her will feels and has in fact been

raped ; but it takes two to-make-a rape, and in law -the man’s belief

cannot be excluded. Perhaps men. will have to become much less

« reckless ».

RÆF. ERENCES :

AMIR (M.) :

Patterns in Forcible Rape 1971 Ch1cago Umversnty Press

CAMBR1DGE UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF CR1MINAL SCIENCE.

« Sexual Offences », Englzsh Studtes in Criminal Sczence, 1957 Vol 9,

- London, Macmillan:

CHRISTIANSEN (K.0) et al.

« Rec1dmsm among sexual oﬁenders », in

Scandinavian Studies in Criminology, London, Tavistock, 1965.

COUNCIL - OF EUROPE : Colléctèd Studies in : Chriminological Research

‘Violence in- Society, Vol XI. Strasbourg, 1974.

ELLIS (A.) and BRANCALE (R)) : The Psychology of Sex Offenders Thomas

Springfield. TIT. 1956.

— 114 —

GIBBENS (T.C.N.), WAY (C.) and SOOTHILL (K.L.) : « Behavioural Types

of Rape », British Journal of Psychiatry, 1977 (n° 130), pp. 32-42.

HALL WILLIAMS (J.Æ.) : Serious Heterosexual Attack, » Medicine, Science

and the Law, 1977, Vol. 17 (n°2), pp. 140-146.

HOWARD (C.) : Australian Criminal Law, 1970.

KANIN (E.J.) : Journal of Sex Research, N.Y. Februarv 1969, Vol. S, (n° 1).

KARPMAN (B.) : The Sexual Offenders and his Offences, The Julian Press.

London,

1954.

KRAUS : Depariment of Child Welfare, New South Wales. 1976. See Newton.

NEWTON (J.E.) Factors affecting sentencing decisions in rape cases. Australian

Institute of Criminology. 1976, Canberra.

REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP ON THE LAW OF RAPE. 1975,

Cmnd 6352. H.MS.0.

SCHULTZ (L.G.) and DE SAVAGE (J.). In Rape Victimology, Thomas

Springfield. IIT. 1975.

SMART (C.) : Women, Crime and Criminology, Routledge

London, 1976.

SOOTHILL (K.L.) and JACK (A.) : « The Rape Victim and the Press », New

Society, 19 June 1975.

SOOTHILL (K.L.), JACK, ANTHEA and GIBBENS (T.N.C.)

« Rape

a

22 year Cohort Study », Medicine, Science and the Law, 1976, Vol. 16

(n° 1), pp. 62-69.

— 115 —

L’APPLICATION DU SURSIS PARTIEL PAR LES

TRIBUNAUX CORRECTIONNELS FRANCAIS *

G. LEVASSEUR

M.-P. CHAMPENOIS-MARNIER

Laboratoire de sociologie criminelle

Université de Paris II - 75005 PARIS

France

I. — L’INSTITUTION ETUDIEE

Le sursis partiel est une institution récemment introduite dans le

droit français et qui n’a guère d’équivalents dans les autres législations.

Depuis 1884, le droit français connaît le sursis simple (acuellement

art. 734-1 à 737 du Code de procédure pénale) : le juge prononce une

condamnation à l’exécution de laquelle il sera sursis si le condamné

ne subit pas une nouvelle condamnation dans les cinq années suivantes.

Depuis 1959 existe, en outre, le sursis avec mise à l’épreuve (actuel-

lement art. 738 à 747 du Code de procédure pénale) : l’intéressé est

soumis à une mise sous probation pendant une durée de trois à cinq

ans au cours de laquelle l’exécution de la peine privative de liberté

est suspendue, C’est une loi du 17 juillet 1970 qui autorise le juge

prononçant une peine d’emprisonnement à décider qu’il sera sursis,

mais seulement de façon partielle, à son exécution, et cela qu’il s’agisse

de sursis simple ou du sursis avec mise à l’épreuve (sursis probatoire).

Le sursis partiel a, pour le condamné, l’inconvénient de le sou-

mettre à l’incarcération pendant une partie de la peine prononcée.

En revanche, il présente l’avantage de ne laisser figurer la condamnation

qui en est affectée que sur les extraits du casier judiciaire accessibles

aux seules autorités de justice.

(*) La recherche entreprise depuis quelques années par le Laboratoire de socio

logie criminelle (université de Paris II) s’insère dans le cadre des études de critri

nologie de la réaction sociale concernant le fonctionnement de la justice. le serten

cing et le traitement des délinquants.

— 117 —

II — OBJET DE LA RECHERCHE

La recherche se propose d’abord d’approcher l’importance de la

place prise par le sursis partiel (dit aussi « peine mixte») dans

l’application concrète du système répressif, et l’évolution éventuelle

de cette place. Quel usage les tribunaux font-ils de la nouvelle insti-

tution ? Quelles considérations incitent le juge à en user plus ou moins

largement ?

Elle tend ensuite à établir le profil du délinquant bénéficiaire

d’une telle mesure

Elle se propose enfin de rechercher les motivations des juges qui

octroient le sursis partiel. L’hypothèse la plus couramment avancée

par les spécialistes est le souci de « couvrir la prévention » en faisant

coincider la partie ferme de la peine mixte avec le temps de détention

provisoire subi par l’individu avant sa comparution. Parmi les autres

hypothèses figurent, chez certains magistrats, la préoccupation d’assurer

chez

une exemplarité suffisante par une peine partiellement ferme

certains autres, celle de permettre au condamné de mieux se rendre

compte du régime pénitentiaire qui serait le sien en l’absence de

sursis partiel et qu’il retrouverait en cas de révocation de celui-ci

(dans ce cas l’idée de renforcement de l’effet préventif du sursis n’est

pas absente). À ce sujet il faut ajouter que l’application du sursis

partiel avec les avantages qu’il comporte pour l’intéressé est peut-être

de nature à freiner la tendance jurisprudentielle précédente qui,

cas d’octroi du sursis simple, augmentait sensiblement la gravité de la

peine prononcée (ce dont le législateur amnistiant a été amené à tenir

compte). D'aucuns ont pu également supposer que le sursis partiel

procède d’un esprit de transaction au sein d’une juridiction collégiale

ou constitue un moyen terme entre les réquisitions du ministère

public et les conclusions de la défense

I. — AMPLEUR DE LA RECHERCHE

La recherche a été entreprise en 1974, alors que la loi du 17 juillet

1970 avait plus de trois ans d’existence, en sorte que l’on pouvait

penser que la pratique judiciaire avait atteint son rythme de croisière et

que le sens de l’évolution était déjà perceptible.

Il a fallu néanmoins en proportionner l’ampleur aux moyens réduits

dont disposait le Laboratoire de sociologie criminelle, ce qui s’est

traduit par une double limitation

D’une part, la recherche ne porte que sur l’application de la loi

du 17 juillet 1970 par les tribunaux correctionnels ; elle exclut par là

— 118 —

- même celle qui. est le fait des cours d’assises (qui peuvent appliquer

le sursis partiel lorsque par l’effet des circonstances atténuantæ, elles

prononœnt des. pemœ d’emprisonnement).… .

- D’autre part, l’étude ne retient comme champ d’investigation

que quelques tribunaux correctionnels, ‘situés dans des régions diffé-

rentes et non un échantillonnage représentatif de toutes les juridictions

.Concernées (au total 767 affaires relevées dans six tribunaux : Paris,

Lyon Lille, Pau, Bayonne, Tarbes) (1). En fonction des moyens dispo-

‘nibles, ilest en effet apparu préférable.de mettre l’accent sur le

qualitatif plutôt que sur le quantitatif, encore que le souci de repré—

sentativité ait fortement marqué le ch01x des dossiers dans les juri-

dictions approchées.

IV. — METHODES

a) Collecte des données

La collecte des donn«m porte sur deux pomts

recherche ‘des

éléments objectifs résultant des décisions de justice (étude sur dossiers) ;

rœheœhe des données subjectives. intervenant dans cette décision

(entret1ens avec lœ mag15trats ayant rendu les décisions étud16œ)

l) Recherche des eléments ob ]ectz]‘s

a) Recensement exhaustif de toutes les donnees retenues dans les

dossiers de 1ugement qui font mtervemr une ou plus1eurs condamnaüons

assort1es du sursis parüel

!

Cette collecte des données a été menée selon un code de dépouﬂ

lement préétabh

— à Pau, Bayonne et Tarbes dans tous les dossiers ayant fait

- Pobjet d’un jugement avec sursis partiel en 1971, 1972 et 1973 ;

— à Paris, dans toutes les affanes 1ugées en juin 1972 et 1mn

1973 .

(1) 314 à Paris (409 Yo), 164 à Lille (21,4

), 150 à Lyon (19,6 “u), 57 à

Bayonne (7,4 ©%), 54 à Pau (7 %), 28 à Tarbes (3,7 %

Les grandes aggloméra

tions, notamment Paris, sont donc surreprésentées

{2) L'’échantillon parisien est apparu suffisamment reprœcntat1f

en cifet,

la

place du sursis simple partiel à Paris au cours de l’année 1972 a été de 1345 °/(

des sursis simples, or ‘au mois de juin choisi les dossiers retenus représentent 13,6 ©

és sursis simples. En 1973, la proportion . pour l’ensemble de l’année a cté dç

18.30 % et celle du mois de juin de 15,65 %. S’agissant de sursis probat01re partiel,

les dœsxers de juin 1972 représentent 27,4 © des sursis probatoires alors que la

proportion de l’ensemble de l’année est de 34,83 % ; en 1973. la correspondance

est moins satisfaisante (30 85 % en 1um au lœu de 2217 @ pour l’ensemble dr

l’année).

— 119 —

— à Lille, dans un dossier sur deux établi durant le premier

semestre des années 1971, 1972 et 1973 :

— à Lyon, dans les affaires jugées en 1972 et 1973 à raison d’une

proportion retenant les variations mensuelles et le mode de

saisine du tribunal (3).

b) Double codage des fiches de dépouillement et établissement

des cartes perforées ; les 80 colonnes des cartes mécanographiques

comportent de multiples indications concernant notamment l’individu

intéressé, l’infraction commise et ses circonstances, la procédure suivie,

la peine prononcée et les recours exercés.

c) Mise en place du programme d’exploitation.

2) Recherche des éléments subjectifs.

Elle se proposait à l’origine de mieux faire apparaître les moti-

vations de la sentence et de pénétrer quelque peu la psychologie dis

magistrats ayant rendu les décisions analysées.

Elle prévoyait, en conséquence, l’entretien, dans chacun des quatre

centres (les trois tribunaux du Sud-Ouest, Pau, Bayonne et Tarbes étant

considérés comme un centre unique), avec une dizaine de praticiens

(magistrats et avocats) relevant du tribunal intéressé. L’effet envisagé

était de confronter les positions idéologiques et pratiques affirmées

par les magistrats avec les décisions qui avaient été rendues.

Diverses circonstances ont malheureusement retardé la mise en

route de cette partie du programme, en sorte que la quasi-simultanéité

recherchée n’a pu être réalisée.

Les interviews n’ont pu avoir lieu qu’en 1976-1977, alors que

l’

tiel des conclusions de la recherche sur dossiers avait déjà pu

être dégagé (4). Mais ce retard, malencontreux à plus d’un égard, a

toutefois permis de mettre l’accent sur certaines questions précices.

(3) Pour 1972, sur 200 sursis partiels relevés (dont 172 sursis simples), 79

dossiers ont été retenus (dont 68 sursis simples, donc mêmes proportions) ; en 1973,

sur 158 sursis partiels relevés (dont 129 sursis simples), 68 dossiers ont été rete-

nus (dont 58 sursis simples, proportions très voisines) ; les procédures de flagrant

délit retenues ont été de 20 sur 34 en 1972 et de 10 sur 21 en 1973.

(4) De toute façon, la fréquence des mutations judiciaires et la règle du « rou-

lement » risquaient de biaiser le résultat cherché. Notons à ce propos que des re-

cherches ont eu lieu d’une part pour comparer les chiffres par année judiciaire et non

pas par année civile, d’autre part pour comparer l’activité respective en notre

domaine des diverses chambres des grands tribunaux. Les indications qui ont pu

en être tirées n’ont pas paru, jusqu’à présent, très significatives.

— 120 —

L’enquête s’est déroulée par interviews à partir de question-

naires (5) comportant à la fois des questions fermées, semi-ouvertes

et ouvertes, eux-mêmes établis à partir d’entretiens non directifs faisant

fréquemment état de la peine mixte (6). Elle a été menée dans les

quatre centres par un collaborateur qualifié différent. La synthèse des

réponses recueillies est actuellement en cours d’établissement.

b) Exploitation des données.

1) Enquête sur dossiers.

Le plan d’exploitation prend évidemment pour base le tri à plat de

toutes les données recencées par codage.

En fonction de l’un des principaux buts de la recherche, il vise

à déterminer les variables qui peuvent expliquer l’octroi par le juge

d’un sursis partiel de telle ou telle durée.

L’hypothèse de départ, qui tendait à considérer que la partie ferme

de la peine prononcée (Pp — Sp) (6 bis) devait, le plus souvent, couvrir

la détention (Dp) (6 bis), fut testée. Le processus utilisé aboutit à établir

une relation entre ces deux variables, mais ne permit pas de conclure

à une relation de cause à effet entre la détention provisoire et la partie

ferme de la peine prononcée.

En conséquence, d’autres variables explicatives, notamment la

gravité des agissements du condamné, furent introduites dans le

calcul des X2. Les résultats n’autorisèrent pas à poursuivre dans cette

voie — la détention provisoire et la gravité des agissements ne justi-

fiaient aucune primauté dans l’explication de l’octroi du sursis partiel.

Ils permirent toutefois d’acquérir une vue plus large des questions

posées et surtout d’établir une liste des variables explicatives suffi-

samment exhaustive pour ne pas encourir la contradiction.

Le schéma analytique, finalement utilisé pour mener quinze

analyses en composantes principales retient donc trois variables à

expliquer (sursis partiel : Sp), mais aussi peine prononcée : (Pp), et

peine ferme (Pp — Sp) et dix-huit variables susceptibles d’être dotées de

pouvoir explicatif : six sont relatives à la personnalité du condamné

—s

(3) Des questionnaires distincts, quoique convergents, ont été établis respecti-

vement pour les magistrats du siège, ceux du parquet, les juges d’instruction, les

juges de l’application des peines et les avocats.

(6) Enquête de E. FALQUE auprès de plus de cinquante magistrats.

(6 bis) Pp = peine prononcée ; Sp = sursis partiel ; Dp = détention provisoire.

— 121 —

(âge, nationalité, situation matrimoniale, nombre d’enfants, catégorie

socio-professionnelle et sources de revenus) ; huit sont relatives au profil

de l’affaire (circonstances favorables, quatre :groupes de: circonstanoes

défavorables, antécédents du prévenu, octroi d’un sursis probatoire

durée de la. procédure) ; quatre sont relatives aux conditions dans

lesquelles-la décision est intervenue (existence et durée d’une détention

provisoire, présence ou non d’un avocat, degré de sévérité de la

juridiction qui a statué (7)

2) Enquête sur interviews

Elle a été menée dans les quatre centres- choisis auprès de cinq

praticiens :

— 24 mag13ttats du snege (8) ;

—

8 membres du parquet (9)

— 6 juges d’instruction (10) ;

.

——

4 juges de l’apphcatnon des pemæ (11) ;

——

9 avocats (12)

‘Les rcponses ‘obtenues ont été réahseœ synthéüsées et comparéæ

analyse&s par fonctions judiciaires . ou. parawd1c1mres respectives et

par région.

2

— PREMIERS RESULTATÊ

8 ?

»

a) Résultats de l’enquête sur dossners, resultats decoulant du tri

à plat.

1) Dannées tenant

2 l’infraction et. à sa poursuite.

a) Les infractions ayant donné lieu au sursis partiel sont dans la

très. grande majorité des infractions contre les biens ; près des 3/4

t

A7).

Pamn les autres cléments recueillis dans les tiches dc dépouilluinent, ont

Cu I“als sés de côté pour l’analyse en composantes principales :

le sexc du détinquant

(la”Proportion de femmes bénéficiaires du sursis partiel n’est que de 55 “o'au

‘rotal), le Heu de naxssance le domicile, la catégorie socio-professionnelle, la nature

de L'infraction jugée, le. lieu de sa commission, le mode de saisine du tribunal, la

K1u;ee de Ja procédure, le caractère contradictoire ou pat défaut de la décision, la

° °

mise’sous contrôle judiciaire, le caractère simple ou probatoire du sursis, les moda-

lités du sursis probatoxre les peines complémentaires, l’existence d’une partie civile.

les voies de recours, etc. La situation résultant des examens en question est néan

moins retracce dans le rapport general

8)

4+ à Paris,

6 à Lyon, 5 à Lille, 9 au centre Pau-Bayonne-Tarbes

(9)

Î

mr

Paris,

2 à Lyon, 2 à Lille, 3 au centre Pau-Bayonne-Tarbes

(10)

Pans

2 à Lyon, 1 à Lille,

d

”

au centre Pau-Bayonne-Tarbes

(11)

Lyon

9

2 à Lille, 1 au centre Pau-Bayonne-Tarbes

(12)

ÈÊË

Paris

p

à Lyon, 2 à Lille

au centre Pau-Bavonna-Tarb,

— 122 —

(73,9 %) si l’on s’en tient aux dossiers comportant une seule infraction,

93,8 % si l’on y ajoute ceux dans lesquels la poursuite vise à la fois

deux infractions (39,8 % des cas), voire trois (14,6 %). Les atteintes

contre l’intégrité corporelle représentent cependant 10,4 % (dont 8,7

atteintes volontaires). La délinquance contre les biens est particu-

lièrement forte (78,1 %) à Paris ; au contraire elle n’est que de 56,1 %

à Lille, où les atteintes à la police de la route représentent 18,9 % (au

lieu de 4 % en moyenne) à raison d’une jurisprudence particulière de

ce tribunal. En effet, la chambre de ce tribunal qui juge les délits de

la route inflige volontiers une courte peine de prison assortie du sursis

pour la majeure partie de la peine (ne laissant à exécuter que huit à

dix jours).

b) Le tribunal correctionnel a été saisi dans 18,6 % des cas (26,8 %

à Paris, 21,3 % à Lyon) par la procédure de flagrant délit, et seulement

dans

© des cas par citation directe du ministère public (31,1 %

Lille où le sursis partiel intervient systématiquement pour de nombreux

délits routiers ou accidents de la circulation). C’est dire que la grande

majorité des poursuites (66,5 %) a lieu par la voie de l’information

(proportion nettement plus élevée dans le Sud-Ouest et à Lyon), ce qui

expliquera la présence fréquente de détention provisoire

c) En effet, 84,5 % des prévenus ont comparu en état de détention

(y compns ceux des jugés en flagrant délit) surtout à Paris (92.7 %

e) ;

(57,3 ©e) à Lille pour les raisons déjà indiquées. Cette detenüon est

inférieure à six mois dans 88,5 % des cas (21,8 % moins de quinze

jours, à raison notamment des flagrants déhts)

elle ne dépasse un

an que dans 1,5 % des cas. Remarquons à ce propos qu’un tiers des

jugements (32,7 %) interviennent moins de trois mois après l’infraction

(52 et 53 % dans le Sud-Est) et que les durées les plus longues sont

enregistrées à Paris (19,4 % supérieures à un an) et à Lyon (25,3 %)

Le contrôle judiciaire, qui était d’ailleurs à ses débuts à l’époque

(il est contemporain du sursis partiel), se rencontre dans 8,7 % des

cas (sauf à Lyon où il atteint 21,3 %)

d) Les décisions sont, dans la quasi-totalité des cas, contradictoires

(93,5 %) ;

dans 77,2 % des cas, les prévenus étaient assistés d’un

avocat (90 % dans le Sud-Ouest ; 60,4 % à Lille).

2) Données tenant à la condamnation

Par hypothèse même, les jugements ont prononcé une peine

d'emprisonnement pour une au moins des infractions, objets de Ja

poursmte (4,6 % de relaxes partielles sont intervenues, presque exclu-

sivement dans le Sud-Ouest et à Lyon). Cet emprisonnement est

123 —

prononcé seul dans 78 % des cas, est accompagné d’une amende dans

11,9 % des cas (notamment à Paris et Pau) et de peines complémen

taires (retrait de permis, interdiction de séjour, confiscation) dans

4,7 Ÿ des cas seulement

a) L’emprisonnement prononcé est, dans la majorité des cas

(54,1 %) inférieur à neuf mois (un peu plus souvent à Lyon et moins

souvent à Paris)

il ne dépasse dix-huit mois que dans 12,2 % des cas

b) Par hypothèse également ces condamnations comportent un

sursis partiel ; sa durée s’échelonne (95,7 % des cas) entre huit jours

et quinze mois (65,4 % au-dessous de quatre mois, 68,1 % au-dessous

de six mois, c’est le cas de la totalité des dossiers de Pau et de Tarbes

au contraire 1/4 des dossiers de Bayonne dépassent cette durée)

Le sursis partiel accordé est, dans 75,7 % des cas un sursis

simple (86 % à Lyon, 84,4 Ÿ à Paris) (13). Dans le cas d’un sursis

avec mise à l’épreuve, la durée de la probation est généralement de

3 ans (74,1 %, sauf à Lyon)

c) Un des points les plus importants est celui de savoir si la période

d’emprisonnement ferme correspond approximativement à l’incarcé-

ration d’ores et déjà subie. On sait en effet que l’objectif de « couvrir

la prévention » est l’hypothèse la plus couramment admise concernant

l’utilité du sursis partiel

La recherche permet de constater que cette tendance n’est pas

néghgeable mais qu’elle n’ést pas majoritaire, et que son influence

paraît même avoir tendance à diminuer. Le « surplomb» dû à la

partie ferme du sursis part1el ne correspond (avec une marge de 15

jours) à la détention provisoire que dans 40,7 % des'cas (il est cepen-

dant nul dans 24.9 “c)

par contre, il excède 3 mois dans 19,6 %

des cas

Une exploitation manuelle a montré qu’à Paris, en juin 1972

43 % des décisions correspondaient à la détention provisoire, que 23 %

(dont pour les 4/5 des flagrants délits) intervenaient sans détention

provisoire appréciable, et que 34 % dépassaient notablement celle-ci

En juin 1973, les proportions étaient respectivement de 29 %, 25 %

(dont 2/3 de flagrants délits) et 42 %,

Il semble donc établi que le souci de « couvrir la détention »

n’est pas l’objectif essentiel de l’application du sursis partiel. Faut-il

se pencher alors sur la personnalité du délinquant ?

(13) Un tri croisé doit permettre de savoir si les sursis partiels avec m15e à

l’épreuve aurait pu être accordés comme sursis simples.

124 —

3) Données tenant à la personnalité du délinquant.

a) CARACTERISTIQUES INDIVIDUELLES.

Aucune conclusion ne paraît pouvoir être tirée du sexe du prévenu ;

la proportion des femmes dans l’ensemble approché est de 5,5 %,

moins élevée dans le Sud-Ouest, plus élevée dans certaines chambres

du tribunal de Paris. Cette proportion n’excède pas celle que l’on re-

trouve dans les peines d’emprisonnement en général et notamment les

L

pein

es de prison ferme (14).

— Par contre, la jeunesse de la population concernée est assez

remarquable. La grande majorité se situe entre 18 et 35 ans (81,1 %)

(15), et même entre 18 et 30 ans (71,8 %). Une importante fraction

relève de la tranchie de 18 à 21 ans (16). Il est vrai que, si la crimi-

nalité générale est forte dans ces tranches d’âge, le passé judiciaire

est généralement moins' chargé.

— Assez remarquable également est la proportion d’étrangers

plus du quart de l’ensemble de l’échantillon (25,6 %) (17) ; plus

élevée, naturellement, dans les grandes villes, telles Paris (34,10 %) et

Lyon (27,3 %), elle est cependant plus modérée dans le Sud-Ouest et

à Lille en dépit de la proximité d’une frontière.

La grande majorité des prévenusî étaient nés dans la région où ils

ont été condamnés, et y étaient également domiciliés. À ce sujet, on

remarque cependant la forte proportion de personnes sans domicile fixe

(12,9 %) parmi les bénéficiaires du sursis partiel, proportion dont les

variations locales sont cependant très sensibles (18).

Lorsque le domicile est connu et que son indication a pu être

relevée (elle manque dans 15 % des dossiers), la dominante urbaine

est frappante (35,7 % domiciliés dans des villes de plus de 100 000 ha-

bitants, 14,9 Ÿ dans des villes de moins de 10 000 habitants, ou en

Zzone rurale) avec toutefois certaines différences régionales.

Ainsi, en schématisant ces données, l’intéressé concerné par

l’enquête répond approximativement au portrait-robot suivant : individu

(14)

Cf. LUVASSEUR. « La femme et le droit pénal », (rapport au congrès de

VIDEF.) Indénendance ei coopération, 1974, p. 1217.

(15)

89,1 7 à Paris, 82 % à Lvyon, 100 % à Tarbes.

(161

233 G, atteignant parfois 29,4 % dans certaines chambres de Lyon et

même 35.7 “ dans certaines chambres de Lille, pour la raison déjà aperçue ; la

proportion est blus forte encore dans le Sud-Ouest

de 35,2 % à 429 ®.

(17)

En 1973, la proportion des étrangers jugés par les tribunaux correctionnels

était de 15 Co.

(18)

222 % à Pau. 17.5 © à Bavonne, 15,6 % à Paris, 9,1 ©o à Lille, 8,7 % à

*yon, O % à Tarbes.

— 125 —

de sexe masculin, en général jeune, le plus souvent français, ne mani

festant pas, sauf s’il est étranger, une forte propension à s’éloigner du

lieu de naissance et domicilié surtout en zone urbaine

b) CARACTERISTIQUES FAMILIALES

Les indications relatives à la situation matrimoniale sont fragmen-

taires et peu sûres, Les célibataires sont nettement en majorité (58,7 %

contre 29,6 % de mariés et peu de divorcés ou veufs), ce qui est en

relation évidente avec l’âge des prévenus mæs comporte de larges

diffémences régmnales (19).

En ce qui concerne le nombre des enfants chez les bénéficiaires

du sursis partiel (il faut noter qu’une lacune affecte sur ce point 27,1 %

des dossiers), le cas le plus fréquent est celui où il n’y a pas d’enfant

(53 % des dossiers contenant l’information) ce qui correspond assez

naturellement à l’âge et à la situation matrimoniale (20)

c) CARACTERISTIQÜES soc10—mom—:ssmmm.æs

Sur le niveau d’instruction, les informations manquent dans plus

d’1/3 des dossiers examinés (et même pour la majorité des dossiers

de Paris). À Lyon (où la lacuhe ne touche que 12,7 % des dossiers)

le niveau primaire est majoritaire (51,3 %) de même à Lille et à Pau.

Le -niveau infraprimaite est relevé dans 11,6 % de l’ensemble, soit

1/6 de la population pour laquelle l’information est donnée.

De même, la catégorie socio-professionnelle n’a pas été mentionnée

dans plus du tiers des dossiers. En s’en ‘tenant aux dossiers contenant

cette information, on constate la surreprésentation de la catégorie des

employés (55 %, de la population connue sur ce plan) (21). On est

frappé par la sous-représentation des ouvriers (7,2 % de l’échantillon,

10 %, des catégories socio-professionnelles connues) qui ne sont pas

davantage représentés que les cadres supérieurs et patrons de l’industrie

ou du commerce (au total 13,5 % de l’échantillon, soit 19 % de la

(19)

857 © de célibataires à Tarbes, 68,7 “ à Pau, 65,6 % à Paris avec de

larges variations entre les chambres, 56,1 © à Bayonne, 52,3 % à Lvon, 451 à

Lil!

(20)

La p…sc cu d'un enfant se relève dans 12,4 o de l’échantillon (correspon

dant à 17 ©

tillon

1 —

I75 c,

» de la population concernée), celle de 2 enfants dans 9,1 % de l’échan

& de la populanon) celle de 3 enfants dans 6,4 © de l’échantillon

celle de 4 enfants. 3.7 Go

celle de 5 enfants et plus. 2,6 %%. L'absence d’enfants

est particulièrement élevée à Tarbes, à Patis et dans le Sud-Ouest

elle est beaucoup

plus rare à Lil!

(21) Il v a peu de variations locales (57 © à Paris et à Lille ;

55 o à Pau

sauf à Tarbes ct à Bavonne (80 ©)

— 126 —

population connue . professionnellement)

sur ce point, les variations

locales ne sont pas très sensibles (22).

Si la majorité des. condamnés occupait un emploi lors de. l’m£rpo—

tion (54,6 %), une fraction importante était alors en chômage (19,4 %

pour l’ensemble, allant de 10,4 % à Paris à 30,7 % à Lyon) ; il. faut

noter en outre que 9,5 % étaient sans professxon (avec des d1ﬁéœnœs

locales appréciables). -

- La recherche d’md1œüons sur les revenus nænSuels s’est révél&

déœvante et stat13üquement mexplontablc

)

9 CARACTERISTIQUES CONCERNANT LE COMPORTEMENT.

— Les informations qui se rapportent tant à la oondmtç qu

la reputaüon la moralité ou l’éthylisme sont peu significatives, . en

raison d’une part de leur généralité, d’autre part de l’absence de

mention sur ce point dans la :moitié des -dossiers (dont plus des 2/3

des dossiers de Pans)

Tout au plus, peut—on observer que le sur&s partiel a été aœordé

à 3ù % des prévenus connus pour leur mauvaise conduite, à 26 %

de ceux réputés de mauvaise réputation, 23 % de ceux indiqués

cernme étant’ de mauvaise moralité, et 20 % des alcooliques.

— Le casier md1c1ære est curieusement absent de 8,7 % des

dossiers.-Dans le cas où il figure, l’absence de condamnation est la

règle pour les 2/3 et parfois les 3/4.des cas (73,2 % à Paris)-sauf à

Tarbes et. Pau (50 %), ce qui est normali, mais non nécæsaxre légale—

ment, pour bénéficier d’un sursis.

Parmi les 27,2- % des intéressés qui ont un :casier 1ud1amre,

l3 6..% de l’échantillon n’ont qu’une. seule condamnation, 27 %

ont plus de 3 (ce cas se relève principalement à Lyon).

— Quant aux antécédents judiciaires résultant d’autres. élﬂmmts

que le casier (condamnations amnistiées signalées par la police ou les

intéressés, mesures de rééducation, intervention des organismes de

contrôle .social), on -observe- des mesures éducatives dans 8,6.% de

l’échantillon (soit 16 % des intéressés connus) ; 7,7 % (soit 14,3 %

des intéréssés) sont s1gnalés par la police comme connus de ses

S€I'Vle«b

il.y aurait 4 %

, de condamnations amnistiées, et 2,3: % de

sanctions admxmstraüves Dans un nombre limité de cas, un examen

psych0bglque ou psychlatnque est mtervenu

Il en résulte que près de 45 Œ de la populatmn p0ur laquelle

on dispose d’informations est déjà connue pour une certaine forme de

délinquance, à tout le moins de déviance,

er 15

(22) Les ouvriers xqvnscmcnt 9 ‘o à Lille, 11 % à Paris et Pau 13 5 à l‘a°‘lx<

a [von. de !

‘a ponulation profe<smnndlemmﬂ connue.

— 1%7:—

4) Données tenant aux circonstances de l’infraction

En dépit de lacunes regrettables dans les dossiers, il apparait que

les éléments tirés de la personnalité du délinquant sont moins éclairants

que ceux qui tiennent à l’infraction et à sa poursuite, pour expliquer

l’usage du sursis partiel par les juges correctionnels

Le plan de recherche attendait beaucoup de l’analyse des moti-

vations de l’octroi de ce sursis — il avait été recommandé, lors du

dépouillement des fiches, de noter intégralement et littéralement tout

ce qui motivait la décision — il faisait preuve hélas d’une grande

naïveté. En effet la motivation est, dans la plupart des cas inexistante,

à tout le moins, extrêmement sommaire. Sur ce plan, les données

recensées se réduisent, à défaut du néant (dans 19,4 % des dossiers

le texte du jugement n’est pas connu) à des indications tout à fait

succinctes

l’existence des conditions légales d’octroi du sursis partiel

n’est accompagnée d’aucune autre motivation dans 43,7 % des cas

Le jugement comporte une nuance de bienveillance dans 25,9 %

des dossiers, une motivation bienveillante détaillée dans 3,7 % seu-

lement

Les décisions avec nuance de sévérité sommaire visent 2 %

échantillon, avec motivation sévère détaillée : 09 %

Face à cette situation bien dégevante, il s’avérait alors nécessaire

de rechercher dans l’ensemble des dossiers et, notamment dans les

circonstances de l’infraction, les éléments qui avaient pu impressionner

favorablement ou défavorablement le magistrat (23)

Un affinement des circonstances favorables et surtout défavorables

fut ainsi mis au point à partir des d1ﬁérents éléments présents dans

les dossiers.

Aux circonstances favorables qui pouvment tenir à l’âge, au sexe,

la situation de famille, à la catégorie socio-professionnelle, aux ressour-

ces, au casier judiciaire, aux antécédents psychiatriques, au début de

sanction résultant de la détention provisoire, furent ajoutées celles qui

pouvaient être tirées, notamment de la faiblesse ou de l’absence de pré-

judice, de la réparation de celui-ci, de l’attitude au moment de la

constatation des faits, ainsi que de certaines déficiences mentales

Quant aux circonstances défavorables qui pouvaient être relevées

dans l’ensemble du dossier, elles furent regroupées en quatre catégories

(23)

Par hypothèse meme, l'affaire devait présenter certaines circonstances favo

rables, sinon le juge eût prononcé une peine de prison ferme

mais elle devait aussi

présenter des circonstances défavorables sinon le juge eût prononcé le sursis total

(simple ou probatoire)

— La première (catégorie A) retient, à titre unique ou joint

à d'autres éléments, le port d'armes et la correctionnalisation d’une

affaire criminelle à l’origine.

— La seconde (catégorie B) retient dans les mêmes conditions,

le concours réel et la réitération.

— La troisième (catégorie C) consiste dans la participation de

plusieurs personnes au fait délictueux.

— La quatrième (catégorie D) retient l’importance du dommage

infligé et les facilités à commettre l’infraction qui tiennent soit à la

personnalité de la victime, soit aux commodités d’accès.

C’est en fonction de cette nouvelle approche des circonstances de

l’espèce que l’on s’est efforcé de discerner les raisons qui avaient pu

déterminer le tribunal, par un savant dosage d’indulgence et de sévé-

rité, à prononcer une peine assortie du sursis partiel.

Contrairement aux attentes les circonstances favorables, tirées

d’ailleurs, à titre essentiel, de la faiblesse du préjudice ou des défi-

ciences mentales, n’apparaissent que dans 1/4 des dossiers (26,1 %).

Cette constatation n’exclut pas le rôle de ces circonstances dans

l’octroi du sursis partiel par préférence à une peine ferme. Mais

celles-ci se présentent avec un caractère si parcellaire qu’il est diffi-

cile de leur reconnaître un pouvoir significatif.

En revanche, il n’en est pas de même en ce qui concerne les

circonstances défavorables. Certes, en fonction du nouveau codage

retenu, deux catégories de ces dernières peuvent être relevées dans

un même dossier (environ dans un cas sur deux). Mais, même en

tenant compte de cette remarque et à ce niveau purement descriptif,

l’importance des circonstances aggravantes paraît justifier le choix

du sursis partiel par préférence au sursis total.

Le tri à plat se conformant au nouveau codage fait en effet

apparaître l’existence de circonstances aggravantes :

— De type B (concours réel ou réitération) dans près des 2/3

des dossiers (63,1 %)

e -

— De type D (importance du dommage ou facilités de l’in-

fraction) dans plus de la moitié (52,8 %).

— De type C (participation) dans plus de 1/3 (37,7 %).

— De type À (port d’armes ou correctionnalisation) dans 16,8 %

€s cas.

b) Résultats découlant des analyses en composantes principales.

L'analyse en composantes principales présente évidemment un

intérêt beaucoup plus grand que l’analyse purement descriptive précé-

— 129 —

dente tirée du tri à plat, puisqu’elle tend à établir des relaüons cau-

sales entre variables explicatives et variables à expliquer.

Parmi les 15 analyæs en composantes prmmpalœ qui ont été

menées pour expliquer la peine prononcée (Pp), la peine ferme (Pp—Sp)

le sursis partiel (Sp), à partir de 18 variables considérées comme

explicatives (24), 10 seulement ont été retenues, en raison des effectifs

très faibles mis en cause dans les autres

a) En ce qui concerne l'importance de la partie ferme de la peine

seuls sont retenus ici Jes résultats de la seconde A.C.P. dont l’échantillon

comprend uniquement les dossiers dans lesquels la détention provisoire

est supérieure à 15 jours (25). (On peut, en effet, supposer que pour les

dossiers qui comportent une détention provisoire inférieure à 15 jours,

la ‘peine ferme, variable à expliquer, se confond avec la peme pro-

noncée, autre variable à expliquer.)

- Cette A .C.P. fait apparaitre une forte corrélation positive de la

peine ferme avec la détention provzsozre, à un moindre degré avec

l’importance du dommage causé.

Brevitatis causa, plus la détention provisoire est longue, plus le

préjudicé de l’infraction est lourd, plus la part1e ferme de la peine

prononcée s’allonge.

En ‘revanche, cette dernière est corrélée négativement avec la

catégorie socio-professionnelle

plus le condamné se situe dans les

mxheux dits défavorisés, plus la durée de la peine ferme diminue.

Les œrräaüons de la peine ferme avec le miveau d’instruction

et.les antécédents autres que ceux figurant au casier judiciaire sont

établies également, mais elles revêtent une nature plus complexe (26)

b) En ce qui concerne la peine prononcée, quatre analyses en

oomposantes prmapalcs tentent de l’expliquer.

Les deux premières (A.C.P. 1 ct A.C.P. 2) portent sur l’ensemble

des dossters. Les deux dernières (A.C.P. 3 et A.C.P. 4) retiennent

seulement ceux dans lesquels la détention provisoire dépasse 15 ÿ Jours.

-(24) Cf supra.…

(25) La première A.C.P. concernait l’ensemble des dossiers.

(26) — Plus le niveau d’instruction baisse, plus la durée de la peine ferme a

tendance à se situer soit dans les temps très courts, soit dans ceux qui dépassent

la movenne, sans toutefois jamais atteindre les extrêmes supétieurs ;

— plus les antécédents autres que ceux figurant au casier 1udœ1a1re sont nom-

breux, plus la- durée de la peine ferme tend à se situer, soit aux alentours de la

moyenne, soit dans les -durées les .plus longues

130 —

La distinction entre A.C.P. 1 et À.C.P. 2 d’une part, entre A.C.P. 3

et A.C.P. 4 d’autre part, tient à l’introduction d’une variable explicative

supplémentaire, savoir la durée du sursis partiel.

Il est remarquable, quant aux résultats, que cette dernière adjonc-

tion ne modifie en rien la structure des autres variables pouvant expli-

quer la peine prononcée. En d’autres termes, la durée du sursis partiel

est munie d’un fort pouvoir explicatif dans À.C.P. 2 et A.C.P. 4, mais

les variables qui expliquaient la peine prononcée quand le sursis partiel

ÿ’f:ntrait pas en jeu, dans A.C.P. 1 et A.C.P. 3, restent inchangées.

Il suffit, en conséquence, de présenter les résultats des A.C.P. 2 et

A.C.P. 4.

|. L’analyse en composantes principales qui porte sur l’ensemble

des dossiers et retient parmi les variables explicatives le sursis partiel

(A.C.P. 2), fait apparaître une forte corrélation positive entre la peine

prononcée, variable à expliquer, et les variables explicatives suivantes :

— circonstances défavorables de type D ;

— présence de l’avocat ;

— sursis avec mise à l’épreuve ;

— durée de la détention provisoire ;

— durée du sursis partiel.

Elle établit également une forte corrélation négative entre la

peine prononcée et les variables : catégorie socio-professionnelle et

Œœnstæmœs favorables.

En schématisant, plus l’importance du dommage causé s’accroît :

— plus la modalité du sursis partiel accordé est un sursis probatoire ;

— plus la détention provisoire est longue ;

— plus la durée du sursis partiel s’allonge ;

— plus la peine prononcée a des chances d’être de longue durée.

En outre, la présence de l’avocat, liée peut-être à une affaire

importante, est corrélée positivement avec une peine forte.

En revanche, plus la catégorie socio-professionnelle du condamné

Se situe dans les niveaux bas :

— plus les circonstances favorables sont nombreuses ;

— plus la durée de la peine prononcée tend à se raccourcir.

2. L’A.C.P., qui éliminc les dossiers comportant un détention provi-

Soire inférieure à 15 jours mais conserve le sursis partiel comme variable

explicative supplémentaire (A.C.P. 4), retrouve les corrélations posi-

— 131 —

tives de la peine prononcée avec les circonstances aggravantes tenant

à l'importance du préjudice, avec la durée de la détention provisoire et

avec celle du sursis partiel.

Dans cette A.C.P., le pouvoir explicatif de la présence de l’avocat

disparaiît, sans doute parce que dans les affaires graves, où la

détention provisoire est importante, la variable qu’il représente devient

neutre.

En revanche, nouveauté par rapport à l’A.C.P. précédente, la

régularité de la situation (quant au travail et quant aux revenus)

paraît corrélée positivement avec la peine prononcée

plus les

intéressés ont une «situation régulière », plus la peine prononcée a

tendance à s’allonger…

Si la catégorie socio-professionnelle et l’importance des circons-

tances favorables ont perdu leur pouvoir explicatif, le niveau d’instruc-

tion en paraît muni dans cette A.C.P. : plus celui-ci baisse (27) vers

niveau primaire, infra-primaire, plus la peine prononcée tend à

s’établir dans les courtes durées.

c) En ce qui concerne la durée du sursis accordé, une remarque

du même ordre que celle qui a été formulée au sujet de la peine

prononcée doit être faite dès l’abord.

L'intégration de la variable explicative supplémentaire

peine

prononcée, qui seule distingue les deux premières A.C.P. portant sur

l’ensemble des dossiers et les deux dernières ne retenant que cux

qui comportent une détention provisoire supérieure à 15 jours, ne

modifie pas la structure des autres variables. Il suffit, en conséquence,

de rapporter les résultats des A.C.P. 2 et A.C.P. 4.

[. L’analyse en composantes principales qui retient l’ensemble

des dossiers et ajoute aux autres variables explicatives la peine pro-

noncée (considérée sur le plan général comme variable à expliquer)

établit, d’une part de fortes corrélations négatives du sursis accordé

avec les circonstances favorables, le niveau d’instruction et la q

d’étranger :

qalité

— plus les circonstances favorables sont nombreuses, plus la durée

du sursis tend à se raccourcir ;

— plus le niveau d’instruction baisse, plus cette durée est courte.

En outre, la durée du sursis paraît d’autant plus restreinte que

celui-ci est accordé à un étranger.

(27)

Les variations sur ce plan étaient codées en partant du niveau d’instruction

le plus haut. La corrélation est donc négative.

— 132 —

Quant aux corrélations positives, elles sont nombreuses. Elles

concernent, notamment, le lien causal entre sursis accordé et peine

prononcée :

— plus cette dernière est longue, plus elle entraîne l’octroi d’un

sursis de longue durée.

L’A.C.P. concernée établit également le pouvoir explicatif impor-

tant

— de la détention provisoire

plus celle-ci est longue, plus la

durée du sursis accordé l’est aussi, ce qui implique que le souci de

« couvrir la prévention » n’a qu’un domaine limité ;

— des circonstances aggravantes, faisant intervenir l’importance

du dommage (type D), la participation d’autres personnes (type C) et

la correctionnalisation (type A) : plus ces circonstances sont nombreuses,

plus la durée du sursis s’allonge.

Cette constatation, surprenante à première vue, s’explique peut-

être par l’importance des affaires en cause qui, par hypothèse, en-

traînent une peine lourde, mais en valeur absolue aussi, un sursis

de longue durée.

La présence de l’avocat, quant à elle, paraît favoriser l’octroi d’un

sursis important.

2. L'analyse en composantes principales qui élimine les dossiers

mentionnant une détention provisoire inférieure à 15 jours, mais retient

comme variable explicative supplémentaire la peine prononcée, fait

apparaître des résultats identiques à la précédente, en ce qui concerne

la relation causale :

— du niveau d’instruction ;

— de la durée de la détention provisoire ;

— de la peine prononcée ;

— des circonstances aggravantes de type D et À avec le sursis

accordé.

En revanche, la corrélation positive de ce dernier avec la présence

de l’avocat et les circonstances aggravantes de type C disparaît.

Mais cette A.C.P. fait apparaître un certain rôle du statut matri-

monial. Les célibataires, en particulier, paraissent tendre à bénéficier

d’un sursis de courte durée.

À ce sujet, il convient de noter que l’importance des célibataires

dans l’échantillon produit peut-être un effet de masse qui annulerait

le_ résultat. La même remarque vaut en ce qui concerne le niveau

‘instruction qui est surreprésenté aux bas niveaux.

— 133 —

Les conclusions à tirer du tri à plat et des analyses en composantes

principales appliquées à l’enquête sur dossiers paraissent être essentiel-

lement les suivantes

Le rôle de la détention provisoire est indéniable ; elle est explica-

tive à la fois pour la partie ferme à exécuter (Pp—Sp), pour la durée de

la peine prononcée (Pp) et pour la durée du sursis accordé (Sp), même

si le sursis partiel ne « couvre » la détention provisoire accomplie

que dans moins de la moitié des cas (supra p. 122). Plus la détention

provisoire est longue, plus la peine prononcée est forte, plus le sursis

accordé est étendu, plus la partie ferme à exécuter est importante

De même la circonstance défavorable du dommage causé (qui,

jointe aux facilités pour commettre l’infraction, paraît dans 528 %

des affaires) est fortement corrélée, elle aussi, avec chacune des trois

variables à expliquer (Pp — Sp ; Pp ; Sp)

Enfin, la présence de l’avocat, qui se relève dans la majorité des

cas, présente une corrélation positive avec chacune des variables à

expliquer

En outre, le degré d’instruction et son corollaire, la catégorie

socio-professionnelle, ont un certain pouvoir explicatif (mais à raison

d’une corrélation négative) avec chacune des variables à expliquer ;

cependant leur incidence est plus complexe (28)

Enfin, quoique les étrangers semblent en proportion anormale

parmi les bénéficiaires du sursis partiel (supra p. 123), la nationalité

n’apparaît pas dans les A.C.P. relatives à la peine prononcée (Pp) ; en

revanche, elle a un pouvoir explicatif en ce qui concerne la durée du

sursis partiel (Sp) et la partie ferme de la peine (Pp — Sp). Elle tend à

réduire la durée de l’un aussi bien que celle de l’autre

Il faut noter, en outre, la relation qui apparaît entre la peîne

prononcée et la durée du sursis partiel

l’une croît toujours en fonction

de l’autre et réciproquement (29)

(28)

Plus la catégorie socio-professionnelle se situe dans les classes défavorisées

plus la peine prononcée et plus la peine ferme sont faibles

pour le sursis partic

ces catégories tendent à se situer dans la moyenne

(29) On verra que cela paraît correspondre à un réflexe spontané des magistrats

qui semblent proportionner la durée du sursis accordé à la longueur de la peinc

prononcée (infra).

— 134 —

Les autres données, telles l’âge, la situation matrimoniale, le

nombre d'enfants ne jouent que de manière très ponﬂueÿe (3Q).

._ b) Résnitats de l’enquête sur entretiens.

Les questionnaires utilisés pour l’enquëtè menée dans chacùn des

quatre centres respectivement auprès des magistrats du siège, des

membres du ministère public, des juges d’instruction, des juges de

l’application des peines et des avocats comportaient plusieurs parties.

Seules seront analysées ici les réponses aux guÿçstions œsen‘tîcllæ.

1) Le principe même de la peine mixte est accueilli de façon

unanimement favorable et parfois enthousiaste par les magistrats du

siège et ceux du parquet. Les juges d’instruction sont à peine plus

réservés, encore que l’un deux observe, justement, que cette peine

mixte équivaut à une courte peine de prison. Il en est de même chez

les juges de l’application des peines ; l’un d’eux perçoit le sursis partiel

comme un empiètement sur la libération conditionnelle, Néanmoins,

pour les uns et les autres, les avantages de cette nouvelle modalité de

sanction l’emportent nettement sur les inconvénients. L’institution

recueille aussi une très large approbation auprès des avocats.

2) L’utilisation de la peine mixte est signalée comme fréquente

par toutes les catégories interrogées. Toutefois, lorsque la question

est posée particulièrement pour le sursis avec mise à l’épreuve, la

réponse est légèrement en retrait (31).

La division et l’embarras l’emportent, quelle que soit la catégorie

des praticiens interrogés, lorsque est demandé si le sursis partiel est

plus indiqué ou plus efficace pour le sursis simple ou pour le sursis

probatoire (32).

(30) L'’âge apparaît comme variable explicative simplement en ce qui concerne

à peine prononcée (Pp) ; plus les intéressés sont âgés, plus ils ont tendance à être

condamnés, soit très fortement, soit très faiblement. La situation matrimoniale

n’apparaît pas dans les A.C.P. relatives à la peine ferme (Pp — Sp) ; par contre, la

qualité de célibataire paraît entraîner une peine (Pp) de durée moyenne, et un

sursis (Sp) de durée faible ou moyenne. Le nombre d’enfants ne présente de cor-

rélation qu’avec le variable Sp, et semble conduire à un sursis partiel se situant

aux extrêmes ; on verra (infra) que cette constatation est malaisément conciliable

avec les intentions des magistrats.

{31) Il est à noter cependant que le bénéfice du sursis probatoire total est

accordé « souvent » et même plus fréquemment depuis trois ans. Magistrats et avo-

cats s’accordent pour approuver totalement les lois récentes élargissant le domaine

du sursis probatoire.

(32) Le parquet et les juges d’instruction pencheraient plutôt vers le sursis

probatoire ; mais au sein du même tribunal, les magistrats du siège ou du parquet

Optent différemment.

— 135 —

Il en est de même de la réponse à la question « le sursis partiel

sera-t-il plus exposé qu’un sursis total à la révocation par une condam-

nation ultérieure ? » (33).

3) Les raisons qui amènent le juge à prononcer une peine mixte

ont fait l’objet de diverses questions, dailleurs combinées et. imbibées

en vue de corroborations réciproques :

a) C'’est incontestablement la personnalité du prévenu (sous ses

divers aspects) qui, aux yeux de la grande majorité des magistrats,

constitue le critère fondamental qui les guide (34). Au contraire, la

nature de l’infraction, contrairement à ce que l’on eût pu penser, est loin

d'être déterminante (35) même pour l’octroi d’un sursis total.

Mais quels éléments, dans la personnalité du prévenu, apparaissent

assez favorables pour éviter à celui-ci une peine ferme, assez défa-

vorables pour lui refuser un sursis total ? Les magistrats du siège

interrogés sur ce point (35 bis) font essentiellement état de cinq

éléments déterminants :

— les charges familiales (36) ;

— le jeune âge (37) ;

(33)

Il faut noter que depuis une loi du 11 février 1975, le tribunal correctionne!

peut décider que la peine d’emprisonnement qu’il prononce ne révoquera pas un

sursis antérieur.

(34)

Un seul juge du siège estime cette considération inopportune, ct un seu!

avocat pense que les juges n’en tiennent pas compte. Au contraire, les parquetiers,

les juges d’instruction, ct les juges de l’application des peines sont unanimes à v

voir la clé du problème, tant pour lc sursis en général que pour le sursis partie!

ui nous occupe, mais avec moins de fermeté lorsqu’il s’agit du sursis avec mise à

l'épreuve.

(35)

Les réponses sont partagées, dans toutes les catégories de praticiens intær-

rogés. Cette considération n’est admise que par une faible majorité des juges du

siège ; seuls les parquetiers (presque unanimement) et les juges d’instruction Jui

attribuent une place plus marquée. Les avocats pensent que les tribunaux en tiennent

assez peu compte.

Sur une question plus précise, les magistrats du siège, partisans de tenir compte

de la nature de l’infraction, ont estimé le sursis partiel indiqué dans le cas d'infrac-

tions « graves » ou correctionnalisées (5 cas), d’infractions violentes (4 cas) ou

au contraire astucieuses contre les biens, notamment les affaires financières (3 cas), et

(chez les magistrats de Lille) les délits routiers (2 cas).

Lorsqu’il s’agit d’un sursis probatoire partiel, on ajoute l’abandon de famille (3 cas).

(35 his)

L’interrogation s’est faite en deux temps

on a énuméré tout d’abord

divers éléments dont on demandait s’il fallait tenir compte de façon fréquente.

modérée ou nulle ; puis les personnes interrogées ont été invitées à faire connaître

quels étaient à leurs yeux, parmi ces éléments, les trois ou quatre plus importants.

{36)

13 réponses dont 3 en première ligne ; une seule réponse estimait cette

considération inopportune.

(37)

12 réponses dont 4 en première ligne ; il y avait unanimité pour faire entrer

cette considération en ligne de compte.

— 136 —

— un passé sans tache (38) ;

— les chances de reclassement (39) ;

— le fait d’occuper, lors de la comparution, un emploi qu’une

incarcération ferait perdre (40).

D’autres éléments de la persônnaﬁté, quoique jugés. dignes d’in-

térêt, sont estimés secondaires (41) ; certains font même l’objet. d’un

refus de prise en considération (42).

Les membres du parquet interviewés, dans les mêmes conditions,

sur le comportement des magistrats du siège, rendent un témoignage qui

corrobore ces déclarations (sauf en ce qui concerne les chances de

reclassement) (43). Le témoignage des juges d’instruction (plus impliqués

peut-être) diffère précisément sur ce dernier point ; il place en effet

les chances de reclassement en tête, suivies du passé sans tache, du main-

tien de l’emploi et enfin des charges familiales (44). Quant à œlui des

avocats, il concorde en général sur les éléments pris en considération

(45), mais ne considère pas que les chances de reclassement soient très

déterminantes (46).

b) En dehors de la personnalité du prévenu, les modalités de la

procédure occupent un rang important dans les motivations des juges.

Il paraissait notamment indispensable de connaître la place que le souci

de « couvrir » la détention provisoire occupait dans l’esprit des magis-

(38) 12 réponses dont 4 en première ligne ; une seule exception pour la pri'se

cn considération de cet élément. Inversement, le « passé judiciaire chargé » est

considéré comme déterminant. au 3° rang (après l’arme et la vio

|

À

encel pour unec

décision sévère.

{39) C'’est là un élément qui est difficile à saisir objectivement et que 1'«:anèïc

sur les dossiers n’éclaire guère (cf. infra).

c0}

10 réponses, dont 4 en première ligne ; il v à une quasi-unantinité pour

sa prise en considération.

(41)

Tel est le cas du grand âge (quasi unanimement retenu, mais cité seulement

3 fois comme déterminant), de la fragilité psychique (unanimement retenu, mais

citée seulement 6 fois comme déterminant), du niveau socio-culturel (majorié pour

le prendre en considération. mais citée seulement une fois comme déterminant).

(42) Tel est le cas du sexe, rejeté par la majorité si l’on tient compte que plu-

sieurs magistrats n’acceptent de le faire entrer en ligne de compte que s’il est lié

à des charges de famille. Tel est le cas également de la nationalité, rejetée à une

torte majorité.

(43)

Le jeune âge vient en tête, suiv! immédiatement du passé sans tache, des

charges familiales et du souci du maintien de l’emploi ; étaient estimés également

pris en considération le grand âge et le niveau socio-culturel, puis, avec plus de

réserve, la fragilité psychique et le sexe ; la nationalité était exclue.

(44)

Le jeune âge, unanimement pris en ligne de compte, n’est cité qu’une fois

comme déterminant : il en est d'ailleurs de même du niveau socio-culturel ; le sexe

ct la nationalité ne sont pris que modérément en considération.

(45)

Ts font cependant une place plus importante au sexe, mais non à la natio-

nalité.

(46)

Pour eux, le jeune âge tient la première place, suivi des charges familiales

du maintien de l’emploi puis des chances de reclassement et du passé sans tache.

— 137 —

trats du siège. En conséquence, deux questions ont été posées

la

première mélait l’incidence de la détention provisoire à d’autres

modalités de la procédure (47)

la seconde posait le problème de

façon plus directe et plus personnelle. La différence de perspective

conditionne des opinions qui divergent

— La détention provisoire, lorsqu’elle n’est pas envisagée à elle seule

apparaît au premier rang des éléments qu’il est opportun de retenir

(10 réponses), mais elle occupe aussi une large place (6 réponses),

parmi ceux qui, au contraire, doivent être écartés (48).

— En revanche, lorsque le problème est posé de façon directe et

brutale, le rôle de la détention provisoire est reconnu déterminant

par la quasi-unanimité des magistrats du siège, qui justifient d’ailleurs

10urs positions par des explications détaillées.

“Des remarques assez voisines peuvent être faites en consultant

le témmgnage des parquetiers (49) et celui des juges d’instruction (50).

1I est intéressant de constater que pour les avocats, qui se prononcent

de façon quasi unanime, d’une part la détention préventive 10ue un

rôle déterminant dans l’octroi du sursis partiel, d’autre part les 1ugœ,

dans le dosage de la peine mixte, manifestent le souci de « couvrir la

prévention ». Les juges de l’application des peines, à qui la première

quesüon avait seule été posée, ont été unanimes à répondre par l’affir-

maüvo

c) Sur un autre plan la motivation du juge peut également être

recherchée dans l'existence de certaines circonstances ayant accompagné

la commission de l’infraction et ayant déterminé le juge à accorder

un sursis partiel, à la place d’une peine ferme (si elles étaient favorables)

ou à la place d’un sursis total (si elles étaient défavorables). Les

circonstances peuvent concerner le modus operandi, la personnalité de

la victime, le dommage causé ou l’inspiration du passage à l’acte

Parmi ces dernières, il semble qu’il faille éliminer l’influence de

l’alcool ou des stupéfiants, écartée par la majorité des juges du siège

(51). Le fait que l’infraction soit restée au stade de la tentative est

(47) Poursuite par la procédure de flagrant délit, contrôle judiciaire, existence

d’une partie civile, réquisitions conformes du ministère public

(48) Parmi ces derniers, une très forte majorité (18) écarte l’existence d’une

partie civile et les réquisitions conformes du ministère public

une majorité nette

(16) écarte également le fait que l’on a employé la procédure de flagrant délit

(49) Mèême division que celle des juges du siège sur l’opportunité de faire entrer

la détention préventive en ligne de compte ; majorité nette pour constater son carac

tère déterminant auprès des juges

(50) Deux d’entre eux n’estiment pas opportun d’en tenir compte ; une majorité

considère souhaitable de « couvrir » la détention prov1501re

(51) Elle ne figure pas parmi les éléments estimés déterminants, et les parque-

tiers pensent aussi au l faut la négliger ;

les juges d’instruction inclinent dans lc

même sens ; ce qui n’est pas l’avis des juges de l’application des peines ;

mais le

témoignage des avocats confirme ce peu d’influence.

— 138 —

considéré lui aussi par une large majorité comme n’ayant pas d’influ-

ence (52). Le fait que la victime soit un représentant de l’autorité est

également écarté, quoique moins nettement (53) et la participation de

plusieurs personnes à l’infraction n’est retenue que par une légère

majorité (54). De même certains magistrats ont fait appel de façon

ponctuelle à l’ancienneté de l’infraction et à l’attitude provocatrice de

la victime (cette attitude en revanche, est soulignée par la majorité des

juges d’instruction, des juges de l’application des peines, ainsi que par

les avocats).

A l’opposé, une majorité massive fait entrer en considération

dans un sens favorable la réparation du dommage (55), et à un moindre

degré le fait que l’auteur se soit laissé entraîner (56). Dans un sens

défavorable, une majorité également massive souligne, dans le modus

operandi, l’usage d’une arme (57) et celui de la violence (58) (souvent

lié d’ailleurs au premier). Une majorité presque aussi forte s’affirme

influencée par le fait que la victime soit sans défense et pitoyable (59),

enfin par les facilités dont le coupable a abusé pour commettre l’infrac-

tion (60).

(52) 15 réponses négatives, 4 «très pèu », 5 affirmatives (notamment dans le

Sud-Ouest). Les parquetiers sont encore plus divisés (3,3,2) ; les juges d’instruction

penchent pour la négative ; les juges de l’application des peines se divisent par

moitié. Le témoignage des avocats est légèrement en faveur de la négative.

(53) 11 réponses négatives, 5 «très peu», 9 affirmatives (chaque centre est

représenté) ; même réaction chez les parquetiers {3,3,2) ; au contraire, les juges d’ins-

truction estiment qu’il faut grandement en tenir compte, et les avocats pensent qu’on

e fait.

(54) 16 réponses affirmatives, 2 «très peu », 6 négatives (chaque centre est

représenté). Il en est de même chez les parquetiers (5,2,1). Les juges d’instruction

en tiendraient davantage compte (3,3,0) et les avocats estiment que c’est ce qui se

passe (5,2,1). Les juges de l’application des peines se partagent par moitié.

(55) 21 réponses affirmatives, 3 « très peu », aucune négative. Les parquetiers

sont tout aussi nets, et les juges de l’application des peines unanimes. Le témoignage

des avocats confirme le comportement des juges du siège. On notera que le dom-

mage minime, mais non réparé, est apprécié de façon variable (10 affirmatives, 9

« très peu », 5 négatives) alors que les parquetiers sont plus favorables (7 affirma-

tives, Î « très peu », Ô négative) et que les juges d’instruction le sont moins (3,2,1).

La majorité des avocats croit en un rôle positif.

(56) 14 réponses positives, 7 « très peu », 1 négative.

(57) 24 réponses affirmatives, 1 « très peu », aucune négative. Les parquetiers

sont unanimes en ce sens, ainsi que les juges d’instruction et les juges de l’appli-

cation des peines. Le témoignage des avocats est également unanime.

(58) 24 réponses toutes affirmatives. Il y a de même unanimité chez les parque-

tiers, et les juges de l’application des peines. Les juges d’instruction vont en

l’affirmative.

grande majorité dans le même sens ; le témoignage des avocats est unanime pour

(59) 23 réponses affirmatives, 2 « très peu », aucune négative. Une seule excep-

tion à l’unanimité des parquetiers ; unanimité des juges d’instruction, des juges de

l’application des peines et des avocats.

60) 21 réponses affirmatives, 3 « très peu », aucune négative. Au contraire, les

parquetiers sont beaucoup plus nuancés (3,3,2), de même que les juges d’instruction

(2,2,1) et les juges de l’application des peines (2,1,1). La majorité des avocats esti-

me que les juges en tiennent compte.

— 139 —

Priés de-souligner les éléments les plus déterminants, les magis-

trats du siège citent dans l’ordre

la : violence (61), l’usage d’une arme

(62) et la victime pitoyable (63). Le classement est le même chez les juges

de l’application des peines et le témoignage des avocats est concordant

Les deux premiers éléments sont les seuls considérés comme prédo-

minants par les parquetiers (64).

d) Dans lu recherche d'autres motivations,

on s'est enquis de

savoir si le désir de faire 8xpérzmenter le regzme pénitentiaire pour

donner plus d’efficacité au sursis, pouvait ou non jouer un rôle. Seuls

trois magistrats du siège le contestent expressément, mais plus du

tiers estirient que cela exerce sur cux un influence, et pensent volontiers

qu il en est de même pour leurs collègues (65). Il est à

noter à ce

su]eL que les juges de l’applncatwn des peines doutent qu’un prévenu

qui n’a 1amms été incarcéré puisse mesurer pleinement le régime auquel

il serait soumis si le sursis dont il vient de bénéficier était ultérieurement

révoqué. Les juges d’instruction partagent en majorité ce sentiment

4) Les effets réels ou supposés du sursis partiel ont fait l’objet de

plusieurs questions

À la première, qui portait sur le degré d’efficacité du sursis partiel

sur la prévention de la récidive, selon qu’il était appliqué au sursis

simple ou au sursis probatoire, la grande majorité des magistrats répond

que l'application au sursis simple est plus efficace. Les parquetiers esti-

ment unanimement que l’efficacité iest certaine dans les deux cas ; les

juges d’instruction, ainsi que la majorité des juges de l’application

des peines, partagent cette opinion avec plus de réserve. Il est à noter

que les avocats sont très divisés sur ce point, et même sur la place

que les juges accordent à une telle considération

Une autre question portait sur l’éventualité d’un choc salutaire

que la peine mixte pouvait produire. Les magistrats du siège admettent

presque unanimement cet heureux effet, et leur avis est assez large-

ment partagé par les juges d’instruction et le ministère public, À deux

exceptions près, il en est de même chez les avocats (bien placés, en

principe, pour en juger), qui estiment toutefois qu’il s’agit là surtout de

l’opinion des magistrats

(61)

Citce 7 fois en première ligne, 8 en seconde, et 2 en troisième

(62)

Citée 7 fois en première ligne, 6 en seconde, et 2 en troisième

(65)

Citée 2 fois en p1em1erc ligne, 1 en seconde, et 9 en troisième.

(64)

La victime pitoyable n’est pas citée, mais un parquetier mentionne la vic-

time agent de l'autorité.

(65) En général, ils fixent entre 8 à 15 jours et l à 2 mois la durée d’incarcé

ration nécessaire ; aucun n’estime que la durée de la partie ferme doive normalement

excéder celle du sursis accordé

— 140 —

Le sursis partiel a-t-il pour effet de rendre une probation plus

facile ? Aucun des juges de l’application des peines interrogés (ils s’é-

taient tous occupés de condamn& à des peines mixtes) (66) ne voit d’a-

vantage très marqué

cet égard, dans l’institution. Ils ne sont pas

d’avis, à tout le moins, d’en faire le préalable normal de la probation.

Parmi les autres effets du sursis partiel, sont signalés positivement

une meilleure intimidation que par le sursis total (d’où meilleure pré-

vention de la récidive) et une plus. grande possibilité de réinsertion

sociale ; négativement les risques inhérents à la promiscuité de la

prison, en dépit des limites apportées à la durée de l’incarcération

c) Comparaison des résultats de l’enquête sur dossiers et de ceux

de l’enquête sur entreüens.

Le plan adopté pour la mise en œuvre de la recherche supposait

un examen comparatif des résultats respectivement obtenus par l’une

et l’autre branche de l’enquête. D’ores et dé]à cette oomparmson peut

être œqmssée

1) Principaux points de concordance.

Les points de concordance concernent tout d’abord les délmquants

susceptibles d’être bénéficiaires du sursis partiel. Le fait qu’ils soient

généralement jeunes (67) ne résulte pas seulement d’une meilleure

aptitude à remplir les conditions du sursis (68), mais correspond à

une intention déibérée des magistrats qui rangent même cet élément

parmi les facteurs déterminants (69).

Cependant le passe md1czazre n’est pas sans importance. Si les

3/4 des bénéficiaires n’ont aucune condamnation à leur casier judiciaire

(70), ce n’est pas l’effet du hasard, car les magistrats voient dans un

passé sans tache un élément non seulement favorable mais déter-

minant (71) et au contraire dans un casier judiciaire chargé un élé-

ment éminemment défavorable (72)

-

(66)

Il faut noter en outre que, à une exception près, les juges de l’application

des peines assuraient également un service de juge du siège, ce qui renforce le poids

des opinions qu'ils expriment

(67)

Voir supra p

123

(6S)

À l'époque où les affaires ont été jugées, de telles conditions existaient

encore pour le sursis avec mise à l’épreuve.

{69)

Foutes les réponses sont affirmatives quant à la prise en considération (bien

qu'en note 2 « très peu »), et le jeune âge vient au second rang (12 réponses dont

6 en première ligne) parmi les éléments considérés comme déterminants

(70) Supra p. 125

(71)

Supra

(72

Supra

— 14t —

L'importance de la durée d’une détention provisoire éventuelle

est nettement confirmée La proportion des personnes poursuivies par

la voie de l’information est certes considérable parmi les bénéficiaires

(73), mais c’est la voie qu’il est nécessaire de suivre en matière correc-

tionnelle (à l’exclusion de la citation directe) si l’on souhaite placer

l’intéressé en détention. En présence de cette situation, les magistrats

affirment en tenir un très grand compte pour le prononcé de la peine

(74) et pour l’octroi du sursis partiel (75) (les analyses en composantes

principales confirment d’ailleurs ces deux points) (76). Le souci de

« couvrir la prévention » apparaît, dans une mesure importante (plus

faible cependant qu’on ne le pensait au départ), à chacune des étapes

de la recherche.

Dans un nombre appréciable de cas, le caractère favorable ou

défavorable attribué lors du dépouillement des dossiers aux circons-

tances de l’infraction (77) se trouve confirmé par les entretiens avec

des praticiens, plus encore que par les analyses en composantes prin-

cipales. Ainsi en est-il, parmi les circonstances favorables, de la

réparation du dommage causé ou de l'attitude provocatrice de la

victime, et parmi les circonstances défavorables, de la violence (notam-

ment l’emploi d'une arme), des facilités dont l’auteur disposait pour

agir, du caractère pitoyable de la victime. Au contraire, certaines des

circonstances supposées influer n’ont été confirmées ni par les analyses

en composantes principales, ni par les entretiens.

2) Principaux points de divergence.

a) C’est notamment le cas pour certaines circonstances de l’infrac-

tion. Ainsi l’importance du dommage causé, qui est une variable

explicative à la fois de la peine prononcée, de la durée du sursis partiel

et de la peine ferme à exécuter, n'apparaît pas de façon aussi nette

dags les entretiens avec les praticiens (78).

(73) Supra p. 121 ; 2/3 alors que ce mode de saisine ne représente d’habitude

que 15 % des poursuites correctionnelles.

(74) Supra

(75) Supra

{76) Supra

(7)

Voir supra pp. 126-130.

(78) Les conséquences de l’infraction ne sont jamais signalées comme détermi-

nantes pour l’octroi du sursis partiel par les magistrats du siège ; d’autre part, le

caractère minime du dommage subi n’est pris en considération, pour l’octroi du

sursis simple, que par une faible proportion de ceux-ci (10 « oui », 9 « très peu »,

5 « non »).

— 142 —

Dans des conditions moins frappantes, on constate que la simple

tentative (79) ou la correctionnalisation de l’affaire (80) n’ont pas sur

l’esprit des juges l’influence que l’on aurait supposée

b) Il y a divergence aussi sur certaines caracténsthuœ du délmquant.

Alors que le dépouﬂlement des dossiers paraissait faire ressortir un

pourcentage élevé d’étrangers, et que la nationalité jouait un certain

rôle dans l’analyse en composantes principales de la variable Sp (durée

du sursis az

cordé), la grande majorité des juges du siège estime que

la qualité d’étranger ne doit jouer aucun rôle dans l’octroi du sursis (81)

De même, il est curieux de remarquer que les charges de famille;

qui n'étaient pas révélatrices au plan statistique, sont au contraire prises

en considération par l’unanimité (à une exception près) des magistrats

du siège, et figurait en tête des éléments que ceux-ci reconnaissent pré-

pondérants pour l’octroi du sursis partiel (82), notamment à Lille et

dans le Sud-Ouest

On est enfin frappé de l’importance considérable que les magis-

trats donnent aux « chances de neclassement » (83), alors que le tri

à plat a permis de constater (84) qu’une importante fraction (25 à 30 %)

des individus connus pour leur mauvaise conduite, leur fâcheuse

moralité, leur triste réputation et leur alcoolisme, bénéficiait cependant

d’un sursis partiel ; de même la récidive, la réitération ou tout au moins

le concours réel apparaissent dans près des deux tiers des dossiers (85)

Mais peut-être n’y a-t-il pas là véritablement contradiction, car les

« chances de reclassement » sont une notion fort complexe qu’il était

difficile de saisir intégralement dans une fiche de dépouﬂlemmt de

dossiers.

3) Points qui restent obscurs.

Ni l’enqueﬁe sur dossiers, ni son exploitation, ni l’cnquête sur

interviews n’ont permis de savoir si le sexe du prévenu exerce une

——

(79) Supra p. 135 et note 52.

(80)

Chez les magistrats du siège, 13 réponses négatives, 2 « très peu» et 8

affirmatives ;

le caractère déterminant n’existe que chez 2 magistrats, les membres

u parquet ‘sont d’un avis contraire mais aucun ne range cet élément défavorable

Parmi ceux qui sont déterminants.

(81)

18 réponses négatives. Certains magistrats lyonnms et parxsxens parament

Plutôt d’avis contraire (2

2 affirmatives, 3 « très peu »

(82) 13 réponses, dont 3 en première ligne et 6 en secondc

(83) Prises en considération par l’unanimité des juges du siège, ct 1ndxquccç

Mmême comme déterminantes (11 réponses, quoique aucune en première ligne, voir

Supra p. 133 et note 39.

(84) Supra p. 125

(85) Supra p. 127

— 143 —

influence sensible sur l’octroi du sursis partiel. Le rôle de la caté-

gorie socio-professionnelle n’est guère moins confus (86).

Il en est de même, on l’a vu, pour la nature de l’infraction (87).

Enfin, les magistrats ont affirmé que le souci de ne pas pro-

noncer une peine qui ferait perdre au prévenu l’emploi que celui-ci

occupe, joue un rôle important dans leur décision (88) et font même

figurer cet élément en 5ème place (89) parmi les éléments déterminants.

L'enquête sur dossier n’a guère pu corroborer ce point : il était bien

recommandé de noter si le prévenu occupait, au moment de sa

comparution, un emploi que son incarcération risquait de lui faire

perdre, mais, pour diverses raisons, il a été difficile de découvrir ce

renseignement.

CONCLUSION

Il n’est guère possible, en l’état actuel d’une recherche qui n’est

pas encore achevée, de dégager des conclusions définitives ; néan-

moins, certaines tendances apparaissent déjà assez nettes pour mériter

d’être notées.

L’institution du sursis partiel a reçu, de la part du corps judiciaire,

un accueil extrêmement favorable. Il était permis de s’en étonner, du

fait qu’elle aboutit à multiplier les courtes peines d’emprisonnement,

qui sont à l’heure actuelle très décriées comme plus néfastes qu’utiles.

Une hypothèse fréquemment avancée était que la peine mixte

échappait à cette critique parce qu’elle correspondait à un emprison-

nement d’ores et déjà effectué, c’est-à-dire à la détention provisoire

ayant précédé le jugement. Cette hypothèse n’est confirmée que par-

tiellement par la recherche. La correspondance approximative (à quinze

jours près) n’existe que dans 40 % des cas d’application, et cette pro-

portion paraît avoir tendance à diminuer.

(86) Sur la répartition dans les catégories socio-professionnelles, voir supra

p. 124. Les analyses en composantes principales (supra pp. 130-131) fournissent

des résultats complexes et parfois étonnants. Les juges du siège n’estiment prendre

en considération le niveau socio-culturel qu’à une faible majorité (13 oui, 5

« très peu », 6 non) notamment à Lyon et Paris. et un seul d’entre eux lui attribue

un rôle déterminant.

(87) Supra pp. 121, 132 ct la note 35.

(88) Unanimité (à une exception près) pour estimer qu'il y a lieu de tent

compte de cet élément dans l’octroi du sursis ; cf. supra p. 133 et note 40.

(89) 10 réponses en ce sens, dont 4 en première ligne.

Le sursis partiel intervient dans de nombreux cas où il n’y a eu

aucune détention provisoire sensible. Il en est particulièrement ainsi

dans les procédures de flagrant délit ; il s’apparente alors à la pratique

de certains tribunaux qui pensent qu’une très courte période d’incarcé-

ration peut avoir un effet de choc salutaire (le « sharp short shock »

britannique) (90). Aussi s’explique-t-on qu’il soit utilisé davantage en

fonction de la personnalité du délinquant que de la nature de l’infrac-

tion.

Parfois la peine mixte remplit un autre rôle, celui de faire suffi-

samment connaître le régime qui serait appliqué au prévenu en cas de

révocation de son sursis ; c’est le cas lorsque la partie ferme est assez

longue ; la durée de l’incarcération estimée nécessaire est en effet alors

un peu plus forte. D’'autre part, il apparaît nettement qu’un partie

du succès acuel du sursis partiel est due au fait que le sursis simple total

a perdu une bonne partie de l’effet intimidant attribué à son caractère

comminatoire (91).

Enfin, il n’est pas rare de voir infliger des peines fortes accom-

pagnées d’un sursis partiel important. Il semble que, de façon préto-

rienne, le juge souhaite alors observer, et observe en fait une certaine

proportion entre la durée de la peine totale et celle du sursis partiel, en

sorte que celle-là est généralement plus longue que celle de l’incarcé-

ration subie ou à subir dès lors que le tribunal ne s’est pas contenté de

« couvrir la prévention ».

Il faut enfin observer que l’enquête apporte de très utiles éléments

à l’étude du sentencing. Grâce à elle, sont mis en lumière de très

nombreux éléments ou circonstances (ainsi que le poids approximatif

des uns et des autres) qui entrent en ligne de compte dans l’octroi du

sursis, simple ou probatoire, total ou partiel et dans le dosage de la

peine.

La présente enquête, une fois menée à son terme, devra pourtant

être complétée par une étude symétrique, déjà esquissée, de l’appli-

cation du sursis partiel par les cours d’assises ; d’ores et déjà, cette

application paraît obéir à des considérations différentes, du fait qu’il

s’agit d’infractions particulièrement importantes. Un autre complément

devra porter sur l’attitude des cours d’appel afin de rechercher si elles

se montrent plus libérales ou plus exigeantes que les tribunaux correc-

tionnels.

(90) Une large majorité des juges du siège et des juges d’instruction se prononce

en ce sens, et fixe la durée maximale à un mois environ (la moitié ne dépasserait pas

15 jours). Les membres du ministère public se montrent divisés sur ce point, mais

l’admettent lorsqu’il prend la forme du sursis partiel.

(91) La majorité des juges du siège a opiné en ce sens. La quasi-totalité des

parquetiers pense que la partie ferme de la peine constitue, aux yeux du tribunal,

UN minimum de répression assurée.

— 145 —

- À titre de pierres d’attente pour des recherches futures, des élé-

ments ont été recueillis sur les réformes apportées au sursis avec mise

à l’épreuve (92), ainsi qu’au sursis simple et à la restriction de sa révo-

cation (93) ; sur l’institution des substituts aux courtes peines d’empri-

sonnement (94) sur la révocation partielle ou totale du sursis pro-

batoire (95), etc. Le fonctionnement de la justice pénale offre encore

aux chercheurs un domaine presque illimité.

(92) Approbaiion unanime de la part des magistrats du siège, des parquetiers, de-

juges d’instruction et des juges de l’application des peincs.

(93)

La quasi-totalité des magistrats du siège ct l'unanimité des parquetiers

approuvent ces réformes ;

timent.

:

v_les avocats partagent tout à fait. bien entendu, ce sen-

(94)

La réforme Aest généralement approuvée par les juges du siège mais peu

utilisée ; les juges d’instruction et les juges de l’application des peines sont beaucoun

plus réservés ; les avocats se montrent divisés.

(95)

Les juges de l’application des peines demandent rarement la révocation par-

tielle, varfois la révocation totale ; dans un cas comme dans l’autre. le tribunal suit

leurs pronositions.

— 146 —

RESTlTUTION TO VICTIMS OF CRIMINAL OFFENCES

IN SLOVENIA

KATJA VODOPIVEC

Institute of Criminology

Ljubljana - S.F.R. Yugoslavia.

In ancient times people resolved or sharpened the conflicts

between the offender and the victim at the beginning among them-

selves (individual revenge, composition) and later on with the help

of the state authority or its institutions (composition, punishment).

Nowadays, it is difficult to evaluate which was the main reason for

the authority’s intervention in resolving private conflicts. Let us quote

two examples. Vasiljevic is of the opinion that in the old accusatory

procedure the pursuit could have been abandoned even if necessary,

due to the lack of knowledge, incapacity or intimidation of the victim

on one hand and on the other, it was possible to charge the person for

the reason of revenge or other negative motives. He refers to the

comedies of Aristophanes illustrating the deficiencies of private accu-

satory procedure (Vasiljevic, p. 18). In the opinion of Mueller and

Cooper « the rights of selfhelp were regulated and formalized by the

state so as to limit their exercise and theoretically, to prevent divisive

feuds and the exploitation of the weak by sirong… By the Middle

Ages, the individual harmed in any way must always have recourse

to law rather than taking the matter into his own hands. In terms of

victim compensation, the price of state assistance in bringing the

wrongdoer to justice soon becomes disproportionately high» (p. 86).

After this time the interests of the victim have been replaced by the

interests of the authority. From the sociological point of view the

interests of the victim have been the most neglected in the inquisitory

procedure.

Nevertheless the theoreticians and judicial practice returned to

the problems of the victims all over again, especially since the 16th

century as e.g. Thomas More, Jeremy Bentham, A.B. Marsagny,

Herbert Spencer, Raffaele Garofalo, Enrico Ferri and others. In some

German countries the judicial practice conceded the so-called adhesive

procedure as early as the l6th and 17th centuries and the French

« action civile » has been enacted by the end: of 17th century (Kobe

— 147 —

1977, IT). Also the international penological congresses in the last deca-

des of the 19th century dealt with the problem of restitution as a

mean for the resocialisation of offenders.

Between Worlid War I and II the criminological and penolo-

gical literature seems to neglect the victim of offences, but the

adhesive procedure in the countries where it was enacted remained and

developed. After the second world war the victim has won one of the

first place in criminological, and finally in victimological literature.

The reasons for such an approach are mainly threefold.

1. — The aspect of the victim.

The attention given to the relationship of the personality of the

offender to his surroundings included in the framework of crimino-

genesis also the victim, at the beginning as a person who might have

contributed to the criminal offence (Hans von Hentig, Benjamin

Mendelsohn). Although Margery Fry recommended the restitution to

the victim in 1951 with the correctional view, this belief has later on

been replaced by the philanthropic attitude toward the victim who

remained damaged especially in cases in which the offender was not

identified or lived in bad material conditions. In 1957 she finally

began to plead in favor of a special state fund for compensation of

victims of criminal offences in Great Britain (Jacob, p. 152). After

1960, in many countries, public funds have been established for this

purpose (Grebing, p. 476-482).

2. — The aspect of the offender — the correctional view.

At the beginning at least this aspect has been in the forefront

of Margery Fry’s interest. The English White Paper : The penal

practice in the changing society of 1959 emphasized especially the

corrective role of the restitution for the offender (Linden, p. 39). In

1958, Albert Eglash was of the opinion that « restitution as a cons-

tructive activity may contribute to an offender’s self-esteem » (Jacob,

p. 156). This aspect has been of special interest for the well-known

victimologist Stephan Schafer from 1960 onwards. Finally, it is possible

to include under this heading also those writers who draw attention

to the detrimental effects of imprisonment and consider the restitu-

tion as an effective alternative to it.

3. — Sociological view.

The critique of contemporary sociologists is oriented toward the

power of state, institution and the bureaucracy — in our case especially

toward the state control — over the relationship among people. Nils

Christie as adherent of the conflict theory (Dahrendorf) considers

— 148 —

conflicts as acceleration of the society>s development. The conflicts

urge the participation of people, their activity and are eluciding the

normative and value problems.

« Segmentation according to space and according to caste attri-

butes. leads into a depersonalisation of social life… The proceeding

is converted from something between the concrete parties into a

conflict between one of the parties and the state… Conflicts become

the property of lawyers…. We have reduced the victim to a nomentity

and the offender to a thing… The offender has lost the opportunity to

explain himself to a person whose evaluation of him might have

mattered » (pp. 6, 3-5, 9).

Marvin E. Wolfgang reproaches to the criminal justice system

that it is not « accountable to the public at large, to the victim and

to the offender ». It is a closed system.

As a compromise of all these and other views many recommend-

ations regarding the indemnification process have been adopted on

the international and national bases. The most important recommend-

ations were formulated especially at the 11th International Congress

of Penal Law at Budapest in 1974 (section IIT) and at the International

Study Institute on Victimology at Bellagio (Italy) in 1975. On the

national basis the most advanced proposals have been made by the

Law Reform Commission of Canada (working papers 5 and 6 —

Restitution and Compensation as well as working paper 7 — Diver-

sion formulated in the years 1974 and 1975). Besides, as already men-

tioned, public funds for the compensation of victims (especially of

offences against the life and body) have been founded in different

countries since 1960.

There exist, however, well founded reasons against an exagge-

rated use of restitution (e.g. Galaway p. 66. Goldstein p. 203, Linden

p. 41, Mueller-Cooper pp. 94, 98, Williams p. 158).

The legal provisions in Yugoslavia.

The new constitution of F.P.R. of Yugoslavia from 1974 has

decentralized legislative competence in the field of penal law among

the Federation and 8 republics and autonomous regions. Consequently,

on the Ist of July 1977 the new nine penal codes were enacted besides

the new federal Code of criminal procedure. Regarding the indemni-

fication possibilities there are no differences in principle between the

previous and the new legislation. In order to give an accurate presen-

tation oË legal provisions we shall describe in this section the present

possibilities although the research has been carried out for the year

1973, Where necessary the differences will be outlined. Regarding the

indemnification possibilities there are no differences among the penal

codes of different republics and autonomous regions. Therefore we

— 149 —

shall take into account only the federal penal code (F.P.C.), the

penal code of the Republic of Slovenia (P.C.S.) and the federal Code

qf Penal Procedure (P.P.).

For this purpose we shall apply the terminology proposed by

S. Schafer and others and shall designate as restitution the indemni-

fication given to the victim by the offender and as compensation the

ipdemniﬁcation awarded to the victim by the public funds.

'We shall structure the presentation of our legal provisions

by problems and recommendations adopted especially at international

meetings and by the Canadian Law Reform Comrnission. For the

more detailled information we refer to the national report prepared

for the 11th International Congress of Penal Law at Budapest by Prof.

Selih and Kobe.

1) The restitution as a mean for the diversion of the judicial

procedure. The most advanced program in this respect has been

developed by the Canadian Law Reform Commission (E.p.7.). In the

U.S.A, an experimental Columbus Night Prosecutor Program in

1971 has been developed (Palmer). Such programs correspond to the

principle of opportunity of public prosecutions as adopted in these

countries in distinction to those legislations of the European conti-

nental system which adopted the principle of legality for the public

prosecution. It means that the public prosecutor is bound to prosecute

all offenders who committed offences which are subject of public

prosecution. The basic idea behind such provisions is equality before

the law.

In accordance with the penal legislation adopted in many states

of the European continent the Yugoslav P.P. adopted the principle

of legality. In the Yugoslav literature this principle until now has

not been disputed and it is very unlikely that it will be changed

ip the near future for very good reasons.

—In spite of that one of the most natural ways for the diversio‘n

of judicial process also in our country is the spontaneous reconcili-

ation between the parties opposed with the consequence of non-

reporting the criminal offence to the state control agencies or of non-

charging the offender in cases in wich criminal offences are prosecuted

by private prosecutor. For a part «of minor criminal offenses are

prosecuted under the Yugoslav system by the injured party who

initiates proceedings, files the charging papers and represents the pro-

secution in court. The public prosecutor may not intervene in the case.

Typical offenses prosecuted in this way are minor assaults and batteries,

malicious mischief, defamation, etc. » (Damaska, p. 33).

— 150 —

In 1959 in Yugoslavia the lay reconciliation boards have been

established at the local level. However, these boards did not enjoy

enough credit among the people and were successful in reconciliation

only exceptionally, especially at rural sides of the country (Pecar 1968)

In this respect the new P.P. of 1977 brought the supplementary pro-

vision that the judge should be bound to advise the subject matter (in

above quoted offences) to the reconciliation board to see whether

the reconciliation was possible (art. 445 P.P.). The law of the republic

will determine when this provision shall be applied in the Republic

Besides, it is possible that the private charge shall be dismissed by

the court judge for certain reasons (art. 438 P.P.). The purpose of

this provision is to eliminate the damage and inconveniences which

might affect the offender due to an unfounded charge. In practice the

private charges are regularly not controlled in this sense (Vasiljevic-

Grubac and others, pp. 179, 180)

Finally, the decriminalisation can be considered as a mean of

diversion of the penal process and such considerations have been taken

into account at preparatory work for the penal code of Slovenia as

well as in some other Republics.

2) The restitution as the subject of penal procedure. Besides the

« action civile» in French Law the so-called adhesive procedure be-

came the overall accepted institute on the European continent since

1850, as enacted by the Austrian Code of Penal Procedure (Kobe

1977 ID). At this time, it was set up on the territory of Slovenia. The

system of adhesive procedure is a system for restitution of damage

civil in character but awarded in criminal proceedings. Its main

features have been described quite often (see e.g. Schafer pp. 112,

113 ; Selih-Kobe pp. 305-313). Basically the Yugoslav solution does

not d1ﬁer much from the others.

After World War II the Yougoslav practice enlarged the claims

for indemnification in two directions. «The first enlargement is

connected with persons entitled to make claim for indemnification

Still more important is perhaps the enlargement for immaterial damage

decided by the court, especially in the civil procedure » (Selih-Kobe,

p. 311).

One of the characteristics of the adhesive procedure is that it is

simple and cheap for the victim, except for expenses for the legal

adviser. In this connection Selih and Kobe are advocating the counsel

on request of the victim, if by reason of his financial position he is

unable to bear the costs for the counsel

There are different possibilities to insure the claim for indem-

nification

by the confiscation of property benefits acquired by the

— 151 —

commission of a criminal offence (art. 84-87 F.P.C.), by the provi-

sional remedies securing the claim (art. 112-114 P.P.) as well as by

the provision for returning the illegally required things (art. 109 P.P.).

Connected with these provisions the court is bound to collect evi-

dence and inquire into circumstances necessary for the adjudication

of the claim even before the claim has been made (art. 107 P.P.).

Finally, the victim may himself assume the prosecution if public

prosecutor finds that no grounds exist for initiating the proceedings

for an offence subject to public prosecution (art. 60 P.P.). With the

amendment of 1977 a new provision has been added according to

which the public prosecutor and the court are bound to inform the

injured party what he can do to realize this right (art. 60/5 P.P.). In

the cases of more serious offences he has the right on the counsel

of the poor (art. 65/2 P.P.), if he assumes the prosecution instead

of the public prosecutor.

Claims for indemnification can be decided by the court only

in the case the offender is found guilty, but the court is not bound

to take the decision provided such a decision would considerably

delay the criminal proceedings and may direct the injured party to

assert his claim by way of civil action (art. 103, 108 P.P.).

Therefore, the injured party has not the right of appeal against

the decision of the court in this matter (art. 360/4 P.P.). Besides, the

victim may choose from the beginning to assert the claim for indem-

nification before the criminal court or by way of civil action before

the civil court.

The provisions of art. 103, 108 and 360/4 P.P. are exposed to

critique of some Yugoslav writers (e.g. Gvozdic), there is still the

problem of the victim’s time spent at the court and in connection

with that of the expenses (Acimovic) and finally, the suggestion can

be found that instead of the injured party the public prosecutor should

have the right to claim the indemnification or the court should have

the right to take the decision in this respect on his own discretion

(Caric). Against such a standpoint are the opinions of Vasiljevic and

Kobe (1977 I). The latter with the argument that the injured party

is and should remain an autonomous person and take the decision

in this respect by himself. Instead of such paternalism Selih and

Kobe propose the right on the counsel in the case the victim is not

in the position to bear the expenses by himself. Finally, it is ques-

tionable whether other physical (e.g. of parents, employers, committers,

insurance organisations) could be made responsible in the adhesive

procedure provided that the claim for indemnification may be decided

by the court only if the offender is found guilty (Kobe 1977 II).

— 152 —

3) The suspended sentence may be given by the court under the

condition also that the offender will restitute the damage to the victim

(art. 52, 56 F.P.C.). Such a provision was enacted in Yugoslavia as

early as in 1929.

4) The restitution as a mitigating circumstance for the strictness

of punishment can be taken into account under the general princrples

in fixing punishment (art. 41 F.P.C.) and by the reduction of punish-

ment (art. 42 F.P.C.). The two researches finished until now in

Slovenia have demonstrated that this circumstance is taken into

account by the judicial practice (Bayer, Bavcon and others). The new

legislature of 1977 has enlarged the possibility to apply the judicial

admonition (art. 59 F.P.C.) and it is possible that the restitution will

have an influence on a larger application of this institute.

5S) The system of insurance and the compensation of damage by

public funds. In Yugoslavia there exists a large system of insurance :

health insurance, the insurance for disablement, the pension insurance

and the obligatory insurance in traffic. Therefore, Selih and Kobe are

of the opinion that it would be suitable to create only a limited

public fund as a supplement for the compensation of damage not

covered by the insurance systems. As far as I understand only the

damage caused by the offences against life and limb would be

additionally compensated with such fund, but the victims who

contributed to the damage would be excluded (pp. 302-303). Caric is

in favour of a public fund in case the offender remains unknown

or lives in bad material conditions (p. 87). For the time beeing

there is no such fund in Yougoslavia.

6) The possibilities for the indemnification our system does not

apply. In our legal system the provision of probation is not foreseen

for adult offenders. Therefore it is not possible to connect the possi-

bility of this provision with the restitution of damage. Besides, our

penal system does not know provisions as

restitution of damage

in lieu of the sanction (abolished in 1951) ; cession of a part of the

fine to injured party for the restitution ; the offender cannot restitute

the damage by his work for the victim but only with his earnings ;

the wages of prisoners are too low for the indemnification of victims

and the legal provisions do not foresee the restitution as a circums-

tance for the approval of parole. Às far as we were able to confront

the Yugoslav literature we have found no standpoints of Yugoslav

authors regarding the proposals quoted. But it does not mean that

some of them would not be worth being examined in the future.

— 153 —

Findines of the research (1l)

The aim of the research. Public opinion often asserts that the legis-

lative provisions are not applied in judicial practice. Therefore, the

main hypothesis was that our judicial practice does not apply the

available legal provisions for the restitution of damage to the victim

So far such a hypothesis has not been verified

This starting point means also the limitation of the research

The findings will not give answers to the questions

whether the

restitution is a mean for the diversion of penal procedure (since we

are observing only finally binding judgements) ; and whether the

victims have got the real satisfaction since at this occasion, we were

notable to follow neither the execution proœdure nor the compen-

sation procedure by the insurance funds.

The sample. The research has been carried out by nine students

of postdiploma course and two undergraduate students under my

guidance and with the help of Peter Kobe, professor of penal law.

The data were collected from the court files for finally binding jud-

gements for 1973 in the Republic of Slovenia (nationally Homogenous

populaüon of 1 800 000 inhabitants). The research was carried out in

1976 in order to allow enough time between the finally binding

judgements of criminal courts and the civil action to be resolved by the

civil court.

In 1973

11387 offenders were condemned. In the case of

concurrence of criminal offences each offender is taken into account

only once for the offence for which the most severe punishment has

been adjudicated. The offenders examined for this research have been

chosen by the method of elimination. We have excluded

1) AIl the offenders who were condemned on the basis

of private charges. These are specific cases since the private

prosecutor decides to charge the offender mainly if the

damage was not restituted. Besides, the role of the private

prosecutor in the penal procedure is different from the

role of the injured party in the adhesive procedure. Finally,

private charges mainly refer to minor assaults and batteries,

(1) The research under the title : Restitution to Victims of Criminal Offences

in Slovenia has been financed by the research fund Boris Kidric and carried

‘out at the Institute of Criminology at the Faculty of Law, University of

Ljubljana.

— 154 —

malicious mischief. defamation etc. ie. offences for which

the damage can hardiy be established

84 %

2) All the offenders who were condemned for traffic

offences. In these cases a great amount of damage is cove-

red by insurances. Nearly all of the offences were com-

mitted with negligence and the legal provisions for these

offences have been restricted with the new legislation. The

research of these offences would demand a special exa-

mination

308 %

3) All the offenders condemned for the offences for

which the damage could hardly be established, e.g. offences

against People and the State, against Civil Liberties and

Rights, against the Dignity of the Person and Morality,

against the Marriage and Family, against the Administra-

tion of Justice, against Public Order and Legal Transac-

tions, the offences of Unauthorised Use of a Motor-Vehicle

(Joy riding) and similar

e »% e .%.."...................

17,3 %

4) AIl the offenders condemned for the offences for

which the total sum of frequencies did not reach the

frequency of 50 with the exception of two cases which

seemed to be of speçial interest for the research

4,2 %

5) Some offences for various reasons, e.g. murder (due

to the fact that this offence is an exception and the damage

caused exceeds the material possibilities of the offender) ;

participation in a brawl (it is difficult to distinguish

between the participation of the offender and the victim) ;

illicite commerce and tax evasion (the dark number is very

high) ; petty theft, embezzlement or fraud (due to low

damage) and receiving stolen property (the damage is

mainly established with the perpetrator of the main

e e à ® % ® © © © 6 % à © © % © » ® » 6 6 © ® © » ® % e % % à © % * » © © à » e « @

offence)

90 %

6) Offences taken info consideration

e 6 e 6 ® #% 6 € % %* % 6 © © » 9

30,3 %

Total

e …. ...

100,0 %

We want to draw the attention that at least 26 % (items 1 and 3)

of offences have been excluded due to the fact that it is almost im-

possible to replace the damage with the monetary indemnification

in these cases.

— 155 —

The outline of the offences considered for the research is the

following one :

Offences against life and limb :

— grievous bodily injury — art. 141 P.C, (art. 52/53

P.C.S.)

. e . %* 6 %* + e ® %* © % © « e 6 6 © % e à © © e % © % < à © » © © & © ® ® # @

19 %

— light bodily injury inflicted by weapons, dangerous

tools or other instruments — art. 142/2 P.C. (art.

54/2 P.C.S.)

. * e « © % © « 6 s * © + © 6 6 © % à % e 6 @ © à %* % % © 6 ® e # #

22,2 %

—— 0 2

Total

30,1 %

Offences against property :

—

theft — art. 249 P.C. (art. 165 P.C.S.)

32,6 %

———emeamer

aggravated theft — art. 250 P.C. (art. 166 P.C.S.) ..

178 %

—

e e © 6 * © — e © e

fraud — art. 258 P.Ç. (art, 171 P.C.S.)

49 %

—

embezzlement in office — art. 322 P.C. (art. 141

. ». © 6 » . 66 806.804 t + © € 8 6 % à ® © à © e % © à 6 % 6 6 6 6 % © 6 % e © #

P.C.S.)

5,2 %

Total

e e e »% 00e

605 %

Other (miscellaneous) offences :

— business mismanagement — art. 213 P.C. (art. 127

. e « . % à % « 6 © 6 © % ® % © % © 6 — % 5 e © D ® & @ © à %* © 6 % % à à » ® —

P.C.S.)

13 %

— pillage (2) — art. 255 P.C. (art. 142 P.CS))

08 %

— malicious mischief — art. 257 P.C. (art. 177 P.C.S.). .

5.4 %

1,9 %

,— forest theft — art. 246 a P.C. (art. 158 P.C.S.)

Sum-total

100,0 %

3451

if the value gained exceeds a certain amount.

(2) Pillages are offences under the articles 250 P.C., 322 P.C. and similar

Comment

the articles following the description of the offence are the

articles of the Penal Code valid in F.P.R. of Yugoslavia until 1977 July the

tion these articles will be used. In the brackets are the articles of the new

lst. Since the research has been carried out for the year 1973 in continua-

Penal Code for the Republic of Slovenia. Between the two kinds of incrimi-

nations there is only partial concordance.

— 156 —

The 25 % random sample has been taken out of these offenders

except for the business mismanagement, pillage and forest theft for

which a 100 % sample has been taken due to small frequencies. In

computation of totals this fact has been taken into account. Thus

the results are representative for the selected offenders. Besides, we

have to call the attention to the fact that the numbers of mwred

persons are greater than the numbers of offenders.

Results.

1) Offenders and victims. Nearly one half of victims of all the

property offences are legal persons (44 % — e.g. economic organi-

sations, public institutions and similar). With criminal offences of

business mismanagement, embezzlement in office, pillage and also

malicious mischief the legal persons are the damaged parties in

almost all the cases. In these conflict situations one cannot expect

a great correctional advantage of direct interpersonal contacts bet

ween the offenders and the legal representatives of the organisations

It might be that in some cases the proceedings before the self-

management bodies could replace the penal procedure what is already

the practice in some situations.

The perpetrators of criminal offences against life and limb

malicious mischief, thefts and partially also of frauds are (in com-

parison to the vocational structure of population) mainly workers

and unemployed persons in distinction to the perpetrators of em-

bezzlement in office, pillage and business mismanagement who mainly

belong to the middie class of population. With personalized offences

(against life and limb) the perpetrators and the victims belong

mainly to the same social class. In these cases the victims are

quite often also supported persons. The individuals as victims of

criminal offences against property mainly belong to the middle social

class and to supported persons (older people, disabled and similar)

Bodily injuries are in 1/5 of the cases inflicted to close rela-

tives or close acquaintances

2) The restitution of damage until the main trial. The damage

involved was :mainly not high. With one half of offences against

property the damage caused did not exceed 1 000 dinars (according

to prices in 1973) and only in 15 % the damage exceeded 5 000 dinars

The offenders of different offences restituted the damage before the

main trial in quite different proportions, e.g. for thefts in 66 % to

2.5 % for grievous bodily injuries. But it would be a mistake to

presume that with thefts we have to deal with spontaneous resti-

tutions. Às already mentioned with thefts the damage has been

restituted in 2/3 of cases, but out of these in 85 % in things

with

aggravated thefts the damage has been restituted in one half of cases

— 157 —

but out of these in 86 % in things. It means the judicial procedure

involves chiefly those perpetrators of thefts and aggravated thefts

(mainly burglaries) with which the things stolen have been found for

this is a good evidence. Thus, we are faced with the selection of these

offenders already at the stage of discovering and investigating. In

connection with this statement we have to mention that according to

a special provision of our penal code the court may, in theft cases,

remit the punishment if the perpetrator had restored the stolen goods

before he learned of the commencement of criminal proceedings (art.

165/3 P.C.S.). It seems that such a situation did not occur since there

wWas no remigsion of punishment in our sample.

It might be that the restitution is more spontaneous with offenders

who committed offences against economy or in official duty (art. 213 —

49 Ÿ ; art. 322 — 44 Ÿ ; art. 258 — 30 % ; art. 255 — 24 %) :

lation.

that is, with offenders belonging mainly to the middle class of popu-

Considering the proposal that the restitution should replace

other sanctions if posible, we are of the opinion that the return of

illegally required things can hardly be treated in such a manner. The

consequence would be that the offenders of the middle class of popu-

lation would be privileged.

3) Adhesive procedure. The victims could find the satisfaction

during the criminal procedure by the restitution of damage, by recon-

ciliation or with renouncement to the claim. There were 33 % of

such victims. From the remaining victims the claims for indemni-

fication have been asserted in 2/3 of cases (64 %). The most claims

have been asserted by the victims of malicious mischief (80 %) and the

least by the victims of bodily injuries (45 % and 36 %). We tried

to compare the ranks of asserted with adjudicated claims with the

presumption that the victims expect the adjudications in advance due

to experiences of other previous victims. Between both ranks we could

not find any correlation. Therefore, we presume that the proportions

of victims for bodily injuries who assert the claim are low due to

personalized relationships between the offenders and the victims. This

seems to confirm our view-point that it would not be advisable to

force the victims to assert the claims for indemnification or to replace

their claims with the claim of public prosecutor or with official

adjudiœtion of the damage by the court.

From all the claims for the indemnification the courts satis-

fied the claims in whole or partially in 2/3 of cases (65 %). Among the

claims the courts did not adjudicate we found 1/3 of claims upon

which the courts have forgotten to decide.

— 158 —

TABLE I

By the victims asserted and by the courts decided claims in %

-—

—

% of | %ofun-! Hofnon ;

Art. PC

Victims

decided | decided

asserted

Total

saturated

claims

claims

claims

— r r

141

N

12,5

19,4

56,9

99,9

11,1

142/2

197

13,8

15,0

13,8

47,4

100,0

249

297

55,9

23,9

10,4

98

100,0

250

236

30,1

32,2

23,2

14,4

100,0

258

83

33,7

27,7

10,8

27,7

99,9

322

50

42,0

38,0

8,0

100,0

12,0

213

41

36,6

31,7

(4,9)

26,8

100,0

255

25

(12,0)

60,0

(8,0)

(20,0)

100,0

257

18,6

419

23,2

16,3

100,0

246 a

66

16,7

42,4

9,1

31,8

100,0

Total

1111

32,3

14,4

24,3

99,9

N

1 111

358

321

160

270

Ncor (3)

1 012

33,3

27,6

24,0

lÔ0,0

The total amount of claims is 481, out of that 321 claims were decided by

—

—

the_ _co_mjs |

_66,7 % (with the cgqqçti_on 64,6).

—

—— —— ——

—

—

——

Regarding the legal advisers we have found that only 13 % of

injured parties have had a legal adviser in penal procedure (the legal

persons more often than the physical persons). As far as the injured

persons have had the legal advisor they asserted the claims more often

and the courts have taken more decisions in these cases. This result

supports our suggestion for the legal advisers free of charge on the

request of injured parties if necessary (Selih-Kobe).

The time between the commitment of damage to the finally-

binding sentence was not very long. In less than l year 69 % of

cases of bodily injuries have been finished (91 % in less than two

years) and 72 % of cases of property offences in the narrow sense

of the word (art. 249, 250, 258 - 89 % in less than two years). An

exception of this is especially embezzlement in office with the longer

period of adjudication, but in this case the injured party is a legal

person.

—

—

(3) Ncor

correction of the 100 % observed offences to 25 %.

— 159 —

4) The confiscation of property benefits acquired by the commission

of a criminal offence was a measure the courts have applied only

with four criminal offences out of ten observed and that in very

low percentages (art. 250 — 3 % ; art. 258 — 3 % ; art. 322 — 7 %

and art. 255 — 5 %). These percentages are of course too low to be

explained with reasons quoted in item 2 and the responsibility for

this is with prosecution and courts. But partially it is possible to

explain such judicial practice with the mentioned high percentages of

return of things with thefts and burglaries as well as with high

percentages of restitution done by the middle class of offenders.

S) The civil action has been asserted in very few cases. First we

had to exclude from the observed cases all those in which the damage

has been restituted, the reconciliation obtained, the victim renounced

to the claim, the court has decided the whole claim and by grievous

bodily injuries those perpetrated between the married couples or

between the children and their parents or vice versa, since we have

found that among these relatives there are no claims for the indem-

nification. So we have foreseen the possibility of civil action in 360

cases of injured parties. Out of these the civil action has been asserted

in only 31 cases or in 8,6 %. After three years 7 cases have not

been decided yet, in ! case there was a withdrawal of the action,

8 cases were resolved by reconciliation and in 15 cases the claim

has been adjudicated (in 7 cases in whole and in 8 cases partially).

The reasons for so few civil actions are

expenses (out of 31 cases

22 victims have had the legal adviser in civil procedure and only 7

in the adhesive procedure), the uncertainty about the decision of the

court and long duration of the procedure. It means that civil action

is not the way the criminal courts could rely upon by directing the

injured person to assert his claim by way of civil proceedings.

The final evaluation of the situation is :

TABLE II

The restitution of damage for offences observed in %

'T.he total number of victims (4).

1012

— the damage restituted, adjudicated in the adhesive

procedure, reconciliation obtained of the damage

claim renounced

e © …. « « — 6 0 n < € € © ® © à € ® « % … »s %* % % 6 © % * *

61,0 %

(4) The total number of victims is given with the correction for the offences

observed on 100 % basis to 25 %. The total number of offenders with the

correction is 792. The total numbers of observations (without corrections) were :

886 offenders and 1 111 victims.

— 160 —

— the damage adjudicated in civil procedure or recon-

ciliated during the civil procedure

23 %

— the civil record in three years after the finally binding

penal judgement not finished yet

0,6 %

— the damage remained unresolved

__361 %

Total

1000 %

The worst situation in this respect is with bodily injuries, but in

these cases 1/5 of them have been committed among close relatives.

6) The restitution of damage and the strictness of penalty. We

have established that the increase of damage influences significantly

the increase in the strictness of penalty. Unfortunately the data

collected do not allow the comparison between the restitution of the

damage and the strictness of penalty due to small absolute numbers

and the complexity of comparisons needed. Therefore we want to

draw the attention to the research of Mrs. Bayer (1967) in which

the findings showed that the courts condemned the offenders with no

criminal records almost in all cases to conditional sentences if the

damage has been restituted. The frequencies of unconditionally

condemned offenders were so small that they were not suitable for

the analysis (p. 92). The recidivists, on the other side have been

treated differently. The fact of recidivism outweighed the fact of

the restitution of damage (p. 93).

Both aspects raise some doubts. The inflicted damage is espe-

cially with thefts and burglaries more the consequence of an objective

situation (how much did the offender find) than of his primary intent.

The restitution of damage is in these cases mainly connected with

the return of stolen things. Therefore, every automatism in instruc-

tions to courts how to decide in these cases would be a hindrance for

a wise criminal policy. Nevertheless, it does not mean that it would

not be appropriate to foresee in the penal code a broader possibility

of the remission of punishment for some other offenders who

restituted the damage except the one we already have in the art.

165/3 P.C.S. (such provision we find eg. in the penal code of

German Democratic Republic art. 24, par. 2).

7) The suspended sentence under the condition the offender will

restitute the damage. The courts very exceptionally pronounce the

suspended sentence under this condition. If we do not take into

account the bodily injuries (due to immaterial damage hard to define)

— 161 —

and the pillages (in which the suspended sentence is not possible)

in all other cases in which the suspended sentence was applied it had

been pronounced under the condition of the restitution of damage in

only 44 %. But with that we have to recall our previous statement

that the courts have sentenced the offenders with the suspended sen-

tence first of all in cases in which the damage has been restituted.

8) Conclusions, Our starting hypothesis was that the penal courts

do not apply provisions for the restitution of damage provided by

our penal legislation which are mainly of facultative nature. the find-

ings of our research do not confirm this hypothesis since we have

found an unexpected great proportion of adjudications of claims for

indemnification and quite reasonable motives for the small appli-

cation of other provisions. This does not mean, of course, that the

judicial practice should not strive to improve its work in this respect.

Such a conclusion is not justified merely by the results of

the research but also by the reasons for which we have excluded from

research some other offences. So, e.g. we have excluded 26 % of

offences in which the damage caused cannot be estabished in mone-

tary value. Besides we have excluded also the offences committed in

traffic (31 % of all offences) which we consider as specific offences,

perpetrated more or less in all cases out of neglect, and sentenced

for the consequences. The great amount of damage is covered by

insurances and the offenders should be bound to restitute the damage

to insurance funds as well as to injured persons. But whether this is

a penal or civil matter is a question of principle which has to be

resolved in the future. We believe however that the public opinion

according to which the courts do not adjudicate the claims for the

indemnification in the penal procedure is mainly due to these offences

which covered a great proportion of all offences dealt with by the

penal courts. With the new legislation the proportion of these

offences will become smaller due to the change in the incrimination.

In the introduction it has been mentioned that the reasons for

the greater interest among the writers for the indemnification of the

victims should be searched in three aspects :

— in the aspect of the victim ;

— in the corrective aspect for the offender :

— in the sociological aspect.

Ad 1!) With the findings of our research we cannot answer the

question how many victims have remained unsaturated after the

penal procedure has been closed for we did not interview the victims

of unknown offenders and we did not follow the execution procedure.

AIl we can do at the moment is to hypothesize that the number of

— 162 —

such offenders is smaller than we expected for the finally binding

sentence gives the right for the execution and besides, the damage

has been restored before the main trial in 1/3 of cases. In spite of

that, our findings do not allow the conclusion that public funds would

not be appropriate to compensate the damage in a speedy way (espe-

cially for the damage inflicted by the offences against life and limb

and ev. by the traffic offences). Due to the extension of the insurances

in our country it seems, however, that such fund would not need to

be extensive and could easily be filled with fines and with small

contributions of all offenders condemned by the penal courts (Selih-

Kobe).

Ad 2) From the correctional point of view it would be advisable

that the offender restitutes the damage inflicted. But in addition to

that the research has drawn our attention also to some obstacles

which hinder such a generalization. We have seen e.g. that some pro-

perty offenders are the subjects of penal procedure mainly in cases

in which stolen things were found and returned. In these cases it is

difficult to see the restitution as having a correctional effect. With

criminal offences perpetrated in our country against the economy

the victims are mainly legal persons. It is a special problem to

sensitize the workers that with criminal offences perpetrated in eco-

nomic or public organizations they are damaging themselves and

other workers. This is a process stimulated in our country by the

selfmanagement system, which the oflenders evidently did not accept.

It is a question whether it is possible to force such a perception

with the restitution of damage by individuals to institutions which

dispose of great amounts of financial means. However, this does

not mean that we should not use also this way of solution. In these

cases, the psychological relations only differ from the relationships

among individuals, and the suggestion one should strengthen the

direct individual contacts between offenders and victims obtains another

content in these cases.

Ad 3) From the sociological point of view the direct reconci-

liation between the offenders and their victims should restrict the

power of the state institutions and bureaucracy over individuals. This

is an aim one should accept. But the actual proposals found in the

literature in connection with the restitution of damage (which were

contained in our headings) contribute to such an aim only in a

limited way. The compensation by public funds, the penal and

adhesive procedure are also institutional interventions into the rela-

tions among people. It is true, however, that a good adhesive pro-

cedure eliminates the need for the additional civil procedure. Besides

that it would be necessary to search for a way toward the limitation of

the institutional power by disciminations, lay reconciliation as well

as by the enlargement of offences prosecuted by private persons

— 163 —

instead of by public prosecutor. But with all that we should not

return to old days of private accusatory procedure and to times

which Aristophanes exposed to mockery.

The macrosociological analyses are a challenge for searching

new ways and solutions. But contemporary proposals generalizing

one way of solution do not always contribute to other and better

relationships among people. The way out of the pitfall is still to be

searched.

The most radical proposals are those made by the Canadian Law

Commision (on Diversion) and by Nils Christie. The idea is in both

cases the same, that is to say the penal prosecution should be optional

and introduced only if necessary in the individual case with a special

explanation why. With this the principle of legality, on the basis

of which the public prosecutor is bound to prosecute if the law demands

so, known in most of the countries of the continental Europe, should

be abandoned. I am not sure that such solution is acceptable in my

country today. It is true that equality in front of the law does not

exist anywhere. But does this mean that aspirations in this direction

should be abandoned also ? One can reasonably presume all kinds

of pressures on the public prosecutor. Would it be wise to expose

him in such a manner ? I am not convinced that the social reality

should be forced by legal provisions in the first place.

Finally, the results of the research and the interpretations should

be understood from the point of view of my social reality and the

time which I am living in.

REFERENCES

ACIMOVIC (M.) : « Polozaj ostecenog medju gradjanima i pred krivicnim

sudom », Gledista, Beograd, 1970, n° 4, pp. 627-636.

BAVCON (L.), VODOPIVEC (K.), UDERMAN (B.) : « Individualizacija

kazni v praksi nasih sodisc », Institut za kriminologijo pri pravni fakul-

teti v Ljubljani, publ. 12, 1968.

BAYER (M.

« Kriteriji za odmjeravanje kazne od strane sudova u

Sloveniji », Institut za Kkriminologijo pri pravni fakulteti v Ljubljani,

publ. 10, 1967.

CARIC (A.)

« Odskodnina zrtvi kaznivega dejanja v sodobnem kazenskem

pravu », Revija za kriminalistiko in kriminologijo, Ljubljana, 1970, n° 2,

pp. 82-88.

CHRISTIE (N.) : « Conflicts as property », The British Journal of Criminology,

London, 1977, n° 1, pp. 1-15.

— 1648 —

GALAWAY (B.

« The Use of Restitution », Crime and Delinquency, NJ.,

Hachensack, 1977, n° 1, pp. 57-67.

GOLDSTEIN (N.) : « Reparation by the offender to the victim as a method

of rehabilitation for both » ; in Victimology : A new Focus, ed. by

Israel Drapkin and Emilio Viano, vol. II, Lexington, Lexington Books,

1974, pp. 193-205.

GREBING (G)

« Die Verhandlungen der III. Sektion über das Thema Die

Entschädigung des durch eine Straftat Verletzten », Zeitschrift für die

gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft, Berlin, 1975, n° 2, pp. 472-485.

GVOZDIC (P.) : « Priviligirani sviedoci iz cl. 211 st. 1 toc. 2 ZKP », Nasa

zakonitost, Zagreb, 1971, n° 3, pp. 210-220.

INTERNATIONAL STUDY INSTITUTE ON VICTIMOLOGY : Conclusions

and recommendations, Bellagio, Italy, July 1- 12,

1975 ;

Victimology,

Washington, 1976, n° 1, pp. 130-153.

JACOB (R.B.) : « Reparation or Restitution by the Criminal Offender to

his Victim : Applicability of an Ancient Concept in the Modern Correc-

tional Process », The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police

Science, Baltimore, 1970, n° 2, pp. 152-167.

KOBE (P.) : « Polozaj zrtve v sodnem postopku s posebnim ozirom na

adhezijski postopek », Revija za kriminalistiko in kriminologijo, Ljubljana,

1977, n° 1, pp. 3-11.

KOBE (P.) : Primerjalnopravni prikaz in analiza, manuscript, 1977.

LAMBORN (LL)

« Crime Victim Compensations : Theory and Practice

in the Second Decade », Victimology, Washington, n° 4, pp. 503-516.

LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA : « Restitution and compen-

sation », Working papers 5 and 6, October 1974, Canadian Journal of

Criminology and Corrections, Ottawa, 1975, n° 2, pp. 1-25.

LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA

« Diversion », Working

paper 7, Canadian Journal of Criminology and Corrections, Ottawa, 1975,

n° 3, pp. 1-25.

LINDEN (M.A)

« Restitution, Compensation for Victims of Crime and

Canadian Criminal Law », Canadian Journal of Criminology and Correc-

tions, Ottawa, 1977, n° 1, pp. 1-49.

MARKOVIC (M.) : « Neka pitanja u vezi sa pravnim pojmom stete, njenih

vidova i odredjivanja naknade », Pravni zbornik, Titograd, 1975, n° 1,

pp. 35-49.

McLEAN (I.) : « Compensation and Restitution Orders », The Criminal Law

Review, January 1973, pp. 3-6.

MENDELSOHN (B.)

« Victimology and Contemporary Society’s Trends »,

Victimology, Washington, 1976, n° 1, pp. 8-28.

MIKLAVCIC (F)

« Odskodnina za nepremozenjsko skodo pri telesnih

poskodbah », Pravnik, Ljubljana, 1973, n°° 10-12, pp. 419-429.

MISIC (V.) : « Uticaj krivicnog postupka na tok gradjanske parnice i uticaj

krivicne presude na gradjansku presudu i obratno », Glasnik advokatske

komore u SAP Vojvodini, Novi Sad, 1972, n° 6, pp. 12-21 ; n° 7, pp. 1-7.

— 165 —

MUELLER (O.W.G.), COOPER (H.H.A.

« Society and the Victim

Alternative Responses », in Victimology : A New Focus, ed. by Israel

Drapkin and Emilio Viano, Vol. II, Lexington, Lexington Books, 1974,

pp. 85-101.

OSTROUMOV (S.S.), FRANK (L.V.)

« O viktimologii i viktimnosti »,

Sovjetskoje gosudarstvo i pravo, Moskva, 1976, n° 4, pp. 74-79.

PALMER (W.J)

« Pre-Arrest Diversion : Victim Confrontation », Federal

Probation, Washington, 1974, n° 3, pp. 12-18.

PECAR (J.), VODOPIVEC (K.), UDERMAN (B.), KROFLIC (M.)

« Porav-

nalni sveti », Institut za kriminologijo pri pravni fakulteti v Ljubljani,

1968, pub. 11.

RESOLUTIONS DU XIe CONGRES INTERNATIONAL DE DROIT PENAL,

(Budapest, 9-14 september 1974)

Revue internationale de droit pénal,

Pau (France), 1974, n° 3-4, pp. 685-689.

SCHAFER (S.)

« Compensation of Victims of Criminal Offenses », Revue

internationale de droit pénal, Pau (France), 1973, n° 1-2, pp. 105-135.

SELIH (A.), KOBE (P.) : « L’indemnisation des victimes d’infraction : Yougos-

lavie », Revue internationale de droit pénal, Pau, (France), 1973, n° 1-2,

pp. 294-313.

VASILJEVIC (T.)

« Sistem krivicnog procesnog prava », Beograd, Zavod za

(zdavanie udjbenika socijalisticne republike Srbije, 2nd ed…, 1971.

VASILJEVIC (T.), GRUBAC (M), KUHAIJDA (V.), BAJIC (L.), MATIC (V.) :

Primena ustanova krivicnog procesnog prava u sudovima Vojvodine,

Zbornik radova VIII, Novi Sad, Pravni fakultet u Novom Sadu, 1974,

pp. 129-196.

VIANO (C.) : « The Study of the Victim », Victimology, Washington, 1976,

n° 1, pp. 1-7.

WILLIAMS (L.V.), FISCH (M.)

« A proposed Model for Individualized

Offender Restitution through State Victim Compensation », in Victimology :

A New Focus, ed. by Israel Drapkin and Emilio Viano, Vol. II, Lexington,

Lexington Books, 1974, pp. 155-165.

WOLFGANG (E.M.) : « Making the Criminal Justice System Accountable »,

Crime and Delinquency, Paramus N.J., National Council on Crime and

Delinquency, 1972, n° 1, pp. 15-22.

LAWS

Criminal Code — Collection of Yugoslav Laws, Institute of comparative Law,

Vol. XI, Beograd, 1964 — Translation and Comments by Mirjan Damaska.

Code of Criminal Procedure — Collection of Yugoslav Laws, Institute of

Comparative Law, Vol. XIX, Beograd, 1969 — Foreword, Translation

and Comments by Mirjan Damaska.

Kazenski zakon Socialisticne Federativne republike Jugoslaviie — Uradni list

S.R.S., Ljubljana, 1976.

Kazenski zakon socialisticne republike Slovenije — Uradni list S.R.S., Ljubl-

jana, 1977.

Zakon o kazenskem postopku — Uradni list S.R.S., Ljubljana, 1977.

— 166 —

POLICE AND MINORITIES IN ENGLAND

GARY T. MARX

MARY MORTON

Department of Urban Studies

Department of Sociology

and Planning,

Queens University

M.I1 T. Cambridge, Mass.

Kingston, Ontario - Canada

Department of Sociology

University of California

Lajolla, California - U.S.A.

Police anywhere are problematic as a public institution for a

varicty of reasons, such as their authoritarian and adversarial role,

the fact that they can legally use force, the opportunities for corruption

they are offered, lack of agreement over the morality they enforce,

and the fact that they must act quickly in situations where only

limited information is available.

The English police are of interest in this regard because they

occupy a rather unique position in appearing to be more loved than

hated, something that can hardly be said for police in most other

countries. The degree of consensus and voluntary compliance with

law, though easily exaggerated by the anglophilic American, ssem more

pronounced than in most other countries.

As with all stereotypes, the image of the English police 1s nb

doubt overdone. Americans operating with contrast conceptions often

exaggerate the virtues of other societies (particularly English and

Scandinavian) and the problems and failings of their own. With

only a little poking beneath the surface, tarnish can be discovered on

the badges of at least some Bobbies. While we were in England, the

head of the Scotland Yard narcotics unit was arrested for dealing

in drugs. Custom’s inspectors traced a suitcase filled with heroin to

him. In another case which was the subject of a parliamentary inquiry,

the special criminal police (C.ID.) were hanging suspects from a

wall and whipping them to gain information. The Challenor case, also

the subject of a government inquiry, saw a policeman who in his zeal

to fight crime went so far as to plant evidence on people. Some

claim that English police carry guns under the seats of patrol cars.

The image of comfortable powerlessness conveyed by police can

be deceptive. The English police appear to have extensive powers

— 167 —

which do not make the subtrafuge and defensive sub-culture of Ame-

rican police as necessary. There is no written Bill of Rights or Supreme

Court Reviews and doctrines such as that in Miranda. In the area of

stop and search they face far fewer formal legal restraints. À New

York detective reported, perhaps with a tone of envy in his voice,

« it’s as if Hitler wrote the laws under which the English police

operate ». The South African head of state has expressed envy of

the British Special Powers Act.

Foreign students and radicals sometimes claim there is an

extensive political intelligence police who know everything that is

going on. The visible police are seen as a subtrafuge. The somewhat

bumbling image they represent is seen as a front. Other more secretive

branches such as the C.I.D. or special branch are said to do the

really dirty work.

Any discussion of the merits of the English police must also be

tempered by their historically oppressive role in Ireland. The image

of the helpful, smiling Bobby is not held by many of Irish and lower

class background in England, not to mention those subject to the

British colonial experience.

One should also not go too far in trying to « explain » the good

English police-community relations without more carefully ascer-

taining just how good they are and what the dimensions of « good-

ness » are. If we wish to say the English police are somehow « better »,

how are they « better» and what is to be explained ? Is it positive

attitudes toward police that citizens hold as revealed by public opinion

polls ? Is it a higher level of citizen cooperation with police ? Is

it in more compliant behavior on the part of those involved in

adversarial relations with police ?

Is it greater police efficiency in deterring or apprehending those

engaged in crime ? Is it better service during emergencies or conflicts ?

Is it lower per capita costs ? Is it lesser police dishonesty ? Is it

resort to lesser degrees of physical force ? Is it more respect for the

liberty of the individual ? Is it more rigorous sanctioning of police

abuses and taking citizen complaints more seriously ? Is it greater

tolerance for ethnic diversity and alternative life styles ?

Were precise comparisons available on all of the above dimensions,

it is doubtful that the English police would uniformly appear better.

Yet holding apart such nuances, it is still our impression that English

police-community relations are relatively unique, even if they are far

from the idealized image held by some. How is this to be explained ?

Beyond historical factors and things such as police organization.

ethos recruitment and training, the relatively good quality of police-

community relations has rested in the social characteristics of the

— 168 —

English people. Changes in this area now make it necessary to question

just how good police-community relations are in England

Important to understanding any social control relationship is

degree of consensus on the rules being enforced and the homogeneity

of the population. One English policeman remarked « we have a

good police because we have a good public ». Relatively speaking,

English society has been homogeneous, consensual and integrated,

and hence high on self-policing.

Social and cultural homogeneity are important factors in the

quality of service citizens receive from public service bureaucracies —

whether police, medicine, schools or welfare is considered. What then

happens when the English police encounter the youth culture and

alien non-white ethnic groups such as West Indians and Pakistanis ?

The system tends to break down. There is more conflict, and

police-community relations in England, at least to the extent that they

involve immigrants and those with deviant life styles, start looking

much more like police-community relations with such groups in the

U.S

In this paper we explore some aspects of police-minority relations

in England. This draws on 1) our observations and in-depth semi-

structured interviews with police and minority group members

2) a

survey we developed in conjunction with Conrad Jameson associates

The survey was carried out in London in 1972-3 and involved 334

West Indians and 438 whites. We first consider some of the survey

data and then some qualitative data

Respect for the police among West Indians and whites

For the purpose of assessing the general standing of the police

in the eyes of citizens in a given social context, the extent to which

members of the public say that they respect the police has often

been used as an indicator (e.g. Reiss, 1967). In the present study,

a composite measure of general attitudes toward the police has been

devised, and as well, specific components of this measure have been

examined in the anticipation that they may shed light upon the image

of the police in London

Our respondents were asked specifically how much respect they

had for the police, and as Table IA revea!

he West Indians in

the sample were much less likely than the whites to say that they

had great respect. Youg persons of both races were less likely than

were older persons of both races to say that they respected the

police. Interestingly, while there appeared to be a linear relationship

— 169 —

between age and respect for the police for both racial groups, it

was those West Indian persons who were between age 25 and age

44 who were most ambivalent on this question, while the youngest

and the oldest blacks were more likely to express deﬁmte views —

strongly positive for the oldest.

Citizens in the United States have been asked in several studies (e.g

Bouma, 1970 ; Bayley and Mendelsohn, 1968) how well they liked

the police in their neighbourhoods, and the results have suggested

strong racial differences in this measure of general regard for the

police. Data from the present study reveal a similar pattern in

attitudes toward the police in London, England. Whereas 60 % of

white males and 57 % of white females say that the police are

liked in their neighbourhoods, less than a quarter of the blacks

interviewed held this view and almost half (42 % of males and 48 %

of females) say that the police are nor liked, in contrast to only 15 %

of whites holding this view. When race was controlled, there were

significant tendencies among both whites and West Indian for young

people to be more critical of the police than their elders, as Table I B

indicates. Indeed, it is impressive to note that over 90 % of the

youngest blacks held negative or ambivalent views as to whether the

police were liked in their neighbourhoods, while just over half of the

white youths between 16 and 24 years of age felt this way. Age

along with race is a significant determinant of whether the res-

pondents claim that the police are liked

The homily that the British police are the finest in the world is a

reflection of the general belief that the police in Britain are highly

regarded. Consequently, our respondents were asked to judge the truth

of this statement as a measure of their general views of the police

The racial differences which showed up on this item were striking, as

l'able IC shows

While almost four-fifths of white males agreed

with this statement, only a quarter of the black males said that the

statement was true ; the patterns were very similar for females

except that less clear-cut opinions were expressed, more females than

males of both racial groups being inclined to say that they did not

know. The data also indicate that within racial groups age differences

were also evident, with young persons of both races being less likely to

agree that the British police are the world’s finest, although this trend

was more striking for whites than for blacks

An indirect measure of esteem for the police which has been

employed in some American studies (Reiss, 1967 ; Bouma, 1970) is

the question of whether one would approve of his son’s becoming a

— 170 —

police officer (l). Interestingly, in our survey differences between

West Indians and white respondents do not appear to be as great

regarding the judgment that for one’s son to be a policeman might be

a gcod idea as are the racial differences in the expression of the view

that this would be a bad idea. Whereas 21 % of the whites would not

approve of their son’s becoming a policeman, over half of the blacks

sampled decried the idea. One possible interpretation of these findings

:5 that for West Indians the idea of one’>s son becoming a law en-

forcement agent has a political significance that is not salient for

whites who may view the question simply in terms of the practical

merits of the occupation. Consistent with this supposition is the finding

that for blacks the tendency to support the idea of one’s son becoming

a policeman increases with age ; if a civil rights rhetoric underlies

young persons’ opposition to a family member’s being a policeman,

this politicized view of the question is not so frequently held by

older West Indians for whom the practical possibility of one’s

children attaining jobs may be more salient.

À composite measure of general regard toward the police was com-

prised of the component items mentioned above and, as Table II

shows, there were differences by race and by age in the tendency of

respondents to score high on this measure. For West Indians, the

clearest age differences were found to be between those under age

25 and those over that age, while for whites, the tendency to express

generally positive views of the police increased more gradually with

age, fully 81 % of whites over age 45 scoring in the highest category

of general regard for the police. These findings tend to lend support

to Banton’s (1973) contention that the « generation gap » may be more

severe among non-whites than among white Britons. Nevertheless,

the eifects of race are greater than those of age, as over half of

even the youngest whites scored high on the index while in contrast

over half (54 %) of the blacks under age 25 fell into the lowest of

three categories on this variable.

Willingness to cooperate with the police

Respondents’ stated willingness to provide the police with assist-

ance in the performance of their various duties provides a beha-

vioural measure of the more abstract concept of respect for the police.

Of course, it is impossible to say from an attitude survey alone whether

(1) In contrast to the U.S., the English police have not tried as hard to

recruit minority group policemen, but there are several in London whose

fathers were police in the West Indies or who were police there themselves.

One of the black policemen is sometimes predominantly displayed directing

traffic in front of South Africa House.

— 171 —

the expressed degree of cooperativeness is reflective of actual behaviour,

and so such measures are probably more useful as indices of the general

image of the police and the extent of positive feelings toward what

the police do. These dimensions of attitudes toward the police are

interesting particularly because they may involve two countervailing

tendencies on the part of citizens in orienting to the policeman’s role

[f, on the one hand, the questions tap a ‘general appreciation for the

jobs that police may perform, one might expect whites to score

higher on measures of cooperativeness than do West Indians. If, on

the other hand, as several American studies (Cumming, Cumming

and Edell, 1965

Bercal, 1970) have shown, lower socioeconomic

status persons are more likely to call upon the police in time of need

than are the more affluent members of a society, then one might

expect that West Indians would express the willingness to call the

police as often or more often than wh1te Bntons

Table III shows responses to several questions which inquired of

respondents how likely it was that they would call the police under

certain specific circumstances. On the question of whether to call the

police if a fight broke out at the respondent’s home, over 60 % of

both racial groups said that they would contact the police. In fact,

fully 47 %, of the black respondents said that they would be very

likely to call the police under these circumstances, whereas only 32 %

of the whites were that emphatic. At the same time, however, a

greater proportion of blacks said that they would definitely not call

the police under such circumstances, although the differences between

the racial groups were not grœt in this respect. Willingness to call

the police if a fight broke out in one’s home was positively associated

with age for whites, but age did not make a significant difference

for West Indians. On the whole, these findings lend support to the

idea that some West Indians would be likely to call the police, as

would many American poor people, in time of need, while others of

their race would actively resist doing so, partly as a reflection of a

general negative attitude toward the police. For whites, on the other

hand, the fact that willingness to call the police is associated with

gc is consistent with the interpretation that this measure reflects general

attitudes toward the police, as we have shown in the previous section

that regard for the police also increases with age among whites.

One of the most interesting ﬁndmgs in Table III is the great

racial differences in responses to the question of whether respondents

would call the police in the event that they observed a store being

broken into. Here we see that while almost all (90 %) of the whites

said that they would assist the police in this manner, just over half

of the blacks were so disposed. The relationship between age and

willingness to call the police when a shop was being broken into

— 172 —

appears to be curvilinear for West Indians, with the youngest and the

oidest groups sampled being somewhat more reluctant to call the

police than were blacks between 25 and 44 years of age. This

finding may reflect a tendency on the part of the young and the older

respondents not to want to « get involved » while those in their prime

might have less to fear as far as their personal safety was concerned

When the question concerned the respondent as hypothetical victim

of a crime, the picture changed. In the instance of having had some-

thing stolen from them, West Indians were almost as likely as were

whites to say that they would contact the police, although the youngest

West Indians (under 25) were less likely to say that they would call

the police than were their elders. If the victimization involved a

person whom the respondent knew, such as a neighbour who threat-

ened, both white and West Indian respondents were considerably more

reluctant to call in the police, and this was especially true for West

Indians under age. 25

When the individual measure of willingness to call the police were

combined into a composite measure of cooperativeness, the strong racial

differences held up as Table IV shows. In addition, there is also

evidence that while willingness to cooperate with the police increases

in a linear fashion for whites, there is a sharp disjunction between

blacks under age 25 and those over that age in their willingness to call

the police in a variety of circumstances. The findings indicate that

there are differences by race and differences by age, as well as

differences attributable to the interaction of race and age, as black

youths are the least likely to express a willingness to cooperate with

the police.

Fear of the police

Research in the United States has shown that minority group

zersons are more likely than are whites to express a general fear of

the police, and that such fears are negatively relatèd to willingness to

support. the police (Block, 1971 ;

Bouma, 1970 ; Bayley and Mendel-

sohn, 1968). Therefore, we dewsed a scale of att1tude items designed

to measure the concept of fear of the police using items derived from

Bouma’s research on adolescent attitudes toward the police in the

United States.

“The data dcmonstrate that the relat10nsh1p between race and fear

of the police is very strong even ‘when age is ‘controlled. In the

youngest are group. over half of the blacks expressed a high fear of

the police while almost half of the white youths gave low fear

responses. Interestingly, the differences by race are even stronger in

the older age groups, with 67 % of whites over 35 expressing little

— 173 —

fear as compared with only 6 % of blacks of this age, and fully 55 %

of blacks over the age 45 expressing hieh fear as compared with only

3 % of the whites in the oldest age bracket

The effects of age show up more clearly for whites than for

blacks as Table VI indicates, with young white persons under age 25

being somewhat more inclined to express fear of the police than was

the case for those over that age. Nevertheless, these age differences

were far outshadowed by those of race, providing a very clear picture

of the way in which West Indian residents in London orient toward

the police in contrast to white Londoners ; this also suggests the

attitudinal foundation for potentially hostile encounters between West

Indians and the police if, as Lambert (1970), Humphrey (1972) and

others have indicated, West Indians may mask their fear of the police

by taking the offensive with them

These findings regarding levels of fear of the police may have

significant policy implications. Some police in both United States and

Great Britain hold the belief that respect for the police can be

instilled in citizens, and especially in minority group persons, through

the use of tactics which indicate that the police are worthy of being

feared. In fact, our data showed that there were very strong negative

correlations between fear of the police and other measures of general

attitudes toward the police, such as general regard for the reputation

of the police (—.51) and willingness to cooperate with the police

(—-.51). While police may feel that fear inspires respect, the evidence

is that citizens who fear the police will withdraw legitimacy from them

and will refuse to aid them even in their law enforcement functions

unless they personally are the victims of crime

In an effort to measure the amount of positive or friendly

contact with the police that white and West Indian respondents had had

with members of the London police force, we asked them to respond

to a number of specific questions, as Table V shows. The findi

reveal that West Indian respondents were significantly less likely to

report having had some positive contact with the police than were

whites, and moreover that this was especially true for West Indians

under the age of 25, only a third of whom reported any positive

contact with the police at all.

West Indians were less likely to have had a friendly talk with a

policeman, and less likely to know a policeman by name, than was the

case for withe respondents. On the other hand, blacks over the age

of 25 were about as likely as whites of those ages to say that they

had at some time gone to the police for help over something

important, a finding which is consistent with those American studies

— 174 —

which have shown that minority group persons may rely on the

police in times of emergencies (Cumming, Cumming and Edell,

1965 ; Bayley and Mendelsohn, 1968).

Table VF shows that the relative amounts of negative contact

with the police which West Indian and white respondents report that

they have had with the police are surprisingly consistent with the

observational data of Black and Reiss (1967) in the United States.

That is, whites were more likely than were West Indians to say that

they had ever been stopped and questioned by the police. In fact,

over half (58 %) of the white males interviewed said that they had

been stopped by the police, as compared with only 36 % of the West

Indian males. There was no statistically significant difference in the rate

of arrest for black and white males, although the percentages indi-

cate that blacks were more likely to say that this had happened to them

than were whites. In the case of both stops and arrests, males of

both races were significantly more likely to report such negative

experiences with the police thaq were females.

Black-white differences alsc appear in evaluations of the nature

of the police role and the quality of police performance (Table VII),

thus West Indians rated police performance much lower than whites

did with respect to the giving of help, respecting the rights of citizens,

and controlling political demonstration. In a related item 75 % of

West Indian males and 55 %, of females agreed with the statement

« tho police arc really protecting the interests of people with power »,

for whites these figures were 41 % and 40 %-

It has been contended by some students of race relations in Britain

that the problems which West Indians have encountered in British

society, and correlatively their attitudes toward British social insti-

tutions, are partly the product of the recency of their immigration

and also partly attributable to the traditions of the islands from which

they came — Jamaica being seen to be more anti-British than, say,

the Barbados which is thought to be staunchly British. Consequently,

it was informative to discover in the course of our research that

neither the island from which respondents had migrated nor the length

of time which they had been residing in Britain was of any impor-

tance in predicting attitudes toward the police.

With respect to social class effects, our data tended to bare out the

conclusion which has often been arrived at in the U.S. (e.g. Bayley

and Mendelsohn, 1968) that socio-economic factors are less significant

determinants of attitudes toward the police than are race and age.

Four different measures of socio-economic status were employed and

none of these showed a clear relationship to general attitudes toward

the police for either blacks or whites in our sample.

— 175 —

Contrary to the « optimistic » view that as West Indians become

better acquainted with British society they will come to share the native

Briton’s positive view of its most sacred institutions, we found that

the length of time respondents from the West Indies had been in

Britain had absolutely no effect upon their attitudes toward the

police, and indeed there is some indication that for those who have

been in the country longer, relations between the police and West

Indians appear to be worse than for those who have more recently

immigrated. Perhaps a decade or more of residence in the country with

no tangible evidence of improvement in one’s life situation has the

effect of embittering people and of passing that bitterness along the

children who have been raised in Britain.

RESPECT FOR POLICE

Table !

West

Indians

Whites

A) «

Considering everything about the way

British police do their job, would you say that

you had a lot of respect for the British

Police, not much respect for the British police

or mixed feeling about them ? » (% saying

« a lot of respect »)

». e8e0ess066sseenen006s

(334)

(438)*

B)

« What about this area, how wéll liked would

you say the police are by the people who live

in it ? » (% saying « very well liked » and

* * + % .. 08500858e8e660ss

22

59

« liked well enough »)

C)

« People say the British police force is the

finest in the world. Do you think this is true

or not » ? (% saying «true») ..........…

25

T7

D)

« Imagine you had a son aged 18 or 19, how

do you think you would feel about the idea

of him joining the Police ? » (% saying it

would be a « good idea »)

. à ...

53

(*) Numbers in our total sample, these vary slightlv depending on

the item

in question.

— 176 —

GENERAL REGARD FOR

THE

POLICE

Table II

—— — -—

West Indians

AGE

. …. . ........% .

16-24

25-34

35-44

45

All ages

% HIGH

+ » e « e © % € ® à

15

'Ï

38

39

|

34

Whites

AGE

16-24

25-34

!

35-44

45 +

| All ages

% HIGH

» e …. .0%6%6e6e

e

63

68

81

66

e =- 0s — srr 5 00e

WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WITH THE POLICE

Table III

West

Indians

|

Whites

A)

«If, for example, you had a party and a

fight broke out that looked as though it might

get out of hand, how likely is it that you

might call the police ? » (% « likely »)

66

B)

« And, if you saw someone breaking into a

shop, how likely is it that you would call the

police ? » (% « likely »)

« « e « . à % 6 %%% 6 % © #% 0 ® © @

57

C)

« And, if you were having trouble with a

neighbour who threatened you, how likely is

it that you would call the police ? »

(% « likely »)

e …. .......................e.e

53

53

D)

« And, if someone stole something valuable

from your house, how likely is it that you

86

96

would call the police ? » (% « likely ») ...

— 177 —

COMBINED MEASURE OF WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE

WITH POLICE

(based on items in table IIT)

Table IV

West Indians

AGE

oooooooooooooo

16-24

25-34

35-44

45 +

AlÎl ages

% HIGH ON

WILLINGNESS

TO COOPERATE

31

47

53

52

î

46

Whites

AGE

16-24

25-34

35-44

45 +

All ages

_

% HIGH ON

WILLINGNESS

TO COOPERATE

74

1

Ë

78

rrs _

87

Î

71

CONTACT WITH POLICE

Table V

_

p SE SE

West

‘ Whites

—- —— —— —

Indians_ |

A)

« Have you ever had a friendly talk

with a policeman who works in your

e . . + ». » ..

26

35

neighborhood ?» (%

yes)

B)

« Do you know any policeman by

< … « © » 000460008980

name ? » (% vyes)

21

C)

« Have you ever gone to the police

for help over something important ? »

(% yes)

33

39

D)

« What about yourself, have you ever

been treated unfairly by the police or

Males

30

20

the law in general ? » (% yes)

...

Females

13

10

E)

« In fact, have you ever been stopped

by the police and asked what you were

Males

36

58

doing ? » (% vyes)

Females

13

F)

« In fact, have you ever been arrested !

Males

;

17

12

. ». e — e e % 6 — e © — — —

—— _— ——e—sreatee

yourself ? » (% yes)_

_Females

— 178 —

FEAR OF THE POLICE

Table VI

—— —

—

—

West Indians

AGE

oooooooooooooo

16-24

25-34

35-44

Û

45 —-

AlI ages

% HIGH

« « « . . ...

57

53

54

55

55

%

LOW

« …. © 0000600s

â

9

6

l

î

Whites

AGE

. . .. ..........

16-24

25-34

35-44

}

45

AlÎl ages

% HIGH .… |

15

7

6

!

%

LOW

. e » t — e — © = —

45

48

64

70

55

— ——

p E

—— — —

EVALUATIONS OF POLICE PERFORMANCE

Table VII

—-—

W est

—0 22200 ce —

Whites

| Indians

—

!

A)

% saying police are doing a « very ‘

Males

!

42

62

Females

51

64

good » or « good » job in giving help.

B)

% saying police are doing a « very

Males

22

63

good » or « good » job in respecting

the law and the rights of citizens

Females

34

64

C)

% saying police are doing a « very

good » or « good » job in controlling

Males

47

69

political demonstrations

Females

57

75

D)

% agreeing « the police are really

protecting the interests of people with

Females

TS

41

power »

. .. .0.....................

Males

—

——c

>3

— 179 —

Some qualitative data

Let us move from the statistical data to some specific examples

that illuminate increased police-minority conflict. An important part

of the greater West Indian dissatisfaction with police would appear

to lie in culture conflict and the breakdown of communication. Such

explanations are often put forth to account for American police-

community issues. Thus police may drive young men off street

corners when hanging out is part of their life style or they may

arrest people whose recreational interests involve gambling, homo-

sexuality and drugs. In the United States context such an argument

is often exaggerated because almost all groups share important elements

of a common culture.

Such an argument may also mask more basic causes of group

struggle involving racism and class. But in the English case they clearly

apply, given the newness of the immigration to England and the

extensive differences between the immigrant and host cultures.

À number of examples of this culture conflict can be seen.

Pakistani Moslem immigrants have special rules about how the

animals they eat should be slaughtered. Thus, Moslem chicken sales-

man may go to immigrant areas with live chickens and kill them on

the spot. This may upset English neighbors who summon a policeman,

though there’s probably no law against killing chickens on the streets

of London. Similar problems may emerge with the sacrifice of a goat.

In another case a bearded and turbanned Seik came into a police

station in a rural area late at night and said in excited and accented

English « they’re fourteen men with sticks who are chasing me and

want to kill me ». The old sargeant looked up at him in disbelief

and said « sure there are fourteen men with sticks that want to kill

you ». Fortunately another person was in the station who had some

understanding of Seik customs and the local situation. The frightened

man had taken an unmarried female alone in a car to a wedding,

and this had embarrassed and humiliated her relatives. They then

set out after the man. The police then intervened and protected him.

The social structure of some Pakistani villages has been repro-

duced in England. Along with this may come traditional social control

mechanisms, such as village councils sanctioning people. In one case

the police intervened on behalf of a man who had received a sentence

of 50 lashes from his village council in England. We were even told

in wWhispered terms oï one English policeman born in India, who could

speak Hindi, being given the power to be a tribal judge.

In West Indian culture, an emphasis on drama and a belief in

conspiracy may make initial police efforts to get information more

— 180 —

difficult. Varying cultural definitions of the tactile may also be relevant.

Touching people has a different meaning than it does in England.

A West Indian may interpret a policeman grabbing his arm as a

hostile act. For a native born English person this is less likely to be

true. West Indian youth often carry nine inch wooden afro combs.

This sometimes results in their being convicted for possessing « offen-

sive weapons ».

West Indians appear to place a greater emphasis on street life.

West Indian youth often congregate outside their homes. Police are

not accustomed to such a life-style and often try to move them indoors

and off the streets. À tradition of open parties where all can join in,

even people walking down the street who hear the music, can generate

conflict with police. Liquor may be sold by the cup, violating licensing

rules. Police receive many complaints of noise even though no laws

are being broken.

Some immigrants interviewed felt that to police, they all looked

alike. Problems with mistaken identity appear more likely when

immigrants are involved. À person may be accused of something he

didn’t do by the inability of the accusers to differentiate facial types.

There are also problems in locating or tracking down immigrants

wanted for crimes, for help as witnesses, or simply to give infor-

mation. À Pakistani involved in an incident with police will give his

name as Singh and his address. When police show up at his house

twenty people all named Singh will appear.

In lower income white areas it is sometimes said that a man

either becomes a cop or a thief. In such areas police and those they

deal with know each other. Stable accomodative relationships may

form. But for immigrants such relationships have not had time to form.

Lack of knowledge of the English system may result in immigrants

unknowingly breaking English law, or interpreting legal and depart-

mental sanctioned police action (or non-action) as examples of

discrimination.

There are cases of West Indian parents beating a child as they

would if they were still in the West Indies. In the West Indies, they

are perhaps less likely to be sanctioned but in England such behavior

can result in jail for the father and the child being taken away.

Its not uncommon for Indians and Pakistanis to arrange marriages

for their daughters. The daughters who have grown up in England,

gone through the English school system and heard the Beatles and

the Rolling Stones sometimes resist arranged marriages and run away

from home. The family reports their missing daughter to the police,

— 181 —

who will locate the girl and tell the family that she is well, but they

will not reveal her address. This infuriates the parents who believe

the police are discriminating against them.

An immigrant stopped by police on suspicion, may not know

that police can legally do this. À stop and search by a policeman 1s

more likely to be seen as an example of prejudice by a West Indian.

It may be felt that police do not similarly stop whites. As one West

Indian said, « Hell, every black in a white society is a suspicious

person ». Police reciprocate and see West Indians as being on the

defensive and as more likely to attack them than whites. Many police

interviewed felt that black complaints often involved routine police

behavior which the complainant mistakenly saw in racial terms.

We presented to our respondents a hypothetical situation of a

young man being stopped and questioned in the area where a number

of robberies had rccently occurred and asked them to sav whether the

policeman was allowed to do this by law. While over three-quarters

of the whites actually knew that the police had the legal power to

make such an investigation, only about half of the West Indians were

aware that this was within the prerogatives of the police and over a

third actually said that such a policeman would have been « going

beyond the law ». These findings suggest that one reason why West

Indians may feel that they are treated roughly or unfairly by the police,

whereas whites are less likely to claim that this is the case, is that

West Indians are not fully apprised of what the police have a legal

right to do Vvis-a-vis any citizen in London.

In the West Indies, police seem to play a more diverse role. They

will punish as well as adjudicate. À policeman called to a house where

the husband is drunk may hit him a few times and then take him to

lail to cool off. À policeman may punish an unruly child. The police-

man may help to adjudicate a landlord-tenant dispute. In England

police actions are more formal and restricted. In landlord-tenant

disputes, for example, police often claim that there is nothing they can

do. They may refer the complainant to a rent board, however, the

immigrant may see the policeman’s failure to take action as discrimi-

natory.

When called upon to settle a dispute between two or more parties,

the police sometimes find that the expectations of citizens for their

intervention actually exceed formal legal powers which the police are

authorized to use. In part, such a situation may arise because citizens

are not adequately aware of what the legal limitations on the police

are, and in part the difference between expectations and reality may

reflect dissatisfaction on the part of citizens about the extent to which

they perceive the police as being willing to help them resolve their

— 182 —

difficulties. Consequently, we asked our respondents about a situation

in which a policeman says there is nothing that he can do in regard

to settling a disagreement between a landlord and a tenant and found

that white respondents were overwhelmingly aware that the police

were not legally authorized to intervene in such matters while almost

a quarter of the West Indian respondents felt that the policeman in

the situation described simply did not want to get involved. In a

similar vein, we asked the respondents whether they felt that the

police ought to be concerned with matters involving landlord discri-

mination and found that while whites were sympathetic to such an idea

(75 % felt that the police should be concerned), West Indians were

somewhat more likely to feel that such matters should be part of the

police mandate, well over half saying that the police should be very

concerned with landlord discrimination.

The tendency for West Indians to feel that the police ought to be

very concerned with protecting the interests of individual citizens

showed up even more clearly in regard to a question concerning

whether the police should become involved in controlling the practice

of overcharging on the part of shopkeepers. While just 60 % of the

whites interviewed felt that such matters should be the concern of the

police and about a quarter said that this should be none of the police’s

business, fully 90 © of the West Indians said that this was a legitimate

concern of the police. These findings may suggest that either the West

Indians really are more likely to be victimized by unscrupulous busi-

nessmen that are whites or that West Indians are more sensitized

to this form of exploitation : in either case it seems clear that the

West Indians sampled are overwhelmingly convinced that this 1s an

area of life which the police ought to be regulating, even though it

is not now part of their legal mandate to exercise control.

While we did not collect systematic survey data on police

attitudes toward immigrants, we did carry out numerous interviews.

Relative to the U.S. there was much less realization of police-minority

problems. One police commissioner said that 98 % of the immigrants

were satisfied with the police. Another told us that there have been

« no really serious immigration problems since Knotinghill ». For

him a problem was seen as a riot and not police mistreatment or lack

of service. We found a greater stress on a perceived need to « make

immigrants become like us » than is the case in the United States.

Pluralism seemed less appreciated, even at the level of lip service.

This may be related to the fact that West Indians, unlike American

blacks, are seen as non-citizen alien immigrants. There was considerable

racial stereotyping among police. Just as American police offered

George Wallace disproportionate support, so too do English police

appear to offer disproportionate support to Enoch Powell.

— 183 —

West Indians, and especially Pakistanis, may expect police to be

corrupt, based on experiences in their homelands. Pakistanis who may

be accustomed to bribing police, may see an English policeman’s

failure to accept a bribe as a type of prejudice against them and be

resentful (2).

The opposite, the failure to involve police or cooperate with them,

may also be a source of conflict. As immigrants with a tenuous status

in the country, minority group members are often hesitant to get

involved with police in any fashion, even when they themselves are

victimized or have done nothing wrong. Police report that whites

are much more cooperative, even during the investigation of crimes

where immigrants are victimized.

Police drew distinctions between the Irish and West Indians.

While the Irish were seen as rowdy, at least they were thought not

to carry knives. The use of a knife in a fight was seen as an unmanly

act. Irishmen were seen to fight ferociously with police in bar room

brawls, but to be repentent the next day in court, apologetically

telling the Judge, « the drink made me do it your honor ». Defiance

rather than repentence was seen to be more characteristic of West

Indian responses.

Some Implications

Over the course of the hundred and fifty years since modern

metropolitan policing was begun in England and America, we have

observed three phases of similarities and differences between policing

in the two societies. At the beginning, large cities in the two nations

faced similar problems and adopted similar solutions in the form of

a bureaucracy of constables trained to serve and protect citizens.

For more than a century, however, policing in England and America

diverged from one another in important respects including the structure

of the police organization, the powers of the police and their accoun-

tability to civil powers and citizens, the degree of centralization of

their operations and their isolation from the public ; and these struc-

tural differences gave rise to a very different image of the police in

the minds of the citizens of the two nations — the one, the benevolent

and wise role-model, and the other, the crude and ruthless wielder

of truncheons. Policemen, too, have shared these conceptions of the

essential difference between British and American policing. When

(2) Several people related the story of a rich Pakistani landlord who was

involved in a dispute with a poor tenant on his land. While the landlord was

traveling abroad, the tenant took the matter to court and a judgement was

rendered. The landlord’s lawyer wired his client about the case « Justice

previals ». The landlord wired back « Appeal at once ».

— 184 —

asked what might happen if the police forces of London and New York

were exchanged, the Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police

said, «The New York streets would be filled with dead bobbies and

the London jails would be filled with New York cops ». However,

the second half of the twentieth century has brought about a renewed

convergence of the patterns and problems of policing between England

and the United States, a convergence which appears to be based most

fundamentally in the structural characteristics of the societies being

policed.

Policing in England and the United States had similar sources

in the perceived demand for order by the propertied classes of the

nineteenth century who feared social changes brought about by rapid

urbanization and industrialization and who associated their fears with

the burgeoning urban masses which were thought of as the « dangerous

classes ». However, whereas the solution adopted in Metropolitan Lon-

don of creating a highly disciplined organization of « professional »

constables rather quickly established a modicum of order and achieved

acceptance by many citizens, in the U.S. there was not, as Allan Silver

(1967:5) put it, «a comparable sense of relief or improvement ».

Throughout the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth cen-

tury, policing developed along diflerent lines in the United States and

Great Britain. Whereas in the United States there was a centrifugal

tendency for local, county and state jurisdictions each to set up their

separate forces with little coordination amongst them, in England

and Wales there was a spread out from the centre, London, of a

standardized method of policing and a growth of the monitoring

capacities of the central government. The result of this latter pattern

was that the legal powers of the English police have continued to

expand with little opposition from most citizens and little generalized

sense that civil liberties have been endangered. In contrast, American

police have found themselves in a position of having their legal

powers systematically curtailed through the efforts of the Supreme

Court in response to protest from segments of the population who

fear the unbridled power of the police. The difficulty of developing a

way of policing a society composed of disparate ethnic and racial

groups in which interests are forcefully articulated has been seen

as a major social problem in the United States for well over a century.

David C. Perry (1975:47) takes the American case to exemplify the

dilemmas of modern policing itself :

« The history of the police function in the United States has

been the history of a nation’s confusion over how to police

itself…. The questions a metropolitan nation has yet to answer

are : What is it we want the police to do ? How is it that we

want our lives protected yet undisturbed in the name of such

protection ? ».

— 185 —

Dismayed and sometimes appalled at the quality of policc

performance in many areas of the United States, and disheartened by

the apparently low level of regard for police expressed by many

citizens, American students of policing have frequently turned to

England for the example of how « good » police-community relations

could be established. They have looked with reverence at the capacity

of the British policeman to command respect from citizens even though

he has no more coercive capability than do ordinary persons. Often

they have interpreted the apparently great deference shown by British

citizens to their police to the long-standing cultural traditions of respect

for authority and civility which contrast with the frontier individualism

and rebelliousness of Americans.

Perhaps it required a British sociologist to identify for Americans

the part that structural factors play in the extent to which legitimacy 1s

accorded

to the police by citizens. In 1964 Michael Banton drew

attention to the relative homogeneity of the population of Britain

as compared with the United States and predicted that as Britain

became more racially heterogeneous, consensus about the police would

decline and patterns of policing would necessarily change.

Whereas the United States has experienced an almost constant

flux in the composition and movement of its population over the course

of its history, England had remained almost exclusively a « white and

tight little island » until after World War IL. Not until the nineteen-

fifties was there any appreciable in-migration of persons from the

former colonies of the Third World. Thus, the chronicle of non-

white immigration to Britain is the story of how in thirty years time

a nation has been awakened to the fact it is no longer homo-

geneous, that long-shared and often unspoken understandings might no

longer be taken for granted, and that conflict over the rights of

citizens and the obligations of authority would manifest themselves

in connection with the role of the police.

Policing in the United States since the Second World War has

been analyzed as involving a growing attention to the law enforcement

aspects of the social control function. Maureen Cain (1973) has

suggested that such changes are already becoming apparent in British

policing as well and has predicted that a new consensus surrounding

law enforcement issues would emerge as conflicts about other aspects

of the police role — such as peace-keeping and service — became

manifest. At the same time, however, it is argued in both the United

States and Britain that as police have relegated the tasks of order-

maintenance and service to secondary positions in their priorities, they

have tacitly acknowledged their allegiance to dominant segments of

the society and have distanced themselves from accountability to most

citizens through adoption of the stance of professional crime-fighters.

— 186 —

But the structural bases of conflicts which surface in demands

for order and service do not evaporate because police disattend to

them. Indeed, research in the United States in the past decade has

highlighted the fact that the most vocal protests about the quality of

police service and the conduct of police functions emanate from those

segments of the society which perceive themselves as being alter-

natively harassed and neglected by police, whom they view as ignoring

theitr demands in favour of the interests of people with power.

It appears that the same patterns of protest about the police are

currently emerging in England ; namely, that minority group persons

as well as young whites are less than satisfied with the quality of

policing which they receive, and moreover that their discontents are

centred upon the order-maintenance and service aspects of the police

function. Granted, there is a fairly high degree of consensus that the

police ought to be concerned about crime control, but those persons

who are unsatisfied with the way the police serve their needs and

answer their demands for order are likely to feel alienated from even

the objective of crime control when it involves their participation in the

process of preventing and apprehending offenders. If there is a « new

consensus » about policing in Britain, or in the United States, it is

a narrow one which leaves many persons feeling deprived of the respect

and protection which, as citizens, they feel they are entitled to. There-

fore, as police in both England and America emphasize their role

as professionals in crime-fighting, they incure, on the one hand, a

qualified appreciation for their specialized expertise and, on the other

hand, a loss of the respect which had been associated with the more

diffuse aspects of their function. As citizens become sensitized to the

limited accountability of police to the public, the demand for cur-

tailment of police power grows and the conflicts between the policers

and the policed become salient issues for debate.

REFERENCES :

BANTON (M.) : The Policeman in the Community, Basic Books, New York.

1964. Police Community Relations, Collins, London, 1973.

BAYLEY (D.H.) and MENDELSOHN (H)

Minorities and the Police

Confrontation in America, Free Press, New York, 1968.

BERCAL (T.F.

« Calls for Police Assistance Consumer Demands for

Governmental Service », in Harlan Hahn (ed.) Police in Urban Society,

Sage Publications, Beverlv Hills, California, pp. 267-278.

BLOCK (R.L.) : « Fear of Crime and Fear of the Police », Social Problems,

Summer 1971, pp. 91-101.

— 187 —

BOURMA (D)) :

« Youth Attitudes Toward the Police and Law Enforcement »,

in J. Curran et al. (eds), Polzce and Law Enforcement A.M.S. Press, New

“(>Th

197/2.

Pp.

219-238.

COIN (ME) :

Society and the Pohceman S Role Routledge and Kegan Paul,

London, 1973.

CUNNING (E) et al.

« Policeman as Philosopher, Guide and Friend »,

Soc1al Problems, n° 12, Winter 1965, pp. 276-286.

HUMPHREY Police Power and Black People, Panther Books, London, 1972.

LAMBERT (J)

Crime, Police, Race Relations

Oxford University Press,

London

PERRY (D.C.)

Police in the Metropolis, C. Merrill, Colombus, Ohio, 1975

LiSS (A

îx)

« Public Perceptions and Recollections About Crime, Law

Enforcement and Criminal Justice », Vol. 1, Field Surveys III, Studies in

Crime and Lan

Presidents

Enforcement in Maior M

opolitan Areas

Conynission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Washington

D.C

1967

SILVER (A.) ; « The Demand for Order in Civil Society », in D. Bordua (ed.)

The Police, John Wiley and Sons, New York, pp. 1-24

-- 188 —

V -Methodology

DECISION THEORY AND COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY

LESLIF T. WILKINS

School of Criminal Justice

State University of New York

Albany, New York - U.S.A.

A Decision Network Model for Criminal Justice.

There are many ways in which the criminal justice system may

be seen. We may focus upon the information which is passed along

various channels and attempt to relate the record to ideas about actual

behaviour. On the other hand we may take the view that whatever

decisions are made, they are made on the basis of available information,

irrespective oË its quality. And there arc processes which lie some-

where between these two approaches. Information which is believed

to be more reliable may be more frequently selected as a basis for

decisions, or items regarded as unreliable may be compared and

combined with others and inferences made accordingly. For the

accused who is caught up in the machinery of the system the whole

system may be seen as a network of decisions made by persons in

authority, treating him rather like a truck in the railroad marshalling

yard. He may have some vague idea of what causes the « points »

to be switched, but the location of any « point », whether correctly

or incorrectly set, will determine his location at any time in this

network.

The idea of a system as a network of decisions is not new. In

the criminal justice field the majority of « switchings » release the

person, initially caught up in its network, from further consideration.

The greatest number of persons go the shortest distance in the pro-

cessing. The initial input to the system is, of course, the « suspect

set ». From this set a selection is made of persons who may be inves-

tigated, and from that smaller set, those who may be charged with

a crime. And so on.

Comparative criminology may be concerned to describe and

compare the networks of decisions, or « switching systems » as they

are organized in various parts of the world or at different times in

the same location. The depth of any such analyses may vary quite

validly from concern only with the officially determined machinery

— 191 —

of justice to concern with the ways in which the official forms are

modified in practice. Another approach, and one which it is intended

to develop in this article, concerns the nature of the « switching

apparatus » itself, whether this official or unofficial. In other words.

we are interested in how it comes about that a particular « switch »

sà

1S

moved in

c

particular manner. We will then begin to suggest

ways in which this approach may be developed into a comparative

form, giving some interim results.

Information as « key ».

The analogy of a « switch » applies to one of the main ways in

which we use the word «decision». In order to generalise the

model we will examine the idea of a « decision » a little more closely.

This should also provide some basis for the further analyses we

shall make.

Although we often talk about decisions as though there was

such a thing as a « decision process » it is clear that more often than

not we use the word to indicate the ferrnination of some process,

rather than the process itself. This fact is captured in the analogies

and metaphores used in relation to the idea of decision-making. We

talk, for example, of « having arrived at a decision » — clearly an

allusion to a journey completed. We talk of decisions with allusions

to « weighing » as in a balance. The etymological base for the word

is related to the latin decidere, «to cut off » and also to our word

deciduous « to fall off ». Sometimes we might say that we « concluded

that… » as an alternative to saying that we had decided. If the « deci-

sion » is an end, of what is it the end ? It is not very satisfactory to

regard it as an end to itself. That is to say a « decision » is not well

defined as that which terminates the « decision process». It is, of

course, the information search process which is terminated by the

decision. If a person says that he has « decided » but continues to

search for more information related to the issue, we would assume

that he was using the word « decision » incorrectly. He might have

made an « interim decision ». a term which is almost a contradiction

in itself.

If the argument of the preceeding paragraph is accepted, we can

now' identify a process of information search which takes place

prior to the action of a « switch » (decision). It is possible to postulate

that there will normally be « strategies » of information search, and

that different decision-makers may prefer diflerent strategies. Ît is

only a small step, then to argue that preferences for strategies of

information search will be related to the utilities sought by the

decision-makers concerned. We may be able to infer the utilities from

a study of the information scarch, or conversely, we may make

— 192 —

projections as to the kind of information search strategy likely to

be adopted, if we assume that we know the utilities sought. Certainly,

if we postulate that different utilities are sought at different times or

places, then we would expect the preferences for strategies of infor-

mation search also to vary.

Preferences for strategies of information search routines will be

observed in relation to the sequence employed by decision-makers in

examining data items. There may be other ways in which information-

search strategies might be classified, but the sequence characteristics

would seem to be a simple one to employ. Unfortunately it is by

no means simple to identify and to classify search strategies, nor

is it a simple matter merely to identify the sequence of search.

The File Problem.

Case files which are the repositories of much information about

persons dealt with (decided about) in the criminal justice system

present considerable difficulties for anybody who wishes to study deci-

sion-makers and information use. The persons of the decision-makers

themselves also present difficulties. Most social studies assume that

persons engaged in an operation are reasonably self-aware — that

they can report upon their activities with some validity. In the decision-

making task this assumption is unsupported by any evidence. Perhaps

because the decision-maker is thinking about the task in hand, he

cannot at the same time think about the process which is itself of the

same qualitv. In other words, it is difficult to think about some-

thing, and at the same time to think - about - the - thinking

about that thing. For whatever reason, decision-makers are poor

witnesses as to the nature of their operations. This fact is important

in several ways ; two of which concern us at this point in the

analysis. The first problem was noted several years ago — probably

first by Haÿes (1) who observed :

« It is commonly assumed that the more relevant data one takes

into account in making a decision, the better that decision will

be. It is clear. however. that as one takes more relevant character-

istics into account for comparing alternatives, the opportunities

for confusion increase. If confusion were to increase rapidly

enough as the number of characteristics increased it is conceivable

that decision-makers would perform better if some of the relevant

data were eliminated ».

Note that Hayes refered to «relevant data» — not merely to

more data. How fast does confusion increase as more relevant

characteristics are taken into consideration ? The correct answer is

— 193 —

usually rejected by decision-makers as being totally unreasonable.

It seems unreasonable because decision-makers are unaware of the ways

in which they « work around » the problem of information overload,

failing to recognise the devices they employ.

Extensive testing by Hayes and others « has suggested that the

maximum number of data items along different dimensions which can

be processed profitably at the same time, without any formal decom-

position and restructuring of the decision process (sic), is about

eight » (2). Note the phrase, « decomposition and restructuring » ;

it is by this means that a greater number of data items can be

accommodated. But again, decision-makers are not self-aware of the

restructuring processes they employ any more than they are aware

of any information search strategy for which they seem to reveal à

preference.

The file — the usual means for the presentation of information

to the decision-maker — is not organized to accommodate any

individual strategy, perhaps because files are usually designed by

committees, and committees will represent as many strategies as

members. Even if a group of decision-makers were aware of the

limitation of eight items of data and wished to design a short form,

the number of items listed as essential by a committee of ten would

be expected to exceed fourty, in order to ensure that every member

had access to his specific eight items. For any decision-maker working

with data from a file, the file contains an excess of information on

some topics or areas in which he is interested, and a paucity of data

on others, unless the file is extremely large. The decision-maker is

then faced with the problem of extracting his particular « gold » from

a very large qualtity of dross. Furthermore, in the course of this search

for the specific items suited to his personal strategy, he will suren-

dipidously hit upon other items of data which may register in his

mind although not sought in relation to the issue of his decision.

It is possible to characterise the case file or other record of infor-

mation regarding offenders as an « information rich » source (*). A

decision-makers seem to carry out two tasks in one operation and to

be unaware of the transition from one to the other. First, when the

task of deciding begins (such as consideration of parole), information

will be sought which is seen to be directly related to the issue. However,

quite quickly and imperceptibly, the task is re-structured to one of

searching for information which would fest the quality of information

that was among the items sought earlier in the process. The first task

rich» field and is of significance in adaptations of all forms of econometric

(*°) This is also true in the more technical use of the term « information-

analysis to crime and criminal justice data.

relates directly to the issue of concern (such as, say, parole), whereas

the second is concerned with the possibility that evidence which had

earlier tended to « swing » the decision towards one or other outcome,

might be unreliable. The first question addressed may, for simplicity

be stated as, « Can or should I parole this person ?», while the

second question becomes, « Can I rely upon the impression I formed

from xyz item(s) of data I saw m…ally ? ». These are, of course, two

quite distinct decisions and require quite different kinds of mformaüon

and different search strategies.

When the task is a selection of an alternative, the items of

information sought (in order to be of maximum power) should be

strongly correlated with the discrimination (criterion), but should

not be strongly correlated wih each other. To test an item for

reliability, it is appropriate to seek an item which would be expected

to be correlated with it. For example, if we suspect the data item

«number of arrest», we might examine the data item, « number of

convictions ». However, if we trusi the data item. « number of arrests »

we Will gain no significant increment in information by looking also

at the number of convictions

From examinations of decision-makers operations under expe-

rimental simulated conditions (3) it has been observed that after about

six or eight items, decision-makers are more likely to seek items of

data correlated with those they have seen earlier. This is a most

reasonable strategy if we assume that the nature of the task performed

has changed from being concerned about the initial problem to one

of a search for verification of data. To put it another way, the

problem addressed changes (imperceptably to the decision-maker, it

seems) from a search for information relevant to the decision (the

selection of alternatives) to a search for information-about-information

In general we may state that information which assists in one decision

may be contra-indicated for another decision, no matter how closely

similar superficially they appear to be

Decomposition and Restructuring of Decision Sets.

The switch from one decision to one which appears to be

related is one way in which decision-makers re-structure the decision

task, probably unconsciously in most cases. Some re-structuring may

be valuable in terms of efficiency of decision-making, while other

forms may not be desirable in these terms. Some strategies may give

the decision-maker some psychological satisfaction (a sort of warm

feeling) which may be unrelated to performance, or positively or

195

negatively associated with efficiency. Some re-structuring may be sub-

divisions of the task. Consider, for example, the disposition of a

person found guilty by the court. The task is the selection of the

appropriate sentence from the set of legally available dispositions.

Thus

Found guilty — (select)

e e »* 0000

TFhe task

ma

be re-structured

or sub-divided to form the

foilowing model :

Found

— incarcerate

—

)

\

(select) How long

(select)

— not

Guilty

\

incarcerate

—

(select) What type ?

Thus instead of the one task (marked «select») in the first

approach, we have three tasks (marked « select ») which add up to the

same outcome as the first. It is now possible for the decision-maker

to consider more items of information in the total task, such as by

using cight (different ?) items for each task (« select »).

Ii will be necessary to return to the idea of decomposition and

re-struciuring of decision tasks later in this article when we shall

consider a form of operation which is at the same time more complex

and of more practical utility. The utility relates to organizational pro-

cedures as well as to analysis and theory in comparative criminology.

The Quality of Decisions.

AIl decisions in criminal justice are made in the presence of

an audience. The audience may be present only in the mind of the

decision-maker, but there is no doubt that there arz considerations

of « an audience reaction » in all judicial decisions. In less picturesque

terms, there is some measure of accountability demanded of all

decision-makers in the criminal justice field — for some sreater and

for some less — none can act alone and unobserved. The author

oñce asked a very distinguished judge whether he had, in his opinion,

ever made an incorrect judgement. It was agreed that this was a

possibility and opened the way for the next question as to how he

would know an incorrect decision. « If ninety percent of the persons

in the public gallery thought it was a wrong decision, it probably

was » the judge said. Another judge stated that he had never made

— Îs6 —

an incorrect decision — at least, not at the time he made it —

later it might have been shown to be incorrect. In one case it Was

the contemporary judgement of à democracy wich provided the

test while in the other it was a test provided by future events or

posterity. In any event it is always interesting to hear from decision-

makers their views on their assessment of their decisions. It is not

easy to say what qualities characterise an incorrect decision, but it is

doubtless easier than stating all the necessary qualities of a correct one.

Most decision-makers are concerned to make correct decisions,

but they seldom or never obtain feed-back which distinguishes deci-

sions which are « acceptable » from those which are of exceptionally

fine quality. Decisions of parole boards, police, prosecutors and most

officials in the criminal justice area tend to go unnoticed by the public

while everything is going well. The determination of « well» is not

always an unbiassed assessment. Nonetheless it may be that the failures

of a process of administration are more informative as to its nature

than are its successes.

In some way or another the majority of officials and adminis-

trators in criminal justice (and perhaps also most other governmental

agencies) are concerned with the possibility of making a decision

which, for some reason, is regarded as « wrong». Accusations of

error may bc as much a problem to be avoided as actions believed

to be genuine errors. JL is important to note that accusations of

error made by others and self-recognized errors can be exacly

similar or quite different kinds of error.

Parole decisions serve as an example for decisions made at many

other points in theo criminal justice system and have been the more

widelv stutlizd than many others. Farole boards receive feed-back

regarding their decisions wholly or mainly when these decisions are

seen to be wrong. But the direction oË incorrectness is biassed —

there is seidom much clamour that a board is detaining an inmate too

long. There is little comment upon the decision of parole board except

in terms of dramatic incidents (e.g. a paroled murderer commits

another crime, or a notorious case is released). There is also a tendency

for the critics to generalize from single incidents and to use these to

attack the board’s policy. (Clearly, by definition, a rare event or

dramatic incident 1s, by that very token, no usefu:! suide to policy.)

The possibility of public criticism, inappropriately founded as

it may be, is always in the minds of board members, even although

suppressed. « If this case fouls up, what can I say 2» is one form that the

reasoning may take. Another form, following upon an unusual incident,

« How can we stop another one like that ? ». The words « like that »

— 197 —

refer to the ways in which the board was embarrassed by the presen-

tation of information regarding the case — correctly or incorrectly

coloured !

Clearly if parole is granted at all, there is always a chance of

cases arising which present facts similar to those which gave rise to

che embarrassment in the previous case. The majority of decisions

in criminal justice have this kind of quality. À suspect may be

permitted to go, and much later it is discovered that he was involved

in the crime. The prosecution decides « not to paper » (proceed with)

à case, only later to discover that had the investigation been pressed

further serious offences could have been avoided. In view of the fact

that information which may be used to discomfort the parole board,

police chief or prosecutor is selected from one sector with a far greater

probability than another, it is not unreasonnable for decision-makers

to concentrate their defences in this area. Namely, they are concerned

with the ways in which the facts may be represented against them.

Anything which may be in their favour will require little or no

attention. Thus it is good policy (as vulgarly, but preciselv put) « to

cover your arse ». That is the nature of the system ; not the personal

prejudices of the decision-makers within it.

Decision-makers in different countries or in different regions

within a country may expect different forms of attack. Which strategy

of attack is chosen will depend upon assessments of the likelihood of

!ts effeztiveness. The effectiveness of a strategy of attack will, in turn,

depend upon the environment (political climate) in which it is used.

For example, the New York Times may use one form while the San

Francisco Chronicle may use another style. The style will also vary

with the interests of any social action group involved. Criminal justice

decision-makers, as we have noted, are sensitive to their environment.

This is, perhaps, as it should be in a democracy. The survival of

parole as a system depends upon its remaining acceptable to legis-

latures and to the public. The press, together with other mass media,

have an influence on both.

Information Search and Decision Defences.

It will be remembered that it was postulated that « preferences

for strategies of information search» may be expected to be related

to « the utilities sought by the decision-maker ». If the purpose changes,

then the nature of the information search is expected to change.

It is not suggested that criminal justice decision-makers select

their method of information search solely because they are preparing

for different forms of possible attack. Decision-makers in general and

criminal justice is no exception, reflect in themselves something of the

— 198 —

qualities of the area in which they operate. States differ from each

other. People who live in one environment are not the same as those

living in another environment. Whether born in a particular state or

not, people settled in an area are breathing that air, living in that

information setting, reacting to that particular political climate. It may

be that criminal justice decision-makers should reflect the essential

elements of the political scenes in which they function. Perhaps even

the same crime is not the same when it takes place in different

environments ? As a judge once stated, « Cutting a wire fence in

Vermont is different from cutting a wire fence in Colorado ».

But it may be represented, people are the same — at least we

are all expected to be equal under the law. How then can we say

that there can be acceptable (ethically justified) local variations in the

dispensation of justice ? It is possible to accept the postulate that all

persons are « equal », but that the environment in which they function

is not, and that justified differences may arise from that fact. It is

possible to modify that statement a little and to formulate another

possible principle, namely, there should be a consistent policy, but

injustice may be done if all persons are pressed into the same policy

mould. Is it possibe to reconcile the idea of a «consistent policy »

with the requirements of justice in the decisions made about offenders ?

Can the unique person of the offender be matched with a unique

decision and yet that decision still fit a policy ? If we take the view

that a basic element in justice is « equity», then this must be so.

If like situations call for like decisions, this statement is itself a

declaration of a policy.

Policy and Case Elements in Criminal Justice Decisions.

We have already discussed the principle of decomposition of

a decision into sub-decisions. It is now claimed that a class of decisions

found in criminal justice and certain other fields can be sub-divided

by a standard procedure into a « policy» element and a «case»

element. It is further claimed that it is possible to discover policy

where it is present and to distinguish it from other factors. There are

several benefits which accrue from this approach, both in terms of

scientific inquiry and in practical operations of the system.

It has commonly been found that decisions which individual

decision-makers tend to claim are unique and unrelated to other

decisions in fact show a definite but complex pattern. There is a

tendency for decision-makers to do the « appropriate » thing, even

where there are no rules laid down as to what is appropriate. This

situation characterizes decisions where a group of persons (such as a

parole board, members of the same district court bench, prosecutors

— 199 —

in the same office) make individual decisions and yet do so in an

awareness of decisions made by their colleagues. Such decisions tend

to be predictable to a greater or lesser degree. The element which is

predictable is clearly not the unique case element due to the personal

prejudices of the individual decision-maker. Whether recognized as

such, or not, the predictable element must be implicit or explicit

« poﬁcy ».

Ît is, then, possible to consider a decision in these situations as

being composed of two or morce elements, one of which is the predic-

table or policy element. As observed, the decisions have some similari-

ties, but cach decision in nonetheless, unique. Decisions in this class can

be considercd to be the summation of three elements, namely (a) the

« policy » element, (b) the element due to the characteristics of the

individual case which is subject to the decision, and (c) an element

due to the idiosyncrasies of the particular decision-maker. The

« policy » element (a) is the part of the decision which is predictable.

It must be noted that this predictability is derived from the collective

of decision-makers in the group (e.g. board, court, office). No reference

is made to individual characteristics of the several decision-makers.

This is because only the « policy » element is required to be specified.

The objective of the analysis at this stage is not to explain

the total complex of the decision outcome, but only the common

elements or, to use a word we used earlier, the « similarities ». If it

can be claimed that the prediction equation (or perhaps sequential

network. or other model). fairlv represents the policy of the « collect-

ive» of decision-makers in the specific unit (Le. board. court, office)

then the task of decision-makers within this group can be re-struc-

tured. Instead of approaching the information search task with the

underlying question, « What should be done with this offender ? »

the task is first to ascertain how the case would be dealt with if

policy were to be followed « blindiy ». Since such decisions are the

« predictable » element, this is a straightforward task. It requires the

meticulous collection of the necessary information and the calculations

to solve the equation. Once this has been done, the decision task is

to assess whether there are any recognizable grounds for setting aside

policy in the particular case under consideration. À search of the

information available is carried out to this end as a separate task from

that of the initial search to determine the policy element.

An Application of the Decomposition Theory.

The decomposition of decisions into policy and other elements

linked with an information search strategy appropriate to this revised

decision-making method has been developed into an operational

system which is currently in use by the United States Parole Commis-

sioners. The ways in which this was done and the background

research are reported in a set of thirteen reports (4) and a short

summary is provided in Carter R. and Wilkins L.T. : Probation, Parole

anl Com:inuniy Corrections (5). 1u may serve here m

LS w-j

:.1rp‘w I

to quote

from a Memorandum of a decision by the Federal District Court in

Connecticut. The court had heard a case which invoked the « guide-

lines » system of decision-making adopted by the Parole Board (later,

The Parole Commissioners).

The court noted (6) :

« These cases present interesting issues concerning the procedures

used by the United States Board of Parole in reaching and

explaining its decisions concerning parole. The issues arise because

the Board, though not constitutionally required to give any

reasons for its decisions (Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F 2d Cir 1970)

has commendably adopted a new procedure designed to promote

rationality in the decision-making process and to enhance under-

standing of the process by all concerned… Key ingredients of

the new procedure are (a) the use of a table of guidelines as an

aid to deciding the appropriate length of time a prisoner should

serve before being paroled…».

The memorandum then goes on to describe the method whereby

weights are giventotheseriousnessof the offence and to certain offender

characteristics, and notes that these indicate ihe « expected » period

of detention in prison. In the terms used in the description of the

theory, the « guidelines » are a specification of the « policy element »

in the parole decision.

Although the guidelines in operation are prescriptive, (they indicate

what should be done unless there are special reasons why they should

be set aside in the individual case), they originated as descriptive

equations. These descriptive equations, based on the seriousness of

the offense and twelve offender characteristics (mainly prior criminal

record) were found to predict a large percentage of decisions. Thus

a policy element which had previously been implicit was made

explicit by research and encapsulated into some simple equations.

The equations are no more complex to read than the appropriate

premium required for a life insurance policy and are of a somewhat

similar form.

An Expression of Cultural Values ?

The « policy element » (guidelines) represent the previously unex-

plained « vague similarities » between sets of unique individual deci-

sions. If à « policy » is not made explicit, it 1s, perhaps, not correct to

— 201 —

refer to the discovered form as a « policy ». It might be more correct to

describe the equations as an expression of the developed phenomenon

of an approximate working concensus of colleagues faced with similar

problems in the same general organization — a « culture of the office ».

It is, of course, from this perspective that the analysis and equations

may commend themselves to the interests of comparative criminologists.

Social institutions develop a «style» by which they express their

identity. Individuals within these social institutions both contribute

towards this identity and blur its outlines by the exercise of their

personal equations.

There are two ways, at least, in which « cultural values» may

be expressed in a latent policy and made visible by the development

of descriptive equations which predict the decisions made by members

of the organizations concerned. It is possible to attempt to fit a

whole variety of equation forms as well as to derive sets of quite

different weightings to data items within a particular form. The

particular form and individual set of weights which were found to

explain the greatest proportion of the variance in decision would, of

course, be the preferred form.

The failure of research studies to find an equation which predicts

the decision outcomes seems to be the extremely unlikely. However,if the

equations forms tried do not give a very good predictor, it may be

that attempts have been made to fit an inappropriate form or alter-

natively it could mean that individual variation was extremely large

and the influence of « policy» was small. Similarly, different weights

to individual items of data which might provide better or worse

predictors do not necessarily reflect the weights given to these particular

items by the decision-makers themselves. The prediction equation is

fitted to the «collective» and not to any individual, and for this

reason alone interpretation of the weights requires extreme caution.

There are reasons for avoiding interpretation of the equations in

other than operational terms. The same problems attend this kind

of analysis as those involved in the fitting of econometric analyses to

crime trends, criminal justice decisions or similar data. The data are

drawn from an « information rich field ». Any matrix of correlations

will present opportunities for a very large number of different sets

of equations, each characterised by similar measures of efficiency. It is

not possible to say which equation is the « best» (most powerful),

because many could be found to satisfy this criterion. The use of

any other criterion for the selection of one equation rather than

another is attended by serious problems for which no satisfactory

resolution seems to exist. Some persons prefer one, others another.

Thus the selection becomes an exercice in subjective selection among

mathematical forms.

« 202 —

If equations can be selected from a large number of apparently

equally powerful expressions, how, it may be asked, can these be

used to assess « policy» ? For many purposes the selection is not

particularly important, any equation which appears to be as powerful

as any other may be selected on other considerations (*). But this

is not the issue in this case.

If the prediction equations were derived to provide estimation

oË the likelihood of recidivism (base expectancy), or were in the form

of econometric models fitted to statistical data, the selection would

cause greater difficulty. There is clearly no point in asking an offender

whether he « feels » that his likelihood of recidivism is better predicted

by equation (a) or equation (b), or whether it would be better to

select the equation which gives a weight to (K) or to (L)! However,

when the equations are used to attempt to discover « latent policy »,

we may recognize the fact that our subjects (the decision-makers) are

somewhat self-aware in this process. Indeed they are, presumably,

weighting data items themselves and the equations may be of the

same form. We may capitalize upon this self-awareness.

It was by this method that it was possible to test the decom-

position of the sentencing decision noted earlier. It was discovered in

the course of attempts to fit equations to sentences handed down by

a court that the quality of the « fit» obtained if (a), the decision were

assumed to be of the sub-divided format, (first decide whether to

incarcerate or not, then, if incarcerate, decide for how long, and if

not incarcerate, decide what form of community based disposition

to select), was superior to (b), that obtained if we assumed that the

decision was a straightforward selection from available dispositions.

Could we rely upon the mathematical evidence for the use of the

sub-divided format ? We could ask judges which form seemed to

them best to represent their mental activities in the act of sentencing.

The evidence of the judges asked was unanimous in favour of the

sub-divided model as the more closely representing the process.

Furthermore, we are not confined to evidence of this kind

Once equations have been established, it is possible to carry out many

tests by methods of stimulation. It is not possible to go into these

methods at this time. The note of these methods is made only to

establish the fact that the fitting of equations to decision outcomes

from a collective of decision-makers is a procedure having several

characteristics which distinguish it from the more usual derivation

of prediction equations or curve fittings applied to other areas and

other problems.

(*) This is the basis of selection by the United States Parole Commissions

only mathematically defensible, but philosophically «cleaner» than others.

of a number of equations of equal power, one was selected which was not

— 203 —

An Example of Comparative Analysis.

The long theoretical preamble to the presentation of a specific

case of comparative criminology has by no means dealt with all

the problems in this complex field. However, it is hoped that suificient

points have been made to make the following example of an application

of the method seem plausible.

Soon after the United States Parole Commissioners adopted the

« guideline » method discussed earlier, a number of states expressed

an interest in investigating the possibility of their adopting a similar

approach. The first step in such an approach is the development of

equation which the decisions of the particular boards. he form

of equation found to fit the decisions of the United States Board

were found to fit also the decisions of some other state boards.

But not all. Some states did not appear to give much weight to the

seriousness of the offense, leaving this to be determined by the sentence

of the court, while they gave most consideration to the behaviour of

the offender while serving his term in prison. In one state, for example,

an offender who had not been promoted to « honor grade» could

not be further considered for parole.

It was the task oË the research team to work out (in cooperation

with the state boards concerned) an acceptable definition of their

« policy » and to incorporate this into guidelines for future decisions.

To do this the prior decisions of the boards provided samples of

experience. The most useful and general approach to fitting an

equation to such data either that of Multiple regression or Discrimi-

nant fonction (which are sometimes identical). However, such methods

presume a basic additivity in the items with the related idea of a

« dimension ». Hence the idea of « seriousness » of the offense in the

federal model could be regarded as a dimension increasing from

trivial to the most serious with all crimes capable of being fitted in

along this scale. Similarly, the oflender characteristics (« salient factor

score ») was such that an offender might cancel out bad points by

good points since it was the total score which determined the weight.

In the Southern states this model did not hold as well as one

which was more analogous to a steeplechase — there.are a series of

« hurdles » to be overcome, and no matter at which one a fall occurs,

the individual is out of the race. He cannot claim that he fell at the

first, but had he been given a chance, he could have made all the

remainder. He cannot say, for example, « If only I had been promoted

to honor grade, I would have met all the other requirements of the

board, so, since there 18 only one ticrm 24 which ! failod. F should te

granted parole ». With the federal model, any one item in the salient

204 —

factor score can be exchanged for another. so that all items are

considered without regard to any sequence.

There are other differences between the models which were found

to fit the Southern state’s parole boards decisions and those of the

federal system than the sequence element, although this is, perhaps,

the most important difference. In the Southern state’s model there is a

pattern of progression that ends with the specification of the decision

as a dichotomy —- parole/not parole. In the federal model there 1s

an inicrcept oï ‘wo dimensions which provides an entry in a cell

which has a limited range of discretion for the individual decision-

maker as to how long the offender should be detained. Within this

range, the decision-maker is « within » the guidelines and, of course,

he may decide outside this range, supporting his decision with

reasons and subject to the other procedures for such cases. In the

Southern model, the decision-maker can go against the indicated

decision, but there is no range of discretion which is left unspecified.

Not only do the models fitted to the prior decisions of Southern

boards differ from those fitted to other states, but the consequences

of fitting such different models also differ. The fitting makes clear, for

example, tho ways in Which information items play their part in the

outcome for the individual decided about. With the federal (matrix

style) model, each item of information in the salient factor score

contributes a small amount to the total and hence to the decision ; no

single item will condemn the individual to any specific decision. With

the « sequence » (network) model this does not apply. It is interesting

to ask why a different style of model fits more closely the Southern

states and why such a style of model commends itself to the decision-

makers in that region. Às the research teams, point out in their report

(7), « The transitton from descriptive to prescriptive is critical to our

research and is a transition which we do not, ourselves, make. This

must be the board’s decision in each state ».

[n tho discussion of tho quality of decisions earlier in this article

t Wais poted fhat “coisson-maters make their determinations before an

audience, visible or invisible. The audience for decisions of parole

boards in the Southern states is a different audience from that of

the United States Board and the audience in other states. It is not

surprising that the « received wisdom » of boards, courts and other

collectives of decision-makers will reflect the culture of the local

society. This we stated was to be expected. The empirical studies have

shown that attempts to discover « latent » policy reveal such differences

both in deta!! and in cencral structure of form. Do these differences

make sense ”

- 205 —

A Tentative Explanation oË Differences.

It was suggested that the ways which decision-makers selected

to make their defense against accusations of incorrect decisions might

reveal itself in the method of information search and decision strategies

How might the United States Board seek to protect itself and from

whom ? What is the constitution of this hidden critical audience for

the federal Board ? Are they a different set of persons from the

audience for parole decisions in Southern states ? It would seem so.

The United States Board, located in Washington, has had plenty

of experience of criticism and the audience is not much of a mystery

to Board members ! (The New York Times and the Washington Post ;

certain well-known law schools ; social action groups and political

interests.) These critics, whether attacking from the left or right, use

a form of argument which may be designated as « somewhat abstract ».

The criticism is not likely, as a general rule, to deal with details of

specific cases, but rather with principles. Are the decisions discrimina-

tory ? Is there evidence of disparity ? How are the public protected

from the dangerous offender ? And so on. These approaches are quite

consistent with the « dimensional »> model which specifically relates to

« seriousness » of offenses. The model and its adaptation into guidelines,

addresses most directly the issue of disparity. If a dramatic incident

focusses criticism, that criticism is still dealt with in general terms.

The size of the audience inhibits a concern for detail — detail can be

subsumed in the appropriate action in terms of principles. This seems

to characterise the federal (and northern) model.

Rather than detail being subsumed in the action to accommodate

principles, the model identified with the Southern states, sees the prin-

ciples in relation to the detail. This particular focus and model may well

apply to other areas and probably to other countries where the social

and political climate are similar. In the « sequence » model a more

ready defense is available for the kind of criticism to be expected from

the invisible audience found in that environment. Here offenders are

somewhat less anonymous, and there is an interest in the detail of

their activities. Decision-makers too are less anonymous and there

is an interest in the detail of their decisions.

It is not surprising that the models which fit are a reflection of

the strategy likely to be more effective as a defense of the decision in

the particular areas. The « sequence» model enables the defense to

concentrate upon the individual items of information in respect of any

«foul up». The « matrix » model enables concentration upon the

correctness of a general policy at the expense of individual detail. The

decision-making strategy has developed naturally over the years as

a « home grown » product suited to the climate. There would seem to

— 206 —

be no reason why this should not be so — perhaps justice should have

a local flavour ?

The explanation of the different models (sequential and matrix)

may be clarified by imagining the form of accusation in case a

member of the invisible audience wished to suggest that a decision

was in error. « Did this person, or did he not….» possess charac-

teristic (x) ? « And did he not… ? » The specific questions relate, in this

example, to discrete items of data. The imaginary defendant (the

Parole Board or other agency) would be inferred to have erred if it

had to answer questions formed in this way with a response showing

that its guidelines were not followed. « Had this person made honor

grade in the institution ; yes or no ? » If the board had to say «no »

then it would be assumed to be in error in releasing the offender and

hence responsible for the fact that he had committed another crime.

The lack of logic (the non-sequitur) would not trouble many of the

accusers ! The boards with the sequential model are ready to meet this

kind of attack. Each decision is made in terms of the branching

network of specific items ; not by adding together items to form some

representation of a concept. There is some possibility, suggested by

other studies of decision-making, that « sequential» models tend to

represent a more risk-aversive decision process than do « matrix»

models (8). It seems that risk aversiveness is increased due to the fact

that at each node (branch) a subsidiary decision is involved. À node

becomes an all-or-none determination, based upon one item of inform-

ation rather than being decided conditionally upon several items.

ÀA «safe » decision tends to be made at each branch, with an overall

result that fewer persons get through the network than would be the

case if alternative routes were available to them. This observation fits

the general explanation of the differences observed in studies to date.

Conclusions.

The possibility of developing the methods discussed into a general

tool of comparative analysis might be explored. In the present case,

it was fortuitous that the data were to arise in a suitable form. The use

of models developed with a different purpose presents different problems

from those which are specifically constructed. Models which were used

to test theories in comparative criminology would require more than

a simple replication of the methods used to develop decision guidelines.

If, for example, instead of attempting to discover the model implicitly

used by parole boards, the research had established some a priori

model or models, it is likely that some degree of fit would have been

found to all states and to the federal system. This fit might have

been nothing more than a meaningless centroid.

— 207 —

Despite the difficulties, it seems clear that the kinds of models

which are necessary to give the best prediction of the decisions made

by agencies reveal the dominant policy issues. Furthermore, while

the weights to items in a multivariate analysis cannot be understood

as having a direct relationship to the interpretation of policy, differences

between weights should suggest questions. Such questions may be

developed into hypotheses to be tested by other means, such as

simulation or further 1ndependent 1nvest1gatmn

ercte

‘It.is clear that decisions made 1ndependenﬂy by individual

decision-makers in positions of authonty in the criminal justice system

with regard to individual offenders in unique situations, represent a

complex pattern which may be « modelled » in a variety of ways. In

most cases.this pattern .may be equated:tosthe idea of an implicit

policy or Lra sét of etiturat valués shared by members of the organ-

IZation concerned. Although the decision rules implied in a policy

may be varied by the decision-maker in respect of individual cases

dealtwith by him, the modifications çan be, regarded.as added elements

Aitiodifiersÿ, -Suctr-recomposition of tkie'decision ‘prôcess into policy

and case elements (the central focus of this article) would seem to

be valuable in comparative research as well as realistic and useful

for purposes of policy control and in facilitating public accountability

REFERENCES

Ï

_

HAYVES ( M0) Häman Da:a Processing Limits in Decision- malung Opera-

é

tiohal“Applications" Lab "HH‘ Forté 'Bléctronics,. Systems’ Divigon, Bedford;

Mass*“ 1962.

2

l

BURNHAM (R.W.) in Decision-making in the Criminal Justice System

{\<

I;1 i\‘30\>

National

Instituté of Mental

Health. Monograph

D H E.W. Publication - (A.D.M.) 1975, pp. 75-238.

WILKINS (LT.

« Information Overload »

Journal of Criminal Law

and Criminology, 1973, 64:2, pp. 190-197

VARIOUS

arole

Dcecision-making Project Reports

Davis california

N.C.C..

RKoscarch

Center.

1973.

(Also

Law

Enforcement

Assistance

Ann.n 15 1ml.on

3l

L)°p\rtmcnt of _Justice.).

-

S

Pr8baîmv

Parole and Community

CARTER (R.) dﬂd WILKIN9 (L.T.) :

Corrections, (Qnd Edition). New York.

Wilev.

1976.

Lupo vs. Norton and Zagarino vs. Attorney General of the United States

Federal District (ed.) Connecticut, 1970, (430)

GOTTFREDSON

î)) Ce (ll

« Diffcrent Faces of Truth ? » in Report of

Research Project

Classification for Parole Decision-making

in press

To be published by L.E.A.A. shortly

8

ROBINSON (J) and TAKAGI (P.T.) :

«The Parole Violator as an

Re; ‘est »>

-in CARTFR (R‘) and WILKINS (L.T.) see (S)

** “Organtzationa!

above

— 208 —

THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PENAL SEVERITY

e

SOME METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS*

PETER N. GRABOSKY

Yale Law School

New Haven, Connecticut - US.A

I. Introduction

One explanation for the dearth of comparative studies of penal

severity is the unhappy reality that such endeavors inevitably encounter

methodological problems of a forbidding nature. While some problems

of conceptualization and measurement have proven to be insurmount-

able, thus precluding the testing of theory in a definitive, universal

ense (accross all jurisdictions and for all time), such impediments

should not deter prospective researchers altogether. While a few

problems will remain intractable, others can be mitigated or circum-

vented through a judicious choice of measurement strategy and research

design. What does exist for the comparative researcher is the inviting

opportunity to formulate general propositions, then to test them in

a succession of different, albeit limited settings (Zetterberg, 1966

pp. 126-8).

For example, while it may lie beyond the capability of social

scientists to describe, much less explain variations in penal severity

across the provinces of China in 1906, it may be possible to test the

applicability of Sorokin’s (1937) theory in the context of contemporary

European industrial societies. While no single study can establish the

universal truth of a given theory of penal severity, the extent to

which corroborative findings recur in subsequent and different settings

is indicative of the theory’s scientific worth

Fhe pages which follow are intended to alert prospective research

ers of penal severity to some of the hazards which they might expect

to face, and to acquaint them with a few of the basic remedies at

their disposal. The discussion will focus first on some of the more

fundamental considerations of conceptualization and measurement

emphasizing the issues of comparability and equivalence. The essay

will conclude with a discussion of alternative research designs which

can serve to mitigate the hazards in question

*) ’TThe author wishes to acknowledge the support of the Russel Sage

Foundation, and the he]pful advice of colleagues in the preparation of this essay

— 209

I[. The Concept of Penal Severity.

The task of delineating the conceptual boundaries of « penal

severity » is a difficult one, for the degree of suffering inflicted on an

individual by authorities in response to the commission of an officially

proscribed act is essentially subjective. Hardly a modern insight, this

recognition of the subjectivity of penal severity appears, for example,

in Grotius’ contention that a fine weighs more heavily on the poor man

than upon his more affluent counterpart (1853, II[: 20 : 33). Indeed,

the notion of differential propensities to suffering seems implicit in

the elaborately graded systems of punishments according to social

status that were implemented in many ancient societies (Sellin, 1976,

Chs. 1-3).

The most sophisticated discussions of the inherent subjectivity

of penal severity, those of Nils Christie (1968, 1975), assert that penal

severity takes on meaning only when experienced against life at large.

Thus, the severity of a day’s deprivation of liberty has increased in

most societies over the past century, and the experience of incarceration

«is more grievous in a society in which life at large is easy and

enjoyable than in one in which it is difficult and dangerous ». (1975,

293). This notion of social or experimential time as opposed to

physical time in conjunction with deprivations of liberty has also been

noted by Sliwowski (1974).

To insist that penal severity can only be studied from the pers-

pective of the recipient of punishment, however, is too confining a

posture. It would preclude the possibility of any historical studies and

demand that any future comparative research be based on equivalent

measures of individual attitudes. Contemporary researchers have thus

adopted the more flexible alternative of focusing upon the objective

properties of penal sanctions, presuming them to be comparable

under certain conditions. What Gibbs (1975) terms presumptive

severity thus appears to be the only viable alternative for those who

wish to undertake comparative research on any significant scale. Indeed,

this appears to be the only practical alternative for those who wish

to regard penal severity as a property or characteristic of political

systems rather than a subjective state of mind.

Another conceptual problem encountered in the comparative study

of penal severity concerns the relative salience of penal sanctions

within a society’s overall system of social control (Newman, 1976,

27). Penal sanctions constitute but one instrument of social control,

and it has been suggested by Black (1976) that they will be less

important to the extent that control functions are shared with alter-

native institutions. In the People’s Republic of China, for example,

a considerable part of the sanctioning function is performed informall

by family, neighborhood, and workplace groups (Cohen, 1968).

— 210 —

In western industrial societies, the sanctioning function may also

be shared by penal and non-penal administrative institutions (Jasinski,

1976). Feeley (1976) suggests that taxes, subsidies, licenses, and grants

are often used as calculated instruments of social control. In Sweden,

there has long been a visible emphasis on administrative regulation in

lieu of the criminal sanction, with regard to juvenile misbehavior and

alcohol abuse (Kinberg, 1933 ; Bengtsson, 1938 ; Gôransson, 1939).

Even medical treatment exists as an alternative to punishment in

some societies (Kittrie, 1971 ; Goldstein, 1967, Ch. 11), and there exist

some tentative research findings to suggest that rates of imprisonment

vary inversely with the availability of mental hospital facilities (Biles

and Mulligan, 1973). There are, quite simply, very different ways of

responding to deviant behavior.

By focusing exclusively on penal sanctions, it is possible to over-

look the subtle interrelationship between these and non-criminal or

informal sanctioning mechanisms within a society. Accordingly, inter-

societal comparisons are doubly jeopardized. These problems of con-

ceptualization raise commensurate difficulties in measurement.

IIL. The Measurement of Penal Severity.

Before venturing further, it is important to confront directly one

of the fundamental problems of comparative research — the issue of

equivalence in measurement. The earlier discussion of the inherent

subjectivity of punishment, and the relationship between penal and

alternative sanctioning systems reflect a problem common to all

comparative researchers and which is particularly threatening to

research on penal systems. The issue, briefly stated, is this : Is the

phenomenon being investigated in society À essentially comparable to

the phenomenon under scrutiny in society B ? Is the measurement

language to be applied equivalent across the two systems ? If the rate

of imprisonment is twice as high in the latter, this does not necessarily

imply that society B is twice as punitive. Only 1f the overall structures

of social control in the two societies are themselves comparable may

such an inference be made (Smelser, 1976, pp. 185-93). It follows that

explanations based on incomparable phenomena should be viewed

with utmost caution.

When different meanings are couched in facially equivalent

measures, the researcher must determine whether it is possible to

modify one or the other of the measures so as to render them at

least crudely equivalent. Given the present state of social science,

researchers will have to settle for what might best be termed « gross

comparability ». One of the more important tasks for the future is the

development of cross-systematically equivalent measures.

— 211 —

The task of measuring penal severity is a difficult one, as has

been apparent to scholars since the late nineteenth century (U.S.

Department of the Interior, 1896 ; Sorokin, 1937 ; Gibbs, 1975). The

problem is essentially twofold — data are available for only a limited

number of jurisdictions, and those data which do exist may not be

comparable across jurisdictions (1).

The problems posed by the scarcity and questionable validity of

data are best confronted through a strategy of multiple measurement.

Given the inevitable imperfection of any one measure of penal severity,

it is wise to rely upon a number of alternative measures. The justifi-

cation for such a multiple measurement approach rests in the assump-

tion that each of the measures chosen will be subject to different

sources of inaccuracy, while still sharing elements of conceptual

relevance (Campbell and Fiske, 1959). From an evaluation of alter-

native measures, the researcher can move to select those which appear

most appropriate to the task at hand, or to construct a composite

index (Sullivan, 1974 ; Gurr, 1972. pp. 49-59).

Any analysis of penal policy must take into account the fact that

formal sanctioning is imposed at a number of stages or dispositional

points. Initially, the severity of response appropriate to a given

category of deviant acts is specified by statute. Following the initial

invocation of the criminal sanction, deprivations may be inflicted in the

course of investigation or processing prior to adjudication. The most

obvious example of such a form of sanction is pre-trial detention.

Subsequent to adjudication, severity may be measured in terms of the

sentence awarded, or ultimately, in terms of the punishment actually

imposed.

It is by no means certain that measures of severity taken at

successive points in the dispositional process will show consistent

covariation. Indeed, there may well be a significant degree of « slip-

page » between statutory prescription and severity as applied, as well

as between the various stages of application (Newman, 1976, p. 18).

Ross (1976) for example, has shown how relatively harsh provisions

are «neutralized » by lenient enforcement and administration. The

magnitude of the gap between symbol and action is itself deserving

of analysis in a comparative context.

The measure of severity as reflected in a jurisdiction’s statutes

(hereafter normative severity) is based upon the premise that the

penalties prescribed in a society's penal statutes are generally indi-

cative of its punitive predisposition. While scholars of the criminal

(1) A number of polities, for domestic and/or international political consi-

derations, conceal some or all of their sanctioning activity.

— 212 —

law suggest that individual provisions are generally initiated and

championed by parochial interests (Heinz e/ al, 1969, Steyn, 1975)

it seems reasonable to conclude that an aggregate or summèar”y

measure of normative severity will constitute a more valid represent-

ation of the concept under study.

Indices of normative severity can be constructed from statutes

by selecting a set of offenses in accordance with one fundamental

criterion : the behavior defined by each offense should be comparable

across units of analysis (Newman, 1976, p. 214). This is important, of

course, since the terms used to label a given criminal act can vary

across jurisdictions and over time. In seeking to compare the severity

with which authorities purport to respond to what is conventionally

termed armed robbery, for example, it will be necessary to ensure

that the penalties in question are not attached to quite different pheno-

mena — robbery with actual violence in one jurisdiction and robbery

with the mere threat of violence in another.

Ideally, the set of offenses chosen for analysis will be large

enough to permit its division into subsets, each representative of a

conventional index category. This division into subsets will permit

the construction of a summary measure of normative severity for

each jurisdiction under investigation, as well as permit comparisons

within and between jurisdictions in the relative severity with which

different offenses are ostensibly punished.

The actual measurement of statutes can be accomplished in a

number of ways. In dealing with similar legal cultures in which impri-

sonments and fines constitute the most common sanctions, one may

use the duration of imprisonment (in years or fractions there of)

prescribed for each offense (Newman, 1976, pp. 228-246). To accom-

modate those statutes which mandate indefinite sentences or a range

of possible punishments for each offense, two measures might be

generated for each offense, one each for the maximum and minimum

possible penalties prescribed (2). For those statutes which prescribe

a fine in addition to or as an alternative to imprisonment, the amount

prescribed can be expressed as a percentage of mean annual income

in the jurisdiction, and equated to an appropriate period of deprivation

of Hiberty. Some penal codes actually provide a conversion scale, thus

obviating the necessity for such judgmental translation. Capital punish-

ment and life imprisonment may be assigned arbitrary values at the

high end of the scale.

(2) Where no upper or lower limits are stipulated by statute, the researcher

may apply judgmental standards or solicit expert opinion. See Newman (1976,

P

)

— 213 —

For the more ambitious researcher who seeks to undertake com-

parative analyses across widely differing cultures and time periods, a

standardized measurement scheme was devised by Sorokin (1937, I,

p. 582). The scheme consists of a ten point scale along which a range of

ostensibly commensurate punishments are arrayed. Aggravated capital

punishment is accorded a weight of ten, a simple fine a weight of one.

Gravely mutilating bodily punishment is equated with life imprison-

ment, and both are coded with a score of eight. While such a measure-

ment strategy may be appropriate for broad comparisons of otherwise

incomparable societies, it is of less utility for the analysis of modern

penal systems. In such cases, the development of more precise

measures 1s preferable.

The degree to which authorities rely on procedural punishment,

deprivations attending the period before and during adjudication, poses

a particular problem, for such reliance varies widely across juris-

dictions, and systematic assessment is most difficult. These dispositional

considerations may not be wished away, however, since in a number

of jurisdictions, it is customary to consider predisposition periods in

determining the sentence actually awarded. Thus, high dismissal

rates and frequent commutation of sentence to time served do not

necessarily imply that no punishment at all is being meted out. The

measurement of pre-adjudicative severity should incorporate two dis-

tinct properties

the proportion of defendants detained prior to trial,

and the average duration of pre-trial detention.

The severity of sentences actually awarded may be expressed

in a number of alternative ways. Where data are available, the

researcher could calculate an appropriate summary measure such as

the mean or median sentence imposed. Alternatively, it is often possible

to represent sentencing severity in terms of the proportion of sentences

surpassing certain thresholds of severity. Data reflecting the percentage

of defendants sentenced to sanctions involving deprivation of liberty,

or the percentage of sentences involving incarceration in excess of

one year, have been employed to this end (Jasinski, 1976).

In addition to those techniques, the researcher may employ a

variation on the method employed by Kobrin and his colleagues (1972)

in their comparative study of California counties. Their additive index

of sentencing severity was constructed by assigning one of six weights

to each sentence awarded, summing the weighted scores, and deviding

by the total number of sentence :

Severity = {(0 x fine only) --- (! x probation onty)

(2 jail and probat'on’

(3 x jail only) -+- (4 x state prison)

(5 x deoth e_ænnl?y \

(S x total sunarier cour!s convictions)

— 214 —

In undertaking to measure the severity of punishments ultimately

imposed, it will be important to distinguish between two distinct

properties — the intensity of sanctions applied, and the scope of their

application. The most common measure of severity thus far employed

has been the median number of months served by inmates of a juris-

diction’s prisons at year’s end (Gibbs, 1975, p. 129). This measure is

insensitive to the property of scope, as it reveals nothing about the

proportion of a jurisdiction*s population which is subjected to penal

sanctions. Alternative measures of severity, based on the rate of

imprisonment, fail to reflect the intensity of punishments inflicted. To

further illustrate the distinction, it is helpful to envision two societies,

one which imposes short prison sentences on a relatively large

proportion of its population, and another which imposes long

prison terms on only a small percentage of its citizens. The extent to

which the scope of punishment varies with intensity is an interesting

question in its own right, but a measure of actual severity should be

sensitive to both of these properties. The process of developing and

refining measures of actual severity should test different additive and

multiplicative combinations of scope and intensity to arrive at a

general measure of the magnitude of punishment delivered by a society.

The contention that penal severity can only be measured in

light of the quality of life in society at large suggest one measurement

strategy which can significantly enhance equivalence of indicators

across jurisdictions as well as within a jurisdiction over time. The

simple adjustment to be described may be applied to any of the

measures of severity reviewed above.

The use of residual scores from a simple two variable linear

regression is a relatively uncomplicated technique described by T'ufte

(1974, pp. 24-29). When a quality of life measure such as life expect-

ancy is regressed on a measure of penal severity, the residual scores

reflect the degree to which that measure of severity is more or less

severe than would be predicted by social conditions at large. The

residual score thus represents what might be described as an « adjus-

ted» measure of severity, one which accounts for the relative well

being or misery of a societys general popuation. This adjus*meut

may be made for differences between societies in the general level of

well being ; it may also be used to control for improvement, deterio-

ration, or fluctuation over time in the quality of life within a given

jurisdiction. Such an adjustment may be made to measures of severity

at any of the above procedural stages ; it may also incorporate other

variables thought to detract from measurement equivalence.

— 215 —

IV. Research Designs.

The formulation of a research design, or rationale by which cases

are selected for analysis, is one of the more crucial issues confronting

comparative researchers, for it is this choice which determines two

fundamental considerations

explanatory potential and generaliza

bility. To compare present day penal policies in North Dakota and

South Dakota, for example, would be a less than fruitful undertaking

for two reasons. First, there would be little variation between the states

either in terms of the policies themselves or in terms of the social and

historical characteristics which might influence these policies. Second

any findings which might emerge from a comparative study of the

Dakotas could not be generalized to other jurisdictions or other time

periods

The task faced by researchers of penal severity, then, given the

inevitable constraints of resource and data limitations, is to select

those jurisdictions for study which, by virtue of their distribution

across time and space, provide for greatest explanatory power and

generalizability

Given the serious difficulties in conceptualization and measurement

which confront the student of comparative penal severity, the choice

of an appropriate research design becomes one of great significance

It should be apparent by now that the rich diversity of penal systems

over time and across space preclude any single test which might yield

findings of universal applicability. Reality dictates what might be

called a modular approach — the testing of propositions within com-

parable groups of cases, systems whose operational indicators have

equivalent meaning (Smelser, 1976, 169-70)

It can be argued that a wide variety of distinct research settings

provide the optimal context for theory building. Consistent findings

emerging from a range of diverse settings each with its own measure-

ment strategy and research design appropriate to the set of systems

under analysis are of much greater knowledge value than ambiguous

results emerging from a «loose fitting » macro-study of every juris-

diction for which data might be available (Stinchcombe, 1968, pp. 18-

22). What is 1mportant is that the limited contexts which serve as the

objects of inquiry be chosen with some care.

Within these general guidelines, it is appropriate to review some

of the more widely employed design stategies and alternative analytic

frameworks, and to suggest the utility and limitation of their appli-

cation to the comparative study of penal severity. Ideally, this discussion

Will provide prospective scholars with guidelines for choosing the

approach which seems most useful for the purpose at hand

— 216 —

1. Basic Design Strategies.

One of the more popular alternatives available to the comparative

researcher is what Lijphart (1975) terms « the comparable cases stra-

tegy ». By selecting fundamentally similar systems for analysis, albeit

systems which vary significantly in terms of independent and dependent

variables, the researcher is able to achieve a considerable amount of

control for extraneous or irrelevant influences. This general approach

has also been termed the « most similar systems design » by Przeworski

and Teune (1970). In addition to the advantages of control, the similar

systems approach provides the additional advantage of minimizing

problems of equivalence in measurement. Sanctioning systems and

accounting practices vary much less markedly across the political

systems of Western Europe than they do across a random sample of

the world’s polities.

It is important to note, however, that the systems selected for

analysis must have sufficient variation on theoretically relevant

variables (penal severity and its hypothesized determinants). Without

such variation, the design lacks explanatory potential, as did the above

example of the Dakotas.

In contrast to the advantages provided by the most similar

systems design, there are some questions which can be approached

fruitfully through comparison of relationships visible in drastically

different penal systems. While problems of comparability would pre-

clude an explicit comparison of the magnitude of punishment delivered

in Sweden, Uganda, Equador, and Singapore, consistent patterns visible

within each of these societies would be of considerable scientific interest.

If, despite the myriad of political, legal, and cultural characteristics

which differentiate these four societies, short term economic contrac-

tions are regularly followed by a decrease in penal severity, a resear-

cher can infer that the relationship is unlikely to have resulted from

some systemic singularity (3). This « most different systems design »

(Przeworski and Teune, 1970, p. 35) should be regarded as one of the

more fruitful approaches to the development of general theorv.

2. Specific Analytic Frameworks.

One of the more common designs in comparative research is the

cross-sectional or synchronic study. Common procedure in this type

of analysis would involve the selection of a set of penal systems and

an attempt to explain the relationship at a given point in time

between penal severity and contemporaneous social and political

characteristics.

(3) Note, for example, Newman’s (1976) study of individual attitudes in six

cultures.

— 217 —

The limitations of cross-sectional analysis, however, are severe.

Since the generalizability of one’s findings is determined by the repre-

Isentativeness and size of the sample under observation, equivalence

is easily jeopardized. A broadly representative sample of the world’s

penal systems would be characterized by incomparable sanctioning

processes and non-equivalent indicators. As far as research on penal

severity is concerned, therefore, cross-sectional analysis would best be

confined to the most similar systems context. One might employ such

a design, for example, to explore the relationship between penal seve-

rity and income concentration in the nations of Western Europe

during 1975.

Cross-sectional analyses admit of another, equally severe short-

coming, however. While a considerable part of the mission of compa-

rative research is to explain differences between systems at a given

point in time, it is fundamental importance to note that many pheno-

mena which researchers seek to explain are longitudinal in nature

(Le. occurring over time). Much of the theory of penal severity

(Durkheim, 1969, Sorokin, 1937) is developmental in nature, and the

logic of causal explanation requires a longitudinal perspective. To

infer developmental relationships from cross-sectional contemporaneous

covariation necessitates drastic assumptions, and these may not always

be tenable. Political systems may well arrive at their respective states

of development by means of very different causal processes, and these

alternative paths to the present can be concealed by a synchronic

analysis.

It is, of course, possible to modify a cross-sectional design to

permit the incorporation of some dynamic variables. The use of the

simple arithmetic mean, for example, would permit the introduction

of such potential independent variables as the average annual rate of

population increase for a preceeding span of years. Similarly, one may

introduce a measure encompassing the average annual rate of impri-

sonment during the same time span. Relationships between such

summary measures or « gain scores» (Bohrntedt, 1969) no doubt

constitute an improvement over those based on simple static measures.

They nevertheless lack the manipulability and potential explanatory

power of observations taken over time.

One analytic strategy which permits a more direct observation of

change over time is time series analysis (Blumstein et al, 1976;

Hibbs, 1974a). While the taking of observations at equal intervals

over time raises the problem of historical equivalence suggested by

Christie (1968), the adjustment technique discussed above provides a

partial solution. However, even if a measurement strategy were to

compensate satisfactorily for an initial lack of equivalence, there are

significant problems to be confronted. Time series analyses pose

— 218 —

inherent problems of generalizability ; it is uncommon to find a

study based on more than a handful of cases. Assuming one were

to discern a negative relationship between short term economic fluc-

tuation and penal severity in France from 1945 to 1975 one may

not infer that such a relationship obtains anywhere else, or indeed that

it would obtain in France during another period.

Moreover, there are a number of variables which may be expected

to explain differences in severity which are more or less invariant

over time within a society and which cannot be accommodated to

time series analysis. Statutory severity itself may change only very

infrequently, and may thus not be picked up in a span of years

under observation. Racial homogeneity, which may well have signi-

ficant relationship to penal severity in the United States, has been

virtually constant in Sweden. Despite the disadvantages, time series

data may be fruitfully employed to assess the impact of a sudden

intervention. Short time series have been artfully analysed to assess

the effect of war on crime, dissidence, and official reaction (Archer

and Gartner, 1976, Stohl, 1976), while longer time series lend

themselves to more powerful multivariate techniques (Hibbs, 1974b) (4).

In some research contexts, when observations over time are

available for more than one case, it is possible to pool cross-sectional

and time series data (Nerlove, 1971). This approach has become increa-

singly popular with social scientists (Hibbs, 1976). While strictly

speaking a technique of data analysis, the pooling of observations can

bear on design strategy by influencing the choice of jurisdictions and

the period of their observation.

By treating each nation year as a case, it is possible to mitigate

those effects of data scarcity which would ordinarily inhibit gene-

ralization. Assuming ten annual obervations for each of five jurisdic-

tions, one can undertake analysis with a sample size of 50, and thereby

apply more sophisticated statistical techniques.

While the pooling of time series and cross sectional data permits

a researcher to share the advantages of longitudinal and cross-sec-

tional designs, it admits of one essential shortcoming. The structure

of causal relationships themselves may differ from time to time and

from place to place, and such differences may be masked by an analysis

of pooled observations. This is not to suggest that penal severity may

defy explanation altogether, but merely that the structure of that

explanation itself may change. Penal policy might be sensitive to

economic contraction during a certain period, and yet be profoundly

influenced bv demographic changes a year later.

(4) For a helpful introduction to the uses and limitations of quasi-experimental

designs, see Caporaso and Ross (1973). For a more advanced perspective, see

Glass, et al. (1975).

— 219 —

One design which accomodates this need for flexibility is the

panel study (Pelz and Andrews, 1964, Shingles, 1976). By observing

the systems under investigation at each of two or three time points,

one is able to undertake temporally distinct cross-sectional analyses

as well as to explore relationships over time.

Such an approach would permit the researcher to discern whether

a relationship between the unemployment rate and penal severity

across western European polities in 1970 was also apparent during

1960 and 1950. While less flexible than the incorporation of lagged

terms in the time series context, the researcher may produce lagged

correlations from panel data, and thus determine the extent to which

economic conditions in 1960 explain penal severity a decade hence.

This capabilitv is quite consistent with the logic of causal inference.

Although the panel design seems to provide the most advantageous

posture for an initial approach to the question at hand, it should

by now be apparent that no one measurement technique or research

design strategy can hold the key to a general theory of penal severity.

Indeed, it has been argued that the greatest knowledge gains will

result from a richly diverse application of measurements and methods.

What is important, however, is that the technique fit the setting, and

that the researcher be cognizant of the inherent limitations of a given

undertaking. With these considerations in mind, researchers should

find the comparative study of penal systems an inviting one.

Bibliography

ARCHER (D.) and GARTNER (R.) : « Violent Acts and Violent Times : À

(‘’oOmparative Approach to Post-war Homicide Rates », American Socio-

logical Review, December 1976, Vol. 41, pp. 937-963.

BENGTSSON (H.) : « The Temperance Movement and Temperance Legislation

in Sweden ». The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social

Science, 1938. Vol. 197, pp. 138-153.

BERK (R.A.) : The Measure of Justice, Academic Press, New York, 1977.

BILES (D.) and MULLIGAN (G.) : « Mad or Bad ? The Enduring Dilemma »,

British Journal of Criminology, 1973, Vol. 13, n° 3, pp. 275-79.

BLACK (D.J.) : l'he Behavior of Law, Academic Press, New York, 1976.

BLUMSTEIN (A.), COHEN (J.) and NAGIN (D.

«The Dynamics of a

Homeostatic Punishment Process », Journal of Criminal Law and Crimi-

nology, September 1976, Vol. 67, n° 3, pp. 317-334.

BOHRNSTEDT (G.W.)

« Observations on the Measurement of Change », in

E.F. Borgatta and G.W. Bohrnstedt (eds.) Sociological Methodology 1969,

Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1969, pp. 113-136.

— 220 —

CAMPBELL (D.T.) and FISKE (E.M.) : « Convergent and Discriminant Vali-

dation by the Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix», Psychological Bulletin,

1959, Vol. 56, pp. 81-105.

CAPORASO (J.A.) and ROOS (LJ. jr.) : Quasi Experimental Approaches

Testing Theory and Evaluating Policy, Northwestern University Press,

Evanston, 1973.

CHRISTIE (N.) : « Changes in Penal Values », Scandinavian Studies in Crimino-

logy, 1968, Vol. 2, pp. 161-172.

« Utility and Social Value in Decisions on Punishment », in Roger Hood,

(ed.) Crime, Criminology and Public Policy, Free Press, New York, 1975.

COHEN (J.A.) : The Criminal Process in the People’s Repuhlic of China, 1949-

1963, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1968.

DURKHEIM (E)

« Two Laws of Penal Evolution », (William Jeffrey, Jr. tr.)

University of Cincinnati Law Review, 1969, Vol. 28, p. 32.

FEELEY (M.) : « The Concept of Laws in Social Science : À Critique and

Notes on ain Expanded View». Lauw and Society Review, Summer 1976.

Vol. 10, n° 4, pp. 497-524.

GIBBS (J.P.) : Crime, Punishment, and Deterrence, Elsevier, New York, 1975.

GLASS (G.V.) et al. : Design and Analysis of Time Scries Experiments, Colorado

Associated Universities Press, Boulder, 1975.

GOLDS'I:EIN (A.S.) : The Insanity Defense, Yale University Press, New Haven,

GORANSSON (H.)

« Treatment of Criminals and Other Asocial Individuals ».

The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,

1939, Vol. 197.

GROTIUS (H.) : De Jure Belli et Pacis, Cambridge Universitv Press, Cambridge,

1853.

GURR (F.R.) : Politimetrics : An introduction to Quantitative Macropolitics,

Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1972.

HEINZ (J.)) GETTLEMAN (R.) and SEESKIN (M.) : « Legislative Politics

and the Criminal Law», Northwestern University Law Review, 1969,

Voi. 64, pp. 277-358.

HIBBS (D.A.) : « Problems of Statistical Estimation and Causal Inference in

Time Series Regression Models », in H. Costner (ed.) Sociological Metho-

dologv 7973-1974, Jossev-Bass, San Fransisco, 1974. pp. 252-289.

On Analysing the Effects of Policy Interventions : Box-Jenkins and Box-Tiao

vs. Structural Equation Models, Center for International Studies, MI.T

Publication C/74-33, Cambridge, 1974.

« Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies», The American

Political Science Review, December 1976, Vol. 70, n° 4, pp. 1033-1058.

JASINSKI (J.) : « The Punitiveness of Criminal Justice Systems (AÀ Cross-

National

Perspective) ».

The Polish Sociologica!

Bulletin,

1976.

n

|

pp. 43-51.

KINBERG (O.) : « Criminal Policv in Sweden During the Past Fifty Years ».

Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, 1933, Vol. 24, pp. 314-335.

KITTRIE (N.N)) : The Right to Be Different : Deviance and Enforced Therapy,

The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1971.

KOBRIN (S.) et al. : The Deterrent Effectiveness of Criminal Justice Sanction

Strategies,

U.S. Department of Justicee Law Enforcement Assistance

Administration, Washington, 1972.

LIJPHART (A.) : « The Comparable Cases Strategv in Comparative Research ».

Comparative Political studies, July 197S, Vol. 8, n° 2, pp. 158-177.

NERLOVE (M.) : « Further Evidence on the Estimation of Dynamic Economic

Relations from a Time Series of Cross Sections ». Econometrica, March 1971,

Vol. 39, pp. 359-382.

NEWMAN (G.) : Comparative Deviance : Perception and Law in Six Cultures,

Elsevier, New York, 1976.

PELZ (D.) and ANDREWS (F.) : « Detecting Causal Priorities in Panel Data »,

American Sociological Review, 1964, Vol. 29, pp. 836-848.

PRZEWORSKI (A.) and TEUNE (H

The Logic of Comparative Social

Inquiry, John Wiley, New York, 1970.

ROSS (H.L.)

« The Noetitralization of Severe Penalties : Some Trafïic Law

studies », Law and Society Review, Spring 1976, Vol. 10, n° 3, pp. 403-413.

SHINGLES (R.) : « Causal Inference in Cross Lagged Panel Analysis », Political

Methodology, 1976, Vol. 3, pp. 95-133.

SLIWOWSKI (G.) : « La Sociologie du temps et la peine privative de liberté »,

7

Revue de science criminclle et de droit pénal comparé,

1974. n°

pp. 295-312.

SMELSER (N.J.) : Comparative Research in *he Social Sciences, Prentice Hall.

Englewood Cliffs, 1976.

SOROKIN (P.) : « Fluctuation of Ethicojuridical Mentality in Criminal Law »,

in Sociocultural Dynamics, American Book Co… 1937. Vol. 2. pp. 523-632.

STEYN (J.H.) : « The Punishment Scene in South Africa », in Roger Hood

(ed.), Crime, Criminology, and Public Policy, Free Press, New York, 1975.

STINCHCOMBE (A.L.) : Constructing Social Theories, Harcourt, Brace and

World, New York, 1968.

STOHL (M.) : War and Domestic Political Violence : The American Capacity

for Repression and Reaction, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1976.

SULLIVAN (J.L)

« Multiple Indicators : Some Criteria of Selection », in

Hubert Bialock (ed.). Measurement in the Social Sciences, Aldine Publishing

Co., Chicago, 1974.

TUFTE (E-R) : Data Analysis for Politics and Policy, Prentice Hall, Englewood

Cliffs, 1974.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, CENSUS OFFICE : Report on

Crime, Pauperism, and Benevolence in the United States at the Eleventh

Census, 1890, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1896.

ZETTERBERG (H.L.) : On Theory and Verification in Sociology, Bedminster

Press, Totowa, (3rd. ed.), 1966.

ee

— 222 —

CONSENSUS,

CONFLIT ET

ATTITUDES ENVERS LE CRIME

ET LA LOI PENALE

PHILIPPE ROBERT,

Service d’études pénales et criminologiques,

(équipe de recherche associée au Centre national de la recherche

scientifique).

PARIS - FRANCE.

Il est devenu courant, surtout depuis une dizaine d’années, de

parler de crise du système pénal.

L’une des premières idées qui soit alors venue à l’esprit a été de

se demander si ce sentiment de crise ne provenait pas essentiellement

du monument législatif — voire jurisprudentiel — par rapport à l’évo-

lution de « l’opinion publique ».

C’est au fond la problématique initiale des travaux « K.O.L. » (1)

du comité de sociologie du droit de l’Association internationale de

sociologie. On s’assignait pour tâche de détecter et de mesurer le

décalage existant éventuellement entre « l’opinion publique», les

prescriptions légales et même quelquefois leur application prétorienne

dans la jurisprudence. Le problème paraissait alors simple, du moins

dans son principe : il s’agissait de connaître l’évolution de « l’opinion

publique », puis de moderniser la loi pour l’adapter à l’état nouveau de

«l’opinion » prise comme indicateur de l’évolution des mœurs reçues

dans la société.

Parmi beaucoup de tâtonnements, le bilan de cette première vague

de travaux a, au moins, permis de découvrir un point tout à fait

essentiel : la faiblesse de la dimension cognitive dans les représentations

de la loi et de la justice pénale. Mais que la connaissance soit limitée

et de mauvaise qualité ne doit pas conduire à conclure à l’inexistence

de représentations et de structures d’attitudes. Seulement, elles sont

caractérisées par leurs dimensions normatives et affectives (2) plus que

par celle de connaissance.

(1) Knowledge and Opinion about Law (Réf. 1).

(2) D’après ma propre expérience de recherche, j'aurais même tendance à

préciser que la dominante est en général normative, tandis qu’elle est affective

pour les gens qui ont eu maille à partir avec la justice pénale (Réf. 2).

— 223 —

C’est d’ailleurs la difficulté à laquelle se sont heurtées la plupart

des études classiques de sociologie du droit qui ont axé sur le cognitif

leurs instruments d’investigation.. outre qu’elles ont souvent sous-

estimé les problèmes de visibilité (3).

Quoiqu’il en soit, ce point doit être considéré comme définiti-

vement acquis aux débats depuis le magistral rapport de Berl

Kutchinsky au Conseil de l’Europe (Réf. 4), d’ailleurs corroboré —

pour ce qui concerne cette question — par un ouvrage récent de

G.R. Newman (Réf. 5). À vrai dire, on n’aurait même pas pris la peine

de s’étendre ici sur ce problème de la dimension cognitive si l’on ne

relevait encore des ambiguïtés et des méconnaissances dans des articles

pourtant récents (Réf. 6).

Malgré cet acquis — d’ailleurs souvent découvert seulement

a contrario et a posteriori — il faut bien admettre que la problématique

initiale d’un décalage entre loi et « opinion » n’a guère permis une

production décisive et qu’elle ne le pouvait pas. En premier lieu, elle

charriait une espèce de postulat optimiste et naïf d’évolution linéaire

qui est directement importé des pseudo-évidences du sens commun, mais

dont le statut scientifique demeure tout à fait flou — et d’autant plus

flou qu’il reste implicite (4). En second lieu, il s’est peu à peu

avéré que l’ainsi nommée « opinion publique » constituait un pôle

de référence moins simple et plus complexe qu’on ne l’imaginait

naïvement au début.

A priori, tout le monde parle de « l’opinion publique » et, d’ailleurs,

nul ne doute de la connaître aisément et de pouvoir se targuer de

son autorité souveraine (5). On céderait les armes devant tant d’assu-

rance si l’on ne s’avisait que chacun l’invoque en des sens différents,

voire contradictoires. De sorte naît le soupçon que ce syntagme ne

soit que la couverture idéologique (6) des idiosyncrasies des uns et

des autres. On découvre alors que l’on baptise de cette expression —

apparemment indiscutable — qui les avis de ses familiers, qui les

propos de son journal favori, ou de sa chaîne de télévision accoutumée,

(3) Cette question de visibilité est en fait très importante pour notre matière

et le plus souvent négligée ; mais je ne peux en traiter ici et je dois donc

renvoyer à ce qui en est dit dans une communication, d’allure plus méthodolo-

gique, faite avcc un de mes collègues lors d’un colloque du C.N.R.S. (Réf. 3).

(4) L’effort scientifique, c’est-à-dire de connaissance et de compréhension,

commence seulement lorsqu’on se prend à questionner les assertions même les

plus assurées du sens commun et les évidences les mieux admises (Réf. 7) et

cette prescription doit rester tout particulièrement à l’esprit quand on prétend

étudier des matières tout empreintes de normativité (Réf. 8).

(5) Souveraine car évoquant la vox populi.

(6) Sans qu’il soit pertinent ni même utile de supposer des intentions

perverses ou même une conscience claire chez l’agent.

— 224 —

qui enfin ces sondages commerciaux si fort à la mode actuellement et

que s'offrent régulièrement journaux, gouvernants, groupes de pression.

Ce n’est pas le lieu ici de démontrer à nouveau les vices le plus souvent

rédhibitoires de cette activité si lucrative et je prends la liberté de

renvoyer à d’autres développements d’allure plus méthodologique

(Réf. 9). Le fâcheux est de constater que maints travaux scientifiques

sont tombés, faute de conceptualisation suffisante ou par défaut

méthodologique, dans des pièges sensiblement analogues. Là encore,

Je ne peux détailler ici ces derniers et je dois procéder par renvoi

(Réf. 10).

Quoiqu’il en soit, il a bien fallu se rendre à l’évidence : travailler

au niveau des manifestations d’opinion — c’est-à-dire traiter comme

variables les données immédiatement recueillies (7) — revenait tout

simplement à prétendre s’intéresser au phénomène des marées tout en

se contentant de recueillir l’écume des vagues, Il est clair que les

manifestations d’opinion (8), tout comme les autres données comporte-

mentales, ne peuvent avoir d’utilité que comme indicateurs

traitées

de manière agrégée et non séparément afin de découvrir les régula-

rités sous-jacentes, elles permettent de faire émerger les structures

d’attitudes, puis les types de représentations (9).

A ce moment, on s’aperçoit combien on se trouvait embarqué

dans des voies trompeuses par la notion même d’une « opinion publi-

que ». Premièrement ce pseudo-concept conduit fatalement à rai-

sonner en termes d’opinion moyenne sans pouvoir dire si cette moyenne

a une signification quelconque. Deuxièmement, elle fait tomber presque

inéluctablement dans le piège des homologies apparentes. Prenons un

exemple très simple

on est tenté de ranger dans la même catégorie

tous cux qui se déclarent mécontents de la justice pénale. Or, une

analyse plus attentive montre que, ce faisant, on classe comme sem-

blables des gens que tout sépare en réalité car ce mécontentement

vient, par exemple, pour les uns du sentiment d’une trop grande

indulgence mettant en péril les valeurs éternelles, pour les autres

d’une impression de rigidité s’opposant à toute évolution jugée souhai-

table, ou, du moins, la contrariant.

On est donc conduit à substituer à l’étude du décalage entre

loi et « opinion publique » un examen des sortes d’attitudes et des

types de représentation. Mais, alors, on soumet fatalement à interro-

(7) A supposer que ce recueîl des données ait été opéré èdrrectement.

(8) Qu’il s’agisse d’un discours et de fragments de discours selon la nature

plus ou moins standardisée de la méthodologie de recueil des données.

(9) Il est impossible dans ce bref article de préciser l’agencement conceptuel

dans lequel j’use de ces différentes notions. On en trouvera un exposé dans

d’autres publications (Réf. 11).

— 225 —

gation, comme le montrait déjà T. Sellin (Réf, 12), l’assertion qui fait

de la loi l’expression de la « volonté générale ».

Dans le même temps où l’évaluation des travaux sur loi et

« opinion » faisait découvrir l’obligation de raisonner en termes d’atti-

tudes et de sortes de représentations, d’autres raisons militaient encore

en faveur du développement de telles recherches,

Longtemps la sociologie du crime et de la déviance n’a accordé

au système pénal qu’une attention marginale. Toute entière adonnée

à l’examen du déviant et de la déviance, elle négligeait largement

d’étudier la main qui lui tendait, pourtant, le plus clair de son infor-

mation.

On réputait — implicitement — que le système pénal était parfai-

tement transparent ; on le considérait comme une sorte de moule qui

recevait passivement l’impact de la criminalité — ce qui mettait le

chercheur à même d’étudier ensuite cette dernière. Bref, la justice

pénale n’était pour le sociologue du crime que la plaque sensible

sur laquelle s’était imprimé son objet d’étude. On considérait donc le

processus pénal comme opérant un simple transfert de données, une

translation ayant pour effet de mettre l’objet d’étude à la disposition

du chercheur (10).

Pareille attitude n’a pas été sans inconvénient pour la sociologie

du crime et de la déviance. En effet, elle se résignait — ce faisant —

à ignorer les conditions de production de sa matière première. Comme

un myope, elle s’enfermait dans un objet d’étude prétendument évident

selon les évidences de sens commun. Mais ceci lui dissimulait un

phénomène fondamental et rendait impossible un autre, tout aussi

important. Cette boîte qu’on croyait de verre, qu’il n’importait pas

d’ouvrir — la justice pénale — s’avérait être une boîte noire bien

difficile à connaître, En outre, ne pas ouvrir la boîte noire de la justice

pénale est se condamner à une sociologie provincialiste qui ne pourra

jamais rattacher — sinon nonchalamment — son propos à une sociologie

historiquement datée de la société entière. Ces deux faiblesses classiques

ont été durement reprochées à la sociologie du crime et de la déviance.

Sous l’effet de pareille critique, notre discipline est venue à

s’intéresser plus activement au système pénal, et d’ailleurs d’autant

plus que celui-ci émergeait lentement comme problème social, comme

institution en crise : il devenait objet de préoccupations pour l’homme

politique ou l’administrateur, d’engagement pour le militant… fina-

lement d’étude pour le chercheur.

(10) Toût au plu$ se désolait-on que des contraintes administratives, juridiques

des renseignements sur le crime et le criminel.

ou le manque de moyens viennent parfois restreindre l’étendue ou la complétion

— 226 —

Avec le relatif recul du temps, les coups d’essai ne sont toutefois

DIs apparus ocomme ayant été pleinement concluants.

D’un côté, nous avons observé depuis le début des années 60 le

pullulement d’écoles anglo-saxonnes — et surtout américaines — qui

prétendaient étudier les modalités de contrôle social de la criminalité.

Elles y parvenaient mal cependant par une ambiguïté dans la problé-

matique. Malgré leur appellation, ces écoles se bornaient le plus souvent

à conïérer au contrôle social le statut de variable explicative de la

déviance, oubliant que la différence de logique entre les deux phéno-

mèncs oolige à y voir deux problématiques irréductibles l’une à

l’autre (Réf. 13).

D’un autre côté, nous avons vu se développer une sociologie

technologique qui focalisait certes son attention sur le système pénal,

mais dans un laxisme épistémologique lui faisant accepter comme des

postulats tous les lieux communs, toutes les idées reçues sur le système

pénal. Il aurait été pourtant préférable de les traiter comme de simples

hypothèses à tester : en agissant comme l’a fait ce courant de pensée,

on arrive à supprimer tout objet de recherche. Le résultat n’ajoute

Tien aux prémisses excepté de l’ésotérisme ou de la « recettologie ».

En fait, ce courant n’a guère été fructueux

il a redit en

termes compliqués les assertions — même erronées -— du sens

commun ; ou alors, il s’est borné à du rapiéçage tandis qu’empirait

imperturbablement une crise qui se comprend au niveau de la fonction

sociale du système pénal et pas tellement (11) à celui de son fonction-

nement.

Enfin, on a souvent admis que le système pénal se ramène à un

ensemble — plus ou moins complexe — d’institutions ou d’agences (12)

entretenant entre elles des relations systémiques et l’on borne l’attention

à ce complexe institutionnel. On risque ainsi de revenir ou de rester

à un simple fonctionnalisme. Or, les institutions constituant le système

pénal sont seulement comme la partie émergée d’un iceberg… Pour

la comprendre finalement il faut s’avérer capable de sonder la masse

bien plus importante qui se trouve immergée. En clair, non seulement

le contrôle social de la criminalité n’est pas entièrement institution-

nalisé (13), mais encore ce qui l’est ne fonctionne qu’adossé à cette

(11) Ou seulement par ricochet.

(12) Police, ministère public, juridictions, agences d’exécution pour majeurs

ou mineurs, de milieu fermé ou ouvert.

- (13) On (KRéf. 14) a ainsi montré que la double spirale de ségrégation qui carac-

térise la situation de bandes de jeunes et qui organise ses rapports à l’environ-

nement, se développe fort bien même sans étiquetage par le système pénal,

donc déjà au seul niveau des relations informelles. Des travaux récents ont en

outre souligné que les représentations de la déviance et de son contrôle confinent

généralement le système pénal dans un rôle marginal et limité à certaines cibles

bien délimitées.

— 227 —

énorme masse peu — ou pas — institutionnalisée dont l’étude est trop

souvent négligée. Ce faisant, on se condamne à mal comprendre le

fonctionnement de la justice pénale et pas du tout à sa place dans

la structure sociale.

La réalité du système pénal n’est donc pas épuisée par le seul

examen de ses règles et modalités institutionnalisées et de ses produits.

Elle se découvre encore dans les représentations qu’on en a et leur

connaissance est indispensable si l’on veut ouvrir la boîte noire.

Les produits et modes d’opérer du système pénal sont indisso-

ciablement liés à ce qu’on en pense, à ses représentations. Ce n’est

pas que ces deux aspects de la réalité pénale soient réductibles l’un à

l’autre. Mais il y a interaction entre les deux (Réf., 15).

Tout d’abord le fonctionnement concret de la justice pénale dépend

de manière importante des représentations qui en ont cours.

Pour qu’une affaire arrive aux institutions répressives, il faut

que les faits soient suffisamment visibles ou qu’il se trouve quelqu’un

pour avertir la police. La visibilité, quant à elle, dépend de conditions

objectives et fort variables selon les cas. Il n’est pas besoin d’être

grand clerc pour réaliser que certains passent le plus clair de leur

vie à l’abri des regards indiscrets tandis que d’autres vivent en perma-

nence à découvert : les illégalismes de ceux-ci sont plus « visibles »

que ceux des autres. Et cette visibilité est fort liée au statut (notamment

professionnel) des agents, donc finalement à leur place dans la structure

sociale. Mais la visibilité n’est pas tout. Les faits que les institutions

répressives découvrent vraiment de leur seule initiative ne sont pas

les plus nombreux. En définitive, la majeure partie de sa matière

première vient au système pénal parce que quelqu’un est venu de

quelque manière lui signaler l’affaire. Ceci met naturellement en jeu les

conditions objectives de reportabilité : certaines infractions — sans

victime individuelle directe (14) — auront moins de chances d’être

dénoncées puisque nul ne s’en reconnaît directement et individuellement

victime

c’est le cas d’une bonne partie du crime organisé et de la

criminalité d’affaires. En sens inverse, les atteintes à la propriété — du

vol de vo'ture au hold-up — auront le maximum de chances d'être

reportées à la police pour cette simple raison que les compagnies

d’assurances exigent souvent pareil préalable à la déclaration de

sinistre.

Mais la responsabilité met encore et surtout en jeu d’autres

mécanismes moins clairs mais tout aussi influents. La décision de

(14) En fait elles pèsent non sur un individu particulier mais sur des fractions

entières de population : ainsi de la fraude fiscale qui porte tort à tous ceux qui

ne peuvent guère y recourir car leurs revenus sont déclarés par autrui (donc

les salariés).

— 228 —

reporter un fait à la police dépend finalement beaucoup des repré-

sentations que l'on se fait du délit (Jle comportement dont nous sommes

témoin ou victime est-il considéré comme un « vrai délit » ?), du délin-

quant (rangeons-nous son auteur parmi les « vrais » délinquants relevant

de la répression pénale ?), finalement du système pénal et de son

adéquation (à quoi doit-il servir ?). Bref, la connaissance d’un fait par

la justice dépend donc à la fois

— de conditions objectives variables selon l’appartenance

sociale comme la plus ou moins grande visibilité ou encore

les circonstances poussant à la reportabilité ou la rendant

improbable,

— Inais aussi des représentations du délit, du délinquant et

de l’adéquation de chaque appareil de contrôle social, dont

le système pénal.

L'influence des représentations sur le fonctionnement du méca-

nisme pénal ne s’arrête pas à cette phase préliminaire — et d’ailleurs

fondamentale. On a montré que le système de justice pénale opère —

parmi la matière première qu’il découvre ou qu’on lui amène — un tri

et une progressive construction de son produit fini. Celui-ci s’élabore à

travers les phases successives de ce mécanisme et, à chaque moment,

entrent en jeu les représentations que se font les opérateurs du système

pénal, bref leur idéologie professionnelle (15).

Ajoutons que ces représentations — qui conditionnent de manière

importante le fonctionnement de la justice pénale — ne sont pas de

génération spontanée. De quelque manière, elles dépendent en fin

de compte de la structure de l’appareil pénal, de son fonctionnement,

surtout de sa production. Dans les représentations du système pénal,

on constate l’existence de fortes stéréotypies reposant sur la production

d’une image type dc son produit fini. On observe également que les

appareils de production idéologique — comme par exemple la presse —

diffusent de telles stéréotypies et de semblables images types Or,

l’existence de cette colonisation idéologique s’alimente au mécanisme

par lequel le système pénal construit progressivement son objet. Parmi

les données et individus constituant la matière première initiale, certains

éléments sont sélectionnés et d’autres rejetés. Puis, ceux qui ont été

conservés sont reconstruits selon la logique interne propre à œ

système et à sa fonction sociale, de sorte que son intervention —

permise en fait par les conditions objectives et les représentations des

intervenants extérieurs, lesquels éléments ne sont pas aléatoires mais

significativement différents selon la structure sociale — paraît avec

(15) Idéologie qui, tout comme celle du public, est loin d’être transparente

pour le chercheur. Il y a tout à la fois intériorisation des contraintes institu-

tionnelles, négociations au niveau des pratiques, et remaniements afin d’éviter

une trop grande dissonance entre normes et réalités des pratiques.

— 229 —

les atiributs inéluctables du destin. Par cette opération, s’édifient des

images types de la clienièle de la justice pénale et de l’adéquation de

cet appareil à telle ou telle intervention, Or, il se trouve que c

produit fini émerge seul — et encore partiellement — de la boîte noire,

qu’il est plus visiblee On comprend la place qu’il tiendra dans

la production des représentations du délit, du délinquant et du système

pénal.

Toutefois ces représentations ne sont pas une photographie du

fonctionnement. Tout n’est pas également visible dans l’appareil pénal,

tout n’y est pas non plus également compréhensible. De surcroît, visibi-

lité et ésotérisme varient selon la situation des différents groupes sociaux

pertinents (16). Ajoutons encore à cela l’existence d’intermédiaires,

d’entrepreneurs idéologiques — comme la presse — qui informent,

forment et déforment. Tenons ainsi compte du fait que la justice

pénale a une histoire fort ancienne, de sorte que le changement

d’aujourd’hui peut mettre longtemps à effacer la trace d’hier. N’oublions

pas que l’on ne se représente pas le système pénal seul en isolat,

que son image doit donc s’insérer dans des conceptions du monde, des

visions de la vie sociale. Enfin, dans la détermination des conduites

effectives des différents groupes, leurs attitudes devront composer avec

des contraintes de situation — variables d’un groupe à l’autre — et qui

rétroagiront sur les représentations et les attitudes.

Voici autant de considérations qui expliquent pourquoi les idées

qu’on se fait sur le système pénal (qui traduisent certaines modalités

de relations à ce même système), ont une consistance propre et une

autonomie certaine — quoique relative — par rapport à son fonc-

tionnement.

Mais on n’oubliera pas qu’en sens inverse les représentations

conditionnent en bonne partie le fonctionnement et la production de

la justice pénale. Ce qui paraît du domaine du symbolique s’avère

posséder des vertus très concrètes,

Et voilà pourquoi une bonne connaissance du système pénal ne

peut s’arrêter à l’analyse des produits et modes d’opérer mais doit

encore s’élargir aux représentations.

Au reste, la réalité de l’appareil pénal ne se borne pas à ce

qu’il est aujourd’hui compte même tenu du poids de l’histoire. Elle est

(16) Lorsque nous parlons ici de groupes sociaux pertinents, il ne s’agit pas

de groupes définis a posteriori par la recherche — ce qui correspondrait à un

« emnirisme » récusable — ni aux classiques catégories socioprofessionnetlles.

qui elles-même recouvrent une théorie souvent peu explicitée. Il s’agit de

grounes définis nar une démarche théorico-conceptuelle préalable et indisso-

ciable de l’ensemble de la recherche. Sinon, on ne fait que se laisser piéger par

l’usage d’instruments préexistants.

— 230 —

encore dans les contradictions, conflits, attentes qui peuvent s’observer

à son propos. Et cette nécessité — pour bien connaître l’appareil

pénal — de le situer historiquement dans un présent instable entre

un passé et un devenir augmente l’urgence d’une investigation sur les

représentations…

La conjonction de ces diverses considérations explique le délais-

sement progressif de la problématique initiale du décalage entre loi

et « opinion » (17) au profit d’une interrogation sur la diversité des

attitudes et des représentations concernant les matières pénales. Mais

cet approfondissement, en principe satisfaisant, risque d’être réduit de

manière telle qu’on passera une fois de plus à côté des questions

pertinentes.

C’est à propos que je voudrais consacrer ce papier à quelques

observations sur l’utilisation de la dichotomie consensus vs conflit dans

l’étude des attitudes envers le crime et la loi pénale.

»

Les recherches sur les attitudes envers le crime et la loi sont,

en effet, en passe d’être dominées par une opposition simple — voire

simpliste — entre consensus et conflit. Cette dichotomie a surtout fait

fortune en Amérique du Nord ; elle prétend ranger les sociologues de

la déviance en deux camps : ceux qui postulent l’existence au sein

d’une société donnée — voire de l’humanité — d’un accord minimum

au sujet des problèmes criminels ; et ceux qui se refusent à pareil

postulat et ne voient à ce propos qu’attitudes contradictoires, voire

opposées.

Celui qui s’aventure dans l’étude des représentations et attitudes

concernant le crime et la loi pénale est sommé de se ranger dans l’un

de ces camps, faute de quoi on y pourvoira pour lui.

Je voudrais montrer que ce simplisme est peu fécond — ou, du

moins, insuffisant — qu’il risque même de faire passer à côté des

interrogations pertinentes.

Pareille discussion me sera occasion de traiter, à la lumière de

diverses recherches récentes, de quelques questions essentielles à l’étude

des attitudes envers le crime et la loi pénale.

Û.Û

Considérons iout d’abord que cette opposition — qui est appa-

mmmt simple — s’avère en fait être à contenu variable.

(17) Encore que certains ouvrages récents y reviennent, comme le fait G.R.

et Caricatural de la dichotomis consensus vs conflit.

Newman (Réf. 16), mais justement, me semble-t-il. par l’effet d’un usage abusif

— 231 —

On s’en aperçoit tout de suite en cherchant à préciser ce que

l’on recouvre de l’étiquette « conflit ».

Dans une acceptation étroite, l’expression « école du conflit » est

appliquée à ditférents auteurs qui s’inspirent de R. Dahrendorf (Réf. 17),

notamment naturellement A. Turk (Réf. 18), mais aussi, dans leur

première époque, W.J. Chambliss (Réf. /9) et, dans une certaine

mesure, R. Quinney (Réf. 20). Chambliss est d’ailleurs l’un des respon-

sables de cette dichotomie puisqu’il la pose comme summa divisio

en tête de son ouvrage de 1971 (Réf. 2/). Tl n’est toutefois que

juste de rappeler que Chambliss subdivisait l’opposition consensus-

conflit. Il distinguait dabord ceux pour qui toute société reposait sur

une certaine communauté consensuelle de ceux qui y voient fonda-

mentalement un champ de conflit ; mais parmi ces derniers, il subdis-

tinguait ceux pour aui l’Etat est au-dessus de la mêlée de ceux aux

yeux de qui 1l est l’enjeu du conflit.

Quoiqu'il en soit, cette appellatiôn — école du conflit — avait

de

essentiellement pour fonction — dans la pratique courante

distinguer la filiation de R. Dahrendorf de celle de G.H. Mead (Réf. 22),

c’est-à-dire tout ce que l’on range lato sensu sous le vocable d’inter-

actionnismes. Toutefois, malgré la différence de filiations, la distinction

apparaît

finalement assezpeu au niveau des

produits.

Malgré

les efforts de Chambliss notamment (18), on y étudie surtout les

aspects différentiels et inégalitaires de la répression pénale, mais sans

savoir focaliser décidément sa problématique sur la norme pénale et

son effectivité au sein d’une sociologie globale,

Dans une acceptation plus large, on étend l’étiquette « conflit » à

des post-interactionnistes plus déclarés comme les criminologues radi-

caux ou critiques et même jusqu’à l’aile la plus radicale de l’ancien

group> de Berkeley : la tendance manifestée depuis 1970, par T. Platt

(Réf. 23) ct les Schwendinger (Réf. 24).

En fait, là encore, la rupture est plus verbale que réelle. De

tcls auteurs adhèrent souvent à une alternative humaniste modrne qui

ne rompt pas substantiellement avec l’idéalisme antérieur. Lode Van

Outrive (Réf. 25) a justement souligné que cett école ne parvient pas

à dépasser le niveau atteint par les interactionnistes et les phénoméno-

logues-ethnométhodologues.

De proche en proche, le terme de conflit est parfois utilisé pour

recouvrir tous les post-interactionnistes ; on l’applique pêle-mêle aux

« radicaux », aux «critiques », aux néo-marxistes, etc… En fin de

compte, ce syncrétisme n’est pas tellement étonnant puisque — à

(18) Tout spécialement dans ses travaux de sociologie de droit.

— 232 —

quelques rares exceptions près (19) — on retrouve dans tout ce foison-

nement de prises de position un vieux fonds commun de nominalisme

idéaliste et d’humanisme dont on vient de dresser un bilan sans

complaisance (Réf. 26); il ressort bien à la définition que donne N.

Poulantzas de l’ultragauchisme petit bourgeois (Réf. 27).

Au gré des auteurs, l’opposition consensus-conflit sert donc soit

à identifier la filiation de Dahrendorf, soit à désigner tous les post-

interactionnistes, qu’ils se baptisent anti-criminologues, criminologues

critiques, criminologues radicaux ou néo-marxistes.

Mais la géométrie variable de cette opposition peut même être

utilisée pour couvrir une marchandise plus vaste et désigner tous les

sociologues de la déviance postfonctionnalistes. C’est d’ailleurs la

porte qu’ouvrait Chambliss en identifiant le consensus à T. Parsons

(Réf. 28).

p

Il est d’ailleurs bien vrai qu’il y a — toujours

à

quelques

exceptions près — moins de rupture fondamentale qu’on ne pourrait le

penser dans la multiplication des écoles qui marque la littérature

criminologique des quinze dernières années… ou, du moins, une

véritable rupture épistémologique à été préparée plutôt qu’accomplie.

C’est que, malgré toutes les différences de tendances, ces auteurs ont

surtout songé à inverser le sens de l’équation, à atteler la locomotive en

queue et non plus en tête de train. Mais un tel changement du

sens de la marche laisse intact le problème fondamental de l’objet

de recherche. Toutes ces criminologies demeurent finalement focalisées

dans leur log'que ultime, sur le crime et le criminel, en ce sens

qu’elles restent des criminologies du passage à l’acte (Réf. 29).

Simplement :

— les interactionnistes ont fait de la réaction sociale une — voire

la — variable explicative de la criminalité ;

— les théoriciens du conflit

——n

striclo sensu

——

ont mis

l’accent sur le traitement discriminatoire par le système pénal

(20) ;

— la plupart des radicaux ont proposé de considérer d’autres

crimes que ceux habituellement ressassés, et donc d’autres

criminels que ceux recrutés dans les habituelles « classes

laborieuses, classes dangereuses » (Réf. 32).

(19) Qui se situent généralement dans différents pays européens et qu’il ne

faut pas traiter par prétérition sous prétexte qu’ils sont souvent interna-

tionalement peu connus.

(20) Souvent sans aller beaucoup plus loin qu'un fonctionnalisme rénové ; en

tout cas en ignorant ou €n traitant de manière infirme tout ce qui a trait aux

idéologies. De ce point de vue, peu de progrès scientifique a été accompli

depuis le bilan dressé dans Crime and the Legal Process (Réf. 30). En fait, la

plupart de ces travaux n’ont pas su égaler D. Chapman qui demeure, pour ce

courant, un précurseur solitaire et souvent ignoré (Réf. 31).

— 233 —

Mais tout cela n’empêche pas que ces différentes « écoles» se

laissent généralement imposer un objet de recherche préconstruit par

les errements du sens commun, par les représentations de l’idéologie

dominante. Elles n’ont généralement pas su mener à bien une construc-

tion réelle de leur objet, bref, elles n’ont pas pu réussir une véritable

réflexion sur leur problématique. De la sorte, la « rupture épistémo-

logique » n’est pas véritablement assurée avec les errements criminolo-

giques classiques, notamment avec les culturalistes et fonctionnalistes.

Même en adoptant une géométrie variable, l’opposition consensus-

conflit hypertrophie à mauvais droit les changements théoriques inter-

venus ces dernières décennies à propos de notre ob]ct d’étude. Elle a

donc peu de justification.

Malgré quoi, on assiste à un nouvel avatar qui vise à en faire

une division permanente des théories en sociologie de la déviance

Dans un ouvrage récent, Lynn Mc Donald entreprend de reconstruire

toute l’histoire de cette discipline depuis le 18* siècle, et même au-delà,

sous les espèces d’un combat entre tenants du consensus et tenants

du conflit (Réf. 33)

L’exemple de ce livre — par ailleurs sympathique et intéressant —

est utile en ce qu’il permet de découvrir l’un des vices majeurs de

l’opposition consensus-conflit :

l’idéalisme.

En extrapolant de proche en proche à partir de la considération

de la filiation anglo-saxonne de Dahrendorf, on parvient à reconstruire

un sorte d'histoire de la sociologie de la déviance dépeinte comme

l’affrontement sans cesse renouvelé de « l’école » du consensus et de

celle du conflit

Mais, ce faisant, on ne présente plus qu’un théâtre d’ombres où

les idées paraissent évoluer en soi, l’une poussant l’autre, sous l’effet

d’on ne sait quel deus ex machina

Qu'il y ait sans cesse, en sociologie de la déviance, une majorité

de conformistes qui acceptent les soit-disant évidences du sens commun

— Singulièrement celles d’un consensus social qu’exprimerait la loi

c’est-à-dire l’Etat — et une minorité qui se réserve le droit d’interroger

ces postulats, c’est-à-dire de ne pas se borner à ressortir en termes

abscons les constructions d’objet du sens commun, voilà qui est clair

En faire pour autant des sortes « d’écoles» qui traversent les siècles

me paraît cependant exagéré et dénué de pouvoir explicatif. On a

l’impression de relire chez Loyola la bataille des deux étendards (21)

(Réf. 34)

(21) Je voudrais répéter une fois de plus que l’utilisation de cette image à

titre de comparaison ne veut pas dire que je mésestime les qualités certaines

et l’intérêt de l’ouvrage de Lynn Mc Donald, mais j’ai eu l’occasion de dire

plus longuement mon sentiment sur ce travail dans une autre revue (Réf. 35)

—— 234 —

Au reste. Lynn Mc Donald est obligée — pour s’en tirer — de

supposer un échange d’argumentaires en cours de joute

peu à peu,

ceux qui adoptent une vue « conflictuelle » auraient délaissé les théories

à étiologie économicisante pour mettre l’accent principalement sur

le développement cancérigène des systèmes spécialisés de contrôle social,

tandis que les avocats du consensus auraient récupéré les notions de

problèmes sociaux, d’inégalités et de privation. Comment identifier sous

le même courant ceux qui séparent des renversements aussi radicaux

d'argumentaires ? Comment, sinon au prix d’un incompréhensible

idéalisme, faire de cette dichotomie consensus vs conflit deux courants

qui se partageraient le champ de la sociologie de la déviance et

suffiraient à expliquer son développement ?

De surcroît, cette opposition n’explique rien puisque les différences

ainsi mises en exergue ne sont pas fondamentales : du point de vue de

la problématique, de l’objet de recherche, bien des « conflictuels »

ne se séparent pas radicalement, nous l’avons vu, des « consensuels ».

se

°

L'usage de l’opposition consensus vs conflit expose — outre

l’idéalisme — à un second danger

caricaturer une opposition et, ce

faisant, passer à côté de certaines questions fondamentales pour l’étude

des attitudes envers le crime et la loi pénale.

Ainsi un travail récent présente-t-il les deux positions, l’une comme

“

stipulant un assez large accord sur les conduites à réprouver et à

réprimer, l’autre comme prétendant qu’il n’existe aucun accord sur ce

point (Réf. 36). Et G.R. Newman prétend trancher le dialogue de

sourds qu’il croit s'être instauré entre les deux « écoles » du consensus

et du conflit

celle-là n’appliquant son effort qu’à des infractions

classiques et peu discutées, celle-ci bornant son intérêt aux cas litigieux

des crimes sans victime. D’où, soutient-il. l’impossibilité de trancher

Sérieusement entre elles. Lui, prétend, au contraire, résoudre définiti-

vement cette querelle en appliquant à des populations tirées dans six

pays (Inde. Indonésie, Iran, Italie, Etat-Unis et Yougoslavie) un

questionnaire comprenant des cas variés d’infractions (mmala in se de

type inceste, mmala antiqua de type vol qualifié, mala prohibita comme

es crimes sans victime, mala nova comme la pollution, mala ambigua

comme l’omission de porter secours ou les infractions liées aux mani-

festations de protestation). Il souligne un très large accord transculturel

sur la réprobation tandis que d’importantes variations apparaissent

dans les définitions, la connaissance de la loi et la perception de

l’action répressive des agences officielles.

Qu'’il trouve un large accord sur un sentiment de gravité-répro-

bation l’amène à se ranger aux côtés de P. Sorokin (Réf. 37) : les

lois sont l’expression de l’état de l’opinion. On se souvient, en effet, que

— 235 —

A.K. Cohen (Réf. 38)-—employant avant la lettre l’opposition consensus-

conflit à propos de la genèse des lois pénales — avait ramené la

controverse sur les attitudes envers la loi

énale à une opposition

entre la position de Sorokin et celle de Becker (Réf. 39). Quant à

Newman, ce résultat le conduit à conclure que les théories consensuelles

se trouvent ainsi vérifiées ct celles du conflit rejetées et à revenir à

la problématique en termes de décalage loi-opinion.

Toutefois, cette conclusion me paraît invalide en raison du

caractère caricatural de l’opposition sur laquelle repose ce travail.

Pourtant, Newman prend un certain nombre de précautions

conceptuelles louables — et qui constituent un apport solide de son

ouvrage. Ainsi précise-t-il que le consensus ne correspond pas à un

problème de majorité-minorité, s'agirait-il même d’une majorité absolue.

Il distingue, de manière convaincante, quatre situations

-— CONSENSUS

à une position structurée ne s’en oppose aucune autre ;

—- dissensus

plusieurs positions structurées s’opposent, l’une majoritaire, les

autres minoritaires :

— conflit :

plusieurs positions s’opposent sans qu'aucune prédomine clai-

rement ;

— ASEnNsus :

il y a atomisation des positions.

Seulement, il ne tire pas des conclusions très convaincantes de

cette excellente classification (Réf. 40). Qu’il y ait un assez large accord

pour désapprouver les conduites analogues à celles retenues dans son

questionnaire, qu’il y ait même un certain accord pour considérer

qu’elles relèvent adéquatement du système pénal — ce qui apparait

déjà beaucoup moins nettement dans ses résultats — donc qu'’elles

doivent être considérées comme des infractions. voilà qui est assez

trivial et ne permet pas de trancher du consensus.

*

%%

En fait 1l faut sérier plusieurs problèmes dans les représentations

du crime et de la loi pénale. Les représentations sont structurées par

plusieurs dimensions d’attitudes (22).

Une première et essentielle distinction sépare le sentiment de

gravité et celui d'adéquation d'une modalité de contrôle à un type de

(22) Et les positions sur chaque dimension d’attitude peuvent varier selon

les groupes sociaux pertinents, de sorte que l’on pourra observer diverses

combinaisons de ces attitudes, c’est-à-dire différents types de représentation.

— 236 —

conduite (Réf. 4/), Beaucoup d’auteurs (Réf. 42) confondent, en effet.

les deux

ils partent de l’idée d’un continuum linéaire unidimensionnel

sur lequel s'étaleraient les perceptions de la déviance, avec, au sommet,

la plage de la criminalité, qui serait caractérisée comme la déviance

la plus grave — ou du moins celle considérée comme telle. Ce

faisant ils postulent une continuité perçue là où bien des travaux ont

surtout mis l’accent sur l’existence de solutions de continuité perçues

(23). Et dans le même temps, ils confondent deux dimensions de

perception

la gravité et l’adéquation. Or, une même conduite peut

très bien, dans un type donné dc représentations, être considérée

come relevant adéquatement du système pénal — donc comme

infraction — et pourtant, en même temps, comme moins grave que telle

autre estimée relever adéquatement d’un contrôle social non pénal,

donc pas comme infraction.

Sans vouloir s’étendre ici trop longuement sur un point qui a fait

l’objet de travaux par ailleurs (Réf. 43), on dira seulement qu’il est

impossible d'’étudier ensemble ces deux dimensions

perceptuelles

que sont la gravité de l'adéquation. Celle-ci domine les représentations

générales des déviances. Elle correspond en matière de représentations

au problème juridique du seuil de criminalisation-décriminalisation.

La sociologie des représentations ne peut aborder ce dernier qu’en

termes de perception d'adéquation et non en termes de perception de

eravité.

D'ailleurs, Newman aperçoit bien cettc distinction conceptuelle

et ses résultats en soulignent clairement la pertinence. Il montre notam-

ment qu’il existe d'assez larges variations dans ses six populations

sur l’attitude d’adéquation de telle forme de contrôle à telle déviance

(24). On lui reprochera seulement de ne guère respecter par la suite

ce qu’il a lui-même contribué à clarifier, notamment en construisant

deux indices et surtout le second que l’on peut assez justement

soupçonner de mélanger de manière abusive ces différentes dimensions.

_—

(2.31).'Â'_'cthoutes les conséquences méthodologiques qu’entraîne l’emploi

d’instruments supposant une continuité linéaire.

(24) Encore ses résultats ne pouvaient-ils être très développés pour trois

raisons

a) comme son sous-titre l’indique plus que son titre, le questionnaire

utilisé bornait l’investigation à quelques cas d’infractions sans permettre

d’étudier les représentations de la déviance en général ;

b) il a traité chaque population nationale — dont on ne connaît guère les

modes de stratifications — comme un tout faute d’y appliquer une

analyse selon les groupes sociaux pertinents

c) enfin — comme nous le redirons en conclusion — sa méthode compa-

rative postule une sorte d’universalisme idéaliste qui évacue — mal

les apparences — toute compréhension de l’historicité des sociétés et de

leurs instances juridiques - normatives, ainsi que des phénomènes idéolo-

giques qui y sont produits.

— 237 —

Mais abandonnons maintenant le problème du seuil de crimi-

nalisation-décriminalisation et donc celui de la perception d’adéquation

d’une forme de contrôle social à une déviance donnée. Nous retrouvons

alors la question de l’attitude envers la gravité.

Ce que ne comprend pas Newman — et c'est le principal grei

que l’on peut lui faire — c’est que les divergences ne peuvent

pas — ou seulement marginalement —- porter sur la perception de

gravité-réprobation. Aboutir à faire dire aux gens que des conduites

incriminées par la loi pénale sont plutôt réprouvables que recomman-

dables paraît finalement assez trivial, En fait la perception de gravité

doit se traiter en termes d’ordre de priorités relatives. La loi pénale

incrimine un nombre très large de conduites et ce n’est un mystère

pour personne que son effectivité répressive varie de manière très

importante de l’une à l’autre. Elle recèle d’ailleurs de superbes

contradictions internes qui ne peuvent se résoudre en pratique qu’en

introduisant des choix, des priorités de fait au niveau de l’effectivité.

Et ce « mode d’emploi » résulte de la combinaison d’effets idéologiques

et de choix dans l’agencement des systèmes répressifs et dans l’allocation

des ressources (25). C’est là qu’est le nœud gordien. C’est là aussi

qu’il faut faire porter l’investigation sur la perception de gravité.

Mais la conceptualisation et l’agencement méthodologique de la recher-

che de Newman ne permettaient pas d’y atteindre.

Je vais tenter de montrer un peu plus bas comment il est possible

d’y parvenir. Auparavant, il faut ajouter que la perception de gravité

(relative, d’ordre de priorité) ne règle pas toute la représentation de la

loi pénale. Elle correspond — si l’on veut une comparaison juridique —

à la partie de droit pénal spécial qui règle les infractions et leurs

sanctions.

L’adéquation dont on parlait tout à l’heure est mesurée selon une

représentation de la délinquance qui combine deux dimensions : la

gravité reconnue à l’acte et l'intentionalité imputée à l’auteur ; une

investigation complète sur les représentations et attitudes envers la loi

pénale ne doit pas borner son investigation à la perception de gravité.

Il faut la compléter par une investigation sur la perception de l’inten-

tionalité — ce qui correspond aux problèmes de droit pénal général.

$

=s*

Faute de pouvbir exemplifier ici chacune de ces trois dimensions

d’attitudes. je vais, pour finir, tenter de montrer spr un exemple

(‘iS)‘lä rècherché——— par ailleurs intéressante de N. Herpin (Réf. 44)—présente

à mon avis la faiblesse de miser touté l’explication de la production du

système pénal sur des raisons tenant à son agencement (et avec des données

parfois fragiles) mais en négligeant totalement les mécanismes idéologiques.

— 238 —

comment il est possible d’étudier la perception de gravité des infractions

en termes de priorités relatives (26).

L’instrument utilisé se compose de 65 descriptions en termes

« quotidiens » de comportements incriminés par la loi. Selon la métho-

dologie mise au point par T. Sellin et M. Wolfgang (Réf. 45) et souvent

répliquée depuis, ont s’est assuré d’étudier seulement la dimension

d’attitude en excluant des descriptions toute information sur l’intentiona-

lité et en les bornant aux conditions et aux conséquences « objectives »

des faits.

Ces comportements ont été choisis de manière à représenter un

éventail aussi diversifié que possible de toute les sortes d’incriminations

légales en droit français, y compris celles qui sont consensuelles,

conspiratoires ou à victimisation indirecte, etc.

Les personnes interrogées étaient invitées à donner une note

exprimant la gravité relative attribuée à chaque comportement. Ce

n’est pas ici le lieu d’entrer dans une discussion sur les échelles de

notation. Je me bornerai à dire que l’on a choisi l’utilisation d’une

échelle entièrement libre à la seule exception de l’interdiction du O et

des notes négatives dont la signification aurait pu être ambiguë et

exprimer une appréciation sur l’adéquation en même temps que — ou

à la place de — une appréciation sur la gravité relative.

Cet instrument a été administré à un échantillon représentatif

de la population française de 15 à 69 ans révolus, tiré selon la

méthode des quotas. On a donc recueilli 1 800 séries de notes.

Avant de pouvoir utiliser ces données, il était nécessaire — compte

tenu du choix d’une méthode à échelle libre — de réduire les amplitudes

utilisées à une amplitude unique. Pour cela, on a rapporté les notes

données pour chaque item par un individu à l’amplitude de son échelle

personnelle.

Si l’on appelle :

— Mij la note donnée affectivement à l’infraction ; par

l’individu : :

— mi la note la plus basse utilisée par cet individu ;

— Mi sa note la plus haute.

On analysera le tableau fi; où

Mij_-——— m/

fij =

M — mi

(26) La recherche ici retenue comme exemple a fait l’objet de diverses publi-

cations plus détaillées auxquelles je prends la liberté de renvoyer pour plus

«mple information (Réf. 44).

—w—

Concrétement les notes à analyser seront un rapport à 100, valeur

attribuée à la note maximum donnée par un individu. Pour un

item donné la notc scra tel pourcentage de l’échelle de gravité.

On a appliqué aux données ainsi transformées une méthode de

traitement statistique où les relations entre éléments statistiques sont

figurées dans des représentations graphiques planes, obtenues par

condensation à partir d’une représentation dans un espace à n dimen-

sions : les éléments analysés sont représentés par des points et leurs rela-

tions par les distances qui les séparent ; les proximités entre ces points

permettent d’opérer des groupements dont les oppositions conduisent à

l’interprétation des facteurs déterminant la répartition des perceptions

d’infractions. Dans l’analyse factorielle des correspondances (27), (Réf.

47), on travaille sur des « profils» et non sur des nombres bruts.

Les séries de notes de gravité obtenues par chacun des délits ont été

placées en variables actives et les données concernant les caractéristiques

socio-culturelles des interviewés en variables supplémentaires.

Il était nécessaire d’utiliser comme variables actives tant les

antinotes que les notes (28). En effet, dans un tableau qui n’aurait

comporté que des notes, les profils des infractions ayant recueilli en

moyenne une note élevée se seraient trouvés aplatis par rapport aux

profils des infractions ayvant obtenu en moyenne une note basse.

Supposons. par exemple. que D+ soit une infraction ayant suscité

une forte réprobation et D’+ une infraction jugée mineure

entre

deux notes données par les individus / et /’

n (( D+) = 10

et n ( D+) =

8

Il y a la même différence qu’entrè

|

n ( D'+) =

et n (ÿ, D'+) =

3

Comme entre 8 et 10, la variation relative n’est que de 20 %, le

profil des notes D+ sera presque plat : le point se placera au centre

des graphiques. Au contraire, D+ aura un profil au contraste très

accusé puisque la variation relative est de 200 % ; le point pourra être

à la périphérie des graphiques. Afin de rétablir l’équilibre. il convient

de traiter un tableau dédoublé.

(27) Je nc m'étendrai pas ici sur la convenance de cette méthode statis-

tique au problème ici traité

la question est longuement exposée par J.C.

Weinberger dans la thèse qu'’il a tirée de cette recherche (Réf. 46). Il est inté-

ressant de noter que Newman utilise aussi une méthode d’analyse factorielle.

mais sans en tirer peut-être tout ce qu’il était possible d’en obtenir au niveau

de l’interprétation des résultats.

(28) Les notes indiquent la pari de l’amplitude de l’échelle 100 donnée

à une infraction, les antinotes représentent la

été donnée à cette infraction.

part de l’échelle 100 qui n’a pas

— 240 —

-Mais cette opération a comme conséquence de donner aux variables

une structure particulière que fait apparaître le premier axe factoriel :

il.a une valeur propre très élevée (40 % de l’inertie totale) mais

tout simplement parce qu'il oppose notes et antinotes,

Au contraire, la multiplicité et la grande variété des comportements

présents dans le questionnaire aboutit nécessairement à un nuage dont

on peut extraire de nombreux facteurs. Ceci explique la faible part

d’inertie extraite par chacun des axes d’ordre égal ou supérieur à 2

(5.3 % ; 4,2 % : 3 % : 22 % ; 2 %).

Mais il faut insister sur la stabilité des facteurs 2, 3 et 4. On

constate, en effet, que chacun d’eux correspond à la contribution de

variables nombreuses dont aucune ne contribue de manière massivement

disproportionnée. De la sorte, une modication des réponses à tel ou

tel ifemn y contribuant ne modifierait pas profondément la nature de

cet axe. On peut tirer deux conséquences de cette constatation

— en premier, on identifie là trois facteurs manifestant des

clivages d'attitudes profonds,

— en second, la sphère de non-clivage apparaiît très limitée au

niveau des priorités relatives ; seulement 25 % des infractions

incluses dans le questionnaire demeurent en dehors des clivages.

Certaines ont été jugées pas graves, d'autres moyennement ou

très graves ; il s’agit d’une liste assez hétérogène et l’on peut

seulement remarquer que l’accord de gravité se fait plutôt sur

les comportements pouvant entraîner l’atteinte physique à des

personnes, surtout si elles paraissent innocentes ou étrangères

à l’affaire.

Ceci étant précisé, il est maintenant possible d’indiquer les

clivages essentiels sur les priorités relatives dans la perception de la

gravité des infractions.

“ Un premier clivage s’opère dans la population selon qu’elle est

plus ou moins tolérante vis-à-vis de mœurs minoritaires « déviantes »,

ou même tout simplement nouvelles. Il s’agit en fait d’une attitude

de libéralisme Vis-à-vis de comportements qui mettent en jeu le droit

de disposer de soi-même, en bien ou en mal. Bref, c’est un clivage

autour de la permissivité. La partie « permissive » de la population

tolère relativement bien, en particulier, les délits ayant trait à la

sexualité, l'avortement (29), la drogue et des manifestations d’opinions

politiques. Par contre, la fraction « non permissive » de la population

tolère particulièrement mal ces mêmes comportements ; alors qu’elle

attribue, en valeur relative, moins de gravité que la première au vol

même avec meurtre, à l’escroquerie, au viol même collectif, au rapt

d’enfant. Ce qui importe le plus. pour elle, semble être une hostilité

aux changements de mœurs,

(29) Encore pénalisé à l’époque de l’enquête.

— 241 —

Dans l'ensemble, les « permissifs » sont plutôt des « cols blancs »,

des étudiants, plus urbanisés et ayant fait plus d’études que les « non-

permissifs ». Les premiers se placent plus à gauche sur l’échelle

d’opinions politiques, Les « non-permissifs » sont plutôt des femmes

au foyer, des commerçants, des professions libérales et des ouvriers.

Un second clivage oppose ceux pour qui l’important est de défendre

l'individu dans ses possessions, à ceux pour qui la priorité est surtout

une défense collective contre les dangers moraux et physiques mena-

çant individus et collectivité, On pourrait appeler les premiers les

défenseurs de «l’avoir individuel », et les seconds les tenants de

« l’être social ». Cet axe peut être décrit comme celui de la défense

de la propriété privée individuelle.

Les défenseurs de l’« avoir individuel » jugent très sévèremeni

toutes les formes de vols. Par contre, ils acceptent relativement mieux

la drogue et l’ivresse, la pollution industrielle, les infractions à la

législation sociale et le trafic d’influence. À l’inverse, les défenseurs

de l’« être social » tolèrent très mal les infractions à la législation

sociale, les abus de pouvoir, l’usage et le trafic de drogue. Ils acceptent,

mieux que les autres, les délits ayant trait au vol sous toutes ses formes.

Les tenants de l’« avoir individuel » sont plutôt des non-salariés,

des ruraux ou provinciaux, ayant un faible niveau d’étude. Ceux de

l’«être social» sont principalement des salariés et des étudiants.

Enfin, un troisième niveau de clivage oppose ceux qui tolèrent

particulièrement mal la délinquance des classes dominantes ou de

leurs agents, à ceux qui jugent plus grave la délinquance des marginaux

ou des contestataires. Les premiers jugent sévèrement les abus de

pouvoir de la police, la fraude fiscale des commerçants et des industriels,

la corruption de fonctionnaires, les atteintes à la législation du travail ;

ils acceptent par contre, mieux que les autres, l’usage et le trafic de

drogue, le vol à main armée, le rapt d’enfant, Pour les seconds, les

délits les plus mal tolérés sont l’usage et le trafic de drogue ; par contre,

ils acceptent relativement mieux les abus de pouvoir de la police, les

infractions au droit du travail, les diverses fraudes des industriels et des

commerçants. On pourrait appeler ce troisième axe « intégration

sociale » dans la mesure où il traduit l’acceptation ou non de normes

en fait destinées à maintenir le système en place et la domination de

certains groupes par d’autres.

Les premiers sont plutôt des ouvriers, des chômeurs et des jeunes,

alors que les seconds se recrutent chez les retraités, les femmes au

foyer, les commerçants, artisans et professions libérales.

Ces trois niveaux de clivage montrent essentiellement qu la notion

de gravité n’est pas unidimensionnelle. Par conséquent, il serait vain de

— 242 —

chercher une échelle continue de gravité au sein de la société française.

Cec axes désignent bien plutôt des niveaux de tensions, des courants

de pensée qui traversent la société, des rapports conflictuels plutôt

qu’une transformation continue et monotone des normes.

Trois groupes ont été essentiellement étudiés

la petite bour-

geoisie non salariée, la petite bourgeoisie salariée et les ouvriers.

La petite bourgeoisie non salariée (professions libérales et petits

patrons) se montre globalement peu permissive, peu tolérante envers

les mœurs nouvelles ; elle privilégie la défense de la propriété indi-

viduelle ; elle est sévère à l’égard de la délinquance des marginaux,

relativement plus tolérante aux manquements des puissants. Il n’em-

pêche que, sur ce fond général de conformisme, les rmêmes clivages

se retrouvent parmi cètte petite bourgeoisie que ceux observés parmi

l’ensemble de la population.

Sur l’axe de permissivité, les plus intolérants sont les exploitants

agricoles (et accessoirement le clergé), les croyants-pratiquants, les

gens se disant de droite. De même, ce sont ceux qui sont les plus

représentatifs de la France rurale, cléricale et de droite qui sont les

meilleurs défenseurs de la propriété individuelle.

En ce qui concerne le dernier axe, l’« intégration au système de

normes dominant », le clivage semble s’être cristallisé autour de la

drogue.

Mais ici le tableau se transforme légèrement. La population la

plus tolérante à l’égard de cette délinquance est plutôt composée de

seoteurs les plus en marge de cette catégorie (retraités, femmes au

foyer), les plus en déclin (petits commerçants) mais aussi les plus

à gauche ou d’un niveau d’éducation plutôt supérieur à la moyenne.

La petite bourgeoisie salariée (cadres, employés) est globalement

plus permissive, plus attachée à l’« être social» que la précédente et

plus tolérante à l’égard de la délinquance des groupes minoritaires.

Mais elle aussi est relativement clivée par les trois mêmes grandes

dimensions. Toutefois, si l’on rencontre les mêmes différenciations entre

droite-gauche, croyants. pratiquants-non croyants, petites villes-grandes

villes, le tableau se complique en raison de la place dans la structure

hiérarchique (par aileurs redondante avec le diplôme obtenu), ce qui

rend cette catégorie plus ambiguë que la précédente.

Les moins permissifs se rencontrent surtout parmi les provinciaux,

croyants-pratiquants, se situant plus à droite, mais aussi parmi ceux

qui excercent un pouvoir hiérarchique. Les défenseurs prioritaires de

à

«

la fois aux couches Jles

la propriété individuelle appartiennent

plus aisées et les plus démunies de cette population, à la fois des gens

ayant un niveau d’étude supérieur et d’autres qui ont un niveau

— 243 —

primaire. Parmi ceux qui tolèrent mieux la délinquance des marginaux

et minoritaires que celle des puissants, il y a des jeunes, des chômeurs

des inactifs, très urbanisés, des gens qui exercent un métier n’imptiquant

pas l’exercice d’un pouvoir hiérarchique, mais aussi des gens ayant

un niveau d’études élevé

Pour cette catégorie

se croisent la dimension d’évolution et

celle de place dans la structure de pouvoi:

En ce qui concerne la classe ouvrière, on retrouve, pour chacun

des trois axes, une opposition entre une population plutôt masculine

jeune, qualifiée, urbaine, non croyante et non pratiquante, et une

population plutôt féminine, plus âgée, moins qualifiée, davantage

rurale et provinciale, croyante et pratiquante. La seule note discor-

dante est pour le troisième axe, où les personnes les plus âgées se

montrent aussi plus tolérantes

En résumé, d’importants clivages traversent la société française

à propos des incriminations et de leur ordre de priorité. Ajoutons encore

qu’il s’agit d’axes stables, durables car ils ne reposent pas sur une

querelle ponctuelle, mais manifestent des oppositions intéressant chaque

fois de nombreuses infractions. Leur ordonnancement d’'importance

n'est d’ailleurs pas démuni d’intérêt.

Enfin

ils traversent chaque

groupe social, même si fondamentalement 1ls les opposent entre eux

— Le premier concerne la permissivité vis-à-vis de l’évolution des

tous les autres.

mœurs ; il oppose la petite bourgeoisie salariée à

— Le deuxième regarde la défense de la pr0pnete individuelle et

oppose les non-salariés aux salariés.

— Enfin le troisième oppose la delmquanœ des marginaux à celle

des puissants ;

ouvriers (et jeunes) s’y distinguent cla1rement

surtout des non-salariés.

Si le désaccord n'apparaît guère Vis-à-vis de la répression des

atteintes à

la personne sur quoi tout le monde semble plus ou moins

tacitement se retrouver, règnent ensuite de profondes divergences sur

l’attitude de la loi pénale

l’égard de l’évolution des cultures et des

mœurs, de la défense de la propriété individuelle (30), enfin des deux

délinquances antithétiques des puissants et des marginaux (31)

De tels résultats peuvent difficilement apparaître dans une recher-

che comparaüvc comme celle de Newman (Réf. 49) par exemple, qui

se résume à

l’administration d’un instrument très standardisé dans six

pays différents.

——c se

(30) Et pourtant combien de fois n’a-t-on pas dit que tout le monde

s’accordait pour voir là une des priorités de la répression ?

(31) Le simple fait que le clivage apparaisse de manière stable (encore

qu’en troisième) montre quelles contradictions règnent actuellement dans le

secteur pénal de l’idéologie acuelle.

—w—

Je crains toujours qu’une telle manière de procéder fasse sombrer

des-travaux comparatifs dans un idéalisme anhistôrique — comme on

l’a souvent reproché à des exercices comparatifs juridiques- (Réf. 50).

- En tout cas, la nécessaire focalisation sur la perception de gravité

en termes d’ordres de priorité y devient quasiment impossible. Et je

pense même qu’une telle sorte de recherche comparative a du mal'à

réussir les focalisations convenables, également, sur les dimensions

d'attitudes concernant l’adéquation sorte de déviance-forme de contrôle

social ainsi que sür l’intentionalité imputée à l’auteur.

A temps qu'à procéder de manière comparative, il me paraît

préférable — sur la base d’une problématique et d’une conceptuali-

sation harmonisées dans les différents terrains — de se borner à

apparier les démarches et non les instruments en commençant chaque

fois, comme on l’a fait au Québec, par répliquer les explorations qua-

litatives (Réf. 5/) sans se laisser obséder par la volonté d’une unité

d’instruments ultra-standardisés appliqués de plano dans une multitude

dç sociéÿés dont les histoires sont profondément différentes.

REFERENCË.S

,— Sur les reèherches K.O.L., on peut voir par exemple

a) POGDORECKI (A.) e: al.

Knowledge and opinion about law,

London, Martin Robertson, 1973.

b) VERSELE (S.C.) ct al.

« Actés ‘du colloque international de

sociologie du droit et de la justice », Rev

n° spécial.

. vlnst, Socio. (U.L.B.). 1970.

t>

Voir sur ce point :

ROBERT (Ph.), LAFFARGUE (B.) et coll. : L'image de la justice pénale

dans la société

1977, ronéo.

: le sy;rènw pén4 vu par ses clients, Paris. SEPC

a) ROBERT (Ph.) et FAUGERÔN (C.) : Représentations du système

pénal dans la société française, rapport au colloque ouest-européen du

C.N.R.S. sur « Connaissance et fonctionnement de la justice pénale »,

Lyon, 1977. ronéo.

Voir aussi

b) op. cit. (2) et ref. cit.

4.— KUTCHINSKY (B.)

« La perception de la déviance ; aperçu sur les

recherches empiriques », in La perception de ta déviance et de la crimina-

lité, Strasbourg, Conseil de l’Europe, 1972.

5.— NEWMAN (G.R.) : Comparative deviance

perçeption and ÿlaw im six

--cultures, New York, Elsevier, 1976.

6.-—- SAYAG (A.) et TERRE (F.

« Connaissance et conscience du droit

problèmes de recherche », Année sociologique, 1975, XXVII, pp. 465-496.

7.— Voir par exemple

BOURDIEU (P.), CHAMBOREDON (J.C.), PASSERON : Le mélm’

de sociologue, Paris. Mouton, 1973.

8.— Voir

MIAILLE (M.) : Une introduction critique au droit, Paris, Maspéro, 1976

9.— op. cit. (3a)

0.— op. cit. (3a)

11.— a) FAUGERON (C.) et ROBERT (Ph,) :

« Les représentations sociales

de la justice pénale », Cahiers internationaux de sociologie, 1976, LXL

pp. 341-366.

b) op. cit. (3a)

12.— SELLIN (T)

« Groupe de pouvoir, législation et criminalité », Revue

de science criminelle, 1960, XL, p. 8

13.— a) ROBERT (Ph) :

« La sociologie entre une criminologie du passage

à l’acte et une cnmmologne de la réaction sociale », Année sociologique,

1973, XXIV, pp. 441-504.

b) ROBERT (Ph.) : « Recherches en criminologie de la réaction sociale »,

in Neue Perspecktiven in der Kriminologie, Zürich, Verlag der Fach-

vereine an den Schweizerischen Hochschulen und Techniken,

1975

pp. 55-83

c) ROBERT (Ph.), LAMBERT (Th.) et FAUGERON (C.)

Image du

reconstruction

Genève-Paris,

Médecine et

viol collectif et

d'objet

Hygiène-Masson

1976, chap. 1

Les handes d'adolescents, une

14.— ROBERT (Ph.) et LASCOUMES (P.)

théorie de la ségrégation, Paris, Editions ouvrières, 1974, chap. 5

1S. — Sur ces points voir par exemple

a) ROBERT (Ph.) : « Les statistiques criminelles et la recherche, réfilexions

conceptuelles », Déviance et Société, 1977, I, 1, pp. 3-27, et ref. cit

b) BOTTOMLEY (A.K.) et COLEMAN (C.A.

« Criminal statistics :

the police role in the discovery and detection of crime », Internationaf

Journal of crim. and pen

1976, IV, pp. 33-58

16.— op. cit. (S$)

17. — DAHRENDORF (R.

Classes et conflits de classes dans la société

industrielle, Paris

Mouton, 1972

18.— TURK (A.)

Criminality and the legal order, Chicago, Rand Mc

Nally, 1969

19.— a) CHAMBLISS (W.J.) (Ed) :

Mc Graw Hill,

1969.

Crime and the legal process, New York

b) CHAMBLISS (W.J.) and SEIDMAN (R.B)) :

Law, order and power,

Reading, Mass., Addison Wesley, 1971.

25.— a) QUINNEY (R)

The social reality of crime, Boston, Little Brown

and Co

1970

b) QUINNEY (R)

The problem of crime, Dodd, Mead and Co., 1970

c) QUINNEY (R.

Critique of legal order, Boston, Little Brown and

C

1973

214— op. cit. (19b)

— 246 —

22.— MEAD (G.H)

Mind, self and society, Chicago, University of Chicago

Press

1934

23.— PLATT (A.

« Prospects for a radical criminology in the United

States », Crime and social justice, 1974, I

— a) SCHWENDINGER (H.) and SCHWENDINGER (J.)

« Defenders

of order or guardian of human rights », /Issues in criminology, 1970

V, 2, pp

123-158

b) SCHWENDINGER (H.) and SCHWENDINGER (J.)

« Continuing

debate on the legalistic approach to the definition of crime ». Jssues

in criminology, 1972, VII, 1, pp. 71-82

25,— VAN OUTRINE (L

« Interactionnisme et néo-marxisme, une analyse

critique », Déviance et société, 1977, I, p. 3

26

— op. cit. (25)

27

—

POULANTZAS (N.)

Les classes sociales dans le capitalisme d'aujour-

d’'hui, Paris, Seuil. 1974, p. 314

28

op. cit. (19b)

29

op. cit. (13)

op. cit. (19a)

N

—

CHAPMAN (D : Socwlogv and the stereotype of the criminal, London.

Tavistock, 1968.

32

— Pour reprendre le titre de l'ouvrage de

CHEVALIER (L

Classes laborieuses, classes dangereuses, Paris, Plon

1958

33

— Mc DONALD (L.)

The sociology of Law and order, Montréal, Book

Center

1976

— LOYOLA (I. de)

Exercices spirituels, Paris, Gigord, 1948, p. 136

35.

— ROBERT (Ph.) :

Recension des op. cit. (S) et (33) in Rev. can. crimino,,

1977, XIX. 4, pp. 398-408.

36.— op. cit. (5)

37.— SOROKIN (P.A.)

Social and cultural dynamics

New York, Amer

Book

1937

38.— COHEN (AI)

La déviance, Gembloux, Duculot

1971

39.— a) BECKER (H.S.)

Outsiders, New York, The Free Press of Glencoe,

1963.

b) BECKER (HS) (Ed) :

The otherside, New York. The Free Press of

Glencoe. 1

40 Dans un sens analogue, voir les remarques de

WEINBERGER (J.C.) : Idéologie et gravité attribuée aux comportements

incriminés, Bordeaux. Université de Bordeaux I, 1975, ronéo (thèse)

41.— op. cit. (13a)

42.— a) RIBORDY (F.X.)

Réaction sociale à la déviance, Varèse. Journées

inter. socio. droit. 1971. ronéo

_— 247 —

b) NGUYEN THI HAU : La réaction sociale à la déviance au Canads,

Montréal,

1972, ronéo.

c) VERSELE (S.C) :

« La perception de Ja démmce et de la cnmmahté ».

in op. cit. (4).

43

FAUGERON (C.) et al.

- De la déviance cl du confrole social, repré—

sentatzons et attitudes, Pans D.GR. S.T.

1975, ronéo.

44

HERPIN (N) :

Lappl:calmn de la loi

Pans

Seuil, 1976

45

a).op. cit.

40)

b) WEINBERGER (J.C.), JAKUBOWICZ (P.) et ROBERT (Ph.)

« T1 declino del diritto…

como strumento di controllo sociale », Questione

criminale,

1976, IL, 1, pp. 73-96.

c) WFINBERGER (JC) JAKUBOWICZ (P.) et ROBERT (Ph)

« Société et gravité des infractions », RS.C.,

1976, 4, pp. 915-930.

46

SELLIN (T.) and WOLFGANG (M.ÆE.)

The measurement of: delin-

quency, New York

Wilev

1964

47

op. cit. (40)

48

BENZECRI (J.P.)

L'analyse des données, Paris, Dunod. 1973

49

op. cit. (5)

50

op. cit. (8)

51

LEVY-(R.) e ZAUBERMAN (R.)

« Les enseignements d’une. recherche

exploratoire

l’image de la justice pénale au Québec»,. Déviance et

Société, 1977

|

4. pp. 411-426

Imprimerie administrative

de Melun 2281 - 1978