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Annales internationales de criminologie, 16 ANNALES INTERNATIONALES DE CRIMINOLOGIE INTERNATIONAL ANNALS OF CRIMINOLOGY ANALES INTERNACIONALES DE CRIMINOLOGIA fnnee 1977 (volume !6n° | et 2, AVERTISSEMENT DU COMITE DE REDACTION Le conseil de direction de la Société internationale de criminologie avait chargé le Centre international de criminologie comparée — que dirige Denis Szabo — de réaliser un volume spécial des Annales. Le manuscrit remis par le C.I.C.C. au comité de rédaction dépas- sait considérablement la taille d’un volume annuel. À vrai dire, il correspondait plutôt à deux volumes. Le comité de rédaction n’a pas voulu opérer des coupures — qui auraient dû être considérables — dans cet ensemble qui forme un tout. Il a résolu d’en répartir la matière en deux volumes : cette première livraison (volume /6) comprend les deux premières parties ; le second (volume 77) qui le suivra à quelques mois, réunira les trois dernières parties du manuscrit mis au point par le C.ILC.C. sous la direction de Denis Szabo. Pour bien marquer l’unité entre ces deux livraisons, la table des matières est intégralement incluse dans le présent volume. — 5— TABLE DES MATIÈRES —— TABLE OF CONTENTS SzABO (D.), Introduction « . © + e + % e » » % # % » © 6 % + ® 6 * » » % = » # 6 6 » — 6 # & |. — COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY : GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES FLYNN (S.E.), Issues and Priorities in International Cooperation . e . . s. *. + + + + + e © < e » * » e » » « 6 »s — * ® » 42 in the Field of Criminology GURR (T.R.), Crime Trends in Modern Democracies Since 1945 .. 41 CLIFFORD (W.), Culture and Crime . . ». e 6 e . « » + © » e © » e % 6 © ® #* »% 6 « »# » 37 ARCHER (D.) & GARTNER (R.), Homicide in 110 Nations The . e « e e # « » 102 Development of the Comparative Crime Data File II. — HISTORICAL AND MACRO-CRIMINOLOGICAL STUDIES Rico (J.), La violence en Amérique latine . e e © « » 6 % » 6 © » » = < ® # © #% e 1453 MIDDENDORF (W.), Bank Robbers and Their Victims 173 BRILLON (Y.), L'acculturation juridique en Afrique Noire et ses e e « e w* < ; 2 incidences sur l’administration de la justice criminelle Rucx (P.), Law, Order and Power in Late Seventeenth and early Eighteenth eCntury England e ZV1IRBUL (V.K.), Potentialities of. Social Process Regulations of Crime Prevention . . + —. » © % « » © + » » 6 * * © » © 6 © © » © © … % % © 8 & — »# »s ® à 267 —7— INTRODUCTION Denis SZABO Centre international de criminologie comparée Université de Montréal Signe de la vitalité d’une discipline, les recherches comparatives en criminologie commencent à prendre forme. Récapitulons-en les étapes. Depuis l’appel des Glueck (1964) au Congrès de La Haye en 1960, et jusqu’à la création du Centre international de criminologie comparée en 1969, les chercheurs ont commencé à explorer les diverses avenues tant « macro» que « micro » criminologiques. Lors du 17° Cours international de criminologie, tenu à Montréal en 1967, M. Wolfgang (1968) n’a-t-il pas prédit l’éclosion de la criminologie compa- rée lorsqu’il a tracé l’avenir de notre discipline pour l’an deux mille ? En 1976, lors d’un séminaire organisé par le C.I.C.C. à Santa Margherita en Italie, une quarantaine de chercheurs ont examiné les problèmes et les priorités d’ordre thématique et méthodologique de la recherche comparative. Enfin, en 1977, la Commission scientifique de la Société internationale de criminologie m’a confié la tâche de pré- parer le présent volume. Vu l’abondance et la qualité des réponses de la communauté scientifique, à l’appel que je leur ai lancé, ce volume sera publié en deux tomes jumeaux, le second sortant des presses quelques mois après le premier. Je me suis expliqué récemment, dans les Annales (1973) sur ma conception de la criminologie comparée ; la présente contribution constitue une partie intégrante du programme de recherche que j’y ai tracé. Les communications et les débats de la réunion de Santa Margherita, résumés par Edith E. Flynn, nous sensibilisent aux attraits comme aux dangers méthodologiques et théoriques inhérents à la démarche comparative. Le texte reflète le sens des priorités éprouvées par des criminologues, issus essentiellement des nations industria- lisées européennes et nord-américaines. Les problèmes du tiers monde sont davantage reflétés dans la contribution de W. Clifford, dont la longue expérience avec les Nations Unies n’est pas étrangère à la formulation de sa pensée. La méthode chronologique par T. Gurr, et diachronique par D. Archer & R. Gart- ner, sont respectivement éprouvées. Parmi les études historiques et —9— macro-criminologiques, les problèmes du tiers monde sont largement évoqués par J.M. Rico pour l’Amérique latine, et par Y. Brillon pour l’Afrique. Le système de justice criminelle est au cœur même des préoccupa- tions comparatistes : l’échantillon des travaux met en garde contre tout enthousiasme prématuré, quant à la comparabilité facile des éléments du système (législations, cours, prisons, polices, etc.) même dans les régions culturellement homogènes telles que la Scandinavie, par I. Anttila, ou des délits spécifiques tels que la criminalité d’affaires, par K. Tiedemann. Le problème de la transplantation d’une réforme sociojudiciaire présente des difficultés ardues : peut-on faire à Paris et à Londres ce qu’on fait à New York ? se demandent J. Vérin & P. Strasburg. La micro-criminologie et la méthodologie sont à peine effleurées dans cette revue des travaux en cours : leur qualité permet, cependant, de présager que les monographies et la réflexion dans ces domaines fourniront, incontestablement, de plus riches moissons dans la prochaine décade. En eflet, la description nuancée de phénomènes tel que le viol, par T.C.N. Gibbens, les analyses du fonctionnement des mécanismes d’administration de la justice, tels que l’application des sursis partiels en France, par G. Levasseur & M.P. Champenois- Marnier, la compensation des victimes en Yougoslavie, par K. Vodo- pivec, constituent les matières premières indispensables pour la réfle- xion comparatiste. Quant à la méthodologie, elle est la substance même de la réfle- xion permanente du chercheur sur l’expérience intellectuelle accomplie : la multiplication de ces dernières stimulera, forcément, le progrès des premières. Les efforts de L.T. Wilkins. de P.N. Grabosky et de Ph. Robert sont, à cet égard, exemplaires. Je tiens à remercier tous les auteurs qui ont gracieusement accepté de contribuer au présent volume. S’ils sont responsables pour leurs propos, le soussigné porte seul la responsabilité du choix des contri- butions et leur répartition en des chapitres divers. Mesdames Jacqueline DePlaen-Beaudry, documentaliste du C.IC.C. et Andrée Hamam, adjointe administrative, m’ont efficacement aidé dans la préparation du manuscrit pour la publication. Finalement, je remercie la Commission scientifique de notre Société de nous avoir généreusement offert l’hospi- talité des Annales, et son secrétaire délégué, M. Ph. Robert, pour l’aide efficace apportée aux ultimes arrangements. RÉFÉRENCES GLUECK (S.) Ventures in Criminology, Combridge, Mass : Harvard University Press, 1964. SZABO (D.) « Criminologie comparée signification et tâches », Annales internationales de Criminologie, 1973, Vol. 12, N° 1 et 2, 89. WOLFGANG (MÆ.) « The viable Future of Criminology» IN Crimi- nologie en action, Actes du XVII° cours international de criminologie, Montréal, Presses de l’université de Montréal. 1968, 109. — 10 — |- COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOG Y : GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ISSUES AND PRIORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF CRIMINOLOGY (*) Edith E. FLYNN School of Criminal Justice Northeastern University, Boston, Mass., USA Introduction and purpose oË the seminar The conference was called for the purpose of discussing issues and priorities for international cooperation in criminological studies in developed and industrialized nations and to arrive at some consen- sus concerning basic issues and priorities within areas of study that would lend themselves to comparative and cooperative research in different countries. An explicit goal of the conference was to arrive at a tentative agenda of high priority research subject areas, which would lend themselves readily to comparative study, depending on the state of development of research capabilities and which reflect the research interests of the different participating countries. The ultimate goal of the conference will be to produce an essay, constituting a written outline for the field of comparative criminology and compa- rative research, which will be made available to the field at large. The following is a preliminary report and first draft of the confe- rence proceedings supplemented by many suggestions received from individuals subsequent to the conference and enriched with pertinent material contained in some of the reference papers that had been specifically prepared for this conference by some of the participants. The three' day conference was divided into 5 discussion periods devoted : (b) to The Assessment of the Crime Problem, a Crime Preven- tion, Control, and Treatment, (c) The Operation, Effect and Control of Discretion in the Criminal Justice System, (d) Professionnal Ethics and the Protection of Human Rights and Privacy, and (e) The Orga- nization and Implementation of International Comparative Research. The conference was deemed most timely. The participants were challenged by the conference conveners to assist the International Centre for Comparative Criminology at the University of Montreal in identifying priorities for future research. It is self-evident that (*) This is a summary of the International Seminar on Issues and Priorities organized by the I.C.C. in Italy on May 1976. — 13 — industrialized nations are presently experiencing rapid social and eco- nomic change. Ît is equally self-evident that such monumental change has directly affected the activities of the various criminal justice systems and that these agencies have perhaps not responded as effectively as they might. Criminal activities are becoming increasingly more sophisticated. For example, there is an increased use of explo- sives (in terms of quantity and extent of usage) in the perpetration of crime. Police clearance rates are dropping. The correctional appa- ratus is clearly inadequate to cope with the dramatic changes facing it. The criminal justice system is overwhelmed and bursting at its seams with an overload of cases. To cope with change, dramatic new proposals have surfaced, such as minimum mandatory sentences, puni- tive sentences, the limitation of judicial discretion, etc. It is noteworthy that such changes are no unique to particular countries but can be found in most developed countries. Unfortunately, there has not been enough research to assist criminal justice policy makers in the assess- ment of the relative merits of such proposals or in the selection of the most appropriate and effective solutions. In he light of the above, there is a profound need for comparative research and for more research in general. We need to focus our recommendations on theory and on fact, and determine the future agenda for research and policy formation. Changes and trends in crime need to be pin- pointed. Answers will have to be found as to what kind of organi- Zations, what financial resources, and what international comparisons will be necessary to provide more effective answers to the rising crisis in criminal justice. 1. — ASSESSMENT OF THE CRIME PROBLEM. Frederick McClintock of the University of Edinburgh presented his views on this topic. He pointed out that before turning to an assessment of the crime problem, one first has to analyze the context of looking at crime, or examine « the problem of the problem ». Since crime can no longer be viewed as a sufficiently homogenous pheno- menon to have a specific meaning in reality, three is first a great need for increased clarity and specificity whenever we discuss crime. The days of consensus between policy makers and criminologists seem to be gone. « The time », as Shakespeare aptly put it, « is out of joint ». Today, one first has to develop one’s own Weltanschauung concerning the definition of crime and ask whose problem is it, and what kinds of problems are defined and by whom? Stated in another way, problems do not exist in the void apart from the definer, and confusion arises whenever this fact is not recognized. We also need to remember that the way in which problems are defined will determine what will be learned about them. Finally, proper assessment of any problem. in- — 1£1 p cluding crime, requires not just the measurement of its magnitude, but also of its frequency and occurrence, as well as its seriousness. But the problem is even more complex than that. The concept of assessment is itself problematic it is more than just finding facts. It needs to be considered in the context of a theoretical explanation. Assessment involves theory, implicitly or explicitly. In the determi- nation of priorities, one needs to move from a theoretical perspective Which sees crime mainly as a symptom of individual or social pathology to the broader context of political economy. Recent developments of macro-criminology reflect the welcome shift of focus on the socio- legal and socio-economical aspects of crime, a shift hastened by the demise of rehabilitation and recidivism prevention programs. Within the subject area of crime assessment, five research priorities can be singled out : (a) the measurement of crime, (b) hidden delin- quency, (c) traditional and « new » crimes, (d) public opinion, and (e) criminal careers. FEach of these topics will be discussed briefly below. a) Measurement of crime. Western European countries have received major stimulation by the pioneer work of Sellin and Wolfgang who have developed a crime index. At this point, there is need to resolve some of the technical problems related to this work, especially if crime indexes are to be developed for international comparison. There would be great value, for example, in the development of a number of specific crime indexes (e. g. theft, sex crimes, etc.), where the problem of weighting for seriousness would be considered in relation to more homogenous units of criminal activity. b) Hidden delinquency. We have some impressive studies on victimization and self-report studies on crime. However, there continues to be an emphasis on an actuarial approach instead of focusing on the nature and quality of crimes in relation to the socio-economic structure in which they occur. Victimization studies and self-reporting of criminal activities are complimentary and work should be continued in this area. But the illusive search for the complete crime picture should be abandoned. It should be noted that studies of hidden delin- quency are not merely an accountancy problem but that they introduce a new dimension into criminal justice and criminological considerations. It would be most productive to stop enumerating the extent of hidden crime and focus instead on its nature. For example, one could deter- mine and examine the circumstances under which hidden delinquency is known to some individuals (or agencies) in society and the extent to which it is being dealt with by non legal control systems. Other research foci might include an analysis of the extent to which the selective processes of the criminal justice system itself produce hidden delinquency, varying perceptions of criminality in the population, underreporting and genuine attempts at concealment of crime. Finally, — 15 — we ought to widen our concepts from the delinquent act (event) and the offender and look at the wider context between the relationship of the offender and his victim. c) Traditional and “new” crimes. When analyzing traditional crimes it is necessary to go beyond legal criteria and to develop more meaningful homogenous social units. Some excellent work has occured in this area but some methodological questions have arisen and further work will have to be undertaken. There is a special need to link together analyses of the crime unit with information on the offenders and the victim. The concept of “new” crimes refers prima- rily to criminal behavior which has previously been largely ignored by criminologists and by policy makers alike. The behavior in question has in the past been considered quasi-legal at best and has largely been dealt with by administrative or regulatory mechanisms, if at all. However, changes in social attitudes (aided, no doubt, by the influence of the new (or radical) criminology) have resulted in white collar crime (e. g. tax fraud, political and public corruption, mobile traffic offenses, pollution, neglect of public safety and health regulations in industry and commerce, and neglect of pharmaceutical industry in proper testing of products, etc.) gaining in importance and thereby coming increasingly into the center of criminological attention. All of these new crimes constitute a major challenge to criminologists in terms of theory development and implications for the criminal justice process, and would therefore lend themselves to international compara- tive research. Obviously, priorities will need to be set for specific endea- vors in view of the multitude of choice and the magnitude of the problems. d) Public opinion. The subject of public opinion is complex and holds many difficulties for research and methodology. We lack precise knowledge on the subject. It would be desirable to have additional information on public opinion in relation to different kinds of crime, distinguished according to the circumstances in which they occur and the public’s fear about personal safety in relation to different kinds of crime. Public fear could then be compared with the computed probabilities of becoming a victim of a particular form of crime. Of additional interest would be the study of the social reality of the images of criminality held by those who are decision makers in criminal justice and by those who figure prominently in public discus- sion on this subject. Finally, the positive and the negative effect of the public news media should be analyzed. The mass media not only develop and sustain erroneous impressions and stereotypes of crimi- nality but they also can fulfill a creative role by presenting to the public the social reality of crime and thereby stimulate open discussion and, occasionally, positive action. — 16 — e) Criminal careers. Criminal careers are another complex pheno- menon. Conceptualizations are dominated by treatment ideologies and simplistic views. The following aspects concerning this topic seem worthy of further considerations : diversity in criminal events, changes in circumstance and social life style of the offender over time, the dark figure of crime in known criminal careers, offender attitudes, variations in personality attributes and motives over time and changes in the socio-legal and socio-economic processes over time. Much work in this respect can be accomplished by means of computer guided pattern analysis. But most importantly, we must begin to examine criminal careers in relation to theories of behavior related to the social environ- ment. Theory needs to be linked with policy in a concept of dange- rousness. To the extent to which we can ascertain dangerousness of criminal careers, we need to link policy to practice in an attempt to control the offender. Discussion brought additional research and methodological sug- gestions for the measurement of crime. Much work in criminology has of late occured in the form of self-reports on oflending and self- reports on victimization. There is now a need to reexamine the wor- king assumptions underlying that research and to propose additional theoretical and methodological steps. It seems that more progress has been made in the development of victimization research than there has been with research focusing on offender self-reporting. It would be extremely useful to exploit the complimentarity of both types oË research and focus less on their differences. Considerable progress could be made, for example, if more information could be obtained on the victims of self-reported offenses, by means of offender based surveys. Such an approach would not only help to assess more compre- hensively the relationship between victims and offenders, but would also inform researchers about the strategies used in committing offenses, such as victim selection, etc. As a result, the development of victim and oflfender surveys and the creation of comparable self-report measu- res of the incidence of offending can be singled out as a matter of highest priority for cross-national comparative research, especially if that kind of research is to have any precision. Such research would take into consideration the development of individual offense rates over time to facilitate the evaluation of social programs directed at changing human behavior and the assessment of social policies directed at deterrence and incapacitation. The utility of such an approach is self-evident. Much criminological research gets people into a labeled status. But there is no way or measurement of removing them from that status. À delinquent event is examined, the perpe- trator is labeled and then left in a stereotyped state. Using a time frame dimension provides a way out of that trap. Research of social conformity was recommended as yet another high priority item for cross-national comparative research. Crimino- — 17 — logical research has traditionally focused on the measurement of devian- ce from social norms and on the victims of such deviance. Such an approach relegates conformity to a residual from a base selected as measure for deviance. There is an urgent need to develop several kinds of measures for assessing conformity. For example, we need to measure collective rather than individual states of normative inte- gration independent of measures of deviance. There are sound theore- tical reasons for selecting measures of compliance with the law as a measure of social integration and social change. The study of contract law (i. e. contract fulfillment) was given as an example on the basis of which one could assess the changing nature of social integration in society. Looking at victimization research, the observation was made that the highest rates of victimization seem to occur with the highest rates of offending. Traditionally, the focus of that type of research has been on lower class (street) crime and on the individual offender. But what about organizations as victimizers ? The highest rates of vic- timization in capitalist societies are committed by corporate entities. Factories are victimized by corporate entities, by employees and by customers. One focus for analysis might therefore be on how orga- nizations become victims, and on the special relationships of individual offenders to organizations. Victimization research conducted in West Germany compared perceptions of crime by victims, offenders, police, and prosecutors. Ît was found that the perceptions did not converge completely. Also, when victimization data were compared between Stuttgart, West Germany, Zurich, Switzerland and the United Sates (Federal Bureau oË Investigation statistics), the results were surprisingly close. Yet West German police statistics were twice as high than those of the United States. One explanation for this phenomenon might be that the West German police arrest many petty offenders while in the United States police chose not to do so. 2. — CRIME PREVENTION, CONTROL AND TREATMENT. Marvin Wolfgang of the University of Pennsylvania presented his analysis of the condition of criminology in relation to policy research. It appears that the field is in a weak methodological and theoretical position. And since criminology is no longer in its nascent state, it can no longer claim any excuses for its current scientific inade- quacies. While evaluation research has mounted in recent years and improved in sophistication, neither research models for intervention schemes are characterized by much science, in its ideal sense. Crimi- nological research results and Kknowledge are mostly negative and always segmental. Whenever poor research designs are applied to flawed, inadequate data to test experiments (which bear little similarity -- 18 — to scientific models}, and as long as research endeavors are couched within an ideology of crime control and the goal of crime reduction (as a measure of success), desillusionment sets in quickly with negative results. Yet, there are few intervention schemes in any field today (from education to politics) that produce positive or encouraging results. At this point in time, the success model of reduced crime and recedivism is being displaced in criminology by managerial efficiency and cost/benefit models. With the revival of neo-classical theory and practice in criminal justice, a resurfacing of policy relevant issues for scientific research and evaluation has occured. Continuation of the large scale research underkaten by the Univer- sity of Pennsyivania on the delinquency of a cohort is producing some interesting and important findings. Three types of data are avai- lable, which permit longitudinal analysis (a) officially recorded delinquency and crime until age 26, (b) self-reported crime before and after the age of 18, and (c) victimization reports. Apparently, these occurs much self-discrimination on the part of delinquents, wi- thout the benefit of state intervention. Juvenile delinquency does not significantly lead to adult crime. The dangerous or chronic offender group is relatively small and is defined by five or more officially recor- ded delinquent and adult criminal events. Many subzjects were victimi- Zzed first and then decided to turn to criminal activity themselves. The following policy relevant research was identified as gaining increasing importance in the future organized crime, deterrence models, macro-economic analyses, operationally defining criminal justice and humane treatment, equity before the law, scaling of sanc- tions relative to scaling of crime, longitudinal studies of criminal causes as a stochastic process, ethics of experimentation, decriminali- zing, target hardening, environmental control of crime, the economic cost of crime control, and process of becoming law-abiding and corporate and collective crime. Simultaneously, it is envisioned that the following policy and research topics will either become underem- phasized, stand mute or come to be abandoned : the etiology of crime. the processes of becoming delinquent, the prediction of dangerousness, coercive treatment, and intervention experimentation. Finally, there will be increased focus on public policy and public opinion. An assessment of people’s perceptions of the seriousness of crime can be tracked on current victimization research conducted by the U. S. Bureau of Census, which now has a representative sample of 75,000 interviews reflecting regional differences and demo- graphic background of the persons surveyed. The wish was expressed by all participants for a better alignment between criminological research and policy. In such an alignment, the importance of public opinion regarding research and practices — 19 — should not be underestimated. At the moment, the public perceives government through its criminal justice system as incapable and incompetent to deal with the problem of street crime. But looking on research and policy strictly from a social defense perspective may be inadequate because such a view fails to recognize that crime is a moral issue in addition to a public protection issue. Even though the criminal justice system may have little effect in reducing socially harm- ful behavior, it needs to be recognized that such a reduction is not the principal reason for having a criminal code in the first place. There is also the legislative point of view to consider. À relationship exists between public opinion and the legal definition of crime. Whenever new crimes are formulated or when certain behaviors are decriminalized, one should take heed that this action agrees — at least in relative terms — with public opinion. One should be cognizant about the types of crime the public would tolerate and the types of crime the public feels strongly about. There are simply much stronger feelings among the public, concerning violent crimes than there are about white collar crimes. It would be wrong therefore, to ignore the issue of traditional crime. There is no question that we need to focus on white collar crime and corporate crime more extensively. The days, when the traditional focus of criminology defended the status quo are gone. But before we get into the subject of corporate crime we will first need to be able to identify it more readily. We need to expand our conceptualizations. The term organizational criminal, for example, expands the concept of white collar crime beyond capitalist society. At present, there is too much focus on the individual offender, small street crime, ownership of property, etc. In fact the very way in which the criminal justice system operates, with its emphasis on case finding, it is specifically geared for dealing with individual crimes, not corporate crime. But there are additional considerations. Before we burden the criminal justice system with additional work, it might be advisable to examine the clearance rates for major crimes. Aside from murder, the clearance rates are dismally small. Robberies and rapes have increased substantially and cause understandable concern on the part of the public. There is a desperate need to maintain a balanced approach. The point was made that the drawn-out debate concerning the “definition” of the crime problem has not endeared criminologists to policy makers. Every day, substantial resources go to law enfor- cement, the courts and corrections. What should policy makers do while the criminologists decide what the problem is ? Also, if crimi- nologists insist that the old definitions of the crime problem no longer stand, they contribute their share to the confusion that currently exists in the criminal justice system. — 20 — Research priorities differ to some extent by countries : Canada is most interested in the control of street crime and violent crime. There is a trend to extend state control over juveniles for increasing age spans. For example, the child protection act now covers children from ages of O to 21 and juvenile courts are expanding and increasing their numbers. Victimization research also has a high priority in Canada. The interest here is not so much in the precise amount of crime but why there are certain levels and factors associated with particular types of crimes. If more were known regarding certain factors and causes of crime, more effective preventive measures (such as defensible space) could be undertaken. Canada is also interested in the definition of dangerous offenders. While the pursuit of this concept may not be too successful, it continues to have great relevance from the corrections perspective. It was noted that even if criminolo- gists were successful in identifying dangerous offenders, there might still be many ethical questions and limitations concerning what could or should be done about such offenders. Finally, Canada is interested in providing humane treatment to offenders, in developing qualitative measures of justice and in developing cost-effective programs. In the United States, there is an interest not only in measuring the extent of crime but also in an analysis of corporate crime and in extra-legal settlements of crime. For example, what happens when shoplifters are not handled by police but by lawyers ? What occurs during torts against persons ? In West Germany, the differences between official crime statistics and self reported crimes are considered less important. But there is concern regarding the perception and definition of crime. Crime patterns have changed considerably during the last few decades. The traditional crime in West Germany during the 1950s was child moles- ting. This behavior decreased and changed into child battery and problems with socialization. Newer crimes, such as economic crimes (e. g. black market activities) tended to lead to the decriminalization of the economic offender. In the 1950’s economic crimes were percei- ved as a major problem by law enforcement but also by the public. In the 1960’s newer forms of crime developed. Once they were accepted by public opinion as crimes, the reporting rate grew. The question that needs to be posed now is whether such crimes are now increasing because of growing willingness on the part of the public to report these activities or because there is a new phenomenon at hand ? Further, the perception of crime differs markedly according to the definer. Law enforcement agents perceive crime differently than do members of the public. And perception of crime will also vary according to social status of the perceiver. In the area of crime prevention, there are quite a few developments in the area of architecture. Defensible spaces are created with the — 21 — hope of reducing crime in overpopulated and overcrowded cities. There is also greater interest in « target hardening », such as impro- ved auto locks and burglar alarm devices. Such an approach tends to view crime largely as a matter of opportunity. It corresponds to a retreat of the medical model and the reduced emphasis on individual responsibility for crime. It is felt that such an approach has serious limitations for reducing crime in society. Focus and re- sources are sidetracked while the more important problems and issues are ignored. Target hardening might well result in displacing crime. We may find that houses without burglar alarms will be victimized and only cars without protective devices will be stolen. An analogous question was posed in 1963 when gas became less toxic. There were speculations as to whether suicide rates would fall or whether people would chose alternative methods for commit- ting suicide. It turned out that people did not chose other ways and that suicide rates declined for a while. What about psychological considerations in crime prevention ? In the area of drug use, for example, should one differentiate more clearly between users and those who deal with the substances ? Should the criminal justice system be more tolerant with users and more harsh with dealers ? Yet, it is often difficult to differentiate between the two types of persons. Turning to corrections, there are many questions today as to whether punishment is more effective than rehabilitation ? Fines are clearly punitive, yet they are relatively easy to administer on a cost- effective basis. The trend is towards emphasis of informal social control and improved socialization. Yet, more needs to be known about the processes of criminal justice, general deterrence, new sanctions, and new solutions for old and new problems. À more extensive discussion of target hardening as a method oË crime prevention revealed that such measures have additional limitations. For example, in the case of hijacking, target hardening in the form of increased airport security programs, has only served to displace hijacking with kidnappings, frequently directed at embassy personnel, whose vulnerability to this form of crime is obvious. It may therefore be useful to differentiate between different kinds of crimes, for example, impulsive crimes as opposed to professional crimes, for purposes of better analysis. Target hardening may be more effective in the case of professional crime and may possibly work to prevent the occasional young offender from breaking the law. But it will do little for the impulsive offender. But there are other problems with this approach as well. In a sense, the majority of people practice target hardening, whenever they use locks, doormen, move out of dangerous neighbourhoods, etc. Such an approach clearly discriminates against the poor who cannot afford these options and who are the most frequent victims of crimes. The policy implications in this respect are clear. One should ask to what extent do governments — 22 — provide people — and especially the poor — with a minimum level of protection, and to what extent should governments provide such protection ? Does research examine the problem of people who suffer the most ? And what kind of protection is most useful in preventing crime ? Crime prevention efforts could probably be greatly enhanced 1f researchers were to focus on life style and opportunities of the disadvan- taged, and on changing community life, rather than on target har- dening. Differenciation should also be made between impulsive and dangerous offenders as opposed to professional offenders who commit highly organized. premeditated crimes. The pursuit of policy research was identified as problematic for criminology. In general, policy research has led to compartmenta- lized approaches, to the disadvantage of criminological research. For example, the study of police as victims of acts of violence has led to organizational studies of police deparments. Quickly, much vio- lence was found to occur in police departments, largely as a result of the rapid growth of organized crime and police themselves provoking violence. The relationship between research and the development of policy needs further analysis. Today, much skepticism prevails concerning the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. Variations in the deployment of police patrols do not seem to produce much difference. Differences in sentencing structures do not seem to help. Corrections 1S in a state of disrepair. Ît Scems that with each new scientific research endeavor the skepticism increases and a sense of helplessness prevails. It is also necessary to ask whether policy makers really utilize the research results that are produced or whether scientists and researchers are not just being used for political purposes ? While skepticism is felt in the police and court areas, it is felt the most in corrections. Cross-nationallv, corrections systems are turning from corrections to punishment. This turn of events is less related to research than to cost considerations and to a decline in the heretofore paternalistic view concerning offenders. While the switch from corrections is not as-pronounced in Europe as it is in the United States, there 1s in most areas a trend towards crime prevention efforts in the community and toward community based corrections. Yet, if one merely transfers the existing corrections model into the community, not much will be changed. À totally different strategy will be needed to deal with the problem of crime. Part of the difficulties experienced by corrections stem from the fact that the early enthusiasm regarding its potential for deducing recidivism has waned because the system has failed to deliver on its promises. Farly reports of success were oversold. The pendulum — 23 — has swung in the opposite direction and the hard liners are deter- mining policy. But it would be a mistake to assume that rehabili- tation does not work. There still is more known regarding the relative effectiveness of rehabilitation than there is known about the effecti- veness of punishment as deterrence. It will be useful to distinguish between doubts concerning the value of rehabilitation as opposed to doubts regarding the use of discretion in criminal justice. The latter are prevalent and justified to a large degree. Examination of develop- ments in the United States reveals that there has not so much been a systematic scrapping of treatment programs in corrections, as there has been an attempt to eliminate or reduce discretion. Some consi- deration should therefore be given as to whether certain aspects in this area could be indentified for international cooperation and research (for example, the German Marshal Fund is presently deciding whe- ther it should become involved in criminal justice matters). The problem of pretrial detention was singled out as one possibility for cross-national research. There are many known problems with pre- trial detention. There is much waste of resources, as can be seen from the fact that roughly 80 % of offenders are subsequently sentenced to probation. There is discrimination based on sex and race. There may be detention pending the receipt of medical reports. In some countries, pretrial detention may last from 6 months to over a year ! Many questions will need to be answered regarding the future of corrections and before assistance can be provided for the deve- lopment of new criminal justice policies. Were the current renun- ciation of the treatment model and the trend toward definite and punitive sanctions to prevail, one needs to ask what kind of punishment should there be ? Since imprisonment has been discredited, is there any reason to continue it ? If not imprisonment, then what ? What about the protection of society from the dangerous offender ? Incar- ceration of this type of offender has thus far been the only option at our disposal. What about general deterrence and general prevention, a function performed presently by punitive sanctions ? If neither the retributive nor the humanistic approach is successful in treating recidivism, might it perhaps be easier to rehablilitate the victim ? Another central issue facing criminal justice is that of public opinion. The confidence of the public in the system is vital and a central issue of concern. One needs to ask how that confidence is maintained, how it differs according to the different aspects of the system (e.g. police, courts, corrections, attitude of victims, etc.). There is a need for criminologists to examine the discriminatory aspects of retribution, to concentrate on how to remove persons (i.e. cate- gories of offenders) from the purview of the criminal justice system, and to be concerned regarding the maintenance of a general sense of justice. The public should be able to have confidence in the fact —— 24 — that laws do work, that police departments are effective and that correc- tion is useful. There is also a need to explore positive sanctions, as op- posed to the tradition of resorting to negative sanctions only. It was sug- gested that perhaps a more general way is needed to tackle the social problem of crime. Why should certain behaviors be labeled as crime ? Why not call them issues or problems ? Once this 1s accomplished, one can proceed to find solutions for these problems. Finally, 1f we define the criminal justice system as the interaction of the police, courts and corrections sub-systems, within the frame- work of shared ideals and goals, we will never be able to say that this system will be successful in solving social problems. Law enfor- cement may be successful, sometimes. Corrections may register some success. But when in a combined state, there is no evidence of total system success. In sum, the criminal justice system is organizationally and ideologically so structured that it defies resolution of its system problems. Further, the political system is not challenging the system or its subcomponents and uses them as they exist. People directly involved with the system have little or no control over organizational goals or direction. Às a result, it should be a primary objective for the crimi- nologist to focus on changing systems so that people have more control over these matters. 3. — THE OPERATION, EFFECT, AND CONTROL OF DISCRE- TION IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM. Inkeri Antilla of the Ministry of Justice, Finland, presented her views on international research on the criminal justice system and on the problems of comparative research. Criminilogists have long strived for globality in their research approaches. Yet, the variance in legislation tended to place barriers to international comparisons of criminal justice systems. As a result, it may be fruitful to retain the legal frame of reference and concentrate studies on the question of why systems differ, rather than attempt to eliminate system diffe- rences. Above all, reseachers and policy makers should strive to minimize criminality and social cost (e. g. property damages, suffering, injury, etc.) so that costs o the victim and society as well as to the offen- der are taken into consideration. Foremost among the decision- making criteria should be the enhancement of the general sense of justice and legal security. When planning comparative research, the clarification of termi- nology should have first priority. The possibility of misunderstanding criminal law concepts and terminology is great. For example, the term “‘preventive detention” has different meaning for the United States, the United Kingdom and for other European countries. Mere — 25 — reliance on the content of written legislation will never suflice. One must determine, in addition, how the law is applied in the specific case. Further, an analysis has to be made as to whether there exist parallel statutes as well as parallel mechanisms that might compete at the level of application, and whether specific legislation is interre- lated to other statutes. When studying criminal justice systems, 1it will be useful to ask to what degree the use of discretion may be connected with the extent and intensity of decriminalization and to what extent cases drop out of the sphere of discretion by being shifted from the purview of criminal policy and the criminal justice system. One should also consider the various self-regulatory mechanisms that exist inside the system, in the relationship between the sub-systems and inside the various institutions. For example, if punishment for certain crimes is most severe, courts tend to look for ways which would facilitate the application of leniency. Also, minor cases will tend to disappear from the scene. Comparative research also mandates a wider knowledge of the legal culture of countries to be studied, than exists at the present time. But how can the difficulties in making valid comparisons cross- nationally be lessened ? One way to approach the problem might be to make the level of research more abstract. Rather than study certain institutions, one could study certain principles and ideologies instead. In this manner, one could examine such goals as (a) the use of discretion connected with the normal application of law (e. g. senten- cing) ; (b) the use of discretion for the purpose of moderation ; (c) the use of discretion for rationalization ; and (d) the use of discretion for individualized sanctioning. Finally, the analysis should include the examination of both manifest and latent goals that influence decision-making and the passage and application of legislation and track how goals may change over time. Nicholas Kittrie of the American University Law School pre- sented his analysis of the use of discretion in the American criminal justice system. In any analysis of this subject, it is useful to first differentiate between limitations upon authority, where the limits of power are well specified by law and the exercise of discretion, where the actor has flexibility in decision-making. Another critical question pertaining to both the exercise of authority and discretion concerns the machinery for their review. In the United States the government is characterized by separate and independent branches of government, which are subject to various internal and external reviews. Two additional charcateristics are important. First, the exer- cise of discretion within criminal justice is widely accepted and deemed unavoidable. Second, the system relies on a conflict model for the limi- tation of discretion. In this connection, there is substantial reliance on intra rather than inter-branch checks and balances. An examination of — 26 — probation, parole and pardon agencies reveals that they approach their tasks from an individual privilege perspective and not from an indivi- dual right point of view. As a result, most protections given to indivi- dual offenders within the rest of the system (such as the right to counsel, the right to a hearing, reviews of decisions, etc.), have been considered inapplicable. However, current heated debates on this subject have raised a growing number of complaints about the isolation of probation, parole and pardon decisions from review. The trend today 1s to grant offenders the trappings of due process at all stages of the criminal justice process and thereby reduce the amount of discretion that has previously been exercised. Moreover, the dissatisfaction of many practi- tioners and academicians with the current abuse of discretion has resulted in dramatic moves on the part of many states towards flat time sentences and occasionally even the abolition of parole. An examination of the American constitutional framework reveals that both the authority and discretion of police in making arrests remains unclear. While there is a growing emphasis on independent judicial assessment before a warrant can be issued, the exercise of arrest powers without a pre-issued warrant continues. The warrant requirement provides a clear check upon police arrest power. À second check on police practices is provided by the requirement that arrestees be taken before a committing magistrate to determine probable cause. À third limitation of police discretion is contained in the inability of police to dismiss an arrestee without court action. While there are ample inter-branch checks and balances protecting citizens against police abuses of arrest practices, there are no guidelines in dealing with police discretion not to arrest. Even though there 1s ample sociological evidence concerning selective enforcement and other abuses, there exists no review process for such practices. American prosecutors have similar unchecked discretion in their decision not to prosecute. Since “‘ministries of justice” are absent in the American system of justice, elected prosecutors are totally free of supervision. The situation is somewhat different in the federal setting, where the United States Attorney General provides guidelines and exer- cises some supervision. The grand jury, as an agency of the judicial ranch is intended to provide a check on prosecutorial discretion. In the reality of practice, however, grand juries are frequently under the control of the prosecutor who emerges as one of the least checked agents in criminal justice. Plea bargaining is one of the few areas of prosecutorial conduct which is more open to view. Prosecutors control the process and tend to over-charge in order to gain a negotia- ting advantage. At the present time, there is much pressure for increased judicial scrutiny of the plea bargaining process or for abolishing the practice altogether. _ dj — Court systems in America are subject to review. While failure to follow evidentiary rules or violations of constitutional safeguards may lead to reversals of trial court decisions, the sentencing power of the courts has long remained unchecked. Under the influence of the treatment philosophy which reigned supreme during the last fifty years, the sentencing power of the judiciary has achieved its greatest flexibility. But rising abuse of judicial discretion and serious senten- cing disparities have led to a barrage of criticism. The indeterminate sentence in particular has been singled out for attack, perhaps jus- tifilably so, since it leaves to the discretion of parole boards the determination of when inmates should be released from custody. Among some of the current developments that affect sentencing discretion are sentencing councils, in which judges participate in sentencing discussions, greater emphasis on educating judges and some efforts towards implementing sentencing reviews. But the highly prevalent dissatisfaction with the status quo today can be seen in the many efforts currently being spent on the part of some reformers on promo- ting and legislating flat time sentences and minimum mandatory sentences, which would just about abolish sentencing discretion altogether. While the recognition of human frailties is understandable, the return to neo-classic mechanistic processes in criminal justice could easily produce a cure that is worse than the disease. The topic of discretion in the criminal justice system produced a rich and flavorful discussion. It is apparent that the importance of the discretion cannot be underestimated. Discretion helps guarantee an individualized response in the system, a response which is suitable for the specific needs at hand. But discretion is also capable of frustrating the major goals of the system, especially when each decision-maker does as he pleases. Further, under discretion, there is the possibility of abuse of individual rights and that some people or groups of people will not be treated equally. À central question in any discussion is whether different branches of criminal justice should be granted more discretion than others ? Are some branches more trustworthy ? Do some have better trained personnel ? Are others perhaps better tuned into the needs of the system ? For example, there is the popular notion that police are the least attuned to public needs, while judges are supposed to be the most sensitive regarding these issues. Research should look into the reality of these assumptions. Is there more discretion in some branches of criminal justice and if so, are they better able to satisfy our feelings of justice ? Other research questions could address themselves to such issues as what are the differences between countries ? Is discretion desirable ? Does it perform a service ? How can it be measured ? What is formal discretion as opposed to informal discretion ? What is the future of discretion in criminal justice ? — 28 — À somewhat different views of discretion was offered from the one given above, which sees discretion as decision-making. Às a result, a discrete distinctiveness can be discerned prevailing throughout the criminal justice system, which can be analyzed for discretion in a binary fashion it either exists or it does not exit (yes or no, zero or one). If one examines research on discretion in the United States it is readily seen that the subject has been researched much more often by lawyers, not by social scientists. Also, the research has not been quantitative in nature and for the most part is has not been too useful. The research should focus instead on the pivotal points of entry into existing criminal justice systems and compare what occurs at these points cross-nationally. We also need to determine how discretion is distributed quantitatively, who has discretion, who has more (or less) discretion, how is control exerted over the processes oË discretion ? Of all the components of criminal justice, the judi- ciary is probably of the greatest sociological interest. It is the legal guild with its own power hierarchy, where judges have more power than any other actor in criminal justice, which should be examined. Precursory examination of the judicial system reveals that discretion decreases as power increases magistrates, where public scrutiny and visibility are lowest, have much discretion and little power. As one moves to state, circuit and appeals courts, the power increases but the discretion decreases. Discretion, from the West German perspective was also deemed important. But the question of interest is not which branch of cri- minal justice has more discretion. This is largely determined by the constitution and depends on the specific stages of the criminal justice process. What would be of interest instead, is an analysis of how discretionary power is actually executed. Where and how can discre- tion be abused ? Where is it undesirable ? At what stages is discretion least harmful ? What does discretion mean for the selection of persons or groups into the system ? What does it mean in terms of equity ? We may find, for example, that discrimination occurs against certain classes of people or against minorities. Discretion translates into “Ermessen” in German. But Ermessen does not fullv describe the fuil meaning oË discretion (Translator’s note : Ermessen implies assessment, evaluation, probing of facts). À recent study of the Max Planck Institute of the prosecutor in Germany analyzed 40,000 offenders from 93 prosecutorial offices which ranged from large to small. The findings revealed similar patterns of procedures, prosecution and refusal to prosecute. Only 10 % of the defendants come to trial, 15 % come to the court under Strafbefehl (penal mandate), the remainder are released because of insufficient evidence. Prosecutors in West Ger- many have no discretion in the legal sense, but they do in practice. Participant observation revealed that when public interest is low and the offender is not deemed dangerous, informal discussions do occur — 29 — regarding subsequent dispositions. But when there is much damage, previous convictions, prosecutors will be less inclined to negotiate. But much more empirical knowledge will be needed to make the decisions of the early stages of the Ermittlungsverfahren (probable cause hearing) more visible. Further discussion revealed some reservations concerning re- search that pursues a piecemeal approach. Legal systems differ considerably cross-nationally. Each country has different compensatory devices which may have nothing to do with the legal system. Research should therefore focus on the whole criminal justice system and track specific criminal acts through the entire process to see where the compensatory devices (ie. discretion) comes in. For example, Italy has rather inflexible sentences but great flexibility in how sentences are served (e.g. parole). French magistrates have extremely high conviction rates compared to other countries. Does this mean that they use more discretion in determining what they charge defendants with ? In Great Britain the police may charge defendants. They do so heavily, probably to avoid bribery charges. But they have high acquittal rates in the courts. Does this mean the charges were initially illconceived ? In the light of the above, an appropriate research design would therefore study the whole system for compensatory devices, look for major contrasts in systems and watch for the effects of discretion. If one can show a high conviction rate for rape in one country and a low conviction rate for rape in another country, we can assume that this observation has probably less to do with the crime per se but with differences in practice and discretion. Discretion can be approached in yet another way : discretion means choice and raises the question of review of the decision. In other words, if a choice is made, 1s that decision reviewed somewhere else ? Is the choice legitimate ? Is it legal ? What specific rules are applied ? Are they procedural or substantive ? What is the range of choices ? Once discretion is examined systematically, can we determine where there is less or more review of the choices ? Where does the compen- sating occur ? All criminal justice systems apply choice to individual cases and the choice must be made regarding these specific cases. The criterion for assessing the system must be done in aggregate. Are equals treated equally ? Equality must be specified. How can that be done cross-nationally ? The answer is in reviewing the choice, looking at cases in the aggregate and in examining equality. You can then compare systems by means of compensatory points and how the criteria come to be applied. The following issues were identified in addition to those discussed above as interesting for research : A c00e Criminal justice overload. Many criminal justice systems (e. g. the United States, West Germany, etc.) are suffering from an overload of cases and from declining criminal justice resources. It would be interesting to find out what happens to legal systems with steadily growing case loads and declining resources. What changes take place over time ? Among some of the better known managerial devices are the following : (a) decriminilization and regulating “‘undesirable”’ behavior outside the criminal justice system ; (b) increasing prosecutorial dismissal power in some categories of behavior ; (c) usage of the penal order processing, e. g summary dispositions ; (d) treatment of work place crime as an extra-legal matter between the employee and the employer (e. g West Germany) ; and (e) increasing the use of fines. It would be useful to analyze these and similar processes. Checks could be made on cases where disposition options overlap, as when prosecutors can choosc bctween dismissal or penal orders in certain categories of crime. Also, in spite of the fact that alternative options are increasing in most countries, there is still a real increase in the number of difficult cases where the principle of legality pushes them into the system. Court delays are increasing. And a growing reluctance to use discretion results in more and more persons being held in pretial detention. Development of Criminal Justice System Blueprints. The observation was made that there is precious little systematic information available on the different legal systems. Yet, cross- national research requires intimate knowledge of the different systems as well as direct experience with the systems. Às a result, it was suggested that it would be immensely valuable to have blueprints available on the various criminal justice systems describing their provisions and procedures in detail. Most countries do have information available that describes their “formal” systems. We know, for example, that police in Scotland have new discretion. But in reality, prosecutors do give them principles and guidelines that regulate police activity to some extent. In Britain, we have another example. Few persons outside Britain know that there is a strong consideration under way to implement a public prosecutor system, especially since the common law is getting increasingly difficult to administer. Britain’s relationship to Europe is also asking for such a development. It is obvious by now that we need to have information on the informal system as well as on the formal one. Complete descriptions and knowledge of the various socio-legal cultures are needed to perform comparative analysis and to provide the foundation on which comparative research must rest. The availability of such blueprints would facilitate cross-national research on such topics as alternatives to incarceration, the concepts — 31 — — and practice of diversion, system assumptions concerning hidden delin- quency, the latent and manifest relationships between the components of the criminal justice system and other systems in the community, and the discretion that is exercised in terms of different categories of crime. It was suggested that the development of such blueprints could be done within the span of one year by means of a task force, de jure and de facto. A comparative approach might perhaps be the best way of approaching that task. The suggestion for the development of individual criminal justice system blueprints received favorable reception from the majority of the participants. The need for such an approach was corroborated by a recent research experience in Canada, which analyzed police discretion in the handling of juveniles at the federal, provincial and local level. Canadian police have total discretion in handling juveniles. Of the 190 municipalities that reported to the federal system, some had no juvenile arrests at all, others had rates that fluctuated between 125 to 1000 per 100,000 population. Qualitative interviews quickly revealed that municipalities kept two sets of statistics. One set for the official statistics, the other for city council and budgetary purposes. Both were different. Apparently, some prosecutors are paid by the case ! The question then becomes what is counted and for whom is the report prepared ? Delinquency rates are in fact produced by police, by the prosecutors and thus influenced more by organizational factors than the reality outside. Even the examination of offense (s), (probably the single most objective criterion that is available) is fraught with problems, because definitions vary considerably, e. g. vandalism, sexual offenses and theft. It seems that the sex of offenders protects females more in some instances, in others females are taken to the courts more often than males. There 1s variation according to the existence of pa- rents, whether youths are residents or transients, whether particular schools are strict or lenient. If they are strict, the youths will be taken to court. The very existence of police departements determines whether kids come to court or not. It became quickly apparent in the study that the statistics were not worth the paper they had been written on. Às a result, quantitative analysis between comparable research elements (e. g. multivariate analysis of such items as age, sex and race) was useless and the usual assumption of random distribution of error Was not valid. The recommendation was made to “begin at the beginning”, i. e. with the events on the street and with qualitative and descriptive approaches. The points was made that cross-national research requires a structural basis for understanding. Flow models need to be developed as a first order of priority, which reflect decision points and flow of offenders through the system over time. Today, we do not have that information. There are no statistics and information on flow and process. _— 32 — 4. — PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRIVACY. Marvin Wolfgang of the University of Pennsylvania discussed the issues of professional ethics, privacy, confidentiality of records and the protection of researchers from having to violate the confi- dence of their clients on the basis of his own research probing into the delinquency of a cohort. The cohort consisted of 10,000 males born in Philadelphia in 1945. À 10 % sample of the cohort was analyzed in terms of self-reports before and after they were 18 years old. Victimization data were also obtained. Researchers found no great reluctance to being interviewed. The problem consisted in finding them. The range of their offenses ranged from petty crimes to murder, rape, assaults and heavy drug use. Offenders were first contacted by mail, then by telephone, then by direct interviews. It can be assumed that if this type of research had to be conducted under the newly promulgated rules of signed informed consent forms, the research could not have been conducted. At least, many difficulties and pro- blems would have been created with altered answers, refusals to sign and to cooperate, etc. Since the undetected crimes included 4 cases of homicide and 75 cases of forcible rape among other severe crimes, a host of ethical and legal issues emerges. Do researchers become accessories after the fact through their knowledge of these acts ? Can researchers be thought of as harboring criminal information and do they thereby aid in the escape of criminals from justice ? Reseachers do not have the protection from the law in terms of confidentiality that medicine and the clergy enjoy. Courts have been known to query psychiatrists concerning the activities of their patients. Would a misrepresentation before a court constitute a felony ? A repressive political atmosphere can all too easily be envisioned, which could bring untold pressures upon social scientists. Clearly, the resear- chers must remain neutral. They are unaligned recipients of data who should neither help, nor treat, nor interfere, nor harm. The researcher is not a representative of government. He responds to a higher value, where scientific research requires the obtaining of highly personal and confidential information in order to gain knowledge and advance science. After some discussion, the tentative conclusion was reached that researchers do not have an obligation to inform on their research subjects. Thus far, society has recognized that scientific endeavor requires confidentiality. But this priority could easily wane ! What should one do when police want to see files ? Some advise to prevent the taking of files at all cost and recommend entering litigation if need be. At present, in the United States, there is no supreme court decision which either affirms or rejects the scientific position on this subject. _— 33 - What 1f the courts interfere ? Would research staff be immune ” Could staff be found in contempt of court ? Can researchers develop a fail safe system to protect their records ? Should they at least develop techniques for delaying law enforcement agents ? One option might be the sequestration of names and code numbers in a foreign bank, but such an approach still would not protect the individual from a contempt of court charge. It also seems advisable that reseachers, in order to protect themselves from the law, should not record the names of the victims. Without that detail. the information would be useless to the police. Discussion revealed uncertainty as to whether there exists in the United States a legal obligation to inform the police about crime that is known to have occured. The clash between the interests of the social scientists and the criminal justice system 1s obvious. It is thought that the failure to report crime constitutes a felony in about 1/3 of the states. In other states, it is a felony if a suspected crime is not reported. However, the Attorney General of the United States and the Depart- ment of Health, Education and Welfare, and the Administrator of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Department of Justice have apparently the power to issue certificates of protection to resear- cher confidentiality. Such permits cover state laws an federal laws whenever research is federally funded. In Sweden, there is no general obligation to report crimes. The same applies to Holland, but there is an obligation to report if a murder could conceivably be prevented. There is also a duty to report homicide and rape if the victim is known. In most European countries court orders can be issued to obtain files but these orders must specify individuals. If such orders were refused, there would be an obstruction of justice. In the light of these provisions, it was felt that there is essentially little risk to most researchers in this respect. On the other hand, if a murder occured and the murderer were known. the need to report becomes more pronounced. The obligation to report issue gains in complexity when research involves the method of observation. A researcher, for example, is studying the police. He observes an officer involved in a felonious assault. In this manner, the researcher becomes a witness to the officer’s criminal behavior. What 1f the subject of study is felonious assault ? Would the researcher then be exempted from reporting the crime ? What if the oflicer had consumed drugs (for example, alcohol) prior to the assault ? IË this were not enough, there are other problems — primarily of a moral nature — as well. Should the researcher side with the policeman ? With the victim ? Should he intervene in the fight? Another example comes from prison research. The day after a lengthy interview with a prisoner, a good A —— friend of that prisoner approaches the researcher and informs him that the prisoner had told him about the interview and that he had purposely lied and that when he got out, he would murder his wife and children. What should the researcher do ? While he is not part of the criminal justice system, he does have a social responsibility for the lives of other people. Further, most prison researchers uncover much information concerning drug traffic and other illegal activities in prison. Legislators can subpoena their files. How can the researchers be protected from that ” Apparently in some European countries the prosecutor would stop such an investigation, in others the material would be protected. À final example comes from a rape study in Phila- delphia, which tracked 1 000 victims from their gynecological exami- nation through a period of three to six months after the offense. They found that police tend to follow up on only a few of the cases but that women tend to inform social workers of the names of offenders and victims. Both district attorneys and defense attorneys have asked for that kind of information. The answer from the researchers involved was negative, which reflects a purist’s perpective. The discussants agreed that the time has come for criminologists to formulate the necessary requirements for unimpeded research and to lobby for the legislation they need to protect their interests. Louk Hulsman of the Erasmus Universiteit of Rotterdam presented his paper on the concept of human rights with special focus on the penal system. The subject can be approached from the perspective of two paradigms. One represents the official perspective on the criminal justice system prevailing at the moment in Europe. It focuses on social control and recently has been formulated by a subcommittee of the European committee on crime problems of the Council of Euro- pe. In this frame of reference the criminal justice system has as objec- tives the protection of society and the rehabilitation of individual offen- ders. It is clear that the sanctions directed towards these objectives have primarily a controllling function towards criminal behavior. At the same time, however, a supportive function on the part of the system is also reflected in these objectives, as sanctions are geared towards achieving the rehabilitation of individual offenders. It should be an intrinsic requirement of justice that limiting conditions be placed on the activities of social control : infringement on individual freedom should be no more that is necessary to protect the public interest. Penal sanctions should place the least possible burden on the commu- nity. The recommended perspective for justicé should be that the best sanction is the mimimum appropriate sanction, a point of view long supported by the findings of criminological research. The second paradigm represents a non-official perspective on criminal justice, one which views criminal justice as a social problem. The entire criminal justice system can be viewed as a problem in- _— 35 — sofar as it is oriented against the welfare and well-being of those persons who come under its purview. From this perspective the whole function and direct output of the criminal justice system can be seen as an infringement on human rights and human liberty of the convict and often also on the primary group to which he belongs. It is furthermore an affront to human dignity and property, a fact which is often forgotten. When viewed in this light, the question could be posed as to why the criminal justice system should not be abolished ? At the very least, there is a need to de-escalate the infringement on human rights presently exerted by the various criminal justice systems. Different countries protect human rights in different ways, with diffe- rent rules and different types of court systems. It is interesting to note that when one compares cross-nationally the emphasis, formulation and codifications on human rights, one finds that human rights are protected the least in countries that have developed the topic the most. For example, the concept of human rights is not well developed in nordic law. Yet human rights are better protected in those countries than they are in Italy, where the conceptualizations have reached a high level of sophistication. We need to analyze the dangers and contri- butions to the realization of human rights as they relate to the criminal justice system. In order to do so, it will be helpful to distinguish between the various sub-components of the system (i. e. police, courts, correc- tions in its expanded sense and the legislatures). À second distinction in- volves certain aspects of the system’s components, such as professional ethics, organizational aspects (e. g. manpower, training, types of internal control, reward systems), and the legal dimension (e. g. legal rules, judicial decisions, etc.). System openness is badly needed because discretion can easily be used to infringe upon human rights. À third distinction touches on the client-system. Here one would examine the risks and contributions of the criminal justice system components in the field of human rights in terms of individual cases (i. e. micro- protection) and in terms of larger groups of people, (i. e. macro-protec- tion). The above point of view generated lively debate and some objec- tions. It was posited that the criminal justice system is a system sui generis. It may well violate human rights and denigrate its clients but when individuals violate the law, they also violate a social contract. Persons engaging in behavior that violates the law, give up certain rights, for example, the right to freedom, and that is a qualitative difference. The observation was made that in West Germany, after 23 years, the criminal justice system is indeed capable of effective control at the federal and state levels. AIl the rules are published and open to inspection. The prosecution activity and autho- rities must report to the people. The system and all its components function effectively. All persons have a protected right to complain about perceived and real violations. The Aufsichtsbeschwerde (super- — 36 — visory agency designed to handle public complaints concerning mal- feasance and system violations) has been created to control any abuse. Further, it should be pointed out that the criminal justice system was explicitly created to defend human rights ! The question was posed as to how the Hulsman position could possibly be tested ? For example, do countries with more legal rights place greater infringe- ments upon the liberties of their citizens ? And do those countries with few legal rights provide more freedom for their citizens ? There was also disagreement as to whether diversion from the criminal justice system is really effective ? There is evidence coming from the United States that diversion programs serve to bring an ever increasing number of people under the purview of criminal justice. In response to these questions, it was suggested that a research experiment be designed in which several countries would create entirely new and different organizations outside the criminal justice apparatus, which would focus on the delivery of services to victims as well as to oflenders. These organizations would have police powers because they would need to engage in fact finding. They would also control the police. Principally, the direct needs of victims and offenders would be addressed by these agencies and the concepts of general deterrence would be forgotten. Subsequent analysis would compare the relative effectiveness of these new insitutions with the performance of the ongoing traditional criminal justice approaches. The response to this suggestion likened it to the opening of Pan- dora’s box. Research would not only have to analyze on a comparative basis how matters are settled within the criminal justice system, it would also have to analyze how disputes are settled outside the system. There would also be the following problems and questions with this proposal should people, for example, have to content themselves with a ““settlement””’ and no longer expect justice ? What would the relationship be between such a settlement and the concept of justice ? Then there are questions concerning a multitude of uncon- trolled variables. The very complexity of the criminal justice system makes it almost impervious to control. How can we expect the new institutions and agencies to be controlled ? S. — THE ORGANIZATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF IN- TERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE RESEARCH. It has been the purpose of this international criminological confe- rence, to determine what would be feasible to research on a cross- national basis. One proposal that had much resonance among the confe- rence participants was the suggestion to develop blueprints of existing criminal justice systems, in order to provide a basis for international comparisons. Such an analysis would focus on the formal an informal — 37 — specifications of penal structures, look at processes and flow patterns and track cases systematically through criminal justice systems. Such ground-work would constitute the much needed foundation on which subsequent comparative research could be built. Louk Hulsman of the Erasmus Universiteit in Rotterdam and Lloyd Ohlin of the Harvard University Law School presented an alternative suggestion in the form of a demonstration project. It was suggested that the study of family assaults would provide an excellent topic for study, on the basis of which alternative approaches to the traditional criminal justice control system could be tested. The subject of family assaults is important because it deals with violent behavior, not property crimes. The persons involved in this type of an offense know one another. The current method for dealing with this problem is to arrest the perpetrators, prosecute them, or to make marriage counseling available to the feuding parties. There are also some attempts at crisis intervention on the part of specially trained police units. There is usually a need to diagnose the situation quickly. Was the event an accident ? Was it intentional ? Was the assault severe ? Are there cultural difference to deal with, such as in intermarriages ? The goal for intervention is usually to start communication between the people involved and to get them to help themselves. There is an eclectic array of agencies at present that attempt to deal with this complex problem, such as household assistance, programs for children, financial assistance, aid with housing and refuge, legal services, and others. The demonstration project would involve the setting up of a program (agency) which would deal with this problem completely outside the criminal justice system. The task for research would then be to test under what aspects such a program would operate. How individual families are assisted through this project, i. e. do families and individuals manage their affairs more effectively after receiving assistance ? Can any linkages be observed between the project and general deterrence ? Is the degree of violence reduced through the assistance of the project ? Comparisons would then be made between all aspects and procedures of the traditional criminal justice approach (including police operations) and the experimental project. Finally, cost comparisons would be made between both approaches. Under such an approach, the traditional definitions of offenders and victims would be irrelevant for the purpose of the project and the objective would be to see how different countries deal with the family assault phenomenon outside the legal system. To get the project started, two cities could be chosen in two different countries where alternatives to the formal social control apparatus would be set up. The projects would examine the different levels of administration and be operationally tied into the respective — 38 — criminal justice systems and into the alternative systems. Research would examine organization conflict, structures and processes. Short term criteria for evaluation would include such issues as adjusment, family stability, socio-economic indicators. Long term evaluation cri- teria would include recidivism and assault reduction. Research results would provide extensive descriptions of the two systems and have major policy implications for the criminal justice systems. Adequate financial support would have to be obtained, perhaps form an international funding source ? Some conference participants thought that while the topic oË choice had some interest, it was not an important area for research when seen from the perspective of the many needs that currently face most criminal justice systems. It was observed that studies of such a nature always tend to produce some side effects. The more one pays attention to a specific conflict, such as family assaults, the more one will find the phenomenon to occur and the more such events become dramatized and the situations polarized. Another point of concern was expressed in that there exists today a major conflict in the United States between professional ““servers’’ and the groups who are serviced. The demand is frequently heard that people in need of service should be served by people of their own kind. And if resources were to be made available, the demand would be made to give them to the indigenous groups that require them. While there is interest in Great Britain in the topic of cruelty to women, it was suggested that the topic might be enlarged to include child abuse since the two types of violence are frequently related. But is there really an organized way of coping with family assault ? Who can best intervene ? Should there be a family violence committe ? And what about mental cruelty ? One would have to be very careful in defining the phenomenon to be studied and there would have to be agreement between participating countries on the scope of the study and the measurement of the variables. Other conference participants had serious reservations concerning the proposed research. Family violence may be a self-fulfilling prophecy and is comparatively unimportant when one considers the pheno- menal increase in such crimes as armed robberies and rape in the United States and in many other countries. There is a need to show organizationally what happens throughout the entire criminal justice sytem. The choice of topic should provide insights on that. The follo- wing criteria were suggested for chosing a resarch topic (a) there should be an organizational concern regarding the issue, (b) there should be a strong public feeling of concern regarding the subject, (c) the public tolerance regarding the crime should be low, and (d) the agencies of social control should be flaundering in the effective — 39 — control of the crime in question. Finally, if it were to be a major quest for a comparative cross-national research project to provide an exa- mination of as much of the criminal justice system as possible, and if it should reveal as many of the informal aspects of control (such as over-reporting, underreporting, handling of victims, etc.) the topic of family assault would not be chosen. At the conclusion of the conference, the representatives of the Soviet Union, V. Shupilov and V. Klotchkov presented their views on comparative research priorities. It was observed that it may be more productive not to concentrate and elaborate the differences between countries during comparative research but to stress experiences which can be shared. The exchange of opinions concerning the many problems of crime is most useful. It is impossible to approach the topic of crime without understanding the problem of hidden delin- quency and crime, and unreported crime. Apparently, non-reporting of crime is quite common. More research is needed on the causes of underreporting so that victims can be protected better than they presently are. There are also serious questions regarding the efficiency of the different forms of punishment. The judgment concerning the non-effectiveness of punishment may be premature. It has been made without in-depth research. Às a result, one can ask whether the present inefficiency is due to the failure of punishment or whether the problem lies in the methods with which punishment is being applied ? More information will be needed on the topic of resocialization, the control of discretionary powers of the criminal justice system, and on the guarantees of human rights in the criminal justice process. We have to advance the cause of human rights, place some limitations on administrative discretion, continue our struggle against criminality and prevent abuse of power. Not all things discussed at this conference were relevant for the Soviet Union but it is most important to pursue those matters which will advance the cause of justice and which conti- nue to be shared concerns. — 40 — Crime trends in modern democracies since 1945 (”) Ted R. GURR Northwestern University Evanston, IHl U.S.A. In a recent historical study of crime and conflict in London, Stockholm, an Sydney we found remarkable parallels in their experience of common crime. The incidence of offenses against persons and pro- perty, as registered in police reports and court records, declined by an average ratio of 8 to 1 between the 1830’s and the 1930°s. Since then, and especially since the 1950?s, rates of common crime have turned sharply upward. The evidence seemed to rule out several plausible explanations of this reversing trend. First, we found no evidence that the trends were due to changes in the criminal law or police detection and reporting practices. Common crime did not become simply less visible through out the 19th century and then more visible in the mid-20th century. Nor could the reversal be attributed to the changing effectiveness of the law, police, and courts. The institutions and policies which evolved during a century of improving public order were much the same during the ‘“‘crime wave” of the 1960’s as they were during the orderly decades between the two world wars. We concluded that the reversing trend signified real and substantial changes in the magnitude of threatening social behavior — changes that were common to all three societies (1). One of many puzzles posed by the historical comparison was whether the three cities’ recent experience was paralleled in all other Western societies and in all kinds of crime. The answer to this question, and the data required .to answer it, were essential for answering the subsequent causal question : what demographic, econo- (*) This work was carried out with the support of a 1976 Common Problem fellowship awarded the author by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, supplemented by funds for research assistance and analysis from the “Reaction to Crime” project at Northwestern University’s Center for Urban Affairs, a project supported by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. Erika Gurr collected and evaluated the national crime data, their analysis was carried out by Robin Gillies. Institutional support was provided by the Institute of Criminology, Cambridge University, and by Northwestern Univer- sitv. (1) The definitive account of the study is Gurr, Grabosky, and Hula (1977). A summary report is Gurr (1976). — 41 — mic, political, and cultural changes, distinctive to which countries, have contributed to the apparant decline of public order in Western society ? This paper offers a systematic comparison of crime trends in 18 economically developed democracies since 1945. Various cate- gories of common crimes against persons and property are surveyed ; so are moral offenses, whose detection depends mainly on active policing. No attempt is made to answer unanswerable questions about which countries have the greatest magnitudes of crime. Trends are compared, not crime rates. The fundamental question is on of change : is public order in each country improving or declining relative to its own recent past ? COMPARATIVE DATA ON CRIME RATES Comparative statistical studies of crime are scarce, despite a gene- ral interest in identifying differences among nations in the extent of crime, and despite social scientists’ interest in testing hypotheses about the causes and consequences of threatening social behavior (2). One reason is the common observation that some of the differences among nations in crime rates are due to variance in legal codes, policing practices, and reporting systems (see among many others Mannheim 1965, ch. 5 ; and Wolfgang 1967). À second reason, to which the first has no doubt contributed, is the lack of collections of comparative crime data. Although time-series data are to be found in the statis- tical publications of many countries, the only systematic post-war effort to bring some of them together has been carried out by Interpol beginning in 1950. The published compilations of Interpol are beset with problems, however, including a rash of petty computa- tional and typographical errors and, more seriously, gross year-to-year variations in country statistics-apparently due to change in the ways in which national agencies have interpreted the supposedly-standar- dized Interpol guidelines for compiling and reporting crime data. Two other cross-national compilations of crime data have been gathered recently by scholars directly from national sources. One such data bank, by sociologists Dane Archer and Rosemary Gartner, includes data for some 100 countries from as early as 1900 to the early 1970’s. The first published study using these data tests the effects of a nation’s involvement in war on its post-war homicide rates (Archer and Gartner 1976). The second such compilation was collected under the direction of the author of this study, for a shorter period and fewer countries. Our primary concern was to assemble data which (2) There has been some historical research on crime which makes substantial use of official data but little comparative work. We know of some 20 quantitative studies of the changing incidence of crime in English-speaking societies, four of which span a century or more but none of which examine —“ 4… were consistent over time within each country, so that trends in the incidence of various categories of offense could be determined and compared with a minimum of artifactual distortion. The data used in this study were gathered from the official publications of each country, either general or specialized yearbooks. Insofar as possible we sought data representing activities at both ends of the criminal-justice “funnel” : offenses known to police, and convic- tions. Data on offenses known to police provide a closer approxi- mation to the real incidence of socially-threatening bebavior than any other official statistics ; only victimization surveys provide a more reliable reading. Convictions data are questionable indicators of cri- minal behavior, but are good indicators of crime-control policies. Varying discrepancies between offenses known and convictions are a measure of changing official efficiency in crime-control efforts ; varia- tions in convictions per se reflect the varying scope and severity of attempts to control crime. Data were sought for all economically-developed democracies for the years 1945 through 1974. Table 1 lists the 18 countries for which substantial data were found, categorized in five groupings that are used in subsequent discussion. The English-speaking, Scandi- navian, and Germanic groups comprise countries with similar cultures, the fourth is a residual category. Israel and Japan, which constitute the fifth group, are included as potential “deviant cases” their cultures differ markedly from those of the other nations. The only developed democracies not included, aside from mini-states like Iceland, are Belgium and Greece, whose crime data proved to be too sparse or internally inconsistent. Both known offenses and convictions data were included for 11 countries for at least part of the 30-year period ; five others are represented by data series on convictions only ; while the United States and Italy are represented only by data on offenses known. more than one society. In continental Europe there are several streams of research. The Netherlands has a long-standing tradition of city and regional studies of criminalitv, focusing on the characteristics or offenders a recent example is Litjens (1973). There are a number of German and Austrian studies but few cover more than 20 years ; here an exception is Rangol (1961, 1962). For other European societies one can identify only a scattering of studies, none of them representative of any national or cross-national research tradition. Two recent examples are Christiansen and Jensen (1972) on Denmark and Minervini (1973) on Italy. Two comparative studies concerned especially with crime in the Third World are Wolf (1971) and Clinard and Abbott (1973). There have also been a few comparative, data-based studies of the impact of war on crime, which Archer and Gartner (1976) survey and add to. À recent comparative study of “the growth of crime” bv Radzinowicz and King (1977) uses no comparative crime statistics. — 43 — Table 1 about here. Statistical series were sought for the eight categories of offenses listed below. For some countries, coverage and consistency were best served by recording more aggregate indicators. For example, aggregate indicators of known “‘crimes against the person’”’ rather than murder and assault separately were recorded for the Netherlands and Norway. The diversity with which property crimes are reported in the national sources made it advisable to employ three alternative levels of aggregation for the statistical series included in the final data set. The first number in parentheses after each category is the number of countries for which the data set includes ‘“‘known’’ offenses at this level of aggregation ; the second number signifies the inclusion of data series on convictions at this level. Aggregate Specific categories categories Murder, manslaughter (11,11) Crimes against Assault (11,11) persons (2,5) Robbery (12,10) Serious theft (0,2) Crimes against property (0,2) Burglary (6,4) Larceny/petty theft (6,5) Other theft (6,9) White-collar crime (11,13) Sexual and moral offenses (13,14) Public order offenses (9,11) TABLE 1 Countries and Types of Crime Data Available Countries Crime Data Series Time-Span English-speaking Australia Offenses known 1964-1973 Convictions 1945-1972 Canada Convictions 1945-1969 Offenses known 1962-1973 — 44 — England and Wales Offenses known 1946-1974 Convictions 1946-1974 New Zealand Convictions 1947-1973 United States Offenses known 1945-1974 Scandinavian Denmark Offenses known 1946-1974 Convictions 1946-1974 Norway Offenses known 1956-1972 Convictions 1945-1966 Sweden Offenses known 1950-1974 Convictions 1945-1973 Finland Offenses known 1961-1973 Convictions 1958-1972 1950, 1955, Germanic Austria Convictions 1947-1972 Germany (West) Convictions 1950-1974 Switzerland Convictions 1945-19"73 Other European France Convictions 1946-1972 Ireland Offenses known 1945-1971 Commitals to trail 1945-1971 Italy Offenses known 1946-53, 1961-1974 Netherlands Offenses known 1964-1973 Convictions 1946-1973 Others Israel Offenses known 1949-1973 Convictions 1951-1970 Japan Offenses known 1946-1973 Convictions 1946-1973 Some categories require a note of explanation. Assault excludes sexual attacks (counted under sexual and moral offenses) and the use of force during robbery (counted under the theft categories). White- collar offenses comprise embezzlement and fraud, and in some countries forgery and similar offenses. Sexual and moral offenses are diverse, ranging from rape to homosexual acts to public indecency. Public order offenses are those which signify individual or collective resis- — 45 — tance to authority, mainly assaults on police but also rioting and offenses against state security (3). The absence of data for a particular category of oflense for part or all of the period under consideration does not necessarily mean that no such data could be obtained. Nor does the lack of data on Kknown offenses or convictions for some countries, as shown in table 1, signify that such statistical series are never compiled and reported. It is more often the case that fragmentary or internally-inconsistent statistical series are given in the sources restricted to a few years., or to only some jurisdictions or regions within a country, or subject to gross changes over time in inclusiveness. Since our overriding consi- deration was to provide data for comparison over the longest possible period of time, many statistical series unsuitable for this purpose were excluded from the final data set. À systematic effort was made to identify and adjust for artifactual changes in the 184 statistical series included in the final data set. “Artifactual’”’ changes are those variations in crime data series which are due to national charges in crime reporting or classification proce- dures. The artifactual changes which most threaten the validity of studies of crime trends are those manifest in quantum increases or decreases in the statistics for a particular kind of offense from one year to the next (4). From the statistical sources and examination of the data, we identified 42 such changes affecting 37 different statis- tical series. Some were due to the addition or exclusion of a particular subcategory of offense from a larger category, a few were due to changes in the scope of reporting (e. g., the addition of data from courts or jurisdictions not previously included), and some are simply inex- plicable, given our partial information on the crime reporting proce- dures of the countries. The effect of each substantial break in a statistical series was eliminated by adjusting all the items in a data series either before or after the break. The difference between the pre- and post-break values was determined and either added to or subtracted from the remainder of the series. For example, in England and Wales in 1969 a conso- lidating act altered the classification of property offenses in such a way that the robbery and especially the breaking and entering (bur- glary) rates jumped sharply. Unadjusted, the statistics exagerate the rate of increase in serious property crime in Britain. We adjusted by subtracting the amount of the 1968-69 increase (most of which was due to the change in classification) from the statistics for 1969 and all (3) Detailed documentation of the data set is contained in GURR (T.R,) & (E.), Crime in Western societies, 1945-1974 Code Index, Evanston, Il Northwestern University, 1976, a Xeroxed document available from the author (4) Many examples oË artifactual changes in crime indicators are contained in the city studies in Gurr, Grabosky, and Hula (1977) along with information on the circumtances which gave rise to them. — 46 — later years. Such adjusted statistical series no longer correspond to the official data on offenses known or convictions. They also introduce a small “conservative”’ bias because they eliminate from the indicators any real change, positive or negative, that may have coincided with the reporting change. But the adjusted data series have the singular advantage that they provide more valid depictions of trends than the unadjusted data (5). Crime indicators were constructed from the adjusted statistical series by the following procedures. First, a total of 51 missing values within series were estimated by interpolation. Next, rates of offenses known and convictions per 100,000 population were calculated. In the third step several composite measures were constructed : ; — crimes of aggression = murder +— assault or ““crimes against persons” — serious theft = robbery (+burglary, if separately given) — all theft = robbery + burglary (if separately given) — other theft aggregations. Finally, each of the six measures was divided through by its lowest value. The result is that the lowest score on each indicator is 1.00 and all other scores in the series can be read multiples of the minimum value. If a country’s indicator of known white-collar crimes increased 1.0 to 3.6 over a decade, the change is directly interpretable as a 260 percent increase. These indicators facilitate direct comparisons of trends and rates of change in countries’ crime rates, irrespective of the substantial differences in the absolute magnitude of those rates. They also can be used in correlation analyses, both longitudinally and cross-sectionally. Trends in Common Crime. The reported rates of crime among countries vary widely. The incidence of reported murder and manslaughter in 1970 varied, among the 1l countries for which we have data, from a low of .92 in the Republic of Ireland to a high of 7.88 in the United States. The range of 1970 conviction rates for all theft varied even more widely among 16 countries from 21,6 per 100,000 population in Japan to 473,9 in England and Wales. National differences in criminal justice systems and reporting raise serious questions about the meaning of such compa- risons. Our experience in studying crime trends in three Western cities Over a period of 150 years, though, has led to the conclusion that comparison of trends in different countries’ experience of common (5) There are other sources of change in crime indicators, unrelated to actual changes in the volume of crime, which will not be affected by these adjustments. They include the effects of changes in the scope of the criminal law (criminalization and decriminalization), variations in active policing, and transfers of certain classes of offenders from the jurisdiction of criminal courts to other agencies. In contemporarv Western societies it is unlikely that such changes will have much effect on the recorded incidence of the more serious forms of common crime. — 47 — crime 1s less problematic than comparison of absolute rates (see Gurr, Grabosky, and Hula 1977, esp. ch. 1.2.). Archer and Gartner base their study of war and homicide rates on the same principle (1976, p. 945). One argument for the validity of trends is that the idiosyncratic features of each country’s legal police, and crime reporting systems tend to remain the same over time. When significant legal or reporting changes are introduced, they usually are easy to detect and take into account — as we have done when adjusting for artifactual changes, as described above. Another justification is that in contemporary Western societies there is likely to be a more or less consistent relationship between the amount of criminal victimization in society and the official records of those offenses. Victims of assault, burglary, and fraud are rather likely to report offenses to the police, and the more serious the offense the more likely they are to do so — and the more likely are the police to record the report and treat it seriously. OË course many petty offenses go unreported, but even in the United States, whose crime statistics are thought to be less reliable than those of most other countries in this study (because of citizens’ suspicion of police and the lack of uniform policing and reporting practices), surveys show that there is a consistent relation between rates of victimization, as reported by private citizens to interviewers, and rates calculated from official records (see for example Skogan 1974). Fi- nally, there are close correlations over time between numbers of offenses brought to police attention and numbers of arrests, committals to trial, and convictions. Our studies of Western societies in the long and short run show that measures of enforcement activity typically increase when known common crimes are rising — though at a lower rate of increase — and decline when known offenses decline (6). An essential qualification 1s that such arguments cannot be applied with any confidence to crimes without victims. There is a large and diverse set of social, regulatory, and political offenses — some of them represented by our categories of sexual and moral offenses, and public order offenses — which enter official records mainly as a result oË active policing. Variations in their incidence is notoriously suscep- tible changing definitions of criminality and changing enforcement practices (7). (6) The absolute magnitudes of offenses known and convictions differ widely, of course ; the point here is that they are correlated. The historical case studies in Gurr, Grabosky, and Hula (1977) provide much evidence that different indicators of crime and criminal justice activity in Western societies exhibit parallel changes in directionality, even though the amplitude of changes usually is different. Our unpublished time-series correlations of known vs. conviction data in the countries in this study also show strong covariation in most instances. (7) On the varving social regulation of deviance see among many examples. Schur (1965), Rock and McIntosh (1974). and Howard and Howard — 48 — The arguments can be summarized in two assertions about the social realities underlying the trends in official data on crime in Western societies. (1) Substantial and sustained changes in indicators of common crimes against persons and property are prima facie evidence of real changes in the volume of these kinds of socially- threatening behavior (2). Both short - and long - term changes in indicators of social and political offenses are prima facie evidence of changes in the nature and scope of official efforts at social control. Both assumptions may be proven wrong in specific ins- tances, but each is the more plausible a priori assumption about a particular class of offenses than its opposite. The discussion of trends which follows assumes that general accuracy of the two assumptions some exceptions which are consistent with the evidence are noted. Trends in Common Crime : English-Speaking Countries. All five English-speaking countries show consistent evidence oË rising rates of common crime, in Figures 1 through 4. There are distinct differences in detail and among countries, though. Known crimes against persons, in Figure 1, have increased in England and Wales at a considerably more rapid rate than in the United States, beginning immediately after World War II. The essential qualification is that the base rate in the United States probably was a good deal higher to begin with — one must say ““probably” because no cross- national equivalence can be claimed for the crimes so recorded. For what the comparison is worth, it shows England and Wales Wwith a rate of 8.2 murders and assaults per 100,000 in 1946 and 127,8 in 1973 ; the comparable figures for the United States are 53,7 and 209.3. The proportional increase for Britain in the three decades is 1400 % contrasted with 370 % for the United States, which can be compared in turn with a 160 % increase in Canada from 1962 to 1973 and a 90 % increase in Australia between 1964 and 1972. The trends in convictions in figure 2 show England and Wales with an earlier and much more rapid increase in convictions for these offenses than the Antipodean countries, but since the mid-1960°s the countries share a common upward trend. Trends in serious thefts — robbery and burglary — resemble those in crimes against persons, as shown in figures 3 and 4. The trends in known offenses in England and the United States differ only in that the lowest rates were recorded in the former country in 1955-56, compared with 1945-48 in the United States. In each country the post-1955 increase has been about 300 %, while in (1974). On discretionary police behavior in the United States see Skolnick (1966) and YWilson (1968), among others. Many historical examples are cited in the studies of London, Stockholm, and Sydney in Gurr, Grabosky, and Hula (1977). — 49 — Canada known offenses increased by 100 % between 1962 and 1973. The actual rates of reported offenses among these countries have been roughly similar, subject to the usual caveats about national differences in legal codes and reporting systems ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES Figure 1 10.000 9.000 8.000 7.000 P 6.000 q 5.000 () J 4.000 3.000 8 INDICATORS OF KNOWN CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS 2.000 Legend 1.000 ENGLAND CANADA USA Ê AUSTRALIA 1945 1 9:55 1 9:65 1975 YEAR 96 — ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES Fiqure 2 10.000 -— 9.000 - —— (D + 8.000 ‘ + 7.000 - _ _ 6.000 15 — d ; 5.000 __ w % 4.000 ) J 3.000 INDICATORS OF CONVICTIONS-CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS v 2.000 ï / € Legend 2 L 1.000 © ENGLAND —* AUSTRALIA © NEWZEAL 1945-0 195'5-0À 1965-0 1975-0 YEAR — 51 — ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES Figure 3 5.000 4.500 4.000 3.500 £ V L 3.000 — 2.500 — d - f 2.000 - y) L — INDICATORS OF SERIOUS THEFYTS KNOWN Te S 1.500 # d) 1.000 — Legend S ENGLAND —# CANADA & USA 1945-0 1955-0 1965-0 1975-0 YEAR — 32 — ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES Figure 4 5.000 — 4.167 —- Ê F 3.333 _ — 2.500 — 1.667 INDICATORS OF CONVICTIONS-SERIOUS THEFTS @ E = . . 833 + egend ENGLAND CANADA AUSTRALIA + + #0 NEW ZEAL 1945-0 195:5-0 1965-0 1975-0 YEAR — 33 — Reported serious thefts per 100,000 population 1950 1970 England and Wales 167 878 United States 307 1259 Canada no data 829 Parallel trends in conviction are to be found in the four countries shown in Figure 4. Conviction rates for serious theft were relatively lower in the arly 1950°s but began to increase sharply, albeit irregularly, thereafter. The amplitude of increase in convictions is less than the increase in offenses known. This is a phenomenon common to almost all countries and categories of crime showing an increase in this study. It is susceptible to different interpretations, however. One is lessened police efficiency in the face of a rising tide of offenses. A second is increased leniency of courts, especially toward youthful offenders — a trend for which there is much impressionistic evidence. A third factor is artifactual : the shift of some of the upsurge of cases to lower courts whose statistics are not included in the convic- tion totals. In England, where our data include convictions by all courts, indictable offenses have been disposed of summarily by magis- trates’ courts in growing numbers throughout the twentieth centu (see Peirce, Grabosky, and Gurr 1977, pp. 144-46, 190-192). In Austrialia and New Zealand, where our convictions data refer only to the higher courts, it can be inferred that the upward trends in conviction rates substantially understate the true increase in convic- tion for these offenses. - Trends in Common Crime in Scandinavia. The four Scandinavian countries are smaller, socially more homogenous, and have more similar police and criminal justice systems than the five English-speaking countries. They also are relatively egalitarian and have a widespread net of supportive social services, which according to some criminogenic theories would be expected to reduce their incidence of common crime. Moreover they are well in advance of most other Western societies in taking a rehabilitative approach to offenders. None of this has spared them from the rising tide in heft, though they have fared better than the speaking countries with respect to crimes against persons. — 54 — AIl the Scandinavian countries have had rising rates of known cri- mes against persons since the early 1960’s, as can be seen in Figure 5, but the increases have averaged a relatively modest 10 % per year, except in Finland were it has been 24 %. (By contrast, the mean annual rate of increase in murders and assault in the English-speaking coun- tries has been on the order of 25 %, over a longer period). Conviction rates (not shown here) have increased commensurately. Despite the similarity in trends, the absolute rates of offenses known to police differ considerably among these countries, as shown below. Without exhaustive study of criminal codes and police record-keeping prac- tice it 1s impossible to say how much of these differences are arti- factual and how much reflect real differences in social behavior. It bears repeating that the trends are similar despite the differences in base rates. Rates of Known Crimes against Persons per 100,000 Population 1950 1960 - 61 1972 - 73 Denmark 412 39.1 58.7 Finland no data 148.0 305.3 Norway no data 52.4 83.7 Sweden 115.7 126.4 214.1 Rates of serious theft in Sweden, Norway, and Finland (we lack separate data for Denmark) have skyrocketed, as figure 6 demons- trates. In these instances the data refer only to robbery, which is the most serious but also the rarest of property crimes. Its rarity 1s attested to by the fact that in all Sweden in 1950 only 190 robberies were reported to police, compared with 2 812 in 1974. The incidence of all thefts known to police, petty and serious, has increased at less precipitous rates, as demonstrated for all four countries in figure 7. The mean increase since the 1950°s has been 13 % per year, with little difference among the countries in the amplitude of increase. Convictions data (not shown) convey much the same information, with the exception that they show a high rate of official action against offenders in Denmark and Norway in the four years after the end of World War IT. Apparently this was due mainly to the belated — 55 — SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES Fiqure 5 6.000 5.000 4.000 —— — 3.000 — 2.000 + INDICATORS OF KNOWN CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS + M 277 E S Gos 1.000 +- É2 Legend —— SWEDEN - DENMARK — NORWAY —- FINLANC 2945 1955 1965 1975 YE — 56 — SCANDINAVIAN COUNTÈIES Figure 6 10.000 —— Q 9.000 e ; — 8.000 0 —- 7.000 -— G —— 6,000 — d 4 — 5.000 is 4.000 4 A > INDICATORS OF SERIOUS THEFTS KNOWN d 3.000 4 +- à 2.000 —— d 8 T f < Legend 1.000 L e © SWEDEN F <© NORWAY - FINLAND 1945 1965 1965 1975 YEAR — 57 — SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES Figure 7 5.000 + 4.500 + 4.000 3.500 + — \\// 3.000 2.500 4 + 2.000 + Ï INDICATORS OF ALL THEFTS KNOWN 1.500 + ès —2 S 1.000 + C +— Lesend 500 + — SVWEDEN — DENMARK --- NORWAY — FINLAND L__ 1945 1955 1 9'65 1275 YEAR _ 58 — prosecution of collaborators for economic crimes committed during the German occupation (see for example Christiansen 1968). The actual rates of theft reported for the four countries are compared below Rates of Known thefts per 100,000 Percent of Population In citiles 1950 c. 1960 c. 1973 100,000 + in 1960 Denmark 1922 2332 5889 34.2 Finland . e . ... no data 886 2453 20.1 Norway . . » e = # e no data 748 1512 20.3 Sweden e . e ® » © 1568 2726 4730 25.1 Part of their differences may be due to idiosyncracies in recording systems since theft in Western societies is more common in cities the differences in theft rates may also be attributed to the differences in urbanization among the four countries. The least-urbanized have had the lowest theft rates, even though their rates of increase in theft have seen similar to the more urbanized Trends in Common Crime in the Germanic Countries. The three German-speaking countries of Europe as a group have had quite a different and more favorable experience of common crime than the societies just examined. Our observations are based only on indicators of convictions so the possibility cannot be ruled out that known offenses have varied — especiallv increased — more than convictions. In both Germany and Austria, offenses against persons increased during the 1950°s, as shown in figure 8 (during the Allied occupation of Austria, but after its end in Germany), then decreased during most of the 1960®%s and showed only a slight increase beginning c. 1968. In Switzerland, untouched by military occupation and little affected by the traumas of post-war adjustment three has been a slight but unmistakable downward trend. To be precise, convictions for such offenses in the early 1970’s were 24 % lower than they had been in the late 1940? The indicators of serious theft (robberies only) in Germany and Austria have increased by some 225 % since 1955, as can be seen from figure 9. As of 1972 the conviction rates for this offense were — 59 — GERMANIC COUNTRIES Figure 8 4.000 -Fe 3500 + 3.m L né —- 2.500 —- — 2.000 +- 1.500 +- P i INDICATORS OF CONVICTIONS-CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS A 1.000 — + Legend — W.GERMANY # AUSTRIA — SWITZERL. 1945 mmmn ts 19é5 1965 1975 YEAR — 60 — GERMANIC COUNTRIES Figure 9 5.000 4,500 + E e 4.000 + — 3.500 -— C3 + (D 3.000 -— + 2.500 _ 2 + 2.000 - O Ÿs - 1.500 \ INDICATORS OF CONVICTIONS-SERIOUS THEFTS / 1.000 -— T Legend L © W. GERMANY -t- AUSTRIA 1945 1955 YEAR 1965 1975 — 61 — GERMANIC COUNTRIES Figure 10 5.000 4500 + 4.000 +— +— 3.500 — J 3.000 4 2.500 d + 2.000 7 + d) 1.500 - INDICATORS OF CONVICTIONS-ALL THEFTS fe, .. ‘_A—’I , 1.000 —+ e © NST 4 500 - Legend © W. GERMANY >t- AUSTRIA < SWITZERL. 1945 1 9E5 1965 1965 YEAR — 62 - similar to those of the other countries examined thus far : Germany 6.0 per 100,000, Austria 3.3, Sweden 3.8, Denmark 3.1, England 4.8, Australia 5.1. Since definitions differ, the only firm conclusion is that the rate of increase in Germany and Austria has been more gradual than in the Scandinavian and English-speaking countries. When convic- tions for all thefts are plotted, in figure 10, the relative good fortune of the Germanic societies is more strikingly evident. Conviction rates did not begin to increase until 1965, and have done so at relatively modest rates. Between 1965 and 1972 the average annual increase has been 2 %, in Switzerland, 8 % in Austria, and 9 % in Germany. Trends in Common Crime in Other FEuropean Countries. This category includes France, Ireland, Italy, and the Netherlands, countries whose only common property is a relatively large Roman Catholic population. Their records of crimes against persons are equally diverse (see figures 11 and 12). Ireland shows consistent evidence of increase in murder and assault, dating from the mid-1950°s and literally going off the graphs. The essential qualification is that the initial Irish rates were very low the rate of assaults known to police in the 1950’s was the lowest of any country for which we have data, and it was noted above that in 1970 Ireland had the lowest murder rate of 18 countries. À relatively small numerical increase in such offenses is reflected in a relatively large proportional increase. For the Nether- lands the evidence seems inconsistent a stable rate of known offenses against persons during the last decade but a rapidly- rising conviction rate. Since convictions are in no year more than 3 % of reported offenses, the discrepancy seems indicative of change in official response rather than public behavior. In France and Italy offenses against persons appear to have declined in most of the post-war period. In Italy, offenses known have dropped steadily since the early 1960’s. À kind of confirmation is provided by the component indicators (not shown separately). The rate of accidental death +— murder (aggregated in the sources we used) has been almost invariant since the war’s end and the assault rate has steadily fallen. In France, where only convictions can be traced, rates of crimes against persons declined until 1960, edged up about 25 % in the next seven years, fell once more, and then increased between 1969 and 1972 by about 80 %. The upturn is too brief, and our information about the disposition of cases in French courts too scanty, to conclude yet that the French are belatedly following the violent fashions of most of their neighbors. — 63 — OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 6.000 Figure 11 E d Z 5,000 .. , — — Ô 4.,000 L =J -— 3.000 , —. Û 1 y 2.000 - fe INDICATORS OF KNOWN CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS —- Q O 1.000 A e 4- Legend © IRELAND ‘ [TALY # NETHERL 1945 1965 1965 1975 YEAR — 64 — OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES Figure 12 4.000 3.500 ‘ 3.000 © 2.500 2.000 ( ® 1.500 Q ‘ Q - e> ® ; S 1.000 INDICATORS OF CONVICTIONS-CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS Legend <© !IRELAND — <© FRANCE e NETHERL. 1945 1955 1965 1975 YEAR — 65 — Âs for the indicators of property crime in these countries, in figure 13 and 14, all were relatively high in the immediate aftermath of World War IL and then declined. It appears that the countries most affected by war had the highest post-war levels of theft — an obser- vation that is consistent with studies of the impact of World War I on crime rates in a number of countries (8). Thefts known in Italy in 1946 exceeded their mid-1950’s minimum by a ratio of 3:1, the rates in Ireland by only 1.4 : 1. À plausible explanation is the problems of readjustment to civilian life of returned servicemen, of whom there were a great many in Italy and relatively fewer in Ireland (many Irish served in the British forces). Exceptionally high conviction rates for theft in post-war France and the Netherlands can be attributed partly to returned servicemen and forced laborers, and partly to the prosecution of Nazi collaborators, as in Norway and Denmark. These four countries’ recent experience of property crime is much more of a piece, similar amongst themselves and to other European societies. Known thefts and convictions have all increased, beginning late in the 1950’s. The years which mark the trough, and the mean annual rates of subsequent increase, are compared below — Sustained Mean average increase in increase Known from offenses Convictions France c. 1959 9 % Ireland . . . . . . … . 00666 C . 1955 12 % 8 % Italy . « « * » » © « © ® % © 6 # e C . 1960 19 % Netherlands C . 1959 1 % 2 % (to 1968) =— The Netherlands appears relatively favored inasmuch as conviction rates stabilized and then began to decline after 1968. Known offenses have continued to rise, though, and the conviction rate for serious property crime (not shown here) increased by 230 %, between 1955 and 1974. The averall decline in theft conviction rates in the Nether- lands is’attributable to changing police and court practices with : respect to lesser offenses. (8) For citations on crime after World War I see Archer and Gartner (1976) pp. 938-939. Two Dutch studies of the impact of World War IL on crime in the Netherlands are Rijksen (1957) and Litjens (1973). — 66 — OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES Figure 13 b.000 -— 4,500 —— =+ 4,000 -— +— + 3.500 — 3.000 —- — (D — 2.500 — J 2.000 — J — % , (f) n 1.500 4- INDICATORS OF ALL THEFTS KNOWN G - - —L B G d Q ; 1.000 —J- c - G - Legend 500 © IRELAND — # ITALY e NETHERL. 1 9:55 1965 1975 1945 YEAR — 67 OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES Figure 14 5.000 —- 4.500 due 4,000 — +— + 3.500 +— + 3.000 THEFTS + 2.500 + 2.000 p va, + > O - O - 1.500 - e '”r”\r__.«/ 5s C e INDICATORS OF CONVICTIONS-ALL e A G + Q L Q E d ® e 1.000 S _ Legend — -— IRELAND -— — FRANCE - NETHERL 1945 1955 1965 1975 YEAR — 68 — Trends in Common Crime in Israel and Japan. The state of Israel was established in circumstances that have no parallel among the other 17 countries in this survey, and her immigrant and indigenous population manifest an unparalleled cultural diversity. Therefore we might expect Israel’s crime trends to be much different from those of countries already examined. The indi- cator of known crimes against persons, in figure 15, shows a distinc- tive pattern of increase during the first years after the founding of Israel — years of heavy immigration — followed by a decline. The pattern is not only different from those of the other Western societies, it shows less variation than most : the maxima are little more than twice the minima. Israel has not been immune, though, to the rising incidence of theft, shown in figures 16 and 17. Between the late 1950°s and 1974 known serious thefts (robbery and burglary) were up by 250 % and total thefts by the same proportion. Culturally, Japan is even more a ““‘deviant case” than Israel, and its trends in common crime are equally distinctive. Known offenses against persons increased very rapidly in the first decade following World War IL until 1958, when they began an almost equally pro- nounced decline that continued through 1974. The reversing trend in convictions (not shown) is virtually identical. Japan has also been spared the rising rate of property crimes experienced in other modern democracies. An examination of rates for various forms of property crime shows that known offenses and convictions for the most serious offenses of robbery fell more than those for simple theft : Ratio of decline, 1948-1973 Known robberies . « * » » ® © % »% » 6 » % % % © © e e e + e + © < * =s e «s + e + — 1.2 1.0 Robbery convictions . e © —. ® * * à » » % 6 %* %* % * © © % + * * » * * e + + + € e e » — 14 1.0 Other thefts known s. e %* ® ® * » ® © 6 © « » . * e . e © % e < » e + e » + + + + e + e 1.7 1.0 Other theft convictions . e * * ®* ® * ® * © %* * » © © * % < à « %* « e © —* « e e % +e © % 7.8 1.0 This pattern of change duplicates the pattern we have observed in historical studies of London, Stockholm, and Sydney during the 19th and early 20th century as public order improved in those cities, serious offenses declined at a more rapid rate than petty ones (see Gurr, Grabosky, and Hula 1977 passim). Moreover the pattern 1s the mirror image of what has been observed in most of the Western societies surveyed in this study : indicators of serious property crimes have risen at a more rapid rate than the more common lesser offenses. À suggested interpretation is that the subs- tantial volume of petty theft which seems to characterize all prosperous capitalist societies is less susceptible to the criminogenic factors (wha- tever they are) responsible for increases in serious thefts and crimes — 69 — ISRAEL AND JAPAN Figure 15 6.000 <j 5.000 e 4.000 —— — 3.000 —Je — A - 2.000 — O S Q - ” Q, Q INDICATORS OF KNOWN CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS —J {) A C O - _ % u 1,000 -j - Legend © ISRAEL - JAPAN 1945 1 9:55 1565 | YEAR 1975 _— 70 — N Figure 16 ISBAÊL AiND{ JAPA _ 10.000 _ 9.000 - -— - 8.000 - 7.000 6.000 5.000 ——s g 4.000 3.000 — INDICATORS OF SERIOUS THEFTS KNOWN P 2.000 -— & p 4 74 E - > - 1.000 -— - Legensii “ -— 3 & .,4{.. JAPAN 19:55 1275 1945 AR | 19:65 l — ISRAEL AND JAPAN Figure 17“ 5.000 —s 4,500 <j L ad 4,000 — 3.500 —Z 3.m e Q Q 2.500 — U 2.000 P, -e ) 1.500 % Û 7 INDICATORS OF ALL THEFTS KNOWN ; - - 1,000 —2 - E d C - 500 Legend D d © !ISRAEL # JAPAN 1945 1â55 1965 1975 VEAR — 72 — against persons, and also less susceptible to the social conditions and policies that bring down the rates of common crime. In other words, a fairly high level of petty theft is endemic to prosperous capitalist societies but serious crime is not. Japan would seem to prove the point. It is a capitalist society which has had a degree of success, unparalleled in any contemporary Western society in this study, in reducing the inci- dence of murder, assault, robbery, and burglary. The improvement has been a sustained one, now 25 years in duration, and it has occured in a society in which economic growth surely and social change probably have been at least as rapid as in the European societies considered here. One must look to the period from 1850 to 1930 to find comparable examples in Western history. White-collar Crime vs. Common Thefît. One theme of critical discussions of the crime-control policies of Western societies is the supposed inattention of authorities to econo- mic crimes by the middle and managerial classes. The crime data of most \Western societies trace the changing incidence of Oofficial action against two traditional forms of white-collar offense, fraud and embezzlement, and it is instructive to compare them with the records of official action against common theft (9). In the countries studied here the rates of white-collar crime usually are much lower than those of common theft, as can be seen from the following ratios between conviction rates in 1970 for all common theft vs. white-collar crimes. In Sweden, for example, the conviction rate for all theft was 237 per 100,000, compared with 91 per 100,000 for white-collar offenses, which translates into a relatively low ratio of 2.6 to |. (9) The classic discussion of white-collar criminalitv is Sutherland (1949). À recent critique of the lack of (scholarly) attention to it is Wheeler (1976). In the data used here forgery and currency offenses are included for some countries, in addition to fraud and embezzlement. Other forms of white-collar crime are rarely specified separately in crime statistics price-fixing, mar- keting defective or injurious products, bribery and illegal payoffs, malfeasance by public officials, etc. So the data used here are less than comprehensive. Morcover, although white-collar crimes usually have “victims’”’, they are not ne- cessarily as likely as the victims of robbery and assault to report to authorities. Business may prefer to handle such offenses internally, and no doubt many middle — and higher — level offenders succeed in ““covering up” their criminal acts. In short, white-collar crime is less visible than common crime, and its official records an uncertain guide to its incidence. — 73 — Ratio of Convictions for Common Theft to Convictions for White-Collar Crime, 1970 Denmark ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo 2.2 to Austria ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo 2.4 to 2.6 to Sweden ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo Germany ......102000000 4 24e e e e e e e e se e e e e e e se se e e S 2.9 to 1314161 1( A A A A A A 4.2 Japan .....12201 1244 e 4 e e d e e e e se e e e e se e se e e se 6 5.0 to Netherlands ........................................... 6.2 to France ......_œ£L111 1111 L L L L 4 4 e 0 4 4 e e LV 6.9 to Australia ............................................. 94 to Israel e e «s « .s © © » e s5 %* & e e © e e © © « % 6 … 6 © e % e ® à 6 © © % ® » ® ® #% s. ® # » ® % % @ ® ® 11 to [reland * e « + e « e à » e 6 + © e » à % « « e » * — % * … » » e % #% % 6 6 6 6 « —. # #% e 6 ® e # # # ® 12 to England « e + e + e * » + e » » % © « © © e » + © * « « ® % % + » 6 % : © … © e « » » 6 #s » 6 % »# # 8 16 to Switzerland . . + …. « … e © © © © « » 6 © # % — « © « © « © % + % »s — » » e » © ® « © 6 — « « e # « 23 to There are many possible explanations of the differences among nations. Some may be artifacts of differences in what is included in our white-collar crime category, or of differences in how courts dispose of the two kinds of offenses. Presumably there are cross- national differences in the actual incidence of white-collar crime. But the most interesting hypotheses is that the ratios also reflect substantial differences among the countries in the diligence of official prosecution of white-collar crime. Simple comparisons of conviction rates are difficult to interpret. A question that can be answered with more confidence is whether the trends in white-collar criminality have slopes and amplitudes similar to those for common thefts. If the trends are similar within countries, it suggests that they trace comparable phenomena the increase in theft is a cross-class phenomenon, and/or the authorities of the country in question have been consistent in prosecuting economic crimes by both the lower and middle classes. In six of the 13 countries compared in Table 2, the trends in convic- tions for the two Kkinds of offense parallel one another. Both increase in tandem over a similar period (England and Wales, Denmark, France, Ireland), or both hold steady (Switzerland), or both decline (Japan). In England, Denmark, and Ireland convictions for white- collar offenses have increased at a more rapid rate than those for common theft, in Japan white-collar convictions decreased more rapid- ly. We tentatively conclude that in these six countries policies toward the two forms of economic crime have been consistent over time — — 74 — Table 2. Trends in Conviction Rates for White-collar Crime compared with Common Theft. (a) — _— WHITE-COLLAR CÊIME AI:L COMMON THEFT —. —— __ COUNTRY TREND MEAN RATE (b) TREND MFAN RATE (b) _— — —… ps AUSTRALIA (c) » ..... Increase 1945-60- 23 % per year Increase 1955-72 8 % per year (steady since) ENGLAND . e * » » % . %* % 6 © + ® à Increase 1956-74 13 % per year Increase 1955-74 6 % per year DENMARK .s . * 6000.00.00 Increase 1966-74 13 % per year Increase 1960-74 9 % per year FINLAND . . . .......... Steady 1955-72 Increase 1955-72 15 % per year SWEDEN . . …. ….%....... Increase 1964-68 12 % per year Increase 1948-68 15 % per year Decrease 1969-74 10 % per year (steady since) AUSTRIA . …. © © … + — + —s © + » # # Steady 1949-72 Increase 1965-72 9 % per year GERMANY . e © * » « * ° < 0% % + %% Decrease 1953-73 4 % per year Increase 1966-73 11 % per year SWITZERLAND . « . . ... Steady 1945-72 Steady 1947-73 FRANCE . « « + © » © — — © + « e » % @ Increase 1960-72 9 % per year Increase 1957-72 9 % per year IRELAND . * — » ® ® + » % © e e % à Increase 1953-70 16 % per year Increase 1955-71 9 % per year NETHERLANDS » ... ... Decrease 1948-73 8 % per year Increase 1956-73 3 % per year ISRAEL . » © * » % % « à % © © # % — Increase 1961-70 13 % per year Irregular, no clear trend JAPAN Decrease 1948-73 10 % per year Decrease 1948-73 | — 28 % per year | (a) White-collar offenses include principallly fraud and embezzlement (see text). Comon theft comprises robbery, burglary, larceny, and similar offenses. (b) rates are calculated by taking the proportional change between the lowest and highest years shown (using the indicators from which Figures 1-17 were constructed) and dividing by the number of vears. (c) Higher-court convictions only, though that does not necessarily mean even-handed, since they may be consistently unequal. In a second group of three countries, variations in conviction rates are too inconsistent or irregular to sustain any conclusions. These indeterminate cases are Australia, Austria, and Israel. There remain four countries where trends have diverged quite sharply. In Finland and Sweden, official prosecution of white-collar crime has remained essentially stable despite soaring rates of convic- tions for common theft. Since our comparison of conviction ratios f£or the two types of offense, immediatly above, showed relatively high levels of official action against white-collar offenders in these coun- tries, the divergent trends may reflect an underlying social reality : the increase in common theft has not been paralleled by an increase in white-collar crime. Finally, in Germany and the Netherlands the prosecution of white-collar crime has declined for some 20 years, despite more recent increases in common theft. The prima facie expla- nation, is that official policies toward white-collar offenders in these two countries have become relatively more lenient. The alternative explanation, that the true incidence of white-collar offenses has declined while common theft has increased, is implausible in view of the experience of most other Western European societies. Trends in Sexual and Moral Offenses. AIl the offenses considered thus far are intrinsically harmful to their victims — in legal terms, mala in res. Some sexual and moral offenses, like rape and abandonment of family, also have victims. But most of the offenses so categorized in our data consist of sexual and other acts by people old enough to know what they are doing to them- selves and one another. The indicators of these offenses can be taken as evidence of the extent of ““moral policing” — subject to the important qualification that petty offenses like drunkenness and causing a public nuisance are not included. Two questions can be addressed with the data gathered for this study. (1) How extensive is the “moral policing” function, by comparison with official action against other kinds of offenders ? And (2) has the prosecution of serious moral offenses paralleled the rising trends in common crime ? Information on the extent of ‘“moral policing” is provided by comparing the incidence of official action against moral offenders with convictions for common crimes against persons and property. The ratios of conviction rates in 1970 are given below for 14 countries. The differences are pronounced the courts in all these countries give much less attention to moral offenses than to common crime. the three countries which give proportionally the greatest attention to moral offenses are Switzerland, Australia, and Austria — all of them characterized by relative conservative social views. Ireland, which —-" 76 — might be expected to resemble these countries in this respect, falls at the opposite extreme, along with countries where the law with respect to sexual and moral offenses is much less stringent : Japan, Finland, Sweden, and England and Wales. Ratio of convictions for common crime to convictions for sexual and moral offenses, 1970 Switzerland « « » » e » 6 % » » % * —# 6 % © « 6 6 » %* 9 à » ° * * e » * © © 6 * © * * 6 % « — © à 5.7 to Australia 6.2 to Austria « . . … © # © « © * © + » . % » 6 « © « © * * e % » » e e © © + * % 6 % e © © » e © © « « e 9.4 to France e e e « . …. . —. © » © © * e … 6 « © © % © « © 6 « + © « * « » » » © % % © » e « © » e » © e 14 to New Zealand e « ». « « e »s * © e © © = © » » %* % © — % »s % * < e * » e © % « © * © + — © # + 14 to Netherlands . e © e « + © © « © —s e — —s » 6 % » » © © © © 6 © =s e © + © * » » e s. * % « © e # e 16 to Denmark . ». * * e e % * » « » * % % . … * » % % e * e + © » ® % « e ® #% * < © %* » » * » 6 % 6 » e 19 to Germany 27 to Israel e « e …. + © © s. + » + — e » e »s % % % » « © » © © — — * 6 … 6 % © © » — e e e e * % 6 © » e © à 29 to Japan . . e + e e * « » » » » » < * e * © % < « »s © + 6 © e * + » © * © « s. 6 * © % » + e » 6 e » À 29 to Finland e e …. « © « © » * + © © + e < » © * © * » * % . © + « © * % % © © e % … % ® % e % e % » # À 41 to Sweden . « e e e » « e © » » e « » © » + © « s5 © 6 * * © « © © * e « % + « © … © © » % © % — « © # 46 to England and Wales e © « « . 6 © * — . © < * © % * — e » « e e « e © 6 © e e » © — © e 50 to Ireland e e © « © « * © e s5 % e % e » — © % ® » % » ® « % 6 * ® e © % + % » ® © * 6 # 6 %* — * » © À 54 to l The police may be relatively more active in detecting such offenses, and arresting suspects, than is evident from the small number of court-administered sanctions. À partial test is provided by data on known moral and sexual policing, a high ratio of known offenses to convictions is indicative of relatively high levels of police attention. À standard is needed of what constitutes a “high ratio” of known offenses to convictions. We use data on assaults known vs. convictions for this purpose. Fhese ratios can be calculated and compa- red for seven countries. 1970 Ratio of known offenses to convictions, Moral offenses Assaults England and Wales 47 to l 2.0 to 1 3.0 to 1 Denmark 8.7to l — Finland e . « © — + à © 6 © © © © © © » % © © à 2.3 to 2.2 to 3.1 to Norway (1966) . © e « e © » e + « » + » e 3.7 to Sweden . e « ® © © « « « — © « + # — e — — © à 5.6 to 3.9 to Israel « « » » © ® © à © © © © © © » © — « © —# & 3.2 to 1.0 to Japan (1967) « « e …. e + » »s » » » < o À 2.5 to ——tb—-‘h—‘h—1_‘ 1.2 to to police were more likely to Without exception, assaults known lead to criminal convictions than known moral offenses, usually by a substantial margin. The “moral policing” role evidently is more compre- hensive than what is reflected in low conviction rates. The detection and punishment of moral offenses in most groups of countries has not kept pace with the rising incidence of common crime. On the contrary in most countries the trend has been towared decriminalization. Representative evidence is shown in figures 18 through 21. In all of continental Europe and Scandinavia the incidence of known offenses (not shown) and convictions has declined steadily since about 1960. In Scandinavia known offenses have declined by half (except in Norway, where they have remained steady) and convic- tions by an even greater proportion. The Germanic countries also show a consistent decline in convictions averaging about 10 % per year, beginning c. 1962. The patterns in Ireland, France, and the Netherlands are less regular but conviction rates in all three have fallen steadily since 1964. In Italy offenses known began a similar decline in 1966. In many of these countries the decade of the 1960’s was marked by de facto and de jure decriminalization of lesser moral and sexual offenses, for example abortion, homosexual acts, prostitution, sale of pornographic literature, and so forth. The declining trends in known offenses and convictions testify to the substantial impact of decriminalization. A move towards decriminalization of moral offenses has also occured in England (see Peirce, Grabosky, and Gurr 1977), but has not blunted the upward trend in known offenses common to all English- speaking lands (figure 18). The most precipitous increases have occured in Australia and the United States, beginning in the middle 1960>s — at the same time that decline set in Scandinavia and on the Continent. Conviction rates (not shown) for England and Australia also have risen, but less steeply, while in New Zealand convictions have increased by an average of only 1 % à year during the past three decades. Many factors help account for the against-the-trend experience of these countries. One is the slow pace of decriminalization of moral offenses in most of these countries, and increased policing by authorities of the deviant lifestyles adopted by many youths in the 1960°%s — lifestyles which in Scandinavia and Continental Europe have met more official — 78 — ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES Figure 18 4.000 D 3.500 d D 3.000 J ‘ 2.500 O S v T& e %% e e C .. ;‘9 - N 2.00 CFFENSES JR - e 1.500 INDICATORS OF KNOWN SEX 1.000 4 ) Legend .500 + © ENGLAND - CANADA © USA # AUSTRALIA 1945 1éS5 1965 1975 YEAR — 79 — SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES Fiqure 19 4.000 3.500 3.000 2.500 + 5 v 2.000 IG J p-A\ L Le, 1.5600 ® 4 INDICATORS OF CONVICTIONS-SEX OFFENSES 1.000 — Legend 500 -— SWEDEN DENMARK -— NORWAY +4#| FINLAND 1945 15555 19'65 1975 YEAR — 80 — Figure 20 GERMANIC COUNTRIES 4,000 3.500 3.000 2.500 À - Ÿ + 4D + 2.000 S S P eN ( Ÿ d ® e - S Q + - v d V_’ 1.500 INDICATORS OF CONVICTIONS-SEX OFFENSES \ ° 1.000 509 Legend — W. GERMANY +— 4- AUSTRIA < SWITZERL. 1975 945 1955 1965 YEAR — 81 — OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES Frure 2 4.000 3.500 +— 3.000 2.500 + L 2.000 + æ 1.500 ; INDICATORS OF CONVICTIONS-SEX OFFENSES Q © & 1.000 4 500 Legend —- IRELAND < FRANCE -* NETHERL. 1945 1£)55 YEAR 1 9'65 1975 — 82 — tolerance. The second is a rapid increase, evident in the data for most of the English-speaking countries, in the incidence of rape. It is likely but unprovable that the real incidence of rape has increased ; there is no question about the increased willingness of victims to bring cases to police attention. Israel and Japan have trends in these offenses (not shown) that are as distinctive as in other cases. In Israel known moral and sexual offenses rose sharply during the period of immigration but since 1965 have remained steady ; conviction rates varied little. In Japan known offenses increased after the war. like common crime, but have fallen steadily since the early 1960°s. CONCLUSION The evidence surveyed here suggests that rising common crime has become a pervasive phenomena in Western societies, manifest in both the experiences of citizens who report offenses to authorities and in the scope and impact of official efforts at control. À rapid and sustained increase in property crime in particular has become virtually universal. The differences among countries are principally ones of detail : the increase appears to have begun in the 1960’s in most Conti- nental countries and Scandinavia rather than in the 1950>s as in the English-speaking nations. Moreover the rate of incerase in serious pro- perty crimes — robbery and burglary — has outstripped the increase in petty theft. Switzerland, with stable property crime rates, is the single Furopean exception to these generalizations. Japan poses a sharp contast : it has had success unparalleled in the West in reducing the incidence of property crime, the more serious forms of all. Upward trends in murder and assaults rates are almost equally widespread. They began earliest (typically in the late 1950’s) and have risen most in the English-speaking countries and Ireland. In Scan- dinavia, France, and Germany the upward trends set in during the 1960°s. Elsewhere on the Continent, and in Israel, they have been rela- tively stable, while Japan again has enjoyed exceptional success in reducing the incidence of such offenses. In the majority of countries trends in white-collar crime parallel trends in common theft. The clear exceptions are Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, and Germany, where the prosecution of white-collar crime seems to have held steady or declined while common theft was rising. Officials have considerable discretion in the policing and prosecution of white-collar crimes, and even more discretion with respect to sexual and moral offenses. The trends in the latter cate- gories of crime are in fact striking dissimilar in most countries to the — 83 — trends in common crime. In all the Scandinavian and Continental countries these oflenses have consistently declined since the early to mid-1960’s. The principal reason is not a change in social behavior but decriminalization, one of whose incidental effects is to enable authorities to give increased attention to common crime. The English- speaking countries are exceptions : despite selective enforcement and pressures for decriminalization, the trends in moral offenses have risen persistently throughout the post-war era. This paper has been concerned with documenting crime trends in the West, not with explaining them. We judge the trends in official data on common crime, with some exceptions and distortions, to reflect real changes in social behavior there really is significantly more murder, assault, robbery, burglary, and petty thievery in most Western countries now than 25 years ago — and more white-collar crime too. The increases are not a matter of a few percent. Most indicators of common crime have at least doubled, many have increased by 500 to 800 %, some by more than 1 000 %. The evidence of rising common crime is sufficiently consistent, both within these societies and among them, that it should prove an effective antidote to scholars who argue that no social reality underlies rising crime rates (see among many others Bell 1960, Turk 1969, Weis and Milakovich 1974). By emphasizing the small errors and inadequacies of official information on crime and crime control, they have distracted attention from a broad and unmistakeable portrait of a very real social problem of substantial and growing magnitude. If the sociological myth that there are no crime waves can be laid to rest, perhaps scholars can get on with the business of assessing their remote and immediate causes. REFERENCES ARCHER (D.) and GARTNER (R.), « Violent Acts and Violent Times À Comparative Approach to Postwar Homicide Rates », American Sociological Review, 1976, XLI, December. BELL (D.), «The Myth of Crime Waves », IN The End of ideology, Glencoe, IM. : The Free Press, 1960. CHRISTIANSEN (K. O.), « Recidivism Among Collaborators — À Follow-up Study of 2946 Danish Men Convicted of Collaboration with the Germans During World War IT.» IN Wolfgang, 1968. CHRISTIANSEN (K. O.) and JENSEN (G.), « Crime in Denmark : À Statis- tical History », Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, 1972, LXIII, T. CLINARD (M.B.) and ABBOTT (DJ.), Crime in Developing Countries A Comparative Approach, New York, Wiley, 1973. — 84 — GURR (T.R.), Rogues, Rebels, and Reformers A Comparative History of Urban Public Order, Beverly Hills and London ; SAGE Publications, 1976. GURR (T.R.), GRABOSKY (P.N.) and HULA (R.C.), The Politics of Crime and Conflict : A Comparative History of Four Cities. Beverly Hills and London, SAGE Publications, 1977. HOWARD (M.D.) and HOWARD (J.R.), « Toward a Theory of Decriminali- Zation », IN Sylvester and Sagarin, 1974. LITJENS (H.P.M.), De Criminalieit in Limburg : Een Historische Overzicht, Maastricht, Ernest van Aelst, 1973. MANNHEIM (H.). Comparative Criminology, Boston, Houghton-Mifflin, 1965. MINERVI (G.), « Criminalita in Italia : Ieri, Oggi ». Rassegna di Studi Peni- tenziari, 1973, XXIIF, 3 PEIRCE (D.), GRABOSKI (P.N.) and GURR (T.R.), « London : The Politics of Crime and Conflict, 1800 to the 1970s », IN Gurr, Grabosky, and Hula, 19'77. RADZINOWICZ (L.) and KING (J.), The Growth of Crime : The International Experience, New York, Basic Books, 1977. RANGOL (A--J.), « Die Straffaelligkeit nach Hauptdeliktsgruppen und Alters- klassen 1884 bis 1958 », Mschr. Kriminol Strafrechtsref, 1961-1962, XLV, 5-6. RIJKSEN (R.). Criminaliteit en Bezetting, Assen : Van Gorcum, 1957. ROCK (P.) and McINTOSCH (M.), |eds], Deviance and Social Control, London, Tavistock, 1974. SCHUR (E.M.), Crimes Without Victims : Deviant Behavior and Public Policy, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1965. SKOGAN (W.G.), « The Validity of Official Crime Statistics An Empiral Investigations », social Science, Quarterly, 1974, LVv, June. SKOLNICK (J.), Justice Without Trial, New York, Wiley, 1966. SUTHERLAND (E.H.), White Collar Crime, New York, Dryden Press, 1949. SYLVESTER Jr. (S.G.) and SAGARIN (E.), [eds.] Politics and Crime, New York, Praeger, 1974. TURK (A.). Criminality and Legal Order, Skokie, III., Rand-McNally, 1959 WEIS (K.) and MILAKOVICH (M.) « Who’s Afraid of Crime ? How to Finance a Decreasing Rate of Increase », IN Sylvester and Sagarin, 1974, Chap. 4. WHEELER (S.), « Trends and Problems in the Sociological Study of Crime », Social Problems, 1976, XXITI, June. WILSON (J.Q.), Varieties of Police Behavior, New York, Atheneum, 1970 WOLF (P.), « Crime and Development : An International Comparison of Crime Rates », Scandinavian Studies in Criminology, 1971, xxxVvIII, 501. WOLFGANG (M.E.), [ed.], Crime and Culture : Essays in Honor of Thorsten Criminology and Police Science, 1963, LVIII, 65. of Criminal Law, WOLFGANG (M.E.), [ed.], Crime and Culture : Essays in Honor of Thosten Sellin, New York, Wiley, 1968. CULTURE AND CRIME () W. CLIFFORD Australian institute of criminology Woden, Australia The relationship between crime and culture has not been neglected. It has intrigued criminologists for years. As deviance or abnormal behaviour it has an even longer history in sociology and psychology (cf£. Wirth : 1931). Though the seminal thinking can be ascribed to sources as diverse as Durkheim, Ferri, Savigny, Duguit, Marx and even Montesquieu, it is Thorsten Sellin (1938) who is generally credited with pionneering the cultural conflict approach in criminology. It is certainly Sellin who encouraged studies of the relationship between cultural norms and crime when inter alia he compared the older social imperatives of the different migrant groups in America with the requirements of the modern law. He was able to demonstrate that acts forbidden by law might well be enjoined by the culture or by the social system to which the migrants belonged (10). Since then the whole area of culture and crime has been defined and redefined, explored and analysed ad infinitum by the delineation of sub-cultures, delinquent and non-delinquent, general and particular, professional and non-professional and by the socially scientific or modern technical re-statements of immemorial truths. For example, the older writings about a criminal ““underworld”” had a great deal in common with some of the newer writings about the delinquent sub- cultures ; and the well-known adage that there is “honour amongst thieves”’ had relevance for some of the more recondite writings on the in-group values. Different terms were needed for a society better educated sociologically. What is interesting however is that despite Sellin’”s examples from other countries the general approach to culture and crime which followed his lead rarely became international in character. Anthropo- logists, of course, have always been interested in the traditional native (*) Reproduit avec l’autorisationl de “International Journal on Crimino- logy and Penology", 1978 January, Vol. VI deel 1 (N.D.L.R.). (10) Sellin led up to this with examples such as that of Siberian tribes killing their women relatives who, in obedience to the new Soviet laws, took off their veils; and the conflict between the French Code Penal in Algeria and the Kabyle’s traditional allegiance to an older custom of a father or brother (not husband) of an adulterous women having the obligation to kill her. — 87 — attitudes to murder, infanticide, stealing, adultery and other acts outlawed by many of our modern legal systems. But their interest has been a passing one so that criminal social anthropology is still very much in its infancy (11). So called “comparative criminology” has remained largely under-developed. Related to this is the relative neglect of cultural economics by the anthropologists so that one does not get quite the same attention paid to the economic systems of the simpler peoples (and deviations from them) as one might well obtain if their economies were to be the subject of analysis by professional economists and criminologists. This flows directly into the subject of crime since so much of the economic system gives rise to the labelling of behaviour as criminal. In the same way, there has been relatively little attention paid in the literature to the important relationship between religion, morals and crime in the simpler societies where sacred offenses were often the only punishable (ie., no-compensatable) acts or omissions. There is here an inter-disciplinary problem in that the interflow between social anthropology, economics, philosophy, sociology and criminology has been less than could have been desired. From such a lack of inter-communication there does not seem to have been much preoccupation with the operation of different types of social system accross the world (or existing at different levels of complexity) and most likely to be disturbed by crime or most readily adaptable to new levels of tolerance. Yet all of these are areas of major interest for anyone interested today in the relevance and effectiveness of those modern systems of criminal justice which do not appear capable of dealing with the steady increases in urban crime. Criminological In-breeding. The international spread of interest in culture and crime has therefore been artificially restricted and too often adjusted to the limited criminological studies which have been done in the past. There have been reasons for this which are understandable if not always acceptable. On the one hand the neccessary expertise for detailed studies of crime in different cultures across the world has not existed. In the areas where the best studies could have been made there were often no universities or professions able to do the resarch ; or else the (11) This is not to undervalue the excellent contributions certain social anthropologists. Those for Africa have already been made by acknow- Oxford University Press, 1974, and some of those for Japan have be ledge IN CLIFFORD (W.) An Introduction to African Criminology, Nairobi, en men- tioned IN CLIFFORD (W.),Crime Control in Japan, Lexington Mass, D C. Heath Co, 1976. The point is that such initiatives have not been follow ed up to provide comparative analyses. — 88 — geographical or language barriers imposed restraints and encouraged the learned adherence to better endowed regions with established faculties and interests in the subject. The science of criminology tended therefore to feed on precedent more than perspective. It was also methodologically more respectable to do so. This is why it has sometimes required philosophers rather than criminologists to show us that violence can be a very efficient and effective way of solving problems and is not necessarily the unprofitable or senseless behaviour that we have assumed it to be in the past. This is also why the recent cosmetic moves to change the face of criminology and to give it a more political aspect have come from sociological politicians or politically minded scientists rather than from the establishment of discipline itself. The attempted and threatening conception of criminology as being no more than a problem of power distribution or as struggle for power has derived from this source and is directly related to the whole question of culture and crime. It represents a reaching for perspective ; and whether we agree with it or not, the need which it represents for criminology to have its own reference groups widened, can be questioned only by those locked into the older concepts of criminology as an importu- nate science striving for academic respectability. For criminology Is now being judged not for its internal consistency or scientific method but for its neglect of external criteria. Just as the natural and physical scientists have not been able to escape the questioning mood of people no longer prepared to support them as an elite without reference to the ethics of the uses and abuses of science, so the criminologists and the sociologists interested in crime are no longer able to escape the social and cultural feedback of the selectivity of their own methods. On the one hand they are challenged for their technical insularity in not relating their studies to some of the broader political issues (though oddly enough this has extended less to the economic or social issues, equally neglected) (12). On the ther hand, if they were intellectually honest, they themselves have not been able to ignore the structural implications of their data e.g., of the statistics collected and published and of the legal, medical or administrative taxomonies they have been using. That is to say they have had to recognise the way in which social and cultural values are reflected or distorted by the institutions originally set up to deal with crime — but which tend to become equally, if not more, concerned with perpetuating their own role in the bureaucracy and (12) For example crime as a phenomenon is not only partly related to the problems of capital and labour, the privileged and under-privileged but in many respects to the taxation diparities, the legalisation of some kinds of ““business methods’’ against the penalisation of others, the manipulations of currencies, banking practices, the incidence of divorce, the changing roles of women. the dynamics of community life in urban areas etc. — 89 — Wwithin the matrix of status. This is a situation not peculiar to the criminal justice system ; but it can have more profound consequences there if it overspecialises the approach to crime prevention. Recognition of the influence of the machinery of social control has made the criminal justice system a more attractive object of study in the past decade than crime itself. So, both in the relevance of its work to broader social issues and in the turning of the searchlight on the institutions providing criminological data, the role of criminology is being challenged. There has, in fact and in theory, been a kind of mutually suppor- tive interfacing of academic and vested interests in the past. At one level there has been a virtually incestuous relationship between the disciplines concerned with crime and the publishing interests of journals and books on crime prevention in the last 100 years. Nearly all the publishing has been done in the West where not only the writers and the students but the markets are. Yet the Western criminologist’s igno- rance of (for example) the Communist approach to crime and its prevention or perhaps of the differences in crime patterns and their treatment in Africa, Latin America and Asia is only comparable to the familiarity of local administrators and practitioners in those same areas with all the Western literature on the different types of crime and its prevention. With so much published about crime in Europe and America, even the specialists in developing countries are tex tually conditioned to set patterns and limited options — sometimes to t he ne- glect of (locally obvious) contrary evidence and to the disregard oË quite exciting opportunities for new approaches in their own coun- tries. Ât another level, professionalism, status, earnings or Unionism in the police, courts and corrections have spawned a range of institutions and interests with an occupational tendency to look inwards at their own roles and recognition requirements — rather than at the broader meanings of the crime phenomena as it occurs in situations abroad where such an institutionalisation of specialities may have no local significance. The Conceptualisation of Escape. The real condemnation of these kinds of traditional , Inward looking, scientifically hypnotised, professionally academic and Western bound types of criminology is not the recent challenge to their political naivety but the paucity of their contributions to the solution of the crime problem. Not surprisingly the more intelligent academics and practitioners have sought to escape from the intell ectual maze which the discipline progressively created for itself. Th e increasing cvidence that they were having no effect at all on the r ates or types oË crime, on the incidence of recidivism or the devel opment of a different kind of society caused them to examine the fundamental — 90 — questions they were seeking to answer. Were they asking the right questions ? Had they not misconceived their role ? It was this kind of probing which led to a gradual abandonment of the study of crime causation (13) in favour of prediction, crime control methods and systems approaches. It was this need to recast the subject which led to the object oËf study becoming the obviously creaking criminal «ustico system rather than crime itself. Unfortunately, the quest for an escape from the disciplinary sclerosis in the West has itself been culture bound. Thus the preoccupation with the problems of crime and criminal justice in the West has led to the elaboration of solutions for the problems of crime there as if they were solutions for mankind — and not for a particular cultural segment of mankind. Unfortunately, some of these solutions were imported to cultures where they had no necessary relevance. Because the crisis in correctional and criminal justice systems in the West is related to the political divisions outside these systems, 1t is not found where such internal political conflicts do not exist or do not exist to the same extent. Law and its breach are always affected by the political divisions — and not only because of the distributions of power. Wilkins (1969) has made the point very tellingly that — “Law for its rationale relates to ethics but operationally the legal system is an integral part of the political system… the connection between law and ethical considerations is effected through the political system… Thus a crisis in confidence in poli- tics is becoming a crisis in law and order”. This a very fair statement of the position in the West but it needs modification for those cultures subsisting which are not expe- riencing such political crises of confidence. Nor is this necessity escaped by arguing that all cultures are spaced along the same continuum of development. They may all have been drawn into the technological chain of accumulated progress materially as Weber suggested in his curve of civilisation ; but Weber also showed that as technology grows culture can decline to a position where virtual ‘“barbarians’ are in control of the most advanced equipment and weapons. So when Wilkins adds (13) Though I believe we will see a return to this as a greater knowledge of crime and culture is required. The *why“ questions outlawed by Comte are even now creeping back into modern philosophy tired of logical positivism and its intellectual fling with linguistics. They are also attracting even young nuclear physicists into dallying with Eastern cults and black magic. The human being likes to ask “whv” whether he gets satisfactory answers or not. — 94 — “We cannot go back to some divine right of kings or expect a revival of the Church, the extended family or other doctrinal support”. He is speaking of the West ; elsewhere in the world are societies still maintaining such cultural or ethical supports for the law and order principle and still prepared to make the kind of binary decisions which have become disreputable in the West, i.e., a two-value logic of « good » or « bad », « right » and « wrong », « legal » and « illegal », « guilty» and « not guilty» not only in church or court but also in the area of knowledge and experience generally. Whether this is desi- rable or not, is not the point at issue. The fact is that, as Wilkins makes clear, the West is faced with the problem of constructing a new ethic capable of accommodating greater diversity to take account of future probabilities ; but there are other cultures, so far largely ignored, which are not facing the same complications and for whom the future probabilities may be different. They still have a general ethic whether this is expressed legally, religiously or culturally, or reflected harmoniously by all three. They have preserved their older precepts and in some cases (like Japan) used them to accommodate technolo- gical change and social adaptation. Only by ignoring what has happened in Moslem societies and Japan can we maintain that every society is condemned to follow the paths of development cut by the West. The Western presumption to speak for mankind because it is ““advanced”” is therefore ques- tionable. Exported limitations. This presumption has occasionally had peculiar results. Crimi- nology’s own limitations have sometimes been exported to do as much mischief as service in cultures ill-equipped to challenge its assumptions. Without reference to the structural differences, the methods of calculating crime and categorising of offenders have been adopted by totalitarian states with greater potential for accurate control and recording of human behaviour. They were also in a position to be selective about the information which was published. Within the context of a flood of multi-lateral and bilateral technical assistance, developing nations have sometimes considered themselves to be in need of training and education in crime prevention methods. As their towns have grown so have their crime rates and looking round for solutions they have turned to Western thinking and to Western towns for ideas. They have adopted Western institutions for crime prevention like the prisons, the courts and the police systems and they have now some very highly educated officials or ministers who are completely Westernised in their attitudes and in their approa- ches so that they are more likely to follow Western ideas if the — 92 — failure to do so might imply that the country may be backward or unsophisticated. With the global impact of the communications media, not only have Western methods of crime been disseminated indis- criminately but also the « correct » or « enlightened » ways of dealing with it have been emulated. Of course, the first imposers of the Western criminal justice systems of administration and institutions to the developing countries were the colonial regimes but the persistence and development of such stereotypes has outlived this original overlay. Long after inde- pendence has been achieved “‘Public Safety” experts have been brought in to train police forces, design institutions for offenders or to organise security. Lawyers have been recruited from the West to redraft laws or develop court systems ; and trained social workers have been employed from the West to improve the services for “juvenile delinquents’”’. I have had the experience of highly sophis- ticated and colonially antagonistic ministers apologising for having prisons only half full or for the inadequacies of their probation services to provide for the styles of Western type supervision. The peculiarity of this is that many countries with /ess crime are now being advised on how to prevent it by experts from countries that not only have more crime but crime growing in amount and gravity with which they have not been able to deal. More recently this has been extended by university institutes and centres in developing areas being staffed from the West or stafled by local persons who have qualified in the West and, inevitably, by Western standards of academic excellence being adopted as necessary for local application. Again there has been an inadequate concern with locally available evidence of cultures different from those described in the university publications imported from the West. Even where local societies have been studied Western concepts have been applied. Need for Reversal. This is a process which needs to be reversed. Not only are deve- loping nations in need of a more lively appreciation of the values that they have preserved and the systems which they possess : but also the developed nations need to learn greatly from those countries which have already succeeded in controlling crime or that are well on the way to doing so. And in this complex of successes and failures, models and reforms, we should not overlook the experience of Japan — the one industrialised and highly urbanised country which has been able to control crime and keep its streets safe even at night. Nor should our disagreements with the systems inhibit us from looking objectively at the situations of crime and crime control in centrally controlled economies since here an ideology has frequently made — 93 — use of older cultural controls which have a wider relevance than the systems they now serve. Those of us who have had the privilege of studying this not only from afar and with reference to the world situation but also within Japan itself have been astonished at the way in which Japanese over the past ten or fifteen years have been reducing their crime as well as industrialising and urbanising on an unprecedented scale. But exactly why and how this has been done is still a matter for consideration (14). The Japanese have the same criminal justice system as those operating in the West. In fact they deliberately borro- wed their services from the West. It is not unfair to suggest that they themselves are not always clear about reasons for the effecti- veness of the system they have developed and applied effectively ; but which is being castigated and treated as a total failure in the countries which originally devised it. The reduction in crime obviously cannot be attributed to the efficiency of the system itself since the same system elsewhere is showing a marked inability to deal with vast extensions in criminal behaviour. If the answer is not in the system then it may be in the way in which the system is conceptualised and applied and this brings us to culture since it is the values and the inherent principles which enable a society to develop its approaches to social problems like crime. Less than justice has been done to the theocratic states of the Middle Fast where laws are designed to reflect the Koran and where huge concentrations of people in places like Cairo and Damascus or Bagdad seem to be able to develop with less alienation and criminal behaviour than in many other parts of the world. Admittedly this area is overshadowed by the Israeli-Arab conflict and by the operation of the Palestine Liberation movements. Yet, even within this warlike, violent context, the crime resulting (or not resulting) has not been studied nor the lessons which it contains derived for later application elsewhere. For reasons more political than scientific there have been few attempts to look even critically at the experience of Rio de Janeiro with its ““favellas’” which have both generated and controlled crime, at Johannesburg with its enormous urbanised segregated communities, at Saudi Arabia with its older harsher penalties, at China with its relatively undefined law and ideological constraints. We do not have to approve the systems to study them. Public exe- cutions were reintroduced in Nigeria — with what results ? Com munity controls were applied in Tanzania but are not reported fo r their effects on crime or deviation. Hawaii and Micronesia are special (14) See CLIFFORD (W.) ; Crime Control in Japan, Mass, 1976. D.C. Heath, Lexi ngton, — 94 — areas where different communities and their crime rates need compa- rison. Even where data is lacking or official figures difficult to obtain, descriptive studies can be of great benefit ; and life histories are still very valuable. Nor have we looked, with the cultural interest we should have had, at the phenomena of similar peoples in several contrasting settings. The rates of crime amongst the minority groups in America show significant differences — Chinese, Japanese, Philippinos, Puerto Ricans — and perhaps now the influx of Vietnamese. Autralia, New Zealand, and many of the countries of Europe have now oppor- tunities of looking more closely at such immigrant variations. But there is also the prospect of international comparison of the same peoples in different circumstances. The rates of crime amongst Chinese on the mainland, in Taiwan, in Hong Kong, in Malaysia or Indonesia differ considerably and they show changes over time doubtless related to the internal forms of community organisations. What are the differences between Koreans in Korea, Japan and Hawaii, between Turks in Turkey, Germany and Greece, between Italians in their own country or in the countries to which they have migrated ? Individual and Group Justice. Fundamentally we know that it is not difficult to evolve a crime- Îree society if we are prepared to control a group of people absolutely and (if necessary) ruthlessly. The real question for most societies is how to do this without absolute control and in a way which promotes the fulfilment of the human personality within the group. The Western approach to urbanisation has been to reduce all group tendencies to individual entities. In the service of human rights and human dignity we have atomised not only our social systems but also our legislation and our administration of law. In our concern for human worth and human freedoms we have concen- trated on the individual at all levels and in all circumstances. Our law is designed for the individual in his many different roles as occupier, owner, tenant, taxpayer, father, consumer, etc. Even our family law tends to deal with the rights of persons inside the family and not with the family as a group. We have progressively reduced the influence of the group on human behaviour by enforcing rights more than duties and by encouraging individual initiative more than group control. At the same time as we have called for more community participation, we have penalised group interest and isolated the individual with a protective fence of barbed remedies designed to ward the intrusion of neighbourhood, family or small group controls. It is highly significant that civic rights groups in the West have been organised around a demand for greater individual rights thus tending to atomise society even further. The claims have been for greater — 95 — recognition of a person’s ethnic rights, sexual rights, religious rights or rights in education, health or welfare. There have been campaigns for children, workers, and now women and homosexuals — but usually to the exclusion of the group interests like the family or neighbour- hood. Indeed the demand has often been designed to ensure individual emancipation from these. There have always been good reasons for this in a Western tra- dition of individual justice. Over-enthusiastic community involvement or untrammelled public participation in the administration of justice can give us lynchings, mob rule or Ku Klux Klans with remedies far less desirable than the disease. A central public authority can opt out of this kind of local community autonomy only by abdicating its responsabilities for those on whose votes it depends — or, perhaps worse, it can positively encourage and purposefully direct such local public intrusions into individual affairs with a view to repressing any opposition — 1f, that is, the central public authority happens to be totalitarian in inclination. Fither way it reduces one type of crime by encouraging another. Fither way it controls the behaviour it deplores at a cost in human freedom and dignity which 1s too high for most of us to countenance. However, the opposite course i.e. the formalisation of remedies to all kinds of public and private problems investing individuals with the power to invoke indiscriminate legal intervention has its own peculiar limits if there is an interest in both justice and equity. What begins as a formal, impartial remedy available to all tends to rigidify over time with its own procedural technicalities so that it can eventually become a cumbersome machine cluttered with ritualised trivia and incapable of responding quickly enough to human and social need. This was the argument used to justify the New Testament against the Old Testament — the need for a spirit to inform the letter of the older law ; it has inspired reforms and codifications of law : legal technicalities is a phenomenon still responsible for the continued incarcerations of thousands of persons awaiting either trial or sentence in Latin-American countries ; it led directly to the Courts of Equity in England which were created to deal with the injustice of the over technical Common Law Courts. We may be seeing it happen again both nationally and internationally with organised special interest groups able to promote individual rights through the courts sometimes at the expense of wider group interests and rights. The educational explosion of more trained lawyers than ever has created a new vested interest in the invoking of law and judicial pronouncements so that nearly all social issues today end on the Judge’s bench ; and the Judge is not necessarily the most suitable, nor the best, nor the most adequately equipped to deal with them — 96 — if we take account of his highly specialised experience or training and his legal powers and restraints. It is almost a heresy today to question the primacy of the courts ; but a society running strictly according to the letter of the law book could well be like a union working to rule — it may run down! The letter of the law was never as important as its spirit and this spirit is effectively exorcised when everyone can complain about everything and every such complaint can be the subject of a formal hearing — or of a succession of formal hearings — all at the expense of the taxpayers. Yet the spirit of the law can be ensured only by reference to the more informal social controls which criminologists are now eulo- gising in the quest for more toleration, less law and a greater degree of decriminalisation and delabelling. There has been an abortive cam- paign to divorce the law form morals or ethics. Certainly the older, religious, kind of morality has been excised from the law in the West ; but it has been replaced by a new form of morality which uses the law to prohibit sexual or racial discrimination, environmental pollution, etc. However, the purging of the older morality tended to purge cultural elements at a time when cultural controls were the only substitute for excessive legislation. The baby may have gone with the bathwater. In many non-Western societies it is possible to decriminalise all kinds of behaviour because of the underlying culture subsisting to fill any vacuum. In the West the vacuum is usually unfilled so that the individual freedoms conferred have no cultural frames of reference — or at least none which are not in conflict with others. The corollary is that if we want to depend more on informal rather than on formal controls, the extreme individua- lisation of rights should not exclude informal group intervention. Individual and groups interests, rights and responsibilities have to be balanced for each type of control and each kind of system to work effectively and tolerably. On a world scale this focusing of all attention on the individual divorced from his social context has developed a characteristic attachment to a single concept of justice. But the Western concep- tualisation of justice is not universal. For centuries it precluded recognition in Western systems of the basic value of compensation to Victims ; in crime it was the breack of the ““Kings peace” or the defiance of public authority which was heinous. The victim was a secondary consideration and might have to have recourse to civil remedies. Even the modern statutes to provide belatedly for the compensation of victims from the public exchequer, fall far short of the direct link between the repentant wrongdoer and the injured party which is at the heart of compensation as this is conceived by less atomised societies. The real value of compensation is to repair the wrong between the offender and the victim and the provision — 97 — of an official public indemnity does not do this as effectively as it is in some others cultures. To give only a single example — when the offender in Papua New Guinea is required by custom to compen- sate his victim, the victim or his family is also expected to make a small but significant reciprocal gift to the offender. This is because, in this instance, it is the peacemaking and the restoration of good relationships which takes precedence over any satisfaction of abstract principles of justice as these are understood in the West. This is not the only variation in the conceptions of justice. À great many of the time honoured technicalities in Western systems of law are unjust to people of other traditions. The exclusion of hearsay, abandonment of collective responsibility and the adversary system of the court hearing make little appeal in some other parts of the world. In fact, the Western concept of abstract justice, blind to diffe- rences and afraid of all discretion (because of the risk of discrimi- nation) is by means universal. In the West we think of impartial judgements ; in other areas impartial decisions without reference to all the facis would be unjust. Human rights and moral obligations are not conceived globally in the same way. Human fulfilment may be attained by group rights as well as by individual claims. Indeed for many years a person’s rights in Middle East countries were guaranteed by the recognition of the ethnic or religious group to which he belonged. The Japanese have a greater regard for public obligation than for individual rights and in some simple conditions in Africa there has been traced a form of justice which requires redress to be sought, not from the offender but from the nearest influential neighbour. It is therefore pretentious to assume that justice is only that derived from the culture conditioning of the West. Yet deviation and justice are basicallly related in both rights and obligations : and we neeed to understand this relationship as it is differently expressed and experienced in the many different cultures of the world. Tt is often the key to the existence of crime as a problem. Culture/Crime Indicators. There are a number of clear indications that crime is a function of culture. This is not to suggest that it is not legally created by law or an offshoot of economic, political or social stresses ; but that it is more related to values and styles of life than it is to individual needs or the impact of criminal justice systems. Reference has already been made to essentially similar systems showing different results in crime control in different countries. This — 98 — itself is an indicator of the effect of culture on crime control. If identical laws and law enforcement procedures have different effects in different cultures we must ascribe he effects to the latter. Even if we argue that the setting feeds into and modifies he system, it is still apparent that it 1s the culture which is responsible for the modifi- cation. Again the level of atomisation or individualisation of a society might come to be regarded one day as an indicator of the crime prospects. For on any graph of crime rates and levels of indivi- dualisation it looks as if the more individualised societies have most crime. Ît is well-known that the simpler societies which are almost invariably group-oriented have little trouble with internal deviation either because there is a consistent form of socialisation from infancy to group norms which is very effective ; or else there is group under- standing on the toleration of certain types of deviation. This brings crime pretty much under control since behaviour 1s fairly well regulated by the group and disputes are dealt with by established procedures which reinforce the group control over the individual. As the societies become more complex, more industrialised and more socially divided and particularly as the group controls are weakened and individualism increases, the kinds of crime which we understand begin to increase. On an international scale it 1s difficult to find exceptions to this rule. Most totalitarian systems claim that crimes have been reduced and this may well be the case with conventional crime even if we leave aside the elements of repression and political regimentation. For the totalitarism systems are prone to return to group control in the form of comrades courts, street committees, neighbourhood leaders, courtyard councils and similar devices for bringing to bear at the local level the policies of those at the centre. This in effect restores or reinforces group controls although now they are directed from above rather than regulated by tradition from below (15). Reading therefore from the West, through the Communist states to the countries of the developing world, it is quite possible to discern a correlation betweeen individualism and high crime rates. This being so it is quite possible on an international scale to regard indi- vidualism as a measure of the prospects in a society of problems of crime. The more individualisation the more likelihood of crime as a problem because of the oppotunities this creates for offending — and the greater the exposure of victims. The less individualism, the more group orientation, the less the likelihood of crime because there is (15) This incidentally explains the enthusiasm of some totalitarian states for “Public Participation in Crime Control” at international conferences. But whilst some states understand by this title the organisation of Public Participation, from below he totalitarian states are thinking usually of its organisation from above. — 99 — less autonomy of the individual and more group protection of potential victims. However, let us not overlook the possibility that this relation- ship could be quite differently expressed — with the incidence of crime being an indicator of the degree of personal freedom in the society. For it can hardly be denied that any forms of group intervention or restraint reduce the area of individual choice of action. But it does not matter in which way it is expressed. The relationship is still there and the essential link between culture and crime is thereby demonstrated. The societies with little crime are those which have strong infor- mal controls and sometimes this means little need for any formal law as we understand it. The societies with most crime are those with the most carefully defined laws. Of£ course, laws define crime but perhaps they also reflect a need for definition which means that they reflect cultural changes which have made it necessary to formalise the law. Fither way, the degree of precision in the law and the quantity of formal law are still fair indicators of the amounts of crime. There is perhaps a corollary which needs to be stated. It is well understood that any kind of crime prevention must depend upon informal social controls. Statutes and even common laws are not going to be effective unless they are the support of social expec- tations and social habits which are developed within every social culture. If there is a breakdown, if informal controls do not underpin the law then, there is either more crime and the laws fall into disre- pute ; or else there is more naked enforcement of the laws even against public sentiment. And either way the country is headed for a breakdown 1f it cannot either mobilise public support for the law or neutralise opposition. The larger and more individualised societies need to learn there- fore from those which still have the group controls. In dealing with crime prevention we have to look to the most preventive elements and these are found in the societies which have customary systems or strong internal and informal controls. However, when the two systems are in juxtaposition the tendency is to favour the more formal and developed law. Lip service may be paid to the need to protect local cultures and community standards ; but nearly everywhere there is greater respect for the robed judge and advocate than for the elders sitting under a tree or solving di sputes in the coffee shops as they do in some Mediterranean areas. From a formal law point of view this assessment is no doubt justifiable. The formal law is a more carefully defined and a more finely honed instrument. It can solve many issues difficult for informal controls to deal with. However, from the point of view of crime prevention the opposite is true. However superior in principle and pre cedent, the formal law is — 100 — manifestly less efficient at controlling behaviour. In several parts of the world (e. g. Africa, Micronesia, Melanesia, Australia) we have statutory systems of law being adjusted to accomodate the unusual and disappearing customary law and this may be regarded as a temporary expedient until the customary people are fully assimilated. But from a crime angle customary law has all the built-in preventatives which the statutory law has usually lost ; customary law is conse- quently more effective in controlling behaviour than the modern formal statutes. If, therefore, we are thinking of crime control the situation should be reversed with the statute law learning to seek or generate in society the restraints and expectations which are natural to and conspicuous in the customary systems. Another very explicit and important indicator of the influence of culture on crime is the recent change in the female crime rate, largely as a result of the cultural changes in the position of women in Western society. From the dawn of criminology, there has always been one statistic which could be relied upon : namely, that the ratio of women offenders to men would be about 1:7 and in some countries a good deal less than this. Indeed the extent to which women had freedom to move and operate within society was itself a measure of the female crime in the society. Now with the women’s liberation movements it is significant that in America the rate of increase of crime amongst women is above seven times the rate of increase in the crime amongst men. In absolute figures, men will predominate but if the present trend continues it could well mean that there would be an equalisation brought about entirely by changes in culture. Therefore the status of women in a society could well be an indicator of the crime rate — or perhaps vice versa. Certainly the level of female crime will indicate the degree of freedom accorded to women. There are many other cultural indicators of crime levels, from the levels of social and geographical mobility through the size of town po- pulations to the sizes of the younger age groups in the population. Nearly always these figures and those for crime are functions of social and especiatly cultural change in the sense of changes in value systems and life styles. It is very significant that systematic organised crime and motiveless pathological killings are not usually associated with strong informal controls so that each of these may indicate the strength or weakness of the other. It is for such reasons that it is unrealistic to look for the strength or weakness of the criminal justice services as the indicators of the levels of crime. Certainly police activity can affect recorded crime but when we take other measures like the public fear of crime or the levels of public safety it is evident that these are more directly a by-product of cultural change. Consequently when we are trying — 101 — to find better procedures for crime prevention and control it is necessary to look across the world at these indicators and to compare the different cultural levels and standards so as to get a better idea of criminal phenomena in its social setting. Crime as an Expression of Cultural Change. The reasons for growing crime have been variously stated and need no embellishment here. The contention of this paper is that the cultural factor has been inadequately assessed and hardly even studied in terms comparative cultures and their crime problems. Certainly this has not been done on a world scale. In criminology itself the various psychological and sociological reasons for crime have been given and not really invalidated by the more recent preoccupation with the lack of social justice and the defects of the criminal justice system. On a broader canvass there have been references to the absence of wars causing youthful aggression to turn inward, the decline oË religious belief, the absence in a materialistic society of sufficient opportunities for self fulfilment. the failure to provide enough oppor- tunities for everyone. When the perspectives are widened to include a variety of diffe- rent cultures the deficiencies of many of these arguments are exposed. Because of the lack oË detailed comparative research across the world we are still obliged to generalise — but not in Ways which cannot be substantiated by available information. Not all of the above propositions can be dealt with here but to take a few examples with the necessary apologies for not giving the discussion in full : a) Poverty. The modern return to crime as an expression of under privilege and especially poverty with the poorer groups being the ones most frequently brought before the courts or sent to prison has a persuasive tone well supported by society’s neglect of white collar, corporate and other respectable forms of crime. It should not lead to a naive conclusion that the poverty itself is a cause of crime — or that crime will necessaril y disappear with the eradication of poverty. Not only do we know, in our own cultures, that more poor people are law abidi ng than those who are not ; but the poorest peoples of the worl d eking out a living on the edge of subsistence appear to be the ones least troubled with crime and best prepared b y means of compensation to deal with it in a way which reintegr the more affluent societies seem to h ates offenders. Conversely ave most crime and the levels of income of most offenders in affluent societies are — 102 — relatively higher than those of offenders in the same society when it was far less affluent. It may not therefore be underprivilege or absolute poverty which is most closely associated with crime but the existence in a society of conspicuous inequalities generating envy and frustration, a sense of injustice and dissatisfaction with the status quo. One cannot overlook the fact that during the depressed 1930>s in the U.S.A. when there was far more need than before or since, the reported rates of robbery and burglary steadily declined. And the developing countries with the highest rates of unemployment are not usually the ones most plagued with crime. b) Religion. On a world scale it is not always the most religious countries which are the most law abiding. Obviously one can argue that a country with an established faith may have many who do not stick to its morality but in any case it is true that, when the religions of offenders were being recorded, a great many of them were people well instructed in some form of religion. Far more important for crime prevention was the influence of religion as a social forre — as a community system (16). Thus if a Moslem country has less crime it may not be because of all its citizens being devoted to the Koran but because the social system is so organised that all action and behaviour at a local level is subject to scrutiny and everyone is caught up in the social system of the faith. Japan is eclectic about religion and its lower crime rates certainly cannot be ascribed to attendance at the temples. But everyone is part of a group system which effectively regulates behaviour. C) The Criminal Justice System. That the quality of criminal justice systems does not correlate with levels of crime is evident from a world view of the operation of different criminal justice systems. They are often very poor where crime is low and highly organised where crime is high. It seems that whether they can be described as a system or non- system has little to do with the incidence of crime for crime may be higher where they are most logically organised — and it can be shown to be low where they have little semblance of organisation. Criminal Justice Systems can be corrupt with high or low crime rates or problems. The same fact is confirmable in any one nation if a long enough period is taken into account. The West certainly appreciates now that police forces however (16) See CLIFFORD (W.) « Crime and Culture. An African Study », Canadian Review of Criminology, 8, p. 157-166. — 103 — numerically strong can detect only a small part of total crime and may have relatively little impact on the wider area of crime prevention. At least this is true if the force is not tyrannical, all powerful, able to control all movement and equipped with a secret department to monitor all dissent and deviation. Similarly rates of crime over any period of time in a country may be found to fluctuate with little correlationship with action by the courts or the correctional system. This is because the true influences on crime are cultural not specifically institutional, governmental or bureaucratic. Oppression. The most obviously oppressed peoples are not the most criminal. If anything crime would seem to rise where the yoke is lifted sufficiently to allow a degree of protest or where incomes have improved sufficiently for the slave to take his nose from the grindstone if only momentarily and to look around. This could appear to be confirmed by studies of revolutions which show that they have occured not when conditions were at their worst for the oppressed but when they were actually getting rather better and there were more opportunities to organise. Ît can certainly be demonstrated by a world survey of societies with different political systems. Unfortunately, the precise data for a comparison of crime rates might not always be easy to obtain but from what is already known it would seem unrealistic to claim that crime rates were direct indicators of the levels of oppression ; it might even be possible to demonstrate the opposite. e) Mental Defect or disorder. On a cross cultural world view the rate of crime appears to be correlated with the levels of mental illness or defect but both are probably functions of other elements because crime rates by the mentally deviate are likely to depend on levels of local tole- rance. And we have now more understanding of the Ways in which the taxonomies of mental disease have been functions of the levels of deviation tolerance in a society. In turn this degree of tolerance also depends upon beliefs and values, the resources available for segregation of such persons. There have been few cross cultural studies of relevance to this issue but it is remarkable that the pathological characters well -known for serious crime in individualised systems are conspicuous by their absence in group oriented systems. Population. On the assumption of a fixed proclivity to crime at different ages we have often looked at the increases in the younger age — 104 — groups to explain crime. But these need to be interpreted according to each culture for on any world view it is the countries with the greatest proportionate numbers of people between say 15 and 24 which have some of the lowest crime rates despite unemployment and conditions of poverty. g) Lack of Wars. The information here is conflicting perhaps because the meaning of crime is likely to be more distorted by war than by any other political, social or economic condition. However, it is instructive to note that there are societies renowned for long periods of peace e. g. Switzerland or Costa Rica which do not exhibit parti- cularly uncontrollable crime rates — as well as societies torn Dy war e.g. Viet Nam or the Congo and Nigeria where crime rates have risen during hostilities apparantly because of the oppor- tunities which war created for crime. Against this there are examples of war periods correlating with decreases in crime perhaps because of the mobilisation of the delinquency-prone into the army ; and perhaps because of the national organisation of whole populations for one purpose which served to discourage by stronger laws and informal controls anyone likely to take advantage of the deprivations which everyone was expected to share in the national intererest. The Common Thread. Cultures accross the world are so infinitely varied that it has not been possible to embark on the kind of generalising evidenced by the foregoing sections of this paper without serious misgivings ; and the attempt has been made possible only by the confidence that the scientific community, to which these observations are directed, will only too readily supply now or in the future the necessary qualifications and modifications. Having ventured so far however one is tempted to go just a little further and to seek the information we may have of the ways in which mankind in its various cultures has been fairly consistent in its approaches to crime and its prevention. We are accustomed to the assumption that crime is anyway a very relative concept ; that it differs in the same nation from period to period of its history and that accross the world the same behaviour is condemned or acclaimed according to culture and conditions. This is obviously demonstrable with killing being enjoined in war and punished in peace, with infanticide being a crime in developed areas and a necessary population control in some societies on the edge of sub- sistence ; with adultery in some systems legally condemned and in others toletared, with property offenses having a variety of different — 105 — meanings according to levels of poverty or affluence and according to the organisation of the means of prodution. Yet, when all the variations have been allowed for, there does appear to be a common residue of conceptions oË crime which does not greatly change. This might well have been suspected from the points of similarity which have subsisted between legal codes from the Code of Hammurabi and the Ten Commandments through the ethical imperatives of the Roman Twelve Tables, the Koran and Confucianism to the Upanishads. Murder of a deliberate nature has always been socially wrong (though it might be compensated for — like a civil offence) theft and robbery were never tolerated within a community although they have been permissible against outsiders or enemies ; incest was universally condemned and lying and deception were always punishable. Now if one examines the thesaurus of anthro- pological literature it 1s still not easy ot find real exceptions to these ground rules for social living even though the action decreed to deal with offenders might vary. There is a kernel of agreement from amongst the Aboriginals of Australia and the Trobiand Islanders through Indian tribes and Afghans to the codes obtaining in Saudi Arabia, amongst the Bedhouins, Esquimaux and the Nilotic tribes of Africa. The studies which have been done of modern penal laws in their relationship to customary laws in Africa (17) and the attempts made in Papua New Guinea to use customary law to a greater extent in combatting urban crime have all shown that there are no great differences between customary and statutory conceptions of crime ho- wever more precise and technical the modern laws have become. Such divergencies as these are related far more to the forms of treat- ment (e.g. compensation rather than emprisonment) than they are to the ways in which intolerable conduct is perceived. Whence derives therefore this basic even if limited agreement on the irreducible minima of human behaviour ? Is it an immemorial tradition transmitted across the worlds’ cultures from primeval times ? Is it a lesson learned in the inexorable school of life as to the basic conditions of keeping tribes and clans together in their struggle to sur- vive ? Is it simply common experience re-learned the hard way by each separate culture so that the coincidence follows from the very nature of man and his culture ? Or does its prevalence in all ages and areas suggest that it is instinctive ? Here is an area for almost unli- mited research in the years to come and for interminable debate. It is a subject which we can hardly afford to neglect however if we want to find the answers to some of our modern problems overlaid as (17) See CLIFFORD (W.) « Juvenile Delinquenc y in Zambia », United Nations Trends Siudies. De Borck (A.) Contribution à ? Etude du Systeme moral de la Jeunesse Zaïroise, Bruxelles, Vander/Nauwelae rts, 1975. Also work in East Africa by University of London, School of Oriental a nd African Studies. — 106 — they are by specious reasoning and conclusions based on very restricted samples. We are inevitably reminded here of Raffaelle Garofalo’s much neglected doctrine of natural and artificial crimes. Garofalo’s moral and ethical overtones could hardly recommend him in his own times or (in the years that followed) to the growing positivist school —- although he regarded himself as a positivist. His « natural crimes » were unpalatable to a world seeking to dispose of the older concepts of natural law and natural justice. Natural law has proved difficult to keep out however. Excluded under this name it has crept back surreptitiously in such concept as « reasonable man » or in the modern form of irreducible human rights ; and Garofalo’s pessimism about the reform of offenders now finds a belated echo in the modern rejection of the myths of «treatment » of offenders. Perhaps, after all, experience of different cuiltures will vindicate his intuition about a common residue of intolerable offences. Perhaps, when all the evidence has been gathered from the widely distributed and rapidly changing cultures we may find natural crimes easier to accept than complete relativity. Whether there is a return to something like Garofalo’s formulation or not it is apparent that there is a case to be made for a consensus of cultural opinion and practice in the definition and punishment of similar offences. These need to be studied with all their local but incidental variations — as well as we need to document and compare the enormous differences which distinguish cultures across the world. Conclusions. This paper has sought to widen the perspectives in crime aetiology, crminal justice reform and crime prevention generally to world dimen- sions. Its thesis has been that, until relatively recent times, criminology has been too narrowly national and too regionally Western in its approaches to the phenomena of crime. Because of the present dearth of research in this international area the paper could not possibly be conclusive ; it could only be indicative of prospects with the object of broadening the approaches. It has been suggested that until now the published work has been culturally bound to one area of the world. In the West the reasons for crime and the approaches to its prevention have followed a succession of fashions, biological, sociological, psychological or politically scientific without any regard to diverse or opposing examples available from even a cursory association with Asia, Africa or Latin- America. There were, even within the Western region itself (if all nations be considered and not only those preoccupied with rising — 107 — crime rates and professional criminology), a number of countries e.g. Switzerland, or Iceland the experience of which would have cast doubts on the published fashions ; but even these were not properly considered. In the West the thread of scientific thought on crime has developed from Lombroso’s atavistic regression (and its biological, endocrimino- logical and genetic derivatives) and Ferris’ environmental determinism (with its socio-psychological offspring in such concepts as « delin- quency area», « opportunity pyramid» and «defensible space ») through Freudian regression and disordered emotions (augmented later by socialisation and role playing theories) to the modern preoccu- pations with victimisation, labelling and crime as a function of the distribution of power. And few, if any, of these basic ideas have been submitted to the crucible test of world comparisons of societies at different levels of sophistication and development. The argument developed here is that no theory, no model, no research result has reliability if it cannot be validated by the world perspective. Examples have been provided of the weaknesses of some such approaches when they are measured on international scales. The implication from this first view is then that culture in the sense of traditions, values and life styles are greater determinants of beha- viour than the best and most rational laws, the most equitable distri- butions of power or the finest organisations of criminal justice systems. There is also the possibility that there might be unity in diversity if we look at similarities as much as differences — possi- bly vindicating the much maligned Garofalo contention that there is in any society an irreductible minimum of behaviour which a society can tolerate whilst still subsisting as a society or culture. Ad mittedly these must be broad conclusions at this stage to be confi rmed or invalidated by more detailed comparative research on a world scale. REFERENCES SELLIN (Th.), Cultural Conflict and Crime, New York, Soci Council, 1938, Bull, 4!. al Science Research WILKINS (L.T.), « Crime in the World of 1990 ». S sity of Toronto, Canada, December 18, peech given at the Univer- 1969. Published also in FUTURES, 1970 September, p. 203-214. WIRTH (L., « Culture Conflict and Misconduct » Soci al Forces, 1931, 9 : 484 : 92, See also : THOMAS (I.) and ZNANIECK I (F.), The Polish Peasant in Europe and America, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1927. — 108 — Homicide in IO nations e e the development of the comparative crime data file () Dane ARCHER Rosemary GARTNER Department of sociology Department of socioiegy University of California University of Wisconsin Santa-Cruz, California U.S.A- U.S.A. For a number of historical reasons research on the causes of crime has tended to be unfortunately insular and even ethnocentric. For example, almost all systematic research on the social, economic, and cultural origins of homicide has been done with respect to the expe- riences of single societies (18). While these investigations of an indivi- dual society are of great descriptive value, they do not by themselves result in general explanations and theories. In addition, researchers interested in homicide rates have lavished repeated attention on the data of a handful of nations — e.g., the U.S. and Great Britain — and neglected the inspection of a heterogeneous range of societies. The reason for this narrow and culturally biased approach has not been lack of interest. The need for a truly comparative approach to crime has long been acknowledged (Sellin and Wolfgang, 1964 ; (*) This project and the development of the 110-Nation Compa- rative Crime Data File were supported by NIMH Grant Number MH 27427 from the Center for Studies of Crime and Delinquency, and by a Guggenheim Fellowship to the first author. Responsibility for the findings and interpretations in this paper belongs, of course, to the authors alone. (18) Some important exceptions are the following works : Straus (M.) and Straus (J.), « Suicide, homicide, and social structure in Ceylon », American journal of sociology, 1953, 58, 461-469 ; Verkko (V.), Survey of current practice in criminal statistics. Transactions of the. Westermark Society, 1956, 5-33 ; Wolfgang (M.E.), « International crime statistics : À proposal »,Journal of Crimi- nal law, Criminology, and Police Science, 1967, 58, 65-69 ; Wolfgang (M.E. and Ferracuti (F.), The Subculture of Violence, New York, Tavistock, 1967 ; Clinard (M.B.) and Abbott (D.J.), Crime and Developing Countries : A Compa- rative Perspective, New York, Wiley, 1973 ; Newman (G.), Comparative Deviance : Perception and Law in Six Cultures, New York, Elsevier, 1976 ; Gurr (T.R.), Grabosky (P.N.), and Hula (R.C.), The Politics of Crime and Conflict : A comparative History of Four Cities, Beverlv Hills. Sage Publications, 1977. — 109 — Mannheim, 1965 ; Wolfgang, 1967 ; and Mulvihill and Tumin, 1969) and even researchers working with the data of single nations have ] investigations. Although underlined the importance of cross-nationa cross-national comparisons are always fraught with a number of metho- le to such comparative research dological problems, the primary obstac has been a dearth of information. In the p ast, the social sciences have not had available adequate historical (or « time series ») data on rates of homicide in a large number of societies. Without such a cross-national data base, rigorous comparative research has not been p ossible on a large scale. As a result, our under- standing of the causes of homicide and other off enses remains, at best, Illustrations of provincial and primitive and, at worst. simply wrong. this problem are not hard to find. For example, sociologists have for a long time suspected that wars might s omehow produce a postwar increase in homicide rates (e.g., Sorokin, 1928 : 340-344). However, in the absence of historical. cross-national data on homicide rates, efforts to research this question have been limited to isola ted case studies — often as limited as the case of a single nation aîte r a sing le war (19). For example, the eminent Mannheim published an entire book on this criminologist Herman question (Ma nnheim, 1941). The boo k was based on the only crime available to Mannheim — rates for England. On the data readily strength of the Engl ish experience after World War I, Mannheim concluded that wars do not produce postwar « waves » of homicide. Recent comparative research, however, indicates that Mannheim was almost certainly wrong — Le., he was misled by studying a single nation’s experience which turned out to be idiosyncratic (Archer and Gartner, 19776). A second example concerns an apparent paradox of current inte- rest to many sociologists. Based on cross-sectional comparisons of the homicide rates of large and small U.S. cities, sociologists have repea- tedly demonstrated taht larger cities have dramatically higher homicide rates than smaller cities (e.g. Wolfgang, 1968). However, there is almost no longitudinal or historical research on whether a given city’s homicide rate grows as its population increases (20). Without such evidence, (19) An imp ortant exception was the early study by Sellin (T.) : « Is mur- der increasing in Europe ? » The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1926, 126, 29-34. Sellin compared the post-WW I homicide rate changes in five belligerent nations and four non-belligerent nations. The few exceptions have generated considerable interest precisely (20) because they h ave not found general increases in crime rates with populations growth — e.g., Lane (R.). « Urbanization and criminal violence in the 19th centurv : Massachusetts as à t est case». In Graham (H.D.) and Gurr (T.R) (Eds.), Viole nce in America Historical and Comparative Perspectives, Washington. U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969, 359-370. — 110 — of course, it is difficult to explain or understand the relatively higher homicide rates observed in large cities. The reason for our continued ignorance on this question is, again, the unavailability of historical data on homicide. What one would like to have to answer this question is a cross-national file of historical homicide data for large cities in several societies À third example can be drawn from the area of social policy Many legislative issues in the Justice area involve an assumption that proposed changes in law are likely to affect homicides rates — e.g., gun control laws, temporary periods of « amnesty » for the surrender of illegal or unregistered weapons, and death penalty legislation. Here again, however, the poverty of available cross-national data has made comprehensive research impossible. There has been essentially no systematic research on how changes in gun ownership in other societies have affected their homicide rates, and also little recent research on how changes in death penalty legislation have affected homicide rates in other societies. This near absence of rigorous comparative research on the effect of death penalty legislation is particularly conspicuous since great deal of deterrence research has been done using American offense rates (e.g.. Gibbs, 1975) Thesc three examples are, unfortunately, only a few of the impor- tant questions which remain unresearched and unanswered because the necessary time series data on homicide rates have not been available for a large sample of nations and cities. There are many other areas where the empirical foundations of existing theory about homicide are embarrassingly provincial. For example, little is known about how fluctuations in unemployment or other economic indicators affect homicide rates. There have been a small number of American studies — including the classic study by Henry and Short (1954) — but virtually no attempts to explore this question using the evidence of other societies (21). This omission in the literature is particularly un- fortunate, since there are recent indications that fluctuations in unem- ployment and other economic variables have important societal conse- quences in terms of individual behavior (e.g.…. Brenner, 1973) In all these areas, our knowledge of the social origins of homicide is lamentably culture-bound. Without historical homicide data from a large number of societies, there have been no opportunities to explore the causes of this violent offense in a _ range of cultures, or even to attempt more modest replications of findings based primarily or exclusively on American data (21) A well-known exception is the work of Radzinowicz — e. « Economic pressures ». IN Radzinowicz (L.) and Wolfgang (M.E.) (Eds) Crime and Justice, The Criminal in Society, New York, Basic Books, 1971, vol. Î. 420-442. — 111 — These constraints on empirical research have had predictable consequences for social theories about the origins of crime. The poverty of existing resources for comparative homicide research have created a climate in which nation-bound and ungeneralizable theory have flourished. À casual reading of many texts on crime or the sociology oË violence reveals several propositions about homicide which appear to be readily disconfirmable by the experience of other societies, Perhaps even worse, it is easy for a reader of these texts to form an impression that homicide and other offenses do not exist outside the United States — since so many conclusions appear to rest rather preca- riously on American data alone. In summary, the absence of readily examinable homicide data for large numbers of societies has retarded the development of general theories about the social origins of homi- cide. The 110-Nation Comparative Crime Data File (CCDF). The major obstacle to generalizable research on the social origins of homicide has been the absence of a dependent variable. For this reason, beginning in 1972, we undertook the creation of an archive of crime rate data which had both comparative breadth and histo- rical depth. After several years of intensive data collection, we have assembled a 110-nation Comparative Crime Data File (CCDF) with time series rates of five offenses for the period 1900-1970. These five offenses are homicide, assault, robbery, theft, and rape. In addition to the data series for 110 nations, the CCDF also includes series for 44 major international cities as well. The principle sources for the creation of this massive comparative file have been : (1) correspondence with national and metropolitan governmental sources in essentially all societies in the world ; (2) exa- mination of documents and annual reports of those nations which have published data on their annual incidence of various offenses : and (3) correspondence with other record-keeping agencies. The time series in the CCDF begin in the year 1900, although many of the nations in the file did not begin maintaining cr ime data until much later. For example, the so-called « developing » nations generally have data in the CCDF only for relativel In addition, the records for some nations ÿ recent periods. contain interruptions due to national emergencies and bureaucratic lapses. These factors mean that for any given year or period, the CCDF has effective data for fewer than 110 nations and fewer than 44 cities. As part of the collection of the 110-nation CCDF, we have reviewed the available literature on possible sources of unrelia bility and invalidity in official crime data. The implications of these co ncerns for comparative research with the CCDF have been discussed elsewhere, — 112 — and efforts have been made to identify research designs which mini- mize these problems (Archer and Gartner, 1976). For example, the most conservative design using the CCDF is one which : (1) examines homicide rather than other offenses ; (2) examines only longitudinal trends within each of several societies and eschews cross-sectional comparisons of absolute offense rate levels across several societies ; and (3) uses some kind of data quality control procedure to take into account the variable validity of the different offense indicators (e.g., offenses known versus arrests) which are present for various nations in the CCDF. With these methodological precautions, the CCDF makes it pos- sible to investigate the effects upon offense rates of a great number of possible antecedent variables. In addition, the CCDF can maximize the comparative rigor of homicide research by maximizing a resear- cher’s chances of identifying both internationally general relationships and also relationships which hold only for certain types of societies. As one goal of the CCDF project, the entire data archive will be published as a resource for the cross-national investigations of other researchers. Before making the data base available, of course, it will be necessary to include a number of methodological guidelines, caveats, and safeguards. As just a single example, it will be necessary to alert potential users to when (and in what way) an apparently continuous data series in the CCDF actually conceals a measure change. Fach methodological aspect of the CCDF will be discussed along with the relative merits of various potential solutions. In the case of a measure change, for example, two alternative solutions might be (l) to smooth the series by estimating the measure change discontinuity and adjusting either the pre- or post-change series ; or (2) simply to treat the two parts of the series as separable cases or replications. Fither decision, of course, requires the researcher to make a number of unique assumptions. When the CCDF data base is published, it will include a detailed methodological guide intended to inform potential users of the CCDF about the relative merits of a wide variety of research decisions and designs and their attendant assumptions. The long-term goal of the CCDF project is to make possible a comprehensive assessment of whether, and to what degree, trends in homicide rates follow lawful and explicable patterns. Faced with a nearly infinite list of potential antecedent variables, we have chosen to treat in greatest detail the following four classes of potential social origins of homicide (1) short-term societal events (e.g., recessions, wars, etc.); (2) long-term social-changes (e.g., urbanization, unem- ployment rate fluctuations, etc.); (3) relatively durable aspects of social structure (e.g., resource concentration or distribution, type of national economic organization, etc.) ; and (4) discrete changes in policy — 113 — an law (e.g. gun control legislation, changes in courtroom evidentiary procedures, death penalty abolition or restoration, etc.) (22). À study on the effects of one of these antecedents, wars, has already been published (Archer and Gartner, 1976). The 110-nation CCDF makes possible for the first time a genuinely international approach to the study of homicide, and work toward this demanding objective has just begun. It is our hope that empirical research drawing upon the CCDF will provide the historical and comparative basis for truly general theories about the social origins of homicide. The rest of this paper reports two of the initial findings made possible by this massive new data archive. One of these is à methodological question ; the second concerns a substantive question of both classic and current concern to sociologists. Study ! A Methodological Observation on Different Homicide Indicators. À classic concern of social scientists working crime data has been the relative merits of different indicators of the «real» rate of an offense. For an offense like homicide, for example, different jurisdictions (e.g., countries, or states and cities in the same country) could conceivably report one or more of the following indicators offenses known to the police, arrests, indictments, pleas entered in court, convictions, incarcerations, or cven figures on the local prison population as of a certain date. Since these various indicators reflect phases of the legal system which are increasingly more remote from the original offense, they ob- viously suffer from a progressive attrition of numbers. Different indi- cators, therefore, report different fractions of the « real » rate. As a re- sult, it is manifestly unwarranted to compare two jurisdictions on the absolute level of their offense rates if they report different indicators of this offense. The invalidity of primitive cross-sectional research designs of this kind is extremely well-known, althou gh they are occasionally still published. It has been established for some time that the most accurate or « valid » indicator of homicide and other crimes is the number of offenses known to the police (Sellin, 1931 : Ferdinand, 1967 : Mulvihill and Tumin, 1969 ; Clinard and Abbott, 1973, Hindelang, 1974). This fact has direct implications for cross-s ectional research d esigns. fhe researcher interested in comparing the absolute homicide r ates of different nations, therefore, will probably choose the relatively Conser- (22) In addition, we are working on a number of a CCDF data set itself. For example, we are using the nalyses internal to the to learn whether the trends of various offenses are time series in the file are factors of offenses which vary together over t collinear, or whether there ime. Finally, We are using the CCDF to the try to resolve a number of moth odological iss ues — one of which is discussed below. — 114 — vative procedure of limiting comparisons to nations using only this optimal indicators (23). For almost generations of social scientists, as a result, it has been a point of dogma to consider only one indicator — the number of offenses known — as valid for research purposes. Although this methodological purism is quite reasonable on a prima facie basis, it is by contemporary standards somewhat uncritical and unsophisticated (24). It is important to remember that the preference for the « offenses known » indicator evolved in the context of cross-sectional comparisons of absolute crime rates in different jurisdictions. One of the major advances in social science epistemology in recent years has been to contrast the causal power of cross-sectional and longitudinal research designs (e.g., Lieberson and Hansen, 1974). It now seems clear that these two different methods can address the same question and yet emerge with unrelated (or even opposite) conclusions about the relationship between two variables. since only a longitudinal design can include a temporal relationship between the variables, this design is inherentlv superior to a cross-sectional design. The difference between these two research designs can be illus- trated with an example to be discussed in greater detail below. For example, suppose a researcher is interested in the relationship between city size and homicide rates. There are two obvious designs by which this question can be addressed. À cross-sectional design would involve a comparison (with appropriate concern for the consistency of offense definition and recording, etc.) of the homicide rates of large and small cities À longitudinal design, by contrast, would involve a study of how the annual homicide rates of one or more cities have changed as they have grown in size. In the case of city size and homicide rates, as discussed below, these two designs in fact reach two different conclusions. The essential difference between the two designs is that only the longitudinal design has a historical dimension. (23) In actual research, however, this precaution is only of limited value. There are many hazards to cross-sectional comparisons of the offense rates of different nations, and limiting comparisons to only nations with the best indicator is necessary but insufficient. The comparative researcher must also minimize the effect of other artifacts — e.g.… national differences in the definition of an offense, national differences in statistical accuracy such as underreporting, etc. Although the validity of cross-sectional comparisons of homicide rates is jeopardized by many potential artifacts, we continue to believe that prudent comparisons of this kind are possible. (24) For example, in comparisons involving large numbers of nations, the presence of different types of indicators can be resolved using a data quality control procedure (Naroll, 1962 ; Archer and Gartner, 1976). — 115 — Since the preference for the « offenses known » indicator dates from a period dominated by cross-sectional research designs, it is important to reassess the quality of different types of indicators for the more powerful longitudinal designs. If a «poor» indicator (e.g., homicide convictions) bears a consistent relationship to a « good » indicator (homicide offenses known), then either indicator would be an equally valid indicator of the trend of a nation’s homicide rate. For example, if a nation’*s number of homicide convictions are a stable fraction — e.g., 40 % — of the nation’s number of homicide offenses known, then the two indicators are equally valuable in longi- tudinal studies of national homicide trends (25). Since longitudinal designs seem certain to dominate future compa- rative research on crime rates, it is very important to determine whether good and poor homicide indicators do — in fact — have a stable relationship over time. If different indicators can be shown to be collinear, then they are of equal quality as measures of national homicide trends. An empirical answer to this question requires redundant homicide data for several societies — i.e. more than one indicator over a reasonably long interval. The CCDF has data of this kind for 14 na- tions. À measure change 1s involved for two of these nations, so the total number of discrete cases is 16. Table 1 shows the correlations between good and imperfect indicators over time in these 16 cases (26). The table also indicates the period over which the comparison is being made, and the exact types of indicators being compared. The evidence in Table l is extremely persuasive for the usefulness of even poor indicators as measures of trends. For the 16 cases in Table 1, good and poor indicators are strongly collinear. In fact, the lowest median correlation across all cases in Table 1 is. 85-a figure considerably above the reliabilities of most measures in sociology and psychology. The remaining correlations among indicators in Table 1 are even higher. This means that poor indicators are in most cases a consistent fraction of good indicators. As a result, good and poor indicators are generally interchangeable as measures of a nation’s offense rate trend. In cases where a researcher has available a good (offenses known) (25) Even if this fraction is not perfectly stable, a resarc her may be protected from spurious results. If fluctuations in this fraction ar e random or « benign », the most likely consequence is a reduction or «attenuation » in the researcher’s chances of finding a significant relationship between the homicide series and some other variable. The error, therefore, is likely to have conser. vative consequences. (26) This data was first presented in a paper read at the 1975 annual meeting of the Society for the Study of Social Problems. — 116 — TABLE I Correlations between good and imperfect indicators of the same offense for 16 cases from the 110-Nation Comparative Crime Data File. CORRELATION BETWEEN TWO INDICATORS FOR EACH NATION ( YEARS | INDICATORS ! OFFENSE Australia 1964-1972 (1) Crimes Murder and Man- known slaughter 1.00, (2) Crimes Assault 1.00, cleared Rape 98 Robbery 96 Canada . . ». 1919-1943 (1) Offenses Offenses against — known the person ; murder, and (2) Convictions manslaughter assault 90 Offenses against pro- perty with violence robbery and bur- glary 93 Offenses without against property violence ; theft 94 Canada . e » — © . 1952-1967 — (1) Charges Homicide 82 (2) Convictions Assault 96 Robbery Theft 1.00, 93 Offenses against women 98 Denmark 1933-1947 (1) Crimes Homicide 95 known Assault 96 (2) Crimes Rape 90 _ cleared 91 Theft Robbery 97 Denmark 1948-1959 (1) Crimes Homicide 92 — e known Assault 92 (2) Crimes Robbery 91 cleared Theft 87 Rape 81 Finland . … . ... 1913-1924 (1) Offenses Homicide 84 reported (2) Prosecutions (1) Offenses Homicide 74 reported (2) Convictions — 117 — Murder 85 Ireland . « . : —s … © —. 1961-1964 (1) Crimes 1.00 nown Manslaughter (2) Court cases Assault 1.00, Indecent assaults against females 99 Robbery 1.00 Burglary and hou- sebreaking 99 Offenses against without property violence 41 Kenya . < . …. ... 1964-1968 (1) Crimes Homicide 179 known Robbery 11 (2) Arrests Theft 93 Homicide 94 (1) Crimes known Robbery -.59 (2) Convictions Theft 85 Mexico 1966-1972 (1) Cases presen- Homicide 73 te Assault 81 (2) Convictions Rape 65 Robbery 89 Netherlands 1949-1972 (1) Final senten- Murder and man- ces slaughter ; crimes (2) Crimes Assault against life 77 known 79 Robbery, theft and housebreaking 41 New Zealand .. 1920-1954 (1) Offenses known All offenses 96 1956-1971 (2) Offenses cleared AlIl offenses 98 Norway 1957-1970 (1) Offenses Homicide 42 known Assault 92 (2) Persons pro- Robbery-theft 97 ceeded against Rape 42 Sweden . * « e © © e 1959-1966 (1) Offenses re- Homicide 89 porte Robbery 86 cleared (2) Offenses Burglary 48 Rape 82 Tanzania . . ... 1962-1972 (1) Crimes Murder and man- known slaughter -.60 (2) Convictions Assault -.52 Robbery Theft 74 -.39 Thaïland . e * » e À 1945-1962 (1) Crimes known All offenses 1.00, (2) Convictions — 118 — . . ... 1933-1971 (1) UCR murder Homicide 85 and non-negli- ter gent manslaugh- (2) Rates of aeath caused by homicides, vital statistics of US2. | MEDIAN CORRELATION ACROSS ALL CASES 85 Homicide, murder and manslaughter Rape 86 Assault 92 Robbery, property offenses with violence 90 Theft 98 AÎl offenses (3 cases) 1 correlation is .995 or greater. 2 Vital statistics section of U.S. Statistical Abstract. time series, of course, he or she does not need to use other indicators as measures of trends. But the analysis of Table 1 suggests that in the absence of offenses known data, a researcher would be justified in using other indicators as measures of rate trends (27). In practice, a researcher with the luxury of data on a large number of nations is able to confirm the implications of Table 1 to his or her own satisfaction. If different nations in the sample use different indicators, the researcher can use a data quality control procedure — 1.e., he or she can analyze the data in successive waves. Nations with data on offenses known can be analyzed in one wave, and nations with other indicators can be analyzed in a separate wave. The strongly collinear relationships among indicators in Table 1 prompt us to make the following prediction in longitudinal studies using large numbers of nations, analyses of nations with good indi- cators will agree with analyses of nations with poor indicators. Al- (27) The impressive collinearity in Table 1 applies to studies of national trends in offense rates. In studies where researchers wWish to detrend an offense rate time series, and study only the detrended residuals, Table 1 does not of course tell us anything about the relationship between the detrended residuals of good and poor indicators. This issue is also, however, an empirical question and is easily investigable using the CCDF. We are grateful to Marc Lieberman for this observation. — 119 — though work with the CCDF is still in its early stages, this prediction is supported by the work already completed. For example, Archer and Gartner (1976) used a data quality control procedure in their study of how wars affect postwar homicide rates. The nations with good indicators were analyzed separately from nations with other indicators — and the results of these two analyses did not differ (Archer and Gartner, 1976, p. 951). This finding supports our expectation that longitudinal studies of national homicide rates — whether of the number of offenses known or of other indicators — Will reach identical conclusions. The conclusions of longitudinal research designs, therefore, are not dependent on the type of indicator maintained by the nations in the studies. In summary, the infatuation of two generations of social scientists with the offenses known indicator may have been overstated and indiscriminate. The indispensability of this indicator in cross-sectional designs remains unquestioned. But the evidence reported here indicates that longitudinal designs do not require this indicator. In fact, this analysis reveals that several different indicators are equally valid as measures of a nation’s homicide rate trend. Comparative researchers are justified, therefore, in performing longitudinal research which includes nations with data on offenses known as well as nations with other indicators. Às a conservative device, of course, researchers can still elect to use a data quality control procedure. This procedure, in effect, constitutes a « replication » using the two different types of indicators in separates waves. Study I : City Size, City Growth, and Homicide Rates. Although urban crime has been a central concern of several social sciences for a long time, it remains poorly understood. Despite several generations of urban theory and descriptive research, expla- nations of urban crime are still beclouded by controversy and apparen- tly contradictory research findings (28). Cities have long been regarded as centers of crime and violence. This unfavorable reputation is at least as old as the Bible. For example, in Ezekial (7.23), one of the explanations God is said to have given for his wrath is that « the land is full of bloody crimes and the city is full of violence », Over succeeding centuries, many writers have contras- ted the immorality of cities with the innocence and purity of rural life. In some of these accounts, the city is described as seducing (28) The classic and recent literature on urban rates of crime and violence are reviewed in some detail in Archer, Gartner, Akert, and Lockwood (1977). Only the central themes of this literature are indicated here. — 120 — its new arrivals into a life of crime. For example, Adam Smith wrote that a man of « low moral character » could be constrained to behave properly in a village environment, « but as soon as he comes into a great city he is sunk in obscurity and darkness… and he is very likely to… abandon himself to every sort of low profligacy and vice » (quoted in Mannheim, 1965 : 545). This image of the city has been extremely influential in the history of sociology and, with some refinement, constitutes today the dominant theory about crime in cities. In sociology, this perspective is particularly identified with Durkheim and Wirth. In The Division of Labor in Society (1933), Durkheim suggested that the « common conscience » is diluted as a city grows in size : …local opinion weighs less heavily upon each of us, and as the general opinion of society cannot replace its predecessor, not being able to watch closely the conduct of its citizens, the collective surveil- lance is irretrievably loosened, the common conscience loses its autho- rity and individual variability grows (p. 300). Wirth (1940) accepted this view of cities and discussed the mecha- nisms by which cities dissolved traditional forms of social control. According to Wirth, the effects of cities included an increase in resi- dential mobility, isolation, and anonymity as well as a breakdown of kinship ties and other informal sources of social control. In addition to this Durkheim-Wirth view of the city as a place where traditional social controls are minimized and anonymity 1s maximized, no fewer than six additional theoretical explanations have appeared in the literature on urban crime. These six hypotheses can be stated in abbreviated form as follows : (l) cities foster the develop- ment of criminal subcultures ; (2) cities produce class, cultural, and racial conflict as a function of greater population heterogeneity ; (3) cities increase criminal opportunities because of population size and the large numbers of commercial establishments ; (4) cities have rela- tively impersonal police-civilian relations which lead to rigid law enforcement practices and therefore arrest rates which are inflated compared to those of non-urban areas ; (5) the age and sex composition of cities have been altered by the arrival of immigrants (from rural areas, other nations, etc.) who are predominantly young males ; and even (6) the possibility that the population density of cities might by itself increase the likehood of pathological behavior. Unfortunately, empirical evidence has not matched the richness and variety of this theoretical banquet. Despite the existence of at least seven quite plausible theoretical explanations, the available evi- dence on urban homicide rates and their social origins is both paro- chial and paradoxical. Much of the empirical confusion concerning urban homicide derives from a collision between cross-sectional and longitudinal approaches to this area. The two approaches imply questions which — 121 — are radically different. The cross-sectional approach asks whether there are homicide rate implications of city size at any one moment in time ; the longitudinal approach asks whether there are any impli- cations of city growth over time. Ât least until recently, the cross-sectional approach dominated research on urban homicide. This research has been based primarily on American data, and has produced results which are as consistent as they are striking (29). For example, Wolfgang (1968) and Clinard (1974) analyzed offense rates for American cities of various sizes and found impressively higher homicide rates in large cities than in small cities. The vividness of this cross-sectional finding with American data must be seen to be fully appreciated. We have replicated this well- known finding, using the most recent data available and also smoothing over five years to reduce the effects of short-term idiosyncracies. Using the FBP’s Uniform Crime Reports, we aggregated the mean rates of murder and non-negligent manslaughter for cities of various size cate- gories over the period 1971-75. The results of this analysis produce à cross-sectional picture of the homicide rates in American cities of various sizes, and this relationship is graphed using a semi-log scale in Figure 1. Figure 1 City Size and homicide Rates in the U.S. : 1971-1975 HOMICICE RATE FER 100,009 Figure 1 ; 5 [ 20 15 10 | ] Jj JL 1 CITY SVIZE Rur. Sub. <10 10 25 50 100 250 500 1000 (1000 s, LOG SCALE) (a) Source : Adapted from the FBIs Uniform Grime Reports, 1971-75, Rates shown are the means of the five-year period 1971-1975, p (29) This cross-sectional question has also been ad data from other nations by Szabo, 1960 ; Mannheim, 1965 : dressed using some and Tarniquet, 1968. — 122 — The strength of the relationship in Figure 1 indicates why this finding is one of the most widely accepted tenets of urban sociology. For cities alone (ie., excluding rural and suburban areas), the relationship between city size and homicide rates is monotonic and approximately logarithmic. The relationship is monotonic in that each city size category has a homicide rate higher than all smaller size categories and lower than all larger size categories. The relation- ship is logarithmic in that the most dramatic differences in homicide rates occur among the smaller city size categories — for more populous cities, it takes much larger city size differences to produce comparable differences in urban homicide rates. In an earlier publication, we have called this cross-sectional result a «logarithmic J-curve» because of the shape of the graph in figure l (Archer, Gartner, Akert, and Lockwood, 1977). The graph 1S J-curve rather than linear because rural areas have homicide rates which are actually higher than the rates for smaller cities. This finding is quite provocative, since it seems intuitively more plausible to expect rural homicide rates to be lower than all urban rates. In fact, none of the seven theoretical models summarized earlier can explain the finding that rural homicide rates exceed the rates of small cities and are as high, in fact, as the rates of cities with populations between 50,000 and 100,000. The ecology of homicide is clearly multivariate in nature, and rural homicides cannot be understood without the introduction of other theoretical variables which are, at present, unidentified. By itself, the cross-sectional approach represented in Figure 1 seems straightforward and — except for the unexpectedly high homi- cide rates in rural areas — quite compatible with any of the seven theoretical explanations listed earlier. All seven theoretical models predict greater homicide rates in large cities, although for different reasons, and the cross-sectional evidence appears to support this prediction. This finding only becomes a paradox when longitudinal evidence 1s examined. The relationship shown in Figure ! has led many researchers to the quite reasonable expectation that this effect of city size might have implications for city growth as well. If it is true that the homicide rates of large cities exceed those of small cities, it ssems reasonable to expect the homicide rates of a city to soar as the city grows from small to large. A few longitudinal studies of this question have been made, however, and the results of these inquiries constitute the other half of the paradox of cities and homicide. These few longitudinal studies are paradoxical precisely because they have not found the reasonable and the expected — 1i.e., they have not found that indi- — 123 — vidual cities experience homicide rate increases as they grow in popu- lation size. Threee of these longitudinal studies have examined cities over a period of roughly one century. For example, Powel (1966) studied Buffallo between 1854 and 1956 ; Ferdinand (1967) studied Boston from 1849 to 1951 ; and Lane (1969) studied both Boston and Massa- chusetts generally from the mid-19th to the mid-20th Century. These three studies of American city growth found a consistent decline in murder and other serious crime rates, despite the population gains oË these cities during the century studied (30). There have also been some historical studies of entire societies. Although studies at this level of aggregation bear only imperfectly upon our question, they appear to support analyses done at the city level. For example, Lodhi and Tilly (1973) studied records of crimes against the person in 19th Century France and found that the rate of these offenses fluctuated mildly over time but had no discer- nible trend. This, then, is the paradox of cities and homicide rates why do large cities currently have higher homicide rates than small cities, if there is no evidence of increasing homicide rates as a city grows ? The cross-sectional evidence on city size and homicide seems at first to suggest that cities must grow to some absolute size (e.g., 100,000 persons) before having a high homicide rate. But this apparently reasonable proposition is contradicted by the longitudinal evidence which shows that cities do not in fact show homicide rate increases as they grow. In short, if larger cities currently have higher homicide rates than small cities, how did they get these high rates — if not by growing in population size ? Using the wealth of 20th Century data series in the 110-nation CCDF, we have attempted a new interpretation of this apparently paradoxical relationship between cities and homicide rates. Our approach has been to try to provide answers to three conceptually separable questions which, we believe, provide the key to this paradox. The first two of these questions address the cross-national gene- ralizability of the two sides of the paradox as we have described them, and the third attempts a synthesis of these findings. The three questions are : (l) Since much of the cross-sectional evidence has (30) An important recent work in this area is by Gurr, Grabovsky, and Hula (1977). These authors studied «common » crimes (offenses against persons and property combined) in four international cities and found a decreasing trend in this aggregate index until 1930 and an increase after Again, these results run counter to any expectations that offense rates should increase systematically with urban population growth. — 124 — depended on American data, is it generally true — in a comparative or cross-nation sense — that big cities have high homicide rates ? (2) Does comparative longitudinal evidence support the tentative indications that urban homicide rates do not necessarily increase as a city grows in population size over time ? And (3) can these two designs be combined in some way to provide a historical picture of the dynamic relationship between the homicide rates of large, growing cities and those of non-urban areas over time ? |. — City Rates and Other Rates (A Cross-Sectional Question) As shown by the logarithmic J-curve in Figure |1, there is no question that large U.S. cities have atypically high homicide rates. But in a heterogeneous society like the U. S., this finding could well be due to factors other then the size of cities per se — e.g., the homicide rate differences could easily be due to the social and economic differences between rural and large urban areas, etc. For this reason, a comparative researcher might well ask if the finding in Figure 1 can be replicated cross-nationally. The CCDF provides an opportunity to assess the replicability of this finding, although the test is somewhat indirect. In addition to aggregate data for entire nations, the CCDF includes offense data for 44 major international cittes — cities which are either the largest city or one of the largest cities in their societies. This feature of the CCDF data archive makes 1t possible to compare homicide rates in each of these major cities with the national homicide rate of the corresponding society. If these two rates differ, it will be a conservative test of the rela- tionship between city size and homicide rates for two reasons (1) the national homicide rate obviously includes the rate of the city and this artifact will diminish the observed difference between the two rates, and (2) the national homicide rate reflects both rural areas and other urban areas, in addition to the major international city itself. The effects of these two artifacts is conservative. Differences will only be observed if the homicide rate of the major city differs from the aggregate homicide rate for all national sectors combined — rural areas, small cities. other large cities, and the major international city itself. Since the CCDF generally contains data for only a single major city in a given country, however, it is not at present possible to test for the fine gradations of city size categories shown in Figure 1. The test will only contrast the homicide rates of very large cities and the aggregate rates of the corresponding nations. — 125 — lhis comparative, cross-sectional test is shown in table 2 (31). In order to smooth the effects of erratic annual fluctuations, the rates shown in Table 2 are in general the averages of the most recent five-year period in the CCDF : 1966-1970. TABLE 2 and National Rates Primate City Homicide Rates A Cross-Sectional Comparison (a). City Homicide Rate City Homicide Rate Lower than National Rate (n=6) | Higher than National Rate (n 18) sm Homicide rate (b) Homicide Rate Guyana (1966-70) 6.18 Australia (1966-70) 1.28 Georgetown 5.21 Sydney 1.57 2.23 t> Japan (1966-70) Austria (1966-70) 73 Tokvo 1.78 Vienna 89 Kenya (1964-68) 5.67 Belgium (1965-69) 29 Nairobi 5.27 Brussels 45 Panama (1966-70) 11.07 Finland (1966-70) 35 Panama City 4.96 Helsinki 65 6.09 Sri Lanka (1966-70) France (1966-70) 45 Colombo City 5.59 Paris 61 Turkey (1966-70) 9.65 India (1966-70) 2:72 Istanbul 4.84 Bombay 2.85 Ireland (1966-70) 34 Dublin 35 Mexico (1962, 66, 67, 72) 13.24 Mexico City 13.34 Amsterdam Netherlands (1966-70) 50 1.23 10 New Zealand (1966-70) 16 Wellington 2.32 }1 Northern Ireland (1964-68 c) .20 Belfast 35 12 Philippines (1966-70) 7.98 Manila 23.86 13 Rhodesia (1966-70) 5.33 Salisbury [4 7.20 Scotland (1966-70) 78 Glasgow 1.56 31 Although it is templing to try to make direct homic ide rate compa- risons across the international cities and across the nations sh oWwn in Table ? such comparisons are hazardous without a careful inspectio n of the CCDF from which these data are drawn. Although the same indica tor (e.g., offenses known) was used within each pair in Table 2, not all pai rs used the same indicator. In addition, national idiosyncracies in homicide classification and definition make cross-national comparisons of absolute h omicide rates far from uncomplicated. — 126 — 1S Spain (1964-68) 49 Madrid 56 16 Sudan (1961-64,68) 5.67 Khartoum 30.25 17 Trinidad & Tobago (66-70) 14.00 Port-of-Spain 31 18 United States (1966-70) 6.62 New York City 11.54 Median Country Rate 6.14 Median Country Rate 16 5.09 1.57 Median City Rate Median City Rate (a) Because of national idiosyncrasies in definition and reporting, the reader is cautioned against making direct cross-national comparisons of homicide rate levels. As explained in the text, this is not a problem for urban-national comparisons within the same society. (b) Source for all data is the 110-Nation Comparative Crime Rate File. Homicide rates are given in offenses per 100,000 population. In order to smooth the effect of annual fluctuations, the rates are the means of the years shown. The difference in rates between nations and cities is conservative for two reasons (1) the national rate includes the urban rate, and (2) the national rate also includes other urban areas (i. e the national rates aggre- gate both urban and rural areas). (c) The period 1966-70 also shows Belfast as having a higher homicide rate. This period was not used in this analysis, however. because Northern Ireland’s most recent political violence began in 1969. %% n Even though the CCDF contains crime data for 44 interna- tional cities, several of these cities could not be included in Table 2 for one of two reasons (1) one (or both) of the city and nation time series were not available in the CCDF for the period 1966-1970 ; or (2) even if both series were available for this period, the city reported a different homicide indicator than was available for the entire nation. However, appropriate city-nation comparisons could be made for 24 cases. In general, the cross-sectional analysis in Table 2 indicates that the homicide rates of primate cities exceed the rates of nations as a whole. This was true for 75 % (18 out of 24) of the pairs of cities and nations. As discussed earlier, it should be noted that the differences in Table 2 understate the actual differences between large city rates and non-urban rates — because the national rate actually includes the major city rate and the rates of other cities as well as the rates of non-urban areas. The exceptional cases are often provocative in comparative research, and it is interesting to speculate about the six exceptional cases in Table 2. Are these six cases qualitatively similar, and are — 127 — they in some way unlike the societies which constitute the majority pattern in Table 2 ? Although post hoc interpretations require more art than system, it does seem that the two types of outcomes in Table 2 might be related to national levels of « development », indus- trialization, etc. Five of the six exceptional cases are « pre-industrial » societies. Perhaps homicide rates in these societies are in some way qualitatively unique — e.g., kinship feuds, revenge killings, etc.… which might characterize rural areas more than the less traditional urban areas in these nations (32). However, even this explanation for the exceptional cases has an exception. Japan is the only heavily industrial nation in which the large city, Tokyo, has a lower homicide rate than the national average. Despite the presence of a clear majority pattern in Table ? 9 and also a not outrageous explanation for the exceptional cases, Japan stands out as an anomaly. Why is Tokyo, alone of the major cities in heavily industrial nations, characterized by a homicide rate below the national average ? Comparative research is both a search for cross-national generalizations and also a quest for unique cases, of course. and we intend to discuss this and other unusual cases in a later publication. With these exceptions, then, the comparative evidence in Table ? is iN rough agreement with cross-sectional evidence for the US. — in both cases, large cities have homicide rates higher than their national averages. Ît is also interesting that although all the cities in Table 2 are large cities, there is obviously great variation among the homicide rates of these cities-just as there is great variation am ong the rates of the nations themselves. This variance indicates that a bso- lute city size does not correspond in any direct way to the absolute magnitude of a city's homicide rate — i.e., cities of 500.000 people do not necessarily have a homicide rate of, say, 17 per 100.000 people. This suggests the intriguing possibility that large cities have homicide rates which are unusually high only in terms of the overall homicide rates of their societies. An international city, therefore, can have a homicide rate which is remarkably low (when compared to other large cities worldwide) but which is still a high rate for this specific society. This pattern can be illustrated using two of the cases in Table 2. Both Paris and New York City had over 7,000,000 (32) Alternate explanations are not difficult to find. In terms of the Durkheim-Wirth hypothesis discussed earlier, for example , it might be that major cities involve a weakening of kinship and communit y ties in developed societies but not in developing nations. Perhaps develo ping societies have lower rates of mobility, or perhaps people moving to societies move with intact families rather than alone. cities in developing Developed societies might also have greater controls over rural homicides law enforcement which reduces blood feuds, — E.g., decentralized marauding gangs, etc. — 128 — inhabitants for the period 1966-70. But as Table 2 indicates, these two cities have dramatically different homicide rates. In both cases, however, the homicide rate of the city is higher than the rate of the entire society. If this observation is well-founded, the relationship between city size and homicide rates is relative rather than absolute — 1e., there is no formula relating specific homicide rates to specific city sizes. Sociologists are unlikely, therefore, to identify a theoretical model which can predict an international city’s homicide rate purely from its population. On the basis of the evidence in Table 2, it seems much more promising to pursue theories which try to explain why the homicide rates of large cities appear to be anchored to — and yet higher then — the corresponding national rates. Other evidence for this « nation-anchored » hypothesis of urban homicide rates will be discussed below. 2. — Homicide Rates in Growing Cities (A Longitudinal Question) As discussed above, the historical half of the paradox has been the observation that a few specific cities — chiefly Buffalo and Bos- ton — have not experienced homicide rate increases as they have grown in size. Since the experience of a handful of cities could easily be idiosyncratic, it seems important to test the cross-national gene- ralizability of this observation as well. In order to provide a rough test of this longitudinal question for the international cities in the CCDF. a simple zero-order corre- lation was calculated between (1) the city’s population, and (2) the city>s homicide rate. Since almost all the cities increased continuously in population during this period (33), this correlation provides a crude index of the homicide trend during this period. À positive correlation indicates homicide rate increases during this period ; a Zero correlation indicates essentially no change ; and a negative correlation indicates homicide rate decreases. Some of the 44 international cities in the CCDF have data points which are too few in number or too scattered to permit calcu- lation of this trend. However, it is possible to produce 34 correlations, each one roughly analogous to the single-city studies of Buffalo and Boston discussed earlier. Since fewer than 100 years were available for these 34 cities, however, our analysis is not as deep as these previous case studies. This analysis is much broader, however, in that it examines 34 cities in 28 countries. The results of this analysis are shown in table 3. (33) Two of the very few cities to decline in population or show discontinuous growth are Belfast and Glasgow. — 129 — TABLE 3 Homicide Rates and Population Size for Primate Cities À Longi- tudinal Analysis (a). es ec Correlation Between Number of City CITY Population |Years in the! Significance and City Analysis Homicide Rate (b) —S rrr rrr mt New York (c) 98 001 Istanbul 88 19 001 Manila 79 23 001 Ouezon Citv (d) 64 090 Calcutta 51 16 044 New York (c) 47 12 121 Panama City 45 11 167 Salisbury (d) 41 22 058 Port-of-Spain 38 25 061 Johannesburg 33 10 360 Georgetown 27 18 273 Sydney 27 40 090 Ouezon City 26 11 437 Wellington 16 17 342 Colombo 15 74 198 Khartoum 13 13 683 Amsterdam 02 43 911 -.04 25 Port-of-Spain (d) 851 -.13 12 Mexico Citv 697 Dublin -.15 47 315 Brussels -.17 27 409 Oslo -.18 14 541 Salisbury -.21 22 361 Munich -.26 28 181 Vienna -.32 21 155 — 130 — Montevideo -.36 31 045 Glasgow -.38 72 001 Paris - 45 39 Nairobi -.50 21 022 Belfast -.54 52 001 Madrid -.57 16 021 Tokyo -.57 73 001 Helsinki -.58 43 001 p _— Bombay -.66 16 005 Median r -.01 Ë — —— (a) Source the 110-Nation Comparative Crime Data File. This ana- lysis tests for the presence of any linear relationship between changes in population size and changes in homicide rates for these primate cities. (b) Since most of these cities have grown consistently over time, the correlations are ecasilv interpreted. À positive correlation means that the city>s homicide rate has increased over time ; a zero r indicates no consistent change in homicide rate ; and a negative r means that the city>s homicide rate has decreased over time (c) New York City appears twice because a change in recording pro- cedures created two series one before 1966 and one after. (d) Indicates that a rate for « murder » was used for this city other rates are homicide rates. “te ns As Table 3 clearly indicates, there is no universal or general relationship between city growth and changes in absolute homicide rates. The correlations range from a low of — .66 (for Bombay) to a high of .98 (for New York City), and the 34 cases are evenly divided into 17 positive r’s and 17 negative r’s. This broad scatter is responsible for the fact that the median correlation in Table 3 is essentially zero (-.01). The inconsistency of these 34 longitudinal analyses suggests that there is no invariant tendency for the homicide rates of large cities to increase as these cities grow in size. Table 3 shows that homicide rates are just as likely to decrease with city growth as they are to increase. Even though the time periods reflected in Table 3 are shorter than the century-long studies of individual American cities cited earlier, several cities in Table 3 have data for more than 50 years. This variance in time periods can be used for a kind of data quality control procedure. If one limits the comparison to the four cities with 50 or more years of data, for example, the median correlation is still only -.46. Even for cities with a half-century or more of data, — 131 — therefore, there is still no strong evidence that homicide rates increase with city growth. It is possible, of course, that the near-zero median in Table 3 conceals some lawful differences among different types of societies. There might be two different outcomes of population growth. Thir- teen of the 34 correlations in Table 3 are, in fact, significant at the 05 level, and this considerably exceeds the 1.7 cities (five per cent of 34) one would expect to reach significance by chance alone. This does support the idea that Table 3 might reflect two radically different outcome patterns. Although the fit is not perfect, there does seem to be some typological order to the scatter of Table 3. Cities in « developing » nations seem to be over-represented among the positive correlations — 1e., major cities in developing nations may be more likely than other cities to experience increasing homicide rates as they grow. This purely speculative typology does not, of course. alter the general lack of a consistent pattern in Table 3. In passing, it is also interesting to speculate about the different conclusions which would have resulted from independent studies of single cities — i.e, without benefit of the CCDF. For example, a researcher examining 20th Century data for Tokyo would have conclu- ded that homicide rates declined with city growth ; a different resear- cher studying data for Amsterdam would have found no relation- ship between the variables of population growth and homicide rates : but a third researcher doing a case study of Manila would have found homicide rate increases with city growth and would have concluded that previous researchers were wrong. The unique strength of the CCDF for sociological research on homicide rates is that it can maximize a researcher’s view of the range of possible outcomes across several societies and also indicate whether an y general pattern occurs. In this case, the CCDF data in Table 3 demonstrates that city growth can have an extremely wide range of implications for homicide rates and that, in general, there is no evidence that cities and homicide rates grow together. Seven of the international cities in Table 3 have essen tially unin- terrupted homicide data for the entire period 1926-1970. These seven cities are Amsterdam, Belfast, Colombo City, Dublin, Glasgow, Hel- sinki, and Tokyo. The homicide rates of the Se seven cities can be reprensented, therefore, by a median rate for each year. This median rate reflects the same seven cities for each yea r in this period and the graph of this median rate over time therefore has a n interpretable slope. The median rate for these seven cities between is shown in Figure 2. 1926 and 1970 — 132 — ” Figure — . Trends in Primate City Homicide Rates, 1926-1970 (a) HOMICIDE MEDIAN RATE Figure 2 PER 100,000 20 — 1.5 Ë— 1.0 e e vn | | L r e | lllllllllllJlllllllllllllLllllllllllll'lllll 1926 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 YEAR (5) u (n ) t (n U (7) (n) (7) (N) (a) Source The 110-Nation Comparative Crime Data File. The cities in this trend line are Amsterdam, Belfast, Colombo city, Dublin, Glasgow, Helsinki, and Tokyo. These seven cities have essentially uninterrupted homicide data for this entire period. t st Just as Table 3 provided evidenœ that urban homicide rates do not in general increase with city growth, Figure 2 indicates that these seven international cities do not show any consistent increase in homicide rates over time. The slope of the graph in Figure 2 is essentially zero (-.006) — i.e., there is no evidence of progressively higher homicide rates over time. À city’s population growth, there- fore, does not appear to have any consistent implications for the citys homicide rate. This completes the generalizability test of the second half of the paradox. Based on an examination of the CCDF, it does seem to be generally true that both : (l) cross-sectionally, large cities appear to have homicide rates which are atypically high for their respective societies ; and also (2) longitudinally, there is no consistent tendency toward elevated homicide rates as a city grows in size. The third phase of our analysis attempts a modest resolution of this apparent paradox. — 133 — 3. — Urban and Non-Urban Rates Over Time The cross-sectional evidence in Table 2 shows that, at a given mo- ment in time, the homicide rates of large international cities generally exceed their national averages. Table 3 and Figure 2, on the other hand, both show that there is no general tendency for urban homicide rates to increase as cities grow. The paradoxical question remains, therefore, how did large cities acquire high homicide rates if not by growing to a certain population size ? We propose to answer this question by extending the time « win- dow» in Table 2 backwards in time. Specifically, we propose to use the historical depth of the CCDF to ask whether major international cities have always had homicide rates which are high relative to their societal averages. If urban homicide rates have always exceeded national rates — despite the tremendous changes in urban size over time — then the atypically high homicide rates must be attributed to certain urban characteristics rather than others. We have used the method of controlled comparison to provide this test of the historical relationship between urban and national rates. Because of missing data or incomparable indicators, only the period 1926-1970 could be included. For each of these years, the median homicide rate of the international cities can be compared to the median rate of the corresponding societies. This is a controlled comparison strategy since each national rate acts as a paired « control » for each urban rate — 1.e., a city is only included in the median for a given year if its corresponding national rate is also available for that year. This controlled comparison prevents any bias due to the partial entry (e. g., only for the median urban rate) of homicide data from a society with unusually high or low homicide rates. The historical relationship between the homicide rates of inter- national cities and the rates of entire nations is shown in Figure 3. The number of pairs (each pair consists of one city and one nation) in the analysis is indicated at five-year intervals. The most striking pattern in Figure 3 is that international cities have consistently had homicide rates higher than their national averages. The gap between the solid and broken lines in Figure 3 is a conservative index of urban-national differences. It IS COnser- vative, again, because the dotted line actually includes the rate of the solid line, and it also includes the rates of other large and small cities as well. The difference between the two lines in Fi gure 3 is perhaps particularly impressive because these international cities were much smaller — in terms of absolute populations — at the be ginning of this period than they are now. — 134 — Figure 3 : Primate City Homicide Rates and National Homicide Rates : ÀA Longitudinal Comparison (a). MEDIAN HOMICIDE . Figure 3 RATE PER 100,000 3.0 2.0 :/ﬁ \‘ t 100 | ; 1 1 0 | t 1 10 | } 1.5 > 1.0 / # :i’ p ‘vscocce? J « 1 O1 O l | RE sRZ E 220 à 1926 prdhisuntontsttonstosnstssrrhinriturii t nn | 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 (s) (7) {9) (8) (7) (12} " (18) (20) 1965 (22) 1970 (18) YEAR {N) (a) Source The 110-Nation Comparative Crime Data File. The solid line shows the median homicide rate of primate cities for each year ; the broken line shows the median rate of the corresponding nations. The number of pairs (each pair is one city and one nation) in the analysis is indicated at five-year intervals. QE The median homicide rates in Figure 3 show that the main finding of Table 2 (that primate cities have homicide rates anchored to, but higher than, their national averages for 1966-70) could be « replicated » for any period between 1926 and 1970. If anything, — 135 — Figure 3 shows that the effect of city size was even more pronounced earlier in this century than during the period (1966-70 (34). The consistent difference reflected in Figure 3 is our most impor- tant longitudinal finding. Although we do not have homicide data reaching back into the 18th and 19th Centuries, the consistently higher rates of the cities in Figure 3 encourage us to make the following extrapolation In general, large cities have always had homicide rates higher than their national averages, and this was true even when these cities were much smaller than they are today. Even in 1926, the first year in Figure 3, these international cities were still more « urban » than their societies as a whole. We are suggesting, therefore, that it is the relative size of « large » cities at any moment in time — rather than their absolute population in thousands — which is responsible for their consistently higher homicide rates. The high rates of urban areas, therefore, must be attributed to variables other than their absolute population size. There are, of course, many other urban characteristics which could elevate urban homicide rates. Even when these international cities were much smaller in absolute terms, for example, they were still characterized by many urban characteristics in-migration from rural areas, housing on a basis other than kinship, heterogeneity of population, stratification into rich and poor areas, etc. It is to these and other urban variables — variables which are not linked firmly to any specific city size — that we must look for an explanation of high urban homicide rates. Some combination of these urban characteristics apparently acts to inflate or exaggerate the general level of homicide in a society. Although urban rates are « anchored » near their national rates, therefore, they have consistently exceeded them — at least for the time period we have been able to examine. À final caveat should be mentioned concerning Figure 3. Because different data points in Figure 3 reflect a different combination of cases — depending on the availability of city and nation data in any given year — the slope of these lines is not meaningful. Since different cities and nations are included in different periods of the table, the lines cannot provide an indication of trends for either cities or nations over time. Our investigation of the paradoxical relationship between cities and homicide rates can be summarized as follows (1) Homicide rates and city size are strongly and monotonically related, for U. S. (34) A plausible interpretation for the narrowin g of this gap after 1960 is suggested by the exceptional cases in Table 2. After rou nations are increasingly represented in the CCDF, and ghly 1960, developing developing nations may not have the same relationshi Table 2 suggests that homicide as is found in developed nations. p between city size and — 136 — cities, by a « logarithmic J-curve » — with the interesting exception that rural homicide rates exceed the rates of small cities ; (2) This cross-sectional result is also true cross-nationally — the homicide rates of large cities exceed their national homicide rates between 1966 and 1970 : (3) However, longitudinal analysis shows that the homicide rates of international cities generally have not increased as these cities have grown in population over time ; and (4) The expla- nation for this apparent paradox is that homicide rates of international cities have consistently exceeded national homicide rates — even when these cities were much smaller in absolute size than they are now .The key to interpreting the paradox of urban homicide rates, we believe, is the observation that the rates of major international cities have consistently exceeded their national rates. The determinant af a city>s homicide rate therefore, is not the absolute size of the city, but its size relative to its contemporary society. Even small cities can have relatively high homicide rates, if at any moment in history they are «urban» by local national standards. With some exceptions, any city more urban than its national environment is likely to have a homicide rate which exceeds its national average. The relative nature of this relationship, we believe, is the answer to the paradoxical question of why large cities have high homicide rates which do not grow higher as the cities grow larger. The CCDF : An Agenda for Comparative Research and Theory. The two studies described above illustrate the potential contri- butions of the 110-nation Comparative Crime Data File, although they tap this potential only lightly to address two extremely concrete questions. The methodological study establishes, we believe, the appropriate- ness of using any of a range of indicators as estimates of trends in national homicide rates — i. e., it no longer seems necessary to restrict longitudinal homicide research to the « offenses known » indi- cator. This study also illustrates how various data quality control procedures can be incorporated in research designs, given a data archive as massive as the CCDF. The substantive study attempts to resolve the apparent paradox of urban homicide rates. Cross-national urban data from the CCDF show that large cities do have atypically high homicide rates, but also that there is no evidence that homicide rates increase as these cities grow in population over time. The explanation of this apparent contradiction between cross-sectional and longitudinal findings appears to be the relative population size, rather than the absolute size, of cities. Our analyisis shows that cities have consistently had atypically high homicide rates, even when these cities were only a fraction of — 137 — their current size. While it is true that cities have high homicide rates, therefore, these rates can only be attributed to urban charac- teristics other than population size. Ît is our long-term hope that the CCDF will contribute to the empirical foundations of a genuinely international understanding of homicide. We believe this massive data resource can assist realization of this goal in two ways. This archive can help researchers to discover those patterns which generalize across boundaries of nation states and time periods, and also to identify exceptional cases where spe- Cific national and urban characteristics outweigh or even reverse these general patterns. An extensive program of this kind of cross- national empirical research is clearly indispensable if we are ever to see a truly general theory of the social origins of homicide. 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VERKKO (V.), « Survey of current practice in criminal statistics », Transactions of the Westermarck Society, 1956, 3 : 5-33. WIRTH (L.), « Urbanism as a way of life», American journal of Sociology, 1940, 743-755. WOLFGANG (M.), « International crime statistics a proposal », Journal of Criminal law, Criminology and Police Science, 1967, 58 : 65-9, « Urban crime », IN Wilson (J.Q.) (ed.), The Metropolitan Enigma, Cambridge, 1968, 245-281. Mass, Harvard University Press, WOLFGANG (M.) and FERRACUTI (F.), The Subculture of Violence, New York, Tavistock, 1967. — 139 — I- HISTORICAL AND MACRO-SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES La violence en Amérique Latine JOSE M. RICO École de criminologie Université de Montréal Montréal, Québec, Canada Une conception très large de la violence est depuis quelque temps fort en vogue. Les expressions « violence juvénile et estudian- tine », « violence dans les rues », « violence institutionnalisée » font actuellement partie du vocabulaire de nombreux criminologues qui refusent de limiter leurs réflexions à l’étude des délits à contenu violent. Pour certains (35), la violence recouvre une réalité poly- morphe, ce qui rend primordial l’analyse des mobiles et interdit, sous risque d’en limiter arbitrairement l’interprétation, de la réduire systématiquement à des actes de droit commun. D’autres auteurs, par contre, se refusent à admettre une conception aussi large de la vio- lence. Ellenberger fait remarquer que le mot violence a acquis, ces der- nières années, une extension démesurée et constitue un exemple typique du phénomène que les linguistes appellent « une surcharge sémanti- que », c'est-à-dire une surabondance de significations engendrant la confusion (36). Il semble évident que la violence institutionalisée fait partie de la réalité latino-américaine. Elle est, par ailleurs, difficile à cerner dans toutes ses manifestations, dans toute son étendue. L’étude des délits à contenu violent semble, par contre, plus accessible bien que les informations disponibles sur certains de ces crimes (homicides, viols vols à main armée) soient beaucoup plus fiables que celles concernant d’autres infractions de la même nature (délits contre l’ordre public). Nous allons procéder à l’étude des manifestations de violence prévues et punies dans les codes pénaux ou dans les lois spéciales, en distinguant, pour fins d’analyse, la criminalité de violence enregistrée de celle qui, pour diverses raisons, ne l’est pas. (35) SELOSSE (J.), « Aspects statistiques de la criminalité de violence ». Etudes relatives à la recherche criminologique, La violence dans la société, Conseil de l’Europe, Strasbourg, vol. xI, p. 44. 36) ELLENBERGER (H.E.) « violence et dangerosité », Annales inter- nationales de criminologie, 1971. vol. 10, n° 2. p. 345. — 143 — 1. — La criminalité de violence enregistrée : Cette forme de violence ne se limite pas aux délits contre les personnes ; elle comprend également certains crimes contre les biens et contre les mœurs. Il s’agit essentiellement d’homicides et de blessures intentionnelles, d’agressions sexuelles, de vols qualifiés, d’incendies, de délits contre l’ordre public. La caractéristique commu- ne à tous les délits consiste dans le fait qu’ils frappent d’une manière particulièrement intense les « états forts de la conscience collective », ce qui se traduit généralement par des pénalités qui comptent parmi les plus sévères des codes pénaux (longues peines privatives de liberté, peine capitale). L’étude statistique des manifestations de violence se heurte à de sérieuses difficultés qui relèvent parfois de la nature des conduites considérées comme violentes et de leur modalité d’enregistrement. L’enregistrement quantitatif ne permet pas, à l’heure actuelle, une comparabilité suffisamment valide pour déboucher sur des généra- lisations. Les statistiques policières ou judiciaires traduisent en effet davantage la diversité des législations et des pratiques en matière pénale que l’enregistrement comparable de situations ou de conduites S sanctionnées uniformément d’un pays à l’autre, ce qui nuit a leur confrontation dans une perspective régionale ou internationale. Des difficultés de confrontation existent même dans des pays possédant une culture ou une organisation sociale assez proche. On sait, par ailleurs, que plus on s’éloigne de la criminalité réelle plus l’interprétation du phénomène a des chances d’être défor- mée. De là l’importance de rechercher, dans la mesure du possible, une information basée sur l'enregistrement de la violence apparente, c’est-à-dire sur les statistiques policières. Même à ce niveau, les données statistiques doivent être interprétées avec prudence car plu- sieurs facteurs sont susceptibles de modifier sensiblement l’enregistre- ment statistique des manifestations de violence. L’étude de la crimina- lité en général et de la violence en particulier basée sur les statistiques policières ou judiciaires ne permettent, en somme, de saisir ces phénomènes que d’une façon indirecte, au travers des filtres intitution- nels reflétant une certaine réaction sociale organisée. Ces réserves concernant les différences d’enregistrement et la qua- lification des conduites de violence étant faites, il serait souhaitable de calculer, en Amérique latine, quelques taux pour des catégories regroupant des types de manifestations de violence qui présentent entre elles certaines analogies, de façon à dégager des indications sur le sens et l’évolution de ces conduites violentes. L’analyse des taux pour 100 000 habitants de criminalité violente en Argentine, Colombie, Mexique. Panama et Venezuela, établis d’après les statistiques policières, judiciaires ou pénitentiaires, permet — 144 — de constater, en ce qui concerne l’évolution entre 1967 et 1971 des délits à contenu violent propres à chacun de ces pays — des variations légères des taux d’homicide dans l’ensemble des pays examinés, avec une baisse en Argentine et au Mexique ; des oscillations en ce qui concerne les coups et blessures, sauf l’Argentine, qui enregistre, ici encore, une baisse ; les violences sexuelles sont relativement stables, avec toutefois une tendance à la baisse en Argentine et au Panama ; une progression de vols qualifiés en Argentine, Colombie et Vene- zuela et des oscillations au Mexique et au Panama ; une certaine stabilité des délits contre l’ordre public, plus sensible en Colombie qu’en Argentine, où semble se manifester une légère tendance à la baisse. Si l’on compare maintenant, à titre d’essai, les taux de criminalité violente dans quelques pays latino-américains pour l’année 1971 (tableau 1), on peut observer, compte tenu du niveau de réalité représenté dans les différentes sortes de statistiques et de la déper- dition que suppose le passage d’un niveau à l’autre TABLEAU 1 Comparaison des taux pour 100 000 habitants des principaux délits de violence dans quelques pays latino-américains, 1971 (37). Infractions Ë Panama Argentine Colombie Venezuela Homicide 2,8 25,1 11,9 32,7 = v Coups et blessures 11,0 140,7 37,1 135,6 ——h — e Délits sexuels viol 1,0 16,0 8,1 57,1 1,1 Vols qualifiés 10,1 130,9 25,7 194,7 2,3 —— Dommages 0,2 12,1 5,0 1,5 — Ordre public 1,9 (37) Sources Argentine (sentences condamnatoires), Colombie et Panama (délits connus par la police), Mexique (accusés devant les tribunaux e première instance), Venezuela (détenus condamnés dans les établissements pénitentiaires). — 145— un taux d'homicide plus élevé en Colombie et au Panama qu’au Mexique, le Venezuela et surtout l’Argentine ; l’homicide est un problème social très important au Mexique, car il représentait, pour l’année 1971, une des principales causes de mortalité, après les maladies infectieuses et celles des appareils respiratoire et circulatoire (38); en Colombie, le nombre d’assassinats a sensi- blement diminué avec la réduction des actes de banditisme découlant de la vague de violence commencée en 1948 : une plus grande proportion de coups et blessures en Colombie et au Panama qu’au Mexique, en Argentine et au Venezuela ; les délits sexuels violents sont particulièrement importants au Panama ; on assiste, par ailleurs, dans les grandes villes véné- zuéliennes, à des fréquents viols collectifs commis, généralement, sous l’influence de l’alcool ou des narcotiques, par des jeunes appartenant aux couches élevées de la population et ayant souvent pour motif la vengeance à l’endroit de bandes rivales (39) : le Panama et la Colombie viennent en tête au chapitre des vols qualifiés ; ces délits, en raison de leur très forte hausse, du caractère de plus en plus dangereux qu’ils représentent pour la sécurité publique et de l’augmentation sans cesse grandis- sante des montants volés, se trouvent au premier plan de l’actualité en Colombie ; certains auteurs constatent une recrudescence de ce type d’infractions au Venezuela, où les auteurs d’attaques à main armée dans les banques et autres établissements com- merciaux n’hésitent pas à utiliser leurs armes et même à prendre des otages en vue de garantir leur fuite (40) ; les délits à contenu violent les plus fréquents en Argentine et en Colombie sont, dans l’ordre, les coups et blessures, les vols qualifiés, les homicides et les infractions sexuelles, alors qu’au Brésil et au Venezuela les homicides occupent la première place, suivis des vols qualifiés, des voies de faits et des délits sexuels, qu’au Mexique les délits les plus courants sont les coups et blessures, les homicides et les crimes sexuels et qu’au Panama prédominent les vols qualifiés, les coups et blessures et les délits sexuels violents. (38) D’après Quiroz Cuaron (A.) et Quiroz Cuaron (R.) El costo social del delito en Mexico, présenté au deuxième Symposium International de Criminologie Comparée, Montréal, avril-mai 1970, l’homicide était la troi- sième cause de mortalité, après la bronchite aiguë et la tuberc ulose, pour la période 1952-1966 (p. 80). (39) Garcia Iturbe (A.) La delincuencia y el delincuente, Caracas, Monte Avila Editores, 1972, p. 138-139. (40) Quiroz Cuaron (A.) Asaltos a bancos en Vene México, Morales hermanos. 1964. zuela y America, — 146 — Il convient de rappeler, avant de procéder à des interprétations hâtives des chiffres contenus dans les publications officielles, que les écarts les entre les et plus importants statistiques policières judiciaires ont, en général, lieu pour les coups et blessures et les infractions sexuelles. L’incrimination policière diffère sensiblement, en ce qui concerne ce genre de conduites agressives, de la qualification juridique qui peut leur être appliquée. C’est ainsi qu’en Argentine, la police a inculpé en 1971 devant les tribunaux du pays sous le chef d’homicide volontaire 2 978 personnes, soit un taux de 12,5 alors que le taux de personnes ayant subi une sentence condamnatoire n’est, pour la même année, que de 2,8 pour 100 000 habitants. Ces constatations, dont nous avons souligné la valeur limitée, pouraient néanmoins servir à la construction d’un shéme d’analyse et à l’élaboration d’hypothèses de travail dans ce secteur spécifique de la criminalité. Le tableau suivant donne, pour l’année 1971, le pourcentage des principales formes de criminalité violente par rapport à l’ensemble des délits commis dans quelques pays latino-américains TABLEAU 2 Pourcentage des principaux délits de violence par rapport à l’ensemble de la criminalité dans quelques pays latino-américains, 1971. INFRACTIONS â Ë â Ë Panama | Venezuela | Homicide . . . » ». … e © + e » » — » © % % ® # © 3,6 16,3 4,1 10,0 1,6 e — © Coups et blessures . . …. …. »% .. 13,6 7,9 22,7 31,2 6,6 @ Délits sexuels viol * . . …. « — 6 à — « # ® 1,2 1,9 2,5 6,8 2,8 @ Vols qualifiés s … …. … . .. . 68 ° ® ® # % ® 12,4 9,1 21,1 21,6 9,5 > L’analyse de ces chiffres montre la proportion considérable d’homi- cides au Venezuela (un tiers de l’ensemble des crimes) et des blessures intentionnelles au Mexique et en Colombie. Les vols qualifiés représen- tent un cinquième de la criminalité totale dans ces deux derniers pays. La proportion des délits sexuels violents est, par contre, relative- ment peu importante. Les statistiques policières ou judiciaires des pays latino-américains étudiés ne permettent pas d’analyser l’influence du milieu urbain ou — 147 — rural sur les diverses manifestations de violence. Elles donnent, par contre, des indications sur les régions où ces délits surviennent le plus souvent. En Argentine, par exemple, les délits de sang ont toujours été des formes de criminalité caractéristiques de l’intérieur du pays. Diverses raisons pourraient expliquer ce fait la tradition criolla, qui considère la lâcheté et le vol ordinaire comme les mani- festations les plus grandes du déshonneur ; la persistance de la coutume de porter des armes blanches (couteau, machette), souvent instruments indispensables pour le travail; l’abus de boissons alcoolisées (un pourcentage considérable des délits de sang survenus dans les Zzones rurales sont commis en état d’ivresse) ; le faible niveau d’instruction du paysan moyen. En Colombie, les départements de Valle, Antioquia et Santander, ainsi que la région métropolitaine de Bogota offrent les taux les plus élevés, en ce qui concerne l’ensemble des délits à caractère violent. La région de Bogota vient en premier lieu lorsqu’il s’agit de viols, coups et blessures et vols qualifiés ; le département d’Antioquia occupe la première place en matière d’incendies criminels et d'homicides. Au Mexique, les zones les plus criminogènes, au point de vue de l’ensemble de la criminalité violente, sont le district fédéral et les Etats de Mexico, Veracruz, Jalisco et Tamaulipas. Ce sont cepen- dant les Etats de Veracruz et Michoacan qui enregistrent le plus d’homicides, alors que les vols sont également très fréquents dans les Etats de Baja California et Sonora et que ceux de Chihuahua et Puebla présentent des taux considérables de viols. Au Venezuela finalement, seuls les homicides et les coups et blessures sont plus fréquents dans les zones rurales que dans les régions urbaines, où se commettent la plupart des viols et des vols qualifiés. En particulier, la région des Andes, et surtout l'Etat de Tachira, possède non seulement le plus haut taux d’homicides au Venezuela mais également un des plus élevés dans le monde. En Colombie, les principaux mobiles des homicides et des blessures sont la vengeance, les rixes imprévues, la passion et les problèmes familiaux. Ces délits sont commis par des armes à feu et tranchantes. L’ivresse semble être, surtout pendant les jours fériés, la cause des délits de blessures. Au Venezuela, on constate la présence d’alcool dans 27,5 % des homicides, dans 10 % des auteurs de coups et blessures et dans 20 % des personnes déclarées coupables de viol et de vol qualifié. Par ailleurs, des symptômes d’ivresse dans l’auteur et dans la victime étaient constatés dans 15 % des cas d’homicide. Ce délit semble être pour certains auteurs un moyen de régler des vieilles rivalités et haines personnelles ou de dénouer des questions passionnelles ainsi qu’une forme typique de réaction mascu- line devant une offense. 2. — La violence non enregistrée statistiquement. L’étude de la violence ne doit pas se limiter à l’analyse des délits à contenu violent. Surtout en Amérique latine, où la violence semble — 148 — être le dénominateur commun, sa raison d’être, « l’unique moyen qu’a l'homme de conserver non seulement la vie mais la dignité » (41). Plus accentuée en apparence au cours des deux dernières décades, elle n’a cependant rien de surprenant, car elle est le résultat de siècles d’histoire. La violence est un problème sociopolitique, qu’il convient d’étu- dier dans son contexte social, politique et culturel. Le Pouvoir, ou ses représentants, ont tendance à la faire sortir de ce contexte global, à la présenter de façon isolée, à la considérer comme la principale cause de la décadence de la civilisation occidentale et chrétienne, comme le démon destructeur du bien-être social, de la paix, de la justice, de l’égalité entre les hommes. On va, à la rigueur, invoquer des arguments scientifiques pour justifier cette approche : l’existence de multiples variables difficiles à identifier et qui rendent, de ce fait, son étude particulièrement ardue. La « vieille politique », selon l’expression de Julio Barreiro (42), s’appuie par ailleurs sur la violence, sur la terreur organisée, sur la tyrannie pour subsister. Elle utilise, dans cette fin, des mythes tels la démocratie libérale ou le parlementarisme, qui, en raison des conditions de vie existant dans les pays latino- américains depuis la conquête et la colonisation jusqu’à nos jours, n’ont jamais pu être appliqués et se sert de concepts politiques propres à la culture européenne, nord-américaine et, plus récemment, soviétique et chinoise. Les valeurs autochtones semblent, par contre, être oubliées ou sont présentées timidement. La preuve la plus frappante de l’échec politique des castes gouvernantes qui dominent encore l’Amérique latine est l’institutionnalisation de la violence dans une forme tellement parfaite que les forces armées sont obligées, par des actions coordonnées, d’assurer l’« ordre » dans tous les pays latino- américains. En Amérique latine, écrivait Helder Camara (43), la première des violences, dont émanent toutes les autres formes de violence, c’est l’injustice. « La violence, ajoutait-il, est partout, omniprésente et multiforme brutale, ouverte, subtile, insidieuse, rationalisée, scientifique. condensée, solidifiée, consolidée, anonyme, abstraite, irres- ponsable » (44). Josué de Castro déclarait également « Moi, qui ai reçu un prix international de la paix, je pense qu’il n’y a malheu- (41) DORFFMAN (A., Imaginacion y literatura en América Latina, Santiago, Editorial Universitaria, 1970. (42) BARREIRO (J.), Violencia y politica en América Latina, Mexico, Siglo XXI, 1971. (43) CAMARA (H.), Espiral de violenca, Salamenca, Ed. Sigueme, 1970. (44) CAMARA (H.), « À violéncia-unica opcao ?», Paz e Terra, avril 1968. n° 7. Rio de Janeiro. — 149 — reusement pas d’autre solution que la violence pour l’Amérique latine » (45), Dans ce continent, la violence présente des caractéristiques propres. Il y a — c’est encore Camara qui parle — trois espèces de violence celle des pays développés, celle des pays sous-développés et celle finalement qu’exercent les premiers sur les seconds. L’ana- lyse de ces diverses formes de violence est indispensable pour compren- dre ce phénomène et essayer de lui trouver des solutions. La dépen- dance des pays sous-développés vis-à-vis des pays plus riches va jusqu’à imiter et importer les formes de violence des premiers. C’est ainsi que le problème des bandes de jeunes et de l’usage des drogues, phénomènes typiquement nord-américains, commence à se manifester de façon inquiétante dans la plupart des pays latino-américains les plus avancés du point de vue économique. L’histoire de l’Amérique latine n’est qu’une suite d’injustices, de pillages, d’exploitation, qui persistent de nos jours, grâce notamment à la violence institutionnalisée (46). En Amérique latine, on ne peut pas ignorer la violence que Julio Barreiro qualifie « d’invisible, silen- cieuse, passive » (47) celle du Nord-Est brésilien, des populations indigènes de l’Altiplano, des mineurs de l’étain et du cuivre, des travailleurs de la canne à sucre, la banane ou le tabac, des multi- tudes condamnées à l’ignorance et à la misère. En Amérique Latine, on ne peut pas se limiter à l’étude de la violence individuelle, car celle-ci n’est que la résultante de siècles de frustration et de colère retenues, qui se traduisent régulièrement en assassinats, pillages, occu- pations de terres, actes de terrorisme et de subversion. En Amérique Latine, la violence semble inévitable et se trouve, par ailleurs, renforcée par la violence institutionnalisée. La majorité des pays latino-amé- ricains se caractérise par des formes illégales d’autorité, qui se main- tiennent au pouvoir grâce à l’emprisonnement illégal, à la violation des droits humains, à la torture, au meurtre. C’est notamment le cas de l’Argentine, du Brésil, de la Bolivie, du Chili, du Paraguay, de la plupart des pays de l’Amérique Centrale. Si la violence se définit par rapport à la légalité, il faudrait établir ce que l’on entend par ce terme en Amérique Latine. Si nous essayons de répondre aux questions « qu’est-ce qu’un crime ? » ou « qui est criminel ? », nous constatons qu’en Amérique latine ceux qui sont coupables de meurtres, de tortures, de détentions illégales ne sont pas considérés par la justice comme criminels. Encore une fois, l’étude sociopolitique et mo- rale du phénomène de la violence s’impose. De la violence institu- tionnalisée, de la contre-violence, qui découle souvent de la première. (45) Cité par GALEANO (E.), Las venas abiertas de América Latina, Mexico, Siglo XXI, 1971, p.7. (46) Voir GALEANO (E.), op. cit. p. 17 s. (47) BARREIRO (I.), Ideologias y cambios sociales, Montevidéo, Alfa, 1966, p. 124. — 150 — À. La violence institutionnalisée : La Vviolence institutionnalisée est le corollaire de la violence structurelle. Celle-ci est la violence de l’organisation du commerce et de la production, du contrôle des marchés et de la technologie par les grands monopoles. Mais alors qu’il y a encore dans cette forme de violence des facteurs irrationnels, la violence institutionnalisée est le résultat d’un processus rationnel, où interviennent des juristes, des politiciens, des moralistes, des éducateurs, des commerçants, des militaires, des hommes d’Eglise, des philosophes. « La violence institutionnalisée est celle qui organise les forces de répression dans le monde entier, de façon systématique et avec le même genre d’appareil technique et militaire. Elle explique la conversion des armées nationales, dans toute l’Amérique La- tine en véritables armées d’occupation de leurs propres pays. Elle explique le « pentagonisme » ; la militarisation de l’édu- cation ; le perfectionnement des systèmes de délation et d’espion- nage ; le réseau de contrôle des activités individuelles à une échelle planétaire, dans une trame complexe véritablement kafkaïenne ; l’uniformité des corps policiers ; la course aux armements qui, d’un autre côté, rapporte des dividendes économiques fabuleux : enfin. elle explique que la culture soit une activité subversive » (48). La répression généralisée, le génocide, la pratique de tortures de toutes sortes par divers organismes officiels et les mauvais traite- ments dans les établissements de détention constituent des exemples très évidents de cette violence institutionnalisée. 1. La répression. En Amérique latine, l’armée a été traditionnellement utilisée davantage pour des tâches de répression que pour faire face à des menaces extérieures. A moins de soutenir la thèse voulant que l’augmentation des forces armées et autres représentants de la loi et de l’ordre pour conséquence de faire diminuer le nombre de violations à la légalité, les interventions militaires en Amérique Latine ne sauraient pas être considérées comme des facteurs susceptibles de réduire les tensions sociales qui caractérisent de façon presque endémique les pays qui composent ce continent. Il serait plus logique d’affirmer que les solutions de type militaire entraînent une hausse de l’agressivité des individus et des groupes qui ne sont les victimes et partant, un accroissement quantitatif et qualitatif des conflits sociaux. Voici quelques exemples de la répression généralisée en Amérique latine. (48) BARREIRO (J.), op. cit. p. 110. — 151 — En Argentine, la répression institutionnalisée a été exercée de différentes façons et dans plusieurs secteurs. Sous les régimes des présidents Ongania et Lanusse, une censure particulièrement sévère fut instaurée sur les livres, le cinéma et le théâtre, les arts plastiques et surtout les media. Les formules que le gouvernement trouva pour appliquer cette censure allaient de la distribution arbitraire des 10umaux (par exemple, les journaux « intellectuels » étaient envoyés massive- ment dans les kiosques des quartiers ouvriers) à la suppression de toute forme de subvention de l’Etat, en passant par le recours à la calomnie, aux intimidations par voie téléphonique ou postale terroriste voire à l’agression En matière d’éducation, on a pu constater, pendant la dernière décade l’infiltration systématique de policiers parmi les adminis- trateurs, le personnel enseignant et les élèves d’écoles et universités la présence de délateurs et confidents ; la persécution et expulsions fré- quentes de professeurs et d’élèves pour des raisons idéologiques et politiques l’interdiction des associations d’étudiants l’intervention dans plusieurs universités (49) Dans le domaine législatif, la création d’un tribunal fédéral en matière pénale, en 1971, avait pour objet d’enlever aux juridic- tions ordinaires prévues dans la Constitution la responsabilité de juger les personnes de plus en plus nombreuses accusées d’activités « subversives» par le pouvoir exécutif. En juin 1972, cette cour spéciale avait traité 3 392 causes et prononcé des peines allant de dix années à l’emprisonnement à vie. Depuis 1960, de nombreuses lois répressives ont été promulguées en Argentine répression du terrorisme (1960), répression des activités communistes (1966), création de conseils de guerre, expulsion d’étrangers indésirables (1969), appli- cation de la peine de mort aux délits politiques (1970), emploi des forces armées dans la prévention et la répression des activités sub versives pendant l’état de siège, détenus de « dangerosité maximum » etc. (54). La répression s’est egalement exercée dans les rues des principales villes argentines, notamment à l’occasion des manifestations. Rappe- lons à cet égard les assauts répétés contre les Universités nationales les charges contre les étudiants et ouvriers à Cordoba, Corrientes Rosario, Catamarca, Mendoza et Buenos Aires. Pendant l’année 1976 le nombre date du dernier coup d’Etat militaire en Argentine d’exécutions d’opposants a été de plus de 1 500 (49) Foro de Buenos Aires por la vigencia de los derechos humanos, Proceso a la explotacion y a la represion en la Argentina, Buenos Aires, Pedro Belluscio e hijos, 1973, p. 97 et s. Voir aussi GEZE (F.) et LABROUSSE (A.), Argentine : révolution et contre-révolutions, Paris, Seuil, 1975. (50) Pour un répertoire plus complet sur cette législation, voir FORO 125 — 152 — Au Brésil, le dossier concernant la répression comprend, parmi d’autres, une série de faits, dûment attestés d’ailleurs, comme les emprisonnements arbitraires, les gardes à vue prolongées, le retard mis à déférer un inculpé devant le tribunal, l’absence de jugement, la mascarade de certaines procédures, la sévérité de certains verdicts. Des témoignages dont la bonne foi ne peut être mise en doute font état de sévices, de brutalités, de tortures, d’exécutions sommaires, dont les polices se rendent coupables avec l’assentiment tacite du gouvernement. Celui-ci ne semble nullement disposé à transiger avec la « subversion » ; il a singulièrement restreint ou réglementé l’exercice de certaines libertés traditionnellement considérées comme liées à la démocratie. Cette réglementation, d’abord codifiée dans plusieurs « Actes institutionnels », dont le premier a été promulgué le 9 avril 1964, fut reprise et systématisée dans la Constitution du 24 janvier 1967 et nettement renforcée dans celle du 17 octobre 1969. Le gouver- nement brésilien a également édicté des « législations secrètes » ; ainsi, en vertu du décret n° 69.534 publié dans le Diario oficial da Uniao du 17 novembre 1971, le Président de la République peut porter des décrets « secrets » ou « réservés » visant la sécurité nationale (51). Ces restrictions affectent également les organisations syndicales, estu- diantines, ecclésiastiques, de promotion sociale, dont les activités sont étroitement surveillées. Pour des motifs politiques, des centaines d’enseignants universitaires ont perdu leur charge. En 1968, à la suite de violentes émeutes estudiantines déclenchées pour protester contre l’asservissement du Brésil aux intérêts américains, qui réussirent à déborder les forces de l’ordre et révélèrent au régime son peu de popularité, les partis politiques furent interdits, les « ligues paysannes » dissoutes, des centaines de Brésiliens éminents frappés d’incapacité civique, l’Union nationale des étudiants fermée, les militaires nommés progressivement aux Vvéritables postes de commande (52). Les moyens de communication sociale (radio, télévision, presse) sont aussi l’objet d’un strict contrôle. Par ailleurs, la vie politique du pays est pratiquement paralysée ; elle est soumise à des règles très rigides qui limitent étroitement le jeu normal de la critique, de l’opposition et le contrôle de l’exécutif. Le parlement continue à siéger, mais c’est plus pour sauver la fiction d’un régime représentatif que pour permettre le débat entre voix discordantes. En somme, la prévention de la subversion violente et la lutte contre cette dernière sont des impératifs absolus sur lesquels le gouvernement brésilien n’est aucunement disposé à badiner. Des communiqués récents de l’agence Reuter soulignaient, en février 1975, la multiplication de ($1) SCHOOVANS (M.), Destin du Brésil, Belgique, Duculot, 1973 p. 16-20 et, en particulier, la note 6 de la page 18. (52) JULIA (F.. Brasil, antes y después, Mexico, Editorial Nuestro Tiempo, 1968, — 153 — prisonniers politiques « disparus » mystérieusement. Il s’agit notam- ment de journalistes, d’étudiants et de syndicalistes. Le gouvernement a affirmé publiquement ne pas savoir ce qu’ils sont devenus. Parmi eux, figurent d’anciens parlementaires, des dirigeants syndicaux et des leaders étudiants. Tous les nouveaux disparus ont été arrêtés par des officiers se prétendant membres des forces de sécurité chargés de la lutte contre la subversion, rapportent leurs familles (53). Le Chili, qui était considéré avant le putsch de septembre 1973 comme un des rares pays de l’Amérique Latine possédant une longue tradition démocratique, n’échappe pas à la liste noire des Etats dont l’histoire a été clairsemée de répressions et de massacres. Citons, parmi d’autres exemples, l’horrible massacre d’ouvriers du salpêtre, leurs femmes et leurs enfants à l’école Santa Maria de Iquique, le 21 décembre 1907, où plus de 2000 personnes furent tuées par des rafales de mitrailleuses et plusieurs centaines fusillées à terre ou sur des navires, leurs cadavres étant transportés dans des chariots à ordures et enterrés dans des fosses communes ; celui qui, le 5 juin 1925, coûta la vie à des centaines d’ouvriers au bureau du salpêtre La Coruna (Tarapaca) et pendant lequel les forces armées inventèrent le système de palomeo de rotos (chaque ouvrier devait creuser sa tombe et se placer devant celle-ci avant qu’un officier ne l’abatte) (54) ; celui finalement dé- coulant du putsch militaire du 11 septembre 1973 amplement connu (55). En Uruguay, le président Pacheco Areco décrétait en juin 1968, des mesures exceptionnelles de sécurité pour faire face à une vague sans précédent de violences estudiantines. En vertu de ces dispositions, certaines garanties constitutionnelles étaient suspendues, permettant ainsi l’emprisonnement de nombreux leaders syndicaux et la suspension de plusieurs journaux. L’état de siège, levé temporairement en mars 1969, fut décrété de nouveau en juin de cette année, en raison d’une grève de plus de deux mois des ouvriers des usines de conservation de la viande et surtout de la reprise de l’agitation exercée par les Tupamaros, dont les chefs demeuraient insaisissables. Il y a actuelle- ment en Uruguay un prisonnier politique par 500 habitants, ce qui en fait le champion en Amérique. Au Venezuela, la violence illégale exercée par l’Etat possède aussi une longue histoire. La période de dictature de Gomez en fut une d’intense terreur, pendant laquelle la tâche principale des autorités (53) DOS SANTOS (Th.), Brasil : origenes y perspectivas dè una crisis, Buenos Aires, Ediciones, Universitarias, 1972. (54) Ces renseignements ont été pris dans MANNS (P.), Las grandes masacres, Santiago, Quimantu, Coleccion Nosotros los chilenos, 1972 n° 20. qui contient de nombreux exemples de massacres commis au Chili. (55) Chili : le dossier noir, Paris, Galliard, 1974. — 154 — était la défense du régime. De la même façon, la période du règne de Pérez Jimenez fut une étape où la violation des droits de l’homme et de la légalité furent à l’ordre du jour ; sous ce régime policier, le pouvoir dont jouissaient les forces de police connues sous le nom de Seguridad nacional transforma ce corps en un puissant instru- ment de répression qui ne répondait plus au rôle d’auxiliaire de la justice que, d’après la loi, il devait remplir. La section appelée « brigade politico-sociale » était chargée de la persécution des adversaires poli- tiques du gouvernement, qui pouvait aller jusqu’à l’élimination physi- que des opposants au régime considérés comme dangereux. Plus de 300 personnes ont été supprimées par cet organisme, dont les activités dépassaient parfois les frontières nationales. Un militaire qui avait abandonné le service en raison de son désaccord avec les méthodes utilisées par le gouvernement, fut assassiné en territoire colombien par des membres de la brigade politico-sociale. Le meurtrier fut arrêté et inculpé. Dans ses déclarations devant les tribunaux vénézué- liens, 1l indiqua les noms de hauts personnages de la dictature, y compris le président Pérez Jiménez lui-même, qui fut officiellement inculpé pour sa participation dans cet événement (56). La chute de la dictature, survenue en janvier 1958, ne parvint pas à régler la situation politique et sociale du pays. Les manifestations devinrent très nombreuses et la répression qui les suivit s’effectua avec des méthodes primitives. Plusieurs morts et d’innombrables blessés furent le résultat d’affrontements entre les manifestants et les forces de l’ordre. Les manifestations de masse furent alors inter- dites, même si elles avaient un but pacifique. La répression entraîna également de nombreuses détentions, souvent illégales et accompagnées de tortures et vexations. En 1970, malgré la disparition des guérillas, la répression continue à l’échelle nationale. Pendant le gouvernement du leader social-démocrate Rafael Caldera, on compte le plus grand nombre d’étudiants morts à l’occasion de manifestations durement réprimées par la police militarisée. Actuellement, sous la présidence du chef de l’Action démocratique, Carlos Andrés Pérez, les opérations de la police contre la population continuent (57). Des exemples de répression existent également au Mexique. Un des plus connus est la fusillade qui éclata dans la soirée du 2 octobre 1968 à la place des Trois cultures, située dans un centre résidentiel (56) BUROZ ARISMENDI (R.), La violencia en Venezuela, rapport présenté au XII1© cours international de criminologie, Maracaibo, Venezuela, 28 juillet-3 août 1974. (57) ARREAGA CAMERO (E.E.) et MARQUEZ FERNANDEZ (A., Literatura de la violencia en Venezuela, rapport présenté au xxuiir° Cours international de criminologie, Maracaibo. Venezuela, 1974, p. 13. — 155 — habité en majorité par la petite bourgeoisie administrative (Tlatalolco), à l’occasion d’une manifestation réunissant quelque 4 000 personnes, en grande partie des étudiants. Cette échauffourée, dans laquelle sont intervenus environ 10 000 soldats, fut une des plus sanglantes d’une série qui s’étendit sur une période de trois mois. Cet épisode, connu comme la Nuit triste de Tlatalolco, causa entre 50 et 300 morts (selon les sources) et 600 « disparus » du côté étudiant et une dizaine de morts et plus d’une centaine de blessés du côté militaire. L’Amérique centrale et insulaire n’échappe pas, elle non plus, à cette vague de répression. Au Guatemala, par exemple, un prêtre catholique expulsé du pays, le père Thomas Melville, rapportait en janvier 1968 dans le National catholic Reporter que, dans une période d’un peu plus d’un an, les groupes terroristes de la droite avaient assassiné plus de 2 800 intellectuels, étudiants, dirigeants syndicaux et paysans, coupables d’avoir essayé de « combattre les maladies de la société guatémaltèque ». Selon un rapport récent d’Amnistie Inter- nationale, plus de 20 000 personnes ont été tuées ou ont disparu dans des conditions mystérieuses au Guatémala depuis 1966. 2. Le génocide. En un certain sens, poser la question du génocide c'est poser la question de notre civilisation, de ses fondements, de ses prétentions, de sa validité, Le massacre généralisé et intentionnel de certains peuples ou de certaines races constitue malheureusement une constante culturelle de cette civilisation. L’Amérique Latine semble avoir été un terrain de prédilection pour la pratique du génocide de races, de peuples entiers. L’empire des Incas comptait, par exemple, au moment de l’arrivée des Espagnols, environ 42 millions d’habitants et s’étendait du Sud de la Colombie jusqu’au Nord du Chili. Un siècle plus tard, à peine trois ou quatre millions d’individus restaient encore en vie dans ce vaste territoire. Le même phénomène de disparition de peuples entiers a lieu, à cette époque, dans d’autres zones du continent latino-américain. Plus près de nous, lorsque le Chili décida en 1881 la « pacifica- tion » des zones occupées par les Indiens Araucans en utilisant ses armes, le nombre d’indigènes fut réduit de un million à trois cent mille individus livrés aux nouveaux propriétaires des terres spoliées. Toujours au Chili, un autre massacre collectif eut comme victime l’ensemble des races habitant la Terre de Feu (Onas, Alacalurfes, Yaganes), exterminées par des mercenaires engagées par les estancieros de la Patagonie et de la Terre de Feu, qui convoitaient ces prairies pour y organiser leurs fortunes et leur pouvoir politique ; ces merce- naires étaient payés en fonction du nombre d’oreilles ou de têtes — 156 — coupées d’Indiens (58). Finalement, des témoignages et des documents très récents indiquent comment s’est déclenché au Chili, en octobre 1973, un véritable génocide des Mapuches, en particulier dans les régions côtières du Cautin et vers la Cordillère, où furent massacrés des centaines d'hommes, de femmes et d’enfants de cette race ; il n’existe pas de chiffres exacts, mais on estime à plus d’un millier les indigènes qui ont payé de leur vie leur adhésion aux partis de l’Unité populaire d’Allende et du M.R.C. (Movimiento Campesino Revolucio- nario), mouvement particulièrement fort dans ces régions (59). Au Brésil, les massacres d’Indiens remontent au xvi° siècle. Leurs auteurs, les bandeirantes d’abord, les garimpeiros et les serin- gueiros ensuite, tous les aventuriers du diamant ou du caoutchouc, qui remontaient l’'Amazone et ses affluents ou qui s’enfonçaient à l'intérieur du Mato Grosso n'ayant à la bouche qu’un seul mot « descendre des Indiens » (60). Au cours des dix dernières années, il a été question au Brésil de génocides d’Indiens, de liquidations de peuplades entières, de mitraillages par avion, d’épidémies provo- quées par des présents de linge volontairement infectés de bacilles, de cadeaux d’aliments empoisonnés, de bonbons à l’arsenic donnés aux enfants, de tortures. de réduction à l’esclavage des survivants, de perversions sexuelles, de prostitution des femmes indiennes, de vols de terres, de promesses arrachées par l’alcool ou par la force, en somme d'à peu près tous les crimes prévus par le Code pénal brésilien. Tout cela est souvent arrivé avec la complicité du Service de Protec- tion des Indiens. Ces informations proviennent d’un rapport de plus de vinet volumes, préparé par une commission d’enquête parlementaire sur la gestion de ce Service de Protection des Indiens et les abus commis contre ceux-ci ; le rapport, remis au Président de la République en 1967, ne fut jamais publié mais la presse a pu en donner des larges extraits, qui établissent l’existence de ces massacres collectifs et nomment souvent les auteurs de ces crimes. À cette commission parlementaire succéda une commission ad hoc nommée par le ministre de l’Intérieur, qui avait pour mandat d’étudier les responsabilités des fonctionnaires brésiliens dans ces crimes et de proposer des sanctions administratives, civiles ou pénales. Cette commission remit son rapport en août 1968 ; publié dans le Journal officiel du 10 septembre 1968, il cite des nombreux cas de mauvais traitements, de viols, d’emprisonnements arbitraires et privés, de sévices, de tortures (58) Patricio MANNS, p. 6. (59) Chili le dossier noir, p 116-117 et CERDA (C.), Génocide au Chili, Paris, Maspero, 1974. 60) BODARD (L.). Le massacre des Indiens, Paris, Gallimard (Collec- tion J’ai lu, n° D36). 1969 p. 91 ; voir également JAULIN (R.) Le livre blanc de l’ethnocide en Amérique, Paris, Fayard 1972 et LEPARGNEUR (F,, L’avenir des Indiens du Brésil, Paris, Cerf, 1975. — 157 — et même de réduction en esclavage d’indigènes. Quant aux sanctions proposées contre les personnes impliquées dans ces crimes — parmi les- quelles on comptait des généraux, des colonels, de nombreux officiers supérieurs ainsi que d’anciens ministres et gouverneurs de provinces — elles ont consisté essentiellement dans des mesures administratives ; aucun des crimes prouvés par les deux commissions ne semble avoir fait l’objet de mises en accusation judiciaire ou abouti à des condamnations (61). L’anéantissement des Indiens brésiliens ‘ est, de toute évidence, protégé par un appareil politico-économique puissant et occulte les enquêteurs des commissions ont été soumis à de nombreuses menaces de mort et, tout récemment, un étrange hasard a fait que les anciennes archives du Service de Protection des Indiens ont brûlé dans un mystérieux incendie à Brasilia. En Colombie, l’armée et la police se sont rendues récemment coupables de persécutions, tortures et morts dont ont été victimes les Indiens « guahibos ». Certains témoignages font par ailleurs état de la mort violente de 16 Indiens Cuibas, tués collectivement en janvier 1968, près de la frontière vénézuélienne, ainsi que de la destruction de villages et de l’expulsion des indigènes par des colons furieux de la création de coopératives indiennes (62). Au XxIx° siècle, s’était développé au Pérou un système d’échange avec les Blancs, en vertu duquel des objets d’usage courant étaient troqués par les commerçants contre des jeunes hommes, des femmes et des enfants, qui étaient réduits à l’esclavage. Vers 1910, les métho- des d’exploitation de la compagnie anglaise Peruvian Amazon Co Ltd., ont fait diminuer de plusieurs dizaines de milliers de personnes la population indigène de cette région. Au début du xx° siècle, les Indiens de la zone comprise entre le Putumayo et le Caqueta ont failli disparaître lorsque les employés de la maison Arana péru- vienne les ont traités comme des bêtes, les arrachant à leurs familles, les vendant comme des esclaves, les torturant, les exterminant. Quant aux Shipibos, tribu vivant sur les rives du haut Ucayali, en Amazonie péruvienne, ils ont été depuis longtemps pourchassés par les trafi- quants de caoutchouc qui, après avoir surpris ces Indiens dans leur habitation, tuaient les femmes et les enfants et déportaient les hommes valides dans la forêt pour un travail forcé quelconque (63). (61) De l’ethnocide. Recueil de textes, Paris, Union générale d’éditions (col. 10-18, n° 711), 1972, p. 41 ; en ce qui concerne le Brésil, voir CARDOSO DE OLIVEIRA (R.). À sociologica do Brasil indigena, Rio de Janeiro, Tempo Brasileiro 1972 ct RIBEIRO (D.), Fronteras indigenas de la civilizacion, México, Siglo XXI, 1971. (62) De l’ethnocide, p. 99, Voir également FRIEDE (J.) et al., Indigenis- mo y aniquilamiento de Indigénas en Colombia, Bogota, Universidad Nacional de Columbia, Faculdad de Ciencias Humanas, Departamento de Autropologia 1975. (63) De l’ethnocide, p. 141 et 180. — 158 — Finalement, d’autres formes d’ethnocide ont été la conséquence soit du choc culturel entre peuples (propagation de maladies inconnues et infectieuses), soit de l’exploitation économique et politique des pays occupés (forte mortalité infantile découlant d’une pauvre assis- tance sanitaire, refus du droit de vote aux indigènes). 3. La torture. Bien que la torture soit un moyen que l’on rencontre à toutes les époques de l’histoire des civilisations (64), elle a surtout été employée par les puissances politiques. De nos jours, la torture est devenue dans de nombreux pays plus c’est surtout le crime des qu’un crime essentiellement politique puissants et, encore davantage, un procédé de gouvernement. Elle a une dimension éminemment politique ; la torture « n’est pas autre chose que la forme la plus directe, la plus immédiate de la domination de l’'homme sur l’homme, ce qui est l’essence même du politique » (65). La criminologie ne peut pas ignorer délibérément une telle forme de criminalité qui est, pour diverses raisons, plus dangereuse que la criminalité ordinaire. En premier lieu, les personnes qui la pratiquent ainsi que les organismes qui l’encouragent ont bonne conscience ; ils sont tous prêts à atteindre les dernières limites de l’horreur car la grandeur de leur cause justifie à leurs yeux l’emploi de n’importe quel moyen ; les sentiments d’humanité ne sont plus pour eux que des faiblesses coupables. En second lieu, cette forme de criminalité est très souvent le fait de groupements plus ou moins vastes, contrairement à celle de droit commun qui est généralement l’apanage d’individus isolés. Certes, les difficultés pour une étude scientifique de la torture restent grandes. La notion de crime politique en est une éminemment relative action coupable si elle échoue, glo- rieuse si elle réussit ; condamnée par les uns, encouragée par les autres. Des études dans ce secteur nous amèneraient, par ailleurs, à sortir du cadre des infractions définies et sanctionnées par la loi posi- tive et à incriminer la violation de règles de pure morale ou de prin- cipes généraux du droit des gens. Comment pourra-t-on étudier pra- tiquement les agissements criminels des personnes au pouvoir ? Cepen- dant, la criminologie a ici au moins un double terrain de recherche : les motivations et la personnalité des chefs ou des exécutants, d’une part, les mécanismes qui peuvent conduire un Etat à devenir tortionnaire d’autre part. En ce qui concerne le premier champ d’investigation, certains travaux montrent que le sadisme, l’instinct de puissance, (64) MELLOR (A.), La torture, Tours, Mame, 1961. (65) VIDAL-NAQUET (P.), La torture dans la République, Paris, Ed. de Minuit 1972. p. 13. — 159 — le désir de vengeance se retrouvent ici plus souvent qu’on n’ima- gine ; pour ce que est du second champ, on peut penser à une certaine conception de l’évolution sociale, aux réflexes de conservation d’une société menacée dans son existence par une dissidence (66). La torture est donc devenue un phénomène de plus en plus répandu dans le monde entier ; elle est utilisée non seulement comme méthode policière pour obtenir des renseignements mais aussi comme méthode de gouvernement pour juguler toute opposition. Le fait de torturer des citoyens, quel que soit leur sexe, âge ou état de santé pour garder le pouvoir politique est encouragé par certains gouverne- ments et toléré par d’autres. Les pays où l’information disponible risque d’être la plus limitée sont précisément ceux qui ne respectent pas les droits de l’'homme en général, ni en particulier les garanties contre la torture. Par ailleurs, dans la plupart de ces pays, seules les personnes riches ou célèbres, ayant une certaine instruction, sont en mesure d’attirer l’attention sur leur sort quand elles sont emprisonnées ou victimes d’une injustice ; 1l se peut aussi que dans certaines régions du monde peu sensibilisées aux problèmes des droits de l’homme, les victimes de vexations ou de tortures n’imaginent pas que leur sort puisse soulever l’indignation publique. En Amérique Latine, on peut affirmer que les brutalités policières et les conditions de détention très dures sont depuis longtemps une caractéristique traditionnelle et largement répandue de la structure sociale. Ainsi, lorsque les paysans sont arrêtés par la police locale, ils s’attendent toujours à être battus. Il existe toutefois une différence très nette entre la brutalité traditionnelle, qui a des racines historiques et la torture systématique, qui s’est répandue dans de nombreux pays latino-américains au cours de la dernière décennie. Et cependant, les constitutions d’Amérique latine contiennent de nombreuses garanties contre l’utilisation de la torture. Elles condam- nent, en général, les traitements cruels ou dégradants et déclarent, même très spécifiquement, que la torture est illégale. Des garanties identiques sont offertes, au moins théoriquement, par les chartes des organisations internationales, comme l’Organisation des Etats Amé- ricains. Ceci n’a pas empêché que presque chaque pays a récemment fait l’expérience soit d’un gouvernement militaire inconstitutionnel, soit d’un état de siège ou d’'un état d’urgence. D’autres gouver- nements, comme celui de Cuba, ne tolèrent aucune opposition politique. Finalement. les pays qui revendiquent le titre de démocratie consti- (66) Voir l’excellent article de VERIN (J.) « Torture et prise d’otages », dans la Revue de science criminelle et de droit pénal comparé, 1973, n° 1 p. 175-180. — 160 — tutionnelle disposent de forces de sécurité spécialement entraînées pour combattre la « subversion organisée » (67). Lorsque l’on parle d’«institutionnalisation » des méthodes de torture, on fait souvent allusion à l’Amérique latine. L’éventail des accusations va de témoignages selon lesquels des spécialistes brésiliens et américains assistent à des séances de torture dans certains pays (Bolivie, Paraguay, Uruguay et, plus récemment, Chili) à l’affir- mation de l’existence d’écoles de torture au Brésil, en passant par des déclarations prétendant que du matériel de torture est directement importé de l’étranger. Il a été fréquemment rapporté que les Etats- Unis ont financé et organisé, dans leur base de Panama, des sessions d’entraînement à la lutte anti-subversive pour les forces de police latino-américaines. On sait également que, malgré les dénonciations faites, preuves à l’appui, par un grand nombre d’organisations inter- américaines et par des membres du Congrès des Etats-Unis, le gouver- nement de ce pays n’a jamais publiquement condamné l’utilisation de la torture au Brésil ni en Uruguay. Dans la mesure où les Etats- Unis financent et équipent la police et les armées des gouvernements qui préconisent ou utilisent la torture, on peut affirmer qu’ils portent une part de responsabilité dans la pratique de ces méthodes. Malgré l’impossibilité de vérifier en détail toutes les accusations de torture et encore plus de déterminer le nombre exact de cas où des procédés vexatoires ou brutaux ont été employés, il reste néan- moins que le dossier noir de la torture en Amérique latine est parti- culièrement lourd. Des renseignements sur les méthodes de torture ont été recueillis par des organismes internationaux tel le Conseil œcuménique des Eglises, la Commission internationale des juristes, la Commission Justice et Paix, l’Organisation des Etats Américains, ainsi que par des institutions nationales, juristes, médecins, psychiatress membres du clergé et, assez souvent, la presse. D’après ces sources, la torture a été utilisée en Argentine depuis de nombreuses années, mais il semble que son usage systématique ait rapidement augmenté au cours de la dernière décennie ; ici > comme dans d’autres pays, on peut considérer que la vaste campagne déclen- chée contre les divers mouvements de guérilla en est la cause fonda- mentale, bien que la torture ait été aussi employée contre les pri- sonniers politiques et de droit commun de tous genres en vue de leur arracher des aveux (68). En Bolivie, depuis l’arrivée au pouvoir du géné- (67) AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Rapport sur la torture, Paris, Gallimard, 1974, p. 197-226. Les considérations qui précèdent comme celles qui suivent s’inspirent largement de cet important rapport. (68) Ceci résulte de l’examen de plus de 86 dossiers dûment vérifiés, dans Foro…. p 159-208. — 161 — ral Hugo Banzer en 1971, une campagne systématique de terreur a été déclenchée contre les opposants de gauche et particulièrement les communistes ; on estime à 20 000 le nombre de prisonniers poli- tiques qui, à un moment ou à un autre, ont été détenus depuis le coup d’Etat alors que 5 000 personnes ont été contraintes à l’exil. Bien que la torture ait été généralement utilisée en Bolivie dans le but d’obtenir des informations et des aveux, certains prisonniers ont parfois été battus à mort dans une intention d’élimination de toute opposition politique. Au Brésil, Amnesty International a reçu, après le coup d’Etat de 1964, qui porta au pouvoir le régime actuel, d’innombrables rapports sur la torture de prisonniers politiques. La torture est très répandue dans ce pays et elle constitue une pratique administrative ; 1l semble qu’on l’utilise dans la plupart des interro- gatoires, même contre des personnes détenues pour une courte période ou bien ramassées dans des « rafles» et retenues pour vérification d’identité. La systématisation de la torture reflète sans doute la volonté des autorités brésiliennes d’étouffer ce qu’elles considèrent comme une menace constante de la «subversion » internationale et interne. En Colombie, pays soumis à l’état de siège durant la majeure partie des vingt dernières années, à la suite d’une guerre civile d’une violence sans précédent, commencée en 1948 et terminée une quinzaine d'années plus tard, pendant laquelle on estime à 200 000 le nombre de victimes, des pouvoirs spéciaux ont été donnés aux forces de sécurité pour combattre la « subversion ». Dans ce pays, les accusations de torture ont été de deux sortes brutalités de la police locale et des D.A.S. (Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad) ruraux contre les paysans, tortures systématiques dans les techniques d’interrogatoire utilisées par le D.A.S. sur les prisonniers politiques supposés être des guérilleros, en vue de leur extorquer des renseignements et des confessions. Au Chili, bien que des accu- sations de torture aient été portées sous les régimes Frei et Allende, c’est après le 11 septembre 1973 que les méthodes de torture ont pris une ampleur démesurée ; on a constaté qu’on a fait venir des spécialistes étrangers (surtout des policiers brésiliens) pour en- seigner leurs « méthodes d’interrogatoires » ; ils ont été reconnus par des prisonniers du stade national. Les investigations d’Amnesty Inter- national ont permis de réunir des preuves nombreuses et continuelles de disparitions, de morts et de faits de torture, que nous avons déjà mentionnés. À Cuba, la Commission inter-américaine des droits de l’homme a publié deux rapports sur la situation des prisonniers politiques et de leurs familles ; dans ces rapports, il existe un très grand nombre d’accusations de tortures physiques et psychologiques, d’exécutions et de simulacres d’exécution de prisonniers et de condi- tions de détention inhumaines. La plupart de ces accusations ont trait au début des années 60, la situation s’étant apparemment améliorée depuis 1968. Pendant de nombreuses années, le trait caractéristique — 162 — de la vie politique du Guatemala a été le grand nombre de dispa- ritions de citoyens du pays. Des cadavres sont régulièrement découverts au bord des routes, dans des ravins profonds ou près des volcans. On affirme que les corps sont transportés par hélicoptère et jetés dans la mer ou dans le cratère des volcans, mais qu’ils manquent parfois la cible ; on rapporte invariablement qu’ils montrent des traces de torture et de mutilations survenues avant la mort. On sait depuis longtemps que la torture est une pratique courante à Haïti, mais comme il n’existe ni procédure judiciaire, ni presse libre, ni visites aux détenus par les familles ou les avocats, on ne dispose que de peu de détails. On sait également que le taux de mortalité est très élevé dans les prisons haïtiennes, en raison des mauvais traitements et des conditions de détention. La torture est pratiquée en vue de déceler tout signe d’opposition politique et pour dissuader toute velléité d’opposition active, ainsi que pour satisfaire des désirs de vengeance. En Honduras, les mauvais traitements sont monnaie courante après l’arrestation. Comme on l’a déjà vu lors des massacres de 1968 et 1970 dans les rues de la capitale, le Mexique possède une longue tradition d’extrême violence politique et sociale en même temps que d’intense brutalité policière. La presse mexicaine a publié des rapports sur l’utilisation de la torture pendant les interrogatoires officiels ainsi que sur la détention de sympathisants de groupes de gauche par des groupes paramilitaires qui les ont soumis à des tortures sévères dans un but d’intimidation. Au Nicaragua, la famille Somoza s’est main- tenue au pouvoir depuis environ 45 ans par la violence et la terreur, y compris l’utilisation de la torture contre les prisonniers politiques. Au Paraguay, qui est pratiquement en état de siège depuis 1954, renouvelé tous les 90 jours, la torture semble un moyen habituel pour extorquer des aveux et très souvent de l’argent aux prisonniers ainsi que pour malmener, sous prétexte d’appartenance au parti communiste, les rivaux dont on veut se débarrasser. Elle est pratiquée en présence des plus hauts responsables de la police. Des témoignages recueillis mentionnent des décès de personnes qui n’avaient pas été officiellement arrêtées et dont les cadavres, ligotés et portant des traces de torture, sont jetés dans les fleuves Paraguay et Parana. Au Perou, les brutalités policières pendant les interrogatoires de prisonniers politiques et de droit commun sont une pratique courante depuis de nombreuses années. En République Dominicaine, les droits de l’homme les plus élémentaires sont constamment violés. Après l’invasion de guérilleros en février 1973, on estime que 1500 personnes ont été détenues et un grand nombre d’entre elles maintenues au secret pendant de longues périodes et torturées. En 1970, on considère qu’il y eut un décès ou une « disparition » toutes les 36 heures et dans la prison nationale, la brutalité pure et simple est d’une pratique courante. Au Salvador, il semble que les brutalités, et les mauvais traitements soient plus fréquents que les méthodes de torture systématiques et raffi- — 163 — nées. En Uruguay, la torture a été de plus en plus utilisée pour tenter d’enrayer le mouvement de guérilla Tupamaro ; elle semble maintenant être de pratique courante après l’arrestation de tout homme soupçonné d’appartenir aux Tupamaros ou de sympathiser avec eux et a pour objectif d’extorquer des aveux et de faire révéler aux détenus les noms des autres membres de ce mouvement. Au Venezuela, un grand nombre d’opposants politiques ont disparu dans des circonstances trou- blantes. Par ailleurs, les fréquentes accusations de torture ont provoqué une enquête officielle du Congrès (69). Les méthodes de torture utilisées sont assez nombreuses c’est ainsi qu’en Argentine, selon la seule documentation reçue par Amnes- ty International, au moins soixante-treize méthodes différentes de torture ont été dénombrées au cours des dix dernières années. Les plus courantes sont cependant l’électrochoc (picana) appliqué sur diverses parties du corps ; les coups de toutes sortes, et, en particulier, celui appelé « le téléphone » et qui consiste à frapper la victime par derrière sur les deux oreilles ; l’immersion jusqu’à la suffocation dans l’eau ; les vexations de caractère sexuel ; les viols, les simulacres d'exécution ; les menaces. Le Brésil s’est fait tristement connaître par la méthode dite pau de arara ou perchoir du perroquet, selon laquelle la personne torturée, après avoir eu les pieds et les mains liées, les bras entourant les jambes, est suspendue d’une barre qu’on introduit dans l’espace situé entre les genoux et les avant-bras ; cette méthode se base sur l’arrêt de la circulation sanguine et sur la contraction musculaire et nerveuse qui la suit ; elle ne laisse pas de traces et ne = tue pas, mais les douleurs qu’éprouvent les personnes soumises a ce traitement sont atroces. Très souvent les prisonniers sont contraints à assister aux séances de torture de membres de leur famille ou de leurs amis. Au Nicaragua, certains témoignages font état de prisonniers enfermés dans des cages très près d’autres cages renfermant des fauves dans le palais présidentiel. Selon le cas, la torture peut durer des minutes, des heures, des jours, des semaines entières ; en général, elle est interrompue à la limite de la résistance physique des torturés, qui sont ranimés entre chaque séance. Les séquelles physiques et psychiques de la torture sont mulitiples, ses conséquences secondaires, imprévisibles. Les plus communes sont les changements d’attitude mentaux, intellectuels, physiques et affectifs. La détention prolongée produit des dépressions, des angoisses, des crises violentes. Sont également fréquentes les déficiences cardiaques, la rigidité musculaire, les difficultés de certains mouvements. Les coups sont la cause d’importantes lésions organiques internes qui affectent les appareils auditif, digestif et moteur. 197 _(69) RANCEL (J.V.), Expediente negro, Caracas, Editorial Fuentes, — 164 — Qui torture en Amérique Latine ? Presque toutes les sections de la police, les forces armées, les forces spéciales de sécurité, de nombreux groupes paramilitaires qui semblent bénéficier de la complicité du gouvernement (70). On a également cité la complicité de nombreux médecins au cours d’interrogatoires. En général, les gouvernements latino-américains nient l’existence de la torture, bien que dans certains cas les réactions gouvernementales aient été nettement plus équivoques lorsque des ministres ont été mis en présence d’avocats et de journalistes correctement informés. De nos jours, il existe peu de moyens efficaces d’empêcher la torture qui, dans les pays latino-américains, sert essentiellement à tenir en main les opposants politiques. 4. Les mauvais traitements dans les prisons. La violence dans les prisons et établissements de détention peut être considérée comme une partie du problème plus général de la torture. Encore ici, il s’agit de la violence institutionnalisée qui viole et nie l’ordre juridique, sur lequel elle s’appuie d’ailleurs. Les mauvais traitements donnés en général aux détenus dans la plupart des prisons d’Amérique Latine constituent une manifestation de plus de la vocation éminemment répressive de certains régimes politiques. Plusieurs documents et témoignages font état des mauvaises conditions de vie qui prévalent dans les prisons argentines (71), mexi- “ caines (72), et vénézuéliennes (73). Elles ont trait a l’exiguïté des = cellules, a leurs conditions hygiéniques, à la promiscuité ou, au contraire, à l’incommunication de divers détenus, aux prohibitions souvent arbitraires imposées à ceux-ci, aux régimes “spéciaux” appli- qués à certains détenus considérés comme de dangerosité maximum, aux fréquentes perquisitions, aux innombrables violations du droit de la défense, aux coups, vexations et tortures de toutes sortes, à la répression terrible qui suit la moindre mutinerie. (70) Parmi ces groupes, les plus connus sont l’Escadron de la mort brésilien, lc triple A argentin et la Mano guatémaltèque. (71) FORO.. p. 89-95 ; PERRONE (E.), Preso comun, Buenos Aires, Ediciones de la Flor, 1973; Maxima peligrosidad, Buenos Aires, Editorial Candela. (72) REVUELTAS (J.), El apando, México Ediciones Era 1969, VIVEROS Anatomia de una prision, México, Editorial Diana, 1972. (73) ALDANA (J.), Retén. de Catia, 62 éd., Caracas, Editorial Fuentès, 1972 ; En ce qui concerne le Pérou, voir VALCARCEL (G.), La prision, Lima, Fondo (J.S.). de Cultura Popular, 1964. — 165 — B. La violence politico-sociale : À côté de la violence institutionnalisée, que nous venons de décrire, il existe une autre sorte de violence, de plus en plus répandue, qui trouve en général ses origines dans l’insatisfaction à l’égard des conditions sociales, économiques et politiques nationales ou inter- nationales. Elle donne parfois lieu à des manifestations pacifiques mais aussi à des révoltes, rebellions, destruction, pillages, homicides, enlèvements, vols. Une de ses formes les plus graves est le terrorisme. Toutes ces manifestations de violence ont ceci de particulier qu’elles affectent non seulement les organismes et les personnes à combattre mais aussi l’ensemble de la collectivité. Ces formes de violence, qui n’apparaissent pas dans les statis- tiques officielles et dont les motivations sont en général d’ordre socio-poltique, provoquent souvent des manifestations de sympathie voire d’appui de la part de la population. En Amérique Latine, les motifs les plus couramment invoqués pour donner une certaine justi- fication aux nombreux attentats et actes de terrorisme qui augmentent sans cesse depuis plusieurs années, sont le désir d’indépendance et la lutte contre un système qui perpétue des inégalités sociales inac- ceptables. La violence politico-sociale, comme la violence institutionnalisée, peut être analysée en fonction des groupes de protestation qui l’en- gendrent. On peut parler, selon cette optique, de violence ouvrière ou estudiantine. En Argentine. par exemple, des groupes armés appartenant à divers courants syndicaux d’opinion ont proliféré à l’intérieur de la puissante C.G.T. (Confédération Générale du Tra- vail), qui comprend la presque totalité des organisations profession- nelles du pays, et ont donné lieu à des affrontements particulièrement violents ; au cours des dernières années, la violence de type syndical s’est manifestée en Argentine par des occupations d’usines, dommages à la propriété résultant d’'actes de sabotage ou de terrorisme, enlève- ments et assassinats de dirigeants, etc. Par ailleurs, la plupart des pays latino-américains sont confrontés à des mouvements violents provenant des milieux étudiants, généra- lement universitaires. Plusieurs circonstances contribuent à l’impor- tance de ce foyer de violence : le nombre considérable de la population universitaire (la faculté de droit de l’Université nationale de Buenos Aires compte, à elle seule, plus de 35000 élèves), l’autonomie et l’immunité dont jouissent les universités et qui favorisent la création de centres idéologiques de toutes sortes, le caractère particulièrement sensible, surtout en matière politique, de la jeunesse universitaire latino-américaine. La violence estudiantine se manifeste, à l’intérieur des universités, par des actes de résistance aux autorités, l’occupation des salles de cours, l’expulsion de professeurs pour des raisons poli- tiques, l’exigence de nouveaux programmes d’études : en dehors — 166 — du campus universitaire, par des manifestations publiques, qui très souvent dégénèrent en des affrontements avec les forces de l’ordre, par la participation des jeunes aux activités de guérilla et de terrorisme. Il est cependant plus aisé d’étudier la violence politico-sociale en tenant compte des actes qui la caractérisent. Il convient, à cet égard, d’analyser successivement les assassinats politiques, les actes de terrorisme et les détournements d’aéronefs. 1. Les assassinats politiques. L’usage de la violence et de l’assassinat pour obtenir le pouvoir a été pendant des siècles une des caractéristiques de la vie politique de nombreux pays. Jusqu’à une époque relativement récente, les études sur ces phénomènes ont été l’œuvre de moralistes, historiens ou journalistes. Une approche plus globale et plus scientifique, où les assassinats des hommes d’Etat auraient été mis en corrélation avec l’ensemble des facteurs sociaux, politiques et économiques du pays étudié, était pratiquement inexistante. Parmi les recherches appartenant à cette dernière catégorie, 1l convient de mentionner deux études effectuées dans le cadre des travaux de la Commission américaine sur les causes et la prévention de la violence et publiées en 1969 (74). Une équipe dirigée par Carl Leiden a étudié les tentatives d’assassinats, réussies ou non, dans 88 pays au cours de cinquante années (1918-1968) ; une autre équipe dirigée par Ivo Feierabend, a recueilli des données sur les faits reliés aux assassinats ou complots d’assassinats dans 84 pays pendant une période de vingt années (1948-1967). Même si elles diffèrent sensiblement en ce qui concerne les types de personnes que l’ont fait entrer dans la catégorie des victimes, ces deux études montrent que les assassinats politiques tendent à se produire plus souvent dans des pays soumis à des formes graves de désordres civils (révolutions, coups d’Etat, guérillas, etc.), alors que la corrélation est moindre lorsque les troubles politiques revêtent une importance moindre. D’après l’étude de Leiden, le Mexique vient largement en tête en ce qui a trait au nombre d’assassinats réussis ; la comparaison avec les données de Feierabend est une preuve évidente que la presque totalité de ces actes sont survenus pendant une période particulièrement trouble de l’histoire mexicaine celle comprise entre 1910 et 1930. Cuba, Nicaragua, Argentine, Bolivie, la République Dominicaine et Guatemala présentent également un (74) Assassination and Political Violence, À Staff Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, prepared by Kirkham J.F., Levy S. and Crotty W.J. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, october 1969. vol. 8. — 167 — nombre considérable d’attentats politiques. Les pays les plus épargnés étaient, durant cette période, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Equateur, Paraguay et Uruguay. Les assassinats politiques sont probablement plus fréquents dans l’histoire de l’Amérique Latine que dans celle d’autres pays. Ceci apparaît nettement dans les recherches citées, d’après lesquelles 21 à 31 % (selon les études) des assassinats perpétrés dans les pays analysés l’ont été dans ce continent. Dans une étude réalisée en 1967, Manzanilla Sanchez signale 82 cas de “magnicides” commis en Amérique Latine depuis 1806. Ils se répartissent de la façon suivante (75) : Magnicides commis en Amérique Latine, 1806-1967 Argentine . » « e + # * e Equateur * . e « « » « » 6 e Paraguay « » e . * © © — à Bolivie 10 Guatemala Pérou Brésil Haïti . « …. « « »s © 6 #% © à à Rép. Dominic. . . .% Chili e . « — « . « . — . » # Honduras Salvador Œl Colombie Mexique Uruguay Costa Rica . . » 6 « — « Venezuela . © » « * e » e Nicaragua Cuba » e . © « « © * « « @ — Panama D’après ces données, c’est la Bolivie qui enregistre le nombre le plus élevé de présidents ou chefs d’Etat assassinés (10), suivie du Mexique (8), de l’Argentine et de la République du Salvador (6 cas chacune), de la Colombie, le Guatemala, le Nicaragua, le Pérou et l’Uruguay (S cas par pays). La période historique qui a connu la plus grande fréquence d’assassinats de cette catégorie a été, selon la recherche de Manza- nilla Sanchez, celle de 1860-1879 (25 %, des magnicides), suivie de celle des années 1900-1919 (18 % des cas) et des périodes allant de 1920 à 1939 et de 1940 à 1959 (environ 12 % de cas chacune). Entre 1960 et 1967, l’Amérique Latine n’a enregistré que deux cas de magnicide. Ces données peuvent être complétées et actualisées par celles de Feierabend, qui répartit les assassinats de chefs d’Etat latino- américains commis entre 1919 et 1968 de la façon suivante Guate- mala (3), Mexique (2), Bolivie (1), Nicaragua (1), Panama (1), Pérou (1), République Dominicaine (1) et Venezuela (1). Il y a donc eu en Amé- (75) MANZANILLA SANCHEZ (A.,) El magnicidio en Mexico, sans mention de maison d’édition, México D.F., 1967, p. 89-91. — 168 — rique Latine 11 assassinats politiques de chefs d’Etat pendant cette période de 50 ans, sur un total de 39 commis dans le monde (dont 11 dans les pays du Moyen-Orient ; 7 en Europe orientale et méri- dionale ; 6 en Europe septentrionale, Etats-Unis et Afrique du Sud : et 4 en Extrème-Orient). Ainsi, environ un tiers de tous les assassinats de chefs d’Etat ont eu lieu en Amérique latine (76). Les assassinats politiques ont fait l’objet de toutes sortes de classifications. On peut, en effet, distinguer les actes commis par une élite politique en vue d’en remplacer une autre. tout en concervant substantiellement le système ou l’idéologie que l’on essaie de remplacer (c’est à ce modèle qu’appartiendraient les nombreux coups d'Etat latino-américains) de ceux qui ont pour but d’instaurer une nouvelle idéologie (par exemple, la révolution russe de 1917) ; on peut également établir des différences fondamentales entre les assassinats politiques effectués ou encouragés par le propre gouvernement en vue de sup- primer des opposants et ceux commis par une personne souffrant de troubles mentaux. On affirme, par ailleurs, qu’il existe des conditions préalables aux assassinats politiques ; que dans des pays vivant sous l’oppression, ces graves événements supposent l’existence de partis politiques préconisant des idéologies et pratiquant des tactiques d’action directe, la perception générale d’une situation oppressive et la présence de groupes d’activistes (77). Ces affirmations sont en général restées à un niveau essentielle- ment théorique. Certaines recherches ont toutefois tenté de faire accroître le niveau de nos connaissances dans ce domaine. Les travaux de Feierabend ont montré, par exemple, que certains facteurs sociaux, politiques et écologiques semblent associés au phénomène des assassinats politiques en Amérique latine, bien qu’ils ne soient pas, en eux-mêmes, suffisants pour fournir une explication complète de ce phénomène ; on peut également prétendre que l’assassinat politique offre des modèles semblables à ceux de la violence politique interne ou de l’instabilité politique. En particulier, il est possible d’établir des corrélations importantes entre un taux élevé d’assassinats politiques et les facteurs suivants : l’instabilité politique d’une forte proportion de pays latino-américains ; le fait qu’il s’agit de pays en transition en ce qui concerne leur niveau de modernisme et de développement ; un faible taux de satisfaction générale ; l’existence de régimes coer- citifs ; un fort pourcentage d’homicides ; un faible taux de suicides. Par contre, d’autres facteurs ne semblent pas jouer un rôle prépon- c’est le cas d’une éventuelle dérant en ce qui a trait à ce phénomène agression externe. (76) HAVENS (M.C.), LEIDEN (C.) et SCHMITT (K. M.), The Politics of Assassination, Englewood Cliffs, New-Jersey. Prentice-Hall (A Spectrum Book), 1970, p. 25 et 2°. (77) HAVENS (M.C.) et al… p. 2-5. — 169 — Des recherches plus approfondies sur les assassinats poltiques en Amérique latine pourraient confirmer aussi un certain nombre d’hypo- thèses particulières, par exemple, une forte corrélation entre les acti- vités révolutionnaires et l’assassinat de figures politiques. Elles pour- raient également fournir des explications valables aux causes géné- rales de ces graves phénomènes. L’examen de quelques cas d’assassinats d’hommes d’Etat semble indiquer que les auteurs de ces actes ont obéi à des motifs particuliers d’ordre religieux (le président méxicain Obregon fut assassiné en 1928 par une jeune religieuse à la suite des mesures prises par le gouvernement qu’il dirigeait contre l’Eglise catholique) ou pathologique (assassinat du président Somoza au Nicaragua, en 1956). Il s’agit cependant de cas rares et isolés. Fn général, les assassinats politiques surviennent plus fréquemment en Amérique Latine à l’occasion d’une révolution ; le Mexique en offre le meilleur exemple, avec la mort violente de trois présidents pendant la période comprise entre 1910 et 1920. Il est surprenant de constater le nombre relativement élevé d’assassinats d’hommes politiques en Amérique Latine, où, suivant la tradition ibérique consistant à entourer la personne du Monarque d’une aura de sacré, les Caudillos et chefs d’Etat étaient regardés avec respect par le peuple. On est d’autant plus surpris qu’à l’occasion des trois grandes révolutions latino- américaines (Mexique 1910, Bolivie 1952 et Cuba 1959), aucun des trois chefs d’Etat au pouvoir n’a été tué par ses vainqueurs, qui se sont limités à l’exiler. Elles pourraient finalement déterminer l’impact, personnel ou systémique, plus ou moins important, des assassinats politiques. La force de cet impact dépend en grande partie de la nature du régime politique du pays. C’est ainsi que l’assassinat d’Anastasio Somoza, au Nicaragua, n’entraîna pratiquement aucun changement politique d’importance en raison de certaines caractéristiques personnelles du dictateur assassiné qui l’identifiaient avec son peuple, alors que la mort violente du général Trujillo, haï par une partie considérable de la population dominicaine en raison de la cruelle répression qu’il avait instaurée dans son pays, eut comme conséquence le renforcement du pouvoir de sa famille, soutenue par les Etats-Unis. D’une façon semblable, les six attentats perpétrés entre 1963 et 1965 contre le général Barrientos en Bolivie entraînèrent un accroissement consi- dérable des pouvoirs du dictateur. Il semblerait, par contre, que l’assassinat politique ne constitue pas en Amérique Latine un moyen efficace pour atteindre des buts politiques spécifiques (cf., entre autres, les cas des présidents mexicains Madero et Obregon, des pré- sidents Somoza et Trujillo, du Che Guevara) (78). (78) Voir, à propos des causes et de l’impact des assassinats politiques en Amérique latine, SCHMITT (KM) “Political Asassinations in Latin- América”. dans Assassination and Political Violence, p, 537-543. — 170 — La force, la violence et les menaces de force et de violence ont été tellement fréquentes dans le contexte politique latino-américain, que l’on peut affirmer qu’elles constituent des issues “normales’”’ de la vie politique de cette partie du monde. 2. Les actes de terrorisme et les mouvements de guérilla. Le terrorisme est un thème à la mode, mais qui est généralement abordé de façon passionnelle et irrationnelle. Cela s’explique par le fait qu’il s’agit d’un domaine indissociable de certaines valeurs qui relèvent plus de l’éthique que du droit. Une approche exclusivement juridique du terrorisme a été et demeure inopérante. La Convention de Genève du 16 novembre 1937 définissait, par exemple, les actes de terrorisme de la façon suivante : « des faits criminels dirigés contre un Etat et dont le but ou la nature est de provoquer la terreur chez des personnalités déterminées, des groupes de personnes ou dans le public». (art. 1, al. 2). Deux constatations découlent de la lecture de ce texte l) définir le terrorisme par rapport à la terreur qu’il provoque constitue une tautologie ; 2) qualifier d’actes dirigés contre l’Etat des actions qui visent plutôt tel ou tel régime politique, social ou économique, telle ou telle structure ou institution constitue également une étonnante appro- ximation, la plupart des actes de cette nature étant bien plus dirigés contre un seul de ces éléments que contre leur ensemble. Ainsi, les définitions juridiques émanant des instances nationales ou internationales accentuent le caractère « nébuleux » de ce concept dont la nature est davanage polémique que juridique. Une meilleure approche serait celle qui tenterait de montrer les relations existant entre le terrorisme et la société a “ laquelle il s’attaque, entre son succès ou son efficacité et les idées ou les intérêts dont il est porteur (79). Par ailleurs, une réflexion sur le terrorisme ne peut être formulée en fait qu’à partir d’une réflexion sur la violence en général. A cet égard. une polémique s’est cristallisée autour de ce qu’on a appelé « le processus des deux violences ». Ce que nous désignons couramment sous le terme « violence » n'est souvent qu’une réplique, celle qu’adres- sent des groupes d’opposition, en guise de représailles, à un inter- locuteur qui a pratiqué au préalable une violence, moins apparente (79) En ce sens, GOTOVITCH (J.), « Quelques réflexions historiques à propos du terrorisme », dans Réflexions sur la définition et la répression du terrorisme, Bruxelles, Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, Centre de Droit International. 1974. p. 15. — 1711 — sans doute, mais aussi grave qu’insidieuse, parce qu’elle s’incarne dans une institution officielle. C’est à partir de cette violence initiale et primordiale que se crée cette « spirale de violence » dont parlait Dom Helder Camara (80). D'autre part, lorsque certains régimes adoptent les mêmes métho- des que les «terroristes» qu’ils combattent — chantage, séques- tration de personnes, tortures, liquidation d’adversaires politiques, exécutions sommaires — et qu’ils sont en outre nés d’un coup d’Etat, on peut se demander de quel côté se trouve la légalité, surtout si l’on tient compte du fait que. dans certains cas, ceux qui pratiquent le terrorisme contre un ordre établi oppressif ont vainement épuisé au préalable les recours offerts par une légalité sans substance réelle. Dans les pays du Tiers-Monde, encore directement placés sous la domination coloniale des Etats occidentaux ou économiquement exploités par eux, le nombre d’actes de terrorisme n’a cessé d’aug- menter, malgré une répression sans pitié de la part des gouvernements nationaux et d’une hostilité de la majorité des pays occidentaux, qui considèrent ces actes comme un danger pour leurs intérêts. Cette attitude est d’autant plus grave que les luttes révolutionnaires armées constituent un des facteurs les plus importants des changements sociaux dans la société internationale contemporaine. En Amérique, la lutte révolutionnaire armée, source de nombreux actes de terrorisme, a été reconnue en 1967 par la Conférence de l’Organisation latino-américaine de solidarité comme étant «la voie fondamentale de la révolution mais non pas l’unique voie». Elle a progressé dans certains pays — notamment en Argentine — et connu des reculs sévères dans d’autres. C’est un phénomène relativement ancien, qui a suscité une littérature assez abondante. Depuis plusieurs années, la plupart des pays latino-américains connaissent des situations de conflit armé où des organisations politico- militaires luttent les armes à la main contre les oligarchies locales et les dictateurs militaires alliés à l’impérialisme. Ces mouvements ont pour but leur renversement, la formation d’un pouvoir populaire, l’expulsion des entreprises et des organismes américains et l’établisse- ments de régimes de type socialiste. La forme principale que revêtent ces luttes armées est celle de la guérilla rurale (Bolivie, Colombie, Cuba, Equateur, Guatemala. Nicaragua, Pérou, Venezuela), guérilla urbaine (Argentine, Brésil » Uruguay) ou les deux types de lutte (Brésil, Colombie, Guatemala). Les caractéristiques géographiques, démographiques, économiques, poli- tiques et sociales de chaque Etat en cause déterminent, chez les (80) MERTENS (P.), « L'introuvable acte de terrorisme », ibid., p. 39-40. — 172 — partisans de l’intervention violente, la forme d’action à mener. Les moyens de lutte sont également choisis en fonction des objectifs à atteindre et varient, eux aussi, selon les conditions socio-économiques et politiques propres à chaque pays. Les principaux mouvements qui recourent en Amérique latine à la lutte armée sont ln Argentine, les Montoneros et l’Armée révolutionnaire du peuple (ERP), 7o en Bolivie, l’Armée de libération nationale (ELN), fondée en 1967, après la mort de Guevara ; 3 au Brésil, l’Action de libération nationale (ALN) et le Mouvement de libération populaire (Molipo) ; 4u au Chili, le Mouvement de la gauche révolutionnaire (MIR) ; Sn en Colombie, l’Armée populaire de libération (EPL), les Forces armées révolutionnaires de Colombie (FARC) et, surtout, l’Armée de libération nationale (ELN) ; 60 au Guatemala, le Mouvement révolutionnaire du 13 novembre (MR-13) et les Forces armées rebelles (FAR) : 7n au Mexique, le mouvement d’action révolutionnaire (MAR) et les Forces révolutionnaires armées du peuple (FRAP) : 8n au Pérou, l’'Armée de libération nationale (ELN) ; 90 en Uruguay, le Mouvement de libération nationale (MLN, mieux connu sous le nom de 7upamaros ; 10° au Venezuela, les Forces armées de libération nationale (FALN) (81). En 1975, le pays latino-américain le plus touché par le terrorisme est sans conteste l’Argentine, où règne un climat de terreur politique sans précédent. Les attentats et les fusillades ont fait en 1975 plus de 400 morts dans ce pays (guérillos, militants politiques et syndicaux de gauche et de droite, membres des forces de sécurité, innocents citoyens pris sous le feu croisé d’affrontements de rue). Certains jours, le nombre de victimes a été particulièrement élevé 10 à 15 morts. La Colombie connaît aussi depuis quelques mois un accroisse- ment sensible des activités de terrorisme. L’élaboration d’une étude comparative de tous les mouvements de guérilla latino-américains semble être une entreprise d’une grande envergure. On ne peut pas mettre dans le même sac les révoltes paysannes, les mutineries d’officiers, les grèves des mineurs et les (81) Voir Terrorism, À Staff Study prepared by the Committee on Inter- U.S. House of Representatives, 93° Congress, 2nd Session, nal Security, August 1. 1974., Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974. — 173 — révoltes estudiantines, pour arriver à la conclusion que toutes font partie d’un même phénomène et que tous luttent pour le même objectif. Il n’existe pas, à notre connaissance, une compilation complète des actes violents commis par les mouvements de guérilla latino-amé- ricains. Il est, néanmoins, possible de les grouper autour des caté- gories suivantes vols qualifiés, attaques contre les casernes et les postes de police, sabotages, occupation de villages et de locaux, attentats à la bombe, opérations armées contre les prisons, enlè- vements et exécutions de certaines catégories de personnes (82). Les enlèvements de fonds dans les banques, les casinos et autres endroits suceptibles d’enfermer des biens appartenant au gouver- nement, aux grands propriétaires et aux grands capitalistes nationaux et étrangers figurent parmi les modes d’action les plus pratiqués par les mouvements de guérilla, qui considèrent ces interventions comme des actes d’expropriation ou de confiscation pouvant leur procurer les ressources nécessaires à la poursuite de leur lutte. Bien que ces actes aient été pratiqués par les mouvements de guérilla urbaine en Argentine, Brésil, Guatemala et Venezuela, c’est surtout en Uruguay où ils ont eu le plus d’impact. Dans ce pays, les Tupamaros ont mené « a bien de multiples opérations contre des banques et des casinos. Les attaques contre les casernes et les postes de police ont pour but d’anéantir des groupes armés et de se procurer des armes et des explosifs. La plus célèbre de ces opérations demeure l’assaut de la Moncada, caserne située à Santiago de Cuba, opération menée le 26 juillet 1953 par quelque 150 guérilleros dirigés par Fidel Castro ; cette opération, qui se solda par un échec cuisant pour le mouvement de guérilla naissant, fut néanmoins une grande victoire politique et stratégique pour les révolutionnaires cubains, Les Tupamaros se sont également illustrés dans la conduite de telles opérations. Les actes de sabotage sont généralement dirigés contre des bâti- ments et des biens qui symbolisent l’oppression politique ou écono- mique, interne ou internationale. Tel fut le cas de la destruction par incendie des locaux administratifs de la filiale uruguayenne de la General Motors et des voitures de cette marque destinées au service de la police, effectuée en juin 1969 par les Tupamaros. En général, les guérilleros prennent bien soin de ne pas détériorer les outils de travail — usines, ateliers — et de ne pas s’attaquer aux moyens de transport réservés à la population. (82) PIERSON-MATHY (P.), « Formes nouvelles de la lutte révolution- naire et coopération internationale dans le combat contre-révolutionnaire », dans Réflexions sur la définition et la répression du terrorisme, p. 66-85. — 174 — Presque toutes les organisations de guérilla ont eu recours à l’occupation temporaire d’agglomérations urbaines, ainsi que de locaux. L’occupation d’usines en vue d’une discussion avec les ouvriers, de même que les appropriations de vivres dans de grandes firmes afin de les distribuer aux pauvres sont considérés comme des actions de propagande armée. Dans certains cas, l’occupation de locaux était destinée à permettre au mouvement révolutionnaire de réunir une docu- mentation révélant des pratiques frauduleuses de plusieurs compagnies. Ce fut le cas de l’occupation de la Financial Monty à Montevideo, qui permit à la presse et aux tribunaux de connaître des pratiques de cette nature portant sur une somme de quelque 800 millions de francs belges (83). Les attentats à la bombe et à la dynamite sont considérés par certaines organisations de guérilla comme peu avantageux politique- ment et peu efficaces. Ils sont généralement le fait de divers groupes politiques et des mouvements étudiants, et ont pour cible principale les ambassades et les consulats américains ou les biens appartenant à des entreprises nord-américaines. Parmi les opérations armées contre les prisons et lieux de détention en vue de libérer des combattants capturés, il convient de mentionner celle effectuée le 6 septembre 1970 par les Tupamaros contre la prison centrale de Puntos Carras, située près du centre de la ville, dans un quartier déclaré « zone militaire» qui permit l’évasion de 106 guérilleros dont Raul Sendic, considéré comme le chef des Tupamaros. Les exécutions ont eu pour cible soit les traîtres, les délateurs et les membres des forces de répression connus pour leurs activités de tortionnaires, soit les espions étrangers, notamment les agents américains de la C.I.A. (le cas le plus connu est celui de Dan Mitrione, qui, sous couvert de son titre de représentant de l’Agence de développe- ment Internationale, était en réalité le chef de la mission américaine d’assistance aux forces de répression, fonction qu’il avait précédemment remplie à St-Domingue et au Brésil, contribuant ainsi à l’introduction dans ces pays de méthodes d’interrogations sous la torture). Finalement, les enlèvements et détentions de personnes peuvent frapper les personnalités politiques importantes et les membres du gouvernement, les industriels, les hommes d’affaires et les grands propriétaires nationaux et étrangers, les diplomates ressortissant des Etats-Unis ou d’autres puissances occidentales ayant des relations économiques importantes avec le pays de séjour. Les enlèvements de personnes appartenant à la première catégorie ont des fins diverses : (83) BAILBY, (F.), « La guérilla urbaine a aggravé le malaise en Uru- guay », Le Monde diplomatique, 1970 février. — 175 — obtenir des informations sur l’organisation et les activités du réseau de répression ou la libération de prisonniers politiques, établir la respon- sabilité de certains dirigeants politiques. Quant aux enlèvements et détentions d’industriels, de banquiers et de grands propriétaires natio- naux et étrangers, ils ont essentiellement pour but soit la libération de guérilleros, soit la remise à l’organisation révolutionnaire de sommes importantes — « l’impôt de la révolution » — soit enfin la « punition » d’un employeur récalcitrant, le forçant à adopter une attitude plus conciliante à l’égard des revendications ouvrières. Les enlèvements de diplomates, relativement nombreux en Amérique latine (84), ont été généralement opérés en vue d’obtenir la libération de guérilleros et de prisonniers politiques. Dans la plupart des cas, les enlèvements de cette dernière catégorie se sont avérés assez efficaces, en ce qu’ils ont permis la libération d’un nombre important de détenus politiques. Certains actes de terrorisme ne peuvent pas se réclamer de mobiles aussi nobles et patriotiques que ceux commis en vue de la libération de prisonniers politiques ou pour prouver la participation dans l’exploitation dont plusieurs pays latino-américains sont victimes d’importantes entreprises nationales ou étrangères. Par conséquent, les mécanismes de protection à prévoir pour faire face à ces phéno- mènes doivent s’appuyer sur des critères plus universels, susceptibles d’être appliqués même à des causes que l’on estime douteuses ou répré- hensibles. Ceci n’empêche nullement une interprétation circonstanciée des faits et une réaction différenciée. Seraient, par contre, à rejeter les dispositions — telles les Conventions de l’Organisation des Etats Américains de 1970 à 1971 — visant essentiellement à « dépolitiser » ou à discréditer les actes commis par les mouvements latino-améri- cains de guérilla. 3. Les détournements d'aéronefs. De nos jours, les pirates de l’air prennent la suite des brigands de grand chemin et des pirates de mer, constituant, en raison de leur fréquence, de la publicité dont ils font l’objet, des motifs politiques qui se trouvent derrière ces incidents et de la menace qu’ils supposent pour la sécurité de centaines de personnes, un phénomène inquiétant et plaçant les autorités des pays qui ont à le subir devant un terrible dilemme. Le détournement d’aéronefs représente, en droit pénal, un nou- veau type de crime ; en criminologie, un nouveau type de phéno- ménologie criminelle ; en droit aérien, un nouveau concept d’infrac- tion internationale. (84) Voir JULLIARD, (P.), « Les enlèvements de diplomates », A.F.D.I, 1971, p. 205 et s. — 176 — Depuis le premier cas de capture d’aéronef, survenu au Pérou en 1930, environ 400 détournements ont eu lieu dans tous les cieux du monde, jusqu’à la fin de 1972. Un tiers environ de ces actes ont affecté les pays latino-américains et, en particulier, Cuba, l’endroit de destination le plus fréquent à partir de 1958. La capture d'aéronefs n'est pas une fin en soi mais un moyen — exceptionnel — d’aboutir à la réalisation d’un objectif. La plupart des auteurs assoient leurs actions sur un fondement politique, les autres mobiles étant leur volonté de fuir la justice de leur pays, le désir d’une publicité mondiale, l’obtention d’une forte somme d’argent ou de se faire conduire gratuitement à Un pays de leur choix, la satis- faction d’une haine ou d’une vengeance (85). L’arme la plus fré- = quemment utilisée est le pistolet, facile a manier, efficace et qui peut être dissimulé sans trop de difficulté ; sont également employés des explosifs, grenades, fusils, couteaux ou autres objets ayant fonction d’armes. Dans leur lutte contre cette catégorie d’actes criminels, les auto- rités publiques ont pris plusieurs initiatives. Sur le plan politique, les gouvernements ont défini leurs positions à l’occasion de déclarations officielles et par le choix d’actions qui pourraient combattre les activités de piraterie aérienne ; certains d’entre eux ont manifesté une attitude ferme devant les demandes de rançon ou d’élargissement de prisonniers politiques (la plupart des pays de l’Amérique Latine), alors que d’autres ont fait preuve, pour diverses raisons, d’une attitude plus conciliante. Sur le plan juridique, les gouvernements ont géné- ralement agi soit dans le domaine des relations internationales (Conven- tion de Montréal de 1971) soit dans celui des législations internes. Comme les assassinats politiques et les activités de guérilla, les détournements d’aéronefs revêtent, en Amérique Latine, une signi- fication essentiellement politique qui dépasse les limites des actes criminels ordinaires ; ils deviennent, en fait, un moyen supplémentaire de lutte utilisé par des formations politiques. Conclusion Ainsi, peut-on affirmer, au terme de cette partie de notre étude, qu’une atmosphère de terreur et de violence a constamment plané sur l’ensemble de l’Amérique latine. Certes, personne ne peut préten- dre de façon catégorique que la violence institutionnalisée est la seule cause de la réaction, également violente, qu’elle a suscitée. Sans — (85) JACQUEMIN, (G.), « Essai d’une approche criminologique de l’aéro-criminel », Rev, Int. de Crim. et de Pol. Tech., 1971-1972, n° 4, ocobre- décembre, p. 253-270. — 177 — doute est-elle la principale responsable, mais il reste à déterminer avec davantage de précision les interactions qui ont eu lieu entre ces deux formes de violence. Quoi qu’il en soit, une étude complète et approfondie de l’ensemble du phénomène s’impose. L’obstacle que représente l’absence de sta- tistiques ne devrait pas arrêter l’activité du chercheur, qui se doit de procéder à un inventaire le plus complet possible de tous les actes de violence. Pour ce faire, le recours à d’autres sources d’information (analyse de presse, rapports d’organismes publics et privés, témoi- gnages des victimes, etc.), pourrait suppléer en grande partie — sinon totalement — la carence de chiffres officiels dans ce secteur. — 178 — Bank robbers and their victims historical and criminological perspectives WOLF MIDDENDORFF University of Freiburg Freibourg i Br. Federal Republic of Germany Violence, and especially robbery, belong to the oldest crimes of mankind. Every country has its own traditions of violence. After a robbery at the Kansas City Fair on September 26, 1872, the « Kansas City Times» called the robbery «so diabolically daring and so utterly in contempt of fear that we are bound to admire it and revere its perpetrators ». Two days later, the « Times » wrote «It was as though three bandits had come to us from storied Oden- wald with the halo of medieval chivalry upon their garments and shown us how the things were done that poets sing of. Nowhere else in the United States or in the civilized world. probably, could this thing have been done ». This incident and this comment are one of the many pieces of evidence that show « how deeply engrained in American life is the tradition, even the love, of violence ». About one hundred years later, Rap Brown, the young Negro militant. said « Violence 1s as American as cherry pie » (86). Europe has its own tradition of « famous » robbers, from the English Robin Hood to the German Schinderhannes and the Italian Giuliano. There was and still is a conñästant inclination to glorification of those men who pretended to fight the rich and help the poor. (86) GRAHAM, (H.), GURR, (T.), : Violence in America : Historical and Comparative Perspectives, New York, Bantam Books, 1969, p. XIII. — 179 — Inspite of these traditions, there is a stricking lack oË crimi- nological material concerning robbery and especially bank robbery. Looking over criminological textbooks, one seldom finds any reference to bank robbery, and university empiricists are producing many results but only very few data which are valuable and helpful for the practioners in the administration of justice in fighting and preventing bank robbery. As far as statistics are concerned, we have the official police data. The FBI reported that nationally bank robbery offenses increased from 2 521 offenses in 1973 to 3 517 in 1974. The average bank robbery dollar loss decreased from $ 4 653 in 1973 to $ 3 598 in 1974. Between 1969 and 1974 bank robbery has increased 94 per- cent (87). In the Federal Republic of Germany, the number of bank robbe- ries decreased from 308 in 1973 to 266 in 1974. Of these cases, 36.1 percent were only attempts. In 66.2 percent, the robbers menaced with guns, they really shot, however, in only 4.5 percent (88). Up to now, as far as l know, no typology of bank robbers and their victims has been established. One of the reasons for this lack, of course, is that there are difficulties in developing typologies of all kinds as Silverman recently has stated. In searching for a typology, one should meet some criteria ; typologies, for instance, should offer cate- gories that are exhaustive and the categories should be mutually exclusive. Silverman citizised that often categories overlapped ; but one may question if there are any typologies which do not overlap because mostly we are facing human beings with more than one typo- logy factor (89). Scholars are always asking for more future research (and for more money), but in the meantime, practitioners have to work with the existing material, as incomplet and imperfect it may be. On the following pages, I shall try to summarize some of the American and German studies, concerning bank robbers and their victims. (87) Crime in the United States 1974, Uniform Crime Reports, FBI, Washington D.C., p. 26. (88) Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik 1974, Bundeskriminalant Wiesbanden. pp. 56-57. (89) SILVERMAN, (R.), « Victim typologies Overview, Critique, and Reformulation », DRAPKIN (I.) and VIANO (E.), (Eds) Victimology, Lexing- ton/Mass. Lexington Books. - 180 — Types of Bank Robbers The Historical Bank Robber The American historieal bank robber is the logical successor of the train robbers who began their activities in the early 1870s and continued for the next sixty years, reaching a peak at about the turn of the century. Gangs like the Dalton Brothers and the Reno Brothers robbed banks and trains alternatively. The Reno Brothers who had committed the first train robbery in the history of the United States — their loot was $ 10 000 were lynched by vigilantes at the Albany County jail in Seymour/Indiana in December 1868 (90). Aîter the first world war, especially in the Roaring Twenties, we find the specialized bank robber who mostly was a professional criminal with a high status in the underworld. He used to regard himself as the elite among the professionals and not seldom as an «honest crook». One example of this type was J. Harvey Bailey who was called « America>s most successful bank robber ». J. Evetts Haley published his life story under the title « Robbing Banks was my Business » (91). Il was a matter of pride for Bailey that he was « ho- nest thief », scorning to pilfer a person or an institution by fraud or manipulation. Bailey was never stopped, never hurt and never appre- hended in the robbery of any bank; after years of phantastic success, he was tried for conspiracy and kidnaping in the famous Urschel case. Bailey was a man of strong principles. He avoided publicity and lived an abstinent life even when he was rich. He was jovial company, but not talkative, extremely temperate in his use of liquor and shunned women like the plague. AIl his actions were very well prepared, for instance there were cases in which Bailey spent as much as two weeks running out the roads by day and poring over maps and handmade charts by night. He was honest against his helpers ; every loot was equally shared and after he was sentenced for life, he refused to turn state’s evidence. In his opinion, betrayal of friends and passed companions was the worst crime of all. Another professional bank robber was Everett DeBaun ; he gave the inside story of how the most highly skilled robbers in the world — the professional heist-men — planned and executed the holdups (90) Robbery, GIBSON (W.), GROSSET and DUNLAP (Eds), New York, 1966, pp. 207 et seq.; NASH (J.), Bloodletters and Badmen, New York, Evans, 1973 pp. 468 et seq. STAMMEL (H.J.) Hoôlle auf Rädern, Frankfurt am Main, Fischer, 1976, pp. 158 et seq. (91) Palo Duro Press, Canyon/Texas, 1973, — 181 — of banks and payrolls. But he made sometimes mistakes and wrote about his experiences in prison (92). Germany has no comparable tradition of similar historical and professional bank robbery. The Modern Conventional Bank Robber In the last decades, it has been particuiarly noteworthy that first time offenders infiltrated into the ranks of bank robbers. Typical of the «new look» in bank robbery was the armed theft of some $ 20.301 from a bank in Connecticut, committed by four juveniles between 14 and 19 years old. One writer commented this bank robbery with the words « The bank robber, once the aristocrat of the underworld, has been replaced by a group so numerous and various that it almost seems as if an universal tempter were whis- pering «You, too, can rob a bank » (93). This tendency away from carefully planned bank robberies was confirmed by a study conducted by the FBI of 238 bank rob- beries which occured during a three months period in 1964. One predominant characteristic of all bank robbers was the desire for easy money without having to work for it, even not to plan carefully for it. The bank robber is no longer a professional and specialist, but an average individual. The FBI found no typical method of operation used by bank robbers. It was revealed that the robbers seldom made any well-defined-plans as to their methods of operation or getaway (94). The psychiatrist David G. Hubbard studied 300 convicted bank robbers and he came to similar results. Most bank robbers were of low intelligence, they were not able to plan their actions, sometimes they only had a toy gun. According to Hubbard’s estimation, only 15 percent of the bank robbers were professionals, 85 percent were « hopeless amateurs » (95). But, of course, there are still many variations in offenders and offenses, and there are for instance insane offenders whose behavior cannot be predicted at all. In October 1975, a young bearfooted man entered a bank in Greenwich Village, New York, in the early afternoon and took ten people as hostages. He demanded the release of Patricia Hearst and the other members of the Symbiose Liberation (92) «The Heist — The theory and Practice of Armed Robbery », «in KNOWLES (H.), HARPER & Brother (Eds), Gentlemen, Scholars and Scoundrels, New York, 1959, pp. 353 et seq. (93) BLOCH, (H.) and GEIS, (G.), Man, Crime and Society, New York, Random House, 1962, p. 331. (94) FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 1965 November, pp. 2 and 20-21. (95) Die Welt, January S, 1974. — 182 — Army and millions of Dollar. The head of the « Police Departments Hostage Negotiating Team » talked with the robber, and some hours later eight hostages were released. In turn for them, police gave the man a case of beer, and when policemen stormed into the bank, they found the robber sleeping and completely surprised and distur- bed by the appearance of the policemen. Apparently, he was insane. On the other side, some old styled organized robberies are not unknown in our time. This is true for instance for the Brink’s robbery, committed in 1950 in Boston ; it was one of the best organized robberies in United States history, executed by eleven professional criminals who carefully prepared their offense. They even broke into a burglar alarm company one night, so that they could study the details of Brink’s alarm system. The loot amounted to 4+ 1.250.000. The robbery was not completely perfect because one of the bandits was cheated in the distribution of the loot and there- f£ore he turned informer (96). If Bailey had led this robbery, it would not have happened that an accomplice did not get his « just » share according to the principles of the « honest thief ». In the Institute for Criminology of the University of Freiburg, research was done concerning bank robbery, covering the years from 1964-1966 in the Federal Republic of Germany. The study embraces 297 robberies and 316 robbers. More than half of the robbers came from disorganized families 83 percent belonged to the lawer classes, that means many more than their percentage in the whole population is. 75 percent of the offenders were previously convicted. The most important result of the study was that the bank robber according to his personality is usually offender against property and not offen- der against the person. Usually the offenders are no professionals, the execution of the robberies is simple and they are not using complicated techniques. À little more than one third of the robbers had guns with them, in 2.7 percent of all robberies only the offenders used their guns (97). The Political Robber Stephen Schafer has shown in his book « The Political Criminal » that the political criminal is convinced about the truth and justi- fication of his own beliefs and deeds, and Schafer proposes to use the term «convictional criminal». He discriminated the political criminal from the ordinary offender, for instance the bank robber, who acts for his personal gain. The convictional criminal on the other hand has an altruistic-communal motivation rather than an p. 272. (96) SYMONS, (J.) : Crime and detection, London, Panther Book, 1968, « Täter und Opfer des Bankraubes », Polizeiblatt für das Land Baden-Württemberg, April 1976. 97) See, MIDDENDORFF (W.) — 183 — egoistic drive (102). With his political motivation, the convictional offender may commit political crimes or ordinary offenses like bank robberies in order to get the necessary money for future political activities. The best example is Stalin who, 1907, raided the State Bank in Tiflis and got 341.000 Rubel In 1928, the Hindustan Socialist Republican Army decided to raise funds by robbing the Punjab National Bank of India in Lahore Though the operation was organized like a military attack, it failed because the man who was appointed to drive up in a hired car and carry the raiders away, could not start the engine. The others waited for him outside the bank and lastly withdraw with the empty bags. The whole story of this organization is « sgnificant in retrospect because it is typical of the amateurish bungling which again and again marks attempts to improve the worlds » (99) From these raids there is a long way to the actions of German terrorists in our time. The motivation, however, did not change. In summer 1975. German anarchists raided within 24 hours two banks in Berlin and each time they got about 100.000 Mark Similar actions are known from urban guerillas in other coun- tries over the last years, for instance in Uruguay and in Italy (100) In the United States new tactics and techniques have been developped by a small number of criminals who call themselves urban guerillas. They took up the old word « expropriations », used already by Stalin and his accomplices, which seemed to justify the crirne These expropriations are not always violent, followers of the weather- man, for instance, fraudulently used traveler’s check (101) On April 15 1974. one black man and four white women raided the Hibernia Bank in San Francisco, two of the women rushed to the cash drawers while another one «in the best Bonnie-and Clyde-style » proudly announced « we are from the SLA ». Patricia Hearst participated in this robbery. The amount of the loot was $ 10.960 (102) (98) The Political Criminal, New York, The Free Press 1974, pp. 145- 147 (99) HASTINGS (M.), The Other Mr Churchill, London, Four Square Book, 1966, pp. 145-146. (100 ALLEMANN, (F.R.), Macht und Ohnmacht der Guenllas Mün- chen,Piper, 1974, pp. 317 et seq and Die Bankräuber aus der Barriera, Die Lebensgeschichte des Revolutionärs Sante Notarnicola, von ihm selbst auf- geschriben, München, Tricont, 1974. (101) FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, ]uly 1973, pp. 3 et seq. (102) Time, April 29, 1974. — 184 — The Woman Robber Otto Pollak in his classic « The Criminality of Women » found in 1929 that as far as robbery is concerned, the material is scarce. There were only few cases reported showing women as accomplices of male offenders who use them as watchers or decoys. « It is interes- ting to note that those cases of female robbery which seem to express a tendency towards masculinization, come from the Middle or Far West, where social conditions have favored the assumption of male pursuits by women, not only within, but also outside the sphere of the law. The female offenders usually retain some trace of feminity however, and even so glaring an example of masculinization as the « Michigan Babies », an all-women gang of robbers in Chicago, shows the typically feminin trait in the modus operandi » (103). At the time of the famous American gangster raids in the early thirties, Clyde Barrow and Bonnie Parker raided banks and committed murders, they often escaped until they were killed in a trap (104). In the above mentioned study concerning German bank robberies, the percentage of women offenders was 3.3 that means, it was much lower than the percentage of female offenders in general (about 11 percent). Women participation was completely restrained in helping the men. The statistic of the German Bundeskriminalant gives for the year 1974 a female participation quota in bankrobberies of 6.7 percent, that means about the double percentage that was given in the earlier German study. According to a FBI survey (2.220 bank robberies were studied which occurred during fiscal years 1965 and 1966), it is interesting to note that in 1965, 14 robbers worked with one female accomplice, but in 1966, the figure jumped to 37 (105). Freda Adler in her book « Sisters in Crime » describes the bank robberies of a wo- man called Marge and she concludes : « In a number of ways, Marge is typical of a new breed of women criminals making their appearance across the imaginary boundery line which once separated crîmes into accross America. She, along with thousands of others, as stepped « masculins» and feminine categories. Marge is a member of the new «liberation movement » which is spreading through the ranks of the nation’s female offenders » (106). This tendency of a greater participation of women in bank robberies was already long time ago predicted by Hans von Hentig (103) University of Pennsylvania Press, 1950, p. 29. (104) NASH op cit. pp. 39 et seq and NEAL, (J.), Die Wahreit über Bonnie und Clyde, München, Moewig, 1969. (105) FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, April 1967, pp. 11 et seq. (106) New York. McGraw-Hill Company, 1975. p. 7. — 185 — (107). À note in « Time » of December 1, 1975 has the title : More Bonnie Parkers. Some years ago, a woman, a modern day Ma$ Barker, had masterminded a bank robbery in Kansas City. She was sentenced to fifteen years on bank robbery and three years on conspi- racy while her two male accomplices only got 12 years on bank rob- bery and 2 years and 6 months on conspiracy (108). This difference in sentences between sexes used to be inverse in former years. Bank Robbery and Taking Hostages John Edgar Hoover wrote in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulle- tin, March 1972, that more and more banking institutions are using security devices, such as cameras, and that bank robbers know this. Consequently, more and more robbers try to avoid these technical safeguards and one of their most dangerous ploys is the seizing of hostages to force bank officials to open their vaults. There are two forms of taking hostages inside and outside the bank. Taking hostages inside the bank may belong to the original plan of the robber, it may also happen that police arrives too early and then the robbers take hostages to facilitate their escape with the loot. mong the 238 cases of bank robbery which the FBI studied in 1964, bank robbers took hostages in five instances to aid them in their escape. Two of these hostages were bank employees, one was a customer, one a cabdriver and one a truckdriver. None of these hostages were injured (109). The later study, conducted by the FBI, concerning 2 220 bank robberies, revealed that in 69 instances hos- tages were taken or attempts were made to take hostages in or near the bank before, during or after the robbery. In 21 cases, the bank robbers kidnaped or made attempts to kidnap or hold employees or relatives at home until payment was made (110). Taking hostages outside the bank is a very old scheme ; in the early morning hours of January 26, 1876, five masked bandits entered the home of the cashier of the Northhampton National Bank at Northhampton/Mass. Five persons were bound to their beds and threatened with violence. The cashier refused to reveal the combi- nation of the vault, whereon the robbers went to work on him and broke him with third degree methods till after three hours he was a physical wreck and gave in. The bank lost about one million dollar (111). (107) « Bankbräuber aus honorigen Berufen », Die Neue Polizei 1968, pp. 219 et seq. (108) FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, November 1965, p. 19. (109) FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, November 1965, p. 6. (110) FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, April 1967, p. 11, (111) Robbery, op. cit, pp. 81 et seq. — 186 — Hoover presented some new examples a bank robber-fugitive Was slain in an early-morning gun battle with FBI-agents outside a motel room in wich he was holding the president of a local bank and three members of his family as hostages. The victims were rescued unharmed. The robber had planned to force the oflicial to open the bank vault prior to the start of business that day. In another case, one of three gunmen held 13 members of a bank manager’s family as hostages while the other two robbers forced the officials to drive to the bank and to open the vault. The trio, later arrested, escaped with $ 405 000 « Obviously, the hostage bank robbery is more than a crime against property ; it is a growing menace to banking officials and their families. The specter of the armed cri- minal follows the banking official from his home to his office and back. Just as there are no absolute means of preventing bank rob- beries, if banking institutions are to continue to provide prompt efficient service to the public, there appears to be no positive way of avoiding the hostage robbery » (112). In other cases, the taking of hostages was faked. À teller in a California bank received a telephone call from a man who told her that he had her husband with a knife at his throat and that there was a man watching her in the bank. The teller was told to do what the robber wanted. As a man approached her window to cash a small check, he told her to deliver him all her money. The robber escaped with $ 3 200. Subsequently, it was heard that the teller’s husband and daughter had not been taken hostages and had not been harmed (113). The relations between robbers and their hostages are as interesting as unexplored (114). In cases of the taking of hostages in connection with a bank robbery the danger for the victims grows less, the longer criminals and victims are locked up together and the longer the police negociates with the offenders. The danger increases when the police lets the offenders and the victims drive off together. The best constellation for an end without bloodshed is where male offenders keep female hostages, when there are no language barriers between them and only small if any differences in social rank. In such a case relations between the offenders and the victims may develop which are sociologically and psychologically as interesting as they are so far neglected and unexplored. Experience shows that in a number of cases the hostages, despite at least initial danger to their lives, being locked up for a long time and expériencing shock, in the criminal (112) FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, March 1972, p. 1. (103) FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, November 1965, p. S. (104) See VON HENTIG, (H.), Remarks on the Interaction of Perpe- trator and Victim. ir Victimology, op. cit. pp. 45 et seg. — 187 — proceedings gave evidence against the offenders only reluctantly indi- cating that the offender’s personality had not failed to impress them. So far, there are no empirical-statistical researches into this problem, but there are enough examples to encourage further research dealing with the behavior of victims. In the case of the Bank hold-up in Stockholm, Olsson and Olofsson were together with the hostages in the bank’s safe from August 23 to 28, 1973. Notwithstanding the danger and the hygienic conditions therein that defy description, the women after their liberation asked that mercy be shown to the offenders because they (the victims) had been well and fairly treated. In such situations, it is very difficult for the victims to keep up their mental resistance against the offender for long time. More or less uncons- ciously, they let themselves be influenced by him. Jhe question arises why female hostages are obviously subject to the influences of suggestion emanating from the offender. Several cir- cumstances may favor these influences. Since criminals and victims in most cases are locked up and surrounded together, there arises a certain feeling of solidarity of which, however, in most cases the persons concerne are unaware. Moreover, from ancient times, in the opinion of the people the robber sometimes appears as a hero. The romance conveyed by television plays on robbers suddenly be- comes real life. Finally, the robber having the greatest imaginary power over the victim, does not exercise it completely, as he might, but is polite and courteous to his victim, and this may also be a factor for consideration. In addition, there is the natural male-female polarity. The conduct of the victim who has obviously been influenced by the offender, reflects back on him and may quieten him and confirm him in his attitude and, at the same time, keep him from using force against the victim. The American journalist Daniel Lang interviewed the hostages of Stockholm and reported his results in « The New Yorker », Novem- ber 25, 1974. Two Swedish psychiatrists told him that the development of the relationship between the criminals and their hostages was similar to a mechanism that characterizes hostages in general and which is typical for everybody caught in situations called survival situations. Dr. Anna Freud has spoken of « identification with the aggressor ». One psychiatrist added : « It is to be expected that after à point a bond of friendship springsup between victims and their captors ». Typology of Victims The victims of bank robbers may be individual persons or collec- tive entities. Among the individuals the most important person is the cashier. Hermann Mannheim asked if there are victim prone occupatirns, — 188 — and he includes in this group all persons who have to handle large sums of money (115). The reaction of male tellers is generally predictable. The bank is insured, why should the cashier endanger his life. He has to safe himself for his family. in short : men are generally no heros. The reactions of women tellers are completely unpredictable. Their range of behavior is much larger than that of men, it reaches from quick delivering all money to just doing nothing and to total resis- tance, even if it is completely useless. DeBaun reported that the robbers were particularly careful if women were present. « Looks tell nothing. One who has all the earmarks of a lady pipefitter, may just roll up her eyes and swoom, while the little mouse who looks so scared a man itches to pat her on the head and say something soothing 1s really coolly examining the mob for warts or moles or counting the hairs on their nuckles as a means of future indentification.. Let us not overlook the screamers, who are legion. The automatic yelper, who lets go involuntarily, from surprise, is not much a problem… the aboriginal, or ritual screamer is a little more troublesome. Her scream is a notice to all males that a poor defenseless female 1s 1n distress, and what are they going to do about it ? Worst of all screa- mers is the hysterical screamer. This one takes a kind of a fit — clenches her eyes shut and lets loose at the top of her voice, and anything done to calm her is only likely to make her worse, if possible. Heist-men know of no formula for dealing with this kind of screamer, though isolated successes are spoken of » (116). Some newer examples may follow in New York City a bandit handed a demand note to a female teller who fell to the floor and screamed. Panic-stricken the bandit fled. Another robber entered a bank and handed his demand note to a female teller. The 72-year old teller took the note, read it and then turned and calmly walked away from the window. The bandit fled. In other cases the « success » was the same. In one of these cases, the teller advised the robber that she was going to faint. and he told her to go ahead, then calmly walked out (117). The employees and clients of the bank may be herded together in a room, may be taken hostages and even harmed. Already von Hentig mentioned the fake victim. After a bank robbery, the subse- quent inquiry revealed that the president of the bank was a defaulter (115) Comparative Criminology, London. Routledge et Kegan, (P.), 1965, vol. 2 p. 673. (116) DEBAUN pp. 365-366. (117) FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, November 1965, pp. 6, 7-8, 21. — 189 — and that he brought a friend in to help him to cover up. The bank robbery was committed on a share-the-wealth-plan (118). In Freiburg/Germany, a man robbed a bank together with his sister. His sister took the role of a client of the bank who was taken hostage, and menaced to force the teller to deliver his money. Collective entities may be the bank, the insurance company and lastly the state. The population in many countries has gradually got used to ever-recurrent bank robberies, kidnapings and acts of terro- rism. In spite thereof, however, any such crime sets a signal that incites potential offenders to emulation and, besides, is generally apt to weaken the people>s sense of law and public safety. The more spectacular a crime is committed, the more the State, as a victim, will suffer. Conclusion and Preventive Measures Âs far as bank robberies are concerned, in criminological theory and in the practice of law enforcement too little importance has been attributed to the social relations between the offender and his victim, especially in cases of the taking of hostages : the danger in which the hostages are, have often been greatly overestimated. Therefore, the formation of such relations should, in the future, be given more consideration, even to the extent of encouraging such relations ; new cases should be measured by the yardstick of experiences gained, and with the help of these experiences, the numbers and the successes of bank robberies should be kept as small as possible. It is often said that every new case is entirely different from all others, but meanwhile we have gained enough experience to be able to state that the common features of these cases are greater than their differences and that, for this reason, a prediction of the offender’s and the victim’s behavior is more and more possible. As a matter of principle the police should seek the decision at the first scene of the crime where the hostage was taken. This will facilitate the development of social relations between the offender and the victim in their joint seclusion. For the State, too, these tactics are the best because they serve to prevent anv spectacular appearance of the offender and the victim in public, and the victim of the crime is less endangered. The New York Police has developed a «hostage plan» and formed a « Psychological Services Unit » to train detectives for nego- ciations. This unit was used as above mentioned in the Greenwich Village bank robbery (119). (118) Criminal and His Victim, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1948, 40 Ëil9) See FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, October 1974, pp. 10 et seq. — 190 — In the field of prevention among others a reward program should be mentioned. This program was developed by the Maryland Associa- tion for Bank Security and was conceived in 1973 ; it has the pur- pose to help deter bank robberies and to assist law enforcement agencies in the solution of these crimes. It offers up to 2000 Dollar to the first person or group of persons giving the information which leads to the arrest and conviction of the offenders (120). (120) FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, December 1975, pp. 9 et seq. — 191 — L'acculturation juridique en Afrique noire et ses incidences sur l’administration de la justice criminelle YVES BRILLON Centre international de criminologie comparée Université de Montréal Montréal, Quebec, Canada La pluie ne fait que mouiller les tâches du léopard, elle ne les efface jamais. (Proverbe ashanti). Pour comprendre la criminalité et les réactions sociales au crime et à la déviance, dans l’Afrique noire moderne, une démarche heuris- tique qui dépasse les données et les statistiques gouvernementales est absolument nécessaire. Dans tous les Etats africains, des systèmes de justice criminelle et des codes pénaux, qui sont presque des copies conformes de ceux des pays occidentaux, ont été mis sur pied sans, toutefois, malgré tous les efforts déployés en ce sens, empêcher que les droits coutumiers continuent d’être opérants. L’appro- che criminologique, pour avoir une certaine pertinence, ne peut accor- der beaucoup de crédibilité aux images du phénomène criminel dont sont génératrices les institutions et les agences de prévention, de répression et de traitement car, par rapport à la conscience morale d’une partie importante de la population, ces structures institutionnelles sont en porte-à-faux dans la mesure où elles ne reposent pratiquement sur aucune assises ayant leurs racines dans les croyances et les cultures traditionnelles. Dans ces conditions, la criminologie doit s’adapter à son objet d’étude et s’orienter, d’une part, vers l’identification des attitudes des populations concernées vis-à-vis de ce qu’elles considèrent elles- mêmes comme étant des crimes et des délits et, d’autre part, vers l’appréhension des réactions informelles, spontanées et institution- nalisées qui leur sont propres, indépendamment des réponses de l’appa- reil officiel envers ce qu’il définit comme étant des infractions. C’est dans ce sens que nous préférons utiliser le terme d’ « ethno-criminolo- gie », terme qui nous permettra d’élaborer un mode d’investigation plus propice à la mise en évidence de la nature du phénomène criminel et de celle des réactions sociales qu’il suscite, et qui sont particulières aux — 193 — populations étudiées (121). En même temps, il nous sera possible de voir les discordances et les dysfonctions qui, entre les systèmes moderne et traditionnel de justice, créent des états anomiques qui court- circuitent le rôle et la finalité qui devraient caractériser un système de justice idéale qui reposerait sur un réel consensus social. D’une façon générale, pour la criminologie, l’Afrique offre la possibilité d’une réflexion profonde et fructueuse sur les principaux problèmes auxquels elle est actuellement confrontée. On assiste, en effet, sur le continent, dans ce que l’on pourrait, en termes imagés, qualifier de « conditions de laboratoire », au déroulement accéléré des mécanismes qui, dans toutes les sociétés, se sont lentement, parfois de manière presqu’imperceptible, produits pour édifier une machinerie complexe qui, au nom du principe démocratique, se veut être le gardien des normes sociales les plus fondamentales en les érigeant en règles de droit afin de pouvoir en garantir, par des mesures plus ou moins coercitives, le respect. Cela par des agences chargées de prévenir, de dépister, de juger et de neutraliser les délinquants dans un but de défense sociale et de protection de l’ordre public. En Afrique, tous les éléments du système pénal incitent le criminologue à se poser les questions essentielles qui ont trait aux fonctions et aux objectifs de la justice. Il est pratiquement impossible, pour l’homme de science, à moins d’avoir des œillères, ce qui — faut-il le dire — est le cas, malheureusement, de beaucoup de crimi- nologues africanistes, de ne pas se placer d’emblée dans une perspec- tive téléologique. En se situant sous cet angle, on ne peut éviter, à moins de faire le jeu de l’autruche, de s’interroger sur la légitimité même du système de justice criminelle. Or, cette légitimité peut être mise en doute de plusieurs manières qui explicitent l’écart ou le fossé qui se creuse entre législateurs et justiciables. Cet écart peut se mani- fester par une opposition soit aux valeurs que la loi prétend préserver, soit au système de justice dont on ne comprend pas le sens et les buts, soit à certaines prohibitions qui rentrent en contradictions avec les normes propres à des sous-groupes, soit encore à des procédures et à des modes d’intervention des agents ou des agences du système. Ces phénomènes sont assez visibles et tranparents, dans les Etats africains, pour que l’on puisse, par le biais de recherches ethno- criminologiques, reconnaître les intentions qui sont sous-jacentes aux politiques criminelles, mesurer leurs effets, discerner parmi les factions sociales les forces d’inertie, de résistance de même que les voies de détournement et d’évitement qui leur permettent de manifester, sinon leur opposition, du moins leur désengagement. Dans un tel cadrage conceptuel, l’étude du phénomène criminel et des réactions insti- tutionnelles de l’appareil gouvernemental fournira beaucoup plus d’in- dices sur ses idiosyncrasies, sur sa logique d’auto-légitimisation, sur (121) A paraître en janvier 1978, Ethno-criminologie de l’Afrique Noire, Montréal, C.I.C.C., Université de Montréal, 300 p. — 194 — ses priorités d’opération, sur son idéologie politique, sur ses conceptions du crime que sur la nature et l’ampleur de la criminalité ; celle-ci étant entendue comme l’ensemble des actes définis, par la population, comme constituant des menaces assez sérieuses à l’ordre public pour que l’on y réagisse d’une façon formelle et particulière. La juxtaposition de deux systèmes de justice, en Afrique, offre la rare opportunité de se pencher sur les conflits qui tiraillent pouvoir et population ainsi que leurs conséquences au niveau de l’efficacité de l’administration de la justice. C’est, en tout cas, selon cette orientation que doit s’articuler une étude réaliste du phénomène criminel et de la réaction sociale au crime en Afrique noire. Pour parvenir à cette fin, il faudrait, bien que les données fassent défaut, procéder sous forme de diptyque par la description, d’abord, des infractions et des réactions aux crimes spécifiques aux populations vivant selon les coutumes traditionnelles pour, ensuite, aborder les légis- lations et les systèmes pénaux africains modernes. Ces deux volets, en autant qu’ils ressortent de visions du monde, de « Weltanschauung », différentes sont, du moins en grande partie, antagoniques ; ce qui ne peut que se répercuter sur le recours, par les citoyens, à une jus- tice qui, d’une part, se veut être la seule voie légitime pour le règlement des litiges et qui, de l’autre ne répond pas aux aspirations culturelles des justiciables. Les travaux des ethnologues et des anthropologues montrent que la justice traditionnelle présente des particularités en ce qui concer- ne, entre autres, les normes légales (caractère sacré, conception magico- religieuse), les sanctions spontanées (homicides de criminels pris en flagrant délit), les instances judiciaires (bien souvent, des autorités traditionnelles), les procédures (arbitrage, conciliation), les modes de preuve (serments, ordalies) et les sentences (prépondérance de la compensation) ; particularités qui non seulement ont trouvé peu de pla- ce dans les systèmes pénaux imposés par les puissances coloniales, puis adoptés par les autorités publiques après les indépendances, mais qui ont été rejetées, en grande partie, comme étant des pratiques inhu- maines, barbares ou inconciliables avec une justice civilisée de type international. Quels que soient les jugements que l’on puisse porter sur les systèmes juridiques coutumiers ou sur leur avenir, ce qui est important et certain c’est qu'ils subsistent et que, en continuant de fonctionner, ils ont une influence. sur les agences pénales insti- tutionnalisées et, par le fait même, sur la criminalité connue. La première question qui se pose est de savoir quelle est l’importance de la survivance du droit coutumier ? La seconde, pourquoi ce droit survit-il encore aujourd’hui ? Quelles en sont les causes ? La troisième, quels sont les facteurs expliquant la coexistence de deux ordres juridiques ? — 195 — 1. Importance de la survivance de la justice coutumière. Au-delà des apparences de modernité, dont se parent les villes, et au-delà des comportements européens qu’adoptent les citadins, il ny a aucun doute que les Africains continuent à répondre à des réflexes ancestraux et que, comme l’écrivait Croce-Spinelli (1967), «la société et les mœurs ont évolué plus vite que le subconscient des individus » (p. 279). Il est assez hasardeux d’évaluer l’importance que possède, encore aujourd’hui jJla justice coutumière dans l’Afrique moderne. Cette justice n’ayant plus, légalement, droit de cité — surtout en matière criminelle — elle s’est vue forcée de se réfugier dans l’ombre, dans la clandestinité ; ce qui rend son étude quantitative impossible. Sa survivance est, cependant, attestée par des faits, dont on ignore l’ampleur réelle, qui, à cause de leur gravité, qui, par des indiscrétions, par des découvertes fortuites ou par des dépôts de plainte, parviennent jusqu’aux tribunaux. Tout ce dont nous disposons ce sont des indices, mais suffisamment nombreux et pertinents, pour prouver la pérennité des traits culturels traditionnels et le maintien de certaines institutions. Deux exemples, tirés du matériel recueilli, en Côte-d’Ivoire, par Ezzat Fattah (122), en 1972, témoignent du recours à des mécanis- mes coutumiers pour le règlement des conflits. Ils ont été choisis dans le but de faire voir les différences dans la définition des actes criminels et de montrer à la fois le sérieux des actes qui peuvent être soustraits à l’enquête judiciaire et les chemins par lesquels ils finissent par aboutir au parquet. La première affaire concerne un assassinat, accompli dans le contexte d’un sacrifice rituel et d’une dette entre familles. Elle a pour décor un petit village de brousse, Gnakanepo, de la région de Tabou, situé à quelques six cents kilomètres d’Abidjan. La victime est une enfant, âgée de deux ans. Le 5 novembre 1965 son père signala sa disparition à la gendarmerie qui devait retrouver son cadavre, deux semaines plus tard, dans un marigot. Voici le résumé des faits : quelques mois avant le crime, en juillet ou août 1965, quatre villageois, au cours d’une réunion annuelle de sorciers avaient « A décrété que la prochaine personne, à € tre enlevée et tuée, serait le chef du village. Parmi les autres participants, certains s’opposèrent = a ce choix et l’un d’eux, le grand-père de la future victime, proposa que la petite T.O. le remplace. Ce qui fut accepté. Le 5 novembre, les quatre villlageois, trois hommes et une femme ,enlevèrent la fillette qui fut exécutée quatre jours plus tard. Après l’avoir tuée, on procéda à l’ablation des organes génitaux et de l’anus, ceux-ci devant servir à la fabrication d’une décoction destinée à droguer une pro- (122) Nous remercions Ezzat Fattah, actuellement directeur du département de criminologie de l’université Simon Fraser, Canada, d’avoir bien voulu nous prêter, pour consultation, toutes les données qu’il a recueillies en Côte-d’Ivoire en vue de préparer une étude sur les homicides et les suicides. Il s’agit d’infor- mations encore inédites. — 196 — chaine victime. Il ressort des procès-verbaux, retranscrits par Fattah, que cet assasssinat s’inscrivait dans le règlement d’une dette macabre entre clans ou lignages, le chef du village ayant déjà livré cinq membres de sa famille. Lors du procès, en 1967, trois des quatre accusés, la femme étant morte avant son procès, furent condamnés à 15 ans de travaux forcés. La deuxième affaire a trait à une accusation d’empoisonnement. Les faits datent de mars 1972, donc de l’époque du séjour d’Ezzat Fattah en Côte-d’Ivoire. Les événements se sont produits dans un village de la région de Divo, à environ 200 kilomètres d’Abidjan. Le 4 mars, à trois heures du matin, N.T., qui ne souffrait d’aucune maladie apparente, décéda après avoir vomi du sang. Selon la cou- tume Gouro, on demanda à l’épouse du défunt, la cause de la mort de son mari. Elle déclara que celui-ci avait été empoisonné par des ennemis Baoulé avec lesquels il avait bu la veille. Le cadavre fut enterré et la famille du défunt dressa une liste des revendications, à titre de compensation, des dommages-intérêts, pour que le litige soit réglé à l’amiable. Cette liste comprenait une importante somme d’argent, du bétail et plusieurs caisses de boissons alcooliques. Toute- fois, les prétendus auteurs refusèrent de payer, en invoquant leur innocence, ce qui fit que l’affaire fut déférée devant les tribunaux. Ces deux exemples, n’eût été le dépôt de plaintes, ne seraient jJamais parvenus jusqu’à notre connaissance et les faits auraient été religieusement gardés sous silence par les villageois. Dans le premier cas, la femme impliquée était une sorcière notoire et, lors de son arrestation, elle avoua avoir tué cinq personnes auparavant. Ce sont donc, pour ce seul village et pour cette seule accusée, cinq meurtres qui ont été cachés à la justice moderne. Il s’agit, semble-t-il, dans cette affaire, d’une société secrète qui paraît exercer une justice ésotérique. Dans le second exemple, le refus de se soumettre au paiement du « wergeld pousse les présumés coupables à s’adresser aux tribunaux. Cette démarche pouvait être motivée par des craintes de représailles, car les procès-verbaux font état d’un conflit ethnique, dans ce village, entre Gouro et Baoulé. Quoi qu’il en soit, les traits culturels propres à la mentalité primitive et les objectifs fondamentaux qui sous-tendent le droit coutumier nous laissent à penser que la criminalité connue, surtout celle des régions rurales, ne représente qu’une partie de la pointe visible d’un iceberg, dont il est difficile d’apprécier le volume réel. Nous ne pouvons le faire qu’indirectement par des recherches portant sur les attitudes de la population vis-à-vis des anciens systèmes juridiques. Une recherche menée dans une grande ville nigérianne, à Ibadan, par Oloruntimehin (1973), de même que l’enquête conduite, par sondage, à Abidjan, en mars 1974, nous livrent quelques indications sur le degré de recours, par les populations concernées, à la justice traditionnelle. — 197 — Une confrontation des deux recherches s’avère intéressante parce qu’elles abordent à peu près le même problème, mais dans deux milieux urbains fort différents. Ibadan est considéré comme une ville traditionnelle car, contrairement à Abidjan, la population y est ethni- quement homogène. La majorité des habitants sont des Yoruba, dont une grande partie est native de l’endroit et se consacre à l’agri- culture, à l’artisanat et à de petits commerces. Beaucoup de clans vivent encore selon le modèle de la famille élargie qui rassemble habituellement, sous la houlette d’un patriarche, vingt personnes et plus. Quant à Abidjan, qui compte un million d’habitants, c’est une ville moderne, un carrefour où l’on retrouve une mosaïque très complexe d’ethnies différentes. Plus de cinquante ethnies y sont repré- sentées. La moitié de la population est composée d’Africains provenant d’autres pays que la Côte-d’Ivoire, d’individus jeunes qui connaissent une grande instabilité résidentielle et professionnelle. Dans ces deux villes, un échantillon de la population (120 person- nes à Ibadan ; 1 000 à Abidjan) fut interrogé sur les attitudes à l’égard des procédures légales, à savoir sur la préférence entre la voie coutu- mière (règlement à l’amiable par les voisins, les chefs de famille) et la voie officielle (instances policières et judiciaires) de la résolution des litiges soulevés par la commission de délits. Les deux recherches ayant été faites sans concertation, les questions posées sont différentes. D’un autre côté, elles se chevauchent et se complètent, ce qui permet d’avoir une vue plus globale des attitudes. Le travail conduit par Oloruntimehin s’est limité à quelques infrac- tions : les assauts (non accompagnés de lésions corporelles très graves), les bagarres, les jeux de hasard et les vols (n’impliquant pas de grosses sommes d’argent). Il ne faut pas être surpris de trouver, parmi ces délits retenus, les jeux de hasard parce que les Africains en sont amateurs et que les dettes de jeu donnent souvent lieu à des que- relles assez sérieuses. Nous avons regroupé les principaux résultats de l’étude, dans le tableau 1, selon les stratifications retenues par l’auteur : a) jeunes (20-35 ans) — vieux (40-65 ans) ; b) classe supérieure (« upper class ») : 15 ans de scolarité et un revenu annuel d’au moins 700 livres sterling — classe inférieure («lower class») : moins de 12 ans de scolarité et revenu inférieur à 400 livres : c) sexe. — 198 — TABLEAU 1 Recours aux procédures traditionnnelles ou modernes selon le statut social, l’âge et le sexe, à Ibadan (Oloruntimehin, 1973). Règlement >rocédure légale ToTAL informel Nombre % Nombre % Nombre e C 33 82,9 40 100,00 Classe supérieure 17,5 Classe inférieure « . …. ... J7 92,5 7,0 40 ToTAL . ....... 70 87,5 10 12,5 80 100,00 Vieux 20 100,00 20 100.00 Jeunes . .................... 17 85,00 15,00 20 100,00 ToTAL …. ....... 37 92,5 1,5 40 100,00 Hommes 36 90,0 10,0 40 100,00 Femmes » ................. 37 1,9 40 100,00 92,5 TOTAL .. .......68 73 91,25 8,7 80 100,00 Il ressort des chiffres obtenus que 82,5 % des membres de la classe supérieure ont montré une nette préférence pour les méthodes informelles de règlement des litiges alors que 92,5 %, de la classe inférieure l’ont fait. L’élite semble donc, pour les délits mentionnés plus haut, s’exprimer majoritairement, quoique à un degré moindre que les petits salariés, contre l’ingérence de la police ou des juges dans les infractions peu graves. Comme il fallait s’y attendre les per- sonnes âgées, plus conservatrices et conformistes, (100 %) sont plus réfractaires que les jeunes (85 %) à l’utilisation du système pénal institutionnalisé. Au niveau de la répartition par sexe, aucune diffé- rence n’apparaît. Quels que soient l’âge, le sexe et le statut social, on préfère régler en famille, ou à l’intérieur de la tribu, selon les coutumes, les conflits que font naître les assauts, les bagarres, les dettes et les vols pourvu que les préjudices subis ne soient pas trop élevés ou trop visibles. Malheureusement, rien ne concerne, dans cette enquête, les délits plus sérieux qui, étant donné l’homogénéité culturelle de la population et la hiérarchie structurelle des sous- groupes familiaux, doivent quand même, assez souvent, trouver leur dénouement au cours de palabres qui donnent lieu à des arrangements et des indemnisations. Dans notre enquête auprès des Abidjanais, nous avons essayé de préciser l’éventail des infractions, en termes de types de crime et de leur gravité, qui — selon les personnes interviewées — étaient susceptibles d’être résolues hors cours. Les questions visaient donc à déceler la fréquence des mesures d’arbitrage et de conciliation ainsi — 199 — que la nature des délits qui en faisaient l’objet. Cette investigation nous a conduit à la conclusion que les systèmes juridiques coutumiers, en Afrique occidentale tout au moins, sont loin d’être des institutions caduques. Nous avons aussi introduit, d’une façon indirecte, dans la formulation des questions, la variable « ville-campagne». Nous allons analyser nos résultats en allant du général au particulier, c’est- à-dire en considérant d’abord les attitudes face aux procédures judi- ciaires non officielles, ensuite les fréquences selon lesquelles les gens pensent qu’elles sont utilisées et, enfin, les actes ou comportements que l’on perçoit comme étant du ressort de ces juridictions coutumières. a) Importance du règlement à l’amiable ou de la conciliation. Pour aborder une réalité aussi délicate que celle de la survivance de la justice coutumière, réalité qui, de toute façon, se révèle intan- gible de par sa nature même (puisqu’elle est marginale par rapport aux organismes gouvernementaux de contrôle social) il nous a semblé que la meilleure manière de procéder était encore de mesurer les atti- tudes et les opinions des Africains vis-à-vis des systèmes juridiques coutumiers. Les résultats que l’on obtient, par cette méthode, s’ils ne nous indiquent pas, avec certitude, le degré de fonctionnement réel des procédures d’arbitrage et de conciliation, nous dévoilent, chez les sujets interrogés, l’ampleur de l’approbation accordée à ces prati- ques en même temps que le dyssensus qui peut exister entre la concep- tion que se fait une population de la justice et celle des autorités publiques, lesquelles ont mis en place un système pénal nouveau. L’approche scientifique choisie est de nature, par conséquent, à mettre en évidence la prégnance contemporaine de certaines caractéristiques de la mentalité primitive. Dans une première étape, c’est sur le principe même du règlement à l’amiable, donc de la résolution des litiges par des voies informelles, que la population de notre échantillon a été appelée à se prononcer. Le sujet fut abordé d’abord en termes généraux afin de déterminer la proportion des personnes en accord ou en désaccord avec l’énoncé suivant « Il vaut mieux arranger les choses à l’amiable, même si ce n’est pas tout à fait satisfaisant, que d’aller à la police ». Une question similaire (« Un mauvais arrangement vaut mieux qu’un bon procès ») a été posée, en 1969, à un échantillon représentatif de la population française (Kalogéropoulos, 1973). Ce qui nous fournira un point de comparaison. Nous avons, dans un second temps, précisé et replacé dans un cadre rural le même principe en le formulant comme suit : « Quelle que soit la gravité de l’acte commis par un membre d’un même village, il vaut mieux d’abord essayer de régler l’affaire entre les familles plutôt que de faire intervenir la police ou la gendar- merie ». La ventilation des réponses à ces questions, pour les Français et pour l’échantillon africain d’Abidjan, est présentée dans le tableau 2. — 200 — TABLEAU 2 Proportion des personnes favorables ou défavorables au principe de l’arrangement à l’amiable des litiges, en France et à Abidjan. FRANCE (1969) ABIDJAN (1974) | Principe appliqué Principe Principe envisagé en soi envisagé en soi au milieu rural (»/ Favorable 57,7 61,9 79,6 Défavorable } 7 T 30,8 20,3 0,4 Ne sait pas 6,2 0,1 TOTAL 99,80 100,0 100,0 Les réponses obtenues suscitent des remarques importantes. Concernant le principe général de l’arrangement par des voies non officielles, ce qui surprend c’est le peu de différences entre l’échan- tillon français et celui d’Abidjan. On ne retrouve chez les citadins africains que 4,2 %, d’individus de plus, comparativement aux Français, qui privilégient la résolution de conflits par des ententes extérieures aux procédures légales. Ceci prouve que dans tous les pays, cer- tainement pour les infractions les moins graves, les citoyens ne sont pas particulièrement processifs et que, si possibilité il y a, ils s’arrangent entre eux pour en finir au plus tôt ou pour éviter les désagréments de la machine judiciaire (coût, lenteur, complexité, conséquences pour l’accusé.…). La « déjudiciarisation » de facto, de la part des justiciables, attestée par les recherches criminologiques sur le chiffre noir de la criminalité, est un phénomène international qui s’amplifie au fur et à mesure que le système pénal se congestionne et qu’il devient de moins en moins efficace. L’indifférenciation des attitudes, entre les deux populations, trouve aussi une explication socioculturelle dans le fait que la conciliation entre les parties en cause dans un différend n’a pas la même résonance pour les groupes respectifs. Pour l’Occidental, qui a subi un préjudice léger ou moyen, un mauvais arrangement vaut mieux qu’un bon procès parce que le bon procès sera long, lourd et pourra constituer = des pertes de temps pour, en fin de compte, aboutir à une solution qui ne rapportera pas grand chose, sinon la condamnation de l’accusé à une amende ou à une peine d’emprisonnement. C’est donc un choix opportuniste qui dicte une conduite destinée à éviter de tomber de Charybde en Scylla. — 201 — L’Africain ne fait pas le même raisonnement, même si les agences policières et judiciaires sont perçues sous le même angle et que les inconvénients sont encore plus grands pour des individus qui, en plus, les considèrent comme des institutions qui ne sont pas les leurs. Pour lui, et il faut insister là-dessus, la justice consiste avant tout à colmater toute brèche qui peut menacer la solidarité sociale, ce qui exige que l’on rétablisse le statu quo ante, de façon à ce que chacun soit strictement rétabli dans ses droits et obligations. La partie restric- tive de la question, « même si ce n’est pas tout à fait satisfaisant », entre en opposition directe avec la finalité de l’arbitrage, lequel est à la base de la justice coutumière, qui est la « vraie » justice par rapport à celle des tribunaux. La formulation de la question a donc pu entraîner des réponses défavorables, non pas parce que les interviewés n’étaient pas en accord avec l’idée de faire appel à la conciliation mais parce qu’ils ne pouvaient concevoir une conciliation qui ne soit pas «‘satisfaisante ». D'’ailleurs l’assentiment de 79,6 % d’entre eux au recours aux instances tra- ditionnelles, entre membres d’un même village, illustre bien l’impact du biais. On peut penser que les réponses favorables (61,9 %) au principe de l’arrangement à l’amiable sont, ici, sous-estimées et que, sans attein- dre les chiffres obtenus à Ibadan (en moyenne, selon les catégories, 90 %), elles doivent se situer aux environs de 80 %, comme l’indiquent les réponses à la question qui focalisait ce type de justice dans le contexte tribal. Cela semble d’autant plus plausible que la question alors posée comportait un facteur de modération non négligeable, car elle incluait tout acte, quelle que soit sa gravité. D’un autre côté, elle insistait davantage sur l’articulation du groupe, uni par des liens de parenté ou d’alliance, que suppose d’habitude la cohabitation villageoise. Lorsque l’on prend en considération la structuration de l’échan- tillon, les attitudes favorables au principe de l’arrangement à l’amiable, comme moyen de solution général des différends, ne laissent entrevoir pratiquement aucune différence entre les Africains étrangers (63,2 %) et les Ivoiriens (60,6 %), entre les hommes (62 %) et les femmes (61,5 %). Par contre, un clivage beaucoup plus marqué apparaît lorsqu’on examine l’âge et la scolarité : les plus de 40 ans se montrent plus traditionnalistes (73,15 %) que les plus jeunes (60 %), de même que les personnes qui n’ont pas atteint le secondaire (63,68 %,) par rapport au plus scolarisés (47,22 %). On retrouve, à peu de chose près le même profil, mais atténué, quand on aborde l’application de ‘a justice coutumière dans son milieu naturel : le village. L’âge y est relativement moins discriminant : 78,96 % des moins de 40 ans sont en faveur du règlement informel des litiges et 83,22 % des plus âgés. Il en va ainsi de la scolarité puisque 72,22 % de ceux qui ont été plus loin que l’école primaire y sont favorables, en comparaison de 80,49 , pour les moins instruits. — 202 — Dans nos données, l’acculturation se manifeste déjà, par l’âge et l'instruction, comme le principal moteur de changement et de modi- fication des attitudes à l’égard des valeurs et des institutions primitives. Toutefois, l’attachement aux coutumes, que témoignent les hauts pour- centages d’'adhésion aux anciens systèmes juridiques, indiquent que la population, même urbaine, reste foncièrement conformiste et fidèle aux chartes sociales ancestrales. On aurait donc tort de minimiser les forces de résistance face a = une évolution qui apparaît comme très rapide. Si les comportements se modifient, les croyances et la men- talité résistent avec ténacité car elles sont profondément ancrées. Entre les citadins, les néo-citadins et les ruraux, il n’y a pas de rupture mais un continuum en ce qui touche à la culture tradi- tionnelle. Sauf pour une infime minorité plus ou moins associée au pouvoir politique. Même à Abidjan, beaucoup d’affaires criminelles sont soumises aux chefs ou aux anciens, à l’intérieur des regroupements d’ethnies, de clans ou de personnes provenant d’une même région ou d’un même village (123). En ville, cependant, à cause de la présence d’un plus grand nombre de policiers et de la proximité des tribunaux, le risque de voir la loi du silence, qui protège la justice parallèle, s’éven- trer est beaucoup plus grand. Cela pour trois principales raisons. D’abord, parce que les crimes graves sont plus difficiles à camou- fler, à dissimuler. Un cadavre n’est pas une chose dont on se débar- rasse aussi aisément dans une aire urbaine qu’en forêt ; une dispa- rition soulève des questions de la part des parents et des voisins, questions qui ont plus de chances de parvenir jusqu’aux oreilles d’un commissaire, jusqu’à un poste de police de quartier ; des blessures graves donnent lieu à une hospitalisation qui déclenchera, dans les cas troublants, une enquête. La deuxième raison, c'est la constitution multi-ethnique des gran- des villes. La justice traditionnelle ne fonctionne que dans le cadre assez étroit d’une population homogène qui partage les mêmes croyances et les mêmes institutions. Autrefois, une infraction commise contre un membre d’une autre ethnie ou tribu n’était pas considérée comme un crime punissable par le groupe du coupable. Il en résultait des guerres tribales, des revanches collectives brutales qui ont marqué la vie des peuplades africaines avant la colonisation. Quand deux groupes hétérogènes, dans une agglomération urbaine, sont en conflit à la suite d’un délit, aucun de leur droit coutumier respectif ne peut avoir juridiction sur le litige, de telle sorte que c’est la justice moderne qui servira d’autorité ou de mécanisme d’arbitrage. La troisième raison, c’est l’action « antitraditionnaliste » des intel- lectuels, de l’élite africaine. Les gens instruits, et cela ressort clai- rement des données analysées plus haut pour Abidjan, sont beau- (123) Témoignage du juge K.D., 1974. Juge ayant professé à Abidjan et étant. lors de l’entrevue, juge dans une section de tribunal, en région rurale. — 203 — coup moins favorables à j.. survivance de structures sociales qui sont contraires à l’idée de détribalisation, idée que suppose celle du « natio- nalisme» économique et politique. Il y a donc une pression qui s’exerce de leur part pour que leurs concitoyens se « civilisent », se « modernisent » et respectent les organes gouvernementaux. Cette pres- sion joue aussi, mais plus faiblement dans les villages. Chez moi (région de Man), les cas d’adultère sont réglés par les familles. Les assassinats sont souvent liés à des que- relles au sujet des femmes. Car un homme a d’autant plus de prestige qu’il a plus de femmes. Ce qui crée des tensions entre les plus vieux, qui sont plus riches et qui mono- polisent les femmes, et les plus jeunes qui n’ont pas de quoi payer la dot. En cas d’assassinat, si la famille du prévenu reconnaît la faute et demande pardon, on arran- gera l’affaire selon la coutume. Si la chose parvient au tribu- nal, c’est soit par accident, parce que la gendarmerie aura découvert quelque chose, soit parce que la famille du cou- pable n’aura pas voulu se soumettre et payer la compensa- tion, soit, encore, à cause de la pression d’un intellectuel. Quand je vais chez moi, les gens savent que je suis juge et ils me parlent des délits, ils me demandent parfois même conseil. Ils savent que je ne les dénoncerai pas. S’il s’agit d’une chose très grave, ils vont me la cacher. La justice traditionnelle est en perte de vitesse dans la mesure où les villages se dépeuplent au profit des villes. Les gens qui vont dans les villes voient autre chose dans un cadre plus grand. La justice traditionnelle n’est pas pratique dans ce cadre social lA. Quand ils reviennent ensuite au village, ils considèrent les choses sous un angle différent et influencent peu à peu la population. Mais avant que les anciennes coutumes disparaissent, cela prendra du temps. C’est peut-être l’affaire d’un siècle… (124). Ces raisons expliquent les différences quantitatives que nous re- trouvons entre les attitudes envers les règlements à l’amiable entre la ville d’Abidjan et celle d’Ibadan (Nigeria) d’une part ; et, de l’autre, entre le principe de l’arrangement, par conciliation, selon qu’il est appliqué dans un milieu urbain ou rural : le milieu faisant inter- venir les variables d’homogénéité sociale, de proximité des agences pénales et de l’influnce de la civilisation occidentale. b) La fréquence du règlement à l’amiable ou de la conciliation. Les attitudes de la population vis-à-vis du recours à des autorités judiciaires informelles et celles ayant trait à la fréquence de l’inter- vention de ces autorités ne sont pas nécessairement imbriquées, ni interdépendantes. Dans la première hypothèse, elles reposent sur un (124) Témoignage de B.À.… juge en brousse. Côte d’Ivoire, 1974. — 204 — Jugement de valeur porté sur les systèmes juridiques coutumiers. Dans la seconde, elles révèlent une appréciation de l’importance des affaires traitées par ces systèmes. On peut donc concevoir que des personnes soient défavorables aux procédures coutumières tout en admettant que celles-ci continuent à être utilisées. L'inverse peut être vrai aussi. Des individus peuvent être favorables à une justice de type traditionnel et constater leur plus ou moins grand degré d’application. Aussi remar- quons-nous qu'il y a un peu plus de personnes interrogées qui recon- naissent l’usage de la conciliation, dans son principe général, qu’il y en a de favorables à cet usage (62,7 % contre 61,9 %) et beaucoup plus, lorsque la question est spécifiquement orientée vers la communauté villageoise (87,2 % contre 79,6 %). TABLEAU 3 tréquences estimées par la population d'Abidjan (1974) des règlements à l’amiable, selon que ceux-ci sont envisagés dans un contexte social général ou dans un contexte rural. Fréquences du règlement Application en milieu à l’amiable Application générale rura —meeens e 0 e e — S S — Ve % V % cumulés cumulés Ne sait pas 4,8 1,0 Jamais 32,5 37,3 11,8 12,8 Rarement 22,5 22,5 20,0 20,0 Quelques fois 17,1 39,6 22,8 42,8 Souvent 20,1 59,7 32,2 75,0 Toujours 3,0 62,7 12,2 87,2 TOTAL 100,00 100,00 En se référant au tableau 3, si l’on compare la fréquence des règlements officieux selon qu’ils sont envisagés sous l’angle d’un mode général d’arrangement des litiges ou sous celui d’un mécanisme plus spécifique au milieu rural, on note qu’il y a, entre les deux, deux fois et demie plus de personnes qui peñsent qu’on ne s’en remet jamais à des instances, autres que judiciaires officielles, dans la première perspective (32,5 %) que dans la seconde (11,8 %). À l’autre extré- mité, si seulement 3 %, croient que l’on a, d’une façon générale, toujours recours à la conciliation, il y en a quatre fois plus (12,2 %) qui attestent l’utilisation constante de l’arbitrage coutumier, dans les villages. Les hautes fréquences (souvent et foujours) caractérisent les — 205 — zones campagnardes (44,4 %,) sans toutefois les exclure d’une uti- lisation plus globale (23,1 %). Quand on sait, par ailleurs, qu’en Afrique noire, plus de 70 % des habitants vivent dans des villages, on ne peut qu’acquiescer à l’hypothèse de Tanner (1970) et de Houchon (1971), selon laquelle la criminalité cachée serait plus importante sur ce continent qu’en Europe ou en Amérique. Cela devient une évidence, un truisme qui laisse planer un sérieux doute sur la portée et la vali- dité des études criminologiques qui ne se basent que sur les statis- tiques criminelles. La remarque, faite plus haut, sur la différence entre les attitudes vis-à-vis des méthodes judiciaires traditionnelles et l’estimation de leur survivance apparaît avec netteté à l’analyse, lorsque l’on fait intervenir différentes variables. Contrairement à ce qui se produit quand c’est une attitude qui est en cause, on ne retrouve pas, pour l’éva- luation des fréquences des jugements coutumiers, de clivages dus à l’âge ou à la scolarité de telle sorte que les profils des réponses offrent moins de contrastes. La question posée, selon une formulation générale, se lisait comme suit «On dit que certaines personnes, lorsqu’elles sont victimes d’un voleur ou d’un bandit, règlent les choses elles-mêmes parce qu’elles prétendent que cela est plus rapide et efficace. Pensez-vous que des personnes agissent de la sorte : jamais, rarement, quelques fois, souvent, toujours ? » La distribution des réponses, selon ces caté- gories, ne montre aucune différence notable et significative entre les moins de 40 ans et les 40 ans et plus. Il en va de même de la scola- rité, Quant au sexe, on relève que les réponses des hommes ont ten- dance, par rapport à celles des femmes, à se concentrer un peu plus dans les plus faibles fréquences (35,4 % d’'hommes estimant que les règlements à l’amiable ne se produisent jamais par rapport à 23,8 % des femmes ; à l’autre bout de l’échelle, 20,9 % des répondants mas- culins pensent que ce type d’arrangement se produit souvent ou tou- jours contre 29,8 % des locutrices). On retrouve presqu’exactement le même découpage entre Africains étrangers, lesquels sous-estiment le recours à l’arbitrage comparativement aux Ivoiriens. Restituée dans le cadre social traditionnel, la question comprenait les mêmes gradations de réponse. Le libellé mettait exclusivement en relief le décor villageois « Lorsque quelqu’un de son village a commis un vol ou a causé du tort à une autre personne, on règle l’affaire entre les familles ou selon les coutumes ou plutôt que de faire intervenir la police ou la gendarmerie. D’après vous, cela se produit-il jamais, rarement… etc. ? » Les scores, tels que colligés dans le tableau 3, connaissent — quand comparés avec l’application généralisée du règlement hors cours — Une progression parallèle à l’augmentation — 206 — du nombre de fois où ce type d’intervention est jugé comme étant encore en vigueur. Ici, encore, l’âge s’avère un facteur de discrimination quasi nul. La scolarisation, par contre, semble jouer un rôle différenciateur plus grand. Ce sont les personnes les plus instruites (école secondaire et davantage) qui croient que, dans les régions rurales, la justice ancestrale continue à s’exercer très fréquemment. Parmi elles, seulement 46 % pensent que la conciliation n’est jamais utilisée (contre 12,7 % des moins instruits) alors que 55,6 %, jugent que les villageois y font appel souvent ou toujours (comparés à 43 % pour les personnes illet- trées et celles n’ayant pas dépassé l’école primaire). Le sexe ne module guère les résultats alors que la nationalité agit en sens inverse de tout à l’heure : 6,2 % des étrangers (contre 17,4 % des Ivoiriens) ont dit qu'en brousse l’arbitrage n’intervenait, actuellement, jamais tandis que 49,2 % d’entre eux (par rapport à 39,6 % des nationaux) disaient que l’on y faisait appel couramment. Contrairement à ce que l’on pourrait conclure, à première vue, il n’y a pas de contradiction ou d’illogisme dans la structuration des réponses des divers sous-groupes. Les tendances qui se dégagent s’expliquent par des considérations sociologiques générales. Si, lorsque la justice coutumière est abordée en termes généraux, les femmes plus que les hommes évaluent son application comme plus fréquente, c’est que celles-ci sont plus tradi- tionnalistes. Dans le milieu urbain, celui d’Abidjan, la femme demeure plus près de ses attaches ethniques et culturelles que l’homme. Ce dernier, par son travail, ses activités, a plus de contacts avec les valeurs modernes. En général, son expérience urbaine est plus longue, plus intense aussi. En effet, le shéma classique de l’exode rural comprend d’abord l’installation de l’'homme à la ville puis, après un certain temps d’adaptation, s’il décide d’y rester, la venue de ou des épouses ainsi que des enfants. Les femmes sont, la plupart du temps, confinées dans des tâches domestiques qui les gardent au foyer. Elles se trouvent, de ce fait, plus protégées contre l’influence de la civilisation occidentale. Il n’est donc pas étonnant qu’elles soient plus enclines à se référer au modèle rural pour évaluer le système de justice ; ce qui a sans doute pour conséquence une appréciation plus généreuse de la fréquence des jugements coutumiers. Quant à la différence entre Ivoiriens et étrangers, elle tire sa source, semble-t-il, dans le principe de la solidarité sociale. C’est là un facteur des plus importants qui joue un rôle sur la surreprésentation des allogènes au niveau de la criminalité connue. Les étrangers, dans le milieu urbain, sont défavorisés en compa- raison avec les autochtones. Comme ils ne sont pas du pays, ils ne peuvent pas aussi souvent faire intervenir en cas de conflit, les procé- dures arbitrales. IIs sont certainement un peu plus désavantagés que — 207 — les Ivoiriens. Non pas que ceux-ci soient ethniquement homogènes, loin s’en faut. La multiplicité des ethnies ivoiriennes, plus de soixante, atteste la complexité de la carte démographique. Cependant, entre certaines tribus, les possibilités d’entente sont plus nombreuses et probables parce qu’elles se rattachent à une lointaine souche commune. C’est le cas des Agni, des Abron, des Baoulé, des Appolo et de leurs sous-groupes qui, tous, forment la grande famille des Akan. Cela peut expliquer le fait que les Ivoiriens d’Abidjan estiment que, sans que le contexte d’application soit précisé, les arrangements par conciliation soient plus fréquents comparativement à l’évaluation qu’en font les allogènes. En définitive, les premiers par rapport aux seconds ont un peu plus de chances, lors d’un litige, de se trouver parmi des groupes dont les institutions peuvent être compatibles. Ces distinctions et ces discordances s’estompent dès que l’on situe la justice coutumière dans le cadre de référence de la société archaïque, villageoise. L’âge, pas plus que le sexe, n’intervient comme élément de différenciation. Assez curieusement, ce sont les étrangers et les = individus les plus instruits qui sont les plus nombreux a accorder de hautes fréquences aux recours aux formes traditionnelles de jus- tice, dans les villages. Il est fort probable que des variables expli- catives psycho-sociologiques, que nous ne sommes pas en mesure de vérifier avec les données recueillies. soient sous-jacentes à cette strati- fication des réponses. On peut penser que les personnes les plus instruites, dont on a vu que les attitudes envers les formes officieuses de justice sont moins favorables, ont tendance à surévaluer la survivance réelle de ces types de règlement en Zone rurale. Une seconde raison, plus concrète peut- être, c’est que plus une personne est instruite, plus elle est urbanisée. L’enseignement secondaire, en Afrique, est directement lié à l’urbani- sation. L’implantation se fait d’abord dans les grandes villes avant de s’étendre aux centres urbains de seconde importance. De telle sorte que, bien souvent, les plus instruits sont beaucoup plus déracinés ; de telle sorte que leurs relations avec le village sont plus lâches, plus loin- taines, plus espacées ; ce qui peut entraîner une erreur d’appréciation due à la méconnaissance de l’évolution sociale qui marque les popu- lations agricoles. Pour ce qui est des étrangers, la condition désavanta- geuse qu’ils subissent à la ville peut influer, par compensation, sur l’esti- mation qu’ils font de la fréquence des jugements coutumiers. D’autre part, venant de pays moins développés, il est raisonnable de présumer que les institutions traditionnelles sont plus vivaces dans leur villlage respectif. Les deux recherches, conduites à Ibadan et à Abidjan, attestent que les droits coutumiers africains — malgré toutes les pressions exercées par les gouvernements pour les rendre inopérants — demeu- rent, pour une partie importante de la population, une ressource — 208 — à laquelle on s’adresse encore assez fréquemment. Certes, avec la modernisation et le développement socio-économique l’importance de la coutume, toute proportion gardée, ne cesse de décroître au bénéfice des droits modernes. Ne serait-ce que parce que les anciens systèmes législatifs ne comprenaient pas ou peu de règles de droit couvrant certains domaines de la vie sociale et économique propre à des structures étatiques modernes : droit constitutionnel, droit administra- tif, droit international, droit privé, c’est-à-dire, le droit des personnes, physiques et morales, le droit de la famille, des successions, des obligations et le droit commercial. Avec le décloisonnement des ethnies et leur intégration dans une entité nationale, il devint nécessaire de légiférer pour réglementer les modes nouveaux de cohabitation, d’échange, de commerce… afin de protéger les individus et les groupes. Mais là où existait déjà une législation coutumière, que ce soit au niveau du droit civil (mariage, divorce, succession, propriété des terres.…) ou à celui du droit pénal, il y a eu, forcément, des diver- gences de points de vue, Parfois, ceux-ci sont presqu’en opposition, comme c’est le cas de la philosophie pénale, si bien que les deux législations ont peu de chance de s’intégrer rapidement. C’est ce que souligne Poirier (1969) : Nous estimons, écrit-il, qu’une observation attentive des faits permet de conclure qu’en de nombreuses régions, 1l y a eu non pas diminution, mais recrudescence de la justice arbitrale. (...) Cette persistance — ou ce renouveau — de l’importance de l’arbitrage peuvent être considérés par exemple au Daho- mey, au Cameroun, au Niger ; il arrive que l’autorité publi- que la reconnaisse sans équivoque. Lors des enquêtes que nous avons faites au Dahomey entre 1959 et 1963 nous avons été frappé par l’insistance avec laquelle les sous- préfets et les chefs de canton soulignaient la fréquence du recours aux instances arbitrales, qui échappaient totalement à leur contrôle (p. 101). Les résultats de la recherche d’Oloruntimehin (1973) ainsi que ceux que nous avons obtenus montrent que les attitudes de la population indiquent, dans des proportions variant de 61 à 90 %, une forte propension à éviter les procédures judiciaires institu- tionnalisées quand l’occasion s’en présente. Il ressort, aussi, clairement de ces investigations que plus on s’éloigne des centres urbains, moins le système de justice criminelle moderne est en mesure d’exercer un contrôle efficace sur la criminalité et sur les façons de la contrer. On rejoint ainsi ce que disait, lors du Colloque du Droit malgache, en octobre 1964, le garde des Sceaux de Madagascar (voir Poirier, 1969, p. 102) : « Dans la très vieille tradition malgache, le recours — 209 — à la justice était Un mal nécessaire, un remède ultime après de vaines tentatives de conciliations». On ne peut mieux reconnaître que la justice officielle est perçue comme étant, pour beaucoup de citoyens, une voie anormale, marginale ; une sorte de seconde instance à laquelle on ne fait appel qu’en dernier ressort quand toutes les autres alter- natives se sont révélées infructueuses. Il faut reconnaître, cependant, qu’au fur et à mesure que les territoires nationaux se voient investis par un réseau rationnel et unifié de surveillance dont les fers de lance sont les commissariats de police, les postes de gendarmerie et les tribunaux, les possibilités d’échapper à la justice moderne se rétrécissent, peu à peu, comme une peau de chagrin. Cette prise en main de l’espace est toutefois extrême- ment lente. Mais 1l est différentiel et dépend de l’organisation admi- nistrative de la justice. C’est ce qui explique, entre autres, les disparités des taux nationaux de criminalité selon les pays. En Afrique anglo- phone, et plus particulièrement dans les pays de l’Est du continent, les colonisateurs, par le principe de l’«indirect rule» avaient placé la plupart des responsabilités administratives entre les mains des autorités indigènes. Par la suite, les tribunaux locaux furent intégrés dans la pyramide judiciaire et perdirent une grande part de leur pouvoir en même temps qu’était réduit l’éventail de leurs activités ils n’avaient juridictions que pour les délits mineurs et pour autant que leurs déci- sions n’entraient pas en conflit avec les normes morales de la « justice naturelle », du « healthy common sense and good morals ». Dans certains Etats, par exemple la Tanzanie, les tribunaux locaux devinrent, en 1963, des cours de première instance. Le droit et les procédures qui gouvernent, depuis, ces juridictions constituent un compromis entre le besoin de mettre sur pied des organismes natio- naux capables d’appliquer un droit unique et la demande pour des mécanismes proches des intérêts des diverses communautés régionales. Le droit criminel coutumier fut aboli et uniformisé. Mais ce qui est important, et l’étude de DuBow (1973) le met en relief, c’est que le système judiciaire n’a pas perdu, comme c’est le cas en Afrique Occidentale francophone, toutes ses ramifications qui s’étendent de- puis les villes jusqu’aux villages. Ceux-ci possèdent donc des institutions qui se situent à proximité des justiciables. Les tribunaux de première instance tanzaniens sont présidés par des magistrats peu formés : les procédures y sont simplifiées et il n’y a pas de procureur. Les juges, en droit pénal, peuvent entendre les affaires de moindre gravité et émettre des sentences allant jusqu’à un an d’emprisonnement, 1 000 shillings (143 dollars) d’amende et douze coups de fouet. C’est, selon les termes de DuBow « une sorte de justice à rabais mais qui est, d’un autre côté, plus accessible » (p. 19). C’est ce qui pourrait expli- quer que, en 1972, le taux de criminalité pour 100 000 habitants était — 210 — de 1267 en Tanzanie, avec près de 900 tribunaux locaux, et de seule- ment 410 en Côte-d’Ivoire, qui ne possède que 28 juridictions de première instance. Dans ces conditions, on peut supposer que la justice traditionnelle absorbe une moins grande proportion des infractions dans les pays où Jes instances coutumières ont été incorporées, ne serait-ce que sym- boliquement, aux organismes étatiques que dans ceux où une étan- chéité et une distance plus marquées séparent les deux appareils de justice. Il est, par exemple, assez étonnant de constater chez les Nouba Masakin du Sud du Kordofan, au Soudan, une symbiose entre la justice du chef clanique et celle de l’administration gouvernementale. Léni Riefenstahl (1976) qui, entre 1962 et 1969, a fait plusieurs séjours dans cette tribu, encore tellement intouchée par la civilisation qu’elle qualifiait ces primitifs d’ « hommes d’une autre planète », rapporte que c’était le «mak», le chef de la communauté qui était chargé de la justice. Entouré des anciens, des hommes les plus respectables des différentes communes, il tenait ses audiences, chaque vendredi, à l’ombre d’un grand baobab. Les crimes les plus fréquents étaient l’adultère, l’enlèvement de jeune fille et le vol de chèvres. Ces infrac- tions, en plus de la compensation, étaient punies de peines de prison. « Deux ou trois policiers nouba se tiennent à la disposition du ““mak”, et conduisent éventuellement ces coupables au long de leur marche de cinquante-cinq kilomètres vers la captivité, c’est-à-dire la prison de Kadougli, où ils sont remis à la police soudanaise. (...) Quand ils rentrent au pays après avoir achevé leur peine, ils sont acueillis et fêtés en héros» (pp. 21-22), Dans de nombreux villages, beaucoup plus «civilisés», de Câôte-d’Ivoire, de la Haute-Volta, du Niger, du Sénégal ou du Nigéria, cette complicité avec Jles agents du système pénal est encore impensable. Tout dépend donc de la structuration de la justice moderne et de son degré d’« acceptabilité » pour les populations concernées. DuBow (1973) qui décrit les tribunaux de première instance, en Tanzanie, comme étant les engrenages de la « justice du peuple» ne manque pas de faire remarquer que, là aussi, il y a encore de vifs sentiments négatifs, surtout dans les régions rurales, vis-à-vis des gens qui font appel aux autorités judiciaires officielles : « Il y a une forte présomption qui veut que les tribunaux doivent être utilisés seulement quand les autres possiblités ont été éliminées. Les gens qui décident d’ester en justice sans consulter d’abord les médiateurs sont considérés comme affichant très peu de respect à l’égard des statuts et des coutumes traditionnels » (p. 185). Force est donc d’admettre qu’en Afrique noire, les mécanismes d’arbitrage et de conciliation sont encore fréquemment utilisés. Il nous reste à préciser les types d’affaires criminelles qui en font l’objet. — 211 — c) Les infractions soumises à la justice traditionnelle La recherche d’Oloruntimehin (1973) ne s’est Irmitée qu’à quelques infractions de peu de gravité. Ibadan étant une sorte de ville cham pignon, où les citadins semblent avoir conservé, plus qu’à Abidjan des habitudes, des institutions et des réflexes ruraux, il en résulte que queilque soit l’âge, le sexe et la classe sociale des personnes interro- gccs, 82,5 Ÿ et plus d’entre elles, selon les catégories précitées, ont avoué que pour les infractions retenuds elles préféraient règler leurs litiges par des voies informelles soit par l’entremise de voisins, de chefs de famille ou par d’autres canaux non institutionnels. À Abid- jan, pour 61,9 © des interviewés, il vaut mieux arranger les choses à l’amiable, même si ce n’ast pas tout à fait satisfaisant, que d’aller à la police. D’autre part, les mêmes personnes estiment à 79,9 %, que, dans le milieu rural, quelque soit la gravité de l’acte commis par un membre d’un même village, il est encore préférable d’essayer de résoudre l’affaire à l’amiable entre les familles que de faire intervenir les agents pénaux. Ces données prouvent, sans équivoque, que la justice traditionnelle est toujours bien vivante et qu’elle sert d’éxutoire à bon nombre de différends. Cependant, cela ne nous renseigne guère sur les limites juridictionnelles de ces systèmes juridiques. Que faut-il entendre par le « quel que soit la gravité de l’acte » ? C’est ce que nous avons tenté d’éclaircir En étudiant la fréquence des recours à l’arbitrage, on a noté au passage, que 12,2 % de l’échantillon abidjanais prétendaient que dans les villages, lorsqu’un tort avait été causé, on le redressait toujours selon les procédés coutumiers. Il nous a paru des plus im- portants de connaître ce que ce « toujours » signifiait aux yeux des répondants. Ce faisant, il nous a été possible de vérifier que, pour cette partie de la population, minoritaire mais relativement impor- tante si l'on songe à ce qui est en cause, le droit archaïque et la machi- nerie conçue pour l’appliquer pouvaient, encore aujourd’hui, statuer sur les crimes les plus graves C’est ce que met en lumière le tableau 4 TABLFAU 4 Afjaires criminelles où la solidarité familiale empêche de dénoncer un membre d’un même village à la police ou à la gendarmerie. Abidjan 1974 Types d’ infractions Jamais 3,7 Pour les actes sans grawte 69,2 Pour les vols et les actes contre les blens maténels 14,0 Pour tous les crimes, même les plus graves (vols meur- tres, viols, incendies de récoltes, etc.) si la famille du cou- pable paye le prix que demande la famille de la victime 11,1 Sans réponse 2,0 TOTAL 100,00 — 212 — es délits mineurs (petits vols, escroqueries, bagarres...) fran- chissent peu les limites du village. Une des raisons évidentes de ce filtrage découle de la disproportion entre le préjudice subi et les inconvénients qu’entraîne un dépôt de plainte auprès des organismes étatiques. Ces inconvénients seront évoqués ultérieurement. Qu’il nous suffise, pour l’instant, d’insister sur le fait que la solidarité ethnique prend l’allure d’une loyauté envers les membres du groupe auquel on appartient ; si bien que traîner un des siens devant le tribunal est ressenti comme un affront, une trahison. Ce raisonnement intervient aussi pour les crimes les plus graves, mais, dans ces cas, la difficulté de les dissimuler et le risque, si la chose est connue des autorités administratives ou des agences pénales, de se voir accuser de complicité, d’obstruction à la justice etc., forcent une brèche dans les anciens systèmes juridiques et obligent à «livrer » les auteurs d’actes trop voyants. Dans la région d’Agboville où j’ai travaillé, nous dit un juge, les plaintes entre les membres du même village ou contre ceux de villages voisins sont très rares. Si une plainte est déposée, il y aura l’intervention de parents pour que celle-ci soit retirée. De préférence, on fait appel au chef du village (...). Si une personne conduit quelqu’un devant le tribunal, elle s’expose à une revanche. Quand, plus tard, un membre de sa famille fera une bêtise, on le conduira, à son tour, devant le juge. Quand j’étais là, J’ai appris, un jour, que, dans un village, une jeune fille avait été victime d’un viol caractérisé. À la suite de cet attentat, elle ne pouvait plus procréer. C’était donc un crime grave et passible d’une longue peine d’em- prisonnement. On n’a pas poursuivi le coupable parce que l’on ne voulait pas créer un précédent et faire l’objet, sS’il arrivait, dans l’avenir, que quelqu’un de la famille de la victime fasse la même chose, d’un procès devant une autorité extra-villageoise (125). Ce qui transparaît, à travers cette argumentation, c’est l’identi- fication de la machinerie judiciaire comme étant quelque chose qui appartient à une autre culture. Ceci étant, y recourir c’est pratique- ment commettre une faute. En le faisant on s’engage dans un processus de réciprocité. Celui qui se rend responsable de l’intrusion de la justice moderne dans des conflits, jugés par la communauté comme étant « internes », devient coupable d’une « infraction » et doit s’atten- dre à ce que, tôt ou tard, suivant le principe de la loi du talion, on lui rende la monnaie de sa pièce. Ce qui est assez préjudiciable socialement, c’est que — dans beaucoup de villages — cette situation peut provo- quer la confrontation de deux familles ou de deux clans : « Chez moi, chez les Attié, un de mes parents s’était battu (125) Témoignage de B.Â.… juge en brousse. Côte d’Ivoire, 1974. — 213 — avec un cousin. Il fut blessé grièvement et fut dans l’inca- pacité de travailler pendant quinze jours. Si cette aflaire avait été portée devant le tribunal, l’auteur des blessures aurait été sûrement condamné mais, ensuite, il y aurait eu un conflit entre les deux familles. On arrangera donc l’affaire au niveau du village » (126). Des cas plus sérieux donnent lieu aux mêmes réactions dans les groupes où l’équiibre entre les parents et les alliés ne souffrent pas des distorsions que peut provoquer la mise en route de l’appa- reil judiciaire contre un individu ou un segment de l’entité commu- nautaire Dans mon village (près d’Alepe), un de mes cousins, qui est agriculteur, décida de se lancer dans la fabrication du vin de palme. Son entreprise s’avéra fructueuse et prospéra si rapidement qu’elle suscita l’envie d’un voisin. Celui-ci, pour se venger du succès de mon cousin, vida, dans les outres , Un insecticide très puissant qui aurait pu entraîner non seulement la mort de mon cousin mais celle de tous ceux qui auraient bu de ce vin. Heureusement, mon cousin reconnnut l’odeur du produit chimique parce qu’il utilisait lui-même cet insecticide sur sa plantation. Après une en- quête, il acquit la preuve que M.J. était l’auteur de la ten- tative d’homicide et il déposa une plainte, au tribunal, contre lui. Dans le village, ce fut l’émoi général. De victime qu’il était, mon cousin fut accusé de vouloir faire du tort à l’autre famille. Tout le monde se ligua contre lui. À la fin, il dut retirer sa plainte car sa situation deve- nait invivable au village et personne ne voulait plus acheter de son vin de palme, ce qui aurait entraîné la faillite de son petit négoce (127). L’existence de deux systèmes juridiques, dont l’un est unifié, centralisé, coercitif et obligatoire tandis que l’autre est plus accessible, compréhensible et populaire (bien qu’illégal), crée, pour la population une possibilité de choix entre deux voies différentes pour faire valoir ses droits. Le choix est motivé, selon les cas, par une diversité de facteurs qui recouvrent autant les réactions du groupe d’appartenance ; les probabilités que le délit ou le crime soient découverts par la police et la gendarmerie ; la gravité de l’infraction, sa visibilité ; les possibilités d’obtenir réparation et satisfaction. Il est certain que sans la peur du gendarme, les populations africaines persisteraient davantage dans leurs traditions. Même si les colonisateurs et, après eux, les gouvernements indépendants ont voulu, par la promulgation de poli- tiques criminelles modernes, contrôler la justice, il faut admettre que, dans les faits, la vigilance du système pénal est beaucoup plus facile (126) Témoignage de Y.P., juge en brousse. Côte d’Ivoire, 1974. (127) Témoignage de H.D.… haut magistrat au tribunal d’Abidjan. 1973. — 214 — à tromper que celle d’Argus qui, lui-même, fut — malgré tout — berné. Pour aborder les phénomènes de la survivance de la justice traditionnelle et de l’acculturation juridique, nous avons procédé par une sorte d’analyse gigogne. Les questions générales nous condui- saient inévitablement à des questions plus précises ; cela parce que ces dernières étaient déjà implicites dans une vision globale de la réalité. C’est ce qui nous a amenés à circonscrire, à chaque étape, de façon plus particulière l’objet étudié. Lors d’une phase ultime, nous avons fait une tentative en vue d’établir certaines balises qui nous fourniraient des indications, d’une part, sur les méfaits qui, par prédilection, sont résolus par des ententes qui surviennent en dehors des cours de justice et, d’autre part, sur les crimes et délits que la population achemine de préférence vers les agences pénales étatiques. Une liste de vingt-deux infractions, som- mairement décrites, fut donc proposée aux mille personnes composant l’échantillon de la population africaine d’Abidjan. Pour chaque infrac- tion, les individus interrogés devaient dire qu’elle serait la réaction des gens ; cette réaction pouvant être l’une des deux suivantes : a) prévenir la police et la gendarmerie afin que la personne cou- pable soit jugée par les tribunaux modernes ; b) régler le litige à l’amiable entre la victime et l’auteur du méfait (ou entre leurs familles) afin d’obtenir réparation sans que la police ou la gendarmerie n’interviennent. Les délits et les crimes retenus l’ont été dans le but de voir l’influence de la variable « cohésion ethnique ». Pour cette raison des situations conflictuelles similaires mettent tantôt en cause des membres d’un même groupe, tantôt des étrangers. La gravité et le caractère traditionnel de certains actes ont été aussi des éléments importants qui ont guidé le choix des infractions. Pour établir notre liste d’actes délictueux, nous nous sommes inspirés du questionnaire HVS de De Boeck, dont nous avions pu obtenir une copie avant que son étude sur le système moral de la jeunesse Zzaïroise soit publiée (1975). Ce questionnaire est formé de 162 items qui comprennent la description de 62 atteintes aux personnes, de 54 atteintes aux biens et de 46 atteintes aux mœurs. Les items ont été élaborés de manière à faire « varier des éléments constitutifs relatifs a la nature de l’acte, à son auteur, à la victime et aux conséquences. La tâche proposée aux sujets consistait à évaluer la gravité morale de ces 162 comportements sur une échelle en onze catégories (de O à 10). Les résultats des réponses aux questions portant sur la fréquence du recours au droit et aux procédures indigènes (tableau 3) et sur les types d’infraction auxquels ils s’appliquent (tableau 4) font ressortir des pourcentages assez stables, respectivement de 12,2 % et de 11,1 %, des 1 000 interviewés qui estiment que les villageois font toujours appel aux anciennes chartes juridiques et, cela, quelle que soit la — 215 — gravité du tort causé. Lorsque des situations précises, comme c’est le cas de la liste des vingt-deux infractions, sont soumises à leur appré- clation, on obtient, sauf pour une seule exception, de plus fortes proportions de personnes qui jugent que les litiges, à l’heure actuelle, sont résolus selon les mécanismes coutumiers, sans qu’il y ait ingérence de la police ou de la gendarmerie. D’après les cas litigieux, présentés à l’échantillon, et les modèles tendanciels qu’ils suscitent, il se dégage trois schémes de réactions qui sont intimement liés à la nature des litiges. Ce sont : a) les crimes et délits qui, majoritairement, font l’objet de trac- tations qui s’eflectuent en dehors des voies officielles du système pénal ; b) les conflits qui donnent lieu à des réactions mixtes, c’est-à-dire pour lesquels les personnes interrogées se départagent en deux groupes importants qui favorisent ou bien la justice traditionnelle, ou bien la justice moderne ; c) les différends qui, selon la majorité des locuteurs, sont dirigés vers les agences gouvernementales (police, tribunaux). Pour simplifier l’analyse des données, on procèdera, en prenant appui sur les pour- centages, par ordre décroissant des items tel qu’il émerge de l’im- portance du nombre de répondants qui a déclaré que l’infraction envisagée était déférée devant les instances juridiques ancestrales. (a) Infractions qui, de préférence, relèvent encore des juridictions traditionnelles. Cette première catégorie d’infractions comprend des situations litigieuses qui, pour 60 % et plus de l’échantillon, donnent lieu à un règlement à l’amiable entre la victime et l’auteur du méfait ou entre leurs familles. Cinq délits ou crimes ont donc, pour plus de 600 personnes interrogées sur les 1000 qui composent l’échantillon- nage, déclaré que, pour les actes qui suivent, on ne prévient ni la police, ni la gendarmerie % JT* 1. — Un homme marié fait un enfant à une jeune fille célibataire ; « e e — « » » 6 * © s. © © e ® #% © — % * © © « À 81,7 %, 2. — Le troupeau d’un voisin détruit les récoltes d’un agriculteur ; . ». « e e e % e . « » 6 « …. ® % » 8 © … « © e 74,1 % 3. — Dans un village, un homme surprend un autre homme commettant l’adultère avec sa femme : . e * © © « © ® ® » ® e © * + + % » . © © # #% + «s —* < e < < À 70,7 %, 4. — Quelqu’un apprend qu’un de ses cousins a volé 5000 francs à une personne prove- nant du même village que lui ; » s. ». e e e + + « — 69,1 % S. — Un mari tue, en sorcellerie, un homme ayant commis l’adultère avec sa femme : . * * e » < = e 62,6 % (*) Pourcentage des interviewés jugeant l’infraction comme relevant de la justice traditionnelle (J.T.). — 216 — (b) Infractions entraînant des réactions mixtes et qui sont, selon les cas, déférées devant la justice traditionnelle ou la justice moderne. Sept cas (items 6 à 12 inclusivement) donnent lieu à une dicho- tomisation assez équilibrée des sujets auprès desquels porta l’enquête. De 44 % à 59 % d’entre eux penchent tantôt pour que le coupable soit traduit devant les autorités coutumières, tantôt devant les tribu- naux gouvernementaux. Ce sont les fautes suivantes : Ÿ J.T 6. — Une personne de la même ethnie viole une jeune femme de son village qui refusait d’avoir des relations sexuelles avec lui ; 55,66 % , — Un jeune homme vole un transistor à une personne de son village ; 54,4 % . — Deux cousins aiment la même femme. Un des deux réussit à l’épouser. Par jalousie et vengeance le second met le feu aux récoltes du premier ; . …. e e © — e . © + % e + © « + » © % ® —s e » # ® 54,1 % . — Pendant que son mari est en voyage, une femme commet un adultère et devient en- ceinte. Pour éviter que son mari découvre sa faute, elle se fait avorter : 53,7 % 10 . — Les troupeaux d’une tribu nomade détrui- sent les récoltes dans un village ; « « e e —. e — — 51,2 % 11l . — Un étranger force une jeune femme à avoir des relations sexuelles avec lui : e « e © . © © — 458 % 12 . — Une femme met au monde un enfant sans bras ni jambes. Elle lui fait boire un pro- duit qui fait mourir l’enfant ; . e « + » — » e = » 40,1 % (c) Infractions qui, en majorité, sont acheminées vers la police et et les tribunaux. Ce sont des infractions dont moins de 40 %, de l’échantillon ont dit qu’elles relevaient de la justice arbitrale. On en compte dix qui dans des proportions allant de 62 % à 94,3%, font — selon les répondants — que l’on dépose une plainte auprès des commissariats de police ou auprès des tribunaux. Ÿ JT 13. — Au cours d’une Îête traditionnelle, une violente dispute éclate entre deux personnes d’un même village. L’un d’eux prend une machette et blesse l’autre gravement à une main ; 378 % 14. — Un étranger s’introduit dans une case et vo- le un pagne ; . e © « © —… » % « — + » * % + © © « e * s » © « © À 35,9 % — 217 — Ÿ J.T 15 , — Un homme perd son fils. Le féticheur lui apprend que son fils est mort parce qu’il a été ensorcelé par un sorcier. Le père fait mourir le sorcier à l’aide d’un poison ; 35,7 % 16 Un automobiliste, lors d’un accident, tue un de ses cousins ; . +. s. e + » » % % » © © © —s e < e » ° À 28,7 % 17 Au cours d’une chasse, un villageois tue par accident un de ses compagnons ; 248 Ÿ 18 Une personne étrangère qui a trop bu en frappe une autre avec une machette et la blesse gravement à un bras ; . e « e © + » e » — « e 22,6 % 19 Dans un village, une femme enceinte de- mande à une amie de la faire avorter. Cette femme s’y prend mal et, sans qu’elle l’ait voulu, la première meurt ; 22,1 Ÿ 20 Un mari tue par poison un homme ayant commis l’adultère avec sa femme ; 18,1 % 21 Un commerçant vend de la marchandise de mauvaise qualité : . « ». e » « © © » e * s« © 9 e « e « »# e 17,0 % 22 Un étranger perd le contrôle de sa voiture écrase un villageois ; celui-ci meurt ; 9e « © — . — 5,6 %, Les réactions des gens à l’égard des crimes et des délits, ont été regroupées en trois catégories qui se situent, en réalité, sur un axe qui ne présente aucune coupure brusque. D’autre part. et cela paraît primordial, ce n’est pas la variable « gravité » du comportement qui est à la base du choix entre la justice traditionnelle et la justice moderne. Une comparaison avec la recherche de De Boeck, malgré qu’elle soit boiteuse le suggère tout au moins. Certains actes, dans le questionnaire employé à Abidjan, ont été formulés dans des termes identiques, ou équivalents, à ceux que De Boeck a utilisés pour l’étude du système moral des étudiants zaïrois (1975). On constate que, si l’on prend comme indice global de gravité la médiane de son échelle en 11 points, il n’y a pas de relation entre la répulsion que soulève un comportement et le choix du système juridique dont il relève. Par exemple, pour sa population, l’adultère avec une femme mariée que l’on retrouve classé dans la catégorie (a), est perçu comme plus grave (Md : 9,02) que l’homicide, par un père, d’un sorcier respon- sable de la mort de son fils (Md : 8,66), placé en (c), mais moins sérieux que tous les types de viol (Md. variant de 9,65 à 9,73) qui se trouvent, ici, dans la catégorie (b). Quant à l’homicide accidentel, par un automobiliste, en (c), il est jugé avec plus d’indulgence (Md : 61,7) que l’infanticide d’un enfant difforme (Md 7,83) ou que l’avortement (Md : 9,60) qui, selon la catégorisation employée. sont tous les deux en (b). — 218 — La nature, en soi, du crime ou du délit n’est en tout cas pas un élément majeur dans la décision de régler un différend selon la coutume ou de le déférer aux agences pénales. Plus important semble être le facteur « cohésion sociale ». Il aurait été d’un grand intérêt, dans l’étude de De Boeck, de vérifier l’influence de la « distance structu- rale» des individus en cause sur la perception de la gravité des comportements. On ne peut que s’étonner que l’auteur, qui tient compte de nombreuses variables se rapportant à l’acte, au coupable, à la victime et à ses conséquences, n’ait pas retenu le critère de l’appar- tenance sociale des protagonistes d’un contentieux. Ce critère, selon les données recueillies auprès de la population abidjanaise, a une influence directe, pour certaines infractions, sur l’option de la juridic- tion qui sera saisie du litige. On note que la destruction de récoltes par le troupeau d’un voisin donne lieu à un règlement à l’amiable pour 74,1 % des sujets alors que, quand 1l s'agit de déprédations causées par les bêtes d’une tribu nomade, le pourcentage des personnes qui croient que l’on recoure à l’arbitrage tombe à 51,2 %. Le vol offre un bon exemple de l’impact de la relation entre coupable et victime sur la réaction sociale on favorise la justice traditionnelle à 69,1 % pour le vol entre cousins (item 4), à 54,4 % pour le vol entre co-villageois (item 7), et à 35,9 % si l’auteur est un étranger (item 14). Un écart de 10 % apparaît, dans les situations de viol entre individus de même ethnie et personnes non-apparentées. Des discriminations existent aussi pour les coups et blessures (items 13 et 18) qui accusent une différence de 15,2 % ainsi que pour les homicides accidentels par des automobilistes (items 16 et 22), dont la réaction différentielle atteint un seuil de 23,1 Ÿÿ. D’après tout ce que l’on sait sur la solidarité ethnique, il n’est pas étonnant de la voir émerger sous la forme d’une pression efficace et centripète qui cloisonne l’administration de la justice à l’intérieur des cadres coutumiers. ependant, la cohésion sociale n’explique pas tout. En plus, certaines valeurs culturelles font que des litiges, par leur nature, ont avantage à faire l’objet de palabres parce qu’elles donnent lieu à des compensations que ne garantit pas toujours le Code pénal. C’est le cas, entre autres, de l’adultère et du viol : items 1 et 3 de la catégorie (a), et. dans la catégorie (b), les items 6, 9 et 11. Par ailleurs, il semble que la « visibilité » de l’offense, c’est-à- dire, la possibilité qu’elle représente d’être découverte par la police ou la gendarmerie, oriente la décision de faire intervenir ou non les agences du système pénal. La distinction, assez inattendue, entre homicide par sorcellerie (item 5) et homicide par poison (items 15 et 20) ne peut se comprendre que par la différence existant au niveau des probabilités de la découverte des causes de la mort : le poison laisse des traces pouvant, en principe, être détectées par autopsie ; ce qui n’est pas le cas dans l’esprit des gens, des meurtres effectués, à distance, par les sorciers et les « mangeurs d’âme ». — 219 — On voit également que les crimes qui peuvent être plus facilement camouflés, tels l’avortement (item 9) et l’infanticide (item 12), tous deux demeurant le « secret des femmes », sont moins souvent rap- portés aux autorités judiciaires que les infractions qui laissent des marques et des blessures qui se voient, comme les bagarres et les rixes (items 13 et 18), ou des cadavres trop encombrants, comme les acci- dents mortels (items 16, 17, 19 et 22)). Ce ne sont là que des hypothèses et, afin d’éviter de se perdre en conjectures de toutes sortes, on a démandé aux personnes interrogées de nous dire elles-mêmes les raisons qui les incitaient à faire appel à la justice traditionnelle. 2. — Causes de la survivance de la justice coutumière Pour recenser les causes de la survivance de la justice coutumière, la question posée était ouverte et se formulait comme suit : « Quelles sont, selon vous, les principales raisons qui peu- vent, dans certaines circonstances, pousser les gens à régler les litiges entre les familles plutôt que de faire intervenir la police ou la gendarmerie ? » LJes réponses à cette question ont été regroupées de façon à pouvoir être pondérées. Le regroupement s’est fait en gardant le plus grand nombre de raisons possibles (en l’occurence 20) qui ont été classées en quatre rubriques : a) litiges peu graves ; b) carences de la justice moderne ; c) solidarité familiale ; d) autres. Le tableau 4 résume les résultats obtenus. L’analyse de ce tableau se limitera aux trois premières, et principales rubriques. a) Litiges peu graves. Parmi les causes données qui motivent la saisie d’un différend par les instances traditionnelles, 30,1 %, de l’échantillon mentionnent que le droit particulier aux populations autochtones ne s’applique qu’aux litiges de peu de gravité. Or, la notion de « gravité », tout comme celle de crime, est relative puisqu’elle se définit par les valeurs d’un groupe social donné. La preuve en est que, sur les vingt situations qui leur étaient proposées, quinze d’entre elles sont considérées, par 35,7 % et plus des individus interrogés, comme devant relever d’un règlement coutumier. Et ces quinze situations comprennent des crimes aussi « sérieux » que l’empoisonnement d’un sorcier (dont 35,7 %, des sujets disent que cette offense est résolue hors cours), que l’infanticide d’ «un enfant serpent » (40,1 %), le viol par un étranger (45,8 %), l’avortement (53,7 %), le viol par un membre de la même ethnie (55,6 %), le meurtre par sorcellerie (62,6 ,), l’adultère avec une femme mariée (70,7 %) et avec une fille célibataire (81,7 %)). Lorsque les Africains évoquent la « gravité » d’une infraction, à quoi se réfèrent-ils ? À leur système de valeur ou à celui du Code pénal ? Il y a certainement là une ambiguïté qui, peut-être, les conduits — 220 — à définir comme sérieux des comportements qui, d’après eux devraient se résoudre à l’échelle de l’ethnie, mais qui ne peuvent l’être à cause de leur « visibilité » trop grande, comme cela a été mentionné plus haut, et aussi à cause de l’importance que leur confère la législation en les sanctionnant par de très lourdes peines. Entre l’émergence d’un droit propre au milieu urbain, d’un seul système de normes reconnu par l’administration, et la non-reconnaissance par l’Etat des anciens systèmes juridiques, il se produit une sorte de TABLEAU 4 Raisons du recours à la justice coutumière Echantillon d’Abidjan - 1974 Raisons Nombre | %o 301 |. Litiges peu graves 30,1 2. Carences de la justice moderne ... 126 12,6 J.M.* trop coûteuse . e e « e e à © © e #% — 42 J.M. trop lente 35 Eviter la prison « e e e 6 % + © = © … © % e © à 26 Corruption des policiers 13 Policiens source d’ennuis Peur d’être impliqué dans J M. ..…. Brutalité des gendarmes J.M. tron éloignée . v e e 6 © 5 —s % e © e » # Î 3 491 Solidarité familiale 49,1 Par solidarité envers les siens 173 Préserver la bonne entente 122 48 Par pitié, par charité Eviter la vengeance 46 Eviter la honte, le déshonneur 39 22 Quand le coupable est repentant .. Conserver les liens familiaux 17 Respecter les coutumes . . © e 66000 14 Quand il y a accord sur la compen- sation . s. … . . . % e . 6 © … + « 6 © © © © — 6 ® 6 =s € 10 Autres . e . . e 6 % e e » © — e © © ® @ © © » % % 8 6 58 5,8 Justice traditionnelle est plus compréhensive e . s. . e …. »s 6 ® © 6 ® % % ® © % 31 On doit tenter de règler à l’amiable avant d’aller à la JM. .......…\.…. 20 On doit tout dénoncer à la police 24 Vn Sans réponse. Ne sait pas. ........ 2,4 TOTAL e « « » % ® » ® ® % #% » ® 6 ® 8 1000 100,00 * J.M. = justice moderne. — 221 « vide juridique », selon l’expression de Balandier (1971) qui incite à choisir avec prudence l’instance judiciaire de façon à ne pas «trahir » le groupe, ni l’exposer à des poursuites légales. On tente donc, et c’est là une des caractérisiques d’une situation d’acculturation juridique, de ménager la chèvre et le choux. b) Carences de la justice moderne. Le deuxième type de causes, favorisant les systèmes juridiques ancestraux, a trait aux attitudes de la population africaine vis-à-vis de la justice moderne. Ces attitudes, à cause de la nature de la question posée, apparaissent uniquement en termes négatifs et portent, non pas surtout sur les agences et les agents, quoique cet aspect émerge déjà dans 48 %, des réponses (aversion pour la prison, corruption, brutalité, peur), mais sur son inaccessibilité consécutive au coût, à la lenteur et à l’éloignement du système pénal (7,8 %). Les personnes interrogées habitaient Abidjan, donc une agglomération où les distances géographiques entre citoyens et postes de police sont assez réduites par rapport à ce qu’elles sont dans les régions rurales. Cet élément n’est donc pratiquement pas évoqué, alors qu’en brousse il devient un facteur déterminant et il ne peut en être autrement car si 25 ou 50 kilomètres séparent un village de la première antenne de la machinerie policière et judiciaire, les indigènes ne la percevront même pas comme partie intégrante de leur champ visuel, à moins de cas exceptionnels, et encore moins comme une ressource à laquelle ils pourraient s’adresser facilement lors de conflit ou d’infraction. Par contre, le coût et la lenteur de la mécanique officielle, même dans les villes, sont des considérations dont les justiciables doivent tenir compte et qui les incitent à se tourner de préférence vers les autorités informelles dont les interventions sont presque gra- tuites et, la plupart du temps, extrêmement rapides. Ces deux caractéris- tiques, coût et rapidité, qui opposent les systèmes de justice moderne et traditionnelle, sont invoquées par 7,7 % des répondants. Les prin- cipaux avantages du droit coutumier étant accessibles (les litiges se règlent au sein de la famille, du clan, du village et de la tribu), peu onéreux (pas d'avocat ni de conseil professionnel) et, enfin, prompts puisque l’on ne peut se permettre de laisser une situation liti- gieuse pourrir, se détériorer, s'aggraver et s’étendre. On atteint de la sorte des motivations culturelles qui font ressortir une inadé- quation entre les deux formes de droit et leurs modes d’opération. c) Solidarité familiale. La moitié de l’échantillon (49,1 %) se sont spontanément référés à la loyauté envers le groupe d’'appartenance pour justifier leur fidélité à la tradition en matière de résolution des conflits. Les raisons avancées — 222 — se réfèrent à des traits de la mentalité primitive qui ressortent des travaux ethnographiques, à savoir, surtout, la solidarité envers les siens ; la nécessité de conserver la bonne entente et d’éviter la ven- geance, la honte et le déshonneur ; impératif de respecter les coutumes. En effet, il s’agit de la solidarité familiale et clanique de même que de la fonction de la justice comme vecteur de la réconciliation dans l’espace clos du regroupement ethnique. Ces éléments prennent d’au- tant plus de poids indicatif de la résistance des valeurs et de l’architec- ture culturo-sociologique des anciennes civilisations africaines que la nature de l’échantilllon indique, chez les individus qui le forment, un assez haut taux d’urbanisation en effet, si nous avons 2,9 % des interviewés qui habitaient la capitale ivoirienne, lors de l’enquête, depuis moins d’un an et 35 % qui y séjournaient depuis un à cing ans, nous retrouvons 5,3 % d’entre eux qui y étaient nés, 25 % qui y rési- daient depuis six à dix ans et 31,9 %, depuis plus de dix ans. En tout, presque les deux tiers (61,9 %) avaient une expérience urbaine de plus de cinq ans (sans compter les séjours d’un grand nombre de néo-citadins dans des villes moins importantes qui servent de relais et de stations d’acclimatation sur la route de l’exode rural). Ce qui est considérable en relation avec l’impact de l’acculturation. Cet état de fait fournit donc un indice sur la vitalité et la volonté de survie. même dans un environnement fortement urbanisé, des structures institutionnelles primitives qui s’échafaudent sur les liens familiaux ou les alliances mythiques. Si à l’heure actuelle les deux systèmes de justice fonctionnent de façon parallèle, c’est parce qu’il y a une incompatibilité ontologique entre les deux. Le premier est tourné vers le mythe originel, vers le Cosmos tel qu’il fut conçu par les ancêtres et dont l’ordre ne peut être préservé qu’en étant fidèle aux prescriptions léguées par les géné- rations antérieures ; le second, lui, s’oriente vers la sécurité présente dans un souci de préparer l’avenir, le monde de demain. Or, et c’est ce que soutient Alliot (1968), la fidélité au passé et la sécurité dans le présent sont souvent incompatibles. Il ajoute : se « La différence capitale est une différence d’esprit développant à des niveaux de pensée différents, l’esprit des coutumes et celui des lois sont irréductibles l’un à l’autre. Tant que le premier subsiste, c’est-à-dire tant que l’accul- turation est inachevée, on ne peut mettre fin à l’hété- rogénéité des ordres juridiques » (p. 1191). Si par des contraintes, les Etats essaient d’obliger les individus et les groupes à renier le passé pour se soumettre au nouvel ordre social, une certaine osmose entre les deux systèmes juridiques va forcément finir par s’établir. Mais il ne faut pas croire que le transfert de l’un à l’autre s’effectue selon les rythmes d’un mouvement brownien. Au contraire, c’est selon une logique qui pèse et considère tous les — 223 — avantages et désavasnages, donc par opportunisme, que l’on partagera ce qui sera référé à l’un ou l’autre système. C’est du moins ce qui semble résulter de l’enquête faite à Abidjan. 3. — Les facteurs expliquant la coexistence de deux ordres juridiques La coexistence de deux ordres juridiques, et les raisons de cette coexistence, sont essentielles à une analyse ethnocriminologique. Les renseignements accumulés prouvent que la justice traditionnelle court- circuite les mécanismes policiers et judiciaires. Cela est dû à maints éléments, à des facteurs d’ordre institutionnel, idéologique (ou fonc- tionnel) et structurel. L’implantation d’une structure nouvelle de justice criminelle dans l’espace, facteur d’ordre géographique, joue aussi un rôle prépondérant dans l’acculturation juridique. a) Facteurs d’ordre institutionnel. Une institution est, partout, une émanation de la culture qui commande certains types de relations interindividuelles, qui définit des rôles sociaux et qui a pour but de satisfaire des besoins collectifs. Elle est imprégnée par les valeurs du groupe, dont elle est une émanation, et, pour fonctionner, elle doit nécessairement s’intégrer dans la vie des membres d’une communauté. La promulgation de Codes pénaux, par les colonisateurs, et la mise en place d’un système de défense sociale, aucunement reliés au contexte culturel des sociétés traditionnelles se sont effectués sans tenir compte ni de la mentalité primitive, ni des aspirations des autochtones, ni de la personnalité ethnique, c’est-à-dire de la « Volkgeist ». La justice mo- derne, comme institution de régulation sociale, a été plaquée, greffée, sur une réalité étrangère au nom du progrès et de la civilisation. Ce qui a entraîné un décalage inévitable entre les deux systèmes juri- diques, parce que réflétant deux conceptions différentes du monde Matungi « Mais alors le Blanc commença à dire que nous ne devions pas avoir plus d’une épouse, et que nous de- vions cesser d’échanger des cadeaux de valeur au moment du mariage. C’était amener beaucoup d’'hommes et de fem- mes à perdre le sens de la dignité, Quelle fierté que celle d’une femme dont le mari n’a pas assez de considération pour elle pour donner à ses parents de nombreuses chèvres en gage d’estime et de confiance » (Turnbull, 1965 : p. 60). Le Code criminel fut conçu comme un instrument de la politique coloniale d’abord, de celle des élites africaines ensuite, dans la réali- sation de l’unité territoriale ; ce qui exigeait le remplacement des coutumes « sauvages » et de la moralité archaïque par la moralité occidentale, jugée <upérieure. On procéda, de façon plus ou moins direc- — 224 — te, plus ou moins insidieuse (selon les modes d’action des métropoles dans les Etats francophones ou anglophones), au sape des anciennes institutions en en restreignant l’aire de juridiction aux délits mineurs, en séparant les fonctions administratives et judiciaires, la plupart du temps interreliées dans les groupements tribaux, en laïcisant le droit, en remplaçant les chefs ou les autorités légitimes par des fonctionnaires détenant leur pouvoir de l’Etat, en intégrant, pour les anéantir, les instances judiciaires coutumières dans le système pénal étatique. On tenta de justifier cette généralisation du droit pénal moderne en prétendant que les chefs et les règles de droit coutumier étaient à la base d’homicides atroces, de guerres tribales, de pratiques bar- bares, tels les serments et les ordalies, que toute œuvre civilisatrice devait avoir pour premier objectif de faire disparaître. Cette mission, seule la justice codifiée, hiérarchisée et réglée, pouvait l’entreprendre. Aussi, le Code pénal fut-il rendu applicable et obligatoire pour tous et partout (Sohier, 1957). Cependant, le droit pénal et les organismes chargés d’en assurer l’application furent loin d’être compris par les justiciables. Pour bon nombre d’entre eux, l’incompréhension des textes légaux et des procédures pénales complexes leur ont fait entrevoir la justice moderne comme une institution « étrangère », comme une « justice de blancs ». N’étant pas enracinée dans le tissu social, cette justice ne peut pas être considérée, par ceux qu’elle est censée servir, comme une insti- tution qui leur appartient. Il y a donc un déphasage, une disjonction entre les chartes juridiques modernes et traditionnelles. Une situation anomique en découle qui fait que, lors d’un différend, malgré les voies institutionnelles de résolution légalement imposées, il existe un fossé entre les moyens proposés et les fins poursuivies. Le recours aux policiers, aux gendarmes et aux magistrats ne se fait pas spontanément. Ces fonctionnaires (qui détiennent des pouvoirs qui leur sont conférés en dehors des hiérarchies « politiques» locales) contredisent, dans l’exercice de leur activité, à savoir l’administration de la justice, la finalité du droit coutumier qui privilégie la conciliation. Les usagers potentiels des agences du système de justice criminelle, ne voyant pas d’intérêts à les utiliser, resteront fidèles aux institutions ances- trales, à moins d’être forcés d’agir autrement. C’est d’ailleurs pour cette raison, comme le remarque Delmas (1975), que l’on assiste à une fréquente complicité, active ou passive, de la part des autorités en place la police ou la gendarmerie, et même les juges, ont tendance à renvoyer de nombreuses affaires devant les juridictions coutumières. Il en va de même des administrateurs locaux ou régionaux qui les tolèrent comme des facteurs de stabilité sociale. C’est ce qui ressort des deux témoignages suivants « Comme juge, dans certains cas, je recommande moi- même le règlement à l’amiable. À cause de la gravité des — 225 — peines que donnent les tribunaux. La justice moderne est très impersonnelle ; c’est là un danger. On dépopularise la justice si l’on s’en tient trop au formalisme » (128). « Par des lois sévères on veut frapper les gros brigands mais on atteint les petits voleurs. Pour le vol d’un paquet de cigarettes, d’un pagne.…, on est obligé de donner cinq ans de prison, même si on n’est pas d’accord. Dès que l’on a un doute, on relaxe… Quand l’affaire est encore au niveau de la gendarmerie, on peut dire aux familles d’arran- ger l’affaire entre elles On procède à un classement sans suite… » (129). Les agents du système pénal servent de temporisateurs entre l’application du droit écrit et celle du droit coutumier. Ils semblent avoir compris que ce sont les attitudes sociales, bien plus que les dispositions législatives, qui rendent une conduite donnée vraiment criminelle. En conséquence, dans une stratégie d’implantation de la justice, ils tentent de faire le pont, entre le passé et l’avenir, de manière à ce qu’un rapprochement se fasse entre les institutions et les justi- ciables. b) Facteurs d'ordre idéologique ou fonctionnel. Les facteurs d’ordre idéologique et fonctionnel, tant que la mentalité primitive subsistera formeront un obstacle majeur à l’uni- fication du droit et des institutions. Le droit nouveau, de conception européenne, est axé sur la personne. C’est au nom de l’individu que le législateur a interdit les actes contre la personne (ordalies, meurtres rituels, exécution de sorciers, de voleurs et de personnes adultères, etc.), qu’il est intervenu dans la réglementation du mariage (suppression ou limitation de la dot, règlements concernant l’héri- tage et les successions, remplacement du mariage coutumier par le mariage civil, interdiction ou restriction de la polygamie...), qu’il a élaboré une législation qui favorise la propriété privée. Gonidec (1968) montre l’opposition idéologique entre, d’une part, une conception collec- tiviste du droit, propre aux anciens groupements sociaux, et celle, individualiste, des Etats africains contemporains. D’autre part, la législation, peut-on dire, s’est rationalisée. La dimension magico-religieuse, si fondamentale dans les sociétés archaï- ques, fut presque complètement rejetée par une vision cartésienne des lois On a donc exclu du Code pénal des actes réprouvés par la coutume (violation des tabous, sorcellerie, profanation des lieux sacrés, etc.). Un peu partout, de trop rares tentatives furent faites pour adapter le droit et les procédures à la philosophie pénale africaine et (128) Témoignage de B.ÂÀ., juge dans une région rurale de Côte d’Ivoire. 1974. 129) Témoignage de M.D., juge en brousse. Côte d’Ivoire, 1974. Gallimard. Encyclopédie de la Pléiade, 1968. — 226 — pour inciure, dans la législation, une part du contenu du droit coutu- mier. La criminalisation d’actes tolérés par la coutume et la décri- minalisation de comportements considérés comme graves, par les po- pulations, ont créé parmi celles-ci un profond désarroi, car elles ne comprennent pas les raisons d’un tel changement des règles de conduite. Dans la mesure où les nouvelléds lois manquent d’un support commu- “ nautaire, on ne peut pas s’attendre a ce que les individus ou les groupes rapportent aux agences pénales les violations de normes qu’ils considèrent comme inappropriées ou injustes. Au niveau du fonctionnement de la justice, on relève aussi des dysfonctions importantes qui sont de nature à creuser un fossé entre les citoyens, surtout ruraux, et la machine judiciaire. Les forces cen- tripètes, qui caractérisent les collectivités claniques, font que les buts = premiers des incriminations et des sanctions consistent à rétablir l’équilibre sociétal et à préserver l’unité du groupe. Cette vocation de la justice traditionnelle s’oppose, du moins aux yeux des indigènes, à celle du système de justice criminelle dont ce sont les aspects centri- fuges qui sont les plus visibles. On voit ce dernier surtout dans son action répressive qui, par le rituel judiciaire, marginalise le déviant et qui, par les types de sentence (peines d’emprisonnement), le stig- matise et le sépare de son milieu d’appartenance. L’antagonisme fonctionnel s’actualise dans le fait que la réclusion, l’emprisonnement, les travaux forcés, les amendes au profit de l’Etat se sont substitués à la compensation de la victime. Or, pour la plupart des Africains, justice n’a pas été rendue S’il n’y a pas un redressement du tort causé, si la victime ne reçoit aucune indemnité pour compenser le préjudice subi. De plus, Ies lourdes peines qui frappent le délinquant, sans que la partie lésée n’y trouve de satisfaction, apparaissent comme incompréhensibles car, bien souvent, l’acte délictueux ne semble pas d’une gravité telle que l’indi- vidu coupable mérite d’être ostracisé (mesure de dernier recours contre les comportements les plus menaçants et les plus dangereux pour l’entité collective) et qu’il ne puisse poursuivre sa vie normale au sein de sa communauté après avoir réparé le mal qu’il a fait. La justice moderne, comme on l’a vu précédemment, est considérée comme une institution presque incompatible avec la loyauté envers les siens, avec la solidarité sociale qui cimente entre eux les membres d’un même clan, d’une même tribu. Enfin, la procédure judiciaire, reposant sur la démonstration de la responsabilité individuelle et de l’imputabilité d’une infraction, est assez éloignée de certaines démarches ou pratiques « irrationnelles » du procès coutumier. Comme le dit Turnbull (1965), le refus de condamner pour absence de preuves est la décision la plus catas- trophique qu’un tribunal puisse prendre dans les sociétés africaines. En effet, une telle décision correspond à admettre qu’il n’y a aucune — 227 — obligation entre le plaignant et l’accusé, qu’il n’y a pas de normes ou de valeurs communes au nom desquelles ils puissent être jugés. Ce qui est inadmissible pour la pensée primitive toute entière orientée VErs l’interdépendance et la réciprocité. Tout crime ou délit, parce qu’il est cause et source de dysharmonie sociale doit, nécessaire- ment et toujours, trouver une solution qui rétablit l’ordre originel indispensable à la poursuite de toute activité communautaire. c) Facteurs d'ordre structurel. Les structures de contrôle et d’autorité ont été bouleversées et se sont différenciées. Une distinction nette s’est établie entre droit civil et droit pénal ; ce qui a donné naissance à des instances juri- diques autonomes et différentes. En plus, dans bien des Etats, on a restreint le pouvoir des anciens chefs en sectorisant les domaines de compétence et en créant de nouveaux postes qui furent pourvus par des fonctionnaires étrangers à la région ou à l’ethnie. Cette action des gouvernements visait à dissoudre les particularités tribales afin d’éveiller une conscience nationale. Dans les pays francophones, la suppression des tribunaux indigènes, en 1946, a considérablement éloigné les juges des justiciables. Dans les autres pays, le choix des juges, pour les juridictions locales, se faisait en dehors de la communauté de telle sorte qu’il n’y avait plus cette relation personnelle, étroite et quasi permanente, entre la justice et les membres du groupe. Le lien devenait plus imper- sonnel puisqu’il était vécu à travers des organismes qui, d’abord, laissaient peu de place aux coutumes et qui, ensuite, étaient admi- nistrés par des allogènes qui usurpaient le pouvoir des autorités traditionnelles. Avec la formalisation des organes de la justice, les procédures devinrent plus complexes et, aussi, plus lentes par rapport à celles des anciens systèmes juridiques. Culturellement, l’esprit qui anime l’administration de la justice s’écarta, de plus en plus, de celui du droit coutumier. Ainsi, plusieurs motifs devinrent des obstacles à l’ac- cessibilité de la population aux structures légales de règlement des litiges — la lenteur des procédures ( qui décourage les plaignants qui recherchent une solution rapide de leur conflit afin que la paix sociale soit ramenée au plus tôt entre les familles ou groupes en cause) : — l’appréhension de devoir comparaître devant les tribunaux, en public, au vu et au su de tous, dans un cadre intimidant où l’on doit s’exprimer en français, en anglais ou dans un dialecte officiel ; — Jle refus de porter plainte, devant une justice « importée », contre un proche parent, un cousin, un originaire du même village, un membre de la même ethnie ; — 228 — — le doute quant aux chances de retrouver le coupable et quant aux possibilités d’obtenir réparation ou compensation — la honte de la victime qui se refuse à dévoiler au grand jour un délit dont elle a été l’objet (viol, coups et blessures la suite d’adultère stigmatisation pour vol ou sorcellerie.…) —— les faibles moyens financiers (qui retiennent plusieurs per- sonnes de s’adresser au commissariat ou à la gendarmerie et de se présenter comme témoins au tribunal) — les procédures, lentes et compliquées (qui comportent des pertes de temps et d’argent : les distances sont longues et le trans- port couteux) ainsi que des risques d’être plusieurs fois convoque interrogé, voire même pr1s à part1e par les policiers et avocats si, par mégarde, certaines imprécisions apparaissent dans les témoigna- ges, etc. Toutes ces raisons freinent l’emprise de la justice moderne et en même temps, assurent une certaine survie aux structures autoch- D tones. Celles-ci ont tendance a se refermer sur elles-mêmes, à fonc- tionner en vase clos et à filtrer les affaires qui doivent être traitées par les magistrats a “ D’une certaine manière, la justice coutumière s’est adaptée l'existence du système de justice criminelle. Celui-ci fut intégré comme seconde instance ou comme une sorte de cour supérieure ou d’appel « laquelle on transmet les cas insolubles, les plus difficiles a traiter ou, encore, les plus compromettants pour la collectivité, parce que trop visibles ou détectables. Dans de nombreux villages, on ne se rend au tribunal qu’en dernier ressort c’est-à-dire lorsque la victime et l’auteur de l’infraction ou leur famille, n’ont pu parvenir à une entente devant les chefs de famille ou de tribu. Il est évident et cela apparaît en filigrane à travers les aspects culturels, que des facteurs d’ordre géographique jouent aussi un rôle important dans la survivance des institutions coutumières d) Facteurs d’ordre géographique On peut affirmer, même si cela prend l’aspect d’une tautologie que plus est grande la distance géographique qui sépare une popu- lation d’un organisme du système de justice criminelle (poste de police ou de gendarmerie, tribunal) plus cette population aura de raisons de se soumettre à ses propres autorités judiciaires. La même argumentation s’applique à la distance culturelle qui isole les citoyens de la justice moderne. Plus un groupe est fermé sur lui-même, plus = il s’en tiendra à ses coutumes. Plus la justice pénale lui apparaîtra = comme «étrangère» par rapport à ses traditions, plus il s’accro- chera à son droit coutumier — 229 — Ces hypothèses, qui semblent à première vue évidentes comman- dent une approche ethnocriminologique qui prenne en considération, d’une part, l’implantation spatiale de la justice afin d’en mesurer l’impact au niveau de la criminalité connue et, d’autre part, les élé- ments culturels qui entrent en jeu dans l’acculturation juridique. Jusqu’à maintenant, les études criminologiques, en Afrique noire, n’ont abordé que de façon superficielle ces problèmes sociologiques. Pour- tant ce n’est qu’à l’intérieur d’une telle problématique que l’on pourra estimer à sa juste valeur l’importance réelle de la crimi- nalité, les convergences et les divergences qui existent quant à la définition des actes criminels, le consensus qui sous-tend les lois, les attitudes des populations face aux agences pénales et les résistances qui sont à la base de la survivance de la justice coutumière. Nous avons étudié ailleurs (Brillon 1975) les relations entre la distance séparant les agences pénales (police, tribunaux) des citoyens ainsi que l’impact de ces relations sur la criminalité apparente. Conclusion Les résultats des recherches, conduites à Ibadan et à Abidjan, ont montré que la justice arbitrale était, encore aujourd’hui, une insti- tution à laquelle faisait appel une majorité de la population et, cela, même pour des actes très sérieux. Certains auteurs, dont Poirier (1969), estiment qu’au lieu de régresser la justice coutumière connaît, dans de nombreuses régions d’Afrique noire, une recrudescence. Delmas (1975), lui aussi, pense de même « L’exode rural, écrit-il, que l’on pourrait croire facteur de désagrégation des coutumes provoque, tout au contraire, leur implantation dans les grands centres. Dès leur arrivée en ville, les individus se regroupent par ethnies ; ainsi se reconstituent des villages individualisés avec leurs noms propres, avec une organisation calquée sur celle de l’ethnie d’origine, qui disposent de leurs propres justices, lesquelles règlent les litiges survenus entre membres d’une même ethnie. Par contre, dès qu’une affaire met aux prises les membres d’ethnies différentes et s’il y a échec de la tentative de conciliation, on fait appel à la justice moderne » (pp. 252-253). Les raisons de la survivance de la justice coutumière qui ont été invoquées, découlent de la superposition de fait de deux systèmes juridiques, traditionnel et moderne, qui développent, l’un par rapport à l’autre, un phénomène de réluctance. D’un côté, l’administration de la justice, dans les sociétés primitives, est — par essence — peu propice à une ouverture sur l’extérieur et, de l’autre, la justice nou- — 230 — velle, dont l’axiomatique dérive d’une évolution et d’une réflexion culturelles européennes, se trouve dans l’impossibilité de se faire accepter spontanément par des populations qui la considèrent comme une menace à leurs valeurs et à leurs traditions. Malgré leur inclusion dans les frontières d’un Etat national, les groupes claniques et tribaux demeurent encore fortement ethnocentriques et misonéistes. Par contre, les autorités politiques qui veulent insérer leur développement socio- économique futur dans les perspectives contemporaines ont, en adop- tant des législations issues des sociétés industrielles, créé une situation de néoténie, puisque les lois sont en avance sur l’évolution des mentalités et des institutions. Il est évident que le droit nouveau et les institutions admi- nistratives nécessaires à son fonctionnement répondent davantage aux conditions de vie urbaine qu’à celles de la majorité rurale de la population africaine. Cependant, même dans les villes, où la cohabi- tation d’ethnies diverses et multiples rend pratiquement obligatoire l’existence d’un « droit commun », qui soit au-dessus des droits parti- culiers à chaque groupement, le système pénal — insuffisamment déve- loppé pour être efficace — semble lui-même contribuer à une « régres- sion » vers une justice primitive. Sanogho (1976) constate que, depuis très récemment, au Mali, des fusillades qui ont fait des victimes parmi les voleurs, «ont marqué la tendance des habitants à l’auto-défense devant la carence administrative. De plus en plus, des cas de lynchage sont relevés » (p. 95). Le même phénomène se retrouve à Abidjan et dans la plupart des grandes agglomérations d’Afrique. Ce qui laisse supposer que la justice moderne n’est non seulement pas adaptée à la pensée traditionnelle mais que, en plus, elle est inca- pable de juguler la nouvelle criminalité qu’engendrent les villes. Certes, à b l’Afrique noire. Au contraire, ce n’est pas là un trait spécifique c’est le propre de tous les systèmes pénaux des sociétés industrielles et, particulièrement, des plus développées. La différence réside dans le fait que les groupes ethniques parvenaient à contrôler leur crimina- lité et que, aux yeux de la population indigène, le système des Blancs, présenté comme «supérieur», ne fait pas la preuve de sa supé- riorité. Devant cet échec, les justiciables inclinent à recourir aux « bon- nes vieilles méthodes », à se faire justice eux-mêmes ; ce qui ne fait que creuser le fossé entre l’administration et les citoyens. Où peuvent conduire ces réactions en spirale qui accentuent de plus en plus la dysfonction des institutions ? Peut-être, à plus ou moins long terme, à une «africanisation » de la justice criminelle, qui s’inscrira dans le mouvement « contre-acculturatif » qui, depuis les Indépendances, marque la volonté des Etats africains de se regrouper. Le panafricanis- me politique, économique et culturel indique ce désir collectif de retrouver les anciennes valeurs, de redéfinir une personnalité africaine — 231 — et d'effacer les humiliations de la colonisation par une revalorisation de la « négritude », par la reconnaissance et l’imposition de l’« afri- canité », c’est-à-dire de traits culturels caractéristiques de l’Afrique. BIBLIOGRAPHIE ALLIOT (M.) : « L’acculturation juridique », IN Ethnologie Générale. Paris, Gallimard Encyclopédie de la Pléiade, 1968. BALANDIER (G.) : Sens et puissance, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1971. BRILLON (Y) « Justice pénale moderne et traditionnelle en Côte d’Ivoire ». Revue Internationale de Criminologie et de Police Technique, 1975, Volume XXVIII, N° 3 CROCE SPINELLI (M.) : Les enfants de Poto-Poto, Paris, Grasset, 1967. DE BOECK (A,) : Contribution à l’étude du système moral de la jeunesse zaïroise, Louvain-Paris, Vander-Nauwelaerts, 1975. DELMAS (A) Droit pénal coutumier africain, Paris (II), Université de Droit, d’Economic et de Sciences Sociales de Paris, Thèse de 3° cycle, 1975. DUBOW (F.L.) : Justice for people : Law and politics in the lower courts of Tanzania. Berkeley, University of California, Ph. D. Dissertation,1973. Evolution et Sources, Paris, GONIDEC (PF) Les Droits Africains — Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1968. HOUCHON (G.) « Methodological aspects of african criminology », IN Proceeding of the XXth International Course in Criminology, Lagos, 1970, Annales Internationales de Criminologie, 1971. vol. 10, N° 1. KALOGEROPOULOS (D.) : L’image de la justice au sein de la population fran- çaise, Paris, Deuxième rapport intérimaire. Laboratoire de Sociologie Crimi- nelle de l’Université de Droit, d’Economie et de Sciences Sociales, 1973. OLORUNTIMEHIN (F.) « The difference between real and apparent crimina- lity». IN Second West African Conference of Comparative Criminology. Lagos, Faculty of law, 1973. POIRIER (J.) : L’analyse des espèces juridiques et l’étude des droits coutu- miers africains. IN GLUCKMAN (M°) (Ed.) Ideas and Procedures in African 1969. Customory Law. London, Oxford University Press, Ely House, RIEFENSTAHL (L.) : Les Nouba, Paris, Edition Du Chêne, 1976, SANOGHO (A.) : Inadaptation sociale et traitement des délinquants au Mali. Paris (II). Université de Droit, d’Economie et de Sciences Sociales Thèse de 3° cycle, 1976. SOHIER (A ) « La justice répressive au Congo belge». Revue de Droit Pénal et de Criminologie, 1957, Numéro du jubilé. TANNER (R.E.S.) : Three Studies in East African Criminology, Uppsala, The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1970 TURNBULL (C.) : L'Africain désemparé, Paris, Seuil, 1965. — 232 — LAW, ORDER AND POWER IN LATE SEVENTEENTH AND EARLY EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND P. ROCK London School of Economics London, United Kingdom « Money.. is the true Fuller’s Farth for Reputations, there is not a Spot or a Stain but what it can take out. À rich Rogue now- a-days is fit Company for any Gentleman ; and the World.. hath not such a Contempt for Roguery as you imagine ». (Peachum [Jona- than Wild], The Beggar’s Opera, Act. 1, Scene IX). Introduction. This paper will offer a highly schematic and focused explanation of a few features of communal and organised crime at the beginning of the eighteenth century. It will largely concentrate on the negotiated character of criminal and social order. l intend my argument to illuminate the effects of rudimentary policing (1) and some special properties of moral status. That argument has been made possible by a deliberate arrangement of structural metaphors, an arrangement which can be justified only by principles of utility and parsimony (2). It does not pretend to be comprehensive. Neither is it designed to capture any essential truths about criminal phenomena. Raher, it has knowingly neglected much that would prove interesting. For ins- tance, there is no full discussion of the ordering of moral beliefs, although those beliefs furnished vitally important recipes for political action. There is no attempt at developmental analysis recipes despite the enlightenment which would undoubtedly flow from an examination of the evolution of criminal processes. Mine will be a comparatively simple exercise in social statics, dwelling on the relationships between social distance, crime and the coercive capacity of the state. Such an exercise cannot assign logical or «causal» primacy to the indi- vidual phenomena which it describes. It must merely insist on the analytic interdependence of its parts. Decentralisation and Formal Social Control, The quality of formal social control in England at the end of the seventeenth century stemmed chiefly from the peculiar geometry of its relations. The aggregations and concentrations of the English people gave rise to an irregular and uneven policing. They imposed — 233 — and refracted markedly varying constraints on possibilites of central direction. Indeed, the very idea of policing is probably anachronistic because there was then no counterpart to anyÿ contemporary agency. Certain areas were unpatrolled or unpatrollable, and they enjoyed an autonomy of state control. They developed about the external and internal frontiers of the country, transforming it into a landscape of regulated and deregulated regions. Some parts achieved a political consequence which translated the moral status of their inhabitants into a matter which demanded negotiation rather than simple control. Gregory King’s estimates suggested that England and Wales posse- ssed a population of over five millions which was spread most une- venly over their terrain (3). Whilst half a million people were congre- gated in London, eight hundred and eighty thousand lived in the other cities and towns, and four millions lived in villages and hamlets. Substantial tracts of England were an unpoliced wilderness without a system of established roads (4). Such wild areas were inhabited by «squatters» and «heathers» who formed communities lying outside official management and constituting no recognised part of the political body. Travel was hazardous, even inside London itself (5), and roads were frequently impassable. There was no uniform or effective sys- tem of maintenance, and floods, ruts, quisksands, holes, subsidence and defective drainage so affected routes that they sometimes could be no used for long periods. In Sussex, for instance, travel was vir- tually abandoned during the winter months. Rogers states « in 1700 the roads [were] scarcely less dirty, dangerous and unreliable than they were in the Middle Ages (6) ». Riders could be thrown, carriages upset and heavy carts rendered useless. Journeys of even a few miles might take a considerable length of time and their success was always problematic. Places adjoining London were taken to be relatively inaccessible (7) and Rogers describes Glasgow as having been « unimaginably remote from southern England (8) ». The social significance of distance and the practical reach or action were thus radically modified by the sheer physical difficulty of movement. Major relations were structured by the effort which Was required to sustain them. But effective access was not only influenced by physical contingencies. It was also circumscribed by the illiteracy of many Englishmen (9). In a society which was heavily dependent on oral communication and personal confrontation, the social world of most was confined and local. It is therefore appropriate to portray England as a web of tenu- ously connected and necessarily self-supporting groupings. It was an array of separate areas which were distinguished by such marks of isolation as the possession of peculiar dialects and economic — 234 — interests. So remote were some communities that local currencies had to be improvised when the central money supply failed (10). Problems of central co-ordination were such that each county tended to display an appreciable political autonomy, an autonomy which was itselË nurtured and defended by local elites (11). The English counties were dominated by their own governments in miniature «the county was, not inappropriately, referred to as the « country », for it was a microcosm of the nation, having its armed force, the militia ; its judiciary, the justices in petty or quarter sessions ; its local parliaments, such as the meetings of the lord lieutenant with the deputy lieute- nants… » (12). Ât all levels. à fluid exchange oË support and information between sectors of the country was obstructed. Not only was there an enforced immobility (13), but there were few institutions devoted to the business of political co-ordination and the compilation of reports. For many practical purposes, a large number of communities were virtually self-policing. Whilst the movement of groups regarded as deviant may have been hindered (14), so also was that of agents oË control. As Thompson observed, «the provincial magistracy was often in extreme isolation. Troops, if they were sent for, might take two, three or more days to arrive, and the crowd knew this very well (15)». Poor transport and communications reduce the radius of effi- cient military action (16), and it was impossible for comparatively secluded populations to rely on useful relief from outside. Unless the members of a community armed themselves to form a surrogate militia, as the population of Goudhurst did to meet a group of smug- glers (17). the maintenance of a legally-defined order could become most problematic. Throughout the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, there were instances of areas being forcibly seized and held against control agencies. Thus, in 1670, the country about Kempsey was governed by a « band of marauders » (18) and, in 1692, a high- wayman named Whitney offered to police the roads in exchange for a fee and a patron. He claimed effective control over a sizeable porti »n of the country (19). The Coercive Institutions. The magnification of distances was probably less significant than the inability of the state to muster an appreciable institutional response to law-breaking. The state lacked the force to exact uniform compliance. Indeed, the Hammonds claimed that central government was in abeyance in the first decades of the eighteenth century (20). The rudimentary formal control that did exist was exerted by four major organisations each offering a set of opportunities for the sha- ping of crime. — 235 — The Army. Any substantial congregation of vagrants, smugglers, poachers or robbers a grouping which could not be mastered by routine policing agencies. It constituted a mobilisation of force which was overwhel- ming (21) Henry Fielding remarked that constables were frequently reluctant to act, and «they could not be blamed for not exposing themselves to sure destruction ; for it is a melancholy truth that, at this very day, a rogue no sooner gives the alarm, within certain purlieus, than twenty or thirty armed villains are found ready to come to his assistance » (22). Constables were, moreover, rooted to their own small policing districts and could not properly act outside them. Anyone who was mobile could fairly readily place himself outside the aegis of the constable’s authority (23). The contable’s work was further complicated by his local links. He was nominally the occupant of an unpaid and voluntary position, returning to an unofficial place in the community after a period of duty. His implication in a network of relations inevitably constrained his ability to serve as an anonymous and authoritative agent of control. In consequence, “the army was the only police force that stood between authority and anarchy, and the only preventive service that could enforce the revenue laws…. It was impossible to put down even a formidable gang of poachers without the help of the military” (24). The radical decentralisation and enforced self-reliance of communal control thus made all but the most routine tasks onerous and uncertain. The army was the chief organisation that could muster adequate force, numbers and institutional competence to manage particular problems of law enforcement. But it was an organisation of last resort and it was itself weak. Partly because Britain lacked land frontiers, the role of a stan- ding army became increasingly subordinated to that of the navy (25). There was a steady decline in funds allotted for military purposes during the first decades of the eighteenth century (26), and troops had to be scattered amongst small towns for their maintenance (27). That shit in strategic emphasis was sponsored by those who resisted the establishment of a national, centralised army. Such a concen- tration of force could threaten local accumulations of power, accumu- lations which dispersed political control and strengthened oligarchy (28). The bulk of defensive work became transferred to a militia which was under local rather than state supervision (29). There Was, in particular, a sustained opposition to the use of the army as a policing institution. The organisational base for a French system of gendarmerie was not only eroded, but there were gross political impediments to its emergence (30). The Commonwealth had provided an earlier model of superintendence by an army acting as a police force, and it was a model that was effectively rejected by conse- quential groups. — 236 — The army could only be an instrument for the resolution of extraordinary crises. Il was organisationally ill-equipped to perform work other than the suppression of riots, and even that work was held in disfavour by military authorities (31). It was most generally summoned to handle specific episodes of social unrest and its role was circeumscribed functionally and temporally. The presence of troops appeared to generate friction (32), and “troops billeted in a town quickly became unpopular, even with those who had first called them in. With uncanny regularity requests for the aid of troops are followed… after an interval of five or six weeks, by petitions for their removal” (33). The army could thus be a repressive implement, but it was incapable of engaging in the commonplace business of monitoring and detecting crime (34). It reprensented a crude and insensitive solution to social problems, and individual or sporadic crimes were beyond its powers of management. Its control work can have had only the most oblique impact on the constitution of everyday criminality. The Militia. The second major coercive institution was composed of the militia and train bands. They were the armed forces of a decentra- lised and oligarchical authority, being locally recruited and based, and symbolising opposition to a national system of social control (35). But they, too, were ill-financed and often represented no more than a nominal force. Musters were infrequently held, armaments were defective and there was no standardised supervision of their activity (36). The militia proved an uncertain support for legal order. Whilst it provided a rudimentary reserve against foreign invasion, it was held by some to be less sure in the settlement of domestic disputes (37). On occasion, its embeddedness in local communities led it to become markedly partisan in its management of law-breaking. It was sometimes partial to those who attempted to resist the collection of taxes and revenues. It did little to restrain rioting in 1675, and troops had to be called in to replace its reluctant members (38). Moreover, like the army, it was unable to undertake routine peace- keeping and detection work (39). Il was, again, chiefly employed as an agent of riot-control, and it was inept at patrolling mundane criminal events. It formed one of the buttresses against poltical disorder, but its general influence seemed slight and it declined stea- dily throughout the eighteenth century. The Constables. In the formal division of control work, the minute supervision of local populations was exercised by the constables and watch. They were required to regulate the activities of a community, enforcing — 237 — an order upon all the detailed life of their social worlds. The crossing of parish boundaries was patrolled. In London, nightly checks were made on lodgers who had entered a district and watchmen were enjoined to arrest strangers. They were required to apprehend “Night- walkers, or any other persons whatsoever that are uncivil, or cannot give a good account of themselves ,and the Reason for their being abroad…” (40). The migrations of gipsies, labourers, fortune-tellers and peddlars were surveyed and directed. Those who wandered without a legitimate purpose could be handed from one constable to another across the parishes until they were returned to their last place of settlement. Within the boundaries, there was supposed to be a coerced hierarchy, decorum and order. Servants who had 1left employment without leave were controlled. Ale-houses were inspected. violations of the Sabbath suppressed, and gambling curtailed (41). Constables could punish mothers bearing bastards, whip vagabonds. force the unwilling to work, uphold apprenticeship statutes, confine begging to the licenced, restrain lunatics and detain the suspicious. They also had to embark on fine detective and crime-control work. They were formally responsible for raising the hue and cry, appre- hending criminals and housing them until they were charged. The maintenance of control in local areas was often precarious. Constables were organised by procedures laid down by the Statute of Winchester, a statute that had been devised to manage a dispersed, settled and weak population (42). They were based on a division of territory into policing districts that had been appropriate to medieval England. They fell under the supervision of numerous and competing authorities ; were governed by diverse structures of rules : and could not engage in any concerted action. They were able to exercise only the most limited powers of arrest and did not have to act outside their own, often Lilliputian, areas. In the City of London alone, for instance, there were six hundred and seventy six precincts (44). They could not search or forcibly enter property. Their work had virtually no bureaucratic support, no system of records, and no effec- tive mobilisation of aid when they were confronted by numbers of antagonists. Generally serving for short terms, they achieved little professional competence and could not accumulate or transmit deve- loped skills. So structurally-orphaned were they that they were ren- dered no legal assistance for guidance or defence. If they were sued or tried, they were without institutional funds to pay fines or under- write the costs of legal representation. They formed an amateur and often reluctant force. As largely unpaid officials, their commit- ment to the occupation tended to be slight. The constabulary system was prone to break down whenever it confronted a substancial concentration of crime (45). Although the constables may have been able to control the more visible activity of in- — 238 — dividuais or small groups, they could be defied by almost any organised or sizeable grouping (46). Thus the mobile populations of vagrants represented a segment of society which fell outside effective mana- gement (47). Again, the suppression of riots, as in Kendal in 1696 and in Coventry in 1705, was beyond the capacities of conventional poli- cing (48). There was therefore a token policing which appeared efficient only when the members of a community were geographically static, scattered and peaceable. The Practical Diffusion of Violence. The weakness of public agencies was accompanied by a spread of corrective violence into private or semi-private control. England became transformed into a mosaic of petty organisations which grew up around the practical possibilities of aggression and defence. Force became a matter of opportunity rather than legal right. The distribution of private violence exerted a critical influence on the shaping of crime, the recruitment of victims and the experience of immunity. It rested on the power which flowed from wealth and social organisation. Men were armed and those who commanded resour- ces could equip themselves with their own police forces (49). Houses and estates were sometimes turned into fortified units that were desi- gned to nrovide some security (50). Immuniy in some areas could simply be grasped by force or organisation. The boundaries between areas of private licence and public regulation were highly fluid during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. They were responsive to the application of vio- lence, and the private area could be enlarged by those who possessed adequate coercive power (51). Resistance enabled men to carve out regions of liberty for themselves. In part, the capacity of groups to appropriate social space rested on a shift in the nature of violence that could be offered. In the middle of the sixteenth century were the beginnings of technical innovations in arms that subverted the basis of a feudal control scheme. The statute of Winchester had established a policing orga- nisation that depended on a special distribution of the means of violence. Authority and power could be decentralised because repre- sentatives of the state and sovereign possessed military skills and equipment which were denied the rest of the population. A combi- nation of fortifications, the horse, armour and the stirrup were too formidable to be resisted by an ill-armed people fighting on foot (52). Centrifugal political tendencies can emerge when groups are radically differentiated in their ability to procure weapons and training in combat (53). Such superiority enables those charged with control work to be widely dispersed. It led to a style of devolution which — 239 — continued to underpin police methods at the beginning of the eigh teenth century Yet the spread and improvement of firearms had brought about a minor revolution in relations between state and populace. The deve- lopment of cheap, efficient and portable guns threw the prevailing balance of power out of joint. In particular, the invention of the flint-lock gave individuals a new range and a new power to inti- midate (54). First introduced in about 1635, it came into widespread use by the end of the century (55). It led to a democratisation of violence. In Europe, the apppearance of such handguns was partially responsible for the growth of standing armies under the command of a central authority. It prepared the way for an implosion of power. Those armies could be put to the work of organising domestic social control. But in England, as I have argued, the army played a much more modest part and was relatively incapable of counteracting the effects of the new distribution of violence. There arose a corres- ponding uncertainty in policing. Smugglers, poachers and footpads were more nearly equal to those charged with their suppression (56). There were, moreover, new forms of crime attendant upon the dispersal of force. Thus it is possible that the evolution of the highwayman may be attributed to the spread of light arms (57) England was fissured to form an agglomerate of largely 1ndepen- dent groupings which were capable of wielding impressive force in their own right. Their allegiance to royal and state institutions was occasionally problematic. The revolts of 1640, 1688, 1715 and 1745 illustrate how militarily and politically autonomous some significant segments could become. In 1715, for example, the outcome of the Jacobite rebellion hinged chiefly on the ability of oligarchs loyal to the Hanoverians to defeat those allied to the Pretender. One of the most critical phases of the rebellion was resolved by the capacity of the army of tenants mustered by the Farl of Sunderland to over whelm the forces of the Farl of Seaforth and the Marquis of Huntley In that encounter, they underscored the extent to which private groups could detach themselves and become the possessors of formidable power. Such groups could uphold a practical and de facto order which was only tangentially related to legally-constituted government. The state held no monopoly over the exercise of violence ‘“The power of the seventeenth century gentry was sanc- tioned by violence riding out against their enemies, ham- stringing their neighbour’s dogs, beating their farmers’ sons or shooting down their riotous labourers. They played ducks and drakes with the law when it suited them. brea- king with impunity what they were supposed to main- tain’’ (58) — 240 — When the state could guarantee neither physical security nor legal control, effective government passed in large measure over to those who were independently powerful. Political order was mediated by webs and hierarchies which developed around local centres of influence. Those networks were structured by access to the Court and by the possibilities that were afforded by command over territory and people (59). Patronage bestowed order on the otherwise rudimentary struc- tures created by a weak government and a weak system of communal control. Relations with a patron knit the client into a fluid system of power which substantially replaced formal state government. Posi- tions within that system were personally awarded and personally exploited. Offices, prerogatives and franchises became items of pro- perty that were practicallv removed from external supervision (60). Patronage, in turn, was crystallised by one of the most pervasive models of political organisation, the transformation of society into a collection of domaine managed by a small number of powerful families (61). Membership of a central family, or its contractual equivalent in the form of a connection with a patrimonial bureaucracy, defined a person’s substantial worth and privilege. It produced a population which possessed an effective immunity against the exercise of almost all legal regulation (62). Significantly, the moral status of the patron or the well-patronised could neutralise virtually every form of deviancy but treason, itself a fundamental attack on the moral basis of hierarchy. Thus, although a number of peers were tried for murder by the House of Lords between 1660 and 1702, no penalties were inflicted on them (63). Such trials may have had some limited sym- bolic effect, but it appears that they were never intended to inflict signi- ficant stigma or pain. Indeed, Hay has argued “the private manipu- lation of the law by the wealthy and powerful was in truth a ruling- class conspiracy, in the most exact meaning of the word” (64). Simi- larly, Defoe observed “the Gentry and Magistrates of the Kingdom, while they execute… Laws upon us the poor Commons, and themselves practising the same Crimes, in defiance of the Laws both of God and Man. go unpunish’d’”’ (65). The Transformation of Community and Population. Officially, the practice of shedding responsibility forced commu- nities to assume corporate liability for crime. À parish formed one of the few identifiable and permanent structures which could be admi- nistratively absorbed into the formal control system. It was required to pay indemnities to those who were robbed whilst travelling in its area, although that obligation was waived at night and on Sundays. It was also supposed to constitute itself into a collective police force, the hue and cry, and those who did not respond to a muster could be punished. Hue and cry transformed the community into a group of — 241 — vigilantes, the posse comitatus, who were expected to hunt the criminal in periods of crisis. The poverty of formal patrolling and policing was ostensibly remedied by casting the entire adult male population into the role of constable. In the eighteenth century, the hue and cry seemed to be principally successful against isolated and unarmed people who were conspicuous strangers. Îts effectiveness depended, too, on a quarry being compa- ratively incapable of travelling with any speed to a refuge which might confer anonymity. Urbanisation was tending to render the posse somewhat anachronistic. It might have countered one who fled on foot to unpopulated territory but, around London for instance, it was difficult to single him out from anyone else. John Fielding argued : “at a [great] distance from London... it would be absolutely impossible for any villain in the country to escape justice ; but near London I apprehend [the hue and cry] would lose its affect, not only from the vast variety of passengers on the road, mounted and dressed alike ; but if they should not succeed before the rogue reaches London, seeking him there, by means of the hue and cry, would be fruitless indeed”” (66). The hue and cry was not able to produce any substantial concerted activity or prolonged pursuit. It was a local response which was spatially confined because of the difficulties of movement. It was also cumbersome to organise, and the responsibility for its mobilisation seemed undefined until quite late. Before 1735, it appears that its raising was supposed to proceed almost spontaneously (67). Moreover, like the army and the militia, it did not form a skilled policing response, able to pursue regular detective or patrolling work. It pre- sented no more than a sporadic and weak restraint in those areas where crime was at all common. Partly as a ready for detective policing (68), and partly as its cause (69), social control was formally delegated to the entire population. The inhabitants of England were turned policemen on themselves. Throughout the eighteenth century, the state depended on private self-interest as its cardinal means of exerting control (70). People were methodically bribed, exhorted and coerced to transform themselves into agents of the state. The management of deviance Wwas forced to become a matter of personal enterprise. Since 1691, legislation routinely offered considerable rewards for the success- ful prosecution of certain offenses. The scope of crimes covered by such rewards was steadily enlarged until it embraced burglary, house- breaking, horse-stealing, highway robbery and the like. State rewards became systematically supplemented by other sums offered by insu- rance companies, the excise and voluntary associations. Neighbours, — 242 — friends and associates of the victim might also contribute to particular rewards. It eventually became a matter of course for the victim himself to promise a reward, often by public advertisement. So commonplace did this practice become that a failure to follow 1t could be construed as a tacit condoning of an offence (71). The business of crime control became entrepreneurial, an area to be exploi- ted for gain by small organisations devoted to thieftaking (72). Coercion was supplied by a major strategy that was designed to make deviants accessible to enforcement work. In the absence of any official procedures for accomplishing the business of detection, criminals were sealed against much formal control. For some purposes, they had to be treated as the population of a virtually independent re- gion. It is significant that the epithet ““thieves’ republic” was to become common, indicating an appreciation of the independence of deviant worlds. When they could not be adequately surveyed from without, techniques had to be deployed to make them visible. Those techniques rested on the standard diplomatic devices of subversion and disruption (73). An internal disunity was fostered to throw up information that could never have been otherwise obtained. As Winslow observed, “the greatest threat to the individual smuggler… appears to have been neither the revenue officers nor the Army and Fleet, but rather the informer” (74). People were encouraged to inform on others in order to gain their own pardon. In some cases, the statutes stipulated that the informer should not himself be in custody if he sought a par- don. In others, it was laid down in a utilitarian fashion that he must bring about the conviction of a certain number of offenders or a conviction for a crime that was more heinous than his own. Arrested suspects were Urged to turn evidence in an effort to win their freedom. Impeachment might have granted the informer a limited or major immunity against prosecution, and much legal process was designed to promote the defection of criminals. Such a systematic use of the pardon made possible the acquisition of what was tantamount to a licence to commit crime. For instance, under an Act of William and Mary, a person who was not in custody and who brought about the conviction of two or more persons guilty of highway robbery could earn a free pardon for all similar crimes which he may have committed before he had impeached his associates (75). Accomplices were enjoined to turn on one another. Thieves were set against receivers. Ît was intended to introduce a funda- mentally divisive element into criminal organisation, and that intention would seem to have been partially realised. The tactic of flourishing pardons engendered suspicion and disarray. For instance, one of the participants in a mail robbery revealed how the threat of competi- tive impeachments could undermine solidarity. That participant, Wilson, recalled how he had been shown a letter by a Post-Officer : — 243 — «Sir, I am one of the Persons who robbed the Mails, which I am surry for ; and to make Amends, PIl secure my two Companions as soon as may be : He whose Hand this shall appear to be, I hope will be entitled to the Reward and his pardon”. As soon as I read it, I knew it to be Sympson’s Letter, so that without any more Words I made a Discovery and I am of Opinion that any Man in England would have done the same. That League of Friendship which was between us was certainly dissolved by this Design against me. As for those who talk of Solemn Oaths and Protestations. I can assure them never were any such amongst us ; and if there had, no Oath is binding… »(76). The fear of impeachment often led associates to scramble amongst themselves for the privileged status of informer. One arrest could produce long chains of prosecutions. The state came to rely pro- gressively on such machinations. As Thompson observed, «in the state papers we seem to meet a society of creeps and informers » (77). Government accordingly was involved in the generation of two dis- tinct planes of regulation. On one plane, law and policing agencies tried to manufacture a moral universe whose contours and conse- quences were clear. There was a lucid dramatisation of the properties of social order. À great number of offenses were made capital. Gallows confessions, sermons, legal statutes, jurisprudence and judi- cial pronouncements emphasized the magnitude of the divide which separated the wicked from the good. The criminal and the deviant were thrust out beyond the margins of propriety, and order was ritually affirmed. On the other plane, however, everyday control practices systematically made those margins ambiguous and murky. The consequences of law were eminently negotiable. Legal penalties and inducements combined to create an equivocal, malleable and complex scheme which could be exploited by the knowing. In the case of hanging, for instance, the death sentence was attached to numerous offenses but comparatively few people were actually exe- cuted. Hall argued, « in the early part of the eighteenth century the persons, lay and official, who administered the criminal law, invented and indulged in practices which almost nullified the capital penalty in most non-clergable offenses » (78). Law was open to ample bar- gaining and collusion. Deviant populations could not be immediately controlled, and command over information conferred a power which could affect most court proceedings. Justice came to resemble a market place in which an elaborate trading economy developed. The moral and the immoral, the regulated and the regulators, came to be utterly entangled in one another. — 244 — The Possibilities of Autonomy. I have argued that policing was most irregular. It was shaped by power and influence ; it was distorted by geographical contin- gencies ; it revolved around the distribution of population ; and it made available different opportunities for negotiation and accomoda- tion. Such variable control reflected and encouraged the emergence of multiple relations with the political centre. The country’s communities and regions were presented with diverse possibilities of establishing a place within the legal and moral order. Some were wholly subordinate to the centre, some evolved modes of compromise with it, and others were relatively free of its influence. When central direction was precarious, the nature and significance of illegality were substan- tially defined by its social location. Indeed, even so small an area as London was popularly mapped out into districts which carried radically contrasting moral connotations. Rogers remarks that in The Dunciad, for example, « a topographic identity becomes a moral equivalence » (79). A number of areas were virtually autonomous of formal social control. Powerful figures and communities became detached from the centre for the purpose of undertaking criminal enterprises. Social regions could become independent on occasion because those held responsible for administering justice were themselves implicated in law-breaking. In a division of labour based on geographical segre- gation, entire communities could pursue wrecking, smuggling or poa- ching as collective projects. Just as the southern border towns of the United States are now sometimes given to wholesale participation in smuggling, so coastal towns in England had widely-ramifying commu- nal involvements in crime. Thus Romney in Kent was so taken up with smuggling that revenue offlicers were unable to safely consign those whom they had arrested to the town’s gaol. Even the mayor supported smugging. Similarly, in 1708, the magistrates of Wigtown were involved with the smugglers who attacked the revenue officers : « Robert Walpole, a J.P. of Norfolk, had smugglers call regularly at his back door at Houghton and even used an Admiralty barge to run his wine up the Thames» (81) ; and a justice of the peace led a group of smugglers who assailed the salt-officer at Conway in 1712 (82). In the instance of wrecking, too, Rule observes « it shows how strong was the local strength of tradition if such a form of criminal action could be persistently employed by the whole community » (83). As important was the preservation of urban areas which retained much of the character of the medieval sanctuaries. Some, like the liberties of the Fleet, Marshalsea and King’s Bench Prisons, were protected by statute (84). Within their bounds, prisoners could pur- chase an immunity from the enforcement of much legislation (85). — 245 — They represented rich farms to be managed by prison administrators for profit. Other areas held on to an immunity long after the formal abolition of their privileges. The sanctuaries had originally been districts which fell under a lay or ecclesiastical jurisdiction that was independent of royal control. One form was the temporary refuge offered by all churches and churchyards. Fugitives could enjoy a limited safety there if they submitted to a discipline and agreed to abjure the realm within forty days (86). Such a practice was etfec- tively banned by the middle of the sixteenth century, but another kind of sanctuary persisted in law and then in fact for several hundred years more. This more significant form, perpetual sanctuary, constituted an extreme instance of franchise (87). Its legal status was tanta- mount to that of a foreign territory, not dissimular to the contemporary embassy. Representing the domain of some powerful auhority, it fell outside the reach of royal justice. Its inhabitants « took a new oath of allegiance and obeyed a new sovereign and a new law, which could protect them against any other… » (88). The independence of the original perpetual sanctuaries was pro- gressively eroded from the fifteenth century onwards. The early legis- lation of Henry VIII was supplemented by Acts of 1604, 1606, 1623, 1693, 1722 and 1727. Yet a few of the sanctuaries survived because the state lacked the power to eradicate them all. À marriage between geographical advantage and organisational strength allowed the Mint, the Savoy, Whitefriars, St Giles and other districts to retain their autonomy. Like the rural communities of smugglers and wreckers, the thieves’ districts of London enjoyed considerable stability. As Pike remarks « Sanctuaries…. were for many generations stronger than a medieval police or ambitious law-givers. In the reign of Willliam III not only were there sanctuaries in England, but they existed in places not even mentioned in the statute of Henry VIIL.. In London and its neighbourhood they abounded » (89). The sanctuaries were spaces appropriated from central and local government. They were held by law, by tradition or by force. They concentrated populations, established styles of collective life, and set up frontiers between centrally-dominated and privately-governed space. Growing up around an area of religious or lay power, a particularly stigmatised district (such as a leper hospital or an insane asylum), or a geographically propitious region, they became organised and relatively permanent. Those sanctuaries which could not claim a direct charter were often supported in their claims by forged documents (90). Others simily formed places which were maintained against law enfor- cement agents, places that could not be easily gained or regained. In a sense, they were functionally and historically akin to the — 246 — seigneuries collectives which the gilds of Europe had attempted to found. Such collective lordships were able to act as appreciable rivals to the barony and the king. They were endowed with privileges, the right to jurisdiction, and a region which was their own. In some instances, they oflered protection to criminal fugitives (91). The Jondon gilds sometimes managed to acquire these lordships, either by open charter or by surreptitious means (92). London in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries contained a number of areas of semi-private jurisdiction. It is plausible that the latterday bastard sanctuaries of the seven- teenth and early eighteenth centuries preserved something of the nature of the districts once controlled by the seigneuries collectives. It is cer- tainly the case that English professional crime took on many of the trappings of the fraternity or mystery, that it resembled the gild in its purpose and structure. First emerging at some time in the four- teenth century (93), it revolved around a division of labour, an appren- ticeship system, patterns of mutual support, the exclusion of outsiders, and the construction of a community of colleagues (94). Cenral pro- blems and practices were celebrated in a special language which often assumed an arcane and intricate form. For instance, the business of picking pockets or engaging in confidence games was lent structure by a highly developed vocabulary which described all the salient roles and procedures of the craft (95). Such crime was typically the work of small, intimate groups who collaborated together over long stretches of time. Through apprenticeship and closure, the world of many professional criminals became stabilised and isolated. There are, for example, revealing continuities between the work styles and terminology of the sixteenth century pickpocket and his heir in contemporary England and America (96). Unwin has argued that gilds and their unofficial surrogates, the adulterine gilds, reprensented the predominant organisational style of almost all groups at the time when professional crime acquired its initial form. The gild, in turn, hinged on the fraternity : « …there can be no manner of doubt that society in the 14th and 15th centuries was literally honeycombed with fraternities in every direction… That of this great mass of social activity we should know so little is simply due to the secretive nature of the facts » (97). Secrecy was grossly enhanced when the activity that was orga- nised was itself unambiguously deviant. Yet, a priori, it seems reaso- nable to suppose that the fraternity served as a model for criminals and outlaws as well as for those following legal pursuits. In a society displaying a poverty of organisational metaphors, where the typical social unit was small and the craft monopolised occupational struc- — 247 — tures, the choices available to those managing problems of social co-operation were most restricted. Many pariah and dispossessed groups did adopt the fraternal form as a matter of course (98). For example, the highly stigmatised occupation of coal- heaving was made up of men who, when some amelioration of their conditions was propo- sed, « naturally sought to organise themselves into a fraternity, such as that of the Billingsgate porters who were ““free” of the city » (99). Indeed, the fraternity suggested a most useful pattern for any clan- destine group which affected secrecy and rested on solidarity. Contem- porary descriptions of criminal groups may simply have borrowed from readily available simile. Yet there tended to be a routine depen- dence on the language of the craft or mystery. Vagrants, vagabonds, confidence tricksters, thieves, prostitutes, and cheats were regularly portrayed as if they constituted some version of the adulterine gilds. The sanctuaries may then be regarded as the domain of de facto collective lordships which seized regions and held them. They formed natural areas governed by a specific, illegitimate segment of society. The originating charters of the sanctuaries might have proved useful to those who sought immunity (100) but, in practice, they had been superseded by claims based on force, special calling and custom. Just as there was a goldsmiths’ or a banker’ quarter in a London that was occupationally segregated into different districts, so there were a number of criminal quarters under the dominion of those who practiced illegal mysteries. One such area was described by Ward in 1709, and his account strongly conveys an impression of the sheer density of the deviant populations of certain districts « We steer’d our course up Salisbury-court where every two or three steps we met some Old Figure or another, that look’d as if the Devil had Rob’d em of their Natural Beau- ty…. Theft, Whoredom, Homicide and Blasphemy, peep’d out at the very Windows of their Soul; Lying Perjury, Fraud, Impudence, and Misery, were the only Graces of their Countenance… AIl this part, quite up to the Square, is a Corporation of Whores, Coiners, Highway-Men, Pick- Pockets, and House-Breakers ; who, like Bats and Owls, Sculk in Obscure Holes by Day-Light, but Wander in the Night in Search of Opportunities wherein to Exercise their Villainy » (101). Indeed, despite its relatively small size, London was most hete- rogeneous (102). The localism and decentralisation of the country were reflected in microscosm in its capital city. London was divided up into diverse areas which were highly distinctive. Its growth had been so rapid and ill-planned that its various parts lacked cohesion and organisation. Districts and villages had been absorbed and fused to become a collection of areas without a recognisable centre. The disparities — 248 — between the parts were reinforced by the absence of a network of roads providing ready access from one area to another. What roads there were tended to be badly maintained and often dangerous (103), and it was physically difficult to move about the metropolis. Such hindrances were further aggravated by the proliferation of “dangerous districts”” and unpatrolled spaces into which it was thought perilous to wander (104). Travel at night was especially hazardous because of the until, narrow and pitted nature of the streets. People usually lived in or near their workplace, grouped together with others who followed a similar trade (105). Most areas were thus relatively homogeneous : distinguished by a separate mode of occupation ; following a district timetable ; differentiated from one ano- ther by the wealth of their inhabitants ; and forming largely self-contai- ned words which emphasized particular styles of life. The populations of neighbouring distritces were often kept apart by a great social distance. London constituted a mosaic of discrete and bounded areas. Addison remarked, for example « When I consider this great city in its several quarters and divisions, 1 look upon it as an aggregate of various nations, distinguished from each other by their respective customs and interests… In short, the inhabitants of St Jame*s, not- withstanding they live under the same laws, and speak the same language, are a distinct people from those of Cheap- side, who are likewise removed from those of the Temple on the one side, and those of Smithfield on the other, by several climates and degrees in their ways of thinking and conversing together » (106). The congregations of criminals in the bastard sanctuaries did not only reflect the radical diversity of London, and they were not simply an ecological counterpart of the areas in which weavers or chandlers gathered. They also represented the internal marches of the city (107). The policing, administration and jurisdiction of London were splintered and stratified in an extraordinarily complex fashion. The various parts that came to form the greater metropolis retained most of their original institutions of control, and the resulting whole contained abundant anomalies and conflicts. London was governed by a number of distinct and autonomous authorities who «had little to do with each other and, as far as they were concerned, ruled separate kingdoms » (108). Burgesses’ courts, manorial courts, magis- trates courts, the courts of the City Companies, sheriffs’ courts and aldermanic courts vied with one another. Separate police agencies patrolled their several districts and precincts. Beadles, javelin men, constables, watchmen, sheriffs’ officers, the train bands, City Marshals, magistrates’ assitants an King’s Messengers attempted to impose some order, but their work was not co-ordinated. It lacked central direc- — 249 — tion or even a precise demarcation of task. Different organisations maintained their own goals and prisons, and Defoe observed « there are in London…. more public and private prisons, and houses of confinement, than any city in Europe, perhaps as many as in all the capital cities put together » (109). The city was thus carved up into a welter of sectors of control. The principal administrative regions fell under the Cities of London and Westminster and the counties of Surrey and Middlesex. Within these regions there was a mass of individual districts. Political and geographical areas did not necessarily coincide, and the divisions often appeared most arbitrary. The areas themselves were frequently characterised by jurisdictional uncertainty, particularly at their boun- daries. Indeed, Rude states that Westminster’s government was « for many years a jungle of rival jurisdictions » (110). Between and within such regions there were abundant zones that were marked by ambiguity. On the frontiers between different jurisdictions were to be discovered places that were not clearly regu- lated by any single authority or by any authority at all. « The activities of constable and watchman were for the most part limited to his own parish, precinct or liberty, and where the authorities of city and county marched there was every opportunity for the development of little Alsatias (111) 112)». Bastard sanctuaries were threaded along these borders. St Giles’s for example, was officially sited in neither Westminster nor the City but abutted on both (113). The strength of the sanctuaries was even further supported by their internal design (114). Since 1580, there had been a series of attempts to prevent the physical growth of London. Coupled with restrictions aimed at controlling the spread of plague, these proscrip- tions made it illegal to erect buildings on new foundations. For about a century, any construction work had to take place covertly in areas that were already built up. New buildings became ever more dense because a substantial proportion of the rapidly increa- sing population were denied work in the City of London. Since few were freemen, they were debarred from pursuing trades there. More and more buildings were consequently piled into a belt fringing on the City’s liberties. Effective authority to restrain development was at its weakest in that inerstitial zone, the zone which formed the ring of debatable jurisdictions. Building regulations were systematically evaded by making new structures as unobtrusive as possible. Areas that conferred invisibility on construction were fully exploited. Behind walls and at a distance from public space, courts and yards were built up, alleys were narrowed, cellars extended and garrets put to use. There thus arose a great maze of intricate passages and huddled buildings that were compressed into the interstices of official power. One area was actually named the « Caribee Islands» because of its topographical complexity. Deteriorated and adapted by the begin- ning of the eighteenth century, those mazes proved almost impossible for enforcement agents to penetrate (115). Ecology, stigma, organisation and custom conspired together to preserve the sanctuaries. Some of their last legal privileges were lost in 1727, but they continued as if no law had been passed. For ins- tance, mid-nineteenth century descriptions of the Mint and St Giles’s reveal little change in the areas (116). Thus Binney discussed the Mint of the late 1840s as «a well-known harbour of low-characters, [containing] knots of thieves at the corners of the different streets » (117), and Beames remarked « rookeries still survive by their very isolation, by their retention of past anomalies » (118). The Mediations of Power. The criminal areas of the country and town are examples of struc- tures which defied direct formal control. Their regulation had often to be mediated and tortuous, involving processes of suborning and the brokerage of power. Attempts to impose order were sometimes more redolent of conciliation and diplomatic manoeuvre than straightfor- ward command. Those attempts illustrate how criminality was nego- tiated rather than awarded, entailing a practical recognition of poli- tical necessity. Internally, English society was arranged into a series of groupings which enjoyed vastly discrepant privileges. The least powerful were in no position to barter for the significance of their actions or their selves. They were the objects of an uncomplicated repression, gover- ning their movement employment and behaviour. The meanings of that group were defined by a particular vision of the social order. It was a vision infused with organic imagery, an imagery which depicted the state as a corporate being with distinct outlines and an inner differentiation of unlike parts. The social organism excluded many. It was constituted by groups which performed fixed and indentifi- able functions. Those groups represented the only authentic compo- nents of society, the only members entitled to recognition as the morally substantial : « the freeholder on the land and the freeman in the town were, each in his own sphere, the accredited elements in a society, in comparison with which other men appeared, not as rival classes, but as adjuncts or excrescences, or even social dangers » (119). Indeed, in an organic language, the politically marginal were a disordering agent akin to disease, parasite or pathology. Much of the writing on crime alluded to the emergence of epidemics and disorders which plagued the body politic. The outsider was not a natural feature of social organisation. Thus Nourse condemned the hiring of an excessive number of servants, arguing “tho”they seem the best Juice to themselves, whilst the genuine Parts languish — 251 — to be a Part of the Body, and to add to the Bulk, [they] do in Truth sucit the best Juice to themselves, whilst the genuine Parts languish and decay » (120). Groups lying outside the approved contours of society were not awarded the same worth as those firmly embedded within them. They were taken to be less than fully human, a qualitatively different breed of men who required special treatment. AIl their actions were necessarily tinged with their twin qualities of dangerousness and deva- lued social status. When regulation rested on the maintenance of an uncertain correspondence between private interest and a special concep- tion of the corporate good, those without a manifest commitment to the political order were alien and threatening. Às strangers, they did not merit the same concern as those who were secure. The signi- ficance of what they did and who they were was thus quite different from that of the morally-grounded population. Large segments of that penumbral group were expected to be hanged as a matter of course. The wandering and the rootless, the gipsy and the unpro- pertied, the follower of a disreputable trade were assumed to be preordained for execution (121). It was the offender, not the offence, which fixed the meaning of law-breaking «the privileged might often commit great crimes with impunity ; for petty offences the unprivileged were hanged » (122). By contrast, some groupings not only served as the principal dispensers of justice but were themselves too powerful to be wholly exposed to it. The holders of wealth and authority were able to trans- late their activities into areas free of almost all interference. Indeed, «liberty» was defined as the right to an independence of external control. Those who enjoyed such liberty occupied a place which neutra- lised many of the more conventional connotations of their acts. Peers could do murder with considerable impunity, and Ogg states that their trials in the House of Lords « usually had an element of farce » (123). À systematic resort to patronage afforded some groups the opportu- nity to acquire an unofficial licence to break the law. Highwaymen, for example, were at one time heavily recruited from the ranks of the powerful (124), and they were buttressed by protective associations which reduced their chances of being executed. Although pardon did not mechanically follow conviction, and many highwaymen were hanged, a substantial measure of immunity could be achieved by such men (125). That shaping of invulnerability and freedom was also to be discovered in the formal organisation of the state. Offices in a patri- monial bureaucracy were generally held to be proper sources of pri- vate profit. Those who secured posts as governors, prison adminis- trators, city marshals, government ministers and the like were led to treat their positions as something like personal property (126). Many — 252 — offices were purchased, sometimes in competitive auction. The expenses that were laid out had to be offset by the money that could be earned by the otlicial (127). Offices in agencies of social control were almost invariably bought, and their incumbents were tacitly allowed to reim- burse themselves by means of bribery and extortion (128). When some scandal occured, the business of officia! extortion was usually defined as tolerable providing certain implicit limits had been respected. Thus the Earl of Macclesfield, whilst Lord Chancellor, was found guilty of embezzling some £100,000 of chancery funds. He defended himself by asserting that such appropriations had « long been practiced without blame » ; was fined £30,000 ; and received a promise from the king that the fine would be repaid to him from the privy purse (129). The powerful were therefore occasionally encouraged to describe criminality as a normal and largely uncontrolled feature of their work. Offices reprensented protected areas of law-breaking even within the confines of law-enforcing bodies. Legitimate concentrations of power accordingly constituted struc- tures which were granted an impressive autonomy. They deflected most regulation. Concentrations of illegitimate power also presented obstacles to regulation. They had a political consequence in their own terrain which sometimes rivalled that oËf government. They could be managed either by subversion or by co-optation. That policy of co-optation, in turn, conferred some stability and de facto legitimacy on areas of criminal enterprise. An orderly institutionalisation and incor- poration of criminal sectors was one strategy of a weak government, and it rendered the very meaning of criminality uncertain. Piracy offers an important illustration of that form of translation of legality. Until the end of the eighteenth century, the seas around Britain were never completely controlled by the navy. Although the volume of piracy fluctuated, the state was rarely able to suppress it (130). Acts might have been passed to order its elimination, but there was no policing agency to implement them fully. Instead, the state was sometimes constrained to recruit pirates themselves to patrol the seas (131). Pirates were co-opted to serve as privateers or, indeed, as adjuncts to the navy during wartime. In this fashion, the management of piracy turned as much on bribery and alliance as on simple conflict. Pirates could not be easily suppressed because they were the major possessors of force. Possessing the means of violence, they were useful as priva- teers ; they could be supported by foreign states ; or they could take virtual command over territoriess a command which bestowed a tenuous legality on their activities. Madagascar and the West Indies formed such bases at one time. The governors of the American colonies, too, were quite frequently prepared to grant letters of marque to pirates. It appears that they were tacitly supposed to supplement their incomes with the profits of raids. Piracy was often an entrepreneurial — 253 — exercise funded by the wealthy and the powerful. Some expeditions even gained royal patronage. The seas were thus politically and le- gally ambiguous areas which were open to complicated processes of compromise and exploitation. The status of pirates was quite indefinite « In international affairs… the distinction between enemy and criminal is a nice one…[the difference between pirate and privateer] relates more to power and to claims to legitimacy than to the actual activities of the pirates or their protectors » (132). Those with influence in the criminal regions were sometimes of too great a moment to be treated with any stance but deference, a deference which might be generalised. One highwayman, for example, was able to become Attorney-general (133). Pirates could be knighted (134). Indeed, there was some mobility between the legal and illegal centres of power. Just as pirates might become respectable, so the respectable could turn pirate or highwayman. There was an occasional equivalence of authority and command which eased a transition in the ambiguous area of the independently powerful. There were real structural affinities between the organisations which incorporated legi- timate and illegitimate enterprises. Officers in patrimonial bureau- cracy were prone to profiteering, blurring the moral character of their undertaking. Members of criminal corporations sometimes turned to apparently benevolent activity, blurring the immorality of their pro- jects. Viewed naively, the difference between the acts of a City Marshal like Charles Hitchen and a receiver and theiftaker like Jonathan Wild is very slight. Both people were able to accuse the other of criminality and corruption. FEach claimed a public usefulness for his own role. Whilst Hitchen was dismissed for corrupt practices and then reins- tated, Wild believed himself entitled to petition for the honour of the freedom of the City of London. It was perhaps only a nominal distinc- tion which fixed what and who were criminal. Indeed, Wild was to serve as a symbolic archetype for satires on Hanoverian government, the affinities being emphasized in criticisms of Walpole and his minis- ters (135). Wild became Walpole and Walpole Wild. As Thompson , argued : « …an examination of the practices of the administration in these years reveals the same use of informers and evidences, employment of blood-money, the same casual sacrifice of colleagues who had outlived their utility, and a similar parasitism upon the public.…. The ”subculture“ of the Ha- noverian Whig and the ’subculture“ of Jonathan Wild were mirror-images of one another » (136). On a more modest scale, the contingencies of social control forced the state to recruit the deviant as its own agent. Diffusely, — 254 — such recruitment took the guise of the specific and temporary contracts which marked the employment of the reward and pardon system. Accused men became temporary instruments of government. More particularly, that tendency to recruitment led official institutions to hire pirates as pirate-catchers, smugglers as revenue-officers (137), thieves as thieftakers and poachers as game-keepers. In France, one of the most celebrated of all policeman, Vidocq, was himself rescued from the world of deviants and sent back to control it (138). Few but those personally schooled in deviant practices were able to aquire the expertise of a competent enforcement agent. Such men, in turn, often played equivocal roles, acting as the middlemen of crime (139). Serving as factors, they mediated the operation of law. They defined the immunities and vulnerabilities of criminal and allegedly criminal populations. The most significant development of that role of middleman was realised in the eighteenth century thieftaker. Thieftakers were not original to that time, but they came to a special prominence in the economy of rewards and pardons created by the state (140). Thief- takers could not borrow from any body of knowledge or practice produced by formal agencies of control. Theirs could also be a dange- rous undertaking because it lacked effective support in a situation where violence was common. Since it was not eased by any consi- derable exchange of information and aid, it became practised by those who merged imperceptly with the world which they were sup- posed to regulate. It became the special province of those who exercised some initial command in that world. Those who were best positioned structurally were the receivers, and receivers either became thieftakers or were displaced by them (141). The thieftaker-receiver existed on the interface between the reputable and the disreputable. He was armed with the ability to impeach the older receiver and to control competi- tion.He had some capacity to restrict the potential treachery of clients and informers. Further, his domination of routine policing enabled him to work outside official scrutiny. Enjoying a practical immunity. which was strengthened by the collusive aid of official enforcement agents, he could retain his organisational integrity at a time when other groups were in some disarray. He held one another major advantage. Because he was one of the few people who were properly and professionally engaged in trafficking between criminals and noncri- minals, he was provided with a useful front. His dealings could be explained as part of a legitimate calling. His clients were dependent on him, but it was not necessarily a reciprocal dependence. Receivers have often informed, but their clients tend to protect them (142). The thieftakers relied on an intimate acquaintance with deviance and, because their stake in it was principally financial, they often husbanded and encouraged crime in order to develop a flow of useful — 255 — and manageable cases (143). Thus Mandeville alluded to the « Damage the Public sustains from the Trade that is drove by the Thiefcatchers, and the various ways now in vogue of compounding Felonies, by which the Safety as well as Maintenance of Thieves and Pilferers are indus- triously taken care of, and the Laws that enforce prosecution alto- gether eluded ». Thieftakers might support thieves, afford them protec- tion and ensure their immunity. In many instances, they monopolised police work and enjoyed total discretion over the selection of those who would be arraigned. Howson has remarked that the manipulation of rewards and pardons gave thieftakers « virtual power of life and death over thieves » (145). They appeared to engage in the business of whole- sale crime farming, carefully reaping profits from cultivated areas of rule-breaking. Their mediating role led to elaborate patterns of co- optation, collusion and conflict. As herdsmen of deviance, they culled as well as protected, delivering to the courts people who were refrac- tory or strangers within their territories. They tended to penalise those who were incapable of offering much resistance or retaliation when arrested. There was thus a major process of discrimination against the marginal, the novice, and the unorganised, the main structures of criminal activity being largely unaffected providing they submitted to a new discipline (146). Despite their predatory and conser- vative role, they constituted the only active agency of control which was able to superintend the behaviour of criminals. They were the real predecessors of the contemporary police, being employed as a necessary albeit unfortunate model for the founding of the Bow Street Runners (147). The principal thieftaker of the eighteenth century, Jonathan Wild, established an almost total monopoly over theif-catching, recei- ving and thieving in southern England (148). His subordinates stole on commission, and surrendered what they had taken to Wild who then returned the goods to their erstwhile owners. As a major broker in stolen goods, Wild was able to ascertain what thefts had taken place and was armed with material to control his dependants. He employed his power as thieftaker to suppress rivals and to maintain an internal discipline. His organisation was consequently a political accomplishment, a significant instance of the brokerage of crime and power. He described himself as a « factor », journeying between diffe- rent worlds (149). His command over criminal worlds represented an imperium in imperio, an accumulation of power which required at least temporary acknowledgement by the state. At his trial, Wild protested « I have brought many bold and daring malefactors to just punishment, even at the hazard of my own life… I have done merit. because at the time the things were done, they were esteemed meri- torious by the government… » (150). Similarly, Hall observed « during Wild’s career as a thieftaker he was rendering valuable services to the police for which he received the usual reward from these officials, a — 256 — compensation still paid to criminals. He was not prosecuted, and he was permitted to operate » (151). Wild managed to acquire the status of expert and consultant on matters of crime control. His advice was sought by the Privy Council in 1720 (152), and there were rumours of his assuming a clandestine role for the state (153). Callin- himself « Thieftaker-General of Britain and Ireland », he surrounded himself with the trappings of authority. In short, Wild came near to assuming an official place as policeman and broker : « [Govenments] not only receive and accept of Informations of the worst of Crimes, from the worst of Criminals, and take Knowledge of the Offence from the Offenders them- selves, but encourage such Criminals to come in and confess the Offence, and Discover their Accomplices, Promising as well Pardon for the Crimes, as a Reward for the Disco- very, even to those who are Guilty. Now this willingess of the Government to detect Thieves, seem’d to be a kind of authority, for Jonathan in his vigorous persuit of those he thought fit to have Punish’d... » (154). It was that authority, recognised by magistrates and the govern- ment (155), which lent force to the argument that criminality was negotiable and fluid. What distinguished Wild’s organisation in the first decades of the eighteenth century was also to characterise the Sicilian mafiosi (156) : the capacity to serve as an acknowledged and necessary intermediary between weak comunity and weak government. That capacity was sufficient to ensure, however briefly, the assumption of political stature and immune status. Conclusion. I have argued in a somewhat simplistic fäshion that legal domi- nation in the late 1600s and early 1700s was uncertain. À forced communal self-sufficiency and relatively uninfluential enforcement agencies combined to permit the emergence of much variation in the subordination of different groups. Some groups were allowed to attain a comparative autonomy and were shieldeld against formal social control. In turn, those who were in effective command over those groups were able to negotiate the character of criminality and crimi- nals. At its extreme, such variation had the consequence of confusing the borders between morality and immorality, between legality and illegality : « Such were the blessings of that state ; Their crimes conspird to make them great : And virtue, who from politics Has learn’d a thousand cunning tricks, — 257 — Was, by their happy influence. Made friends with vice And ever since, Fhe worst of all the multitude Did something for the common good » (157). Paul Rock 258 REFERENCES ] Radical criminologists have been urging a return to what are basically eighteenth century forms policing. It seems useful to examine some of the implications of such a system in its original guise. For one instance of that radical plea, see Young (J.), « Working Class Criminology », IN Taylor (I.) and al. (eds,) ; Critical Criminology, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975, [2 I have tried to defend such an approach in « Some Problems of Interpre- tative Historiography ». British Journal of Sociology, 1976, September Quoted in Ogg (D.), England in the Reigns of James II and William III, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1955, p. 30. C. f. Parkes (J.), Travel in England in the Seventeenth Century, London, Oxford Universiy Press, 1925, p. 1. Ibid.. pp. 18-20. Rogers (P.), introduction to Defoe (D.), ÀA Tour Through the Whole Island of Great Britain, Harmandsworth, Penguin, 1971, p. 24. C. f. Rogers (P.), Grub Street, London, Methuen, 1972, p. 4. Rogers (P.), introduction to Defoe (D.), ÀA Tour Through the Whole Island of Great Britain, op. cit, p. 24. C. f. Laslett (P.), The World We Have Lost, London, Methuen, 1965, pp. 19, 66. 10 10. C. f. Parkes (J.), Travel in England in the Seventeenth Century, op cit… p. 283. 11 C. f. Scott (J.), Comparative Political Corruption, New Jersey, Prentice- Hall 1972, p. 38. 12 Ogg (D.), England in the Reigns of James II and William III, op. cit., p. 122. 13 C. f. Zirker, Fielding’s Social Pamphlets, Berkeley, University of Cali- fornia Press, 1966, p. 17. 14 C f Beloff (M.), Public Order and Popular Disturbances, London, Oxford University Press, 1938, pp, 22-23. 15 Thompson (E.), « The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteeenth Century », Past and Present, 1971, February, N° 50, pp. 120-121 16 C. f. Andreski (S.), Military Orgañization and Society, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954, p. 79. 17 C. f. Pringle (P.), Honest Thieves, London, Robert Hale, 1938, p, 35. 18 C. f. Beloff (M.), Public Order and Popular Disturbances, op. cit, p. 23 19 C. f. Clark (G.) Sir. The Later Stuarts, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1955, p. 259. 20 Hammond (J.) and Hammond (B.), « Proverty, Crime and Philosophy » IN Turberville (A.) (ed.), Johnson’s England, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1933, p. 301. 21 C. f. Knapp (A.) and Baldwing (W.), The New Newgate Calendar, London, J. Robins, 1824, Vol. I, p. 226. — 259 — 22 Quoted in Pringle (P.), Hue and Cry, London, Museum Press, 1955, p. 52. 23 C. f. Howson (G.), Thief-Taker General, London, Hutchinson, 1970, p. 25. 24 Fortescue (J.) Sir, « The Army » IN Turberville (A.) (ed.), Johnson’s En- gland, op. cit., pp. 69-70, 25 C. f. Hill (C.), The Century of Revolution, Edinburgh, Thomas Nelson, 1961, p. 15. 26 C.f. Fortescue (J.) Sir, « The Army », op. cit.… p. 68. 27 Ibid., p. 68. 28 C. f. Western (J.), The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965, p. 3. 29 C. f. Barnett (C.), Britain and her Army, London. Allen Lane, 1970, pp. 107-110. 30 Ibid., p. 107. 31 C. f. Thompson (E.), « The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century », op. cit., p. 121 32 C. f. Winslow (C.), « Sussex Smugglers» (« Hay (D.) and al. (eds), Albion’s Fatal Tree : Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England, London, Allen Lane, 1975, p. 144. 33 Thompson (E.), « The Moral Economv of the English Crowd in the Fighteenth Century », op. cit… p 121 34 C. f. Clark (G.) Sir, The Later Stuarts, op. cit, p. 259. 35 C. f. Plumb, (J.), The Growth of Political Stability in England, London, Macmillan, 1967, p. 20. 36 C. f. Western (J.), The English Militia in the Eighteenth Century, op. cit., p. 27. 37 Ibid, pp. 72-73. 38 Ibid, p. 72. 39 C. f. Clark (G.) Sir, The Later Stuarts, op. cit., p. 259. 40 De laune T ), The Present State of London, London, George Larkin, 1 681, p. 2 ‘ 8. 41 C. f. Ogg (D.), England in the Reign of Charles II, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1934,, Vol. 2, p. 493. 42 C. f. Pike (L.), A History of Crime in England, Londoﬁ, Smith Elder and Co., 1876, Vol. II, p. 369. 43 C. f. Radzinowiez (L.), A History of the English Criminal Law and its Administration, London, Stevens and Sons, 1956, Vol. II, p. 27. Shaw (J.), Paris Law, London, Lintot, 1753, p. 344. 45 C. f. Beloff (M.), Public Order and Popular Disturbances, op. cit, p. 26. C. f. Parkes (J.), Travel in England in the Seventeenth Century, op. cit… p. 45. 47 Ibid., p. 152. 48 C. f. Beloff (M.), Public Order and Popular Disturbances, op. cit, p. 24. — 260 — 49 C. f. Ibid…, p. 133. 50 C. f. Howson (G.), Thief-Taker General, op. cit, p. 4. 51 C. f. Winslow (C.), « Sussex Smugglers », op. cit, p. 128. 52 C. f. White (L.), Medieval Technology and Social Change, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 38. 53 C. f. Andreski (S.), Military Organization and Society, op. cit., p. 81. 54 C. f. Fuller (J.), Armament and History, London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1946, p. 99. 5s Ibid. 5 C. f. Thompson (E.), Whigs and Hunters : The Origins of the Black Act, London, Allen Lane, 1975, p. 64. S/ C. f, Pringle (P.), Stand and Deliver, London, Museum Press, 1951, p. 63. 58 Plumb (J.), The Growth of Political Stability in England, op. cit., p. 21. 59 C. f. Scott (J.), Comparative Political Corruption, op. cit., p. 40. 60 C. f. Swart (K.), Sale of offices in the seventeenth Century, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1949. 61 C. f. Laslett (P.), The World We Have Lost, op. cit, p. 19. 62 C. f. Hay (D.), « Property, Authority and the Criminal Law», IN Hay (D.) and al. (eds.), Albion’s Fatal Tree, op, cit. 63 C. f. Ogg (D.), England in the Reigns of James II and William III, op. cit., p. 107. 64 Hay (D.), « Property, Authority and the Criminal Law», op. cit., p. 52. 65 Defoe (D.), The Poor Man’s Plea, London, No named publisher, 1968, pp./-8. 66 Fielding (J.), A Plan for Preventing Robberies Within Twenty Miles of London, London, A. Millar, 1755, pp. 22-23. 67 C. f. 8 Geo. ” — c. 16, s. 11, 1735. 68 C. f. Pringle (P.), Hue and Cry, op. cit.,, p. 48. 69 C. f. Holdsworth (W.) Sir, A History of English Law, London, Methuen, 1938, Vol. XI, p. 585. 70 C. f. Radzinowiez (L.), À History of the English Criminal Law and its Administration; op. cit, Vol. 2, p. 33. n Ibid. 12 C. f. Howson (G.), Thief-Taker General, op. cit.… for an excellent account of thieftaking. 73 For a more recent example, see Marx (G.), « Thoughts on a Neglected Category of Social Movement Participant : The Agent Provocateur and the Informant », IN Halleck (S.) and al. (eds), The Aldine Crime and Justice Annual 1974, Chicago, Aldine, 1975. See also the report in The New York Times, 1975, 2nd, April. — 261 — 74 Winslow (C.), « Sussex Smugglers », op. cit.… p 144 75 4 W. and M,, c. B, s. 7. 76 Wilson (R.), ÀA full and Impartial Account of all the Robberies Committed by John Hawkins, George Sympson… and their Companion… by Ralph Wilson, late one of their Confederates, London, J, Peele, 1722, p. 24. T7 Thompson (E.), « The Crime of Anonymity », IN Hay (D.) and al. (eds.), Albion’s Fatal Tree, op. cit, p. 272. 78 Hall (J.), Theft, Law and Society, Boston, Little Brown, 1935, p. 87. 79 Rogers (P.), Grub Street, op. cit.… p. 12. 80 C. f. Pringle (P.), Honest Thieves, op. cit., p. 18. 81 C f. Plumb (J.), The Growth of Political Stability in England, op. cit., p. 21 82 Beloff (M.), Public Order and Popular Disturbances, op. cit, p. 95. 83 Rule (F.), « Wrecking and Coastal Plunder ». IN Hay (D.) and al. (eds.), Albion’s Fatal Tree, op, cit., p. 186. 84 C. f. Defoe (D.), A Tour through the Whole Island… op. cit… p. 295 85 C. f. Rock (P.), Making People Pay, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973, Ch. 12. 86 C. f. Jusserand (J.) English Wayfaring Life in the Middle Ages, London, T. Fischer Unwin, n° date, p. 165. 87 C. f. Ogg (D.), England in the Reigns of James II and William III, op. cit. p. 66. 88 Thornley (I[.), « The Destruction of Sanctuary », IN Seton-Watson (R.) (ed.), Tudor Studies, London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1924, p. 184. 89 Pike (L.), A History of Crime in England, op. cit., p. 253. 90 C, f. Thornley (I.), « The Destruction of Sanctuary », op. cit, p. 202. 91 In the case of the Sicilian gilds, see Hess (H.), Mafia and Mafiosi, Hants. Saxon House, 1973, p. 17. 92 C. f. Unwin (G.), The Gilds and Companies of London, London, Frank Cass, 1908, p. 42. 93 C. f. Judges (A.), The Elizabethan Underwood, London, George Rout- ledge and Sons, 1930, xxvi1. 94 See Sutherland’s standard definition of professional crime : Sutherland (E.), The Professional Thief, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956. 95 C. f. Maurer (D.), Whiz Mob, New Haven, College and University Press, 1964, and Maurer (D.), The Big Con, New York, Signet, 1962. 96 C, f. Maurer (D.), Whiz Mob, op. cit., p. 5S2. 97 Unwin (G.), The Gilds and Companies of London, op. cit., p. 98. 98 C. f. Thompson (E.), Whigs and Hunters, op. cit., p. 81. 99 Ogg (D.), England in the Reigns of James II and William III, op. cit, p. 84, (emphasis added). — 262 — 100 Thus, the inhabitants of the Mint in London continued to claim their privileges in 1708. C. f. Thornbury (W.), Old and New London, London, Cassell, Petter and Galpin, undated, Vol. VI, p. 61. 101 Ward (E.), The London-Spy, London, J. How, 1709, pp. 155. 156. 102 C. f, George (M.), « London and the life of the town », IN Turberville (A.) (ed.), Johnson’s England, op. cit, p. 163. 103 C. f. Ward (E.), The London-Spy, op. cit., p. 151. 104 C, f. George (M.), London Life in the Eighteenth Century, London , Kegan Paul, Trubner and Co., 1925, p. 68. 105 C. f. Laslett (P.), The World We have Lost, op. cit, p. 14. 106 Quoted in George (M.), « London and the Life of the Town », op. cit. p. 163. 107 C. f. Weir (W.), «St. Gile’s, Past and Present », IN Knight (C.) (ed.), London, London Bohn, 1851, Vol. ITI, p. 262. 108 Howson (G.), Thief-Taker General, op. cit., p. 22. 109 Defoe (D.). A Tour through the Whole Island…., op. cit, p. 321. 110 Rude (G.), Hanoverian London, London, Secker and Warburg, 1971,p. 128. 111 “Alsatia” was named after the disputed frontier region between France and Germany, itself being a disputed territory. 112 George (M.), London Life in the Eighteenth Century, op. cit… p. 82. 113 C. f. Weir (W.), « St. Gile’s Past and Present », op. cit., p. 262. 114 C. f. Lyons (F.), Jonathan Wild : Prince of Robbers, London, Michael Joseph, 1936, pp. 101-102. 115 C. f. Fielding (H.), An enquiry into the Causes of the Late Increase of Robbers, London, 1751. 116 C. f. Tobias (J.), « À Statistical Study of a Nineteenth-Century Criminal Area », IN Halleck (S.), and al. (eds.), Aldine Crime and Justice Annual 1974, op. cit. 117 Binney, (J.), « Thieves and Swindlers », IN Mayhew (H.), London Labour and the London Poor, London, Griffin, Bohn and Co, 1862, Vol. IV, p. 301 118 Beames (T.), The Rookeries of London, London, Thomas Bosworth, 1850, p. 41. 119 Ogg (D.), England in the Reigns of James II and William III, op. cit.… pp. 56-57. 120 Nourse (T.), Campania Foelix, London, Bennet, 1700, p. 17. 121 C. f. Ogg (D.), England in the Reigns of James II and William III, op. cit., p. 102. 122 Ibid, p. 57. 123 Ibid., p. 107. 124 . C. f. Pringle (P.), Stand and Deliver, op. cit, p. 28. — 263 — 125 C. f. Parkes (J.), Travel in England in the Seventeenth Century, op. cit PP 162-164 126 C. f. Swart (K.), Sale of Offices in the Seventeenth Century, op. cit 127 C. f. Plumb (IJ.), The Growth 0f Political Stab1hty in England, op. cit.… p. 7T. 128 C. f. Howson (G.), Thief-Taker General, op. c1t p. 28. 129 C. f. Pringle (P.), Hue and Cry, op. cit, p. 46 130 C. f. Pringle (P.), Jolly Roger, London, Museum Press, 1953, passim 131 C. f. ibid., p. 47 132 McIntosh (M.), The organisation of Crime, London, MacMillan, 1975, p. 19 133 C. f. Pringle (P.), Stand and Deliver, op. cit., p. 25 134 C. f. Pringle (P.), Jolly Roger, op. cit p. 47 135 C. f. Irwin (W.), The Making of Jonathan Wild, New York, Columbia Un1versüy Press, 1941, p. 3. 136 Thompson (E.), Whigs and Hunters, op. cit., p. 218 137 C. f. Pringle (P.), Honest Thieves, op. cit p. 71 138 C. f. Stead (P.), Vidocq : A Biography, London, Staples Press, 1953 139 This was, indeed, part of a larger efflorescence of middlemen discussed by Thompson (E.), « The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the EFighteenth Century » op. cit and Westerfield (R.), Middlemen in En- glish Business Transactions of the Connécticut Academy of Arts and Sciences, New Haven, Yale University, Press, 1915 140 For a description of an earlier, Elizabethan thieftaker, c. f. Hutton (L.) The Black Dogge of Newgate, London, G. Simson and W. White, 1596 141 C. f. Howson (G.), Thief-Taker General, op. cit.… pp. 37-38 142 For more recent examples, c. f. Mack (J.), The Crime Industry, Hants, Saxon House, 1975, esp. pp. 126-127. 143 C. f. Marx (G.), « Thoughts on a Neglected Category of Social Movement Participant », op. cit. 144 Mandeville (B.), An Enquiry inio the Causes of the Frequent Executions at Tyburn, London, J. Roberts, 1725, part of unnumbered preface 145 Howson (G.), Thief-Taker General, op. cit., p. 37 146 C. f. Pringle (P.), Hue and Cry, op. cit p. 36 14/ C. f. Pringle (P.), Ibid,, p. 35 148 C. f. Howson (G.), Thief-Taker General, op. cit, p. 5 149 C. f. Lyons (F.), Jonathan Wild, op. cit 150 Quoted in Hayward (A.), Lives of the Most Remarkable Criminals London, George Routledge and Son, 1927, p. 266 151 Hall (J.), Theft, Law and Society, op. cit p. 136 — 264 — 152 . C. f. Howson (G.), Thief-Taker General, op. cit., p 125 153 . C. f. Benson (L.), The Book of Remarkable Trials and Notorious Characters, London, Reeves and Turner, undated, p. 89. This charge is also put in a most fanciful form bv Ainsworth (W. H.), Jack Sheppard, London, Richard Bentlev, 1839. 154 Defoe (D.), The True and Genuine Account of the Life and Actions of the Late Jonathan Wild, London, John Applebee, 1725, p. 17. 155 C. f. Smith (A.), Memoirs of the Life and Times of the Famous Jonathan Wild, London, Sam, Briscoe, 1726, p. x. 156 C. f. Ianni (F.), A Family Business, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972, p. 40. 157 Mandeville (B.), The Fable of the Bees, New York Capricorn, 1962, p. 31. — 265 — Potentialities of social process regulations for crime prevention V. K. ZVIRBUL Federol institute for the study of couses and the elaboration of crime prevention measures Moscow, U.S.S.R. l Fach separate crime is an act of conscious will. The absence of the conscious will element deprives an objective socially dangerous action of its criminal character. That is why the socially dangerous actions of children under a certain age or persons who suffer from mental disorders and are not able to judge their actions or direct them, are not considered crimes. The conscious will element which is present in any crime creates a basis for individual prophylaxis. The prophylaxis can vary. It may include the restraining influence of punish- ment, the timely suppression of crime by social control, or educative oral measures, directed towards building up a system of attitudes and habits conducive to compliance with the legal norms in a given situation, etc. The effectiveness of individual treatment depends on the degree of our knowledge of an individual’s criminal behaviour mechanism ; the crime motives, the personality of an offender and the process moulding the latter. In general, this problem of individual prophylaxis is fairly well solved in modern criminology. The problem of the possibility to regulate (consciously) social processes with a view towards crime prevention, meaning by crime a mass phenomenon — a committing of various crimes by a great number of people — wants greater atten- tion. The conscious will elements of an isolated crime «are lost » in crime as a mass social phenomenon. Here we deal with a sponta- neous process. And this particularly presents the greatest difficulty in finding an optimal variant of the crime-combatting regulation. 2. Some research by Soviet authors may be of interest in this respect. If we try to select the principal features characterizing Soviet criminology — we see the intensification of studies of the impact of the social processes on crime in general with the object of raising the effectiveness of crime prevention. From the point of view of the social needs, the following items constitute the principal foundation. For the last fifty years, the crime — 267 — index in the USSR has experienced a 3.5 reduction for in only the afterpost-war period it was reduced twice (130). The official attitude and the dominating theoretical concepts in the USSR consider crime prevention the main strategy in combatting this phenomenon (131). At the present stage of the development of our society, we believe that criminal punishment is a necessary, though not the principle, but an auxiliary aspect of crime-combatting. Even more, the very essence of criminal punishment is undergoing certain changes by acqui- ring more and more characteristics of the educational prophylactic type. The alterations in the criminal legislation that took place in February 1977 might serve as an illustration of this. These changes have narrowed the sphere of application of criminal punishment invol- ving deprivation of liberty and widened the scope for the application of conditional punishment allowing correction and reform of persons who have committed crimes. They changed the regime of punishment for minor crimes in the same direction. Crime-combatting is being studied from the point of view of the impact on it of the economic system of social control, social structure, education, culture, law, etc. We approach the research of crime functioning from two aspects : one, crime as a part of the general system developing under the pre- conditions of the general development of human society, the socio- economic system social order ; two, crime as a separate, possessing its own rules, exposing themselves in their interactions with other social phenomena and the system a sa whole. Historically, we consider crime as a dangerous breach of the rules governing the normal functioning of a human society. In our opinion, conflict between an individual and the society creates the grounds for such a breach. The conflict may spring from an indivi- dualistic psychology which arose with the appearance of private pro- perty and exploitation of one man by another. V. I. Lenin wrote in his book « State and Revolution » « … We know that the radical social cause of the excesses consisting in breaches of the social norms is the exploitation of the masses, their wants and misery. With the elimination of this main cause, the excesses will inevitably begin to «die off! We do not know how fast and within what circums- tances ; but we know that they will die off » (132). Lenin’s thesis has been further developed in the CPSU Program, stating the « the growth of the material provision, the cultural level (130) Sociolisticheskaya zakonnost, 1977, N 3, p. 3. (131) Criminology, M 1976 pp. 137-143. (132) LENIN (V.I.), cw. V.33, p. 91. -— 268 — and the consciousness of the working people creates all the condi- tions for the eradication of criminality, and in the end, for the repla- cement of measures of criminal punishment by measures of social influence and education (133). Another methodological premise with which we agree stipulates that the causes of crime are distributed to different degrees in all the main spheres of human society and their elimination must always be of a complex nature and be accomplished by coordinated measures of an economic, social. educational. cultural, organizational and legal nature. At the same time, we reject the incorrect and simplified idea that the relation between crime and social life is direct and immediate. In reality, there is an intermediate phase between the social processes and crime and that is social psychology. The objective social processes and phenomena infiuence crime by means of the alteration of views, habits, norms, standards of behaviour, that is, by means of the psychology of the different strata of the population. In order to make a prognosis of the possible behaviour of people, we should know the mechanisms of the development of their social psychology, customs, traditions. habits, motives, norms and standards of behaviour and learn their regular development under the influence of the processes taking place in the society. And our last methodological premise stipulates that crime-combat- ting should be organized in compliance with the regularities of the social processes in the corresponding socio-economic system, the corresponding social order. 3. One of the principal rules of socialism — that of a planned and proportional development of the social production in general in order to achieve the complete welfare and overall development of the mem- bers of society — offers opportunities for the elimination of both sponta- neous and arbitrary actions in the economic structure, the liquidation of negative social and ideological consequences, resulting from an economy based on private property, and thus pre-determines an objective trend towards the coincidence of the interests of society, state, communities and individuals. The changes in the social structure are taking place on the basis of the integrity of the economic, socio-political and ideological aims, common concern for all friendly classes and groups of working people in the process of establishing communism, and contributing to the overcoming of the contradictions between personal and social interests. (133) The Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Nora- lisation, M. 1970. p. 106. — 269 — The growth of democracy leads to the widening of the political and social freedoms and their guarantees, at the same time increasing personal responsibility to the society for individual acts, and by this, strengthening the legislation and legal order. Thus it creates conditions favourable for settling the various conflicts between the individual and the society. The spiritual culture of socialism is apparent in its trend towards contributing to the development of the abilities and skills of the Soviet people, influencing thus the process of moulding a versatile and har- monic personality, whose wants, purposes, orientations and interests are integrated naturally with those of humanity. So, the dominating rules of socialism, with their correct know- ledge and use, create an opportunity for the people to be taught a spirit of good-will, industry, and fulfilment of their duties. The raising of the living standard, cultural level and consciousness of people leads inevitably to a social situation where the contradictions between personal and social interests will disappear. However, in real life, the growing process is not a simple but a complex one. This explains why the finding of an optimal solution to crime prevention means overcoming a series of difficulties. It is well known that social development is the result of multiple factors, including some which go counter to the positive process of crime-combatting. Suffice it to say that planned and proportional development does not function in isolation, but interaction whith the society’s values. Possible violation of the optimal equilibrum between them may development 1s the result of multiple factors, including some which go bring about negative consequences — development of a conservative psychology resulting in the reduction of the social activity of the citizens. This is why premeditated prevention of the negative actions supposes that crime-combatting must be planned with consideration for both the principal pre-conditions of human development, the social order, and their interactions, and must consider the peculia- rities of the psychology of different strata of the population. People’s consciousness, social by nature, is the product of the interactions of different factors. It reflects several elements 1) general — the socialist order ; 2) specific — national ties (collectives, etc.) which may both conform to the nature of the socialist order, or oppose it in some cases ; 3) individual — family — neighbourhood impact, orientations of ”informal groups“ which appear as a result of personal relations, etc., which also may both correspond with or go counter to the nature of socialism. — 270 — The perequisite for consciousness development consists in the subordination of the specific and individual factors to the general ones. But this process is not a direct dependence, but an objective trend. This trend leads to a situation where the great majority of the Soviet people acquire a socialist attitude towards the interests of the society, state, collectives, citizens. The main and typical feature is that different interests of the Soviet people are formed as a result of the homogeneity of their main interests and, as V. G. Afanasiev quite justly has written : under socialism ““purposes of the individuals in their’’essence coincide with the common goal, and so the latter does not dominate them as a blind, alien force, but assumes the role a pre-determined result, as an achieved (134). However, under the impact of certain conditions, the above-mentioned correlation may become unbalanced, and for some individuals the special and individual factors may become determinant. And if these factors contain negative elements, they may result, for such individuals, in egoism, contrary to the ideas, needs and interests of society. Considering the fact that the causes of crime in socialist society are stricted by the dominating regulations, the definition of the degree of impact on the mechanism of interaction with the causes acquires a growing significance. The knowledge of the pecularities of this me- chanism of interaction between causes and conditions at a given stage of development of our society creates theoretical prerequisites for the elaboration of a scientifically grounded system of regulating the process of crime prevention. Elimination of the contributing condi- tions, and the organization of crime-combatting on scientific grounds, obstructs and in some cases stops completely the influence of the causes. By conditions contributing to influence the causes of crime, we understand contradictions resulting from the drawbacks in managing the economy, culture, educative work, etc. In the sociological and juridical literature, the conditions are often called subjective causes, meaning that their elimination depends on the people’s will. It seems, however, that the term “conditions” meaning a set of circumtances where the cause and the consequence interact, would be better. Since one type of conditions may help the action of causes, others may obstruct or again stop such an action. The mechanism of the interaction between causes and conditions is not sufficiently studied as yet. However, in criminology conditions contributing most intensively to the causes of crime are indicated. The elimination of such conditions therefore brings about greater efficiency in the crime prevention system. Socialism presupposes the (134) AFANASIEV (V.G.), Scientific Regulation of Society, M., 1973, p 119.. — 271 — duty to work and receipt of payment only according to the work done. Any deviation from this principle leads inevitably to the resto- ration of the views and habits typical of societies based on the system of private property. But there still exist cases where income is derived, not from socially useful labour, but from illegal sources. The amount of payment must be defined by the quantity and qua- lity (qualification) of the labour. Nonobservance of the above requi- rement leads to the breaking of the balance between the interests of an individual and a collective, and sometimes even the State. So the absence of a material incentive may affect the labour discipline negatively, while unjustified gaps between salaries may become a source of carcerism. The dominating trend under socialism — growth of the produc- tivity of labour, general raising of the living standard, levelling of unjustified differences in the salaries, make it possible to more and more fully overcome these contradictions. However, the contradictions between an individual and a society may sharpen as a consequence of incorrect economic methods, drawbacks in the planning and orga- nization of production, violations in the balance of accumulation and consumption, lagging behind of agriculture and the consumer goods industry. A programme principle of the CPSU, expressing the communist orientation, reads : ““All is for the sake of a man, all is for the benefit of a man”. The violation of that principle is the bureaucracy of some officials. An inattentive, formal attitude towards the working people’s requests, the solution of their problems, consideration of their propositions and claims, may often create a false image of the superio- rity of socialism in satisfying their material and spiritual demands and may inspire a conflict between an individual and the society. Faulty organization of the economic system produces its impact on the crimes against socialist property, leads to breaches of trust. Over 40 per cent of the stealing of state and socialist property is accomplished under conditions of an absence of control and poor attitudes towards material values. The analysis of 150 cases of theft has shown that crimes committed were fostered by poor economic organization, inadequate auditing (57 cases), deficiencies in the operating control of the organization (34) ; improper stafË selection (31) ; poor inventorying (16) ; inadequate accounting of goods and funds (21), absence of control in the banks and other financial bodies (4). Deficiencies in the establishing of the norms of expenses of raw materials may create conditions for the expropriations of the unregis- tered extras, in the control over the construction work for the expro- triation of money and construction materials, in the trade — for the customer’s fraud, bribery, speculation. — 272 — Taking into consideration the fact that the socialist way of life is dominant in forming the people’s attitudes, we often forget about the role of the negative factors taking place in the individual’s life and educational milieu. Meanwhile these very factors, if they lead to disagreement with the nature of the socialist order, socialist morals, are the source of law-breaking. Among them a) a deficient personality training in the family ; b) faulty education in the school ; C) negative aspects of the way of life and environment ; d) deficiencies in educational work in production, (and educational collectives). The impact of the above-mentioned conditions is especially evident in juvenile delinquency — an indication of the deficiencies of education in the family, school, labour collectives, social organizations. Insufficient attention is paid in the ideological work to the direct influencing of the feelings and will power of a person, the forming of his habits. Many years ago M. I. Kalinin referred to “collectiveness as a normal habit of the people the “‘introduction of social ways into life, work creating conditions under which the collectivity shall constitute an inseparable part of our habits behaviour norms, so that the actions would not only be premeditated, conscious, but also instinctive and organic”” (135). The forming of communist living habits 1s the key to compatibility of thought and action. Alteration of this compatibility between the rational and the emotional causes contradictions between the ideas and actual habits of certain people. This aspect is reflected in crimes against the person and public order. The process of habit- forming is closely connected with the forming of new traditions and customs, providing for the increasing immunity of every Soviet person against unfavourable situations which may arise. There still exists a gap between economic organization and educa- tion. Often managers of enterprisss and organization do not take measures against law breaking, do not apply for the right educational measures which are available. Considering that about # of those who committed crimes worked in offices and enterprises, one may see that the educative problem must be recognized an urgent one. À labour collective is the nucleus in socialist society where a person is formed. The movement for “communist labour and way of life, for enter- prises without breaking of order may serve as an example. Case (135) KALININ (MI.). On Communist Education, M., 1948. — 273 — study findings show that hardly any worker or employer participating in this movement committed crimes. For several years now, workers and employees of 250 industrial enterprises of the Dnieprope- trovsk region, participating in the movement, have not committed a single crime. Crime shows a reaction to the deficiencies in the work of a) the Ministry of the Interior and Procurature bodies dealing with the prevention of illegal actions and crimes ; b) the agencies engaged in preliminary investigation, crime detection and prevention ; c) the judiciary bodies which deal with the effectiveness of penal measures and take steps for the elimination of the circums- tances contributing to the commission of crimes ; d) the corrective-labour institutions in the reforming and correction of the convicts, etc. One should especially underline the need for the elimination of all deficiencies in the prevention of recedivism. Persons who were released from places of confinement and who maintained their criminal orientation, actively influence the forming of antisocial atti- tudes and habits in those who are close to them, and involve unable persons in criminal activities. While organizing practical work in accordance with the requi- rements of social regulations, and considering the regular interaction of the crime causes with the conditions for its realization, it is possible to create an effective system of special regulation of the social processes aiming at reducing this social phenomenon. The metho- dological basis for the establishment of such a system is the fact that the functioning of the principal rules of socialism restricts and, in the end, eradicates the occurrence of crime causes, and objective possi- bilities exist for the elimination of the conditions unleashing the causes of crime for the creation of an environment which blocks the occurrence of these causes. The scientific regulation of all social processes includes the process of reducing offences, which in turn consists of different proce- dures. These are the planning of social changes, the influencing of ideas, traditions, of the whole system of education, of the legal regulation of public relations, of the activities of state organs and social organization directed to combatting crime. Fach type of regu- lation differs from another by the scope of its tasks and specific methods of its influence on consciousness, feelings and thus human behaviour. The study of the coordination of different types of regulation and their methods for crime prevention composes one of the large sections of Soviet criminology. — 274 — The regulation of socialist society is not limited by the economy, but includes an oriented regulation of the main spheres of public life. Under socialism, production is geared to the material and cul- tural wants of the masses. That is why economic planning has its social goals. The plans contain the indices of development in the non-economic spheres science, education, medical care, social assis- tance, etc. Social planning is the adoption and application of measures, creating conditions for the most complete realization of the deve- lopment of socialist living and socialist consciousness. The social process’ prognosis, and that of the educational process in particular, is accomplished by means of an analysis of the level achieved and settled trends, a forecast of their development and an elaboration of measures aiming at the chosen goals. It is obvious that none of the social programmes can embrace and predict the actual process. Any activity, and especially that of the forming of consciousness, habits of people, their relations to one another, is subject to the influence of unexpected circumstances, certain innovations. With the shortage of experience of planning in this sphere, there is insufficient study of many problems. Bearing in mind the nature of these social processes, one should determine in the prognosis the level of the realization of certain trends, but not concrete data. Planning is important in socialist society and is based on an objective rule-planned and proportionate development. At the same time, it should be noted that this regularity as such does not provide for a harmonious development without some disproportions, does not eliminate a spontaneous element. The regularity as such only creates the possibility of such a development ; however, in order to transform this possibility into reality it is necessary to study this regularity, expose its action mechanism, and learn how to use it skill- fully in the regulation of society. A transition to scientifically based social process planning requires the preliminary solution of some problems. The first and most impor- tant is the problem of collecting and processing the data on the existing social processes. This requires the establishment of a perfect account system for the most important social factors, including amoral acts, since their dynamics is one of the most important indices of the effectiveness of educational work. There is a need for better demography statistics, considering all the complexities of population movements and changes in a country. Às a basis for planning, we should make a precise sociological analysis of the existing public relations and their interactions, the apparent and measured trends of development and their dependency on concret social conditions. — 275 — It seems that social planning is a neccessary part of all the activity directed to the regulation of socialist society on different levels : of the USSR as a whole, Union Republics and all administrative territorial units, labour and educational collectives. 4. Crime-combatting, in the broad sense, is a necessary part of the regulation of the social processes. At the same time, the process of crime reduction has its own peculiar characteristics. That is why it is expedient to choose special measures for combatting crime. First of all, there are complex initiatives by the Party and the State agencies, ministries, establishments and public organizations directed to the elimination of conditions contributing to crime. The final goal of such initiatives is to eliminate the circumstances, which, permeating the surroundings, cause discrepancies in the general trend of the consciousness-forming of the Soviet people ; they (the circumstances) may contribute to the appearance and strengthening of attitudes and habits counter to the law and create a conflict situation that may bring about the commission of socially dangerous actions. The next group includes the initiatives resulting from the cri- minological analysis of crime. Such an analysis should give answers to the following questions what type of crimes are most widely spread, what are their causes, what does the crime geography look like, etc. The initiatives worked out on the basis of such an analysis are aimed at the coordination of purpose in the crime-combatting activities of the Ministry of the Interior. Investigation, courts, procu- ratura, and other state and public bodies. The plans of social activities should constitute a foundation for the working out of prospective plans for the state bodies dealing directly with crime-combatting. The determining of the main direction for crime-combatting allows the planning of educational work in the labour and educational collectives. In the crime-combatting plans we should consider the economic development and correspondingly stipulate crime prevention activities for the developing industrial districts and large construction-sites. 5. An important element in the settling of human behaviour is law consciousness. Law consciousness, as it is well-known, consists of three elements a knowledge of the law, an attitude toward its principles and norms, habits of legal behaviour. Studies of the problem have shown no substantial difference in the level of know- ledge of the law between offenders and law abiding persons. Diffe- rences may arise in the attitude towards law abidance in a concrete situation. This difference amounts to 40 per cent (136). (136) KUDRIAVTEV (V.N.), “Crime-combatting and tasks of criminolo- gical science”. Issues on research of crime and crime-combatting, M., 1975, p. 13. — 276 — Bearing in mind the above circumstances, we included the law as an important part of the general mechanism of human behaviour regulation. Via its impact on the will and consciousness of people by means of juridical norms and responsibilities, actively influences the forming and development of people’s behaviour motives, inspiring them, in some cases, to abstain from certain actions, or vice versa, obliging them to participate actively in others. Socio-legal research sees the elaboration of such an academic problem as an increase in the social effectiveness of the law. The law effectiveness criteria at this stage of social development are evaluated by the extent to which the law may bring individual interests in conformity with public needs and secure an optimal variant for the behaviour of the members of society. 6. Labour and way of life are the spheres that directly form the individual personality, his ideology, habits, norms of behaviour. The regular development of socialism under the conditions of the technical revolution is manifested by the growth of the ratio of highly skilled specialists within the social structure. This regularity defines the changing character of the social structure, the tempo of education growth, the improvement of professional qualifications, in- fluences the forming of socio-cultural demands and finally — through socio-psychological mechanism — determines the trend towards the reduction of law-breaking. But this given regularity exists only as an objective possibility and the degree of its coming to life is connected to a great extent with its realization in the concrete plans of economic and social development. Research accomplished at the Federal Institute of Study of Causes and Elaboration of Measures for Crime Preven- tion, shows that the crime level is much higher among unskilled people. This situation may be explained by the fact that many of such persons consume a great deal of alcohol and, consequently, commit socially dangerous acts. À bettering of labour conditions, a raising of labour qualifications, and a creative potential promotes general culture and thus contributes to crime prevention. By improving conditions in the main areas of people’s lives, we consciously form the characteristic features of a new man and fight against his antipodes. Bringing to life the humanistic idea, the decisions of the XXV Party Congress stipulate the ““bettering of socio-economic and produc- tive conditions of labour, the strengthening of its creative character, reducing, by all means, manual labour” (137). (137) Materials of XXV CPSU Congress, M. 1976, p. 215. — 277 — The Congress has worked out a complex of measures directed toward the improvement of the conditions of labour and its protec- tion, an improvement of technology and equipment providing the secu- rity of labour, and has outlined programmes for the material and moral stimulation of labour (138). Another important sphere of personality-forming is the people’s way of living. In the recent past we had some cases of imbalance between economic and socio-cultural measures, which caused certain negative manifestations in large constructions areas. Broad socio-cul- tural programmes are being elaborated now for the solution of the problem. These programmes naturally combine solutions to economic, social and spiritual problems (139). One should note that family and informal group conflicts often turn into law-breaking. Half of the crime victims of crimes committed among families and informal groups. That is why the improvement of living conditions also has a criminological aspect. The decisions of the XXV CPSU Congress are oriented to a substantial improvement of the living conditions of the Soviet people. The Congress stipulates : “the growth of population income, the raising of the level and improvement of the consumption structure, the comple- te satisfaction of the demands for consumer goods ; large-scale housing construction and improvement of the quality of the houses is one of the main directions for the further improvement of the living conditions of the people ; broadening of types of services, and enlarging their capacity connected with the easing of housework and aflfording more for the Soviet people. The raising of the educational and socio- cultural level of the people, improvement of medical care, protection of environment, bettering of the conditions for mother and child, educa- tion of children and prolongation of life-span ; further bringing to- gether of welfare and culture levels, labour conditions and ways of living of different groups of the Soviet society, both residents of urban and rural districts’’ (140). Planning allows the coordination of the initiatives of socio-eco- nomic, ideological and legal character. It helps to organize rationally the forces for crime-combatting, provides for a differential approach for prevention activities, taking into consideration the areas with different levels of law breaking, different social groups, etc. Planning is simultaneously an organizational form of eflfective coordination (138) Ibid., p. 215-223. (139) Ibid., p. 223-224. (140) Ibid., p. 215-216. — 278 — ot the crime-combatting agencies, and the strengthening of their contact with social organizations and labour collectives (141). Thus the social processes regulation directed to increase the effectiveness of the preventive impact on crime comprises planning of the economic, social, educative, organizational and legal measures for the eradication of the causes of crime, teaching the collectivist psychology, comradeship, mutual help, improvement of the legal regu- lation of the social processes, the activities of the state bodies directly charged with crime-combatting. ÀA historical approach, in our opinion, 1s the most adequate for a deeper knowledge of the nature of crime and is capable of presenting a solution to the problem of achieving the most effective crime prevention. vs cu> (141) As justly says AFANASIEV (G.A.), due to planning, we provide for a proportional development of all crime-combatting organs and services. See. Criminology, “Juridical Literature”, 1976, p. 60. — 279 — ACHEVÉ D'IMPRIMER SUR LES PRESSES DE L’'IMPRIMERIE ADMINISTRATIVE DE MELUN 576-78